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Programming
Guidance**

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JOINT PROGRAMMING GUIDANCE:

Supporting EU Delegations to *work better together* with Member States, like-minded partners and country stakeholders

European External Action Service

DG International Cooperation and Development, European Commission

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Background and Context

Background and Context

The new European Consensus on Development¹ signed on 8 June 2017 sets out a common approach to development policy for the European Union's institutions and Member States. It signals a new era of closer and more coordinated approach to our work with partner countries.

In the new Consensus, the European Union (EU) and its Member States commit to respond jointly to global challenges and to support partner countries in their progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda. Joint Programming and joint implementation both remain essential in this endeavour.

The new European Consensus on Development:

- 73. In response to global challenges, the EU and its Member States will further improve the way they deliver their cooperation, including by working together better, taking account of their respective comparative advantages. This includes improving effectiveness and impact through greater coordination and coherence, by applying the development effectiveness principles and by delivering development cooperation as one part of the overall internal and external action to promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. To be more effective in pursuing its objectives, and consistent with the primary aim of eradicating poverty, the EU's development policy should be adaptable and responsive to changing needs, crises and priorities.
- 74. The EU and its Member States will coordinate and develop common positions in international fora on matters related to development policy. This will enhance the EU's and Member States' collective influence and will contribute to more effective multilateral discussions.
- 75. At country level, the EU and its Member States will enhance Joint Programming in development cooperation to increase their collective impact by bringing together their resources and capacities. Joint Programming should be promoted and strengthened, while being kept voluntary, flexible, inclusive, and tailored to the country context, and allow for the replacement of EU and Member States' programming documents with EU Joint Programming documents. Partner country engagement, appropriation and ownership are essential for this process. Joint Programming should be led by the partner country's development strategy and aligned to the partner country's development priorities. The EU and its Member States will work together to develop strategic responses grounded in shared knowledge, added value, lessons learnt and joint analysis of the country context, including poverty and sustainability, and the country's overall relations with the EU. In doing so, they will take account of available means for development financing, in line with the AAAA. The EU and its Member States will also pursue enhanced coordination and synergies in fragile and conflict-affected countries, including through Joint Programming processes and joint conflict analysis. This will also contribute to the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.
- 76. The increased use of EU joint responses derived from Joint EU Programming can ensure greater impact and visibility for the EU and its Member States on the ground. This approach will help pool resources, reduce fragmentation and boost effectiveness. Joint monitoring and results frameworks will be core elements of the joint response to maintain momentum, inform dialogue and enhance mutual accountability. Joint Programming should be open to other relevant donors and international actors when this is assessed to be relevant at country level by EU Delegations and Member States' Embassies and field offices.
- 77. The EU and its Member States will also seek to support partner countries through joint implementation whenever appropriate. Joint implementation is a way of promoting more coherent, effective and coordinated EU support based on shared objectives in selected sectors or on specific cross-sectoral specific themes tailored to the country contexts. Joint implementation will be grounded in joint analyses, will take account of available resources and will be monitored and evaluated jointly. Joint implementation can take place at national, regional or global level and can be linked to other areas of external action as appropriate.

1 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/new-european-consensus-development-our-world-our-dignity-our-future_en

In May 2016, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions on 'Stepping up Joint Programming'² as part of an ongoing effort to increase the impact of EU development and neighbourhood policy³. This is something that the EU Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy⁴ calls for as well. These Council conclusions point out that in "pursuing Joint Programming the EU and its Member States collectively contribute to implementing the policy commitments made at global and EU level" and ask for Joint Programming to expand its focus in conflict-affected and fragile contexts and in low- and middle-income countries.

In addition, Joint Programming can heighten the impact of cross-cutting policies in key areas, such as human rights, gender equality, good governance and civil society. Joint Programming Documents should evolve to include strategic issues such as migration, climate change, fragility, security and democracy.

An independent evaluation report on Joint Programming published in April 2017⁵ found it to be very valuable and worth pursuing, but also in need of improvement. The report highlighted that Joint Programming's role is not only as a policy tool to tackle development effectiveness issues⁶ (see Annex 10), but also increasingly as a leverage tool for better policy and political dialogues and greater clout with the partner country. One of its recommendations is to update the Joint Programming Guidance Pack⁷ for EU Delegations and Member States Embassies, field offices and implementing agencies supporting Joint Programming in partner countries.

Based on experiences observed in the field, various approaches to the Joint Programming process have emerged. These can be assessed, combined, adapted and improved in line with local circumstances and ambitions. Joint Programming is a locally driven process and the scope and expectations of participating development partners (EU, Member States, like-minded partners) can vary from country to country. Also, the scope of the process will depend on the enabling conditions in the partner countries, and on the extent to which participating development partners are willing to engage.

Monitoring various practices in the field will enable us to make subtle changes to the Joint Programming process and building our common understanding of 'working better together' with EU Member States and like-minded partners, as mandated by the new European Consensus on Development.

This Joint Programming Guidance, therefore, builds on the existing 2015 Joint Programming Guidance Pack bringing updated experiences and practices together within a single document. The guidance is presented as a number of possible actions and a range of options for EU Delegations, since Joint Programming has to be tailored to the country context. As a result, it is not prescriptive and allows colleagues working at country level to innovate and adopt pragmatic practices that fit that context.

In each section of the Guidance, you will find:

- (i) a brief introduction;
- (ii) a range of possible activities to help structure work at country level;
- (iii) examples from other countries to help provide inspiration for country-level solutions;

2 <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8831-2016-INIT/en/pdf>

3 The new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) calls for a more coherent effort by the EU and the Member States. See https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/overview_en

4 "The Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy" -<https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union>

5 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-eu-joint-programming-process-development-cooperation-2011-2015_en

6 See the Declaration of 'The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation' <http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/busanpartnership.htm>

7 <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming/minisite/eu-joint-programming-guidance-pack-2015>

- (iv) links to relevant annexes;
- (v) a short overview of the role of HQ.

Please note that all sections may be used separately and may therefore overlap in places. They should not be read or interpreted sequentially.

If you have any questions, please contact the relevant helpdesk or functional mailboxes:

JOINT-PROGRAMMING-SUPPORT@eeas.europa.eu

DEVCO-Joint-Programming-Support@ec.europa.eu ; NEAR-JOINT-PROGRAMMING@ec.europa.eu

You may also want to consult the Joint Programming Group homepage and the Joint Programming tracker:

<https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming/>

<https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/jptracker> [to be launched by mid-2018]

1. What is Joint Programming? A quick guide

What is Joint Programming?

- Joint Programming is the **joint planning of development cooperation⁸ and external action⁹** by EU development/external action partners working in a partner country. It is a voluntary, flexible and tailored process designed and driven by these European partners
- Non-EU development partners** who subscribe to the principles of Joint Programming are welcome to join the process, as like-minded partners, provided the EU and Member States on the ground assess them as relevant.
- Joint Programming includes a joint analysis of the country situation, followed by a joint response setting out how participating partners will provide support and measure progress. These are set out in a **Joint Programming document¹⁰**. Joint results frameworks are developed as part of the joint response to monitor the Joint Programming process, to further inform dialogue with national stakeholders on the impact of our collective EU assistance and to enhance mutual accountability.
- A **Joint Programming Document should set out priorities** for support, indicate expected results and give the indicative level of funding, broken down by priority. In principle, it should respond to the partner country's national development plan¹¹. It should also indicate the division of labour between the EU, the Member States, other European donors, and other non-Union donors across chosen priorities for support. The EU's participation, as set out in the Joint Programming Document, must adhere to the legal requirements in the respective regulations¹². Joint Programming Documents tend to evolve towards including common approaches and delivering joint messages on strategic and sensitive policy issues¹³.
- Ideally, the timing/timeframe of the Joint Programming Document should be **synchronised** with the timing of the partner country's national planning cycle, so that participating development partners can plan at the same time and for the same period as the government. This allows to be more responsive to national priorities and to tailor the Joint Programming document to the country context. Many Joint Programming Documents find that a gradual and pragmatic approach to synchronisation allows the process to move forward in line with the country planning cycle.
- The Joint Programming Document is developed at the **partner country level** by the EU (EU Delegation and other EU institutions' field offices), the Member States (including their relevant development institutions) and other non-Union donors. **The EU Delegation usually plays a coordinating role** in the Joint Programming process. The Joint Programming Document is prepared in close cooperation with a wide range of stakeholders such as the government/national authorities, parliament, regional organisations, civil society and the private sector.

8 Bilateral government-to-government development cooperation and if possible regional and thematic funds.

9 Article 21(2) of the Lisbon Treaty under Chapter 1 - General provisions on the Union's external action states that the Union's external action aims to (a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders; (d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; (e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; (f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development; (g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and (h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance

10 See EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 29 November - 1 December 2011) - Council conclusions https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf

11 In the context of the European Neighbourhood Instrument, Joint Programming Documents are also guided by jointly agreed documents such as updated Association Agendas, Partnership Priorities and other equivalent documents (agreed by the EU, the Member States and the partner countries during association/cooperation council meetings).

12 Please see Annex 9.

13 <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/private-joint-programming/documents/analysis-heads-mission-reports-joint-programming-2016>

- Each participating partner in the Joint Programming process may decide:
 - Either to **replace its existing bilateral/regional programming documents** with the Joint Programming Document; or
 - To **retain those documents** as their contribution to the Joint Programming Document.

In both cases, the participating partners approve the Joint Programming Document, as a framework for their individual contributions.

- **Joint implementation** modalities often (although not exclusively) derive from a Joint Programming process and as such are the best way to provide coherent, effective and coordinated support to specific sectors/priorities in the Joint Programming Document. Joint implementation may cover both financial and non-financial modalities.

Why is Joint Programming a good idea?

- **Joint Programming can make „Europe a reality on the ground”**, with shared European values and policies on issues such as fundamental rights and good governance translated into coherent, targeted action in partner countries.
- With participating partners planning together, there is less aid fragmentation; individual partners can focus on the sectors where they can add the most value, safe in the knowledge that the Joint Programming Document has all priority needs covered. This **improves alignment** with national development plans and reduces **gaps** and **overlaps** in collective action.
- There should be **less pressure** on each participating partner to tackle all of the sectors and issues in a given country that are in need of attention. Instead, they can now credibly demonstrate that they are part and parcel of a coherent Joint Programming Document which, through a division of labour, ensures that all relevant sectors and issues are being covered.
- Joint Programming may lower **transaction costs** for partner country governments/national authorities as they have only one country analysis/response strategy to manage for all participating partners. **Predictability** and **transparency** also increase as EU partners plan together, setting out what overall objectives and sectors they are going to support with indicative financial envelopes in a single document.
- Planning together over the same time period can also help identify opportunities for **joint implementation** on the ground, with possible subsequent savings through economies of scale and reduced overhead costs. We can deliver more **value for money** and greater impact as EU partners combine their resources.
- EU partners can show **greater coherence** vis-à-vis partner country governments/national authorities and other stakeholders, as they work together and speak with a common voice, backed by a single European strategy with a funding envelope.
- There should be more **visibility** for EU partners as a whole in the partner country, with a single European brand outlined in the Joint Programming Document. Besides this, partners can expect visibility both from their involvement in the Joint Programming process and from the actions they are implementing/supporting.

2. Feasibility or Scoping Exercise for Joint Programming

The goal of a **feasibility** or **scoping exercise/study** is to decide whether or not to engage in Joint Programming or not in a particular partner country. It is useful to identify entry points for Joint Programming and assess the extent of consensus amongst partners on what is to be achieved and why – in other words, the ‘added-value’ of Joint Programming in the given circumstances. This is a crucial step to gauge the ambition of participating development partners in a specific partner country context, as the European partners drive Joint Programming at country level.

Identifying advocates of Joint Programming e.g. among EU ambassadors, within government/national authorities and among participating development partners is crucial. Not only does it increase local ownership and ‘divide up the workload’ for sustaining the process; it also helps alleviate fears that the process will not be locally driven. Reaching out to Member States and other like-minded partners to gauge their desire to take part in Joint Programming is advisable. A joint assessment of the existing development effectiveness mechanism/coordination platforms and the added value that Joint Programming can offer may be a good starting point in pinpointing gaps and opportunities.

The feasibility/scoping exercise should manage expectations on the particular elements that Joint Programming entails and provide a realistic timeframe to prepare the Joint Programming Document. Reflecting on the experiences of other partner countries that have successfully implemented a Joint Programming process can be helpful at this early stage. Typically, developing a Joint Programming Document takes similar amount of time as developing bilateral strategies – around one and a half to two years. The process of Joint Programming can also start targeting synchronisation with domestic processes over time through a pragmatic and gradual approach drawing on the options below.

To achieve synchronisation with a given country’s national plan, development partners may consider extending or shortening their current planning cycles, so that they align with the upcoming cycle. Alternatively, they may consider undertaking a review (ad hoc or mid-term) to coincide with the start of the next national plan, allowing them to re-align their support at this point. Some existing Joint Programming Documents take a gradual and pragmatic approach to synchronisation recognising that changes may take place over time. This is especially useful when European partners cannot immediately synchronise their programming cycle (bilateral programming plans) with the national development plan and/or pragmatically prefer to target a later date for better synchronisation or coordination.

A proper feasibility/scoping exercise should also plan scenarios that provide for unexpected events and delays that might arise from political cycles/transition, humanitarian crises, or staff rotations within the delegations, development partners’ offices and governments.

The exercise should also seek to acknowledge and anticipate the transaction costs¹⁴ for Joint Programming in the specific country context (i.e. in-country human resources etc.) and may be of use in identifying options to help mitigate some of these costs and identifying the anticipated positive returns for participants of a future Joint Programming process.

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The Joint Programming evaluation found the contributions to improving aid effectiveness to be uneven. The results on predictability were positive, but the effects on aid fragmentation, transparency and transaction costs were limited. Nonetheless, joint programming has boosted EU aid complementarities and synergies, and in doing so has made development cooperation more effective.

- In **Tajikistan**, the scoping phase concluded with a number of pertinent recommendations that looked at how to better structure the Heads of Cooperation meetings, how to increase the communication between development counsellors and Heads of Mission (political-development links) and the type of external assistance that could usefully support the coordination process locally. The scoping phase also recommended that the EU and Member States in the country jointly prepare a short document on common principles for engagement and coordination, as well as undertaking a self-assessment of division of labour to better inform the discussion on policy lead roles within the group.
- In **Cambodia**, following a discussion on the letter from the then High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) and Commissioners in January 2012 EU Heads of Mission, mandated European development counsellors to undertake a feasibility study on Joint Programming. The study found that the Government preferred partners to synchronise their planning cycles with the National Strategic Development Plan in 2014. It also highlighted the absence of procedural barriers that would prevent EU partners to synchronise with the country programming cycle starting in 2014. The study also recommended that Switzerland be invited to join the process as like-minded partner, making an EU+ group. The study then concluded that a roadmap to develop a Joint Programming process in Cambodia should be proposed to respective Head Quarters (HQs) (through a common letter) for agreement.

The feasibility/scoping phase increases participating partners' knowledge about how to programme their resources; in turn, these insights into how participating partners operate can help build a path towards a Joint Programming Document. The 'Compendium on EU and Member States Programming Processes' is a working document¹⁵ (see Annex 6) that summarises available information on EU Member States' positions on:

- 1) whether a participating partner is ready to replace bilateral programming with Joint Programming,
- 2) EU and Member States' requirements and conditions for Joint Programming where they are to replace bilateral strategies,
- 3) the stakeholders and actors to be consulted by the Member States in their programming processes,
- 4) whether EU and Member States' programming can be synchronised to partner country development cycles, and
- 5) whether the Member States' bilateral programming documents are legally binding. These elements are useful to analyse in the feasibility and scoping work.

Activities in a scoping exercise

Before and during the scoping exercise, it is advisable to involve participating partners' HQ and field offices to ensure consistent support. Engagement with interested Development and/or Political Counsellors from EU Member States can support agreement on common interests and principles, which could form the basis for Joint Programming (see also Developing a Roadmap - key activity 2). The EU Delegation and interested Member States may also consider approaching other like-minded development partners, to form an 'EU+ group'.

A. This engagement should focus on opportunities that demonstrate added value and added development/ external action impact for the EU/European group of partners as 'a whole'. Possible activities might include:

- getting Member State buy-in and understanding their aspirations on Joint Programming through interviews with interested Heads of Cooperation from EU Member States and their Head of Implementing Agencies and/or circulating a questionnaire focusing on key questions, opportunities and challenges (see also Developing a Roadmap — key activity 4);
- interviewing interested ambassadors/political officers/trade counsellors from EU Member States to understand their aspirations for Joint Programming and the challenges they anticipate. The scoping work might also identify at which key stages political actors would wish to become more involved in the Joint Programming process;

¹⁵ The Compendium represents Member States' views on Joint Programming based on a survey conducted in 2016. As such, it does not have legal value; it is to be considered a work in progress and should not constrain options in working with EU partners on the ground. Please contact the Joint Programming functional mailboxes if you wish to share different approaches taken by EU Member States in your country for the benefit of this Guidance.

- interviewing any EU or EU Member State humanitarian bodies present to understand their interest in Joint Programming and the opportunities they see for Joint Programming to integrate resilience¹⁶ across the humanitarian-development nexus¹⁷;
- identifying which issues and development challenges are particularly relevant for the country, taking into account relevant policy frameworks¹⁸ such as existing Economic Partnership Agreements, as well as association agendas and partnership priorities for European Neighbourhood Policy partners;
- assessing the effectiveness of existing aid coordination architecture (as a whole and at sector/area/theme level) and defining what Joint Programming may add to it. This may include facilitating coordination by presenting a consolidated EU offer. Learning from any experiences of coordination across the humanitarian-development nexus such as the prior use of joint humanitarian development frameworks with Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO);
- identifying any good practices in joint implementation that could provide catalytic opportunities and quick wins such as initiatives to bring down transaction costs, namely: joint monitoring, evaluations and technical studies; joint missions; reviewing recent (joint) evaluations and (joint) analysis (related to budget support, etc.);
- reviewing the ongoing programming documents of participating development partners to identify joint priorities - focusing particularly on programming priorities that cluster around identifiable global priorities (e.g. Agenda 2030/SDGs, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, research and innovation, migration/mobility and security/development nexuses, gender, climate change, resilience) and European commitments (e.g. the new European Consensus on Development, the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy and Aid for Trade¹⁹);
- identifying other quick wins which may improve EU policy dialogue and EU positions in country processes;
- identifying any upcoming events (e.g. pledging conference, elections, reform processes, high-level events) and opportunities for joint approaches and communications;
- considering lessons learnt from common work around other initiatives, such as the EU Country Roadmaps for Civil Society, Gender Action Plans and Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategies. These are for the most part developed locally and jointly with Member States, to identify opportunities for Joint Programming;
- using existing consultations with government/national authorities on the national development plan as an entry point to present/mention/discuss Joint Programming. Early and proper involvement of officials is desirable to gauge their interest and respond to their concerns around Joint Programming;
- anticipating the transaction costs associated with Joint Programming for participating partners in the short, medium and longer term and identifying country-tailored solutions to help mitigate some of these. Some options could be to identify dedicated staff resources internally across the participating partners to share certain parts of the workload (such as facilitating consultations or drafting inputs) or to hire external technical assistance at key moments in the process to facilitate discussions/ consultations, prepare relevant documents or support the group on development effectiveness aspects. External technical assistance could be provided by participating partners on a rotating basis.

16 See chapter 4.3: Integrating the resilience approach into EU programming and financing of the Joint Communication on Resilience: A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action.
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/join_2017_21_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v7_p1_916039.pdf

17 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/05/19/conclusions-operationalising-humanitarian-development-nexus/>

18 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management/resilience-building-humanitarian-development-nexus_en

19 An updated Aid for Trade strategy has been published - COM(2017)667
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0667&from=EN>

B. The programming cycles of participating partners and their sector(s)²⁰ should be mapped in a development partner matrix (looking at all ongoing and planned interventions). A good resource for mapping ongoing interventions is the IATI database. One of the easiest ways to access IATI²¹ data is through www.d-portal.org, which is refreshed daily.

Possible activities:

- Identify current and planned technical assistance, particularly where embedded in government agencies to help assess potential entry points for building stronger relationships to facilitate engagement on policy issues;
- Refer to national development plan priorities and seek to map ongoing and planned interventions in support of these priorities, to determine the extent to which the participating development partners can use the partner government's sector definitions as the basis for programming;
- Include early considerations on comparative advantages enjoyed by EU partners vis-a-vis other development partners in topics/areas/sectors or geographical areas (see Chapter 9 on division of labour and Annex 2).

C. Heads of Mission should be involved by means of a basis for future decision-making with which to engage in Joint Programming. A short document might be produced, illustrating the scope of Joint Programming and the common principles for engagement and coordination as an outcome of the scoping phase ('declaration of intentions').

Role of HQ: whereas HQ is generally not directly consulted on the feasibility/scoping exercise (as there is no need for a specific HQ validation), you are advised to keep your colleagues in DEVCO/NEAR and the EEAS geographical directorates updated on the process. Support for launching a scoping/feasibility study can be provided through the Joint Programming helpdesk/functional mailboxes.

20 This will also be relevant for the upcoming discussion on sharing the analytical and practical workload involved in the Joint Programming process itself. How responsibilities are shared will probably depend on the comparative advantages development partners have in a certain sector and/or interest for engaging in that sector, as well as the aid modality they will use (see also Chapter 9 on Division of Labour).

21 The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) is a technical publishing framework in the field of development cooperation.

3. Developing a Roadmap for Joint Programming

A roadmap is a document that sets out who needs to do what and when in order to make Joint Programming a reality in a particular partner country. Its primary objective is to agree on a timeline and a process for developing a common approach that could lead to a Joint Programming Document. This involves making space and time for consultations and inputs from all relevant stakeholders.

A roadmap is also helpful for mapping, and preparing for, external events such as a pledging conference or the publication of a national development plan. While some participating development partners follow their own programming cycles, a synchronised roadmap would make for more effective programming.

