

***THEMATIC EVALUATION OF
FOOD-AID POLICY AND FOOD-AID
MANAGEMENT AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
IN SUPPORT OF FOOD SECURITY***

Synthesis Report - Country reports
Final Version

Volume 4

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Evaluation for the European Commission



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The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view, which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the authorities of the countries concerned.

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**Thematic Evaluation of Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and
Special Operations in Support of Food Security;**

FIELD REPORT FOR BANGLADESH

Final Report

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June 2004

For the

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The EC has provided assistance to Bangladesh since 1976. Most of this assistance comprised relief initially but later development as reflected for example by the general phasing out of food aid and its replacement with cash aid.

The financial cost of the 2002-2006 EC's Food Security Programme (FSP) is estimated at 120 m euro equivalent to almost 22% of the total National Indicative Programme (NIP) cost.

The two largest FSP interventions in terms of financial cost and beneficiary numbers are the Food Security for Vulnerable Group Development (FSVGD) programme and the Rural Maintenance Programme (RMP). These are categorised as Government programmes.

Other FSP interventions that are implemented solely through NGOs include the Life Nopest project and the Institute for Integrated Rural Development (IIRD) project but these projects are small in terms of their share of the total FSP's financial cost and beneficiary numbers and may therefore be considered less important in these terms than the above-mentioned Government programmes.

The FSP's overall objective is to contribute to the eradication of mal- and under-nutrition in Bangladesh according to the CSP.

The objective of this report is to provide a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the Regulation-financed food security actions in Bangladesh. This report contributes to the overall objective of the evaluation, which is to determine whether or not Regulation 1292/96 or its components should be terminated or continued in another form..

The main findings and conclusions are:

- a) The EC actions are generally relevant to the short-term needs of the main beneficiaries but there should be more emphasis on nutrition for the poorest and monitoring at all levels could be improved. The main weaknesses of the FSVGD programme are its top-down design, short duration and the absence of credit provision. It is understood however that the latter is being alleviated and that bottom-up planning and improved monitoring by the key stakeholders has started. The RMP weakness is the lack of an adequate development link that could move the target women sustainably out of poverty. The Life Nopest and IIRD projects are generally relevant to the needs.
- b) The effectiveness of the RMP, FSVGD programme and the above-mentioned solely NGO-implemented projects is believed to be fair as reflected by some positive contribution by the results to the achievement of the purposes although it is recognised that this effectiveness is difficult to measure empirically in the absence of proper monitoring. The educational and training needs of the poorest and their training programmes however need to be reassessed in order to make interventions more effective. There could be improvement in monitoring at all levels, the management of the CARE-implemented project and in the NGO selection.
- c) The cost-efficiency of converting the actions into high-quality results is also thought to be fair as reflected by the fact that the unit costs of achieving many of the

logframe's results do not appear to be out of line with those of similarly-performing actions funded by the EC or other donors in other countries. The unit costs of the CARE-implemented project however are considered to be excessive owing to the high fixed-variable cost ratio. Monitoring at all levels and the management of the CARE-implemented project could be improved.

- d) The sustainability of the food security strategies and actions that refers to the capacity of the final beneficiaries to maintain any improved livelihoods they have achieved during the period they are involved with the project is considered to be poor although this is difficult to verify in the absence of adequate data. It was noted in a study by RESAL on income-generating activities (IGAs) that it may only be possible for less than 50% of the participants to successfully create sustainable IGAs.
- e) The short term impact on the final beneficiaries appears to be good except in the case of the CARE-implemented Life Nopest project where there is believed to be great unrealised potential.
- f) The internal and external coherence is believed to be satisfactory.
- g) Regarding the comparative advantage of Government programme aid vis-à-vis other instruments within the Regulation, it is reported that Government programme aid provides the GOB with more ownership but with less flexibility and less EC control while the NGO call for proposal aid modality provides more flexibility and more control to the EC but with less GOB ownership. It is therefore difficult to determine the net comparative advantage of each aid modality as reflected for example by frequent mention by EC sources that these aid modalities are indeed complementary and the question of which is better may be irrelevant.
- h) The comparative advantage of the Regulation vis-à-vis other instruments such as ALA is that its administrative procedures are easier and quicker.

The recommendations are:

Based on conclusion a, Recommendation 1:

The EC should recruit at country level an additional foreign food security expert to be located in the EC Delegation in order to assist in the in-depth analysis of food insecurity's causes, the ranking of their importance and the identification of the linkages between them. The expert would also identify the food security impacts of possible interventions, select the most appropriate interventions in planning and expand the use of socio-economic surveys so that the chances of the programmes and projects actually reflecting the final beneficiary needs would be increased. It is understood however that this recruitment process may have already started.

Based on conclusions a,b and c, Recommendation 2:

The EC should recruit at EC level an additional food security expert to improve project and programme planning and implementation. The efficient performance of the latter is currently hampered by the huge work load of AIDCO's food security person who also handles other countries and a horizontal dossier.

Based on conclusions d and e, Recommendation 3:

The FSVGD programme should be extended by 3-5 years to enable sufficient time for the targeted women to become eligible to join other donor/NGO development programmes and the provision of credit should be introduced although it is reported that this may be in the process of being introduced. The RMP's women beneficiaries should be taught how to read and write so that they can optimise the benefits from their accumulated cash savings of 16,000 Taka. It is proposed that the programmes and projects adopt a more flexible approach to the issue of cash income generation.

The EC should encourage more dialogue with the GOB on sustainability in order to help to put in place its required financial and institutional mechanisms. The EC should provide more capacity building in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating including the strengthening of local GOB and administration and with NGOs playing a role in order to help ensure institutional sustainability and therefore the maintenance and continuation of the same level and quality of benefits to the food insecure.

Based on conclusions b, c and e, Recommendation 4:

Improve the NGO selection process so as to ensure that their management structure are in line with the focus to be put on final beneficiaries. This could be achieved by setting up a assessment grid for NGO's work and by promoting a the elaboration of an ethical "code of conduite".

Based on conclusions a, b, c, d and e, Recommendation 5:

Using the newly-recruited technical assistant mentioned in Recommendation 1, the EC should provide more higher-quality support to the local Government for the provision of reliable household data on socio-economics, poverty and food security and make available criteria and indicators that show whether or not household food security is improving. The EC in collaboration with for example the local MOWCA and NGO staff should systematically carry out intervention monitoring and evaluation not only for control but also to generate learning at country and donor level. This would be supervised by appropriately trained EC-financed technical assistance and use would be made of a joint design and monitoring and evaluation system. The technical assistant would focus analytical and advisory actions on improved monitoring and evaluation of the reform implementation as well as assisting in the measurement of the impact before and after interventions.

Based on conclusions a, b, c and d, Recommendation 6:

Steps should be taken to ensure the consistency of services provided by the NGOs and to modify the selection criteria to encourage the most appropriate and competent NGOs to apply.

Based on conclusion f, Recommendation 7:

More efforts should be made by the EC to improve donor cooperation and coordination and to provide additional human resources in order to increase the chances of more effective achievement of the food security objectives assuming that the Regulation continues in its present form

Based on conclusions g, h and i, Recommendation 8:

Bangladesh should adopt a multi-sectoral and decentralised rural development programme that addresses simultaneously the diversity and plethora of causes of both food insecurity and poverty with food security and poverty reduction objectives and actions incorporated into this single mainstream programme. Food security and poverty reduction are separated here because they are not necessarily synonymous.

The programme would be planned participatively and take account of the GOB's, EC's and other donors' complementarity, coordination, coherence, integration and synergy. The programme would include a set of institutional and financial mechanisms that would allow a process planning approach in which detailed projects for example would be planned at decentralised or community level and be financed from criteria-conditional Trust Funds.

The EC has already started to experiment in some African countries with this kind of rural development using finance from only one geographical instrument and performance so far is understood to be good. The advantage of this rural development experiment may therefore be clear: the diversity and plethora of causes of both food insecurity and poverty would be addressed using one budget line whilst simultaneously taking into account the GOB's, EC's, and other donors' complementarity, coordination, coherence, integration, synergy and cross-cutting issues such as governance, the environment and gender.

2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Background to the mission

This country case study is a review of the food aid and food security programmes in Bangladesh that since 1997 have been funded by the EC, with special emphasis on the period from 2000 onwards. The study forms part of the evaluation of ‘Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security’ which was launched in September 2003³.

This 2003/04 thematic evaluation of EC food aid and food security programmes is a follow-up of the evaluation of the Food Security Budget line (FSBL) that has been established in 1996 (Regulation No. 1292/96), and the review of the functioning of the FSBL by the Court of Auditors presented in 2003, with the main objective to analyse the added value of this budget line compared to other EC instruments and budget lines. The results should provide an assessment of the coherence and complementarity of the EC strategy for food aid and food security, and an assessment of the steps taken by the Commission to improve the efficiency and quality management with regard to programming, targeting and handling of its food aid actions and operations in support of food security.

2.2 Why Bangladesh

2.2.1 Introduction

Countries participating in this evaluation have been selected according to certain criteria:

- Being a beneficiary of the budget line B7-201;
- Having a good balance between Food Aid and support to Food Security activities in this budget line;
- Selected countries must have a good geographical representation among ACP, ALA, TACIS, MEDA and CARDS;
- Selected countries must also be a beneficiary of ECHO, budget lines such as “rehabilitation”, “NGO co finance” and being selected for LRRD;
- Priority is given to countries which were not evaluated during the last two years;

The countries that were finally selected are:

ACP:	Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Burkina Faso;
ALA:	Bangladesh, Peru, and Nicaragua;
MEDA:	Palestine;
TACIS:	Kyrgyzstan;

³ As part of the 2004 evaluation of the food aid policy and food aid management and special operations in support of food security, ten country field studies have been executed: in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gaza, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru and Zimbabwe.

