



# Tools and Methods Series

## Reference Document No 17

# Operating in situations of **conflict and fragility**

*An EU staff handbook*

*June 2015*

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Operating in situations of  
conflict and fragility

An EU staff handbook

Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development – EuropeAid  
European Commission

Brussels • Luxembourg, June 2015

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# Foreword

While in recent years many countries have moved out of poverty, it is striking that one in three of the world's poor are living in a fragile or conflict-affected situation. Consider this: if we fail to act, and act decisively, by 2018 that figure will be one in two. The Arab Spring, setbacks in Mali, South Sudan and the Central African Republic and, most recently, renewed conflict in the Middle East show that the legacy of conflict and fragility cannot be erased over night. Long-term, targeted engagement is the only solution in these situations.

The European Union will continue to be part of that solution. To that end, it has a special role to play on three fronts:

- first, as a development partner with a proven, positive track record of long-term engagement, able to mobilise Member States and other like-minded development partners;
- second, as a development partner with the capacity for politically smart, potentially game-changing engagement across policy issues, such as diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, development, security, trade, investment, capital flight, environment and regional integration;
- third, as a development partner willing to listen and adapt its business model to the specific challenges of fragility and conflict — recent examples of this include the introduction of state-building contracts, EU trust funds and flexible procurement procedures for countries in crisis.

In line with our drive for development policy to target support to those countries where the needs are greatest, the EU has set aside considerable funding to make this triple role work. With over EUR 6 billion spent in 2013 in aid, we are the world's second-largest provider of assistance in fragile situations. More than two thirds of funding under the 11th European Development Fund and over half from the Development Cooperation Instrument for 2014–2020 will be used to help people in such situations.

This is a handbook written **by** staff. It recounts staff experience as told in the first person and documented in evaluations. As such, it seeks to reap the benefits of the EU's rich experience in situations of conflict and fragility.

It is also a handbook written **for** staff. As such, it hopes to provide staff newly deployed to such situations with a useful overview of current concepts, policies, instruments and good practices. It does not set out new policies or procedures at length; instead, it summarises them in a single document and points to where more detailed guidance and documentation can be obtained.

Last but not least, it is a **living** handbook. As new challenges emerge — be they related to demography, new technologies, climate change or identity politics — the business model for engaging in situations of conflict and fragility will evolve. This handbook will reflect the new developments and lessons learned.

All in all, this handbook constitutes a valuable summary of what we have learned so far and the instruments we have created and applied to date. We hope it will help staff to further draw on and enrich the vast knowledge and resource base that we have amassed in order to address the challenges of conflict and fragility effectively, be they entrenched and chronic, or emerging and unfamiliar.

Fernando FRUTUOSO DE MELO  
Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development – EuropeAid



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The Task Managers were Mihaela Haliciu and Johan Van Geert, supported by a team of consultants: Eric Buhl-Nielsen (Team Leader, PEMconsult), Juana de Catheu (Development Results) and Chloé de Soye (ADE). Virginie Morillon (ADE) also provided inputs.

Over 80 EuropeAid, ECHO, EEAS and Delegation staff in 18 European Union (EU) Delegations and at Headquarters were closely involved in all stages of the handbook, and took a leading part in the development of the case studies in Part II. Major contributions were made by Rafael Aguirre Unceta, Dominique Albert, Claes Andersson, Timothy Baines, Guy Banim, Guillaume Barraut, Roger Bellers, Sarah Bernhardt, Beatrice Bussi, Benjamin Fisher, Sonia Godinho, Peter Hazdra, Timothy Heath, Karolina Hedstrom, Frank Hess, Patrick Illing, Thijn Ingeborg, Rima Joujou Deljkic, Nadim Karkutli, Jérôme Le Roy, Raniero Leto, Peter Maher, Marina Marchetti, Willem Olthof, Roxana Osiac, Andreea Pavel, Cedric Pierard, Erik Ponsard, Micha Ramakers, Manuel De Rivera Lamo De Espinosa, Chloé Robert, Jorge Rodriguez Bilbao, Vaclav Svejda, Chantal Symoens, Piero Valabrega, Heino Van Houwelingen, Juan Villa Chacon, Vincent Vire, Hesta Groenewald, Tim Midgley and Birgit Vleugels.

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The handbook was designed and laid out by Nita Congress under the coordination of Arnaud de Vanssay and Aziza Taourirt. It was developed within the Methodological Support and Training for Project and Programme Management service contract managed by the DEVCO Quality and Results Unit headed by Jan Ten Bloemendal.

# Abbreviations and acronyms

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSA	conflict-sensitive approach
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	civil society organisation
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development – EuropeAid
DFID	Department for International Development
ECHO	Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EU	European Union
FPI	Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IfS	Instrument for Stability
JHDF	Joint Humanitarian-Development Framework
LRRD	linking relief, rehabilitation and development
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NEAR	Directorate General European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
TMAF	Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
TRM	transitional results matrix
UN	United Nations



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PART I

# Concepts, policies and the EU approach



## INTRODUCTION

# The EU's engagement in situations of conflict and fragility


The European Union (EU) engages with over 50 countries affected by conflict and fragility.

- The EU has Delegations in the 50 or so countries that can be considered in situations of conflict or fragility. Beyond the Delegations, there are 12 EU Special Representatives (as of January 2014). Nearly all Special Representatives work in fragile and conflict-affected countries or regions, or on fragility-related themes.
- The EU's engagement in situations of conflict and fragility spans a wide range of interventions (Graph 0.1). The engagement also involves other issues that can directly affect fragility and conflict, such as trade, investment, global economic governance and financial regulation, energy, the environment and regional integration.

## SUMMARY

- The EU engages with over 50 countries affected by conflict and fragility.
- The EU has a track record of contributing to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation.
- EU evaluations point to strengths arising from the EU's comparative advantages but also to areas for improvement.

GRAPH 0.1 A wide range of interventions



**Note:** CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; LRRD = linking relief, rehabilitation and development.

**Source:** Adapted from J.P. Lederach, as cited in EEAS and EC (no date).

- In 2012, the EU's development cooperation with countries in situations of conflict and fragility represented EUR 4.9 billion (a budget managed by the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development – EuropeAid, or 59 % of total EU assistance. This makes EU institutions the second-largest provider of assistance in situations of conflict and fragility — after the United States and before the World Bank. The top three recipients of such assistance in 2012 were Egypt, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex 7). Taking a longer view, over 2000–12, the top three recipients were the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan and Ethiopia <sup>(1)</sup>.
- The EU is also engaged in situations of conflict and fragility through electoral observation missions and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. There were 16 CSDP missions in July 2014, civilian and military, representing over 7 000 personnel (Graph 0.2).

The EU has a track record of contributing to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. For example, it has made 'significant contributions to development, peace and stability' in Ethiopia (2012); it has 'succeeded in implementing the support to the Palestinian Authority in difficult circumstances' (2013); and in the East and South Neighbourhood Policy Regions, 'EU support stimulated regional policy dialogue and contributed to stability' (2013). Regarding justice and security reform, the EU 'has substantially increased its engagement globally though funding, development of its concept and utilisation of a wide range of financial and non-financial instruments' (2011). With regard to integrated border management and organised crime, one of the EU's 'major successes was the contribution to fostering international border management policy exchange and inclusive cooperation between countries that until recently had been involved in conflict or dispute' (2013). And, in the EU's support of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 'evidence of results and positive impacts has been identified in relation to both the promotion and protection of human rights' (2011).

Evaluations point to recurrent strengths arising from the EU's comparative advantages, but also to areas for improvement.

These strengths include the high relevance of EU support, respect for national ownership and a multi-sector/holistic approach. The EU's comparative advantages include (i) its long presence, making it a reliable partner, (ii) its critical mass in terms of financial support, (iii) its wide range of instruments and (iv) its recognised thematic experience in sectors. However, evaluations also point to areas for improvement — notably increasing low efficiency, improving the quality of political dialogue and setting more realistic time frames (see Section 2.1).

GRAPH 0.2 EU CSDP missions as of July 2014



Source: EEAS website, [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm).

<sup>(1)</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development statistics on official development assistance, available at <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>. These data do not include military common security and defence policy missions, which are not funded by development assistance.

## CHAPTER 1

## Concepts

## 1.1 What is a situation of conflict and fragility?


Situations of conflict and fragility include high levels of poverty, low development and low security, creating significant challenges for attaining the EU's overarching objectives of 'poverty elimination in the context of sustainable development' (EC, 2011).

- Situations of conflict and fragility host a growing number of the world's poor. The number of people who survive on less than USD 2.00 a day has fallen sharply in global terms, but their number in fragile states is expected to remain the same in 1990 and 2025 (Graph 1.1.1). In 2005, 20 % of the global poor lived in situations of conflict and fragility; by 2010, this proportion had doubled to 40 % and is expected to exceed 50 % by 2015. Today, about 280 million poor people live in just five countries in situations of conflict and fragility. In descending order, these are Nigeria, the Democratic Republic Congo, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Kenya.
- Other measures of development besides poverty set situations of conflict and fragility apart: these countries host 77 % of school-age children not enrolled in primary school, 70 % children dying before their fifth birthday, and 40 % of tuberculosis and HIV-AIDS cases. Compared with non-fragile situations, there is little or no progress to date on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) such as infant mortality, poverty, undernourishment and sanitation (Graph 1.1.2).

## SUMMARY


- Situations of conflict and fragility include high levels of poverty, low development and low security, creating serious challenges to the EU's goal of poverty elimination.
- There are distinguishable types of situations of conflict and fragility, each calling for a different set of responses. Besides countries, sub- and transnational areas can be in fragile or conflict-affected situations.
- Situations of conflict and fragility are influenced by a range of local and global factors.