Activities in developing a roadmap

Roadmaps can be as detailed as needed for the country context although simple concise overviews are usually easier to work with and provide an overview of the process at a glance (see Annex 8). Possible activities in developing a roadmap:

1. Draw up a timeline for all steps in a Joint Programming Document using the expected time frame of the partner country's national development plan (or political cycles, etc.);
2. Draw up a calendar of key events that will identify the appropriate time sequence for a joint analysis and formulation of a shared vision and joint response strategy. Ideally, this calendar will be an early opportunity to include visible actions to emphasise the benefits of 'speaking with one voice' in political or policy dialogue and to show decision makers, both in partner countries and in development partners, how they can achieve better development results. Key events might include a review of the national aid architecture, a review of sector strategies, investment conferences or analyses by development partners (e.g. the World Bank's country diagnostic or UN country reports) alongside more internal events such as Heads of Mission or Heads of Cooperation retreats;
3. Engage with EU and, possibly, like-minded development partners, focusing on key questions, opportunities and challenges (see also Chapter 4 Starting a Joint Analysis). At this stage, it is essential to consult with relevant actors in the local development community (development partners, civil society organisations and relevant private sector groups), including humanitarian actors²² (such as DG ECHO) if this has not happened already under the scoping phase²³. One useful tool for engaging with humanitarian actors is the joint humanitarian development framework²⁴;
4. Hold discussions on actionable next steps and related workload with Development and/or Political Counsellors from EU Member States to decide on deadlines for preparatory work that will enable European development partners to derive maximum value from key developments and events. Identify the partners, such as Heads of Cooperation, who should lead and implement these steps. Also, determine the length of time required for specific activities;
5. Draft and circulate a roadmap to participating and other interested development partners. The roadmap should highlight specific dates/times for meetings. Propose next steps and indicate which actions may need external assistance;

22 In broader terms, recent Council Conclusions reiterate the logic in coordinating development and humanitarian aid:

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/05/19/conclusions-operationalising-humanitarian-development-nexus/>

23 2012 EDF-DCI programming instructions: 'Joint EU-Member States programming is a priority and a powerful tool for coordination. Other relevant actors in the local development community should be consulted, including humanitarian partners (e.g. in situations of transition, linking short-term interventions to longer term engagement). In all cases, strong coordination and cooperation with and between EU Member States and other donors (including emerging donors, international NGOs and private foundations) is essential. Coordination should also cover the EIB, other European Development Financing Institutions (EDFIs) and International Financing Institutions (IFIs) active in development in the country/region, including Regional Development Banks.'

24 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management/resilience-building-humanitarian-development-nexus_en

6. Plan consultation sessions with the government/national authorities and other key national stakeholders such as parliament, local authorities, civil society and the private sector, including local and European chambers of commerce. Consultations can be key to building an understanding of the Joint Programming process. To the maximum extent possible, they should be planned when the Joint Programming Roadmap is prepared, to move away from ad hoc tick-box consultations (see Chapter 10 How to consult stakeholders on Joint Programming Documents for a more detailed explanation on consultations). The consultations should gather useful inputs for the joint analysis such as the perceived comparative advantages of joined-up European intervention or key development issues not effectively addressed to date through national processes;
7. Consider whether a conflict /situational analysis is relevant for your country and how conflict sensitivity could be embedded in Joint Programming to further promote resilience (see Chapter 13, Joint Programming in fragile contexts);
8. Consider whether a joint communication to respective HQs announcing the intention to start a Joint Programming process and attaching the roadmap would be useful. The communication could highlight specific support that may be needed from HQ, highlight the opportunity to replace future bilateral programming documents with the Joint Programming Document and/or request clarification from HQ on procedures for approving the future Joint Programming Document.

- In **Cambodia**, the Roadmap was a succinct rolling table of month-by-month actions drawn up at the beginning of the year as a work plan for the EU Development Counsellors group and updated the following year to reflect the actual timing of events. In this way, it became an operational document that also provided a record of the process. The EU Delegation also contracted an aid effectiveness consultant to support the Joint Programming process in anticipation of the workload. The consultant provided secretariat services for the European Development Counsellors Group (drafting documents and inputs, keeping minutes, organising retreats, preparing extracts of aid statistics etc.) and was available to support all European partners in their sector-lead facilitation role, together with the EU Delegation. This external support provided direct added value for all partners.

Role of HQ: HQ is generally not directly consulted on the roadmap (as there is no need for a specific HQ validation). However, you are strongly advised to keep your colleagues in DEVCO/NEAR and the EEAS geographical directorates (including the Joint Programming Helpdesk/functional mailboxes) updated on the process, and to share the final roadmap²⁵.

25 For a Roadmap example, please see Annex 8 (Palestine Roadmap).

4. Starting a Joint Analysis

A joint analysis is a document recording and assessing the binding constraints on all dimensions of development in a partner country. It provides a common understanding of challenges and opportunities based on the partner country's development plan and other relevant analysis undertaken by other key stakeholders. The analysis should be concise. It should refer to available information in various national/regional/thematic studies and reports (by EU Member States, international financing institutions, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or other donors) and should form the basis for the Joint Response (see Chapter 5 Starting a Joint Response). The joint analysis is most useful when it remains analytical and avoids descriptive reviews of the country context.

To prepare for a joint analysis, it may be useful to identify and carry out complementary studies to help participating partners better understand the country's medium-term development challenges. Studies could include a political economy analysis, key sectoral public expenditure reviews, a conflict sensitivity/ conflict analysis, a capacity gap analysis of duty bearers and rights holders, civil society mapping, etc. - if these do not already exist. Different partners can take the lead in conducting/contributing to such studies²⁶.

Activities in a joint analysis

An extensive joint analysis informs the joint response, although it is recommended that only a summary version of the analysis be included in the Joint Programming Document to ensure that it remains user-friendly. Some parts of the analysis may also be sensitive and not appropriate for a larger strategic document. The decision on the structure of the joint analysis, and how public this document will be, lies ultimately with the Heads of Mission and Heads of Cooperation at country level.

Possible activities:

1. Prepare a feasible timeframe, considering the opportunities for policy dialogue at sector and/or national levels, that might influence the analysis and the response;
2. Identify each participating partner's requirements for analysis - contents and structure. It could also be useful to refer to the Compendium for Member States' core requirements (see Annex 6 and Annex 9 for the EU legal basis);
3. Jointly identify a common analytical framework with participating partners, notably on sectors where some play an influential role; where they have common views on needed policy reform; where there is consensus on developmental priorities; or where there is agreement to work together on issues such as democratic governance, conflict prevention/sensitivity of development actions²⁷, a rights-based approach to development cooperation²⁸, EU trade assistance or gender equality. In this step, there should be an initial/preliminary agreement around tasks and sharing of responsibilities by section/area;
4. For programming in European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) partner countries, the analysis should take into account the main priority areas as jointly agreed with a specific partner country in line with the principle of differentiation, as set out in the revised ENP²⁹, as well as:
 - multilateral policy frameworks (such as the '20 Deliverables for 2020' agenda under the Eastern Partnership³⁰);

26 For example, in Laos, these studies included a political economy analysis, CSO mapping, a study of youth perceptions on development, social media in Laos and resettlement issues. Different participating partners took lead in the different studies. Please contact the EU Delegation in Laos or the functional mailboxes for more information.

27 On the 'do no harm' principle, see the following Commission links: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management/analytical-tools_en; https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/protection_en. Also, see the OECD Report, Do No Harm: international support for *Statebuilding*. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/donoharm.pdf>

28 'A rights-based approach, encompassing all human rights for EU development cooperation', adopted in 2014, is a toolbox for integrating this approach into all EU development instruments and activities. See: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/116803_fr

29 Joint Communication JOIN(2015)50 adopted on 18 November 2015 and Council Conclusions of 14 December 2015. See: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf

30 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20_deliverables_for_2020.pdf

- bilateral legal basis and policy frameworks such as Association Agendas and Partnership Priorities; and the challenges highlighted in the EU's general and country-specific reporting on the eastern and southern neighbours;
 - the challenges highlighted in the EU's general and country-specific reporting on the eastern and southern neighbours.
5. Consider joint statements by European partners; review relevant Council conclusions and communications, such as those related to the new Consensus, Joint Programming, the Global Strategy, or country- or region-specific issues.
 6. Draw on recent analyses carried out by European partners, including those related to the preparation of the Gender Action Plan, EU Roadmaps for engagement with CSOs, Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategy, Budget Support annual risk assessment, Joint Humanitarian Development Frameworks or other Humanitarian analysis.
 7. Draw on recent country/thematic analyses by multilateral and regional organisations (e.g. the World Bank, regional development banks, International Monetary Fund, UN and its specialised agencies) and by international NGOs, civil society organisations and political foundations to inform the joint analysis and avoid overlaps.
 8. Draw on recent recommendations, reports and concluding observations formulated by Charter-based bodies³¹ and Treaty-based bodies monitoring the implementation of core international human rights treaties³² - and whenever relevant, reports and recommendations from regional human rights frameworks³³.
 9. Exploit data published by the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) to have a 'bigger picture' view of all development partner funding and support in the country. Other, locally held data sets on development partner support may be added as appropriate. IATI is a technical publishing framework with more than 500 publishers (including international organisations, governments, national authorities and NGOs) making data available on their projects and programmes in the field of international cooperation to the IATI standard. As such, it serves as a powerful tool for bringing together a wide range of data on who is doing what in a specific country. The easiest way to access IATI data is through www.d-portal.org which is refreshed daily.
 10. Draw on existing policy briefs that have been developed in-country to address specific development challenges or existing country briefings by participating development partners.
 11. Consider the need for external technical assistance and support to prepare the first draft of the joint analysis and to update this in the light of comments from participating partners.
 12. Develop a proposed structure for the joint analysis³⁴ focusing on issues of shared interest. If applicable, conduct a conflict analysis (see Chapter 13); integrating the required structure and sections, as outlined in the participating partners programming guidelines, and aligning with national development plans and priorities.
 13. Present a proposed structure of the joint analysis to participating partners and suggest that a 'pre-zero draft' text be compiled based on the discussions and consultations held to date:

31 UN Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, Special Procedures.

32 The country pages of the OHCHR website (www.ohchr.org) provide a direct access to all relevant reports and concluding observations to which countries are legally bound under international human rights treaties they have ratified. Relevant reports and recommendations from regional human rights frameworks (the Council of Europe, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) should also be considered.

33 For example: the Council of Europe, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

34 For Neighbourhood partner countries please follow the relevant programming instructions. This exercise should also take into account existing reports and analysis and in particular review the progress made in relation to the policy framework and the achievement of previously agreed objectives.

- emphasise that the final version of the joint analysis should be short, to make it easier to gain approval from all participating development partners at local level and make the final Joint Programming Documents more accessible (i.e. user-friendly);
 - stress that more extensive analysis may be used to inform the programming document or any planned reviews of the document in due course but may not necessarily be part of the document for approval.
14. Consult relevant country stakeholders, including central government/national authorities together with other relevant key stakeholders such as civil society organisations, private sector representatives, local authorities, parliaments, trade associations on the structure and the key topics emerging from the analysis, through dedicated consultation events. You may want to consider organising separate events (per actor) and structuring the events around a series of guiding questions and/or preliminary findings on which the participants are encouraged to give feedback and help inform and fine-tune the analysis³⁵.
 15. Undertake an analysis of the existing country results framework (if there is one) to determine on the quality of country level data and monitoring systems, and also to review the scope of the existing results framework and the appropriateness of the indicators being tracked.
 16. Consider a rights-based capacity gap analysis of the duty bearers (state institutions) to fulfil their obligations deriving from ratified international/regional conventions, and of rights holders (citizens) to claim their rights, with special consideration for the most vulnerable groups in the country and any structural barriers (laws, cultural norms, practical obstacles, etc.) preventing them from effectively claiming their rights.

Role of HQ: HQs should be consulted on the joint analysis. In the case of EU Delegations, this consultation could include Commission line DGs, the EEAS and DEVCO geographical directorates and, when appropriate, thematic directorates. The final version should be shared with HQ colleagues and with the Joint Programming Helpdesk/ functional mailboxes.

.....
 35 Please see chapter 10 on consulting stakeholders

- In **Zambia**, the European Union Delegation and the Member States missions developed an EU Joint Framework Paper on Joint Programming. This reflected the outcome of discussions on how to ensure closer collaboration at development cooperation and political issues to maximise effectiveness, leverage potential and improve collective EU visibility. There was consensus that the best opportunities for enhanced collaboration were at sector level.

Nine concise notes emerged, focusing on key areas of engagement mapping out EU and Member States interventions, and outlining the scope for strengthened cooperation based on a common understanding of sector challenges and shared objectives.

- In **Moldova**, a work plan dividing up tasks for preparing the joint analysis was agreed. It covered the structure of the document, the concrete milestones, and the distribution of sector analysis. The extent of this challenge cannot be overstated and took considerable time to agree on, not least because every partner has its own definition of a sector. It should be noted that Moldova had recently signed an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU covering many sectors. But at the same time, a number of partners argued that the development objectives covered more ground than these sectors. In practical and pragmatic terms, 13 sectors were finally agreed, with 13 sector leads working in parallel work groups. In Moldova, the joint analysis really meant joint work. Regular coordination meetings were organised to monitor and manage this complex process.

In this process the EU Delegation encouraged partners to actively engage in contributing to the analysis while ensuring that overall, the joint analysis document remained coherent and balanced. It was recognised that in some areas through expertise (often based on ongoing or recent assistance) could be drawn on, while in other important areas expertise needed to be actively sought. So, at various stages, the analysis was consolidated and reviewed by all partners.

Broad consultations were conducted with the government, sector coordination councils, other key donors and civil society organisations to ensure that all sector descriptions contained accurate and up-to-date information. Finally, the consolidated joint analysis paper was shared with donors, and discussed and endorsed by the Heads of Mission meeting (this process took approximately eight months). The document was handed over officially to the Prime Minister and his ministers by the Heads of Missions at a public event on 13 October 2016. The analysis was a comprehensive reference document of shared expertise. The joint presentation clearly signalled a common understanding of the challenges and was an opportunity for EU ambassadors to highlight the most important of these. In short, with the Republic of Moldova as a close neighbour of the European Union, the Joint Programming exercise is less about technical division of labour and much more about reinforcing common policy dialogue and a coordinated approach in our assistance, supported by a solid joint analytical basis.

5. Starting a Joint Response

A joint response to the partner country's national development plan sets out the overall rationale and direction for the participating partners' support. It provides a shared vision on how participating partners can best use their resources as an incentive for positive change in the partner country. The joint response outlines the sectors in which participating partners plan to invest and identifies global and country-specific priorities, partnerships and joint working arrangements.

Subsequently, the joint response becomes a shared narrative that conveys the common interests of participating development partners in all sectors in which they programme support. This narrative should be mainstreamed in sector approaches and in some cases accompanied by joint sector responses.

Activities in a joint response

The joint response makes up the Joint Programming Document, together with the joint analysis. The Joint Programming Document can directly replace a participating partner's bilateral programming strategy or can provide a more strategic framework under which participating partners align and coordinate their bilateral programming documents³⁶. Possible activities:

1. Review the findings of the joint analysis and/or other key reports to map participating partner priorities and make sure they complement each other.
2. Consider latest programming instructions from the EU and all participating partners when drafting a Joint Programming Document. Include considerations on democracy, rule of law and human rights, building resilience and sustainability, sustainable growth and job creation, gender, climate action, a rights-based approach (see Annex 11), as well as development effectiveness principles (see Annex 10).
3. Propose a structure for the joint response. The structure should meet participating partners' expectations and requirements and to be acceptable to all (for more information on approval procedures, see Chapter 7 EU approval of Joint Programming Documents).
4. Agree a scope and coverage of the Joint Programming exercise - whether to include only country programmable bilateral assistance, and/or thematic/centrally-managed programmes, European Investment Bank and other Member State development banks' programmes/concessional loans; scholarships, etc. Agree also on how to address cross-cutting and strategic issues in the Joint Programme (see Chapter 14).
5. Include in the joint response justifications for the choice of sector(s) for programming and a proposed division of labour among participating partners:
 - pay attention to divergent/different sector definitions of participating partners and the partner country (see Chapter 9 on division of labour);
6. Agree on how the joint results framework will be used to monitor the implementation of the Joint Programming Document and the timing and cycles of such monitoring and review processes.
7. Agree to which extent the final Joint Programming Document needs to be formally endorsed by the government and outline the steps for structuring this process to have all feedback taken into account before finalisation.

36 For the EU legal basis, see Annex 9.

8. Propose a work schedule that allows consultation, feedback and updating of the joint response at regular intervals with deadlines attached. Consider the need for Heads of Cooperation to attend retreats at certain points to agree on parts of the Joint Programming Document.
9. Plan appropriate levels of consultation with other development partners, partner country representatives (including the parliament) and other stakeholders such as civil society and the private sector where applicable (on consulting stakeholders, see Chapter 10).
10. If the Joint Programming Document is to replace the bilateral programming document, the programming requirements of the replacement development partners must be fulfilled. Please refer to the European Development Fund (EDF)/Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)/European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) programming instructions³⁷ and Chapter 7 for minimum requirements for the EU part of the strategy in the case of replacement.
11. If the Joint Programming Document is not replacing the bilateral programming document, a specific text will need to be inserted to clarify the link between the Joint Programming Document and the bilateral programming document. This is set out in Chapter 7.
12. For transparency reasons, consider indicating in the introduction of the Joint Programming Documents details on the status of the Joint Programming Document vis-à-vis the bilateral programming documents for each participating partner.
13. The Joint Programming Document should include a table which provides indicative financial information by sector/priority. For EU funds, it is advised (to facilitate approval) that the current EU funds from the Multiannual Indicative Programming (MIP)/National Indicative Programming (NIP)/Single Strategy Framework (SSF) are clearly identified and separate to EU financial contributions from other sources such as thematic budget lines, trust funds or investment facilities.

A draft budget template which could be adapted to the local context could therefore include:

JP axe/priori- -ty/sector	Indicative JP contribution	EU - funds bilateral	EU funds other sources	Participating development partner 1	Participating development partner 2
1	xx	xx from focal sector 1 xx from focal sector 3	xx from ...	Xx from ...	
2					
3					
Totals					

³⁷ For the EU legal basis, see Annex 9.

- In **Kenya**, the EU(+) Joint Cooperation Strategy in Support of Kenya's Medium-term Plan 2014 - 2017³⁸ was based on guiding principles covering the five themes of Joint Programming in Kenya: division of labour, use of country systems, joint monitoring, the Kenyan government's role and joint communication and visibility. The Joint Cooperation Strategy is structured around these principles and contains sections on the expected benefits of Joint Programming, together with a joint analysis of Kenya's development challenges and opportunities, EU support and alignment to implement Kenya's Medium Term Plan II - including priority sectors, division of labour, capacity development, and use of country systems. Sections on indicative financial allocations to the Medium Term Plan, monitoring and evaluation - including a set of indicators based on the national plan, joint implementation, joint communication and visibility and synchronisation complete the Joint Strategy.
- In **Mali**, the EU's Joint Programming (Programmation Conjointe de l'UE au Mali 2014-2018) is aligned with the national development strategy (CSCR 2012-2017) and the government's action plan (Plan d'action du Gouvernement" (PAG 2013-2018)). The document defines the concentration on three intervention areas and division of labour between the EU and the Member States within these intervention areas. As in Kenya, principles were identified that should guide the European strategy in Mali. The strategy contains a European analysis and response to the challenges the Mali faces, and an analysis of each sector. Potential risks and corresponding mitigating measures are described. The strategy presents a high level of detail in terms of financing forecasts sector by sector until 2018. A results framework clearly identifying EU donors and the indicators to be met completes the strategy.

Role of HQs: HQs of the EU and Member States should be consulted early on the joint response.

For the EU, the draft Joint Programming Documents should be shared with EEAS and DEVCO/NEAR geographical units for consultation before the finalisation of the document at country level. In the case of the EU, a Country Team Meeting (CTM) will be organised on a draft Joint Programming Document to ensure consultation with Commission services and to provide feedback on any elements that need to be taken into account to facilitate the approval procedures. The result of the CTM will be communicated back to the EU Delegation to allow the finalisation of the Joint Programming Document at country level.

Once drafted, the document should be submitted to HQ with a note from the Head of Delegation to the EEAS and DEVCO/NEAR geographical units (copied to the Joint Programming Helpdesk/functional mailboxes) for approval. For more detail on the process of approval for a Joint Programming Document see Chapter 7 and Annex 9.

Reminder: for the EU part of the Joint Programming Document, current EU programming instructions apply: for example, guidance on fragmentation across sectors, key priorities, consultation, modalities etc.

38 <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming/minisite/3-country-cases#kenya>

6. Preparing a Joint Results Framework

The Consensus makes joint monitoring and results frameworks core elements of the joint response to maintain momentum, inform dialogue and enhance mutual accountability. Experience of Joint Programming Documents to date shows that successful results frameworks are as much as possible aligned to national processes for results management³⁹.

Joint results frameworks can become a tool for information sharing, monitoring, evidence-based actions and mutual learning. Managing for results is about systematically collecting and analysing information to assess how programmes are performing against expected targets - and how improvements can be made for future performance. Relying on partner countries' statistical, monitoring and evaluation systems might be a challenge and may need to be accompanied by efforts to strengthen national statistical capacity and information systems.

Alignment to an existing country results framework can provide a stronger and more credible platform for subsequent policy dialogue. Ideally, the framework can also help better highlight the contribution of the respective European partners to the achievement of specific results either in financial terms or through specific projects and programmes. A regular monitoring round can be instrumental in evidence-based discussion and policy dialogue with sectoral Ministries and national stakeholders (civil society, private sector) and provide the basis for learning from experience. It can also allow for the joint results framework or the Joint Programming Document to be updated and revised as needed. If substantial updates are made to the Joint Programming Document, as a result of the monitoring process, HQ approval may subsequently need to be sought (see Chapter 7).

When choosing results and objectives to be put in the joint results framework, a good balance between quantity, level, measurability and the existence of baselines should be achieved. Too many results and indicators at different levels (operational/macro-level) will make the task of measuring them more difficult.

In the absence of a country results framework, global frameworks, such as the Sustainable Development Goals, can provide a credible option and can also refer to partner country engagements at global level, such as the Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs)⁴⁰ regarding the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement on climate change⁴¹.