Bangladesh has been selected among the 20 candidate countries for the following reasons:

- Is an important recipient of the budget line B7-201;
- Is an ALA country;
- Has an important programme on NGO call for proposals

2.2.2 Country profile: Food aid and food security: Situation, policy, actors and programmes

Bangladesh experience shows that in spite of the achievement of some degree of national food self-sufficiency, many persons are food insecure as demonstrated by the fact that about 51 m people lived below the poverty line in 2000 and of this number, about 22.6 million people were classified as ultra poor. This food insecurity was due to lack of purchasing power or to insufficient or no “direct entitlement”. Food security may be categorised into three components:

- food availability through domestic production, stocks, commercial imports and aid
- food access through own production, cash income and government transfer
- food utilisation and nutrition

2.2.2.1 Food Security Situation

National production of food particularly for rice and wheat increased by about 100% in the 1972-1997 period and increased further in 2000/2001 mainly as a result of improvement in infrastructure, irrigation, rural electrification and the credit supply. The national population increased however by about 75% in the same period and combined with the frequent occurrence of natural disasters such as floods and droughts still leaves many food insecure people. Bangladesh therefore currently imports about 2 m t of food.

Agricultural Growth

Agriculture is Bangladesh’s dominant economic sector employing nearly two-thirds of the labour force and generating on average 30% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Agricultural production grew significantly in the late 1990s owing to high production growth rates in crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry. The total area cultivated to rice increased from 9.9 m hectares in 1995/96 to 10.7 m hectares in 1999/2000 resulting in increased production from 17.7 m t to 23.1 m t. The cultivated area and the production of wheat also increased in the same time period. This agricultural growth stemmed mainly from the following:

- (i) increased use and availability of high yielding seed varieties, water and fertiliser
- (ii) improved soil and water management, market integration and infrastructure
- (iii) increased cultivated area due to expansion of irrigation facilities, increased availability of credit and greater dissemination of extension
- (iv) improved livestock and poultry breeds
- (v) increased inland fish cultivation

National Food Self-Sufficiency

Bangladesh has increased its degree of national food self-sufficiency in recent years resulting in a reduction of privately-financed food imports to about 2 m t.

Food Aid

About 45 percent of the population lives below the poverty line which may be defined as a per capita daily intake of less than 2122 calories. About half of these people may be further defined as hardcore poor with a daily per capita intake of less than 1850 calories. Table 2 shows the food-aid volume trend in the 1988-1998 period.

Table 2: Food Aid ('000 t) in 1988-1998

Year	Rice	Wheat	Total
1988-89	40	1316	1356
1989-90	41	908	949
1990-91	10	1530	1540
1991-92	39	1375	1414
1992-93	19	716	735
1993-94	0	654	654
1994-95	0	935	935
1995-96	1	737	738
1996-97	10	608	618
1997-98	0	549	549
1998-99	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1999-2000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2000-2001	562	993	1555
2001-2002	127	1664	1791
2002-2003	1557	1664	3221
2003-2004 (1)	806	1889	2695

Source: Bangladesh Country Paper on Food Security Reserve Board Seventh Meeting - Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1998 and Food Grain Digest, WFP, 2004

(1) Projection

The table shows that total food aid volumes of rice and wheat to Bangladesh declined by an annualised average of 10.9% in the 1988/89 - 1997/98 period but increased to a projected peak of almost 2.7 m t in 2003-2004. The proportion of food aid to total domestic production in the late 1990s was probably less than 5%.

2.2.2.2 Food Security Policy and Strategy

The Evolution of Food Policy in Bangladesh

Bangladesh food policy in the last decade changed from large-scale government intervention in the rice and wheat markets to more free-market reliance together with some focus on food distribution targeted to those households in greatest need. The Government of Bangladesh also expanded nutrition programmes comprising the provision of nutrition education and targeted nutritional interventions to women and children.

Policies and Strategies

The main objective of the national food policy and strategies is food security through the attainment of some degree of food self-sufficiency. Bangladesh's food security is constrained by the fact that many households have either no land or land that is too small to produce sufficient food and that the members of many households have little or no employment and cash income.

The Government during the last quarter of a century encouraged the adoption of high yielding rice and wheat varieties together with the expansion of the use of irrigation water and fertiliser. It is now realised however that as well as increasing agricultural production there should be an expansion of the poor's effective demand together with improved market access for farm produce.

In order to improve national and household food security including the protection of consumers and producers from short-run supply and price fluctuations, Bangladesh has adopted the following strategies:

(1) Increase Agricultural Production

The Bangladesh Government formulated in 1999 a National Agriculture Policy in order to promote food production and availability through diversification combined with rapid increases in the productivity of rice, wheat, pulses, oil-seeds, vegetables, fruit and livestock products. This policy advocated the following strategies:

- increase marketing efficiency for seed, fertiliser and irrigation materials
- restructure agricultural research and extension and formulate comprehensive agriculture research plan including development of major crop production technologies
- promote integrated pest management (IPM)
- encourage agricultural mechanisation
- provide credit to poor farmers
- improve agriculture production infrastructure
- optimise land use
- expand agricultural education and training
- improve disaster preparedness and post-disaster rehabilitation programmes and coordination amongst Government, NGOs and the private sector

- develop more location-specific flood- and drought-tolerant varieties of rice and other crops

(2) Public Food Distribution System (PFDS)

Due to private market failure during natural disasters such as floods and cyclones, the Bangladesh Government developed a public food distribution system (PFDS) that includes rural public works and social development programmes in order to ensure a sufficient food supply at affordable prices for the poor. The PFDS dates back to the mid 1940s and has undergone some changes and some components such as the Public Rationing System have been dropped.

The Bangladesh Government also designed effective storage mechanisms to reduce seasonal and regional price and supply fluctuations including encouragement of the private sector to store food in surplus and deficit locations.

As a result of the large volumes of food imported during the 1993-1994 floods and droughts, the government also decided to maintain minimum buffer food stocks levels. But the latter is mainly for political reasons.

(3) Income Generation for the Poor

Bangladesh has many landless people who depend therefore on off-farm employment. The Government and NGOs consequently implement employment and cash-income generating programmes comprising the provision of credit, skills training, rural infrastructure development and marketing support.

(4) Targeted Support for Vulnerable Groups

A degree of national food self-sufficiency is not necessarily synonymous with household food security as reflected in the fact that about 45% of the national population lives below the calorie-poverty line as mentioned earlier in spite of increasing food production and declining real prices of rice for example. The Government and NGOs therefore provide cash income and food aid through for example labour-intensive public works that target the under- and mal-nourished vulnerable groups.

(5) Reduction of Post Harvest Losses

Annual post harvest loss in Bangladesh may reach 30% particularly for fruit, vegetables and spices and stems mainly from a lack of knowledge of proper storage, preservation and handling. An appropriate post harvest strategy should be adopted.

(6) Promotion of Food Utilisation and Nutrition

It is recommended that the Bangladesh Government adopts food utilisation and nutrition strategies comprising

- (i) adequate consumption of calories, protein and fat particularly for women and children
- (ii) provision of safe drinking water and improved sanitation
- (iii) promotion of a balanced diet containing sufficient micro nutrients and
- (iv) promotion of adequate health through food supplementation, education and disease control.

2.2.2.3 Main Actors and Programmes

Government, Private Sector, Donors and NGOs

Food security in Bangladesh is provided by the Government of Bangladesh, the private sector and NGOs. The Ministry of Agriculture is involved mainly in promoting sustainable and efficient agricultural production through credit provision and investment in research and extension. The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation is involved in investment in water development and irrigation while the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and Cooperatives (MOLGRDC) is involved in the development of infrastructure including rural roads.

The Ministry of Food aims to ensure food availability especially in the short run through market intervention such as food distribution from public stock, provision of farmer-guaranteed prices through public procurement, guaranteed and timely supply of fertiliser and other agrochemicals and research in and extension of improved rice and wheat varieties.

Food distribution-related programmes are operated by the Ministry of Food, the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED), the Ministry of Relief and Disaster Management and the Ministry of Women's and Children's Affairs.

In order to meet food-shortfalls, the public sector should:

- reduce the burden of maintaining huge storage of food grains, which is about one million metric tons on average and the recommended level of storage has been mentioned as 600,000 metric tons at any given time.
- maintain incentives for marketing and private storage that would facilitate the free flow of food within the country
- develop targeted safety nets for the poor
- guarantee and stabilise farmgate prices through public food procurement

Bangladesh also has a Nutrition Policy, Strategy and the National Plan of Action on Nutrition.

Government and NGO Micro-Credit Programmes for the Poor and Food Insecure

Many of the poor who have no access to land or capital are assisted by Government and NGOs programmes including the MOWCA's Department of Women's Affairs, the Ministry of Youth and the MOLGRDC's Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB) that provide micro-credit and skills training to the poor while. NGOs include the Grameen Bank (GB), the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the Association for Social Advancement (APSA) and Proshika that provide credit to the rural poor.

Vulnerable Group Development Programme

The Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) programme was initially conceived as a relief provider but now also contributes to development for the poorest rural women. The programme is jointly funded by the GOB, the World Food Programme (WFP), the EC and the Governments of Canada and Australia.

The programme components comprise the promotion of cash savings, group formation for social awareness building and training in income generation, savings and human development. The activities are implemented by NGOs in order to facilitate the women to reach the first rung of the development ladder and thereafter to participate in NGO non food-assisted programmes.

A WFP-conducted impact evaluation of the VGD programme concluded that:

- the number of households taking up IGAs increased
- the average per capita daily calorie intake increased
- livestock is the main productive asset
- school children enrolment increased
- more households save and are involved in personal banking

Nutrition-Improving Programmes

The GOB emphasised the expansion of nutritional facilities for the poor through its approval of the National Food and Nutrition Policy and the National Plan of Action on Nutrition in 1997 together with the reactivation of the National Nutrition Council. The GOB is also integrating nutrition into overall development partly through the promotion of policy dialogue between it and the development partners. The GOB implemented the following nutrition-related programmes in coordination with donors and NGOs:

(1) Health and Population Services Package of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare

The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare implemented interventions including immunisation, improved reproductive health and control of acute respiratory infection and diarrhoeal diseases.

(2) Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Project (BINP)

The GOB in collaboration with the NGOs mobilised the targeted people of the community and provided them with nutrition-related services. Though some positive results were obtained, reduction of severe malnutrition is not applicable.