GRAPH 1.1.1 Poverty and fragility



Source: Adapted from Kharas and Rogerson (2012), as cited in DAC INCAF (2012).

GRAPH 1.1.2 Percentage of fragile and non-fragile countries expected to reach MDG indicator targets by 2015



Source: OECD (2013), based on World Bank Global Monitoring Report estimates (2013).

- Fragility often correlates with violence — whether acute, such as in armed conflict and war, or low-level but chronic and pervasive.
  - In 2012, there were 32 armed conflicts (defined as causing 25 battle-related deaths or more), of which six caused 1 000 battle-related deaths or more. In total, armed conflicts caused about 37 000 casualties; in descending order, these were in Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan, Yemen and Sudan.
  - Countries with high homicide rates could also be considered as having a degree of fragility; in 2010, the countries with the highest homicide rates were, in descending order, El Salvador, Côte d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Belize and Guatemala.
- Fragility constrains development. Conversely, addressing fragility is a powerful development multiplier. Peace and stability lead to the resumption of economic activities and therefore stimulate jobs and growth (e.g. post-war Mozambique experienced double-digit growth). Peace also leads to human development — in post-war Mozambique, 83 % of children completed primary school in 2012, up from 73 % in 2009. And in most cases, peace brings positive spill-over effects beyond national borders.

'[Fragile and conflict-affected] situations [are] where the social contract is broken due to the State's incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meet its obligations and responsibilities regarding service delivery, management of resources, rule of law, equitable access to power, security and safety of the populace and protection and promotion of citizens' rights and freedoms.'


*Commission of the European Communities (2007)*

There are distinguishable types of situations of conflict and fragility, each calling for a different set of responses. There are many ways to distinguish such types (see Annex 6), but one of the most useful is the security-capacity-legitimacy model proposed by Charles Call (2010), which classifies country fragility according to deficiencies or gaps involving three sets of issues (Graph 1.1.3).

- **Security issues.** The state has a good degree of capacity and legitimacy, but has limited reach and suffers from illegal trafficking and/or chronic violence;
- **Capacity issues.** The state has legitimacy (e.g. through regular elections), but low capacity to deliver services;
- **Legitimacy issues.** The state has some capacity to deliver services but suffers from weak legitimacy, resulting from, for example, the violation of agreed rules, poor public service delivery, beliefs shaped by tradition and religion, or international action undermining national sovereignty.

Countries can have gaps in one, two or all of these areas.

**GRAPH 1.1.3** Three dimensions of fragility and country examples from 2010



Source: Adapted from Call (2010), as cited in Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012).



This model is authoritative because it recognises that strength in one or two of these areas does not make up for weakness in the other(s). A country with security issues requires a different set of responses than for one with capacity issues, legitimacy issues or multiple issues. Table 1.1.1 gives examples of the type of responses that may suit each general situation — bearing in mind that nothing will, or should, replace a strategic country-specific analysis.

**TABLE 1.1.1 Possible responses to different situations of conflict and fragility**

Situation and example			Response	Comment
Security issues, e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s			<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Analyse the nature (political? criminal?) and causes of violence (grievances? opportunities?).</li><li>Invest in economic, social and political inclusion</li><li>Support meaningful dialogue between state and citizens and across social groups</li><li>Develop or reform the security and justice system</li></ul>	Political economy analysis and international coordination are vital
Low security	Medium capacity	Medium legitimacy		
Capacity issues, e.g. Sierra Leone in 2010			<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Develop human, organisational and institutional capacity for the State to deliver services, thereby also improving legitimacy</li><li>Invest in the business climate, including the rule of law</li><li>Increase domestic revenue mobilisation</li></ul>	Apply the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, especially use of country systems
Medium security	Low capacity	Medium legitimacy		
Legitimacy issues, e.g. Guinea-Bissau in 1999, 2003, 2012			<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Carefully weigh the probable impact of international support and watch for opportunities to engage more decisively</li><li>Support civil society and the media in their checks-and-balance function</li><li>Support the complete electoral cycle (beyond election day), and political parties</li></ul>	Political economy analysis and international coordination are vital
Medium security	Medium capacity	Low legitimacy		
Multiple issues, e.g. Somalia in the 2000s			Holistic and sequenced approach: <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>Focus on humanitarian assistance and security</li><li>Quick socioeconomic gains (including from the bottom up)</li><li>Establish the basis for legitimate politics, whether through support to an inclusive peace process, a transitional government during a ‘cool-off’ period or credible elections</li></ol>	
Low security	Low capacity	Low legitimacy		

**Source:** Authors, based on interviews; Call (2010); Carment and Yiagadeesen (2012); and Gravingholt, Ziaya and Kreibaum (2012).

Besides countries, sub-national and transnational areas can be in fragile or conflict-affected situations. Some countries that are not usually thought of as being fragile contain large swaths of territory that exhibit all the attributes of fragility; examples include Northern Uganda, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan, Mindanao in the Philippines, North-East Nigeria and Southern Thailand. In Asia, sub-national conflict is considered the most deadly, widespread and enduring form of violent conflict, affecting more than 131 million people (Parks, Colletta and Oppenheim, 2013).

Fragility and conflict can also affect territories beyond national borders — for example, the belt of instability that stretches from the Horn of Africa to the Sahel, due to Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab and related groups.

**Situations of conflict and fragility are influenced by local, national and global factors.** Local factors of conflict and fragility include weak or exclusionary local governance; limited or unequal access to land and water; etc. National factors include tense social relations; unequal access to jobs and services; and weak rule of law; etc. Global factors include the following:

- international trade (e.g. barriers to export and vulnerability to shocks);
- transnational organised crime and illicit trade;
- the existence of a global and poorly regulated market for private security services;
- economic and financial liberalisation processes;
- migration to and from fragile states and the spread of radicalism through new technologies;
- internationally networked non-state armed groups;
- climate change.

These global factors are often ignored in political economy analysis, yet globalisation makes them a central set of forces to take account of — especially in contexts of weak institutions, high poverty, high levels of violence and structural exclusion. Additionally, local, national and global factors interact, as the spread of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the explosion of drug-related violence in several Central American countries illustrate.

## 1.2 What is conflict sensitivity, why does it matter to the EU and how do I need to engage differently?

The EU engages in situations of overt conflict and fragility, transition societies and in more stable countries with latent conflict issues. EU external interventions will always have an impact on conflict dynamics to a greater or lesser extent — intentionally or unintentionally; and in a positive or negative manner. Adopting a conflict-sensitive approach (CSA) will maximise opportunities for having a positive impact on conflict, peace and poverty reduction in any context.

**What is conflict sensitivity/CSA?** Conflict sensitivity can be defined as:

- understanding the context (historic, social, demographic, political, economic and security);
- understanding the potential interaction between any planned action/intervention and the context — how will interventions affect the context, how will the context affect interventions;
- revising/adapting planned interventions in order to minimise negative and maximise positive impacts on conflict and peace.

### SUMMARY

- Sensitivity to context is required in all fragile situations, not just those in crisis.
- Sensitivity to context is required in all programmes, not just those focused on governance and security.
- Sensitivity to context may require adapting some of the principles of aid effectiveness.
- A comprehensive approach to conflict and fragility is more conducive to helping countries graduate from conflict and fragility.
- A comprehensive approach does not mean that everything must be done. Critical path thinking is needed.
- Risk (i.e. the possibility of harm) has to be acknowledged, calculated and managed.

**Why does conflict sensitivity matter to the EU?** Adopting a CSA can help the EU to avoid aggravating conflicts and to instead have a positive impact on peace dynamics and programme purpose. Interventions that are not conflict-sensitive risk:

- aggravating or prolonging violent conflict, or contributing to latent conflict becoming violent;
- putting staff and partners at risk;
- putting investments at risk and wasting time and resources;
- undermining the achievement of intervention objectives;
- damaging the EU's reputation locally and globally.

On the other hand, being conflict-sensitive adds value to EU external interventions by:

- making engagement in conflict-affected and fragile states more effective by better understanding needs, risks and opportunities;
- making engagements more cost-effective by avoiding resources being wasted;
- strengthening risk management and complementing risk assessment tools;
- fulfilling EU policy commitments to take a CSA in all external action, as well as contributing to conflict prevention and peacebuilding (see [Annex 2](#) for a summary of key EU policy commitments);
- enhancing the EU's reputation as a global actor at the forefront of best practice in external action in conflict-affected contexts.

**Intervening agents can work in, on or around conflict.** Working **in** conflict means: i) being aware of the conflict dynamics and ii) taking measures not to aggravate those dynamics when intervening ('minimalist approach' or 'do no harm'). Working **on** conflict means: i) being aware of the conflict dynamics and ii) targeting interventions to address the causes and dynamics of conflict and/or support peace ('maximalist approach' or peacebuilding). One set of interventions can include a mix of development, humanitarian, diplomatic and peacebuilding aims — all of these actions need to be conflict sensitive.

The EU has a commitment to work 'on' conflict in recognition that sustainable development is undermined by conflict (Council of the European Union, 2007). However ECHO mostly focuses on working 'in' conflict in order to safeguard humanitarian neutrality. For more information on applying conflict sensitivity to humanitarian assistance, see [Annex 2](#).

**Sensitivity to context is required in all fragile situations, not just those in crisis.** The case of Rwanda, where the international community was claiming progress in economic and development terms just months before the 1994 genocide was unleashed, is evidence of the need to gain greater awareness of the political forces, social dynamics and fundamental beliefs and values that exist in society. Post-conflict settings require political savvy. Ethnic-, clan- or regional-based exclusion; gender-based violence and discrimination; and youth exclusion are often acute in situations of conflict and fragility and require special attention.