Activities to prepare a results framework⁴²

Results frameworks should support national ownership and leadership, to develop institutional capacities and to facilitate an enabling environment for strengthening national systems. Results frameworks should also support better coherence across bilateral policy and programmes of participating partners, and facilitate consistent support for development results. Possible activities:

Agree with participating development partners the purpose of the results framework

The purpose of the results framework can be discussed at the outset of the Joint Programming process, to ensure common understanding of the purpose of the results framework. Results frameworks can be used:

- to underpin policy dialogue by signaling key priority messages;
- to improve accountability in terms of project/programme results;
- to contribute to overall monitoring of national development goals, so as to provide visibility for the European and participating partners in terms of their combined impact in a country; and
- to monitor the commitments to the development effectiveness agenda (see Annex 10).

³⁹ See also the analysis and country studies included in an independent Evaluation on Joint Programming (2017). http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-eu-joint-programming-process-development-cooperation-2011-2015_en

⁴⁰ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/vnrs/>

⁴¹ http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php

⁴² For a detailed study on joint results frameworks in selected Joint Programming partner countries, see the report at: <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming>

1. Define the scope of the results framework

It is important to consider some key principles for a high-quality results framework. Among them are the influence of global agendas and commitments⁴³, the country's own political economy and incentives for delivering development results, accountability for the results (national, sector, agency level), and the extent to which the results framework can be managed and monitored.

Results frameworks can be quite detailed, specifying the information down to a given activity, or can remain at the higher (outcome and output) level. The extent of detail needed should be decided at country level: experience to date suggests that higher-level results frameworks are more useful in terms of assessing the overall direction of change in a partner country and helping focus on the big picture of sustainable development that the joint results are contributing to.

To keep results frameworks manageable and understandable for a range of national stakeholders, it is useful to reflect on how to select the outcome/output results to include in the framework. A smaller number of representative results might be easier to monitor and communicate than an exhaustive list of everything that is desirable.

2. Build-in time for consultations

There should be an open, in-depth discussion among participating partners about how each partner currently monitors results and at what level. Sharing participating partners' existing results frameworks and monitoring processes, as well as reviewing the country results framework, can help provide clarity as to the expected and achievable results from the Joint Programming Documents. Consultations with other national stakeholders (government, parliament, CSOs, academia and the private sector) can help determine representative/selective results for a sector based on key challenges and country priorities. Participating partners can use the consultations to discuss on national priorities and gaps in policies and legal frameworks, as well as the institutional capacities of state and non-state actors.

3. Review the adequacy of the national results framework

A review of the adequacy of country results framework and monitoring system (including data) can support an agreement on whether the national framework is 'good enough' to align to. In the absence of a national results framework, participating partners should consider what other strategic frameworks they could align to (for example the SDG framework). Alternatively, other higher-level results that are appropriate for the country context and already specifically formulated by participating partners could form the basis for the joint results framework. Joint results frameworks could include a mix of country results framework indicators and other indicators (such as on aid effectiveness) as appropriate to the country context and the agreed scope.

4. Consider including assumptions and risks

The joint analysis will have provided some consideration of critical assumptions in the local context, notably poor/weak governance issues, risks and mitigating measures. These assumptions can be included in the results framework logic. Attention should also be given to risks and assumptions related to country level data collections, evidence generation and data processing, and support for national statistical and information systems. Cooperation projects can have unintended negative impacts on the environment and human rights⁴⁴

43 Such as Agenda 2030, European Neighbourhood Policy, EU Global Strategy, Development Effectiveness agenda, Rights-Based Approach.

44 Such as disadvantaging certain groups, interfering with participation rights and labour rights or contributing to forced displacement. It is therefore important to abide by the 'do no harm' principle and carry out the required analysis and mitigation.

5. Consider how to include cross-cutting issues and joint values

Joint Programming Documents are underpinned by the common values of participating partners. These include commitments to promote gender equality, environmental sustainability, an enabling environment for civil society, protection for human rights and democratic governance. These common issues should be reflected in the joint results framework in a way that facilitates reporting on related results.

This could be further achieved through the inclusion of specific indicators; through reference to existing agreed activities (such as the Civil Society Roadmap, Gender Action Plan and Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategies); and through emphasis on these issues across all sectors (by including disaggregated data and reference to environmental impacts are just two such examples at sector level).

6. Formulate the joint results framework aspects that could be

included:

- (i) selected strategic priorities (objectives). Priorities should be strategically adopted to demonstrate an understanding of the local political economy in such a way that promises access to and influence in policy dialogue relating to domestic resource mobilisation and using development cooperation resources to deliver on global goods (e.g. the SDGs);
- (ii) outcome indicators measuring outputs and intermediate outcomes which can be directly linked to Joint Programming interventions, as a collection of implementation results in bilateral/multilateral/Joint Programming Documents;
- (iii) development effectiveness indicators to monitor improvements in the effectiveness of participating partners' development cooperation, as measured against aid fragmentation, division of labour, use of country systems, etc.;
- (iv) process and impact indicators measuring the extent to which the working principles of a rights-based approach are effectively applied in external cooperation programmes;
- (v) where possible, baselines to help with assessing progress in achieving the outcomes;
- (vi) links to other joint strategies, such as the CSO Roadmap, Gender Action Plan and Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategies - although certain aspects of these could be directly incorporated into the Joint Programming Document and their indicators taken on board in the joint results framework;
- (vii) clarity on the division of labour among the participating development partners for monitoring and reporting on specific indicators or the results framework;
- (viii) a defined frequency for monitoring and reporting on the results of the Joint Programming Document and thought as to how to share progress with a range of stakeholders in appropriate formats.
- (ix) consider including a column in the joint results framework that links and matches each joint results indicator to relevant SDGs.

- In **Cambodia**, the European partners did not wish to create a parallel system for monitoring results, but rather boost existing national processes. The European Strategy results framework was therefore aligned with the Government's own strategy and associated national processes for results management including the national process of agreeing joint monitoring indicators between government and the development partners in 19 sectors. The results framework in Cambodia was intended as a concise framework that includes the outcomes which are of particular importance for the European external cooperation programmes and which provide a platform for policy dialogue. In this context, one representative output indicator was selected for each area of European partners' focus and support, as well as some additional indicators in areas European partners felt were not covered by the 19 sectors but which were important for the group. The results framework was originally 14 output indicators although after the first monitoring report this was expanded to 21 to better capture the breadth of European support in Cambodia (the added indicators covered higher education scholarships and TVET, anti-corruption, green energy, sustainable production, social protection, support for the CSO enabling environment and climate change)

Experience shows that the following principles were key for Cambodia:

- use of the joint results framework as a tool for policy dialogue,
- importance of alignment to country priorities,
- selectivity in the choice of results to be monitored,
- references to the SDGs targets that the Joint Programming priorities contribute to, and
- keeping the joint results framework understandable for external stakeholders and manageable for the European group.

Role of HQ: HQs should be consulted on the joint results framework, which often forms part of the Joint Programming Document. The final version of the results framework should be shared with HQ colleagues and with the Joint Programming Helpdesk/functional mailboxes.

- In **Nicaragua**, EU and Member States mixed four different results frameworks to produce a tailored joint results framework. This took the SDGs as a starting point, because it was agreed that it should allow for the monitoring of the Joint Programming contribution to the SDGs. In addition, results from the National Plan for Human Development, the EU Results Framework and the results framework of each participating agency mostly drew on national indicators from this National Plan. Mechanisms for coordinating the monitoring and evaluation of the results were outlined and now include an annual update of results. This annual update requires discipline from all partners, but allows for regular adjustments of the results framework as needed.

7. EU approval procedures for Joint Programming Documents

Full approval procedures and requirements can be found in Annex 9.

Succinct version:

For the EU, there are two possible options (and corresponding HQ circuits) for finalising Joint Programming Documents (including the joint analysis, joint response and joint results framework):

1. approval of a Joint Programming Document which is to be considered as the EU Programming Document ('replacement');
2. approval of a Joint Programming Document not replacing a bilateral programming document.

In both cases the HQ Joint Programming units/division will ensure that information is provided at regular intervals to all services on the current state of play of Joint Programming to ensure transparency and information sharing. This information will cover the state of play including information on future Joint Programming Documents. Specific country-level issues related to the Joint Programming process will be discussed in country team meetings as needed.

1. Approval of a Joint Programming Document which is to be considered as the EU programming document ('replacement')

A Joint Programming Document replacing a bilateral programming document has the same legal status as the bilateral programming document it is replacing. This means that the same programming instructions, adoption process and timeline as for a 'normal' MIP/NIP or SSF are to be followed.

The replacement process for Joint Programming Documents will be undertaken by each participating partner, according to its own rules and procedures focusing on its own contribution.

Regarding the signature: the Commission Decision may specify that the Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development or the Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (or their designate) are entitled to sign the Joint Programming Document.

2. Approval of a Joint Programming Document not replacing a bilateral programming document

When a Joint Programming Document does not replace the EU bilateral programming document, it is not adopted through an amending Commission Decision. In this case, the Joint Programming Document is seen as a document that sets out a coherent and coordinated response to the partner country priorities by the EU and participating partners (including Member States) and under which bilateral programming documents are maintained⁴⁵.

The Joint Programming Document should contain a section, which explicitly states that the relevant MIP/NIP/SSF remains the legal basis for EU support until it expires. When the relevant MIP/NIP/SSF expires, a Joint Programming Document could replace a subsequent NIP/MIP/SSF and, in that situation, the approval process follows the procedure described in the point 1 above.

The approval process for Joint Programming Documents will be undertaken by each participating partner, according to its own rules and procedures focusing on its own contribution.

⁴⁵ In this context, bilateral programming documents form the legal basis for development cooperation of participating partners.

Minimum requirements for the Joint Programming Document:

1. The Joint Programming Document should contain a section, which explicitly states that it fully reflects the existing EU country MIP/NIP/SSF and that this MIP/NIP/SSF remains the legal basis for EU support until it expires.

In addition to the NIP/MIP/SSF that is central to the EU contribution to the Joint Programming, other key EU priorities supported through other actions funded through other financing instruments may also be included in the Joint Programming Document. Such priorities must already have an existing legal basis and be specified in a financial match table.

2. To enable the financial 'match' between the MIP/NIP/SSF and the Joint Programming Document to be confirmed prior to approval, an internal breakdown of the EU contribution to the Joint Programming Document should be provided (in an annex to the document or as part of the note from the Head of Delegation). If useful, the EU contribution through the MIP/NIP/SSF could be broken down to include funds already committed and those yet to be committed.

Joint Programming Document	EU contribution	EU bilateral MIP/NIP/SSF (with reference) *	Other EU funds if applicable : with appropriate references			
			Previous bilateral support	Regional funds (RIP)	Thematic budget lines	Others such as EIB, Trust Funds etc.
Priority 1		MIP sector 1 amount x MIP sector 3 amount y				
Priority 2 etc.						
Total						

* A Joint Programming priority might be supported across a range of EU MIP/NIP/SSF focal sectors. This information should be presented in a way that provides the greatest clarity and accounts for the existing allocation under the MIP/NIP/SSF.

The Joint Programming Document should not contain a page with the signatures of the EU Delegation and the EU Member States, as this may create ambiguity as to the legal status of the document vis-à-vis (already adopted) bilateral programming documents.

Monitoring and review of Joint Programming Documents:

If, after a monitoring or review of the Joint Programming Document, the participating partners agree that substantial changes are needed to update the document, the relevant approval procedures may have to be followed for the updated version. Further advice on this can be sought from HQ. For the EU, the notion of 'substantial change' is referenced in the MTR Guidance 2017.

8. Moving towards Joint Implementation

The new European Consensus sets out the commitment of the EU and its Member States to support partner countries through joint implementation whenever appropriate. Joint implementation is seen as a way of promoting coherent, effective and coordinated EU support based on shared objectives in selected sectors or on specific cross-sectoral themes tailored to country contexts.

The Consensus also highlights how joint implementation is inclusive and open to all EU partners who agree and can contribute to a common vision, including Member States' agencies and their development financial institutions, the private sector, civil society and academia.

Joint implementation is also understood to involve various financial modalities such as co-financing and delegated cooperation as well as non-financial means of implementation and should build on actors' comparative advantage and sharing of best practice. In this context, the EU and its Member States may wish to draw on and share the experiences of all Member States, including transition experience.

The 2016 Council conclusions on stepping-up Joint Programming called on the Commission services and the EEAS to continue promoting EU- and Member States-financed joint implementation activities.

Broadly speaking, joint implementation can be divided into:

- actions involving non-financial means: these could include joint sectoral/thematic analysis; joint project identification and formulation; joint policy dialogue in the context of programme implementation; and joint follow-up and evaluation of EU interventions; and
- actions involving financial means: a number of joint implementation modalities already exist, such as delegated cooperation, blending, EU trust funds, joint co-financing, parallel co-financing and joint operational programmes. Options for developing new mechanisms to push joint implementation further, such as extending twinning/TAIEX modalities to development cooperation, are being explored.

Joint implementation puts many of the development effectiveness principles (see Annex 10) into practice by reducing fragmentation in sectors and cutting transaction costs for national governments and stakeholders.

When joint implementation actions involving financial means are undertaken between the EU and Member States, the relevant provisions in the PRAG should be consulted.

Activities to support joint implementation

There are clear and strong links between Joint Programming and joint implementation. Joint Programming can help with joint implementation, and joint implementation arrangements can become a concrete outcome of the Joint Programming process. Joint implementation can also support a bottom-up coordination process in specific sectors to facilitate future Joint Programming processes. As a result, joint implementation can exist in partner countries where there is no Joint Programming process in place. It is also important to note that joint implementation can go beyond 'programmable aid' such as through the EU trust funds. Possible activities to support joint implementation:

1. ensuring that the Joint Programming process openly discusses participating partners ambitions for future joint implementation;
2. reviewing current forms of joint implementation to collect experience and reflect on practices and impacts of this arrangement, such as enhancing national and local capacities, contributing to national and local ownership, enhancing policy leverage and contributing to building new (or strengthening existing) partnerships;

3. considering linking the priority sectors identified in the Joint Programming Document with appropriate types of joint implementation that could be further explored;
4. discussing how best to include participating partners' development agencies in the Joint Programming process to prepare the ground for a more strategic use of joint implementation;
5. discussing with the national government's line ministry the benefits of future joint implementation arrangements and seeking their feedback on any current joint implementation modalities;
6. considering setting up a 'Committee on Joint Implementation' to provide for coherence and consistency throughout the Joint programming process.

- As part of the Joint Programming process in **Ethiopia**, three pilot programmes for joint implementation were identified: nutrition, health and green sectors. In nutrition for example, a draft roadmap was developed and an EU+ Nutrition Group established. The roadmap, which provides the principles and guidelines for Joint Programming and allocates responsibilities within an estimated time schedule, is structured around three key phases:

- 1) Planning: defining membership, situation analysis, and prioritising the elements of a strategic response;
- 2) Point Action Framework: this principally relates to the development of an action plan incorporating joint initiatives as well as bilateral interventions; and
- 3) Accountability: including resource tracking, results monitoring, evaluation, communication and visibility.

Fourteen Member States participate in the EU-led joint nutrition strategy. The nutrition group is involved in all three Joint Programming clusters (job creation, governance and natural resources) to make nutrition a cross-cutting issue.

- In **Cambodia**, delegated cooperation with Member States was considered for the first time as means implementing Joint Programming. Alongside each EU budget support programme an agreement was reached as to which Member States could best provide support. For example, Sweden was chosen in the area of Public Finance Management (PFM) because of its ability to support organisations such as Transparency International or the Cambodian Parliamentary Institute with both core funding and activity funding — this being challenging for the Delegation. Sweden was also able to mobilise twinning-type support through agreements with the Swedish Audit Office, Swedish Tax Authority and StatisticsSweden.

9. Work on Division of Labour

‘Division of labour’ simply means sharing out the work to be done in such a way as to avoid overlaps and ensure that Development Partners complement one another. This also allows each partner to specialise in what they do best (their area of comparative advantage) as opposed to spreading their support thinly over many sectors and issues. Division of labour has the potential to lead to fewer and larger initiatives, delivering economies of scale and reducing administrative costs. It should also promote more joint implementation in cases where more than one partner wishes to work on the same sector/thematic issue.

Targets of not more than three sectors per donor and not more than five donors per sector have previously been agreed in the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour⁴⁶ and can be useful benchmark figures to aim for. A result indicator to monitor the impact of Joint Programming on the division of labour could be included in the joint results framework if this is a specific element of working together that needs action. A useful reference is the EU Toolkit on Division of Labour⁴⁷.

Some entry points/opportunities to engage in division of labour:

- at the start of a new national development plan cycle, or a major change in the country (transition from conflict, electoral cycle, natural disaster etc.);
- at the start of a new strategic programming period or a review process for several important development partners (including in case of policy changes at headquarters);
- during high-level country meetings (e.g. round tables or consultative groups), where partner governments present their plans and solicit development partners support;
- in situations of fragility or transition from humanitarian aid to more structured programmatic aid and more development partners.

The key aspect that partners need to discuss is where comparative advantages lie. Ideally, the comparative advantage of a given partner should be self-assessed, endorsed by the partner government, and recognised by other partners (see Annex 2).

The division of labour also means using comparative advantage assessment to decide on which partner will be the lead, i.e. actively taking on this responsibility.

Assessing comparative advantage can include considerations beyond the mere amount of resources, such as:

- ability of the partner to provide assistance through a certain aid modality;
- historical track record in sector and relationships with the government counterparts and other development partners;
- performance of the partner’s development cooperation support to date;
- partner’s mandate of the partner;
- performance against development effectiveness indicators;
- organisational expertise and experience globally;
- potential impact of the given partner’s aid as a catalyst for other sources of development finance;
- willingness to take on a leadership role and the resources to support the coordination work that this entails.

⁴⁶ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:r13003&from=EN>

⁴⁷ EU Toolkit for the implementation of complementarity and division of labour in development policy https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/eu-toolkit-implementation-complementarity-and-division-labour-development-policy_en

Activities to prepare division of labour

The work on division of labour can start in the early phases of the Joint Programming process (scoping/mapping) and is considered one of the most complex parts of it. It needs continuous review as it is likely to evolve and a pragmatic approach may be needed in the Joint Programming Document to achieve a better division of labour over time. It is acknowledged that division of labour discussions can be more challenging at country level when there are many partners as compared to a few. Possible activities:

1. Preparation for division of labour

- i. analyse existing development partner harmonisation, coordination and alignment mechanisms in the country including a review of any partner lead coordinating roles agreed;
- ii. engage in early consultations with respective line ministries and officials;
- iii. define sectors based on participating partners' and partner country's sector classification - considering existing internationally agreed frameworks, such as OECD or EU results frameworks;
- iv. discuss how visibility aspects will be addressed.

The development partner matrix (Chapter 2 - Feasibility or Scoping Exercise for Joint Programming) mapping the sector(s) where each partner has existing and planned activities can be of value in sketching a preliminary division of labour.

How responsibilities are shared will depend on the comparative advantages that partners have in a certain sector and/or interest in engaging in that sector. Division of labour must be discussed and agreed jointly by all actors involved.

2. Working to improve division of labour

Since division of labour is the means through which participating partners share responsibilities, it subsequently raises the profile of cross-cutting priorities in focal sectors where Joint Programming is underway.

(the steps below are not necessarily in chronological order.)

1. conducting partner self-assessment of their comparative advantage per sector (using questionnaires, desk reviews, peer reviews, including OECD peer review, etc.);
2. comparing and reconciling each partner's self-assessment of comparative advantages per sector with the assessment by the partner country and other partners;
3. exploring partners' options for (further) sector concentration and willingness to give up sectors and/or be silent partners in the sector;
4. identifying criteria for selecting lead development and coordinating partner(s) per sector;
5. defining partner roles, projecting each partner's preferred role in a sector;
6. involving partner headquarters in the decision-making process;
7. involving key stakeholders other than the central governments (i.e. civil society, local authorities, parliament) to get their feedback on the sectors of concentration or perceived comparative advantages of partners.

- Over 20 participating development partners in **Palestine** have agreed to concentrate programming in five sectors. The division of labour among European development partners in Palestine is grounded on the comparative advantage of European donors and based on past and current engagement and expertise. This Strategy defined EU lead and active donors in 12 focal sectors. Since then, the division of labour has been constantly evolving as the priorities of European development partners shift over time and interventions move from a sector-based to a results-based approach.

Under the European Joint Strategy, the European lead takes responsibility for coordinating among other European development partners active in that sector. This may involve discussions on programming and projects, exploring opportunities for joint implementation of projects, or being the European voice in policy dialogue with the Palestinian Authority. European leads are also responsible for reporting on developments and progress within their sector. Overall coordination of this process is undertaken by the EU Delegation. The division of labour is a pragmatic tool and it is vital that it is kept flexible to allow for shifts in policy priorities, especially following elections. One example of flexibility is in the education sector, which was originally led by Belgium. As Finland's prominence in the sector grew, it was decided that both Belgium and Finland should assume co-lead for the sector. This process was helped by the existing cooperation in the education sector between Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland and Norway through what is known as the Joint Financing Arrangement.

One challenge is that coordination of European development partners takes a significant amount of time and often relies on the goodwill of participating colleagues. When European development partners propose becoming a lead -especially those states, which are represented by smaller missions, it is important that they are aware of the resource implications of assuming such a role (leads may require extra support from capitals to fulfil their role). Finally, in order for progress not to be reliant on individuals, an institutional framework should be set up to ensure future coordination processes.

3. Implementing the division of labour

1. Reach agreement on a responsible exit strategy as appropriate (phasing out sectors outside focal/centration areas), without creating a financing gap⁴⁸ and with minimum disruption to the partner country. Joint Programming processes should reflect these exit strategies, for example by including scenarios in which other participating partners 'plug the gap' and/or other forms of cooperation beyond ODA (e.g. the private sector) come into play. Exit strategies should be discussed and designed as much as possible with the partner country.
2. Reach agreement on silent partnerships. These are arrangements between two or more like-minded funding bodies/agencies which allow one or more partners to channel a financial contribution to a sector of a partner country, with which they do not have a bilateral relationship, through a partner active in that country and in that sector, including how visibility will be maintained for the silent partner.
3. Seek partners for joint actions and joint implementation (see Chapter 8).
4. Feed process into joint response (see Chapter 5).