The project delivered food and micro-nutrient supplements to females of reproductive age who suffer from chronic energy and micro nutrient deficiency.

(3) Health Education Programme

This health education programme is implemented by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

(4) Nutrition Surveillance Project

The Nutrition Surveillance Project is coordinated by Helen Keller International (HKI) and other NGOs.

Coordination Mechanisms

There are many programmes to increase food access for the poor people.

2.2.2.4 Major Constraints to Improving Food Security

Natural Disasters

Bangladesh is one of the most disaster-prone countries in Asia with frequent cyclones, floods and droughts. About one-fifth to one-third of the country is flooded every year during the May-to-September period and in 1987 rice production declined by 3.5 m t or 17.5% of normal national output. Damage to fisheries is also estimated to be substantial.

Poverty

Nearly 45% of the total population live below the absolute poverty line and causes most of these to be food insecure. The main constraint to improved household food security is lack of employment or purchasing power. But the GOB and donors have not been very successful in ensuring sufficient calorie intake, employment and income earning opportunities for the majority of the poor.

Many of the poor have little or no access to land and formal credit. Many NGOs consequently prefer not to assist these peoples because of the perceived risks and these peoples remain food insecure as a result.

Malnutrition

The prevalence of malnutrition in Bangladesh is one of the highest in the world and is exacerbated by poor personal and environmental hygiene, sanitation and water quality. The effects of this include underweight children, vitamin A deficiency (VAD), VAD related eye damage and anaemia. Malnutrition is both a cause and an effect of food insecurity.

Growth in Agriculture

Agriculture is the most important economic sector accounting for about one quarter of GDP and employing more than 60% of the labour force as mentioned earlier. It is argued that agricultural growth may play a crucial part in contributing to household food security. However, although new rice varieties may lead to doubled yields compared to the local varieties, only 47% of the total cultivable area is planted with local varieties due mainly to agronomic. These constraints should be removed and environments created for the production and dissemination of these new varieties.

Given the land scarcity and the abundance of landless and marginal farmers, the development of non-crop agriculture would be essential to enhance the quality and the quantity of the food production system. But the non-crop sector is also constrained by the following:

- disease, poor genetic stock, shortage of pasture land and inadequate feed supplies results in low poultry and livestock productivity. The sector is also dominated by farmers with little knowledge and capital.
- the fishery sector is also facing technological and marketing constraints.

Supply Stabilisation through Trade

Bangladesh depends on imports for food supply stabilisation but is subject to various risks and uncertainties. So in order to minimise the risks, the following actions may be taken:

- strengthen early warning systems
- increase private trader and farmer stocks
- establish government stocks in deficit areas
- make long-term food import agreements, even if Bangladesh is in recent years nearly self-sufficient in production of major cereals and the overall macro level food security situation is quite at ease
- ensure food security reserves

Conclusion

National food production increased substantially since Bangladesh's independence but the number of food insecure persons is still great. The recommendations are:

- adopt pro-poor strategies to generate employment and to protect and generate cash-income
- increase agricultural production using labour-intensive strategies
- improve household food utilisation

2.3 Summary of the mission

The mission was carried out by Antony Penney and M.A.Momin between the 29th February and 15th March 2004.

A detailed list of persons interviewed and chronology of the mission are given in Annexes 1 and 3 of this Country Report.

2.4 Constraints

The main constraint was a lack of time and reliable data.

3. EVALUATIVE QUESTIONS

3.1 Evaluative Question 2

“What is the level of coherence between the food security policies, strategies and objectives of Regulation No.1292/96 and those from other geographical instruments (EDF, ALA, MEDA, TACIS, CARDS) and budget lines (ECHO, Rehabilitation, NGO Cofinancing)? “

The evaluative question 1 will be dealt within the synthesis report.

3.2 Evaluative Question 2

What is the level of integration of the food security policy within the Commission’s development strategy with the partner country concerned as laid down in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP)?

Coherence of the overall objectives of the food security policy and the CSP

The overall objective of the EC’s Food Security Programme is to “contribute to the eradication of mal- and under-nutrition in Bangladesh”¹ while the overall objective of EC co-operation with Bangladesh is “fostering sustainable economic and social development while helping to reduce poverty and contributing towards Bangladesh’s integration into the world economy.” These objectives are fully coherent since it is assumed that improved household food security is encapsulated by poverty reduction. The quality of the cross references is sound.

Importance of FS issue in CSP

The importance of the food security issue in the CSP may be demonstrated by the level of the financial cost of the food security interventions² that accounts for nearly 22%³ of the National Indicative Programme (NIP) cost. Food security’s importance in the CSP may also be exemplified by the number of targeted beneficiaries which is estimated at 85,000 every 2 years for the FSVGD⁴ programme and 42,000 every 4 years for the RMP equivalent to a 6-year total of 339,000. The quality of the cross-references was found to be good.

1 Through ‘indirect nutrition activities’ targeted at the ultra-poor and specific programmes for small and marginal farmers. The ultra poor are defined as the poorest 25% of the population equivalent to 35 million people with a daily per capita intake of less than 2122 calories. This category also contains the hardcore ultra poor or the poorest 15% of the population equivalent to 21 million people with a daily per capita intake of less than 1805 calories.

2 That together form the 2002-2006 Food Security Programme. Typical interventions include the Life Nopest project, the IIRD project, the Rural Maintenance Programme (RMP) and the FSVGD programme.

3 The financial cost of the 2002-2006 EC’s Food Security Programme is estimated at 120 m euro compared to a total NIP cost of 560 m euro.

4 Food Security for Vulnerable Group Development.

Clear definition of the role of the regulation within CSP

One of the priority sectors⁵ outlined in the CSP under the heading “improving Bangladesh’s human development indicators” is Food Security and Rural Development while the Food Security Programme is mentioned several times in the CSP. The Regulation is not mentioned in the CSP but assuming it is synonymous with this Food Security Programme, its role would be to contribute to the eradication of mal- and under-nutrition in Bangladesh as mentioned in 2.1.

The FSP’s detailed roles set out in the CSP⁶ are derived in principle from food security’s causes but there seems to be some lack of clarity of these causes, their relative importance and identification of the linkages between them. The effectiveness of the role of the Regulation within the CSP depends on the quality of food security data and analysis and on the articulation of the linkages between the nature and extent of food security and the EC’s interventions. Food security data do not appear to be shaping the CSP as it should and the extent to which this data is feeding into inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral priority setting is unclear. The solution would be to conduct a more detailed household needs-assessment analysis and this indeed is being planned for 2005 for the FSVGD programme as mentioned in 9.6.

Complementarities of the various EC instruments within CSP

The activities of the FSP and ALA are seen to be contributing to complementarity in reaching common objectives such as poverty reduction and improved food security. This complementarity as well as that between the EC and other donors in programming, programme and project design and implementation is also being strengthened by the EC Delegation through regular consultation within the EC as well as with other actors.

Coordination of EC interventions

The coordination of EC interventions is considered to be good as it is facilitated by monthly Local Consultative Group (LCG) sub-group meetings together with constant contact between the EC Delegation staff. The food security technical assistants also attend the meetings of other programmes such as the CFPR. The EC Delegation is also ensuring coordination of the EC interventions with the GOB, NGOs and other donors in programming, programme and project design and implementation.

⁵ Priority sectors include (i) Health, Population and Nutrition (ii) Education (iii) Food Security and Rural Development and (iv) Employment Creation.

⁶ Pages 24-25

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 2:

The objectives of the food security policy and the CSP are fully coherent since it is assumed that improved household food security is encapsulated by poverty reduction. The importance of food security in the CSP may be demonstrated by the financial cost level of the food security interventions that accounts for nearly 22% of the National Indicative Programme (NIP) cost and by the estimated number of almost 340,000 beneficiaries targeted over six years by the largest programmes.

The role of the Regulation within the CSP is unclear since food security data do not appear to be shaping it as it should and the extent to which this data is feeding into inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral priority setting is unclear. The complementarities of the various EC instruments within the CSP and the coordination of the EC interventions are considered to be fair.

3.3 Evaluative Question 3

‘What is the coherence between EC food aid and food security policy and national strategies of beneficiary countries, especially the PRSP?’

Coherence of the overall objectives of CSP and IPRSP⁷

The overall objective of EC co-operation with Bangladesh is “fostering sustainable economic and social development while helping to reduce poverty and contributing towards Bangladesh’s integration into the world economy” while the overall strategic goal of the IPRSP is “poverty reduction⁸ and accelerating the pace of social development⁹”. These objectives are fully coherent if it is assumed that poverty reduction encapsulates improved household food security. The quality of the cross-references was found to be good.

Importance of FS issue in IPRSP

Food security is important in the IPRSP as reflected by its number and type of references and this importance is increasing as a result of the monthly Food Security Local Consultative Group¹⁰ (LCG) sub-group meetings. The EC Delegation is indeed currently preparing a position paper on food security to highlight its increasing importance in Bangladesh’s development. Poverty reduction and nutrition however are in practice not high on the GOB’s agenda as reflected by the absence of a GOB national food security policy although this is believed to be under preparation as mentioned in 11.2. It was not possible to assess the importance of food security in terms of its financial cost relative to the total IPRSP cost because the latter has not yet been translated into a 3-year rolling financing plan in which ranked and prioritised domestic and external resource commitments are costed. This financing plan is however in the process of preparation as mentioned in 11.2 but it is felt that food security’s importance in this plan would be great in financial cost terms.

Clear definition of the role of EC within IPRSP

There is no clear definition of the role of the EC¹¹ within the IPRSP although the latter does recognise the NGOs’ roles.

⁷ Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2003/04-2006/07.

⁸ With special focus on the removal of hunger and chronic poverty.

⁹ With particular emphasis on empowering the poor and achieving gender equality.

¹⁰ The LCG comprises persons from the GOB, NGOs and donors.

¹¹ Including food security programming.