Although it is easier to infer causal relations in hindsight than to guess them as events unfold, all programming in a fragile or conflict-affected situation needs to be informed by context analysis and anticipation of what might be the impact — intended and unintended — of the programme and its components. This analysis is often readily available in well-documented contexts such as Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When such documentation is not available, various tools exist for rapid, 'light' analysis — for example, the [Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis in Support of EU External Action](#) (EEAS and EC, no date).

**Sensitivity to context is required in all programmes, not just those involving governance and security.** While it may be tempting to think that only governance and security colleagues need to worry about doing no harm and addressing fragility, roads, food security and agriculture, education and energy programmes also have a direct bearing on fragility and conflict (Boxes 1.2.1 and 1.2.2) and thus must be programmed with a conflict lens. For more information on applying conflict sensitivity to sectors and thematic agendas, see [Annex 2](#).

**Sensitivity to context may require adapting some of the principles of aid effectiveness,** notably ownership and alignment, as recognised in the [Accra Agenda for Action](#). As stated in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD's) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, endorsed by the EU:

Where governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, international actors should seek to align assistance behind government strategies. Where capacity is limited, the use of alternative aid instruments — such as international compacts or multi-donor trust funds — can facilitate shared priorities and responsibility for execution between national and international institutions. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, international actors should consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner country, and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Where possible, international actors should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without

#### **BOX 1.2.1** Conflict-sensitivity in brick-and-mortar projects

After Operation Artemis in the Ituri province of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, one donor-funded programme supported job creation through road works. However, it unintentionally employed only one of the two ethnic groups that were in conflict at the time. A smarter, more sensitive programme — aimed at creating jobs, rebuilding roads *and* rebuilding peace across groups — would have employed both, fostering their cooperation and mutual trust.

Similarly, agricultural development projects have the potential to rebuild social capital through cooperative efforts (e.g. by sharing irrigation water and infrastructure across social divides), but can make things worse if benefits are unevenly distributed or unwittingly increase conflict (e.g. by reducing the amount of water available for certain groups).

### BOX 1.2.2 Conflict-sensitivity in education

Education in conflict-affected and fragile contexts is an acute challenge. Out of the 57 million primary school-aged children not in school in 2011, half lived in conflict-affected countries. And of the 69 million adolescents of lower secondary school age not in school in 2011, 20 million lived in conflict-affected countries (UNESCO, ‘[Children still battling to go to school](#)’, 2013).

Education can play a critical role in social transformation and long-term sustainable peacebuilding, but it can also perpetuate or even exacerbate the source of conflict and risks. There has been a growing recognition that education policy and programming focused only on technical solutions is not sufficient to address the challenges of conflict-affected and fragile contexts.

Staff should recognise the complex role that education plays and systematically integrate conflict-sensitive measures into their education sector planning, policies and implementation processes to minimise negative impacts that contribute to conflict and maximise positive impacts. A good resource in this regard is the [Conflict Sensitive Education Pack](#) from the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (available in English, French, Spanish and Arabic) and the associated [training module](#) (in English, French and Arabic). For more information on conflict sensitivity in education see [Module 6](#) of Annex 2.

thought to transition mechanisms and long-term capacity development. It is important to identify functioning systems within existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these (OECD, 2007).

### A comprehensive approach is more conducive to transformation.

In stable contexts, a lack of coherence across policies and related interventions can lead to limited results. In a fragile or conflict-affected situation, lack of coherence can easily lead to no results at all — or even do harm. And a lack of progress in one area — be it political, security, economic or social — risks reversing the whole transition process. For example, in Niger, improving livelihoods in the short term was a condition for restoring security, and at the same time security was needed to improve livelihoods. By considering all the relevant and interconnected aspects of diplomacy, security, defence, finance, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid, a comprehensive approach is conducive to both effectiveness and efficiency. Guidance to adopt a comprehensive approach is available globally and in the EU (Box 1.2.3), and can be applied to jointly analyse the context, agree on a strategic approach across these policy areas and identify practical coordination mechanisms.

**A comprehensive approach does not mean that everything must be done. Critical path thinking is needed.** This assessment needs to answer the question of ‘what is a priority when everything is a priority?’ and resist the temptation to overburden national counterparts with too many agendas in the face of limited capacity and

### BOX 1.2.3 Guidance for adopting a comprehensive approach

- The OECD’s [Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations](#) include the need to ‘recognise the links between political, security and development objectives’ and highlight the fact that ‘there may be tensions and trade-offs between objectives’. For example, the urgent need to deliver essential services may trump the important need to develop local capacity to do so; the urgent need to re-establish security can undermine longer-term stability, for example, if it requires recourse to non-state armed groups; and there can be a trade-off between focusing on poverty reduction versus addressing inequality, often a root cause of conflict. The 10 principles call for ‘joined-up strategies’ across the departments of each administration while preserving the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid.
- Joined-up analysis frameworks and mechanisms facilitate common and coherent understandings of fragile, conflict and post-conflict situations; see, for example, [post-conflict needs assessments](#) and [post-disaster needs assessments](#) and the [UN Integrated Mission Planning Process](#).
- ‘[The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises](#)’ sets out several practical steps in carrying out a comprehensive approach: (i) develop a shared analysis, (ii) define a common strategic vision, (iii) focus on crisis prevention, (iv) mobilise the various strengths and capacities of the EU, (v) commit to the long term, (vi) link policies and internal and external actions, (vii) make better use of EU Delegations and (viii) work in partnership with other international and regional actors.

narrow political space. Prioritisation and concentration are also in line with EU programming instructions for the 2014–20 period.

**Transitional results matrices** (TRMs) are a tool that can help to identify priorities for the short term (first 12 months), medium term (one to three years) and long term (three years and more). TRMs can be used in the following circumstances.

- If **priorities are agreed upon across sectors** — diplomacy, defence and development, etc. (Box 1.2.4).
- If **priorities are agreed upon across actors**, including among international partners and with national counterparts. In this way, TRMs can (i) serve as a catalyst for harmonisation among donors, allowing for improved donor coordination and articulating a compact between national and international actors; (ii) explicitly help to identify the links between political-security matters and economic-social issues; (iii) articulate a compact between national authorities and the population and provide a framework for demonstrating gains achieved and (iv) provide a management tool for national leadership and international actors to focus on critical actions. The greatest gains are achieved when TRMs are negotiated around the budget planning, voting and execution process; this helps to strengthen domestic accountability (Box 1.2.5).

#### BOX 1.2.5 Agreeing on priorities across actors

In Timor-Leste's post-crisis phase, 30 % of the recurrent budget was supported by a multi-donor trust fund that was guided by the Transition Support Programme, a TRM. Individual donor countries participated fully in review missions; while individual viewpoints and input often differ, stakeholder consensus ensures continuing support even when opinions differ on individual items.

Source: UNDG and World Bank (2005).

#### BOX 1.2.4 Agreeing on priorities across sectors

Liberia's Results-Focused Transition Framework identified the full range of essential actions needed to safeguard the transition; for each priority outcome, it identified the critical results required in each time period. For example, in order to produce government functions implemented through a merit-based public service, the first step was a census of civil servants, followed by public safety and security for government workers in key rural areas, removal of persons absent from the payroll, the development of new regulations and the piloting of a new system of oversight and transparency. This framework helped in effectively identifying lags in both government action and donor support, facilitating a structural discussion of actions to fix these problems.

Source: UNDG and World Bank (2005).

- If **flexibility is built in** to respond to challenges and opportunity. For example, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) annually reviews and adjusts its operational plans in countries that are fragile or conflict-affected.


**Risk (i.e. the possibility of harm) has to be acknowledged, calculated and managed.** Specifically, this entails the following.

- **Acknowledging risk.** 'Dealing effectively with fragility involves taking risks and requires rapidity and flexibility in adopting political decisions and making them operational in the field, while dealing simultaneously with partner countries' constraints, often in terms of limited capacities' (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). Risks in situations of conflict and fragility are (i) contextual, ranging from corruption, weak governance and lack of aid absorption capacity to political and security risks; leading to (ii) programmatic risks (failure to achieve programme goals and the risk of doing harm) and ultimately to (iii) fiduciary and reputational risks for the institution providing support.
- **Calculating risk.** Situations of conflict and fragility are usually higher risk than more stable contexts, but taking a zero-risk or low-risk approach could lead to strategic failure (zero impact). Rather, the calculation should (i) weigh the risk of action vis-à-vis the risk of inaction and the potential benefits of engaging, and (ii) compare the risks involved with several courses of action. In calculating risk, there is a need for greater realism (most recent evaluations identify overly optimistic objectives and/or timelines in EU support to situations of conflict

and fragility) and greater honesty about risk exposure between donors and receiving partners, and within donor administrations between programme managers and financial controllers.

- **Managing risk.** Risk in situations of conflict and fragility can be managed by being more proactive than in more stable contexts. If there is a high fiduciary risk, it might be both safer and have more of an impact to invest in strengthening the financial management of receiving partners than to state conditions that will probably not be met. For another example, ‘combating corruption ought to be done within the framework of broader support to strengthen good governance and democratisation processes’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). Risks in situations of conflict and fragility can also be managed through multi-donor efforts, including pooled funding; and/or by using special instruments, such as the EU [Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace](#) (IcSP; formerly the Instrument for Stability (IfS)), for which there is higher tolerance (within agreed limits) than for regular instruments if innovation and untested approaches are not fruitful.

### 1.2.1 Resources on situations of conflict and fragility




***The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*** asserts that 50 failed states — home to the world’s poorest 1 billion people — pose the central challenge to the developing world in the 21st century. It suggests a number of relatively inexpensive but institutionally difficult changes; notably, that aid agencies should increasingly be concentrated in the most difficult environments and accept more risk (Paul Collier, Oxford University Press, 2007).