⁴⁸ „For division of labour to be effective, it should observe commitments on predictability. This is in line with the Accra Agenda for Action, which commits donors to provide “regular and timely information on (donors’) three- to five-year expenditure and/or implementation plans”. It is therefore recommended that to the extent possible, the terms of donors’ commitments mirror the period of the national development strategy. At the same time, both Governments and donors recognise that priorities on either side may change as an outcome of democratic processes. Where such changes lead, for example, to a donor wishing to alter its priorities for involvement, this should be done in a staged and managed way in order to ensure the minimum possible disruption to the overall support provided to the country in question.” OECD International Good Practice Principles for Country-Led Division of Labour and Complementarity, March 2009.

10. How to Consult Stakeholders on Joint Programming Documents

It is important to consider at the outset which stakeholders should be consulted and to what extent. For example, in some country contexts it will be important to involve the government/national authorities from the beginning; in others it might be better to do so once there is a minimum of agreement on the scope of Joint Programming and the process to be undertaken, as this can provide more concrete entry points for discussion. The local context and dynamics will dictate this.

There are several principles that underpin successful partnering for dialogue and should inform preparation of all consultation events:

- awareness of incentives for engaging in dialogue - to facilitate engagement from partner organisations (not only individuals) based on common interest;
- agreed principles –partners building on shared goals and principles;
- added value for participants - inclusive and transparent approach to ensure collaboration;
- responsiveness - for maximum results and mutual benefits.

In line with the second Rights-Based Approach working principle (participation and inclusion), any consultation process should:

- Make for meaningful participation (e.g. as regards timely notification, language, location, timing, adequate time for participants to seek other opinions);
- be accessible to the most marginalised groups (e.g. young people, the elderly, rural/urban communities, indigenous people, etc.); and
- be equally accessible to people with disabilities.

Consultations with key stakeholders⁴⁹ can take place at any stage in the Joint Programming process. Ideally, thought should be given to potential consultations when designing the roadmap (see Chapter 3), so as to build them into the process and avoid ad-hoc, last-minute 'tick-box' exercises. The sooner they are planned the better, as consultations require resources (i.e. time and often financial resources notably for translation, for example).

This chapter is focused on the involvement of the partner country government and national authorities (including sub-national levels if appropriate), the partner country parliament, like-minded partners, civil society organisations and private sector associations and groups - but can also be applied to other stakeholders as needed.

Consultations during the Joint Programming stages

The reference document⁵⁰ for consultation with different stakeholders during the EU programming phase is the programming guidelines. With the necessary adaptations, the same principle should be kept in Joint Programming. This principle holds even truer today in light of the 2030 Agenda and the new EU Consensus on Development, which calls for stronger and more inclusive multistakeholder partnerships⁵¹.

49 Stakeholders could include national governments, national and local authorities, civil society organisations, the private sector, parliaments, multilateral and regional organisations and entities, including European financial institutions, international financial institutions, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, private and political foundations and non-EU donors.

50 Article 11 of the DCI Regulation 2014 stipulates that 'Programming documents for geographic programmes, including joint programming documents, shall be based, to the extent possible, on a dialogue between the Union, the Member States and the partner country or region concerned, including national and regional parliaments, and shall involve civil society and local authorities and other parties so as to enhance ownership of the process and to encourage support for national development strategies, particularly for those aimed at reducing poverty'.

51 Article 83 of the Consensus says: 'Stronger partnerships are at the heart of the EU's approach to SDG implementation. The EU and its Member States will work more closely with all other relevant actors to promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and strengthen their capacity for democratic ownership. Parliaments and political parties as well as regional and local authorities must play their respective roles fully, including their scrutiny role, alongside national governments and actively participate in the decision-making process. This also includes the important role of national and regional parliaments in legislation, agreeing budgets and holding governments to account'.

Building on the stages of the Joint programming process outlined in the preceding chapters, there are four key moments when consultations can take place:

Feasibility/scoping	The feasibility/scoping exercise can not only help identify key stakeholders to be consulted throughout the Joint Programming process but can also provide opportunities to explain the rationale for Joint programming. The scoping work can also seek some early inputs from key stakeholders on their perceptions of the value-added of European Joint Programming, including its contribution to development effectiveness, and any potential challenges that might exist at country level.
Joint analysis	<p>Key stakeholders can inform and enrich the EU's analysis with their perceptions and specific focus (i.e. 'people focus' for civil society, 'local focus' for local authorities, 'growth' focus for the private sector, etc.)</p> <p>Key stakeholders are often involved at this stage as major actors being interviewed/consulted when the analysis is undertaken. If deemed relevant particularly in sensitive/fragile environments and in contexts where there may be a 'gap' between national governments and major country-level actors, dedicated sessions can be organised to share the results of the analysis and obtain key stakeholder feedback.</p>
Joint response	Once a first draft of the joint response is available, consultation sessions can be organised to obtain feedback from key stakeholders on the selected focal sectors, the suggested division of labour, the identified priorities, the design of the overall or sector strategies, etc.
Monitoring and evaluation	Key stakeholders can also be invited to provide their feedback on the Joint Programming progress monitoring report(s). This helps 'check' the national statistical picture against the realities on the ground and highlight the priorities to be addressed going forward. This provides inclusive follow-up to the process.

Types of Consultations

There are two distinct types of consultation processes: dedicated consultation events around the Joint Programming process and "blended" consultations:

- dedicated events: inviting relevant stakeholders separately or together to events tackling a series of guiding questions, with participants encouraged to provide their feedback that will contribute to/inform the design of the overall Joint Programming; and
- blended consultations: making use of already established coordination spaces and platforms (which can be both formal and informal) to include elements of the Joint Programming Document on specific meeting agendas. Blended consultations can also take advantage of consultations planned in the context of the implementation of the Gender Action Plan, CSO Roadmap or the Human Rights and Democracy Strategy in the partner country.

Consultations may also take place through workshops/focus groups and so on or via surveys and other online tools. A combination of the two is also possible and could be an appropriate option depending on the country context and the target audience.

Identifying the right stakeholders

These are relevant questions when considering 'whom to invite':

1. Which sectors of society have an interest in the issues that will be discussed in the joint programming process? Are those sectors represented in any organisations/bodies (particularly umbrella bodies/networks/ coordination mechanisms) that can be identified as interlocutors?
2. Which other sectors of civil society are concerned directly or indirectly with joint programming and/or will be impacted (positively and negatively)? Are they organised? Can we reach them?
3. Who has influence in the community/area with regard to the issues that will be debated?
4. Who was involved in past EU consultations? Who was not involved in the past, but should have been, and what were the reasons for this?

It may also be important to think about how to engage specific groups or take into account their interests (the extreme poor, young people or groups in remote provinces) in ways that are appropriate and which do not over-burden their own capacities. Well-designed, well-run consultation sessions can help address the problem of participation among vulnerable and marginalised groups. However, in particular contexts, more proactive efforts may be required, including separate discussions for specific groups to ensure their views are taken into account. Experience shows that different cultural groups may respond to different strategies of engagement.

- **Moldova** faces major challenges due to the sustained outward economic migration of Moldovans. On the one hand, there is a hollowing out of Moldova's productive capacity with the country's educated youth looking abroad for work and business opportunities. On the other hand, the outward migration of household bread-winners presents an overwhelming social protection problem, with Moldova's elderly, children and disabled often left behind with threadbare social services struggling to protect these vulnerable groups. In conducting a joint analysis European donors in Moldova acknowledged the pressing need to rethink development cooperation in a way that demonstrates to Moldovans the visible benefits from combating this problem. Unless development partners are able to deliver a credible promise of a better future Moldova's outward migration will continue unabated with devastating consequences both for the viability of donor programming and for the integrity of the nation state as a whole.

The joint analysis led the EU to agree to focus programming more on demonstrating tangible and visible benefits. To do this, it needed to conduct a wider and deeper consultation with a large portion of the population that has increasingly questioned the value of the partnership with Europe. In 2016, the EU and other European donors held two one-day workshops with 20 government ministers in attendance to reflect on the analysis and provide a more critical space in which to approach future programming.

At the same time, European donors also held a consultation with civil society that included representatives of disabled people, the diaspora and the private sector. This laid the foundation for the shaping of a shared approach to Joint Programming in Moldova, because it raised awareness of the need for a shift in programming that emphasises the importance of demonstrating value to Moldovans. In this way, coalitions can be developed in support of the hard reforms Moldova needs to implement to unleash its economic, social and cultural potential.

Managing the challenges of consulting stakeholders

Based on experience to date, it is evident that there are no 'blueprint' approaches on how to consult and engage with key stakeholders, and more specifically with civil society. National contexts are simply too diverse to allow for uniform approaches and Joint Programming should be flexibly tailored to the country context. Hence, an adequate reading of the context, civil society movements using assessments, mappings, political economy assessments and/or sectoral studies is essential. These can be launched via the Joint Analysis (see Chapter 4). This aspect is even more pertinent in sensitive, politically challenging and fragile contexts.

Secondly, the very process of consulting raises expectations on the part of key stakeholders. Therefore, managing expectations is very important, together with a systematic consideration of the political economy of national stakeholder dynamics. It is worthwhile developing shared key messages on Joint Programming in clear and concise language, openly sharing information on the whole process, and providing feedback and updates at agreed points in time.

Experience also shows that targeting and/or identifying the right actors continues to be a fundamental means of making consultations effective and inclusive. In addition to the national government leading national stakeholders to be consulted on Joint Programming may include:

- parliamentary working groups,
- national and local authorities and their networks,
- umbrella organisations and networks of local NGOs,
- international NGOs active in the country,
- cooperatives and associations active in the relevant sectors,
- human rights organisations and associations representing special interest groups,
- trade associations,
- Chambers of Commerce including any existing European Chamber of Commerce,
- think tanks, research funding agencies and local researchers,
- social interest groups and movements and even resource institutions with particular technical or personal expertise.

A thorough analysis deals not only with the major groups and institutions but also with the diversity that may exist within them. Hence the need to carefully map out the actors and their roles. For civil society, this mapping may already have been established in the case of a joint CSO Roadmap. Consultations with civil society should be planned and undertaken in a way which does not endanger any of the representatives/organisations especially in countries where there is a track record of limitations on the freedom of expression and association.

Consultations also raise operational challenges. They require time and add extra workload to the existing tasks of the EU Delegation and Member States. They may involve organising meetings, preparing questionnaires, translating documents into local languages, providing access, facilitating reflection and exchange, assessing and compiling the results and providing feedback to the key stakeholders on the outcomes of the consultations and how their input was taken into account.

Consulting with government

The new European Consensus highlights that "Partner country appropriation and ownership are essential" and that "Joint Programming should be led by the partner country's development strategy and aligned to the partner country's development priorities". The May 2016 Council conclusions "encourages the EU and Member States to strengthen their efforts to raise awareness among partner governments and other stakeholders of Joint Programming in order to strengthen and encourage ownership and alignment by timely consultations and dialogue". In practice, misperceptions and limited interest from the partner country government for Joint Programming processes remain a stumbling block. This is sometimes observed alongside a general country preference to manage the diversity of bilateral relations with development partners.

- In **Palestine**, European donors were fully committed to having Joint Programming aligned with and directly supporting the Palestinian Authority's (PA's) national development plan (the National Plan for Action). European donors represent a very large amount of development financing in Palestine. This means that Joint Programming would largely reduce fragmentation and transactions costs, while also improving impact by strengthening the standing of the Palestinian Authority as the legitimate development planning authority. EU support to help deliver Palestine's national development plan was strongly welcomed by the Palestinian Authority; and the Office of the Prime Minister took responsibility for regular dialogue with European development counsellors. The ongoing dialogue between the Palestinian Authority's Office of the Prime Minister and the European development partners created an invaluable environment of trust. The Palestinian Authority and European donors met repeatedly to exchange views on draft texts before they were officially endorsed. This gave the European donors confidence that the PA was responding to their concerns in finalising Palestine's National Policy Agenda. As European donors were willing to exchange views on their draft strategy with the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian officials became more confident in their development partnership with European donors.
- In **Laos**, open communication on sensitive issues was key in changing the government's initial concern about losing bilateral relationships to a more positive and constructive attitude. Every opportunity was taken to reinforce the positive aspects of Joint Programming, including arranging meetings with the neighbouring Cambodian authorities on their Joint Programming process. The consultations gave European partners the chance to clarify certain misperceptions with Lao government officials. These related to:
 - i) the impact/implications of Joint Programming on existing bilateral relations, with no risk of it being at the expense of existing bilateral mechanisms;
 - ii) the expectation of co-signing the Joint Programming Document;
 - iii) the positive effects in terms of bringing down transaction costs and giving more value for money (not less money), with the potential to increase the efficiency of European ODA disbursed in Laos; and
 - iv) the instrumental role Joint Programming will play in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.

Country cases reveal, however, that when the government actively supports Joint Programming, there is an acknowledgment of its advantages along with active participation in the process. A review of Joint Programming processes also shows that scepticism and fears around issues such as 'losing' bilateral relationships or funds can be overcome through regular, timely engagement and clear communication with national governments/authorities on the benefits of Joint Programming to both sides of the partnership.

Consulting with the wider development partners group

All development partners in the country should be consulted on the Joint Programming process to ensure that it is coordinated with their on-going work. In some countries, similar processes such as the preparation of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework can also provide experiences for the Joint Programming process in terms of consultative processes and choice of strategic priorities. Moreover, during consultations with the wider development partner community, non-EU partners can also be invited to join the Joint Programming process if this is judged appropriate by the EU and its Member States.

The new European Consensus confirms that Joint Programming should be open to other relevant donors and international actors if this is assessed as relevant at country level by EU Delegations and Member States' Embassies and field offices. The inclusion of non-EU partners in the Joint Programming process is desirable as it will increase the 'coverage' of the joint planning of development funds and thus render the strategy more inclusive. Switzerland and Norway are like-minded partners that join Joint Programming processes. When non-EU partners join the process, it is important to also agree and set out mechanisms to allow them to participate at relevant Heads of Mission discussions on Joint Programming.

How different are consultations in Joint Programming from a 'standard' programming consultation?

- this is a joint process among partners participating in the Joint Programming process;
- it can use the Joint Programming division of labour to share out the burden of work, with each coordinating partner taking the lead in consulting on a specific sector;
- it attracts more attention from all different types of stakeholders, because of the joint nature and the longer list of partners/interlocutors that the Joint Programming partners bring together;
- it may not be limited to the priority sectors, but may also encompass and specifically address cross-cutting themes (e.g. gender or climate change etc.) or development principles (e.g. transparency, a rights-based approach, etc.);
- the joint aspect enhances the political and financial leverage factor (the group of bilateral partners has a greater impact than the sum of their individual parts). The enhanced political factor may meet with some resistance from the partner country and it may be useful to pace the consultations to allow partner country counterparts to understand/digest the Joint Programming concept/process.
- it requires a clear strategy of joint messaging on what Joint Programming is and how it may (or may not) affect existing bilateral cooperation mechanisms;
- It allows Joint Programming partners to communicate a joint/coherent approach in response to national policies, and makes for a more systematic joint messaging.

- In **Cambodia**, European partners consulted the government, civil society, private sector and other development partners before finalising the Joint Programming Document. Consultations with the government were organised together with the government's lead agency for aid coordination, which then communicated arrangements to all government ministries and agencies. The consultations were co-chaired by the government minister and the EU ambassador. However, each European ambassador presented an aspect of the Joint Programming strategy that was part of the consultations. Consultation with civil society was organised with Cambodian civil society networks, utilising and supporting their role as umbrella organisations. All documents for consultations were translated into the Khmer language to ensure that Cambodian stakeholders could prepare fully for the consultations and simultaneous interpreting was provided to enable all stakeholders to participate meaningfully. Consultations helped give the joint European group visibility from early on in the process and served to facilitate subsequent dialogue around the first monitoring report on the implementation of the Cambodia Joint Programming Document.

11. Joint Policy Dialogue through Joint Programming

Broadly speaking, policy dialogue is a strategic discussion to bring about change/reform. It covers specific sectors of development cooperation and supports the partner country's efforts to achieve the objectives laid down in their national and sector strategies. Policy coherence involves aligning development and political objectives in the relationship with the partner country so that they are mutually beneficial.

Policy dialogue opportunities are best when:

- i) a public policy change process is already underway;
- ii) the government's lead actors are open to the engagement with donors and core stakeholders;
- iii) the legitimacy and credibility of responsible stakeholders are high; and/or
- iv) there is a pushing factor such as an international binding policy, pressure from the civil society, or an emergency situation⁵².

The new European Consensus states that at country level, the EU and Member States will enhance Joint Programming to increase their collective impact by bringing together their resources and capacities as well as using joint results frameworks to maintain momentum, inform dialogue and enhance mutual accountability. The May 2016 Council conclusions state that Joint Programming can be an effective tool to enhance coordination at country and sector level and reinforce coordinated policy dialogue; and the evaluation of Joint Programming provides evidence that Joint Programming processes can contribute to improving the political and policy dialogue. In some countries, monitoring based on a Joint Results Framework and the adoption of a 'cluster' approach to Joint Programming have supported strategic policy dialogue focusing on accountability for public policy implementation.

To best exploit the opportunities for joint policy dialogue, it is vital that there are clear communication channels between the political and operational sections in EU Delegations and Member State' embassies and implementing agencies. Partner countries may also need support with the coordination of policy dialogue, and this can be more comprehensively supported through a division of labour under the Joint Programming process.

A guide to framing policy dialogue in the context of budget support is presented in Annex 13 to the "Updated Budget Support Guidelines"⁵³. In short, the guidelines state that effective dialogue requires a pro-active, strategic, structured and documented approach, and is based on robust monitoring and evaluation of data generated ideally by the partner country. Four steps are outlined namely:

- (i) an adequate analysis of the country and sector context;
- (ii) a precise definition of the objectives of the policy dialogue;
- (iii) the establishment of an agreed framework and resources for the dialogue; and
- (iv) the maintenance of adequate records and reporting on policy dialogue.

Effective policy dialogue requires qualified partners, builds on trust, respects the principles of national ownership, and is aligned with existing policy and budgetary cycles. Alignment and harmonisation between partners under a Joint Programming process can help reduce the transaction costs for partner countries and helps strengthen policy messages.

Policy dialogue is also a continuous process, which takes place in formal and informal contexts alike. Formal dialogue benefits from a clear agreement with partner countries on a dialogue framework. The starting point, whenever possible, should be sector/national coordination, monitoring and reporting mechanisms. Based on the objectives and framework, the dialogue should be adequately resourced. Setting up a dialogue facility can provide additional support for example for technical assistance, workshops, coordination tasks or joint missions.

52 For thematic resources on policy dialogue, see <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/consultation-pd/minisite/thematic-resources-policy-dialogue> (access requires registration to the group on capacity4dev).

53 <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/articles/updating-eu-budget-support-introducing-2017-guidelines>

Activities to support joint policy dialogue:

Joint Programming supports joint policy dialogue and this is often one of the key purposes/objectives for development partners' participation in the Joint Programming process. When the EU and Member States come together to adopt common approaches, speaking with 'one voice', they implement joint policy dialogue. Possible activities:

1. Analyse possible challenges/constraints to effective joint policy dialogue: it may be worth undertaking initial collective preparatory work, such as awareness-raising on aims, ambitions and possible barriers to joint policy dialogue in different priority areas of the Joint Programming Document. Carrying out this initial groundwork may result in dialogue being more joined up and effective, leading to positive outcomes.
2. Identify focal point(s) in the governments (ministries) responsible for dialogue on aid effectiveness and coordination at sector level. It is crucial (and challenging) to understand the linkages between the horizontal ministries and the line ministries on sectoral issues. For joint policy dialogue on a cross-cutting or multi-sectoral thematic priority, the first step may be to initiate a conversation with the partner government/ national authority to request that a lead line ministry be mandated to coordinate at sector level.
3. Ask participating partners to nominate a coordinator/policy lead who will be tasked with (a) mapping the development partners in the sector and (b) initiating meetings with participating partners to identify shared priorities. This could draw on the already agreed division of labour.
4. Identify other major and influential non-EU development partners in the sector. Recognise that in some instances partners can exert considerable influence irrespective of their development cooperation budget and verify the extent to which these actors have shared priorities for the sector.
5. Initiate a multi-development partner discussion on the effectiveness and efficiency of the coordination mechanism of a sector or the structure of the group. This can be carried out while focusing on the extent to which the partner government has the capacity and authority to lead coordination and whether the coordination structure has sufficient secretariat capacity and/or authority to be recognised as an important institution at sector level.
6. Develop a timeline to show possible opportunities for dialogue. These might include points at which:
 - a new policy or development plan is being designed or developed;
 - there are actions to pursue the Sustainable Development Goals at local level;
 - evaluations, reviews, impact assessments, or major technical or feasibility studies are being conducted.
7. Agree a plan among participating partners to draft common policy briefs/lines-to-take on shared priorities, at key events, and for briefing Heads of Mission. These briefs/lines-to-take should be short and succinct - i.e. focused on key messages, and communicated to the appropriate audience. Consider developing a pool of policy briefs, per priority sector in the Joint Programming Document to support joint messaging. Briefs and lines-to-take should have an appropriate format for the user. For example, for Heads of Mission, they may be more succinct (one page) than for a sector policy officer.
8. Map out planned evaluations, reviews and technical studies (preferably performed jointly) to better understand where these might be of use, e.g. as evidence or background material to be consulted prior to undertaking joint policy dialogue.

9. Assess whether joint policy dialogue has been effective by evaluating results achieved over time, both formal and informal (such as building trust). Aim to report on the outcomes of policy dialogue and feed this into the review of progress on implementing the Joint Programming Document.
10. Consider structuring Heads of Cooperation meetings to include updates on policy dialogue in key areas of interest to all participating partners (government reforms that affect all sectors, for example).
11. Consider holding combined discussions between Heads of Mission and Heads of Cooperation on Joint Programming progress, the impact of policy dialogue, upcoming policy dialogue opportunities or key issues that need to be mainstreamed in speeches such as gender.

- **In Palestine**, the Joint Programming Document 2017-2020 directly responds to the Palestinian National Policy Agenda, and was prepared based on six years of joint policy dialogue, using flexible locally developed and managed policy dialogue tools.

Sixteen sector strategy fiches established leads and active donors for each sector (cluster approach), with specific roles and responsibilities. Those are working documents, regularly updated, and used by the EU Delegation and the Member State embassies/field offices to pass on collective messages and information to Palestinian counterparts (way forward, financial means). They are backed by a results-oriented framework aiming at steering a structured, coherent and results-oriented policy dialogue, with stronger monitoring and evaluation features.