Rationale of EC intervention

Mention is made in the IPRSP of the Food Security for Vulnerable Group Development (FSVGD) programme and the Rural Maintenance Programme (RMP), the largest¹² EC-funded food security programmes in Bangladesh. These programmes are considered to be in strategic line with the IPRSP since they contribute to both relief and development although many of the poorest¹³ are not targeted by them. There are however many other projects in Bangladesh focusing on the poorest.

No adequate stakeholder analysis has been done however so no one knows with certainty of the real household needs and therefore whether or not the EC interventions perfectly match them but it is reported that the FSVGD programme for example would conduct a household needs assessment in 2005 and therefore adjust the EC interventions if necessary to better match the real needs.

It has been reported by some stakeholders that were the EC to withdraw its support from its beneficiaries, the latter would not receive support from anyone

Coordination of donors and government interventions

The coordination of donors and government interventions is reported to be of generally high quality as a result of regular meetings¹⁴ although feedback is not always provided by certain parts of the Government perhaps because of the fact that no government department has yet been mandated with food security. The EC however is currently co-funding the Food Security Capacity Strengthening Programme (FSCSP) in order to improve the Ministry of Food's food security planning, increase civil society capacity and food security awareness in other Ministries and encourage collaboration between WFP and FAO. This would improve the coordination of the GOB's and donors' intervention planning.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 3:

The objectives of the CSP and IPRSP are fully coherent if it is assumed that poverty reduction encapsulates improved household food security. Food security is important in the IPRSP as reflected by its number and type of references but there is no clear definition of the role of the EC within the IPRSP although the latter does recognise the NGOs' roles. The FSP projects and programmes are considered to be in strategic line with the IPRSP since they contribute to both relief and development although many of the poorest are not targeted by them. The coordination of donors' and government interventions is considered to be fair.

¹² In terms of financial cost and beneficiary numbers.

¹³ The hardcore ultra poor comprising the poorest 15% of the population or 21 million people are excluded from these programmes.

¹⁴ These meetings would focus on coordination and not only on data sharing.

3.4 Evaluative Question 4

What is the added value of Food Aid in kind (FA) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

Relevance of FA strategies and actions

There used to be a general need for food aid but the EC has planned its phasing-out based on factors such as (i) the achievement of some degree of national food self-sufficiency (ii) a realisation that food aid may not provide a sustainable solution to structural food insecurity and (iii) a preference by the beneficiaries of cash instead of food. Food aid¹⁵ is still considered relevant however for crises and nutrition interventions.

The preconditions for food aid use have become “phasing out” for the above-mentioned reasons.

Effectiveness of FA strategies and actions

The effectiveness of food aid strategies and actions was demonstrated by their contribution to the saving and improvement of many lives¹⁶ owing to the EC’s provision of about 175,000 t of relief food aid during the 1998 floods followed by some developmental food aid via the IFADEP¹⁷. This effectiveness is however generally difficult to empirically measure due to a lack of high quality qualitative monitoring data. However, a comprehensive monitoring plan for ongoing and future FSP projects with inclusion of impact is in the design phase.

Efficiency of FA strategies and actions

The implementation modality under the IFADEP was food for work and this became food for structural training under the FSVGD Programme. The efficiency of these food aid strategies and actions vis-à-vis their flexibility and rapidity in response to the needs is believed to be good as also is the timely delivery of food aid.

The benefit-cost ratio of providing food aid to the beneficiaries is estimated to be much less than unity and therefore financially cost inefficient¹⁸.

¹⁵ On condition that it is sourced locally and not from overseas and that it is managed in a strategic manner consistent with development objectives and targeted where it is needed most.

¹⁶ As reflected in the steep declines in the mortality and morbidity rates. There was also some nutritional benefit but this is difficult to measure.

¹⁷ Integrated Food Assistance Development Project (IFADEP) which became the Food Security for Vulnerable Group Development (FSVGD) Programme in January 2001.

¹⁸ The wholesale Dhaka cost of 1 kg of wheat is estimated at 6 Taka while the Europe to Dhaka per kg transport cost is estimated at 11 Taka in financial prices.

Impact of FA strategies and actions

The FSVGD programme and its implementing NGOs¹⁹ recently started to monitor food aid distribution and found that most of the target group²⁰ was targeted and that each woman received more than 95% of the intended monthly allocation of 30 kg of wheat. The short-term food aid impact is good because the women who attend the meetings also receive the food aid thereby safeguarding their current consumption. The women who do not attend the meetings receive no food aid.

There may be some nutritional status improvement as a result of the food aid strategies and actions but its measurement is difficult.

There was no price or production disincentive effect caused by food aid as reflected in the absence of any declines in the farmgate price level or cultivated area for wheat or for any of its potential staple food substitutes and the mortality and morbidity rates declined dramatically as a result of the food aid strategies and actions particularly after the 1998 floods as mentioned in 4.2.

It is reported that the degree of satisfaction of the partners such as the GOB, the NGOs, the EC and the beneficiaries is good with fine cooperation between them although the lead NGO²¹ is believed to be weak. The food aid needs appraisal is sound and the beneficiaries seem pleased with the food aid type delivered.

Sustainability of FA strategies and actions

The provision of relief food aid is meant to safeguard current consumption while the training component is intended to facilitate the establishment of a link between this and future cash income generation. The combination of relief food aid and training could in principle assist in the provision of sustainability but this seems to be precluded by the low quality or inappropriateness of the training.

The degree of ownership of the food aid strategies and actions is high since the GOB is able to fund the food aid component itself.

Comparative advantage of FA to operations in other instruments (outside regulation) dealing with FA

It has been noted by some observers that it is quicker to source food aid through ECHO than through the Regulation 1292/96 while other observers took the opposite view.

¹⁹ These NGOs are selected not through the NGO call for proposal but by a donor pool since the EC is not the major programme financier.

²⁰ Women only.

²¹ Thengamana Mahila Sambaya Samity (Thengamana Women's Cooperative Society).

Coordination of the various types of operation (within the Regulation) and other instruments dealing with FA

Not applicable

Quality of beneficiary targeting

The FSVGD programme's main target group is defined as the ultra poor²² and targeting efficiency is reported to be 95% as mentioned in 4.4 although there is an estimated food aid leakage of 13.5%²³.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 4:

There used to be a general need for food aid but the EC has planned its phasing-out. The effectiveness of food aid was demonstrated by its contribution to the saving and improvement of many lives particularly during the 1998 floods. The benefit-cost ratio of providing food aid to the beneficiaries is estimated to be much less than unity and therefore financially cost inefficient.

The provision of relief food aid safeguards current consumption while the training component is intended to facilitate the establishment of a link between this and future cash income generation. The combination of relief food aid and training could in principle assist in the provision of sustainability but this seems to be precluded by the low quality or inappropriateness of the training so sustainability appears to be lacking.

It is reported by some EC staff that it is quicker to source food aid through ECHO than through the Regulation 1292/96 while other EC staff took the opposite view. The quality of targeting is good.

²² The FSVGD Programme's beneficiary selection criteria include (i) < 0.15 acre of land (ii) wage labourer (iii) monthly cash income < 300 Taka (iii) per capita daily intake of < 2122 calories (iv) no active male including disabled (v) active and able women and (vi) household should have no other involvement in other development projects and programmes.

²³ Including 0.5% transport and storage losses.

3.5 Evaluative Question 5

‘What is the added value of the currency facility (CF) / Budgetary Support (BS) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 5:

The Regulation’s food security actions are not financed through direct budgetary support.

3.6 Evaluative Question 6

‘What is the added value of the operations to support food security (FS) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

3.6.1 Part 1: The FSVGD programme and the RMP

Relevance of FS strategies and actions

The FSVGD programme is generally relevant because the target group belongs to the ultra poor²⁴ comprising food deficit households with a daily per capita intake estimated at less than 2122 calories. The programme provides these households with short-term consumption-safeguarding food aid although this is currently being replaced by cash aid owing to factors mentioned in 4.1.

The training of the women in awareness raising and income generating activities (IGAs) is also relevant in order to assist them to eventually produce, earn or pay their own way out of food insecurity by for example becoming eligible to join sustainable NGO-implemented food security-improving or poverty-reducing projects or programmes. The capacity building of the NGOs and by the NGOs is also relevant.

The RMP²⁵ is relevant because its target group is also food insecure and ultra poor and is provided in the short-term with consumption-safeguarding cash aid and after four years with possible employment and cash income-protecting or cash income-generating opportunities facilitated through cash-savings accumulation. The CARE-implemented training component is also relevant.

It was not possible to obtain the data on the pre-conditions of using Government programme aid or the NGO call for proposal modality.

²⁴ The poorest 25% equivalent to an estimated 35 million people.

²⁵ The EC started in October 2002 to fund the Rural Maintenance Programme (RMP) which provides cash for year-round work to its target group of 42,000 women from 4,200 Union Parishads for the maintenance of 84,000 km of non-paved roads. The RMP is also funded by CIDA and GOB. The women are paid for 6 hours each day for 365 days at 75% of the prevailing rural wage and there are compulsory daily savings of 10 Taka equivalent to an accumulated sum of 16,000 Taka after 4 years or 1 cycle. The RMP also provides training to the final women beneficiaries and to the local and central government staff.

Effectiveness of FS strategies and actions

The FSVGD programme seems to be effective in the short term while it has been found that the RMP is also effective²⁶ up until the women leave the programme but anecdotal evidence and limited field discussion indicated that the programmes may not be effective in the long term. This is difficult to verify however in the absence of long-term monitoring data.

Efficiency of FS strategies and actions

The efficiency of the food security strategies and actions in fund-delivery terms is generally fine although there is some food aid delivery inefficiency in the FSVGD programme where 'leakage' is in line with the national average. The cost-efficiency of converting the food security strategies and actions into results is generally unknown owing to a lack of adequate monitoring data but a broad indication may be discerned for example from a comparison of the programmes' per beneficiary cost with the per capita income level.

The FSVGD programme's annual cost²⁷ is estimated at 5.93 m euro equivalent to about 70 euro per beneficiary. Assuming the combined annual financial contribution of the GOB and the CIDA is also 5.93 m euro, this would make a per beneficiary cost of 140 euro equivalent to 46% of the estimated per capita income of 307 euro. This cost may be judged to be acceptable²⁸.