***European Report on Development 2009: Overcoming Fragility in Africa*** aims to stimulate debate and research on development issues and amplifying the EU’s voice internationally. It bridges expertise in development-related issues in research and academic institutions and policy-making throughout Europe (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Brussels, 2009).



***Fragile States 2013: Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World*** is an annual report that serves as a tool to monitor the levels, timing and composition of resource flows to fragile states. This edition (i) takes stock of the evolution of fragility as a concept, (ii) analyses financial flows to and within fragile states between 2000 and 2010, and (iii) identifies trends and issues that are likely to shape fragility in the years to come (DAC INCAF, OECD, 2012).



***Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*** is a highly accessible book that attempts to explain why similarly endowed countries diverge so dramatically. It integrates the best of economics, history and political theory to answer the question of why some nations are rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine (Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Crown Publishers, 2012).



## CHAPTER 2

# The EU approach to conflict and fragility

## 2.1 What lessons have we learned?

This section outlines the lessons learned from earlier EU support to fragile and conflict-affected states gathered from a series of recent evaluations as well as from other sources, including interviews with Delegations that are working in situations of conflict and fragility. These and other lessons learned are a source of reflection and have provided some of the context and rationale for recent adjustments and improvements in the EU approach.

### 2.1.1 Relevance of EU support

Evaluations generally find EU support as being highly relevant to situations of conflict and fragility, with high respect for national ownership. The EU is recognised

as having made a positive

contribution to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation in countries including Angola, Bolivia, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.

*'In emergencies, the theories and policies are the first to be lost. There is not enough time to adopt complex coordination arrangements or undertake detailed studies. These are needed but they have to be done before and continuously if they are to be effective.'*

*Discussion with Benoist Bazin and Zoe Leffler, Pakistan Delegation*

#### SUMMARY

- EU support is most relevant when objectives are realistic and shared across actors.
- EU support is most effective when it is tailored to the specific context — the analysis of which can be continuous — and when it is rooted in a comprehensive approach.
- EU support is most efficient when it builds on proactivity, creativity and coordination, and when it leverages the EU's recognised comparative advantages.

**EU support is most relevant when objectives are realistic and shared across actors.**

Defining what is meant by 'success' in situations of conflict and fragility helps to ensure that the goals of EU support, and its modalities, are suitable to the purpose. Evaluations of both the EU and other major actors that engage in situations of conflict and fragility almost always find that objectives were overly ambitious in too short a time frame. Objectives and time horizons are better defined in conjunction with the local stakeholders — state, non-state, national and local, and when societies are divided, preferably all of these if possible — and with other international actors. It is also best to factor in from the start the constraints associated with fragility and conflict — notably security, which limits fieldwork and adds to overhead costs — and limited national capacities. Expectations regarding timeliness and disbursement of funds need to be realistic.

### 2.1.2 Effectiveness of EU support

**EU support is most effective when it is tailored to the specific context, the analysis of which can be continuous.**

Pathways to recovery are rarely obvious, especially when the context is fast changing. For example, there are often trade-offs between the need to manage the effects of an ongoing crisis and the need to address the root causes of conflict: doing both can prove difficult when security, capacity and trust are in short supply. There are cases, however, where the EU has managed to do both. For instance, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, evaluations indicate that stakeholders generally recognised that on top of providing life-saving humanitarian assistance, the EU made the right choice of priorities to support towards preparing a two-state solution (2006) and that its contribution had been critical. Where the EU has been able to foresee crisis situations, it has been able to undertake analysis in advance.




In this way, when the time came for action, it was ready — for example, in Niger in 2012 where fighters from Libya threatened to destabilise large parts of the country.

Analysis does not need to hinder action if it is continuous from design to implementation. On the contrary, monitoring can serve as a management tool to correct the course as and when needed. Analysis that feeds into programme implementation is particularly important in the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development, which remains a challenge for the EU.

**EU support is also most effective when it is rooted in a comprehensive approach**, integrating different activities, actors, time and geographical dimensions (Graph 2.1.1). The EU increasingly applies it, for example, in supporting the Occupied Palestinian Territories where efforts were made to continuously adjust approaches according to the latest information on the conflict situation, implement support through a multi-sector approach, involve all the major actors concerned and target geographically vulnerable areas. The EU has also made progress in taking a systemic approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, justice and security, and human rights, working through multiple sectors, with state and non-state actors, and using a wide range of financial and non-financial instruments. EU programmes increasingly focus on the security and justice system as a whole, rather than supporting individual parts, and increasingly anchor them in national security and justice strategies. Commission assistance helped in many cases to enhance institutional capacities within state security and justice bodies to deliver public services. For instance, the Commission's support to the criminal justice reform process in Georgia through the Sector Policy Support Programme (2009–13) has contributed to a shift in Georgia's criminal system from a punitive to a more liberal one. These and other experiences, however, reveal two issues that need constant attention.

**GRAPH 2.1.1 Comprehensive approach to support situations of conflict and fragility**



Source: ADE (2011).

- **Planning:** coordination between actors needs to go beyond the exchange of information and begin at the planning stage: What are the shared goals? What are the unique strengths of each actor?
- **Programming and implementation:** the concept of a comprehensive approach can easily get lost in operational translation: What are the activities best carried out jointly? Independently? What level of operational coordination is required?

While in some cases, the costs of operational coordination can outweigh its benefits (for example if slowing down response to an emergency situation), coordination at the planning stage is essential to effectiveness.

### 2.1.3 Efficiency of EU support

**EU support is most efficient when it builds on proactivity, creativity and coordination.** Evaluations generally rate the efficiency of EU support in situations of conflict and fragility as low, with much room for improvement. Improving support efficiency requires first and foremost a recognition that each situation is different. Also, creativity is needed in seeking solutions. A good starting point is for staff to put coordination arrangements in place that bridge the fragmented responsibilities among donors — and even within EU institutions — in responding to fragility and conflict. Situations of conflict and fragility also demand thinking 'outside of the box'; in this regard, good practices among EU Delegations note the following.

- Harnessing both financial and non-financial support (e.g. political and policy dialogue; technical assistance) can be valuable.
- There is value in engaging at different geographical levels of intervention (local, national, regional) — sometimes, the best entry points are not necessarily within the central government.
- Engaging with both state and non-state actors, preferably together, can provide opportunities for change.

Situations of conflict and fragility require additional resources and continuous development of more appropriate tools for support. The EU at Headquarters is investing in knowledge management, notably through training and [Capacity4dev](#) (see [Annex 5](#)), and is developing monitoring frameworks with indicators for operating in fragile contexts.

**EU support is most efficient when it leverages the EU's recognised comparative advantages.** The EU's comparative advantages enable it to add value to the efforts of others by drawing on its:

- credibility as an intergovernmental entity, with a negligible political profile and no tie to national interests;
- reliability, in terms of its continued presence and capacity to establish long-term partnerships;
- representation of a critical mass of financial support;
- wide array of policies and instruments, including as a major trading partner with many fragile states;
- in-depth thematic experience in a range of fields that are pertinent to fragility and conflict-related issues.

The EU can add considerable value by emphasising these strengths, notably by playing a greater role than currently as a convener or co-convener in liaising with Member States to engage with one voice in political and policy dialogue with government, setting the policy agenda and/or coordinating priority sectors.

## 2.2 What is the EU approach?

The 2007 [Lisbon Treaty](#) and the 2011 [Agenda for Change](#) (EC, 2011) sharpened the EU's focus on situations of conflict and fragility. The Lisbon Treaty directs the EU to 'preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security'. The Agenda for Change charges it to 'allocate more funds than in the past to the countries most in need, including fragile states'. And a 2013 communication sets out the case for a comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis (EC and High Representative, 2013). In response to this guidance, and based on the lessons learned presented in [Section 2.1](#), the EU has fashioned a successful and cogent approach to engagement in situations of conflict and fragility, the key elements of which are summarised here.

### SUMMARY

- Coordinate and cooperate broadly and appropriately to ensure a comprehensive response.
- Enhance resilience.
- Use the right mix of financial instruments and tools.
- Develop, safeguard and support human resources.
- Ensure consistent, integrated Headquarters support.
- Make best use of EU comparative advantages.

**Coordinate and cooperate broadly and appropriately to ensure a comprehensive approach.** Building on lessons from experience, recent EU guidance (EEAS and EC, 2013) identifies a full range of issues that comprehensively need to be addressed regarding conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security under external cooperation instruments

*'The EU should ensure that its objectives in the fields of development policy, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and international security are mutually reinforcing.'*  
EC (2011)

and the range of responses available (Box 2.2.1). As well as being based on a thorough conflict analysis, a comprehensive approach implies working and coordinating closely with other development, diplomatic and security actors, including EU Member States and key EU entities — namely, DEVCO for development, the European External Action Service (EEAS) regarding political and security crises and/or the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) regarding humanitarian crises. A comprehensive response requires coordination of activities and actors (Graph 2.2.1) so that actions are well sequenced in time and minimise geographic overlaps and gaps.

Coordination within the EU and between the EU and its partners and other development agencies is most effective at the planning stage. It is never too late to improve coordination, but coordination is usually easier and more effective early on, before implementation rigidities set in and differences in approach become pronounced. Coordination is particularly difficult in extreme emergencies, as there is little time to plan complex coordination arrangements carefully. Each situation is different. In acute cases, the United Nations (UN) is the default coordination agency. The Union Civil Protection Mechanism, described in [Section 2.4](#), is also available to facilitate a coordinated and swift response from the EU and Member States.

The recent communication on the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis (EC and High Representative, 2013) sets out the following measures for ensuring a comprehensive response to a conflict or crisis.