In Cambodia and Laos, joint policy briefs were developed through the Joint Programming process by lead partners under the division of labour. In Cambodia, the briefs were essentially key messages for Heads of Mission and were presented in a 1-2 page format so as to be accessible as meeting briefs.

In Laos, the Delegation has set up a facility to support the implementation of EU-Lao bilateral cooperation, with particular focus on the EU's Joint Programming focal areas (education, nutrition and governance). The activities support implementation through the provision of:

- expertise supporting policy dialogue and analysis;
- information, best practices and know-how exchanges;
- technical assistance;
- studies (including feasibility studies and design of new programmes) and research;
- logistics, coordination and organisation of meetings, events, campaigns and visibility.

This facility mechanism results in reduced transaction costs linked to other contracting arrangements for individual assignments, contributing to a higher efficiency and impact of the funds available for support measures.

12. Improving EU Visibility through Joint Programming

Joint Programming has the potential to improve visibility - for participating partners – both as a group and individually. A focus on visibility can support dialogue and build on aspirations for greater consistency between political dialogue and development cooperation. Visibility tends to be achieved if the Joint Programming exercise is presented as relevant for newsworthy events and decisions made in the partner country.

Activities to Improve Visibility

The Joint Programming process in itself is not attention-grabbing and the general public does not connect with it easily. Communicating on the total amount of funds invested, calling attention to programming priorities or European values and highlighting how Joint Programming supports the partner country in achieving international objectives, such as the SDGs are more newsworthy messages⁵⁴

Possible activities:

1. Consult, and organise meetings of participating partners' communications officers on how best to use the Joint Programming exercise to improve visibility.
2. Map out a calendar of key events in the partner country or in relation to the participating partners and develop joint press releases. This can improve the likelihood of press releases appearing in the local press⁵⁵.
3. Brief Heads of Mission and political officers in advance of visibility opportunities so that they can refer to Joint Programming when interviewed or speaking at official events.
4. Develop a user-friendly brochure explaining the key goals of Joint Programming in the partner country, paying particular attention to explaining what Joint Programming is:
 - for example, employ an easily understood metaphor such as working together as a sports team;
 - explain how Joint Programming adds value to the partner government and to people. Quote combined financial allocations, preferably in local currency and converted to round numbers, compared to the partner government's budget. If it is a large proportion, then state the proportion, but if it is small, relate the percentage to government spending on visible services, e.g. the Joint Programming is equivalent to the national education budget;
 - explicitly name participating partners and include their flags;
 - provide an explanation as to what objectively verifiable results are being pursued in priority sectors;
 - resist using Joint Programming jargon i.e. technocratic expressions/narratives such as fragmentation, harmonisation, and programming, as these will mean little to the public.
5. Once finalised, consider giving the Joint Programming Document an "official look" and professional finish so as to ensure it is appropriate for public circulation (good examples include the monitoring report on Joint Programming for Cambodia⁵⁶, and brochures produced in Palestine and Laos). Translating into local languages can also trigger a wider circulation and target audience.

54 Communication and Visibility in EU-financed external actions: requirements for implementing partners (adopted 16 November 2017) <https://myintracomm.ec.europa.eu/dg/devco/communication/communication-visibility/Documents/communication-visibility-requirements-for-eu-financed-external-actions-internal-document.pdf>

55 It is worth including a graphic/data illustration that draws the attention of journalists.

56 <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming/minisite/3-country-cases#Cambodia>

6. Consider printing an appropriate number of brochures, fact sheets and copies of the Joint Programming Document once adopted for circulation.
7. Explore new ways of communicating Joint Programming messages, such as social media, short videos, infographics and local events.
8. Consider hosting joint visibility events in priority areas of the Joint Programming Document and using these sector entry points to communicate on radio and through TV/press reporting on the collective work of the European partners under the Joint Programming Document.
9. Agree locally that any speeches by participating partners on specific projects should refer to the project's impact on a priority in the Joint Programming Document.
10. Produce visibility items in partnership with press and information officers that make reference to the Joint Programming Document, such as a banner or t-shirts for events. Flags of participating partners are usually a good way to provide visibility to all participating partners and communicate the 'joint' aspect.
11. Consider undertaking joint missions with the press to the field to visit a range of participating partners' projects (including joint implementation) to reinforce the joint nature of their work and provide human stories linked to the priorities in the Joint Programming Document.
12. Consider publishing a book that captures the contributions of participating partners under the Joint Programming Document or specific instances of joint implementation (a good example is the Kenya Blue Book 2016).
13. Consult, and contribute to, the central visibility tools for Joint Programming such as:
 - a) on the EEAS website, ensuring a dedicated Joint Programming part under the section 'Relations with the EU' in each EU Delegation webpage (HQ-based work);
 - b) contributing to the Joint Programming group in capacity4dev and share documents and updates from your country;
 - c) adding information on the newly created Joint Programming tracker website (<https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/jptracker>).

The launch of a Joint Programming Document can be an opportunity to organise an event that creates visibility. In **Ethiopia** and **Namibia**, for example, the partner governments actively participated in the event surrounding the launch of the Joint Programming Document, while in **Cambodia** the government co-hosted and co-chaired the event.

The EU Delegation in **Cambodia** produced the first ever video on Joint Programming, in which participating partners explain the process, their role and the expected impacts of the Joint Programming document.

You can find the video on the EuropeAid-EU in the World YouTube channel (and soon in DIVA platform):

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8uQgDwVp5s&t>

The **Kenya** Blue Book 2016 can be found here: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20160206blue_book2016.pdf

- Existing leaflets/brochures on Joint Programming can be found here⁵⁷. Please note that, if needed, DEVCO may be able to assist in publishing brochures and reports. Please contact the functional mailbox of the DEVCO Joint Programming team, or visit the Joint Programming group in capacity4dev: <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming>.
- In **Ghana**, the Joint Programming Document contains a specific section on joint visibility and communication. The Joint visibility strategy identified joint written publications, organised joint events, such as joint signing ceremonies for projects and programmes, joint missions and joint reporting and cross-references on individual participating partners' websites as some of the key activities to support joint visibility. Developing a common logo and branding may also be worth considering.

57 <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming/documents>

13. Joint Programming in Fragile Contexts

In its May 2016 conclusions, the Council stresses the opportunity of expanding Joint Programming including in fragile situations and conflict-affected countries, as well as in prevention or post-conflict contexts. Pointing to its conclusions⁵⁸ on the EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises⁵⁹, the Council says that early, coordinated and shared analysis is the starting point for the Comprehensive Approach. This is taken forward by the EU Integrated Approach to external conflicts and crises, expanding the scope and ambition of the Comprehensive Approach⁶⁰. It provides a strategic basis for conflict-sensitive EU programming and also contributes to the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States⁶¹.

The EU is committed to being sensitive to situations of tension and to opportunities to support resilience in fragile contexts⁶². The new European Consensus on Development underlines that, 'The EU and its Member States will also pursue enhanced coordination and synergies in fragile and conflict-affected countries, including through Joint Programming processes and joint conflict analysis.'

Activities to Support Joint Programming in Fragile States

Fragile states are especially vulnerable to aid fragmentation and ineffectiveness, especially when there is an overlap of humanitarian and development actors and low or non-existent national government capacity to coordinate. In addition, situations of fragility can evolve rapidly in crisis contexts and the institutional memory in EU Delegations and Member States embassies and implementing agencies may be constrained by high staff turnover and limited presence on the ground. Possible activities in such a context to support Joint Programming:

1. Assess whether a conflict/situational analysis can usefully contribute to a Joint Programming process. Key criteria include situations where:

- a country or context is deemed fragile or where underlying tensions make the environment particularly complex and sensitive;
- a country is on the EU conflict Early Warning System⁶³ (EWS) priority list⁶⁴;
- there is no national development plan on which to base the Joint Analysis and/or no functioning/recognised central government with which to hold dialogue;
- experience shows that certain interventions may have exacerbated social or other types of conflict.

Starting a Joint Programming process through a conflict/situational analysis is beneficial as it builds risk assessment into the joint planning and response and generates trust between actors, as well as a shared understanding of complex and sensitive circumstances. In doing so, it paves the way for a conflict-sensitive joint response and uses better risk anticipation and prevention as the basis for sustainable interventions. Starting with a conflict/situational analysis can also help develop a more explicit EU narrative to approach countries with the most challenging contexts for effective development engagement. These are countries where (i) there is no national development plan; (ii) when a functioning central government does not exist; (iii) where legitimacy/authority is contentious, i.e. the most challenging contexts for effective development engagement; or (iv) where the EU suspended direct cooperation with partner countries' governments/national authorities (or create conditions to lift the suspension).

58 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf

59 <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-fragility/document/eu-comprehensive-approach-external-conflicts-and-crisis>

60 Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to external Conflicts and Crises https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/january-2018-council-conclusions-integrated-approach-external-conflicts-and-crisis_en

61 <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-fragility/minisite/policy-developments/new-deal-engagement-fragile-states>

62 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/join_2017_21_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v7_p1_916039.pdf

63 For info on the EU conflict Early Warning System, see the 2017 Staff Working Document EU conflict Early Warning System: Objectives, Process and Guidance for Implementation – 2017: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/swd-eu-conflict-early-warning-system-2017_en.pdf

64 The EU conflict Early Warning System priority list is a classified document. It is shared with relevant EU Delegations. Member States receive this list via the Political and Security Committee.

As for the joint response, conflict sensitivity implies ensuring that actions do not accidentally contribute to instability risks (the 'do no harm' principle) and that we maximise the EU contribution to peaceful progress and stability through an integrated approach bringing together all relevant EU tools and sources of influence in a coherent way. This is also relevant for addressing underlying risks of violent extremism. Conflict sensitivity does not relate to security engagement alone; it is relevant across all programming and political engagement.

A conflict/situational analysis⁶⁵ is a flexible methodology that is adapted to the context but usually involves commissioning a background literature review. A structured workshop is then organised to bring interested parties together to analyse the structural and political economy factors underlying risks of instability, as well as dynamics/trends/ future scenarios, stakeholder analysis and the sources of resilience for communities. The workshop also provides an opportunity to review whether the EU and its Member States are taking action that effectively addresses the key issues highlighted in the analysis, to reflect on lessons learnt through a conflict-sensitivity lens and to generate ideas on how the EU and Member States' strategy and action could be more 'conflict-sensitive'.

2. Consider the best approach to developing a conflict/situational analysis that can contribute to the medium- to long-term aspiration of a Joint Programming process. There are as many approaches as country situations, but two main options can be explored:
 - a conflict/situational analysis to launch the Joint Programming process. A conflict/situation analysis workshop is immediately followed by discussions on how to organise Joint Programming (both in terms of analysis and response) to best tackle the challenges identified. This can mean, for example, structuring the joint analysis around the key priorities identified, or revising the division of labour if key sectors emerging from the workshop appear to be 'orphaned'. A Joint Programming process can also start by taking stock of an existing conflict/situational analysis, as a means of ensuring operational follow-up on the conclusions reached;
 - a conflict/situational analysis to inform the Joint Programming process. A Joint Programming review or new Joint Programming phases synchronised with country cycles (new development plan and/or new government) can provide an opportunity to carry out a conflict/situational analysis. The latter can then be used to update the joint analysis if necessary, to make the joint response more conflict-sensitive or to recommend drawing up a joint humanitarian and development framework⁶⁶, as a way of connecting humanitarian and development actors.
3. Before the conflict/situational analysis, consider sending out a questionnaire to Member States with questions on priority sectors, planning cycles, opportunities and challenges, and enquire about any strategic analysis Member States may already have that would contribute to understanding fragility in the country
4. After the conflict/situational analysis, the conclusions should feed into the Joint Programming process operationally. This will involve them:
 - providing the underlying foundation for the joint analysis. A joint analysis may not be the best channel through which to explicitly adopt all conclusions from the conflict analysis, as some may be sensitive and restricted. However, a number of considerations can help steer the joint response;
 - developing a conflict-sensitive joint response, according to the above-mentioned guidance. The latter is available in *Operating in situations of conflict and fragility: an EU staff handbook*⁶⁷. Further guidance is offered through the EU online course on conflict sensitivity⁶⁸.

65 "Conflict" analysis and "situational" analysis mean the same process; it is up to the participating partners to choose the best term that reflects local sensitivities. For more operational instructions, see the "Operating in situations of conflict and fragility: EU staff handbook June 2015", note no1, pages 45-62 on <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-fragility/document/operating-situations-conflict-and-fragility-eu-staff-handbook>

66 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management/resilience-building-humanitarian-development-nexus_en

67 <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/t-and-m-series/blog/operating-situations-conflict-and-fragility-eu-staff-handbook-0>

68 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/ils/learner_main.jsp?dmy=1527589561307&proclid=internareaprocess

- In **Burundi**, a conflict analysis, undertaken prior to the start of the Joint Programming work helped identify two key guiding questions for a first Joint Programming scoping mission in 2017, namely:
 - 1 What should the overall goals of European development cooperation be where there has been a 'change for the worse'?
 - 2 How can a Joint Programming Document be drawn up and put into operation when the government is not engaging in dialogue with European partners?

The consensus reached was to centre the EU's 'joint response' around three pragmatic, fragility-tailored medium-term aims: (i) supporting the resilience of the Burundian population; (ii) working at local level (households and communities) to support community-driven development and decision-making, social cohesion and local accountability; and (iii) improving coherent responses among all partners in Burundi.

Given the risk of abrupt contextual changes in Burundi, European partners also agreed to undertake annual reviews of the joint programming, where needed. The fact that three Heads of Mission have been strongly involved in the Joint Programming process from the start is certainly critical in such a highly politicised context. The need for stronger linkages between the CSO roadmap and Joint Programming process was also emphasised, especially in view of the role of CSOs in supporting populations in fragile contexts.

14. Broadening the Scope of Joint Programming

The 2016 Council conclusions set higher ambitions for Joint Programming processes. They called for the inclusion of strategic issues such as migration, climate change, fragility, security and democracy in line with the EU Comprehensive Approach, and for account to be taken of cross-cutting policies, notably on human rights, gender equality, good governance and civil society.

Joint Programming processes have so far focused mainly on programmable bilateral cooperation as including other funds (thematic, regional, etc.) adds to the complexity of the exercise. However, some country experiences have highlighted pragmatic ways to address this issue.

Joint Programming should consider strategic issues⁶⁹ such as migration, climate change, security, democracy, resilience and fragility⁷⁰; and/or cross-cutting priorities notably on human rights, gender equality, good governance and civil society, plus youth, mobility, investment and the mobilisation of domestic resources. These can be mainstreamed across all relevant areas of programming or form the focus of specific action under the Joint Programming process. Policy initiatives such as the Gender Action Plan⁷¹, the Civil Society Roadmap⁷² and the Human Rights and Democracy Strategy⁷³ already share common mechanisms, principles and goals with Joint Programming and are all usually drawn up together with EU Member States.

Including strategic issues in Joint Programming

Through a Joint Programming process, the EU and participating development partners may be able to develop joint approaches to strategic issues more easily as a collective group, drawing on the practices around closer coordination developed in the Joint Programming Document.

Possible actions:

1. involve Heads of Mission as high-level advocates for Joint Programming at country level with high-level national counterparts and highlight how working together is addressing strategic issues;
2. identify which strategic issues are of critical importance for the partner country and for the partners participating in the Joint Programming process;
3. consider organising a joint training session or joint retreat to focus on specific strategic issues and reflect on possible joint responses in a range of priority sectors;
4. based on dialogue with the government, national authorities, stakeholders and participating partners, review the mapping exercise to identify existing support for strategic issues. This could both provide useful experience and highlight the potential for future joint actions or programming in these areas;
5. develop a concept, sector vision or shared narrative on how like-minded partners should work together to address strategic issues and what results could be envisaged. These results could then be included in the joint results framework;
6. gather a working group to discuss a strategic issue: identify which of the participating partners can act as a coordinator and work towards increased dialogue with counterparts in government/the national authorities, possibly developing a common policy brief as a starting point;
7. when consensus is reached, develop a plan for participating partners to work jointly on the strategic issue in one sector or across a range of sectors;

⁶⁹ It is acknowledged that there can be some overlaps between strategic priorities and cross-cutting policies, such as climate change issues, gender and civil society, as they are often considered both themes to be mainstreamed as well as “sectors” to channel support.

⁷⁰ https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/join_2017_21_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v7_p1_916039.pdf

⁷¹ <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-gender/minisite/eu-gender-action-plan-2016-2020>

⁷² <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-governance-civilsociety/minisite/roadmaps>

⁷³ https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/eu-policy/action-plan-human-rights-and-democracy-2015-2019_en

8. communicate and ensure continued visibility to demonstrate how working jointly can improve results on strategic issues;
9. if external consultants are recruited to support the EU Delegation on specific strategic issues, ensure they report to the Heads of Cooperation on a regular basis;
10. consider highlighting joint work on strategic issues in the Joint Programming Roadmap (see above Chapter 3 - Developing a Roadmap). This can also be used to instigate the development of a roadmap if there is not yet a Joint Programming process in place.

- In **Senegal**, migration is a strategic issue, which is referenced in a number of ways in the Joint Programming Document. In particular, migration is part of the 2nd strategic objective in the Joint Programming Document (economic governance, public finance management and the fight against corruption; migration management; democratic governance and security). An analysis of the state of migration is provided in the document along with other strategic issues. Furthermore, migration is also specifically monitored through the joint results framework notably linked to SDGs 5 (gender equality), 8 (decent jobs and economic growth), 10 (reduced inequalities), 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) and 17 (partnerships for the goals). The overall aim is to step up management of regular and irregular migration as a factor promoting sustainable development and there are tables with expected results, indicators, means of verification and lead actors. Finally, the Joint Programming Document for Senegal also looks into the relationship between programmable and non-programmable aid, noting that both deal with migrant management, because they are complementary and help deliver the aims and results of the European Joint Strategy.
- In **Ghana**, graduation beyond aid is a strategic aspect of the Joint Programming Document underpinning all of the priorities. The Joint Programming process will specifically support and accompany Ghana's transformation process and consolidation of its middle-income status, economic growth and democratic governance. The aim is to move towards a mature and mutually-beneficial partnership and into more strategic forms of cooperation, which the government refers to as "Ghana beyond Aid". This 'EU+ Cooperation Group' will therefore evolve from traditional aid to a more comprehensive approach encompassing trade, competitiveness, migration and climate change. The role of Joint Programming in the broader cooperation context is deemed essential in serving Ghanaian and European common interests.

Including cross-cutting priorities in Joint Programming

As with strategic issues, cross-cutting priorities can be mainstreamed across all areas of action in the Joint Programming Document or included as specific areas for joint focus, depending on what is most relevant in the country context. Possible activities:

1. Identify the partners who have developed effective ways of mainstreaming⁷⁴ cross-cutting priorities and ask them to share their experiences and advice for similar actions in other sectors.
2. Assess the available entry points and the work that will be required to effectively mainstream cross-cutting issues in priority sectors. Consider identifying designated lead partners for each cross-cutting issue. Individual partners who take on such a lead should ensure there is adequate support for this role.
3. Consider setting up a contracted pool of experts in cross-cutting priorities to provide external support on specific issues. Encourage participating partners to make use of this external expertise to 'provide an analysis' of how well cross-cutting issues are being mainstreamed in particular sectors.

⁷⁴ Although the mandate to mainstream applies to all partners it would be better to identify "the champions" (i.e. those having developed effective ways of mainstreaming for each topic and maybe also leading the topic as a sector) so that they can inspire others.

4. Think about organising a joint training session or joint retreat to focus on a specific cross-cutting issue and reflect on possible joint responses in a range of priority sectors.
5. Identify specific critical cross-cutting issues that could form the basis for a specific result in the joint results framework to guarantee continuous monitoring and attention.
6. Draw up a work plan or schedule to ensure that key cross-cutting issues receive continuous review and plan regular dialogue (at different levels) with the partner country. This could include indicators, which can be monitored and could be included in the Joint Results Framework.
7. Consider a local agreement to support specific technical assistance on a cross-cutting issue in all participating partners programmes and projects.
8. If regular reviews and/or evaluations of the Joint Strategy are planned, incorporate the regular review of cross-cutting issues into the broader review and evaluation if this has not already happened through the results framework.

- **Bolivia** has included gender as a cross-cutting issue that is integral to the Joint Programming Document. More specifically the participating partners have adopted gender mainstreaming principles for cooperation in Bolivia and committed to promoting gender equality throughout their programmes. In particular, they have agreed to use national law and international agreements as a reference for defining future support to include proposals from women's organisations in their programme design, to contribute to the development of measures on gender inequality and to allocate budgetary and technical resources to promoting gender equality. The Joint Programming Document also highlights the joint approach to fostering the increased transparency of national investments in gender equality and to pushing for the establishment of formal accountability spaces. The results framework for the Bolivia Joint Programming Document includes a specific gender indicator monitoring the number of development cooperation instruments incorporating gender mainstreaming.
- **In Cambodia**, the European partners found that the absence of a coordination group on climate change in the existing aid coordination framework meant that support in this area was fragmented, with a high risk of duplication and limited institutional capacity-building. As a group, European partners pursued a three-track approach: starting their own internal coordination; lobbying for the creation of a coordinating group in the aid coordination framework and including a specific result on climate change in the results framework. The lobbying and advocacy work resulted in the creation of a government coordination group open to development partners for specific meetings and to which the EU was invited as a key partner in recognition of its advocacy work on climate change. The joint results framework was also updated to include an indicator taken from the country's Intended Nationally Determined Contribution in an area of key policy interest for the European partners, namely forest cover.