The RMP's annual financial cost and the number of beneficiaries are estimated at 20 m euro and 42,000 respectively thus giving a per beneficiary cost of 476 euro equivalent to 155% of per capita income. This cost may be judged to be too high even though the RMP is generally relevant to the beneficiaries needs and reportedly stems from CARE's high fixed costs. The RMP's cost efficiency would be enhanced were these fixed costs reduced.

The efficiency of the implementing modality of the food security strategies and actions is generally below potential vis-à-vis the NGO call for proposal owing to the lack of dialogue and flexibility.

It is further noted that it is difficult to find an NGO that is competent and committed to development instead of to profit maximisation. The dilemma may be that the EC needs NGOs but only the good ones.

The flexibility and rapidity of the food security strategies and actions are considered to be satisfactory although all regulations are bound by financial agreements. But Regulation 1292/96 does allow sourcing flexibility²⁹.

It was not possible to measure the benefit-cost ratio of the food security strategies and actions in the time available but it has been noted at least that their cost-effectiveness is improved owing to rules-of-origin flexibility.

²⁶ As demonstrated by good governance and being leakage free and well targeted.

²⁷ Excluding the GOB's and CIDA's financial contributions.

²⁸ The general criterion is that a per beneficiary investment cost may be considered acceptable if this cost is not greater than the per capita income level.

²⁹ Untied aid.

Impact of FS strategies and actions

It was difficult to measure the FSVGD programme's impact in its 1st cycle³⁰ because there was no monitoring³¹ but the programme recently started to monitor³² and will conduct an impact assessment in 2005⁷ on 85,000 ultra poor women³³. Anecdotal evidence together with some field discussion however indicated a good short-term consumption-safeguarding impact but a poor long-term one owing to the limited growth, employment or cash-income generating linkages facilitated by the training investment. It was indeed reported that the increased awareness training provided by the FSVGD programme was of limited value in facilitating the women's escape from food insecurity.

While it is too early to adequately measure the programme's impact of income generating activities (IGA)³⁴, preliminary assessments³⁵ demonstrated that some women became eligible for NGO³⁶ borrowing thereby enabling them to pay their own way out of food insecurity.

The RMP's impact on its target group is not known with certainty because there is little or no monitoring data but it is recognised that the RMP design is generally good although the efficiency of implementation could be improved. The implementing NGO³⁷ for example has been criticised for its poor performance including its high fixed costs which are currently estimated to be 25% of the NGOs total costs as mentioned in 6.3.

The impact of the food security strategies and actions may include improved nutritional status but this has not been measured owing to quantification and perhaps attribution problems. The possible impact of increased food production could not be assessed in the absence of monitoring data.

The degree of satisfaction of the partners such as the GOB, the NGOs and beneficiaries is reported to be good and the target group women are indeed delighted with their dramatically increased consumption.

Sustainability of FS strategies and actions

The first-round impact of the FSVGD programme and the RMP is generally good with higher food consumption or cash income as mentioned in 6.4. But the sustainability of the food security strategies and actions that refers to the capacity of the final beneficiaries to maintain any improved livelihoods they have achieved during the period they are involved

³⁰ January 2001 to December 2002.

³¹ Monitoring was not considered a priority under IFADEP because its food security intervention selection criteria were based perhaps more on short-term effectiveness and efficiency, administrative feasibility or political acceptability rather than on long term impact and sustainability.

³² Together with its 13 implementing NGOs.

⁷ During the 2nd cycle from January 2003 to December 2004.

³³ The FSVGD programme targets every 2 years 85,000 different ultra poor women equivalent to about 467,500 household members or 6.7% of the total VGD target group of 7 m. The latter is estimated at 20% of the ultra poor or 20% of 35 m. The FSVGD programme does not target the hardcore ultra poor or the poorest 15% or 21 m of the population.

³⁴ Because IGA training did not start until October 2003.

³⁵ From NGO-conducted case studies.

³⁶ NGOs generally target only the moderate poor in the 3rd and 4th cash income deciles.

³⁷ CARE

with the project is considered to be poor although this is difficult to verify in the absence of adequate monitoring data.

The food security-improving intervention selection criteria conventionally include effectiveness, efficiency, administrative feasibility, political acceptability and long term sustainability but it seems from anecdotal evidence and from discussions with other donors that long term sustainability may have received a lower ranking and weighting priority than the other criteria which could explain why some of the beneficiaries seem to be denied the opportunity to produce, earn or pay their own way out of food insecurity.

Were future programme design to take more account of establishing or strengthening the growth, employment, cash-income protecting or cash-income generating linkages with the current interventions, the chances of the programmes actually reflecting the beneficiaries' real needs and therefore long term sustainability would be increased.

The key to achieving improved household food security is to focus not just on safeguarding current income and food consumption but also on the longer term livelihood interventions that may be geographically specific and designed to support traditional community food security arrangements. Consistency in macro and micro level food policy would also be important. The FSVGD programme and the RMP would need to distinguish more clearly therefore between short-term and long-term interventions and to strengthen the links between them. Once the newly-planned credit interventions are implemented however, it may succeed in enabling more women to pay their own way out of food insecurity and to remain food secure.

It has been reported however that financial sustainability mechanisms are in the process of being set up. The shares of the women's wages for example that are currently financed by the Union Parishads, central GOB, CIDA and EC are 10%, 45%, 22.5% and 22.5% respectively but it is anticipated that the Union Parishads and the GOB would be able to finance all of these costs in the long term.

The two largest food security programmes in terms of financial cost and beneficiary numbers are the FSVGD programme and the RMP and these are part of the GOB thereby giving it political ownership while the financial ownership at present is 55% as inferred in 6.5.

Comparative advantage with regard to other types of operation (within the Regulation) and other instruments dealing with FS

It is reported that Government programme aid provides the GOB with more ownership but with less flexibility and less EC control while the NGO call for proposal aid modality provides more flexibility, gives more control to the EC and by definition no GOB ownership. It has been argued by some EC Headquarter and country level staff that these aid modalities may indeed be complementary and that the question of which is better may therefore be irrelevant.

It is reported that ALA would need the GOB approval while the FSP is able to operate without this approval vis-à-vis large programming because it falls outside the NIP¹. The FSP therefore has a comparative advantage vis-à-vis ALA.

¹ This refers to programme which are not involving GOB.

It is also argued that the EC aid volume allocated through ALA to Bangladesh is too small in terms of Bangladesh's per capita needs and the FSP could therefore be viewed as a compensatory or redistributive aid mechanism since other countries with "smaller" needs receive disproportionately more aid per capita from the EC. This however may not necessarily justify a separate budget line.

Coordination of the various instruments dealing with FS

The coordination of the various instruments dealing with food security is considered to be good.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 6 - Part 1:

The FSVGD programme is generally relevant because the target group belongs to the ultra poor and the RMP is relevant because its target group is also food insecure and ultra poor. The FSVGD programme seems to be effective in the short term while it has been found that the RMP is also effective up until the women leave the programme but anecdotal evidence and limited field discussion indicated that the programmes may not be effective in the long term.

The cost-efficiency of converting the food security strategies and actions into results is generally fair for the FSVGD programme but poor for the RMP.

Anecdotal evidence together with some field discussion however indicated a good short-term consumption-safeguarding impact but a poor long-term one owing to limited growth, employment or cash-income generating linkages facilitated by the training investment.

The sustainability of the food security strategies and actions that refers to the capacity of the final beneficiaries to maintain any improved livelihoods they have achieved during the period they are involved with the project is considered to be poor although this is difficult to verify in the absence of adequate monitoring data.

It is reported that Government programme aid provides the GOB with more ownership but with less flexibility and less EC control while the NGO call for proposal aid modality provides more flexibility, gives more control to the EC but no GOB ownership. It has been argued by some EC Headquarter and country level staff that these aid modalities may indeed be complementary and that the question of which is better

The coordination of the various instruments dealing with food security is considered to be good.

3.6.2 Part 2: Solely NGO-Implemented Projects

Relevance of FS strategies and actions

The Life Nopest project supports small- and marginal-farmer capacity building in Greater Mymensingh and Rajshahi through the promotion of education, self-awareness, confidence and individual and community action. These strategies and actions are considered to be generally relevant for improving household food security.

The Institute for Integrated Rural Development (IIRD) Project aims to achieve food security for the extreme poor and assetless through sustainable income uplift and poverty eradication by providing, training, education and productive investment and income generation opportunities in Bogra, Netrokona, Kishoreganj and Chandpur. These strategies and actions are considered to be broadly relevant for improving household food security.

Effectiveness of FS strategies and actions

The effectiveness of the Life Nopest Project's food security strategies and actions is believed to be below potential due mainly to CARE's management structure according to anecdotal evidence and to discussions with the EC Delegation and other donors although it was not possible to obtain more details in the time available.

The CARE's management structure seems unable or unwilling to support the maximising of the development processes resulting in a situation where the project wants to go one way but cannot because of the organisational structure. The net result is a project with great unrealised potential. This assessment however of the contribution made by the project's results to the achievement of the project purpose³⁸ was difficult to empirically measure owing to the absence of sufficient quantifiable and reliable indicators.

Similarly with the IIRD project, anecdotal evidence together with discussions with the EC Delegation and other donors suggested that the effectiveness of food security strategies and actions is below potential.

Efficiency of FS strategies and actions

The efficiency of converting the Life Nopest's food security strategies and its 4 m euro actions into high quality results is believed to be well below potential mainly because of the reasons mentioned above while the efficiency of the IIRD's food security strategies and its 2.626 m euro actions were considered to be fair according to local GOB and donor sources.

Impact of FS strategies and actions

It was not possible to adequately assess the impact of the food security strategies and actions of the Life Nopest because of the absence of internal long term monitoring but it is understood that the long term household food security impacts were unsatisfactory.

³⁸ Including how the assumptions affected the project achievements

The IIRD's food security strategies and actions however did lead to poverty reduction particularly among the ultra poor and the hardcore ultra poor women by increasing by 8% to 27% the number of (i) cash income earners (ii) land and other asset owners (iii) latrine users and owners and (iv) cash savers.