- Develop a shared analysis within the EU and Member States.
- Define a common strategic vision based on the shared analysis.
- Focus on prevention.
- Mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU.
- Commit to the long term.
- Link EU policies with internal and external action.
- Optimise use of EU Delegations.

### BOX 2.2.1 Typical peacebuilding support measures for longer-term development

- Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants
- Control of small arms and light weapons
- Mine action programmes
- Peace mediation and dialogue
- Transitional justice measures
- Support to parliaments
- Support for elections
- Security sector reform

Source: EEAS and EC (2013).

**Enhance resilience.** Conflict, vulnerability and poverty are mutually exacerbating. In recent years, the frequency and severity of natural and human-made disasters — including those that are conflict-related — have increased, affecting the poor disproportionately. This trend is likely to continue given the impacts of environmental degradation, climate change and other factors (e.g. the outbreak of disease) that exacerbate poverty, fragility and vulnerability. To enhance resilience, external support harnesses the local resources of the people involved and contributes to the mitigation of the current crisis and the prevention of future ones:

... the EU's resilience approach recognises the need to address the root causes of crises, especially recurrent crises, chronic poverty and vulnerability and to take a long-term perspective which is firmly embedded in local and national policies and linked to complementary action at regional level. The approach incorporates a number of key components including: the need to anticipate crises by assessing risks; a greater focus on risk reduction, prevention, mitigation and preparedness; further efforts to enhance swift response to and recovery from crises (EU Council, 2013).

Moreover, the EU's approach to building resilience 'provides an opportunity to bring together political dialogue, humanitarian and development work and priorities in a comprehensive, coherent and effective approach to achieve better results on the ground' (EU Council, 2013). Best practice principles to promote resilience are summarised in Box 2.2.2, and an example is given in Box 2.2.3.

*'Resilience is the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to prepare for, to withstand, to adapt and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks without compromising long-term development prospects... Building resilience not only reduces suffering and loss of life but is also more cost effective.'*

EU Council (2013)

**Use the right mix of financial instruments and tools.** The EU has a wide range of financial instruments (Section 2.4) and tools (Section 2.5) to address fragility and conflict. Typically, these instruments and tools manage an immediate crisis and prepare the way for longer-term development actions. For **short-term security-related crises**, available instruments and tools include the IcSP and the launching of civilian and military CSDP crisis management missions and operations. In Africa, the EU supports African-led military interventions through the African Peace Facility to bring about peace. In **humanitarian circumstances**, ECHO uses the Humanitarian Aid Instrument to deliver immediate relief. These crisis-related instruments are geared for short-term use; it is essential that they be replaced with the longer-term instruments available to development cooperation.

#### BOX 2.2.2 Good practices in enhancing resilience

- Recognise that it is primarily the national government's responsibility to build resilience and define priorities.
- Develop, jointly and on an ongoing basis, well-informed, context-specific analysis.
- Build on a shared understanding between humanitarian and development actors and between the EU and its Member States and work in close cooperation with other bilateral and multilateral partners.
- Take a medium- to long-term perspective when planning: aim to tackle the root causes of frequent crises in order to prevent their recurrence.
- Invest in capacity strengthening across all relevant sectors and ensure that analysis and solutions are rooted in local ownership and the experience of affected communities, countries and regions.
- Ensure a gender- and child-sensitive approach, recognising the distinct rights, needs, capacities and coping mechanisms of women, girls, boys and men.
- Within the regions and countries most in need, focus on the most vulnerable households and marginalised groups through a comprehensive rights-based approach.
- Support lasting solutions for internally displaced people and refugee populations, in recognition of the need to increase the resilience of these vulnerable groups and host communities.
- Promote accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, including through the development of robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks and related measurement tools.

Source: EU Council (2013).

### BOX 2.2.3 The value of shared approaches in enhancing resilience: Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, the EU is taking a new approach to enhancing resilience: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE). Within the SHARE framework, resilience is being built in selected geographical areas that, in the past, have been regularly affected by drought and where humanitarian assistance has been intermittently provided. EU assistance in these areas includes support to productive activities, water, sanitation and hygiene, and nutrition and health, as well as capacity building for local actors. A longer-term presence in these areas is foreseen, enabling a quick shift from a predominantly humanitarian aid mode to a development mode, and vice versa, as required.

Because of SHARE, EU efforts to respond to the Ethiopian drought of 2011 — which affected 13 million people — benefited from work aimed at developing shared policies and approaches. This enabled a more effective and better coordinated transition from humanitarian to development assistance than had been possible in earlier crises. Led by the Government of Ethiopia, efforts by the EU, DFID, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and others to work coherently to enhance a commonly shared concept of resilience resulted in the provision of more efficient and effective support.

Source: DEVCO, [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/press\\_corner/0-0-0-africa-horn.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/press_corner/0-0-0-africa-horn.htm).

As noted earlier, coordination must occur during the planning stage. If coordination arrangements are not set in advance of the implementation stage, it is, at worst, too late or at best, much more difficult to bring disparate processes together. Especially in crisis situations, it is essential (i) that those involved are familiar with the relevant instruments, tools and procedures and (ii) that there is good communication up the chain of responsibility to ensure that obstacles and unforeseen challenges are dealt with as they occur.

**Develop, safeguard and support human resources, which are always the most important asset.** Providing flexible and quality support in situations of conflict and fragility places a huge demand on Delegation staff. Fast-track actions require intimate knowledge of and familiarity in using flexible procedures. The demands not only entail the level of workload but also tolerance of stress and the wide range of requisite skills. The EU has a variety of initiatives to share knowledge and experiences across staff and with Member States. The EU also undertakes skill audits and provides training programmes to improve staff management at all levels; develops staff knowledge and skills; and provides timely, coordinated and qualified support from Headquarters (Box 2.2.4). It is increasingly recognised that the difficulty of operating in fragile countries demands that only the best staff be deployed in Delegations affected by conflict. Each Delegation is responsible for ensuring the security of its personnel, establishing codes of conduct, and issuing timely and updated advisory notices.

#### **Ensure consistent, integrated Headquarters support.**

Within the EU, DEVCO, ECHO, EEAS and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) combine to provide one of the most specialised and comprehensive sources of support for field operations in the world. Their respective areas of responsibility in this regard are summarised in Graph 2.2.1. [Annex 4](#) provides a more detailed organisation chart.


#### **Make the best use of the EU's comparative advantages.**

As outlined in [Section 2.1](#), the EU has a comparative advantage in a number of identified areas. Exploiting these advantages, along with context analysis, should be a starting point for programming.

### BOX 2.2.4 Staff development for situations of conflict and fragility

The EU has set up a staff development strategy in the area of fragility and crisis management, comprising a wide range of specialised training courses. Since 2012, more than 200 people from both EU Headquarters and Delegations have been trained to address specific fragile and crisis situations. Training is delivered in a variety of formats, including a joint course with the European Security and Defence College, as well as an inter-agency workshop conducted in partnership with other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. A significant amount of the training is aimed at increasing Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development – EuropeAid staff expertise on external and operational aid delivery methods in support of fragility and conflict-affected countries and regions, and on tools for addressing situations of conflict and fragility. Key resource materials used in these trainings are disseminated through the fragility and crisis management groups at [capacity4dev](#) and [learn4dev](#).

GRAPH 2.2.1 Who does what at EU Headquarters on operating in situations of conflict and fragility?



Source: ADE (2014); organisation is as of 15 September 2014.



## 2.3 What are the relevant policies?

**Policies provide practitioners with a guide for how best to react in complex or unexpected situations.**

Prescriptive approaches are rarely useful, particularly in the fast-changing contexts common in situations of conflict and fragility. EU policies related to fragility aim to help practitioners to be in a position to identify strategic and innovative solutions to unfamiliar and challenging situations. But as each circumstance is different, it is up to Delegations to translate the available policy and guidance to fit the particular context. Headquarters aims to support Delegations in tailoring new interventions with confidence and effectiveness. Policies and strategies evolve as lessons from the field emerge and innovative approaches are tested. An example of this evolution is the move towards a broader concept of resilience away from the linear approach of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD).

### SUMMARY

- Policies provide practitioners with a guide for how best to react in complex or unexpected situations.
- The EU has issued a number of policies and communications in response to the complexity of operating in situations of conflict and fragility.
- EU policies and communications are closely aligned to global policies and commitments, which provide a common platform for action.

**The EU has issued a number of policies and communications in response to the complexity of operating in situations of conflict and fragility.** There are generic policies that provide a wider framework but highlight the specificities of situations of conflict and fragility — for example, the Agenda for Change and the Lisbon Treaty (see [Section 2.2](#)). Graph 2.3.1 shows the evolution of current EU policies and communications, focusing on those most relevant to situations of conflict and fragility. Some focus primarily on security, humanitarian assistance and development; others are cross-cutting or geographically specific.

**EU policies are closely aligned to global policies and commitments, providing a common platform for action.**

As a signatory to the [Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles](#), [Fragile States Principles](#), the [New Deal](#) and the [Paris Declaration-Accra-Busan](#) package, the EU has largely contributed to these policies and commitments, as well as shaping the forthcoming post-2015 framework. Close alignment with global policies helps the EU to work constructively and effectively with Member States, multilateral organisations and countries in situations of conflict and fragility. Shared commitments, concepts and strategies at the global level ease the burden of coordination at the country and regional levels — and are particularly valuable in times of crisis when urgent, coordinated action is needed.

The EU's various global policies and commitments are summarised in [Annex 3](#), but this section highlights three.