Annexes

Annexes

Annex 1. Overarching Joint Programming approach: summary table

Joint Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consult and make use of existing analytical work e.g. political, economic, social, environmental analyses and human rights information and analyses⁷⁵. • Assess the quality, relevance and credibility of the National Development Plan as a basis for Joint Programming. • Address priorities, goals and challenges outlined in the National Development Plan. • Take a comprehensive approach, analysing the economic, political, social situation etc. • Analyses of ODA (e.g. bilateral and multilateral development cooperation, regional and thematic funds, funding channeled through civil society organisations). In principle, the analysis can also include other sources of development finance (e.g. loans, guarantees, other Official Flows, as provided by European development banks, publicly-funded equity investments funds⁷⁶, vertical/global funds, etc.)
Joint Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall vision laying out objectives. • Commitment to synchronise with partner country's national planning cycle or jointly agreed timeframes (Neighbourhood). • Division of labour that shows which participating partner will work in which sectors including a clear definition of sectors of intervention. • Indicative multi-annual financial allocations for each sector. • Joint results framework for monitoring the implementation of the joint response. - Optional elements to consider: risk assessment, communication strategy, sector fiches, cross cutting and strategic issues, indications on intervention modalities.
Joint Programming Document	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Analysis + Joint Response (including joint results framework) = Joint Programming Document

⁷⁵ As far as ENP countries are concerned, ENP country reports should be included.

⁷⁶ For detailed explanation of different development financing flows, see the definitions provided by the OECD DAC at www.oecd.org

Annex 2. Short methodology for mapping comparative advantage

1. Conduct a desk review of the national development plans, relevant sector strategies, and current bilateral European cooperation strategies to identify the sectors where participating partners are active.
2. Use partner countries' existing aid-management systems to extract information on current and historic involvement of participating partners in different sectors. Data for this can also be sourced from IATI (www.d-portal.org) and OECD DAC.
3. Use a questionnaire to ask European partners about their existing and future plans, which can encourage them to assess their own comparative advantage.
4. Interview European players, government counterparts and development partners (including civil society, the private sector and other relevant stakeholders) about the comparative advantage of the participating partners as a group and separately as appropriate.
5. Facilitate discussion of the findings at a workshop to better understand how partners' comparative advantages are perceived.

Example of mapping /comparative advantage questionnaire:

- Q1. Which development partners work in which sectors?
- Q2. How involved are the development partners in the sectors in which they work? How active is their policy dialogue role versus their project implementation role?
- Q3. Where do the development partners see their comparative advantage?
- Q4. What are the development partners best at and why? This could include a review by sector or a review of partners' abilities to put into practice specific approaches such as gender mainstreaming or the 'do-no-harm' principle.
- Q5. How does the development partners' present sectoral coverage match up with their comparative advantage?
- Q6. What are the development partners' programming cycles?
- Q7. Where do the development partners want to lead, be active and be silent in the future?
- Q8. How do the development partners future plans match up with their comparative advantage?

Annex 3. Cambodia: Joint Programming monitoring report - a tool for policy dialogue

In May 2016, the first annual monitoring report of the European Development Cooperation Strategy 2014-2018 was issued. This report, together with its conclusions and recommendations and the joint results framework, provided the basis for an informed dialogue with the Cambodian Government and other stakeholders (namely civil society organisations, with whom a dedicated session was organised prior to the meeting with the government). The progress report was conceived as a tool for joint analysis of progress – or lack of progress – in key development areas in a constructive and solution-oriented manner. To facilitate the discussions, the report rated the progress made in the European Strategy outcome areas during the 2014-2015 period using a numerical and a colour-coded system. The rating was accompanied by an assessment, and more importantly, a list of areas of special attention and further actions, making the report a real instrument for measuring and managing results. Progress was rated in two complementary ways:

- 1) Numerical scoring (from 0 to 5), referring to progress on the basis of specific indicator for each output where 0 means 'no progress' and 5 means 'excellent progress' towards achieving the output.
- 2) Colour coding (red, yellow and green), referring to progress in the relevant sector and denoting the overall direction of change, where green means that, on the whole, progress is 'on track', yellow means 'partly on track/some concerns' and red means 'not on track/concerns'.

The chosen indicators in the results framework were only proxy indicators. This dual scoring system allowed a full progress assessment to be made taking into account not only the implementation of the European projects and programmes that directly support the given indicators, but also overall progress in the relevant sector from the European partners' perspectives, using international indices and qualitative measures. The Cambodian government particularly appreciated this scoring system, as it is better suited to measuring the progress made as part of complex reforms.

European partners shared the draft report, translated into Khmer, several weeks ahead of the scheduled consultations, which allowed all government representatives to familiarise themselves with its contents and feel confident about contributing to discussions.

Following the dialogue with the government, an information session was organised for the Cambodian parliament (chairs and vice-chairs of all parliamentary working groups) to share with them the conclusions of the progress report and the outcomes of the consultations with civil society and the private sector and the dialogue with government. This also allowed for an exchange of views and perspectives on the development progress to date and notably raised legislative and transparency issues related to the work of the parliament to be raised. The members of the Cambodian parliament found the precise recommendations in the monitoring report useful as this was the first time they had been provided with such a succinct and reader-friendly overview of development progress and challenges by European partners.

This 12-month process culminated in the revisions of the results framework as part of the mid-term review of the Joint Programming Document.

Annex 4. Example of Policy Brief

Policy brief on Coordinating European Partner

Key messages to the Government („lines to take”)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ... • ... • ... 	
Policy recommendations & actions	
a) Specific and practical measures that we can advise?	
b) Proposed next steps for action we recommend?	
Relevance of the topic to European Partners	
European interests and issues	
Context (page 2)	
(Problem) Statement on the topic	What it is about, terminology used and background
Government benefits/ advantages	What would be the benefit for the Government to address this issue? What are Governments interests?
Achievements & Challenges	What are key Government achievements regarding the issue (sector/ topic)? What are key challenges regarding the issue (sector/topic)? What is planned? Reference to the national development strategy or specific related reform plans?
DP's engagement and DP interests	What is the DP's engagement so far? Where is the focus? What are key issues the DPs involved are prioritising
Key entry points for the policy dialogue	
Key actors and institutions	Who in Government has decision-making power on the subject? Are there any change agents? Who could be relevant allies (Development Partners - multilateral organisations, private sector, civil society.)?

Annex 5. The use of surveys and workshops by EUDs – characteristics and lessons learnt

(from "The Roadmap process: taking stock". Framework Contract Commission 2011. Report drafted by the Roadmap Facility. Lot 1: Studies and technical assistance in all sectors. Letter of Contract No. 2014/351923)

Instrument	Characteristics	Lessons learnt
<p>Use of questionnaires and surveys (online, paper dissemination)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good method for getting widespread feedback on aspects of a strategy/ policy under discussion; • Good method for baseline information and regular follow-up from the same group of individuals; • Allows for better outreach (i.e. to get a general reading of many people at once). It is particularly relevant in big countries (e.g. Indonesia, India) and/or in countries where access is difficult (e.g. fragile environments) and/or when a large number of CSOs need to be reached and/or where resources are too limited to organise live consultations; • When multiple-choice questions are used, it allows data to be easily and quickly compiled. Open-ended questions allow for richer and more in-depth answers but may be difficult to analyse. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Choose a limited number of questions to prevent "questionnaire fatigue"; • Use questionnaires in the local language to allow for better outreach to local organisations; • Use appropriate and straightforward language and questions which can be easily understood by participants; • Find a balance between closed questions (easier to assess and allowing for greater focus) and open-ended questions that provide sufficient space for participants to freely express themselves (i.e. say what they want to say); • Build on Member States relations and networks to reach out beyond the "EU usual suspects."

<p>Workshops/ Consultation sessions / Focus groups</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good method for gaining more information where issues will bring multiple views and you are trying to understand the details and search for consensus; • Focus groups allow you to hear how individuals react to each other as well as to hear details. They also allow for divergence while at the same time remaining focused on covering key questions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide sufficient information and time in advance to allow for participants to be well prepared; • Select participants carefully and ensure women's and minority groups' participation; • Hold meetings in a local language, use appropriate and straightforward language and questions which can be easily understood by participants; • Structure consultation sessions into clear sections/ questions which can be easily followed by the participants; • Provide sufficient space for participants to freely express themselves (i.e. say what they want to say) while, at the same time, remaining focused on the issues to be addressed • Appoint facilitators/ moderators (if possible local) to lead the discussions in order to contribute to depth and fluency of plenary sessions.
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Annex 6. Compendium on EU and Member States Programming processes

1. Do Member States and the EU consider it possible to replace bilateral programming documents with JP documents?

Austria	<p>Not for the time being as Austria's bilateral country strategies are actionable documents which form the basis for 1) coordinating all Austrian actors under a whole-of-government approach, and 2) implementing an SDG-aligned, results-based management cycle, with results reported to the Austrian parliament and government.</p> <p>Priority regions & countries (bilateral cooperation): Albania, Armenia, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, the Caribbean, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kosovo, Mozambique, the Middle East and Palestinian Territories and Uganda.</p>
Belgium	<p>Not for the time being. Since ENABEL was made responsible for development cooperation on 1st January 2018, a common country strategy for European donors at European level is encouraged.</p>
Bulgaria	<p>Not for the time being but it may be considered in future. Financial resources for development cooperation are planned according to a mid-term financial planning, usually on a 3-year basis.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): no information available</p>
Croatia	<p>No information received</p> <p>Priority regions & countries (bilateral cooperation): territorial focus is Southeast Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Southern Mediterranean (Morocco, Tunisia and Syria), and Afghanistan.</p>
Cyprus, Republic of	<p>No information received</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Autonomous Palestinian Territories, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mali and Yemen.</p>
Czech Republic	<p>Not full replacement. The Joint Programming Document would only be a chapeau document, as CZ would have to keep a bilateral "contract" document specifying all the necessary details of the provision of bilateral aid.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Mongolia, Serbia, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia.</p>

Denmark	<p>Not for the time being because Denmark is currently formulating a new overall development strategy.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.</p>
Estonia	<p>Not for the time being, but willing to use JP Documents as reference document for bilateral cooperation.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine.</p>
Finland	<p>Not for the time being, although JP documents will be used as part of Finland's country programming preparations, particularly if the joint analysis meets set quality criteria.</p> <p>FI country programmes are part of the results management system of Finnish country level development cooperation, which is designed to also include general sectoral results targets and more detailed results targets that are directly linked to the programmes supported by Finland.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Palestinian Territory, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Ukraine and Zambia.</p>
France	<p>YES. FR will replace its bilateral programming in all priority countries except in cases with legitimate justifications and has already done so in Mali, Comoros and Chad. In all cases, AFD will continue to implement its "country intervention frameworks", which provide an operational framework in line with JP documents.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation):</p> <p>Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Senegal, Seychelles, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.</p> <p>Latin America and the Caribbean: Antilles, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname.</p> <p>Mediterranean and Middle East: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey.</p> <p>Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam.</p>

Germany	<p>YES - Germany can replace and has already done so in Mali. Priority countries (in which replacement may be considered):</p> <p>Benin, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Laos, Mali, Palestinian Territories.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation):</p> <p>Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia</p> <p>Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, India, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.</p> <p>Middle East: Palestinian Territories and Yemen.</p> <p>Latin America and the Caribbean: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Peru.</p> <p>South Eastern Europe/Caucasus: Albania, Kosovo, Serbia and Ukraine.</p>
Greece	<p>YES - Greece is willing to replace as soon as it restarts programming.</p> <p>Due to fiscal constraints, Greece's bilateral programming with partner countries is currently on hold.</p> <p>Priority countries: No information available</p>
Hungary	<p>Not for the time being.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine, Albania, Belarus, Cambodia, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Georgia, Iraq, Kosovo, Mongolia, Montenegro, Palestine, Vietnam, Tanzania.</p>
Ireland	<p>Not for the time being.</p> <p>To ensure greater policy coherence the Country Strategy documents are wider than development cooperation and address the broader political and economic relationship. Furthermore, the Country Strategy reflects IE engagement with the EU as well other relevant organisations including the UN, World Bank etc.</p> <p>The development cooperation aspect provides the detailed operational framework which is required for appraisal; budget approval, management and evaluation - including accountability to Parliament. It also forms the basis for communicating the activities and results of the Country Strategy to ensure continued public support for our engagement.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia.</p>

Italy	<p>Yes, bilateral programming documents should be replaced by a single EU doc. However, need for flexibility.</p> <p>Priority countries (2014 - 2016): Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Niger, Burkina Faso; Egypt, Tunisia; Albania; Palestine and Lebanon; Bolivia, El Salvador and Cuba; Afghanistan, Pakistan and Myanmar.</p>
Latvia	<p>Joint Programming documents will be used to help Latvia identify its priorities.</p> <p>The Strategy and Policy Plans state that Latvia will set its development cooperation priorities, inter alia, based on the Joint Programming process in a priority country, and based on Latvia's added value to that process. Latvia does not have bilateral Country Strategy Documents.</p> <p>Latvia's development cooperation is based on 1) the Mid-term Development Cooperation Strategy (2016-2020) and 2) annual Development Cooperation Policy Plans (with specific amounts per projects).</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova.</p>
Lithuania	<p>Not for the time being.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Afghanistan, Georgia (Eurasia and Central Asia) and Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine (Eastern Europe and Russia).</p>
Luxembourg	<p>Not for the time being although replacement could be considered in the medium-term.</p> <p>The JP document may serve as an annex to the Programme Indicatif de Cooperation (PIC), setting interventions in the framework of national policies of the partner country.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Central America, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Laos, Vietnam.</p>
Malta	<p>No information received</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Palestine & select Commonwealth countries.</p>
Netherlands	<p>YES - NL intends to replace, notably in Palestine & Ethiopia.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, the Palestinian Territories, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda and Yemen.</p>

Poland	<p>Not for the time being, due to legal limitations of PL. However, PL plan to use the JP documents in annual plans that define specific actions for each partner country. Polish development cooperation is carried out on the basis of the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme (2016-2020) covering 10 priority countries.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar, Palestine, Senegal, Tanzania.</p>
Portugal	<p>Not for the time being. Due to the decentralised system of Portuguese Cooperation, Bilateral Strategic Cooperation Programs (PEC) signed with partner countries are essential for coordination and coherence of the different national actors engaged in cooperation activities in those countries and in terms of bilateral political relations.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique and Macau & East Timor.</p>
Romania	<p>Not for the time being.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Georgia, Moldova, Serbia.</p>
Slovakia	<p>Not for the time being but could be possible after 2018 for some priority countries in the framework of the new Medium-Term Strategy for Development Cooperation of the Slovak Republic.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Afghanistan, Kenya and South Sudan.</p>
Slovenia	<p>Not for the time being but the new strategy as well as the new act on development cooperation that are being prepared and are due by the end of 2016 will provide guidance for future engagement in EU Joint Programming.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Montenegro, Macedonia and Moldova.</p>
Spain	<p>Not for the time being because 1) The Spanish programming methodology covers bilateral issues not covered by JP such as the coordination of Spanish actors in the field, other policies beyond cooperation, internal policy coherence, role of different Spanish institutions; 2) the programming methodology is based on an engagement model that differs substantially to the current Joint Programming framework, with the involvement of the Spanish Parliament as well as Spain/partner country decision making bodies (Joint Commissions).</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation): Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Palestine, Paraguay, Peru, Western Sahara (Sahrawi Population), Senegal, Philippines.</p>

Sweden	<p>Yes - a government decision on 21st September 2017 specified the possibility for replacement.</p> <p>Priority countries (bilateral cooperation)</p> <p>Africa: Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Middle East and North Africa, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.</p> <p>Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Iraq, Myanmar, Palestine</p> <p>Europe: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine.</p> <p>Latin America: Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala</p>
UK	<p>No. The UK supports Joint Programming in principle, having endorsed the 2016 Council Conclusions on Joint Programming but does not consider replacement a possibility.</p> <p>Some sectors in the UK (e.g. higher education) acknowledge the potential advantages of coordinating national responses to shared societal challenges. While the UK is broadly supportive of Joint Programming, it urges the Commission to ensure that Joint Programming activity is not allowed to distort the priorities of national funding bodies.</p> <p>Priority Countries (bilateral cooperation): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Democratic Republics of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Occupied Palestinian Authorities, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.</p>
EU	<p>YES - the EU is able to replace and has done so in Laos. In preparation: Palestine, Senegal.</p>

2. What are Member States and EU's core requirements for Joint Programming Documents to replace bilateral documents (or otherwise requirements of bilateral strategies)?

Austria	<p>Not ready to replace, but Austria's requirements (in addition to Joint Programming core requirements) include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lessons learnt, 2. Theory of Change analysis, 3. Common Results Framework for Development Cooperation <p>(in line with commitment to partnership and mutual accountability that is inherent to the 2030 Agenda).</p>
Belgium	<p>Not ready to replace but Belgium is a strong advocate of Joint Programming and actively promotes Joint Programming.</p> <p>Belgium's requirements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Policy priorities of BE's Minister for Development Cooperation 2. Priority sectors as defined by the Law of 2013 3. Specific objectives and expected results within a realistic timeline (incl. risk management) 4. Performance indicators (monitoring matrix, results framework / aid effectiveness benefits, visibility) 5. financial framework (incl. per priority area)
Bulgaria	<p>Not ready to replace but Bulgaria's requirements include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Objectives 2. Target sectors/ groups 3. Monitoring framework 4. Allocations per sector
Croatia	No information received
Cyprus, Republic of	No information received

Czech Republic	<p>Not full replacement but Czech Republic's requirements include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Analysis (assessment of framework conditions ind. strategic priorities of partner country) 2. Definition of priority sectors and cross cutting priorities 3. Indicative allocations per sector and division of labour among MS 4. Results and Monitoring framework
Denmark	<p>Not ready to replace but Denmark's requirements include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Integration of past experiences, 2. Budget specified at the outcome level, 3. Description of programme management and administration arrangements. Denmark's bilateral programme documents require: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Justification based on a context analysis, and 2. Coherence with the strategic priorities of the partner country.
Estonia	<p>Not ready to replace but Estonia's requirements include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Context analysis; 2. Strategic priorities for cooperation with baseline indicators and results framework; 3. Division of labour among Member States 4. Indicative financial allocations
Finland	<p>Not ready to replace but Finland's requirements include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Harmonised sectoral objectives, 2. division of labour and 3. indicative financial allocations

France

France is ready to replace and has already done so in Mali, Comoros and

Chad. France's requirements:

The Joint Analysis should include:

1. **A causal analysis** of the development dynamics and challenges in the partner country;
2. **A logical framework** identifying the main leverage points, multiplier effects to foster and prioritize activities to be implemented, in order to make progress towards the SDGs;
3. **An analysis of existing interventions** to reduce the risk of duplication and to identify complementarities to be exploited;
4. **An analysis of gaps**, especially relating to the French priority axes of interventions and
5. **A summary of the results.**

The Joint Response should include:

1. Defining the priority sectors of intervention.

France favours (but does not consider it necessary) a broad approach to value the "non-programmable" and "not fully programmable" aid and to present a broad vision of the European actions (peace and security, humanitarian aid, actions presenting benefits for the climate, decentralised cooperation, culture domain and/or francophone etc.), also including non-public development aid.

2. Sectors of concentration.

French offices in the field should focus on:

- 3 priority sectors of French aid (among the 10 sectors of legally identified interventions),
- 2 cross-cutting priorities consisting of gender equality and the fight against climate change.

3. A Precise Division of Labour:

- Offices in the field have been requested to adopt a breakdown by sector or sub-sector.

4. Indicative financial allocation per sector and donor (*)

- Financial allocations are indicative and may be modified. In order to permit a higher degree of flexibility, the financial allocations for bilateral action may be presented highlighting maximum and minimum values.

Field offices are invited to refer to the 'EU Results Framework' and French aid indicators to obtain measurable results indicators temporally defined for each of the concentration areas.

Germany	<p>Germany is ready to replace and has done so in Mali.</p> <p>Germany's requirements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sound analysis (assessment of framework conditions), 2. Definition of priority sectors, 3. Joint Results Framework per defined priority sector with results at outcome/ impact level according to OECD standards.
Greece	<p>Greece will replace once Greek assistance resumes.</p> <p>Greece's requirements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Defining priority sectors and interventions 2. Indicative allocations per sector and division of labour among MS 3. An Evaluation Monitoring framework 4. Lessons learnt from previous evaluations
Hungary	<p>Not ready to replace but Hungary's requirements include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Defining priority sectors 2. Indicative financial allocation per priority sector 3. A thorough analysis of the background of and outlook for partner countries development (including risk assessment, sector-analysis etc.) 4. Monitoring and results framework

Ireland**Not ready to replace/Ireland does not intend to replace.**

Ireland's requirements (for bilateral cooperation) include:

1. A broad "Whole of Government" approach (integrating political, economic and development cooperation activities),
2. A general context analysis together (with a more detailed context analysis of the specific areas in which Ireland will engage),
3. An assessment of partner country priorities compared to Ireland's policies and priorities,
4. An assessment of the overall donor environment in each sector including support from non-EU donors,
5. An assessment of lessons learned from previous strategies and evaluations,
6. Clear "Theories of Change"; a "Logic Model" and "Performance Management Framework" setting out the outcomes and outputs that Ireland will specifically contribute to,
7. Specific arrangements for budgetary allocations as well as overall arrangements at the Embassy for managing the strategy including risk management and human resources.

Italy

Replacement is currently under consideration in Italy The Joint Analysis should include:

1. **Priority sectors with cross-cutting issues** such as gender, human rights, youth and civil society, which will be mainstreamed. These will take stock of the National Development Plan and Sector Plans' reviews and evaluations in order to reflect what is left to be done, along with a feasibility and gaps evaluation.
2. **The State of Play**, an assessment of the political situation (respect for democracy and human rights, rule of law, governance, security and conflict risk assessment) and economic, social and environmental situation, gap analysis, emerging needs and priorities, stakeholders involved, financial channels and pledged and disbursed budget at the actual state.
3. **A specific assessment per identified priority sectors**, and analysis of specific issues intertwined with the humanitarian crisis and the reconstruction process.
4. **Involvement in regional cooperation initiatives** and their influence on national policy (both actual and potential) and country capacity (public institutions, civil society and private sector).

The Joint Response document should include:

1. **General objectives, expected results, indicative allocation per sector, results and monitoring frameworks** (including clear targets and indicators), governance mechanisms and possible conditionalities/prerequisites (policy, governance, public financial mechanisms), financing instruments (program- me approach, sector or general budget support, triggers for disbursement, pooling mechanisms etc.)
2. **Risk assessments and related mitigation measures.** If possible, it should also include "CSO Roadmaps" and be coordinated with other EU processes such as "EU Democracy Support" and Human Rights Country Strategies.
3. **A timetable** that is effective and realistic.
4. **Core elements** such as: an overall strategy including a commitment to synchronize MS planning cycles with the national cycle, a clear division of labour that shows which EU donor will work in which sectors, besides indicative financial allocations from each EU donor to each sector.
5. **A Results Framework**, set upon key performance indicators evaluated with SMART criteria with reference to international indicators (i.e. SDGs, PEFA, CPIA, GEI, etc.).
6. **A Risk assessment, a communication strategy and the commitment** to a review of the effectiveness and impact.