Sustainability of FS strategies and actions

The sustainability of the food security strategies and actions is considered to be poor according to anecdotal evidence and limited discussion with other donors and in the field although this cannot be verified in the absence of long term monitoring data.

Comparative advantage with regard to other types of operation (within the Regulation) and other instruments dealing with food security

The performance of the Life Nopest project is poor and stems more from CARE's management structure rather than from the choice of the GOB or NGO aid modality. The project performance would probably be greatly improved were CARE's management structure improved for example but whether or not it would be better if the project were implemented through local government structures is difficult to say.

It is also difficult to say whether or not the IIRD project's performance would be better were it implemented through another aid modality.

Coordination of the various instruments dealing with FS

The coordination of the various instruments dealing with food security is reportedly good.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question – Part 2:

The solely NGO-implemented projects are broadly relevant to the beneficiary needs while the effectiveness and cost -efficiency of the projects are below potential. It is understood that the long term household food security impacts of the Life Nopest project was unsatisfactory while that of the IRRD project has some positive impact.

Whether or not it would be better if both projects were implemented through local government structures instead of through NGOs is difficult to say and the coordination of the various instruments dealing with food security is reportedly good.

3.7 Evaluative Question 7

What is the added value of the “other / Technical assistance and capacity building” component for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

Relevance of “other’s component” strategies and actions

The technical assistance and capacity building are considered relevant to achieving the overall food security objectives and the use of external technical assistance may be justified when local expertise is not available or when it is available but would need upgrading.

Effectiveness of “other’s component” strategies and actions

The technical assistants’ main tasks are to (i) identify, monitor and evaluate food security interventions (ii) build capacity and (iii) follow up evaluation-mission recommendations but the effectiveness of the technical assistance and capacity building has been limited owing to over-occupation with closed projects, deconcentration, understaffing, bureaucracy and poor management. The recruitment of additional staff is constrained by lengthy and complex procedures in the EC Headquarters and the EC Delegation.

Efficiency of “other’s component” strategies and actions

The efficiency of the technical assistance and capacity building is considered to be fair vis-à-vis its flexibility and rapidity to respond to changing needs.

It was difficult to measure the benefit-cost ratio of the technical assistance and capacity building in the time available³⁹ but it is felt that their long term benefits would outweigh the short-term costs despite the above-mentioned constraints. It is expected however that the latter would be alleviated in the medium-term.

Impact of “other’s component” strategies and actions

The FSVGD programme’s impact includes the Department of Women’s Affairs (DWA)⁴⁰ staff-training in seven districts by the Programme Management Unit (PIU), NGO and group worker-training by the TMSS⁴¹ and final beneficiary-training by the group workers. This training is believed to be generally good although the beneficiary training quality could be improved as mentioned in 6.4.

The FSVGD programme’s staff turnover however is high because of the GOB interference and the view that working in MOWCA is associated with low status.

³⁹ Notwithstanding the methodological difficulties

⁴⁰ The DWA is part of the Ministry of Women’s and Children Affairs (MOWCA).

⁴¹ The lead NGO

The RMP through CARE provides capacity building of the local GOB Union Parishads and its impact is considered to be good as reflected by the reportedly high degree of satisfaction of the partners and beneficiaries. The EC has indeed been praised for such activities.

Sustainability of “other’s component” strategies and actions

The sustainability of the technical assistance and capacity building would be greatly enhanced if the Public Administration Training Centre’s capacity was improved and more civil servants were trained because these two activities are interdependent. The capacity building of the GOB is also being provided by the EC/DfID/USAID-funded Food Security Capacity Strengthening Programme (FSCSP)⁴² and this is expected to contribute to long term sustainability by for example designing improved food security policies that may be translated into interventions for the household that better reflect its needs. This programme has a high degree of ownership of government with the technical assistance component from the donors.

Comparative advantage in comparison with other types of operations (within the Regulation) and operations in other instruments dealing with “other’s component”

The comparative advantage of technical assistance and capacity building cannot be compared to other within-Regulation types of operation because their objectives are different although the absolute advantage of this technical assistance and capacity building is reported to be positive as inferred in 7.3.3 and 7.4.2.

The EC Delegation has four technical assistants of which two are responsible for food security, one for health and one for Chittagong Hill Tract Development. The latter two technical assistants are financed by ALA.

It is reported however that the comparative advantage of technical assistance and capacity building financed under the Regulation may be compared to those financed under ALA and that there may be no noticeable difference between the two.

It has been observed by some of the EC staff that the activities⁴³ financed by the Regulation 1292/96 may also be financed by ALA, that there is no duplication between ECHO and this Regulation and that the FSP is not part of the NIP⁴⁴ but should be.

⁴² The Food Security Capacity Strengthening Programme aims to strengthen the GOB’s capacity to formulate, implement and evaluate food security policy.

⁴³ Except for food aid

⁴⁴ See 8.1

Coordination of the various instruments dealing with “other’s component”

There is good coordination of the various instruments dealing with technical assistance and capacity building owing to the twice monthly Operation Section Meetings and Operation Section and Financing Contracts Meetings. There is also good coordination between the DWA, the EC and Helen Keller International⁴⁵. It is believed that the FSVGD programme’s target group would be excluded from other donors’ or NGOs’ interventions were the EC to withdraw its support so there would be no duplication.

Empowerment role of TA

The technical assistants’ initial terms of reference are said to be political and outdated while the second set is considered to be practical and comprises mainly the design, monitoring and evaluation of food security interventions as mentioned earlier. The performance of the technical assistants is considered to be generally fair but is constrained by administration, bureaucracy and poor management.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 7:

The technical assistance and capacity building are considered relevant to achieving the overall food security objectives while their effectiveness has been limited owing to over-occupation with closed projects, deconcentration, understaffing, bureaucracy and poor management. It is believed however that their efficiency is good. The impact is believed to be generally good although the beneficiary training quality could be improved. The sustainability of the technical assistance and capacity building would be greatly enhanced if the Public Administration Training Centre’s capacity was improved and more civil servants were trained. The comparative advantage of technical assistance and capacity building cannot be compared to other within-Regulation types of operation because their objectives are different. There is good coordination of the various instruments dealing with technical assistance and capacity and the performance of the technical assistants is considered to be generally fair.

⁴⁵ An international NGO that implements the NGO Gardening and Nutrition Education and Surveillance Project (NGNESP) promoting gardens and nourishing-food access.

3.8 Evaluative Question 8

To what extent has the design of supported actions (phasing in) facilitated progress towards the achievement of food aid and food security objectives? This includes the identification of priorities, the selection of countries, the targeting of beneficiaries / vulnerable groups, the funding operations - components, the identification and appraisal process, the multi-annual programming, etc.?

Quality of the overall programming of resources (identification of priority countries, eligibility criteria, focus on specific target groups...)

The overall resources-programming quality is considered to be below potential because the EC Delegation is not consulted as it should be as reflected for example by the planning of the National Indicative Programme (NIP) without any food security programming⁴⁶ commitment. There is indeed no food security programming document thus giving little food security relevance to the NIP.

The criteria for EC-resource allocation to Bangladesh include its classification as a Least Developed Country⁴⁷, low human development index (HDI), chronic food insecurity, EC policy priorities, absorption capacity, political priorities of other donors, comparative advantage of the Regulation 1292/96 vis-à-vis other budget lines, disaster-prone, old food-aid recipient and economic-structural constraints.

But the criteria for sub-sectoral priority setting of the Food Security Programme may have been based more on short-term effectiveness and efficiency, political acceptability or administrative feasibility rather than on a more participatory bottom-up needs-based analysis as mentioned in 6.4 while the selection criteria of aid modalities would depend on a similar range of factors plus the need for flexibility, the degree of control desired by the EC and the importance of the GOB ownership.

The broad beneficiary characteristics include rural poor, most vulnerable, landless, small/marginal farmers and single women-headed households but focus is on women in the RMP and the FSVGD programme.

The FSVGD programme targets every two years an estimated 85,000 beneficiaries located in the Lalmonirhat, Kurigram, Panchagarh, Dinajpur, Thakurgaon, Rajshahi and Naogaon Districts of North-Western Bangladesh while the RMP targets every four years 42,000 beneficiaries located nationwide. The Life Nopest project targets small and marginal farmers in Greater Mymensingh and Rajshahi while the IIRD project targets the extreme poor and assetless in Bogra, Netrokona, Kishoreganj and Chandpur.

⁴⁶ Programming may be defined as the pre-investment identification stage. The mandate for horizontal programming is with DG Dev and that for geographical programming is with DG Relex while the identification-to-evaluation stages are AIDCO's responsibility.

⁴⁷ With a per capita GNP < US\$ 675 in 1992 prices (Source: IBRD)

Quality of the country level of programming (link to CSP and PCSP, actors' participation in programming)

The overall country-level programming quality is also considered to be below potential partly because the EC Delegation is not adequately consulted which stems perhaps from the concentrated decision-making power in the EC Headquarters.

The country-level programming quality may also be jeopardised by the unpredictability of EC Headquarters-funding which may result in over-rapid planning in order to meet expenditure deadlines. This sometimes leads to the continued provision of ex-post rationalisation of existing practice rather than to priority reappraisal in the light of the assessment of food insecurity's causes and of the needs of the food insecure.

It was not possible to quantify the number of meetings and seminars attended by various actors.

Quality of the programme approval process

The quality of the programme approval process is also believed to be poor because the EC Delegation is not consulted as it should be even though there are linkages⁴⁸ between the various units or services working on food aid and food security as discerned from Appendix 3. It is reported however that the food security budget line is flexible and rapid vis-à-vis the changing needs.

Relevance of EC actions vis-à-vis beneficiaries needs

The FSVGD programme⁴⁹ was jointly designed by the EC and the GOB and the actions are broadly relevant to the ultra poor's short-term needs but not to the long term ones and not to those of the extreme poor. The EC Delegation is aware of this and in principle may change this programme's beneficiary selection criteria in order for example to target the ultra poor as well. But in practice no action is taken allegedly because the programme belongs to the GOB. The RMP's actions are also considered to be broadly relevant to the short-term beneficiary needs but not to the long term ones.