- The 2007 OECD [Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations](#) was drafted at a 2005 Senior-Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States. It reflects a growing consensus that fragile states require responses that are different from those for better-performing countries (Box 2.3.1). In this sense, they complement and inform the commitments set out in the Paris Declaration. Operational guidance to

### BOX 2.3.1 The OECD Fragile States Engagement Principles

1. Take context as the starting point (guidance [here](#)).
2. Ensure that all activities do no harm (guidance [here](#)).
3. Focus on state-building as the central objective (guidance [here](#)).
4. Prioritise prevention.
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives (guidance [here](#)).
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies (guidance [here](#)).
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts (guidance [here](#)).
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors (guidance [here](#)).
9. Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance (guidance [here](#)).
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion ('aid orphans').

**GRAPH 2.3.1 EU policy documents relevant to situations of fragility**

	Security agenda	Development agenda	Humanitarian agenda	Geographic focus
<b>Pre-2007</b>	European Security Strategy (2003) EU Strategy WMD (2003) EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflicts (2003) Headline Goal 2010 (2004) EU Concept for ESDP SSR (2005) EU Strategy on SALW (2006) EU Concept for DDR (2006)	EC COM LRRD (1996 & 2001) EC COM EU Election Assistance and Observation (2000) Göteborg EU Programme (2001) EC COM Conflict Prevention (2001) EC COM Governance and Development (2003) EU Consensus on Development (2006) EC COM Governance in the European Consensus on Development (2006)	Council Regulation Concerning Humanitarian Aid (1996)	EC COM CPPB in Africa (1996) EC COM Europe & Asia (2001) Cotonou Agreement (2005) EC COM EU & Latin America (2005) Council Common Position on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa (2005)
<b>2007</b>	CC on New Civilian Headline Goal 2010 CC on Security and Development	CC: An EU Response to Situations of Fragility	Council Decision on Establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism	Africa-EU Strategic Partnership
<b>2008</b>	Council: EU Approach to Implement UN Resolutions on Women, Peace & Security Report on Implementation of European Security Strategy EC/EU HR Paper on Climate Change and Security		European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid — Action Plan	
<b>2009</b>		CC on Policy Coherence for Development Council: Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities	EC COM: EU Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction	EC COM: EU & Latin America
<b>2010</b>			CC on Role of Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid	2nd Revision Cotonou Agreement
<b>2011</b>		CC on Conflict Prevention	Implementation Plan of EU Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction	CC on EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel CC on Horn of Africa
<b>2012</b>	CC on Common Security and Defence Policy	CC: An Agenda for Change	CC on Future Approach to EU Budget Support in Third Countries	Joint COM EU-Pacific Development Partnership
<b>2013</b>	Joint EC/EU HR COM: EU's Comprehensive Approach to Conflict and Crises	EC COM: A Decent Life for All CC on EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transition Societies CC on EU Approach to Resilience Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries	Council and Parliament Decision on Establishing a Union Civil Protection Mechanism	CC on Great Lakes Region
<b>2014</b>				EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

**Note:** To eliminate repetition, only Council conclusions (CC) are listed where a policy is also cited in a communication. All items are hyperlinked to the source document.

**Source:** ADE (2014).



sharpen donor strategies and programmes in situations of conflict and fragility has been developed by different donors. The principles are also being used in evaluations (see e.g. the 2014 Burundi [evaluation](#)) and to review [collective donor engagement](#) in some countries.

- The 2011 [Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation](#) reiterates some of the principles of aid effectiveness — notably national ownership, a focus on results, using partnerships for development, and transparency and shared responsibility. It also agreed on action points to accelerate progress (Box 2.3.2). It includes sub-sections on ‘Promoting sustainable development in situations of conflict and fragility’ and ‘Partnering to strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability in the face of adversity’. See [EU Common Position for the HLF4, Council Conclusions](#).
- The 2011 [New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States](#) is a notable breakthrough in putting the voice of fragile states and their people at the heart of country-led peace- and state-building solutions. Participating in this New Deal are the [g7+](#) group of 20 countries in situations of conflict and fragility (Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo and the Republic of Yemen) and their development partners (Graph 2.3.2).

#### BOX 2.3.2 The Busan commitments that most relate to fragility

1. Use results frameworks as a common tool, and use country-led coordination arrangements.
2. Use country public financial management systems as the default option for development financing, and support the strengthening of these systems where necessary.
3. Agree on principles to tackle the issue of countries that receive insufficient assistance (‘aid orphans’).
4. Provide recipient countries with indicative three- to five-year-forward expenditure plans.
5. Increase support to parliaments and local governments.
6. Step up efforts towards gender equality, including disaggregation of data by gender and establishing gender-specific goals.
7. Recognise the fundamental contribution of South-South and triangular cooperation to sustainable development.
8. Recognise the role of aid as a complement to other sources of development financing, since aid on its own cannot break the poverty cycle.

*‘We as fragile states must define our own unique pathways out of fragility with support from our international partners. Country-owned and -led peacebuilding and state-building is at the heart of these transitions from fragility.’*

*Amara Konneh, Minister for Planning and Economic Affairs, Liberia*

The New Deal emphasises

tailoring responses to the individual country context. It builds on three interconnected pillars (Graph 2.3.3), a coherent and comprehensive set of actions that seek to address legitimacy, security, justice, employment and livelihoods as well supporting revenue management and capacity building for fair service delivery. In particular, the New Deal recognises the central role of jobs and growth — which are often seen as an agenda for ‘later’, after things are stabilised. The New Deal posits that jobs and growth are central to consolidating peace.

The New Deal is being piloted in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan and Timor-Leste. The EU has expressed its commitment to being a partner in New Deal implementation and to join Australia’s efforts in Timor-Leste.

*‘Without peace our nations cannot deliver services that are needed to rise from poverty, and without people building strong state institutions to deliver these services, we cannot maintain peace.’*

*Mustafa Mastoor, Deputy Finance Minister, Afghanistan*

GRAPH 2.3.2 New Deal endorsing organisations and countries




Source: New Deal, 2014.

GRAPH 2.3.3 The three pillars of the New Deal

## THE NEW DEAL CREATES CHANGE BY...

Addressing what matters most for the 1.5 billion people affected by conflict and fragility



Source: New Deal, 2014.

### 2.3.1 Resources on EU policies



**The Agenda for Change** aims to adapt the way that the EU delivers aid in a fast-changing environment: it re-prioritises aid delivery to ensure maximum impact on poverty reduction. The document states two priorities on which the EU should concentrate its development cooperation: (i) human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance; and (ii) inclusive and sustainable growth for human development. The EU must seek to target its resources where they are needed most to address poverty reduction and where they could have the greatest impact. In all regions, it should allocate more funds than in the past to countries most in need, including fragile states. A [short video](#) presents the Agenda for Change.



**Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation** is the outcome document of the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan, Republic of Korea, in 2011. The result of an inclusive year-long process of consultation, it benefited from the support of a broad range of governmental, civil society, private and other actors. The document sets out principles, commitments and actions that offer a foundation for effective cooperation in supporting international development. Among the topics covered are promoting sustainable development in situations of conflict and fragility, and partnering to strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability in the face of adversity. Key messages are summarised in the [EU Common Position for the HLF4, Council Conclusions](#).



**A Decent Life for All: Ending Poverty and Giving the World a Sustainable Future** sets out a common EU approach to the post-MDG framework (2016–30). This 2013 communication of the European Commission (EC) identifies five priorities that are seen as the building blocks of a decent life for all, one being peace and security. In this regard, the communication notes that, ‘Where there is physical insecurity, high levels of inequality, governance challenges and little or no institutional capacity, it is extremely difficult to make sustainable progress on the key MDG benchmarks’.



**The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States** summarises the agreement between the members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding — comprised of the g7+ group of 20 countries in situations of conflict and fragility, development partners and international organisations. The New Deal defines a global approach that supports fragile and conflict-affected countries in preparing and taking the necessary steps that lead to transformation from fragility to development. The document frames implementation of the New Deal between 2012 and 2015 as a trial period. It provides details on the three pillars of commitment: (i) peacebuilding and state-building goals, (ii) a focus on engagement to support country-owned and -led pathways out of fragility and (iii) mutual trust and strong partnerships between countries and their international partners.

## 2.4 What EU financial instruments are available?

A variety of EU instruments channel finance. Each of these has its own regulations and procedures (Table 2.4.1).

Traditional instruments should be used with a fragility and conflict-sensitive lens, where possible. The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument include special measures and flexible procedures in case of declared crisis to allow for quick response. It is important that annual and multi-annual programming under these instruments takes full account of the opportunities to contribute constructively

in situations of conflict and fragility (see [programming instructions for situations of conflict and fragility](#)). An example from the Occupied Palestinian Territories is given in Box 2.4.1, and an example from Somalia is in Box 2.4.2.

### SUMMARY

- A variety of EU instruments channel finance.
- The traditional instruments can be used with a fragility and conflict-sensitive lens.
- There are specific instruments for situations of conflict and fragility.
- The mix of instruments available allows for a comprehensive, flexible and sequenced approach.

#### BOX 2.4.1 Conflict-sensitive programming in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

The EU supported the two-state solution mainly through (i) strengthening the Palestinian Authority, considered critical for its viability; (ii) support for rule of law (police, criminal justice), considered essential for ensuring security; and (iii) support for economic and social cohesion with a view to preventing violence. An independent evaluation found that:

- conflict sensitivity was mainstreamed into the programming: all support could be seen as aimed at contributing to conflict prevention and peacebuilding;
- the programming was flexible (a specific and innovative instrument was swiftly created to deal with a crisis situation) and was geared to the transition to the long term and supportive of regional stability through assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency;
- the programming succeeded in building in coordination from the start, by targeting geographically vulnerable areas characterised by acute need and a gap in support from other donors and by being sensitive to the requests of non-governmental organisations to extend support to other zones.

Source: [Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building: Final Report](#).