Latvia	<p>Not yet ready but Latvia intends to use JP documents to help identify priorities</p> <p>Latvia's requirements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Context analysis, 2. Objectives, 3. Definition of priority sectors, indicative financial allocations per sector, 4. Division of labour, coordination of donor activities, 5. Alignment with partner country policies, 6. Risk Assessment.
Lithuania	<p>Not yet ready to replace.</p> <p>Lithuania's requirements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Priority sectors, 2. Specific objectives in combination with a realistic timeline, 3. Expected results (incl. risk management), 4. Indicative financial allocation (incl. per priority area), 5. Alignment with the policies of the partner country.
Luxembourg	<p>Not ready to replace but replacement could be considered in the medium term.</p> <p>Luxembourg's requirements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Objectives, 2. Results, 3. Indicators per sector, 4. Alignment with partner country policies.
Malta	No information received

Netherlands	<p>The Netherlands is ready to replace.</p> <p>Netherlands requirements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Objectives, 2. Results & indicative allocation per sector, 3. Results and Monitoring Frameworks, 4. Risk Assessments. 5. In addition: bilateral issues related to other instruments for foreign policy and details on human resources and finance (see Ethiopia example). <p>Updates to these are foreseen as the Netherlands is likely to move towards the Comprehensive Approach.</p>
Poland	<p>Not ready to replace but Poland's requirements include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Objectives, 2. Results and indicative financial allocations per sector, 3. Results and Monitoring Frameworks, 4. Risk Assessments.
Portugal	<p>Not ready to replace but Portugal's requirements include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Voluntary; 2. Flexible; 3. Inclusive; 4. Tailored to the country context; 5. Pre-conditions of partner country engagement, appropriation and ownership. <p><u>Replacement will be determined on a case by case basis.</u></p>
Romania	<p>Not ready to replace but Romania's requirements include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Development priorities of the target country, 2. Identify funding targets with the most potential for positive impact, 3. Allow flexibility for reallocation between sectors and between donors, 4. Allow for the particular expertise of one Member States in certain fields.

Slovakia	<p>Not ready to replace but possible after 2018.</p> <p>Slovakia's requirements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sectors, 2. Indicative allocation per sector, 3. Specific objectives, 4. Results, 5. Indicators, 6. Risk assessment.
Slovenia	<p>Not ready to replace but Slovenia's requirements include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Objectives, 2. Results & indicative allocation per sector, 3. Results and Monitoring Frameworks, 4. Risk Assessments.
Spain	<p>Not ready to replace but Spain's requirements include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Alignment & Ownership: through a permanent dialogue conducted in the framework of specific fora aim to facilitate their adequate participation to the process. The different Spanish stakeholders (line ministries, regions, civil society, private sector...) would have to be proportionally represented in those fora. The "Joint Analysis" may need to include references on how to reach the most adequate level of alignment and ownership. 2. Regard for other aid effectiveness principles (especially mutual accountability and predictability). 3. All agreed development results negotiated and prioritized by the Spanish Co- operation. 4. Overall results frameworks and budget estimations. 5. Clear criteria on the choice of sectors and strategic orientations. 6. A JP process that is more structured, based on a more defined methodology which establishes a balance between leadership at the field level and coordination at HQ level. 7. For Member States, internal documents elaborated during the JP process should detail the criteria used to assign roles to each participating MS.

Sweden	<p>Sweden ready to replace.</p> <p>Sweden's requirements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Objectives 2. Indicative allocation per sector 3. Results and Monitoring Frameworks 4. Risk Assessments
UK	No information received
EU	<p>EU requirements for the Joint Response:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strategic objectives of the EU's relationship with the partner country 2. Priority sectors (max. 3; less for smaller country allocations; specific considerations for fragile states and situations of conflict and crisis) 3. For each sector, the overall and specific sector objectives 4. For each specific objective, the main expected results 5. For each result, the main indicator(s) (limited in practice to not more than 15 indicators in total per sector) 6. Donor coordination and policy dialogue: describe donor coordination, other main donors' key priorities, the organisational set-up for policy dialogue including the role of the lead donor, and possible steps to increase donor harmonisation. 7. The Government's financial and policy commitments: the main sector and policy measures to be taken by the partner country which are necessary to obtain the expected results should be described, including the partner country's commitments to ensure mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues.) 8. When needed, the appropriate type of environmental assessment (Strategic Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Assessment) 9. The overall risk assessment of the sector intervention 10. Support measures (For example for ACP countries covered by the EDF, a Technical Cooperation Facility).

3. Can Member States and the EU synchronise their programming with Partner Countries' Development Cycles?

Austria	<p>Austria consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Governments and civil society in the partner countries 2. All relevant AT ODA actors (Ministry for Finance, MoD, Interior, Development Bank, Science Ministry, Austrian Economic Chambers organisation, etc.) 3. Civil society (NGOs) 4. Parliament in the process of elaborating new strategies AND on results delivered. <p>In addition AT has set up an inter-agency standing committee on results which is responsible for validating suitable SDG aligned results indicators for our corporate results frameworks.</p>
Belgium	<p>Belgium consults in the partner country:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ministries 2. Political actors 3. Administration 4. Executing agencies (BTC, BIO) 5. Non-governmental actors 6. Multilateral organisations in Belgium and the partner country
Bulgaria	No information received
Croatia	No information received
Cyprus, Republic of	No information received

Czech Republic	<p>The Czech Republic consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partner Country Ministries / public administration (as Government is co-signing the programme) 2. Non-state actors in the partner country and in CZ 3. Other donors
Denmark	<p>Denmark consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. National governments 2. programme partners
Estonia	<p>Estonia consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partner country government stakeholders; 2. Ministries, parliament, relevant non-state actors in Estonia, as well as embassies.
Finland	<p>Finland consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partner country government stakeholders 2. Key stakeholders in Finland.
France	<p>France consults:</p> <p>Bilateral programming documents (DCPs, Documents Cadres de Partenariat) are developed in dialogue with the administration of the partner country. At the end of this process, bilateral programming documents are co-signed with the authorities of the partner country.</p>
Germany	<p>Germany consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partner governments 2. Civil society in the partner country and in Germany 3. Other donors (when developing the strategy document, usually a 3-month period of intense consultation activities).

Greece	<p>When JP was active (see Question 1 for details), Greece consulted:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partner countries 2. Other donors
Hungary	<p>Hungary consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Line Ministries 2. CSOs 3. the private sector 4. local authorities in partner countries 5. stakeholders in partner countries 6. other donors
Ireland	<p>Ireland generally consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Government 2. other multilateral and bilateral donors 3. civil society and other partners
Italy	<p>Country Programs are first designed locally, in line with the government strategies and policies, shared and agreed upon with the partner government before being officially approved by the Parties.</p> <p>Country Programs are usually directly negotiated with the Prime Minister's Office and concerned line Ministries in order to ensure a strong alignment of its objectives with the priorities identified by the Partner Government.</p> <p>Italy encourages the promotion of inclusive partnerships with:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NGOs 2. the private sector 3. academia and 4. local authorities <p>Consultation with these actors is addressed through periodic meetings, promoted by the Italian Development Cooperation (IDC) Country Office and the Embassy.</p>

Latvia	<p>Latvia consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Latvia's stakeholders (line ministries, civil society, private sector), 2. The partner government via Latvian embassies in the partner countries.
Lithuania	<p>Lithuania consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partner countries ministries/administration 2. NGOs 3. Local authorities 4. Other donors
Luxembourg	<p>In the partner countries, the following stakeholders participate in developing programming documents (Indicative cooperation programmes - PIC), as well as in formulating project/programme documents arising from it:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partner countries ministries /administration 2. CSO 3. Private sector
Malta	No information received
Netherlands	<p>The Netherlands consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The embassy and the government of the partner country, 2. Other donors (in particular from MS), 3. Civil society 4. The private sector.

Poland	<p>Poland consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The partner government (also analysis of strategic documents of partner) via Polish embassies 2. Partners of bilateral development cooperation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NGOs - public administration bodies - Solidarity Fund PL - private sector entities 3. Social partners provide suggestions concerning development cooperation by participating in the work of the Development Cooperation Programme Board
Portugal	<p>Portugal consults (for bilateral programming documents):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The partner country 2. PT development cooperation actors (public, civil society, etc, through institutionalised mechanism such as the Inter-ministerial; Commission for Cooperation, the Development Cooperation Forum) 3. Inputs from the Embassies at the country level <p>Final documents co-signed with the authorities of the partner country.</p>
Romania	<p>Romania consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Authorities 2. Civil society in partner country through high-level and expert level meetings
Slovakia	<p>Slovakia currently consults the following but hope to increase consultations with local subjects soon:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Donors 2. Implementing agencies 3. Local stakeholders involved into the implementation process 4. In the case of Kenya: Slovak organisations implementing projects in the field.

Slovenia	<p>Slovenia consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Stakeholders at regional, governmental and local level, notably partner governments 2. Local NGOs
Spain	<p>Spain consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The partner government (ownership) 2. Spanish stakeholders (line ministries, regions, civil society, private sector...)
Sweden	<p>Sweden consults:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partner countries' governments 2. Civil society, to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 3. The private sector (in some cases).
UK	No information received
EU	<p>The EU consults:</p> <p>For the ACP and DCI countries (as per DCI-EDF Programming instructions 2014-2020):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The national government, 2. National parliament and other representative institutions, taking ownership of an inclusive development process. 3. CSOs and the private sector <p>For the neighbourhood countries (as per the ENI instructions 2014 - 2020):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. National, regional and local authorities as well as 2. Civil society organisations and social partners

4. What is the legal status of Members States and EU's bilateral programming document?

Austria	NOT LEGALLY BINDING. But Austria is trying to bring about maximum commitment on all sides. To strengthen the ownership and buy-in of line ministries, preliminary ideas have been floated to submit country strategies to the Council of Ministers for approval.
Belgium	LEGALLY BINDING. General Agreements on Cooperation between the Partner Country and the Belgian State are signed and ratified by the Parliament. Within that framework, Development Programmes are formulated in a Joint Commission between both parties.
Bulgaria	Mid-term programme on ODA and humanitarian aid is adopted by Decision of the Council of Ministers.
Croatia	No information received
Cyprus, Republic of	No information received
Czech Republic	NOT LEGALLY BINDING. Country Programme document is not legally binding, but is the basis for future grant approvals. It is co-signed by the partner country Government.
Denmark	The Country Programme document serves as the basis for grant approval and constitutes an essential annex of the programme agreement co-signed between Denmark and the partner country Government (or other).
Estonia	NOT LEGALLY BINDING.
Finland	LEGALLY BINDING. The bilateral country strategies are approved by the Minister for Development.
France	NOT LEGALLY BINDING. Bilateral documents (DCPs) are considered as a "declaration of intent" and financial annexes are only indicative. These are not legally binding and a French representative can sign documents (DCPs or JP docs). However, debt alleviation documents (Contrats de Désendettement et de Développement - C2D) are <i>legally binding</i> .
Germany	NOT LEGALLY BINDING. Country strategy documents (15 pages) are not legally binding .

Greece	NOT LEGALLY BINDING.
Hungary	NOT LEGALLY BINDING. But the project-based development assistance is provided on the basis of commitments laid down in legally binding contracts.
Ireland	NOT LEGALLY BINDING. The Country Strategy serves as the basis for approving and accounting for grants to Government and other partners in country. It is supplemented as appropriate by a series of MoUs (generally non-legally binding) and legally binding contracts.
Italy	<p>LEGALLY BINDING. The strategic vision, objectives, intervention criteria, and thematic and geographical priorities reflecting the government cooperation policy are binding.</p> <p>Upon proposal by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, in close coordination with the Minister of Finance, the document is approved by the Council of Ministers by the 31st of March of every year, after acquiring the opinion of the parliamentary committees.</p>
Latvia	Latvia does not have bilateral Country Programming Documents. However, the Development Cooperation Strategy for 2016-2020 (adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers) is legally binding.
Lithuania	No information received
Luxembourg	NOT LEGALLY BINDING. The Indicative Cooperation Programme (PIC) is indicative as regards activities only in relation to its funding.
Malta	No information received
Netherlands	NOT LEGALLY BINDING. Policy document, not legally binding.
Poland	Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme is a government document (adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland). Annual plans are adopted by the MFA.
Portugal	NOT LEGALLY BUT POLITICALLY BINDING. Strategic Cooperation Programmes (PEC) are co-signed by the partner country authorities at ministerial level.
Romania	NOT LEGALLY BINDING. There is a Development Cooperation strategy, but no country programming document.
Slovakia	NOT LEGALLY BINDING. Country Strategy Papers are official Slovak Aid documents approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not legally binding towards and not co-signed with the partner country. Annual Program and the Mid-term Strategy (approved by the Government), are politically but not legally binding.

Slovenia	LEGALLY BINDING. The programming documents are confirmed by both governments, ratified and published in the official journal. These have the status of international agreements (and foresee that disputes shall be dealt with by the interstate joint committee, established by each respective agreement).
Spain	NOT LEGALLY BINDING. The cooperation agreement (Marco de Asociación País, MAP) with the partner country serves as framework formalising the cooperation relation. These agreements establish a "Joint Commission" comprising of representatives of the Spanish and partner country government at ministerial level. The Joint Commission approves the MAP (which can then be considered to be co-signed), but also monitors and evaluates the projects and programmes portfolio.
Sweden	LEGALLY BINDING. The multi-annual programming document takes the form of a "Strategy for bilateral cooperation" in 34 priority countries. It is based on a "Special Government Decision" which acts as an instruction to an independent government agency, in most cases SIDA. It is therefore a unilateral document, which is not co-signed with the partner country governments (there are other cooperation agreements which are signed, e.g. state to state agreements, between agencies, and agreements concerning specific contributions, e.g. programmes).
UK	No information received
EU	<p>NOT LEGALLY BINDING. MIPs, NIPs and multi-annual programming documents for ENI i.e. SSFs are mandatory documents foreseen in the legal regulations which form the basis for the commitment of the credits which the EU will use for the support to partner countries. The programming documents are of an "indicative" nature. This means that the document does not create legally binding financial commitments for the EU towards the partner country, and the financial contribution for the DCI therein can also be adjusted unilaterally by the EU. This is also the case when a programming document is or needs to be signed with the partner country like is the case with ACP countries.</p> <p>The approval of the programming documents by the Commission is a formal Decision, through which the Commission agrees to implement the programmed support by the subsequent adoption of financing decisions engaging the funds necessary to do so. The same would apply where the Commission approves a Joint Programming document replacing an EU MIP/ NIP</p>

Annex 7. Brief report on consultation on EU and Programming in LAOS 2016-2020



The EU Delegation in Laos consulted widely throughout the programming process, both formally and informally. Informal consultations were initiated at sector level during the process of developing the sector intervention strategies (sector fiches). These informal consultations took place in Laos between May and December 2015 and involved relevant line ministries from the government of Laos, civil society (local and international), the private sector and other development partners. The formal consultation process comprised a dozen consultations events, the first of which was with the Government of Laos on 28 September 2015 (see photograph above).

Between September and November 2015, there were formal sector consultations in the following seven sectors:

1. Agriculture and rural development,
2. Education,
3. Environment and Natural Resources,
4. Governance,
5. Health,
6. Nutrition and,
7. Private Sector Development.

The formal sector consultations were instrumental in the process of designing the sector fiches. All sector fiches were revised based on feedback and input from the formal consultations, thus ensuring that the sector programming approaches are contextualised and enjoy stakeholder buy-in.

On 3 November 2015, the EU, EU Member States and Switzerland (European development partners) held a plenary formal consultation event with civil society and the private sector. It was well attended, with some 30 organisations represented, although private sector participation was somewhat low. For half of the civil society organisations in attendance, this was the second formal consultation event in which they had participated since, by this stage, civil society had already been consulted on a sector by sector basis. The first of these sector-level consultations was held on 3 October 2015 in the context of designing the governance sector fiche.

On 4 November 2015, the EU consulted development partners at the monthly development partners working coordination meeting. This consultation, however, was informed by informal consultations that had already been conducted in each of the seven sectors.

Finally, on 14 December 2015, there was a second formal consultation with the government on the draft programming documents (including this MIP) which were to be submitted to Brussels for processing.

The consultation process has not only been instrumental in ensuring that our intervention plan for the next five-year period. It has also provided an opportunity to display the EU's openness to collaboration, to demonstrate that ours is the only voice being heard. The process forms part of the joint planning of our bilateral cooperation with Laos, in alignment with the Lao government's 8th National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2016-2020) and based on a sound division of labour.

Joint Programming has overall been clearly welcomed by the stakeholders consulted. The Government of Laos recognises it as a good example of aid effectiveness, in a context where Laos has recently reinvigorated the Vientiane Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to launch the Vientiane Declaration on Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation at the High Level Round Table Meeting on 27 November 2015.

A final wrap-up consultation event with key stakeholders from the Lao government was planned for early 2016. Once the applicable approval process was concluded, a launching event was announced for the EU programming commitments for 2016-2020.

Last but not least, throughout the Joint Programming process, this Delegation cooperated closely with both EEAS (ASIAPA.3 & GLOBAL.5) and DEVCO (H.1 & A.2) services, which were regularly consulted through various reporting processes, numerous videoconferences, geo-coordinator missions and a dedicated seminar held in April 2015.

Annex 8. Palestine Roadmap

PHASE I: January - March 2016 Finalisation of the first two components of the European Joint Strategy: the Principles of the Palestine-European Development Partnership and the Joint analysis. The quality control groups will be reviewing each of these components before they are submitted to the Heads of Cooperations (HoCs) for final validation. Working meetings will be held regularly with the PA/PMO to stay informed about the process and priorities of the National Policy Agenda (NPA).	
January 2016	<p>15-29 January: Expertise mission (Alexander O’Riordan). Outline of the Joint Strategy+ proposals related to working arrangements +. Expert will participate in the HoCs meetings of 15 and 29 January.</p> <p>19 January: meeting with the PMO (EUREP + expert).</p> <p>21 January: EU HoMs meeting (EU JP included in the agenda).</p> <p>22 January: Gender Technical Working Group (how to mainstream gender in all sectors and in the EU Joint Strategy?)</p> <p>28 January: Civil Society Technical Working Group (how to mainstream civil society in the European Joint Strategy?)</p>
February 2016	<p>1 February: 1st Advisory Council meeting on the NPA</p> <p>2 February: Environment Sector Informal Group</p> <p>9 February: bilateral meeting EUREP-PMO on the NPA and outcomes of the EU JP expert’s mission</p> <p>11 February: high-level technical policy meeting with the PMO on the RoF (Pillars I and II). Two quality control groups established (half of HoCs donors):</p> <p>8/9 February: Consultant submit the Principles of the Palestine-European Development Partnership to the quality control group 1 and the Joint Analysis (based on joint statement to advisory council meeting, above) to quality control group 2 for detailed comments.</p> <p>15 February: Comments given to consultant.</p> <p>17 February: Revised Joint Analysis shared with the quality control group 1 and the Principles of the Palestine-European Development Partnership to the quality control group 2 for detailed comments.</p> <p>20 February: Comments given to consultant.</p> <p>22 February: Revised Principles of the Palestine-European Development Partnership and Revised Joint Analysis to entire EU HoCs for detailed comments.</p> <p>24 February: HoCs meeting with the PMO (NPA, European Joint Strategy, etc.) and to discuss Principles of the Palestine-European Development Partnership and the Joint Analysis.</p> <p>26 February: Comments given to consultant.</p> <p>29 February: Zero draft of Principles of the Palestine-European Development Partnership and the Joint Analysis sent to HoCs</p>

March 2016	<p>First week of March: Sector leads check implications of joint analysis on sector strategy and vice versa. For those sectors not included in the RoF process, sector leads propose key indicators for inclusion in the joint strategy - feedback to the JP consultant by email or telephone.</p> <p>15 March Finalisation of the text for the zero draft of the Principles of the Palestine-European Development Partnership and the Joint Analysis. One to two-page paper drafted detailing key considerations for the Joint Response (taken from the sector strategies, feedback from sector leads and the joint analysis).</p> <p>TBC: Meeting with the PMO (update on the NPA).</p> <p>18 March: HoCs meeting on the update of the RoF, endorsement of the EU Joint Analysis, European principles and agreeing priority policy dialogue sectors. HoCs agree to send their historical financial allocations for 2013-2015 by sector and indicative financial allocations by sector for 2017 onwards (to the extent possible).</p> <p>19 March - 5 April: Sector leads identify what is needed to revise the sector fiches (in coordination and communication with the consultant and in line with the discussions on the RoF).</p>
<p>PHASE II: April - June 2016 [THE DETAILS OF THIS PHASE WILL BE REVIEWED EARLY APRIL]</p> <p>Finalisation of draft Joint Response, finalisation of sector summaries, working meetings to discuss sector approaches and provide an opportunity to contribute to the text. Coordinators (leads and active) continue consulting government, other development partners, CSO and the private sector on an informal basis.</p>	
April 2016	<p>8 April Consolidated Principles of the Palestine-European Development Partnership, Joint Analysis and proposed structure for the joint results framework text sent by JP consultant to EUD.</p> <p>22 April: Half day workshop to agree what is needed to finalise the sector fiches and to discuss how they complement the Joint Response.</p> <p>Outcomes of the independent evaluation of the RoF to go towards developing a results based EU Joint Strategy</p> <p>Update of the relevant (priority) EU/MS Sector Strategy Fiches.</p> <p>Update of the EU/MS Financial allocations (2017-onwards).</p>
May 2016	<p>Finalisation of sector fiches; complete indicative financial allocations.</p> <p>TBC: Meeting with the PMO (update on the NPA).</p>
June 2016	<p>Finalise inclusion of cross-cutting issues, programming and complementary sectors (i.e. for those sectors that updated fiches are not concluded). Agree how best to feature Area C, East Jerusalem and Gaza.</p> <p>Finalisation of the Joint Response.</p> <p>23 June: HoCs meeting with the PMO (including on the NPA and the EU JP).</p>

PHASE III: July - August 2016

Approved draft of Joint Strategy document sent to Headquarters with a request for approval at the latest by end of October / early November 2016.