The Life Nopest and IRRD project actions are also considered to be broadly relevant to the short-term beneficiary needs.

No detailed stakeholder analysis of the real household level needs has yet been conducted but it is reported that such an analysis would be carried out this year by the food security technical assistants. This would therefore increase the chances of the programmes and projects reflecting the real beneficiary needs thereby improving the returns to EC expenditure.

The characteristics of the FSVGD programme and the RMP beneficiary groups include (i) < 0.15 acre of land (ii) wage labourer (iii) monthly cash income < 300 Taka (iii) per capita

⁴⁸ Sourced from "Deconcentration Guidelines, European Commission, Food Security Program" (draft), AIDCO, Horizontal Operations and RRD, Food Security and Thematic Support, October 2003

⁴⁹ It began in January 2001

daily intake of < 2122 calories (iv) no active male including disabled (v) active and able women and (vi) household should have no other involvement in other development projects and programmes.

The broad characteristics of the Life Nopest and IRRD projects beneficiaries include extreme poor, assetless and small and marginal farmer.

Selection of adapted (suitable) FA-FS component / channel (ing) (added value of each component compared to the others)

The food security component design is generally based on some needs-assessment, relevance, complementarity, coherence and coordination. The NGO call for proposal aid modality is sometimes better than the GOB programme one owing to its greater flexibility and with more EC control while in some cases it is better to use the GOB programme aid modality because it provides for example more GOB ownership. The net comparative advantage of a given aid modality may depend on a particular and perhaps complex set of circumstances making it difficult to explicitly say which is better. It has indeed been stated by some of the EC staff in AIDCO and in the Dhaka Delegation that these different aid modalities may be complementary implying that determination of the added value of each aid modality may be irrelevant.

Clear planning of division of responsibilities in the various PCM phases (programming to Financing)

There is no clear division of responsibilities in the programming to financing phases although this is expected to be gradually resolved with deconcentration as reflected by the quality of decentralised project selection. An updated logframe is available and is contained in the Food Security Strategy.

Integration of cross cutting issues in programme / project design

Gender was always in the back of the EC planners' minds but was rarely put into practice until recently when a technical assistant was recruited to focus on gender and nutrition as mentioned in 8.7. A checklist covering cross-cutting issues such as governance and environment may be found in the Memorandum of Understanding but there is no specific gender-oriented criteria checklist for programme design. Gender has become however a priority issue as reflected in the importance of integrating women and children in development through for example the RMP's and the FSVGD programme's focus on women. It is understood however that a specific checklist does exist and is used by the Quality Support Measures (QSM) group.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 8:

The quality of the overall resources-programming, country-level programming and programme approval process is considered to be below potential. The EC actions are also generally relevant to the short-term beneficiaries needs but not to the long term ones.

The NGO call for proposal aid modality is sometimes better than the GOB programme one owing to its greater flexibility and with more EC control while in some cases it is better to use the GOB programme aid modality because it provides for example more GOB ownership. The net comparative advantage of a given aid modality may depend on a particular and perhaps complex set of circumstances making it difficult to explicitly say which is better. It has indeed been stated by some of the EC staff in AIDCO and in the Dhaka Delegation that these different aid modalities may be complementary implying that determination of the added value of each aid modality may be irrelevant.

There is no clear division of responsibilities in the programming to financing phases although this is expected to be gradually resolved with deconcentration as reflected by the quality of decentralised project selection.

A checklist covering cross-cutting issues such as governance and environment may be found in the Memorandum of Understanding but there is no specific gender-oriented criteria checklist for programme design. Gender has become however a priority issue as reflected in the importance of integrating women and children in development through for example the RMP's and the FSVGD programme's focus on women. It is understood however that a specific checklist does exist and is used by the Quality Support Measures group.

3.9 Evaluative Question 9

To what extent have implementation set-ups (i.e. suitable structures for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation), management mechanisms / tools and processes (i.e. division of work and responsibilities, coordination of actions) facilitated the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?

Complementarity with other programmes

The food security programmes are considered to be complementary⁵⁰ because the health and education projects and programmes target different groups and any references on other existing programmes and on the coordination strategy are mentioned in the CSP and in the IPRSP.

Clear division of responsibilities in the various PCM phases (implementation and evaluation)

There is no clear division of responsibilities in implementation and evaluation⁵¹ but this is expected to be resolved with deconcentration. Its proposed task distribution between the EC Headquarters and the EC Delegation is summarised in Appendix 3.

Empowerment role of technical assistance

The technical assistants have a pivotal role in programme and project implementation and the technical assistants' new terms of reference are relevant in contrast to the old political and out-of-date ones as mentioned earlier. The technical assistants' performance is considered to be good considering the administrative, bureaucratic and management constraints that they face as mentioned in 7.8.

Adapted procedures for programme management (In time delivery mechanisms)

There are no specially adapted procedures for programme management although an in-built logframe is revised regularly to analyse and adapt project implementation.

Adequate resources for programme (EC level) and project (country level) management

There are inadequate programme management resources at EC level with only one technical food security person responsible for Bangladesh. This person is also in charge of two other countries and a horizontal dossier.

⁵⁰ Assuming that this complementarity refers to programming

⁵¹ Although AIDCO does manage food security implementation

There are also inadequate programme management resources at country level with only two-thirds of the EC Delegation's required technical assistant labour force and this is exacerbated by the plethora of constraints facing it including those that need to be overcome in recruiting new local or foreign staff.

Adequate M & E including impact assessment system (Early warning systems and information systems, food security assessments, coordination mechanisms, impact assessment)

There is little or no internal monitoring and evaluation owing to time and human resource constraints⁵² with therefore little or no project or programme impact assessment. A baseline survey was conducted however by the FSVGD programme's PIU⁵³ in May 2003 and the establishment of internal monitoring and evaluation including impact assessment is planned for this programme for 2005.

Two external evaluations were carried out in 2000 and 2004 together with some internal reviews and the recommendations from these analyses are reportedly taken into account.

Actor's participation in programme management

The actors' participation in programme management is reported to be good and the gender mix is well balanced with many women employed for example in the FSVGD programme. There are indeed more women than average employed in some of these programmes.

Integration of cross cutting issues in programme / project implementation

Gender was recently put into practice when a technical assistant was recruited to focus on gender and nutrition as mentioned in 8.7. A checklist including cross-cutting issues such as governance and environment may be found in the Memorandum of Understanding but there is no specific gender-oriented criteria checklist for programme and project design. Gender has become however a priority as reflected in the importance of integrating women and children in development through for example the RMP's and the FSVGD programme's focus on women and the targeted interventions of other donors such as DfID on women and children.

⁵² And perhaps also to the fact that the original programme and project designs did not take account of the need for adequate internal monitoring and evaluation

⁵³ The PIU is located in the Ministry of Women's and Children Affairs.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 9:

The food security programmes are considered to be complementary but there is no clear division of responsibilities in implementation and evaluation although this is expected to be resolved with deconcentration.

The technical assistants have a pivotal role in programme and project implementation and their performance is considered to be good given the constraints that they face. There are no specially adapted procedures for programme management although an in-built logframe is revised regularly to analyse and adapt project implementation.

There are inadequate programme management resources at EC level with only one technical food security person responsible for Bangladesh and also at country level with only two-thirds of the EC Delegation's required technical assistant labour force.

There is also little or no internal monitoring and evaluation owing partly to human resource and time constraints and consequently a lack of adequate project or programme impact assessment.

The actors' participation in programme management is reported to be good and a checklist including cross-cutting issues such as governance and environment may be found in the Memorandum of Understanding but there is no specific gender-oriented criteria checklist for programme and project design.

3.10 Evaluative Question 10

To what extent has a phasing out of the supported actions been planned and what contribution did it have on the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?

Presence of a clear strategy to gradually reduce dependence on EC assistance and its effectiveness

There is a clear strategy at present to phase out food aid but the phasing out of non-food aid food security interventions is not yet envisaged because achievement of household food security in Bangladesh is expected to be a long term process. The phasing out of food aid is mentioned in the Food Security Strategy document.

Empowerment strategies of partners - actors (Capacity building)

The EC's capacity building of actors does empower them and therefore improves project and programme performance but it is still envisaged that donors would continue to provide assistance to Bangladesh for the next two decades.

Adequate procedures for smooth transition

There are currently no adequate or explicit procedures for the smooth transition from an aid-dependent to an aid-independent Bangladesh because the country's food security interventions are expected to continue in the long term owing to the huge needs in both quantity and time terms as mentioned above.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 10:

There is a clear strategy at present to phase out food aid but the phasing out of non-food aid food security interventions is not yet envisaged because achievement of household food security in Bangladesh is expected to be a long term process. The EC's capacity building of actors does empower them and therefore improves project and programme performance but it is still envisaged that donors would continue to provide assistance to Bangladesh for the next two decades.

3.11 Evaluative Question 11

How sustainable are the effects and impacts of EC-supported policies and programmes in the field of food security, both at the level of target populations and at institutional and policy level in the partner countries?

Presence of a clear strategy to gradually reduce dependence on EC assistance and its effectiveness

There is no clear strategy at present for the EC to withdraw its financial and technical support because the eradication of household food insecurity from Bangladesh is expected to take a long time. Even the current external aid level is believed to be insufficient⁵⁴ to meet the enormous resource needs of the target population. Some efforts to help to ensure sustainability however are being made by the EC's Food Security Programme (FSP) through the capacity building of partners such as the GOB and NGOs together with the identification by the FSP of improved household coping strategies.

Ability of Government (and non-government) institutions to elaborate strategies and implement programmes as well as to continue to pursue programme objectives in all areas after EC assistance ceases.

The limited ability of Government (and non-government) institutions to elaborate strategies and implement programmes as well as to continue to pursue programme objectives in all areas after EC assistance ceases does exist but it is being improved by the FSP through its contribution to an enabling environment that is facilitated by the GOB's and donors' political will for consensus.