#### BOX 2.4.2 Flexibility in practice: Somalia

The EDF is the largest funding source available to the EU Somalia Mission. It has been used, where possible, to fund the mission's operational needs (e.g. to hire staff through project funding, or to pay for staff security coverage when in Somalia) that were not otherwise covered by the mission's budget. The mission and ECHO jointly advocated for innovative rules in order to be able to explore synergies between their activities and to use funds allocated to Somalia beyond country borders — for example, for the EDF-funded education programme in the Dadaab refugee camp for Somalis in Kenya. The instrument's flexibility thus enabled responses to be adapted to circumstances.

Source: EC, 'Enhancing the contribution of EU external assistance to addressing the security-fragility-development nexus'.

There are specific instruments available for situations of conflict and fragility.

- The **IcSP** has a short-term component to contribute to stability in partner countries where there is an ongoing or emerging crisis and a long-term component to contribute to the prevention of conflicts; ensure crisis preparedness and build peace; and address global, transregional and emerging threats. The bulk of IcSP funds aim at financing short-term crisis response interventions that can be mobilised faster than under other instruments and can bridge the gap until longer-term actions can be put in place. Up to EUR20 million can be released without management

TABLE 2.4.1 EU instruments

Instrument	Main purpose	Coverage
<b>General geographically related instruments</b>		
European Development Fund (EDF)	Supports actions in three key areas for cooperation: economic development, social and human development, and regional cooperation and integration.	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and Overseas Countries and Territories
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)	Increases the effectiveness of EU development cooperation as it replaces a wide range of geographic and thematic instruments. Covers three components: (i) geographic programmes; (ii) thematic programmes including food security, asylum and immigration; (iii) programme of accompanying measures for the EU sugar regime.	Latin America, Asia and Central Asia, the Gulf region (Iran, Iraq and Yemen) and South Africa; all developing countries; 18 African, Caribbean and Pacific Sugar Protocol countries
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)	Contributes to strengthening bilateral relations with partner countries in areas such as democracy and human rights, the rule of law, good governance and sustainable development. Builds on the achievements of the former European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).	European Neighbourhood
Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA)	Enhances the efficiency and coherence of aid via a single framework to strengthen institutional capacity, cross-border cooperation, economic and social development, and rural development.	EU candidate countries
<b>Others applied in situations of conflict and fragility</b>		
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)	Enables the EU to address the full spectrum of conflict, from conflict prevention and crisis response to the promotion of stability and post-conflict peacebuilding. Boosts the EU's own capacities for responding to conflict and for building the capacity of key partners such as the UN and CSOs.	Global
Humanitarian Aid Instrument	Provides emergency assistance to victims of natural disasters, outbreaks of fighting or other comparable exceptional circumstances.	Global
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)	Helps civil society become an effective force for political reform and defence of human rights. Focuses on sensitive political issues and innovative approaches.	Global
<b>Other</b>		
Transition compact	Both an instrument and a process enabling agreement to be reached between national and international actors on priority action in a post-conflict situation. Has an explicit financing strategy through a mix of funding sources and instruments.	Global; first compact done in Somalia
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	Aims to strengthen the EU's external ability to act jointly through the development of civilian and military capabilities in conflict prevention and crisis management.	Global
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)	An integral part of CFSP, it offers a framework for cooperation within which the EU can conduct operational missions aimed at peacekeeping and strengthening international security. The missions rely on civil and military assets provided by Member States.	Global
Union Civil Protection Mechanism	Facilitates close coordination of the EU and Member States' response to disasters, with a focus on protection of people and environment.	Global; operates both within and outside the EU
Thematic programmes	Promote and test innovative thinking and provide fresh policy input into geographical cooperation. Serve as vehicle for approaches that do not fit within the historically determined boundaries of the EU's regional programmes and for global action.	Global

committee approval. Such short-term interventions may have a maximum duration of 18 months but can be extended up to 30 months. The IcSP is designed for urgent intervention to initiate and complement actions financed under humanitarian, development and security instruments. It is a powerful instrument requiring close coordination with other longer-term assistance programmes to ensure a smooth transition from the IcSP to those programmes.

- The **Humanitarian Aid Instrument** covers short-term relief, disaster prevention and recovery operations. Unlike the IcSP, there is no time limit for the duration of the instrument. The procedures are flexible, with emergency humanitarian decisions up to EUR 3 million being delegated to ECHO.
- The **European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)** works with civil society organisations (CSOs) and intergovernmental organisations that implement international mechanisms for the protection of human rights. There are also other instruments and budget lines such as for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (non-military) and CSDP missions.
- The **Union Civil Protection Mechanism** facilitates close coordination of EU and Member State responses to disasters, with a focus on protection of people and the environment. It operates both within and outside the EU.

**The mix of instruments available allows for a comprehensive, flexible, sequenced approach.** Development-related instruments such as the DCI and the EDF rely on multi-year programmes, thus enabling a longer-term perspective. Where needed in acute situations of conflict and fragility, they are complemented by humanitarian and security instruments. Working closely with its partners, the EU can use its array of instruments to prevent conflict and humanitarian disaster and lead a process of transition to stability, security and lasting development. Each situation is different, and the appropriate response greatly depends on Delegation staff skills, knowledge and experience in using the available instruments to their full potential.

**Each instrument can be more flexible than it appears to staff.** Examples include the use of annual programming, or programming over two years (instead of the Multi-year Indicative Programme's seven), such as in Yemen (2013); changing focal sectors during implementation of Multi-year Indicative Programmes, as in Lebanon (2013); and reallocating programmed funds between focal areas.

**There is also the possibility of using specific, flexible procedures.** The longer-term development instruments such as the EDF and the DCI allow the use of flexible procedures to enable fast procurement and engagement of service providers. Although flexible procedures can be much swifter, they require clear justification and preparation. Experience in some countries shows that without great familiarity with normal procedures, flexible procedures can actually take longer. They also depend on flexible decision-making at higher levels. A risk-averse approach can work against the use of flexible procedures. Some points of good practice from the field are shown in Box 2.4.3. Part II provides some examples of where flexible procedures have worked as intended and some lessons learned on how to avoid problems. The 2013 [programming guidelines](#) encourage more flexibility, especially in situations of conflict and fragility. For example, the Delegation in Zimbabwe is using a two-year planning horizon to allow changes in the programme. While this introduces flexibility, it also increases the programming work.

#### BOX 2.4.3 Good procurement practice in situations of conflict and fragility: Voice from the field

- Don't be afraid to initiate any procurement procedure as per normal guidelines: maintain a professionally high standard.
- Never compromise on the basic principles: fair competition, full transparency, equal treatment: stay ethically 'top quality'.
- Ensure that your selection and award criteria are smart, objective and measurable: be crystal clear.
- Don't hesitate to organise explanatory sessions: keep smiling.
- Make sure that your required documentation to support the criteria's compliance match your local market: keep it simple.
- Always get a deal within a reasonable time frame: keep it speedy.



**Source:** Michel De Knoop, Afghanistan Delegation.



## 2.5 What EU tools are available?

There are a variety of EU tools specifically developed for use in situations of conflict and fragility. Table 2.5.1 lists several of these, along with other useful tools for assessing and responding to developments in situations of conflict and fragility. These include guidelines for ensuring that programming is responsive to fragile and conflict-affected situations, a conflict early warning system (under development), mediation and dialogue, and conflict analysis.

**Tools for context and cross-cutting analysis can be used through a conflict lens.** The EU has a number of core tools that are obligatory or recommended for budget support and sector-based approaches such as policy analysis, risk management, stakeholder analysis, and capacity assessment and development. These are complemented by more specialised tools such as environmental and climate assessments, and gender assessments. The EU is also developing a conflict early warning system tool (Box 2.5.1). In all cases, these tools can be used with a conflict-sensitive lens. For example, capacity assessments can examine which stakeholders in a conflict situation have the potential for making transformational change; gender assessments can determine how to provide best protection to women, who are usually most at risk in situations of conflict and fragility, and take advantage of their capacity to mobilise for peace. Beyond the EU there are a wide array of tools used by other development agencies and actors; these can be particularly valuable where the EU is harmonising its efforts with others.

### S U M M A R Y

- There are a variety of EU tools for use in situations of conflict and fragility.
- Tools for context and cross-cutting analysis can be used through a conflict lens.
- Tools often need to be used under time and information constraints.
- Conflict analysis is a key tool for improving the relevance and quality of EU support.
- Harmonise analysis with other development partners.
- Use the context analysis to design actions that are simple and robust.
- Adapt budget support modalities to the context.

**Tools often need to be used under time and information constraints.** The most common obstacles to the effective use of tools and ensuring a robust context analysis are severe time, resource and information constraints. Actions are often required urgently with limited time for in-depth context analysis. Additionally, context analysis in situations of conflict and fragility is usually more time consuming than in stable countries because information is scarce and the

### B O X 2.5.1 The EU Conflict Early Warning System

The EU is developing a Conflict Early Warning System to promote a common understanding of medium- to long-term risks and identify priority actions across relevant EU services — diplomacy, security, development and, when appropriate, humanitarian assistance, justice and migration — at Headquarters and on the ground. It will be rolled out by the end of 2014 and is envisaged as follows.