July and August 2016

Zero draft of European Joint Strategy shared with the EU Heads of Mission for comments.

Approved draft of European Joint Strategy sent to Headquarters with a request for approval at the latest by end of October / early November 2016.

15 July: Endorsement of the revised EU/MS Sector Strategy Fiches.

25 August: HoCs meeting with the MoFP.

PHASE IV: September - December 2016

Consultations/feedback process (mainly with HQs/capitals). European Joint Strategy completed and endorsed.

September 2016

Update on the Sector Strategies.

October 2016

Update on the Sector Strategies.

November 2016

10 November: HoCs meeting with the PMO.

December 2016

Visibility event (signing ceremony?) with the PA approving the *European Joint Strategy for Palestine*.

Annex 9. Approval procedures for Joint Programming Documents

The HQ circuits related to the finalisation of Joint Programming Documents (Joint Response) distinguish between two different cases:

1. **A Joint Programming Document that is to be considered as the EU programming document ('replacement'); this should increasingly become the standard.**
2. **A Joint Programming Document not replacing a bilateral programming document.**

In both cases the HQ Joint Programming units/division will ensure that information is regularly provided to all services on the current state of play of Joint Programming, in order to ensure transparency. This includes information on future Joint Programming Documents. Specific country-level issues related to the Joint Programming process can be discussed in country team meetings as needed.

It should be noted that a single Joint Programming Document could replace the bilateral programming documents for some participating development partners while not for others. For transparency, consider indicating in the introduction of the Joint Programming Documents details on the status of the Joint Programming Document vis-à-vis the bilateral programming documents for each participating partner;

1. **A Joint Programming Document (joint response) that is to be considered as the EU programming document ('replacement')**

The EU-Delegation should abide by the legal and programming requirements set by the European Development Fund (EDF)⁷⁷, Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)⁷⁸ and European Neighbourhood Instrument (EN I) or the successor instrument.

These instruments require that programming documents for the EU contribution set out: priority sectors; specific objectives; expected results; performance indicators; and indicative financial allocations, both overall and broken down by priority.

Regarding the adoption:

A Joint Programming Document replacing a bilateral programming document has the same legal status as the bilateral programming document it is replacing - i.e. Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP)/National Indicative Programme (NIP)/Single Support Framework (SSF) for Commission services/EEAS. This means that the same programming instructions, adoption process and timeline as a 'normal' MIP/NIP or SSF are to be followed.

The replacement process for Joint Programming Documents will be undertaken by each participating development partner according to its own rules and procedures. Each participating development partners' headquarters is invited to review the general parts of the document and to take a decision related to the replacement of its own bilateral strategy based on its own contribution to the priority sectors of the Joint Programming document, including its indicative financial allocations. However, it may not comment on the focal sectors and allocations of other participating development partners.

For the replacement procedure, the following steps are obligatory: country team meeting with the line DGs;

77 COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32015R0322&from=EN>

78 REGULATION (EU) No 233/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R0233&from=EN>
REGULATION (EU) No 232/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/enp-regulation-11032014_en.pdf

Country-level agreement on the draft Joint Programming document by participating Heads of Mission in-country; interservice consultation; strategic dialogue with European Parliament if relevant; comitology with Member States experts; Commission Decision.

To further facilitate the HQ analysis and approval process, particular attention should be given to the following points:


- The draft Joint Programming Document should be informally discussed with the relevant geographical Units (DEVCO/NEAR/EEAS) who in turn will consult with the relevant Commission/EEAS services as appropriate well ahead of the country team meeting.
- Following the programming instructions, the final draft Joint Programming document should be discussed in a country team meeting before the country-level agreement by Heads of Mission.
- The draft Joint Programming Document should clearly and visibly identify the EU contribution for each priority in the Joint Strategy, as well as the contribution to the expected results, as this forms the basis of the Commission Decision.

Regarding the signature:

The Commission Decision can specify that the Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development or his/her designate is entitled to sign the Joint Programming Document.

EXAMPLE: REPLACEMENT OF MIP IN LAOS

The European Joint Programming document for LAO People's Democratic Republic 2016-2020 replaces the EU Multiannual Indicative Programme for 2016-2020. The structure and content were conceived for this purpose, and the parts of the document which relate to the EU and to the content that is required by a MIP can be identified (highlighted in blue in the Joint Programme Document).



Art 72: "Strategy papers and multiannual indicative programmes, including the indicative allocations therein, may be adjusted taking into account the reviews as foreseen in Articles 5, 11 and 14 of Annex IV of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement".

Relevant extracts from regulations:

DCI Regulation:

- Art. 11.1:
'Where possible, the programming period shall be synchronised with partner country strategy cycles'
- 'Programming documents for geographic programmes, including joint programming documents, shall be based, to the extent possible, on a dialogue between the Union, the Member States and the partner country or region concerned'
- Art 11.3:
'no strategy paper will be required for: (...) (c) countries or regions for which a joint multiannual programming document between the Union and Member States has been agreed'
- Art 11.4:
'Strategy papers shall be reviewed at their mid-term or on an ad hoc basis'
- Art. 11.5:
'the joint multiannual programming document (...) may be considered as the multiannual indicative programme.'
- 'Multiannual indicative programmes for geographic programmes shall set out the priority areas selected for Union financing, the specific objectives, the expected results, clear, specific and transparent performance indicators, the indicative financial allocations, both overall and per priority area and, where applicable, aid modalities.'
- 'The multiannual indicative programmes for geographic programmes may be reviewed where necessary, including for effective implementation, taking into account mid-term or ad hoc reviews of the strategy document on which they are based'
- Art. 11.6:
'The Commission shall report on joint programming with Member States in the mid-term review report (...) and shall include recommendations in cases where joint programming was not fully achieved.'

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF Regulation):

- Art 5.1:
'The programming period must become, in principle, synchronised with partner country strategy cycles'
- Art 5.2:
'With the consent of the partner country or region concerned, no strategy paper will be required for: (...) (b) countries or regions for which a joint multiannual programming document between the Union and Member States has been agreed'
- Art 5.4:
'multiannual indicative programmes shall be based on a dialogue with the partner country or region'
- 'the joint multiannual programming document (...) complying with the principles and conditions established in this paragraph, including an indicative allocation of funds, may be considered as the multiannual indicative programme in agreement with the partner country or region'
- Art 5.5:
'Multiannual indicative programmes shall set out the priority sectors selected for Union financing, the specific objectives, the expected results, the performance indicators and the indicative financial allocation, both overall and per priority area. They will also explain how the proposed programmes will contribute to the overall country strategy referred to in this Article and how they will contribute to delivery of the Agenda for Change.'

REGULATION (EU) No 232/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 March 2014

establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI Regulation):

- Art 5.3
'Joint programming shall be implemented whenever possible and relevant'
- Art. 73:
'A comprehensive programming document including a strategy and multi-annual indicative programme (...) shall: (a) define a Union response strategy on the basis of an analysis of the situation of the country concerned, of its relations with the Union, and of the partner countries' strategies or plans where those strategies or plans are consistent with the overall policy framework; (b) set out the objectives and priorities for Union support; (c) indicate expected results; and (d) set out the indicative level of funding, broken down by priority. Accompanying indicative financial allocations shall be given in the form of a range of not more than 20 % of those allocations. The programming document shall have an appropriate multiannual duration.'
- Art 75:
'The single support framework documents shall be reviewed when necessary'
- Art 79:
'Where Member States and other donors have committed to jointly programme their support, a joint multi-annual programming document may replace the single support framework and the programming documents referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4, on condition that it meets the requirements set out in those paragraphs'

2. A Joint Programming Document (joint response) not replacing a bilateral programming document

A Joint Programming Document that does not replace the EU bilateral programming document is not adopted through an amending Commission Decision. In this case, the Joint Programming Document is seen as a document that sets out a coherent and coordinated response to the partner country priorities by the EU and participating development partners (including Member States) and under which bilateral programming documents are maintained. In the context of non-replacement, the preparation of the Joint Programming Document involves reviews by participating development partner headquarters to assess coherence with their existing bilateral programming documents. When confirming our support for the Joint Programming Document, the EU will pay particular attention to ensuring that the Joint Programming Document follows the existing Commission Decisions.

Joint Programming Documents will be approved by each participating development partner according to its own rules and procedures. Each participating development partners' headquarters is invited to examine both the general parts of the document and its own contribution to the priority sectors, including its indicative financial allocations. However, it may not comment on the focal sectors and allocations of other participating development partners.

As far as the EU (Commission services and EEAS) is concerned, the references are the relevant EDF, DCI and ENI programming instructions.

Regarding the minimum requirements for the Joint Programming Document:

1. The Joint Programming Document should contain a section, which explicitly states that the document fully reflects the existing EU country MIP/NIP/SSF and that the MIP/NIP/SSF remains the legal basis for EU support until it expires (see wording below).
 - 'La base légale de la contribution de l'UE est le PIM/PIN/IEV 2014-2020 (pays). Ceci prévoit une allocation indicative de.....EUR aux priorités de la stratégie conjoint comme suit: allocation d'x EUR du PIM/PIN/IEV au priorité 1, allocations d'y EUR au priorité 2'
 - 'The MIP/NIP/SSF 2014-2020 remains the legal basis for the EU support to (country). It foresees an indicative allocation of EUR.. to the priorities of the joint strategy as follows: allocation of x EUR from the MIP/NIP/ SSF to priority 1, allocation of y EUR to priority 2...'

In addition to the NIP/MIP/SSF that is central to the EU contribution to the Joint Programming, other EU actions funded through other financing instruments may also be included in the Joint Programming Document to better reflect the breadth of the EU's development cooperation with the country. Such actions must already have an existing legal basis (Commission Decision) and be specified in the financial match table (see below).

2. The draft Joint Programming Document should identify the EU contribution, including funding, for each priority in the Joint Programming Document. The table below provides an example of how this information could be presented.

JP axe/ priority/sector	Indicative JP contribution	EU - funds bilateral	EU funds other sources	Participating development partner 1	Participating development partner 2
1	xx	xx from focal sector 1 xx from focal sector 3	xx from ...	Xx from ...	
2					
3					
Totals					

3. To enable the financial 'match' between the MIP/NIP/SSF and the Joint Programming Document to be confirmed prior to approval, an internal breakdown of the EU contribution to the Joint Programming Document should be provided (in an annex to the document or as part of the note from the Head of Delegation) - see suggested template below. If useful, the EU contribution through the MIP/NIP/SSF could be broken down to include funds already committed and those still to be committed.

Joint Programming Document	EU contribution	EU bilateral MIP/NIP/SSF (with reference)*	Other EU funds if applicable : with appropriate references			
			Previous bilateral support	Regional funds (RIP)	Thematic budget lines	Others such as EIB, Trust Funds etc.
Priority 1		MIP sector 1 amount x MIP sector 3 amount y				
Priority 2 etc						
Total						

* A Joint Programming priority might be supported across a range of EU MIP/NIP/SSF focal sectors. This information should be presented in a way that provides the greatest clarity and accounts for the existing allocation under the MIP/NIP/SSF.

4. The Joint Programming Document should not contain a page with the signatures of the EU Delegation and the EU Member States, as this may create ambiguity as to the legal status of the document vis-à-vis (already adopted/existing) bilateral programming documents.

Regarding the process:

1. Joint Programming documents under preparation should be discussed with the relevant geographical units (DEVCO/NEAR/EEAS), who in turn will consult with the relevant Commission/EEAS services as appropriate well before the Heads of Mission reach a country-level agreement on the final strategy.
 2. EEAS/DEVCO/NEAR geographical units will consult with all other relevant Commission services and EEAS divisions on the general parts of the document and more specifically on the EU contribution. This consultation should take place at a country team meeting before finalisation of the Joint Programming document. This step can help raise awareness among services and can confirm coherence with the sectors of the MIP/NIP/SSF, thereby facilitating future approval.
 3. EEAS/DEVCO/NEAR geographical units inform the EU Delegation about the outcomes of this country team meeting. These outcomes should be taken into account as the process of finalising the Joint Programming Document at country level continues.
 4. After the draft final Joint Programming Document has been completed, the document is formally transmitted by the EU Head of Delegation to the relevant (DEVCO/NEAR and EEAS) geographic directors, with the Joint Programming units/division (functional mailboxes) in copy, with the request to start the approval procedure.
 5. Once the EU geographical unit(s) has/have checked the consistency of the Joint Programming Document with the MIP/ NIP/SSF (sectors and financial allocations), they will confirm to the central services (Legal Service, Secretariat-General and DG BUDG) whether the Joint Programming Document is fully coherent in financial and sectoral terms with the MIP/NIP/SSF.
 6. DEVCO/NEAR and EEAS regional directors jointly reply via a co-signed letter to the Head of Delegation, stating that the formal requirements for the Joint Programming Document have been met that Joint Programming Document is fully consistent with the MIP/NIP/SSF and confirming/affirming their support for the Joint Programming Document.
 7. When the Joint Programming Document has been approved by all participating partners according to their own rules and procedures, country-level visibility events – such as press release or signed joint declaration - can be organised. The texts below can be used; any deviation from these texts should be checked with the EEAS Legal Division and DEVCO R3 (who will liaise with the Commission Legal Service) to ensure that the content does not create any legal obligations.
- *When a draft Joint Programming Document is sent to the geographical units, we would like to encourage the geographic desk officers to contact the Joint Programming teams in the EEAS/DEVCO/NEAR to receive the „How to setup a Country Team Meeting in the context of Joint Programming“ document.*

Wording for the press release:

We, the EU and [list of development partners] today launched the xxxx (local name for joint response) Joint Programming Document for the period xyz. The Joint Programming Document sets out how the EU and participating partners will coordinate their support for the national development strategy xxx. This support is focused on the following sectors: xxxxx. These are the basis for sustainable development of xxx [or link to achievement of SDGs etc].

The EU and participating partners estimate their contribution through the JP document to be xx amount (local currency). This money will support country xyz in implementing its national development strategy/national reforms/[sector strategies]/achieving the SDGs, particularly Goals xxx.

Wording for joint declaration:

Flags - EU and participating partners

Flag - National

'As a result of a strengthened coordination carried out by the EU Delegation in [name of country] with [list of participating Member States], [other donors as appropriate] and the Government of XX, the Joint Programming Document for the period xxxxxx is hereby launched. Together we look forward to implementing the [local name for Joint Programming Document] in close partnership with the Government of XXX and other stakeholders [indicate as appropriate: civil society, private sector, other development partners etc.]'

Signature and date

All Ambassadors of the participating European development partners

Minister of XXX

Annex 10. Development Effectiveness principles

The Busan Partnership agreement ⁷⁹ (2011) specifically highlights a set of common principles for all development actors that are key to making development cooperation effective. These are:

- **Ownership of development priorities by developing countries:**

Countries should define the development model that they want to implement. Partnerships for development can only succeed if they are led by developing countries, implementing approaches that are tailored to country-specific situations and needs.

- **A focus on results:**

Having a sustainable impact should be the driving force behind investments and efforts in development policy-making. Development efforts must have a lasting impact on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality, and on enhancing developing countries' capacities, in line with their own priorities.

- **Partnerships for development:**

Development depends on the participation of all actors. Openness, trust, mutual respect and learning lie at the core of effective partnerships, and the different and complementary roles of all actors should be recognised.

- **Transparency and shared responsibility:**

Development cooperation must be transparent and accountable to all citizens. Mutual accountability and accountability to the intended beneficiaries of development cooperation, as well as to citizens, organisations, constituents and shareholders, is critical to delivering results. Transparent practices form the basis for enhanced accountability.

Following the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was established. The European Commission plays an active role in GPEDC and DG DEVCO represents the EU on the Steering Committee. GPEDC is a unique global multi-stakeholder forum, which brings together all of the actors relevant to development cooperation, including traditional donors, developing countries, emerging economies, civil society, local government, philanthropic foundations and the private sector. GPEDC works to make progress on the commitments made in Busan as part of a shift from aid effectiveness to broader effective development cooperation.

The Second High-Level Meeting (HLM2) of the GPEDC, held in Nairobi in December 2016, produced the Nairobi Outcome Document, which sets out how existing and new development actors can work together to implement Agenda 2030 and achieve the SDGs. It reaffirms the four effectiveness principles (country ownership, results, inclusive partnerships and transparency and accountability), and all the commitments made at the previous high-level forums on aid effectiveness (Paris 2005, Accra 2008 and Busan 2011) and at the First High-Level Meeting of the GPEDC (Mexico 2014). In the spirit of inclusion, the Nairobi Outcome Document recognises the diverse array of partners in development and reaffirms participants' commitments to leave no-one behind.

The Nairobi Outcome Document can be accessed here:

<http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/OutcomeDocumentEnglish.pdf>

Further information on the EU's approach to development effectiveness can be found here:

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/eu-approach-aid-effectiveness_en

79 <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf>

Annex 11. Rights-Based Approach to development cooperation

A rights-based approach to development cooperation, encompassing all human rights

'The EU and its Member States will implement a rights-based approach to development cooperation, encompassing all human rights. They will promote inclusion and participation, non-discrimination, equality and equity, transparency and accountability. The EU and its Member States will continue to play a key role in ensuring that no-one is left behind, wherever people live and regardless of ethnicity, gender, age, disability, religion or beliefs, sexual orientation and gender identity, migration status or other factors. This approach includes addressing the multiple discriminations faced by vulnerable people and marginalised groups'⁸⁰

The new European Consensus on Development commits **the EU and its Member States** to implementing a rights-based approach (RBA) to development cooperation, encompassing all human rights. It thereby reinforces the EU's commitment to an RBA as outlined in the 2012 EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy⁸¹, the 2014 toolbox 'A Rights-Based Approach, encompassing all human rights, for EU development cooperation' and the respective council conclusions⁸².

An RBA is a **working methodology** based on internationally recognised human rights and which aims to promote and protect human rights in practice. It integrates the norms, standards and principles of international human rights law into the plans, policies and processes of development programmes and projects. It applies to all sectors, all modalities, and each step of the project cycle - identification, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Within the framework of an RBA, target groups are considered '**rights-holders**' with legal entitlements, and government institutions are not mere service providers, but are '**duty-bearers**,' who are under an obligation to deliver on people's human rights. Applying an RBA to development cooperation should help 'rights-holders' claim their rights and 'duty-bearers' meet their obligations.

Programmes and projects therefore need to assess the capacities of rights-holders and duty-bearers and develop the appropriate strategies to build these capacities. At the heart of an RBA is the recognition that unequal power relations and social exclusion deny people their human rights and often keep them in poverty. The approach therefore puts strong emphasis on marginalised, disadvantaged, and excluded groups.

The RBA methodology also reminds us that development projects can have an **unintended negative impact in terms of human rights** such as by disadvantaging certain groups, interfering with participation rights and labour rights or contributing to forced displacement. It is therefore important to abide by the 'do no harm' principle and carry out the required analysis and mitigation.

Moreover, the RBA working methodology recognises that pursuing human rights objectives is not, in itself, enough. The way these objectives are achieved is equally important. Programmes therefore monitor and evaluate **both outcomes and processes**.

The following elements are necessary in order to apply a rights-based approach to development:

- **Assessment and analysis** to identify the human rights claims of rights-holders and the corresponding human rights obligations of duty-bearers as well as the immediate, underlying and structural causes of the non-fulfilment of rights.
- **Programmes and projects** assess the capacity of rights-holders to claim their rights and of duty-bearers to fulfil their obligations. They then develop strategies to build these capacities.

⁸⁰ Article 16 of the new European Consensus on Development - link:

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/new-european-consensus-development-our-world-our-dignity-our-future_en

⁸¹ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf

⁸² http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/142682.pdf

- Programmes monitor and evaluate both outcomes and processes guided by the following **five RBA working principles**:
- **Applying all rights (legality, universality and indivisibility of human rights)** - Human rights are universal, inalienable and indivisible - all human rights, whether economic, political, civil, cultural and social, are of equal validity and importance.
In practice: Make the link to the human rights system and use its products (reports, concluding observations, recommendations, etc.) to inform activities: How are human rights standards from treaties or laws - and related recommendations - identified in strategies and used to advance the intended project and programme outcomes (or how could they be)?
- **Participation in and access to the decision-making process** - Participation is the basis for active citizenship. Active, free and meaningful participation is both a means and an end in itself.
In practice: Make sure that participation is more than consultation or a technical step in project preparation. Do rights-holders participate in a meaningful way? Are there opportunities for them to influence strategies and the intended outcomes of the project or programme before/during/after the project activities)?
- **Non-discrimination and equal access** - Activities have to prioritise the most marginalised groups and avoid contributing to established patterns of discrimination.
In practice: Who are the rights holders? Have they been taken into account in designing the contribution? Is there unjustified formal or de facto restriction or prevention of particular groups' access to resources or services or of their participation in decision-making processes? Have efforts been made to include the most marginalised? Is the development intervention accessible for persons with disabilities (in line with the EU's obligation under Article 32 of the Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities⁸³)?
- **Accountability and access to the rule of law** - Activities have to promote accessible, transparent and effective mechanisms of accountability.
In practice: Who are the duty-bearers? Which powers and capacities do they have (and not have) to advance their human rights obligations? Is the proposed initiative accountable towards the rights-holders?
- **Transparency and access to information** - Activities have to be transparent, with information available in accessible formats (for example, in local languages). Transparency is paramount for ensuring the application of the other working principles; without transparency it is not possible to achieve accountability and participation will not be meaningful.
In practice: Is information available in an accessible way to all stakeholders (people that are involved in the activities) concerned? Are rights holders able to participate in meetings and processes where issues which affect them are discussed?

Following the adoption of the new EU Consensus for Development in June 2017, **the EU and its Member States** are now committed to implementing an RBA. The RBA toolbox, including its checklist, provides a comprehensive methodology for ensuring inclusion and mainstreaming across the project/programme cycle⁸⁴.

83 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/ConventionRightsPersonsWithDisabilities.aspx>

84 Commission Staff Working Document: Toolbox a Rights-Based Approach, encompassing all human rights for EU development cooperation, 2014 - <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209489%202014%20INIT>

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