- A composite index will help the EU to identify and rank the countries most at risk of violent conflict in the next two years.
- EU Delegations around the world take the lead in assessing the risk for violent conflict to occur based along 10 broad categories ranging from human rights to the economic or regional situation, using a checklist of structural risks of violent conflict. EU Special Representatives, the EC, the EU's civilian and military missions and operations present in countries, as well as Member States are invited to contribute inputs and insights. The Conflict Early Warning System has been piloted in the Sahel and Central Asia, and is meant to be applied every six months to ensure that the analysis is current and the programming relevant.
- Following this initial, checklist-based assessment, Country Conflict Risk Reports analyse long- and short-term risks and identify options for action. A regional lens is also applied in most cases. This is led by EEAS, and involves the Commission and EU Delegations.

underlying circumstances are complex and subject to rapid change. Using analysis done by other development agencies or trusted partners can help where available. A more continuous approach with light analysis during programming and formulation is also sometimes possible, with more in-depth analysis being pursued during implementation. The EU has developed a light conflict analysis tool.

The EU has rich experience as an actor in mediation and dialogue, including positive contributions in Kosovo, the Philippines, Indonesia (Aceh), Kenya and Georgia. EU actors, especially EU Special Representatives, EU Delegations and CSDP missions, are frequently engaged in mediation efforts, engaging at a high political level and providing political facilitation and confidence building. The EU is also active in dialogue processes with CSOs at the grassroots level, in particular the IcSP. A dedicated Mediation Support Team within EEAS supports geographic services, EU Delegations, EU Special Representatives and EEAS senior management in taking decisions in these matters. It offers coaching and training in mediation, promotes knowledge sharing, supports the conception and implementation of EU mediation, and helps to deploy internal and external experts on a short-term basis.

**Conflict analysis is a key tool for improving the relevance and quality of EU support.** Conflict analysis can be initiated by the EU Delegation and head office structures and/or CSDP engagement. It helps the EU to understand what can be done within the constraints — even if in many cases the EU is not in a position to change the constraints and many of the underlying causes of conflict.

All engagement in a conflict setting is likely to have an effect on the conflict. Conflict analysis seeks to understand how negative impacts can be eliminated and positive impacts increased. Well-meaning support for reform can increase the dependency of some groups and the power and patronage of others. A late response — for example, because of concerns over fiduciary risk — can lead to missed opportunities for conflict transformation. Support will need to address the causes of conflict so that a transition from conflict to stability and lasting peace and development can take root. The EU can apply significant leverage with its combination of instruments that have a diplomatic, development, humanitarian and security nature (both civilian and military). But their use needs to be well coordinated and guided by an insightful conflict analysis. EEAS and DEVCO have developed a [Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis](#).

**Harmonise analysis with other development partners.** Many tools and types of analysis are available and have been developed and used by other partners. It is important that the EU and its partners (both government and non-state actors as well as other development partners) share and agree on the findings and implications of conflict and other analysis so that actions are compatible and can be coordinated. Given the difficulty, time delay and expense in carrying out context analysis, the EU is open to using the analysis of others or undertaking joint analysis where possible. A [useful reference guide](#) to different approaches to conflict analysis is available from the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium.

**Use context analysis to design actions that are simple and robust.** A surprising conclusion of some assessments (Hellman, 2013) is that projects in situations of conflict and fragility are often more successful than those in more stable countries. A major contributory reason is that in situations of conflict and fragility, more time and resources have to be spent on understanding the context, which in turn leads to better conceived and prepared projects. Another factor is that the difficulties of operating in situations of conflict and fragility lead to the design of projects that are simpler and have more realistic objectives.

**Adapt budget support modalities to the context.** The 2011 [Communication on Budget Support](#) acknowledges the specificities of situations of conflict and fragility, and the 2012 [Budget Support Guidelines](#) provide for an innovative form of budget support aimed at situations of conflict and fragility: state-building contracts. For many fragile states, national partners are unlikely to live up to all the requirements of normal budget support, but in some circumstances there is still a good case for providing budget support to build up key functions. Such functions could include the police and civil service so that security and essential services are delivered which serve to underpin a legitimate but still emerging government structure. The 2012 Budget Support Guidelines (see especially [Annex 9](#)) and examples in Part II give more details on the eligibility conditions and how state-building contracts can be used in an innovative and far-reaching modality for some, but by no means all, situations of conflict and fragility. As experience is gained on the use of state-building contracts, the EU will adjust and extend or restrict the modality accordingly.



TABLE 2.5.1 A selection of EU tools available to staff: strategic, core and specialised

Tool	Main purpose	Reference
<b>Developed by the EU specifically for fragile states</b>		
Conflict Analysis	A key reason for carrying-out a conflict analysis is to increase the EU's conflict sensitivity by strengthening shared contextual understanding and proposing an appropriate response. The EU has developed a light-touch joint DEVCO-EEAS approach to conflict analysis. The process is recognised as a vital element of the EU comprehensive approach and increasingly involves Member States and partners.	<a href="#">Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis</a>
EU Conflict Early Warning System	Promotes a common understanding of medium- to long-term risks. Identifies priority actions across relevant EU services: diplomacy, security, development and, when appropriate, humanitarian assistance, justice and migration, at Headquarters and on the ground (in development).	EC checklist (2001)*; <a href="#">Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention</a> (2011)
Political Framework for Crisis Approach	A PFCA aims to provide an overview of the challenges faced in a crisis situation and to outline the way forward for the EU to support a response.	
<b>Specialised tools developed by the EU for context assessment</b>		
Gender Impact Assessment	Examines policy proposals to see whether they will affect women and men differently, with a view to adapting these proposals to ensure that discriminatory effects are neutralised and gender equality promoted.	<a href="#">EU Gender Toolkit</a> (2004)
Environmental and Climate Assessments	Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA): identifies the key potential impacts on the environment and proposes mitigation measures to integrate in project design.  Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA): analyses the environmental and climate change aspects (potential risks and opportunities) associated with a government's policy, plan or programme.  Climate Risk Assessment (CRA): identifies climate risks that may affect the success of an intervention and develops appropriate responses.	<a href="#">Guidelines on the Integration of Environment and Climate Change in Development Cooperation</a> (2011)
<b>Tools issued by or in partnership with others</b>		
Fragility Assessment	Identifies drivers of fragility and priority actions for the New Deal's five peace-building and state-building goals. Informs the design of national development plans, as well as compacts with international partners to support plan implementation.	<a href="#">Progress Report on Fragility Assessments and Indicators</a>
Post-Conflict Needs Assessment	Maps the recovery and reconstruction priorities of a country emerging from conflict or facing conflict-related crises. A post-conflict needs assessment aims at stabilisation and transition towards peacebuilding and development; its components should both consolidate peace and mitigate against a return to conflict-related crises. The assessment usually includes both assessment of needs and prioritisation and costing of needs.	<a href="#">Post-Conflict Needs Assessment</a>
Post-Disaster Needs Assessment	Determines the needs of a country or territory after it has been affected by a natural disaster event. Maps the post-disaster economic, social, environmental and human development needs; and broadly encompasses the gap analysis between pre-existing and post-event conditions. Leads to a recovery strategy that enables the preparation of a post-disaster recovery framework addressing reconstruction of disaster-affected assets and recovery of economic and social flows.	<a href="#">Post-Disaster Needs Assessment</a>

\*Only available for internal staff.

## 2.5.1 Resources on the EU approach



**Addressing Conflict Prevention, Peace-Building and Security Issues Under External Cooperation Instruments: Guidance Note** seeks to raise awareness among the responsible EEAS (including EU Delegations) and EC staff about the need to ensure that building peace, preventing conflict and strengthening international security are adequately included in EU external cooperation instruments. The document is structured around practical questions, including, ‘Are there specific policy documents or guidelines on conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security issues?’ and ‘Whom should I contact if I need support?’ (EEAS and EC, 2013).



**The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises** sets out key policy principles for action to help vulnerable communities in crisis-prone areas to build resilience to future shocks. Drawing on experiences in addressing recurrent food crises — mainly in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel — and with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of EU responses, the communication recognises that strengthening resilience lies at the interface of humanitarian and development assistance. It proposes 10 steps to increase resilience, including focusing on more flexible funding and donor coordination. Although based on lessons drawn from food security crises, the approach is applicable to other types of vulnerability, notably disasters, climate change and conflict (EC, 2012).



**EU Development Cooperation in Fragile States: Challenges and Opportunities** analyses the strengths and weaknesses of current EU engagement in fragile states — particularly its support to conflict prevention and periods of transition within the broader international context. It examines the limitations of the instruments and methods implemented by the EU to address the problems of fragile states and identifies what could be done to improve them. The study concludes with seven recommendations (Directorate-General for External Studies, European Parliament, Brussels, 2013).



**Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis in Support of EU External Action** seeks to analyse how EEAS and the EC can better work to preserve peace, prevent conflict and strengthen international security using a comprehensive approach. Conflict analysis contributes to making an informed choice in articulating the EU comprehensive approach across a wide range of mechanisms and tools. The document is structured around practical questions such as, ‘What constitutes EU conflict analysis?’ and provides key ‘who, when and how’ information (EEAS and EC, no date).



**Handbook on CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, 2nd edition** supports the development of a common and shared European security culture. Designed for CSDP training purposes, it offers an overview of the CFSP/CSDP, specifically its current status, structures and policies. This second edition of the handbook was necessitated by the evolution of the CFSP/CSDP, especially after the Lisbon Treaty. An important addition is the relationship between international security and climate change (Jochen Rehr and Hans-Bernhard Weissert, eds., Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, Vienna, 2012).



**Handbook for Decision Makers: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union** aims at supporting leadership training for staff involved in the decision-making process. This training material focuses on the CFSP/CSDP, recruitment and skills for leadership positions and the principles of EU engagement as well as geographical and horizontal approaches (Jochen Rehr, ed., Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, Vienna, 2014).



**Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions (PRAG)** explains the contracting procedures that apply to all EU external aid contracts financed from the EU general budget and the EDF. For information on flexible procedures, see the negotiated procedure subsections for service, supply and works contracts (Subsections 3.2.4.1, 4.2.5.1 and 5.2.5.1, respectively).