Most NGOs however are aid-dependent and therefore unsustainable but were the EC to become more prudent in selecting higher quality NGOS to implement interventions, the chances of institutional and financial sustainability would be increased.

Nutrition however is not yet high on the GOB or donor agenda but the FSP envisages that it would soon become an intervention priority owing to the recent recruitment by the EC of a nutritionist and to the current advocacy efforts by other stakeholders to highlight nutrition's importance.

It is therefore expected that the GOB and many of the NGOs would be able in the long term to maintain and continue the delivery of the desired level and quality of benefits to the target group. Dependency would therefore remain until such time is reached.

There is however a GOB policy decision on whether or not to continue funding every donor-supported programme⁵⁵ so the GOB may in principle be willing and able to fund all

⁵⁴ Despite the GOB's external aid budget being > 50% of GOB's income.

⁵⁵ The Food Policy and Management Unit (FPMU) for example was initially funded by the USAID but the FPMU's activities still continue even though the USAID withdrew its funding in 2001 thanks to the GOB financial support.

of a project's or programme's incremental recurrent costs once the donor withdraws. It is probably prudent however to assume that this would not be the case in practice.

The forthcoming PRSP would have a 15-year time frame and derived from it would be ranked and prioritised domestic and external resource commitments formally set out in a 3-year rolling financing plan. The preparation of this plan may include an FSP contribution explicitly or implicitly identifying household coping mechanisms in order to help to achieve sustainably improved household food security.

A National Food Security Policy is currently being formulated⁵⁶ by the GOB and the donors and this is expected to assist stakeholders to improve the chances of identifying successful household food security-improving interventions. It is envisaged that the design of this policy would be completed in the short term thereafter facilitating the design of appropriate strategies and actions that may be translated into improved household food security.

Adequate food security data and analyses are not currently available but are expected to soon become available as a result of the above-mentioned Food Security Capacity Strengthening Programme.

Ability of service providers to continue provision of services in the long term.

The ability of service providers to continue in the long term is expected to increase as a result of the FSP's such as the EC's training of the NGOs and the GOB in PCM⁵⁷. The FSP staff are also upgraded regularly but they are also constrained in improving their ability to continue provision of services in the long term because of staff shortages as mentioned in 9.5.

Ability of beneficiaries to continue accessing the benefits of the EC-supported project after the EC grant has ended.

The ability of a small proportion of the beneficiaries to access the project or programme benefits would probably continue after the EC grant ends because of the GOB's capacity or willingness to switch around funds from its own budgets or from those of other donors to meet these requirements. The vast majority of the beneficiaries however would probably be unable to continue accessing the project benefits after the EC grant ends.

The ability of the project or programme beneficiaries to remain out of poverty after the EC grant ends would probably be increased were the women to be taught literacy and if sustainable growth or employment linkages with the current interventions were introduced or strengthened such as for example the introduction of a more flexible approach to the issue of cash income generation. This is of course difficult to verify in the absence of monitoring.

⁵⁶ Although this would be a separate exercise from the EC/DfID/USAID-funded Food Security Capacity Strengthening Programme aiming to strengthen the GOB's capacity to formulate, implement and evaluate food security policy as mentioned in 7.5.

⁵⁷ Project Cycle Management is a methodology for the preparation, implementation and evaluation of projects and programmes based on the integrated approach and the logical framework approach.

Ability of women and men of different ages, ability, ethnicity, income and religion to have equal access to the benefits of the EC projects

Gender, age, ability, ethnicity, income and religion are not considered to be constraints to the equal accessing of EC project benefits in Bangladesh. The focus on women is to empower them and because they are pivotal in ensuring household food security but men are still indirect beneficiaries even though they are not directly targeted by the RMP and FSVGD programme.

Ability of EC delegation to manage programmes as well as to insure coherence between EC different instruments

The ability of the EC Delegation to manage programmes as well as to insure coherence between EC different instruments is reportedly good owing to good coordination including constant contact with colleagues. There are however only four EC Delegation food security persons instead of the desired five.

The EC Delegation has an Operations Section that includes a Food Security Unit and a Finance/Contracts Department and deconcentration is now official with new linkages.

Ability of EC headquarter to define strategies as well as to insure coherence between EC strategy and international food security strategy

It is reported that the EC Headquarter's ability to define strategies is good since food security activities including policy analysis are conducted by AIDCO itself as a single unit. The latter also analyses policies formulated by DG Dev's Food Security Unit. The EC headquarters however does depend on the EC Delegation to define strategies as well as to insure coherence between EC strategy and international food security strategy partly because there is only one technical food security person in the EC headquarters. It is also understood that coherence between the EC strategy and the international food security strategy is ensured.

There are linkages in the EC headquarters between F6, F5, H2, H6 and DG Dev and some of these linkages may be discerned from Appendix 3. DG Dev is formally responsible for food security programming which it conducts with the input of various EC departments such as AIDCO's Food Security Unit and other parts of DG Dev, DG Relex and AIDCO. The FSP in Dhaka reports to AIDCO's F5 Food Security Unit in Brussels and vice-versa.

It is reported that there is no difference in adequacy between the technical assistance financed by the Regulation 1202/96 and that financed by ALA. There are several budget lines but they are managed together and coordination between them is good according to EC sources.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 11:

There is no clear strategy at present for the EC to withdraw its financial and technical support because the eradication of household food insecurity from Bangladesh is expected to take a long time but the FSP is capacity building the local and central GOB and NGOs. Were the EC to become more prudent in selecting higher quality NGOS to implement interventions, the chances of institutional and financial sustainability would be increased.

The FSP envisages that nutrition would soon become an intervention priority and the 3-year rolling financing plan that would be derived from the forthcoming 15-year PRSP comprising ranked and prioritised domestic and external resource commitments may include an FSP contribution explicitly or implicitly identifying household coping mechanisms in order to help to achieve sustainably improved household food security.

The ability of service providers to continue in the long term is expected to increase as a result of the FSP's design such as the EC's training of the NGOs and the GOB in PCM. The ability of the project or programme beneficiaries to remain out of poverty after the EC grant ends would probably be increased were the women to be taught literacy and if sustainable growth or employment linkages with the current interventions were introduced or strengthened such as for example the introduction of a more flexible approach to the issue of cash income generation.

Gender, age, ability, ethnicity, income and religion are not considered to be constraints to the equal accessing of EC project benefits in Bangladesh and the ability of the EC Delegation to manage programmes as well as to insure coherence between EC different instruments is reportedly good owing to good coordination including constant contact with colleagues. There are however only four EC Delegation food security persons instead of the desired five.

It is reported that the EC Headquarter's ability to define strategies is good since food security activities including policy analysis are conducted by AIDCO itself as a single unit.

3.12 Evaluative Question 12

What is the role of Regulation No.1292/96 in the on-going efforts to bridge the gap between relief, rehabilitation and development?

It is reported by the EC Delegation that there seems to be some disagreement between ECHO and F5 on the LRRD concepts and that their mandates are unclear.

The “grey areas” between humanitarian assistance and development exist because there is a divergence between humanitarian aid and development cooperation programmes in terms of their objectives, procedures, time frame, partnerships and in the types of interventions they execute. Humanitarian aid responds to the immediate needs of individuals in crisis. It is provided mainly by non-governmental organisations and multilateral and bilateral donors. On the other hand, the aim of development cooperation is to support policies and strategies that match the priority needs of the partner country (Source: “Deconcentration Guidelines, European Commission, Food Security Program” (draft), AIDCO, Horizontal Operations and RRD, Food Security and Thematic Support, October 2003).

It was not possible to clarify this in Dhaka. More information on a clear division of role between the various instruments involved in this process, the complementarities of the various relevant instruments and the added value of the regulation to fulfill its role will be given in the synthesis report.

4. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

4.1 Relevance

The EC actions are generally relevant to the short-term needs of the main beneficiaries but there should be more emphasis on nutrition for the poorest and monitoring at all levels could be improved. The main weaknesses of the FSVGD programme are its top-down design, short duration and the absence of credit provision. It is understood however that the latter is being alleviated and that bottom-up planning and improved monitoring by the key stakeholders has started. The RMP weakness is the lack of an adequate development link that could move the target women sustainably out of poverty. The Life Nopest and IIRD projects are generally relevant to the needs.

4.2 Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the RMP, FSVGD programme and some of the solely NGO-implemented projects is believed to be fair as reflected by some positive contribution by the results to the achievement of the purposes although it is recognised that this effectiveness is difficult to measure empirically in the absence of proper monitoring. The educational and training needs of the poorest and their training programmes however need to be reassessed in order to make interventions more effective. There could be improvement in monitoring at all levels, the management of the CARE-implemented project and in the NGO selection.

4.3 Efficiency

The cost-efficiency of converting the actions into high-quality results is also thought to be fair as reflected by the fact that the unit costs of achieving many of the logframe's results do not appear to be out of line with those of similarly-performing actions funded by the EC or other donors in other countries. The unit costs of the CARE-implemented project however are considered to be excessive owing to the high fixed-variable cost ratio. Monitoring at all levels and the management of the CARE-implemented project could be improved.

4.4 Sustainability

The sustainability of the food security strategies and actions that refers to the capacity of the final beneficiaries to maintain any improved livelihoods they have achieved during the period they are involved with the project is considered to be poor although this is difficult to verify in the absence of adequate data. It was noted in a RESAL study on income-generating activities (IGAs) that it may only be possible for less than 50% of the participants to successfully create sustainable IGAs.

4.5 Impact

There appears to be a good short-term consumption-safeguarding impact but a poor long-term one owing to limited growth, employment or cash-income generating linkages facilitated by the training investment according to anecdotal evidence and limited field discussion.

4.6 Internal / external coherence

The internal and external coherence is believed to be fair although the role of the Regulation within the CSP is unclear since food security data do not appear to be shaping it as it should and the extent to which this data is feeding into inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral priority setting is unclear.

Food security is important in the IPRSP as reflected by its number and type of references but there is no clear definition of the role of the EC within the IPRSP although the latter does recognise the NGOs' roles. The FSP projects and programmes are considered to be in strategic line with the IPRSP since they contribute to both relief and development but many of the poorest are not targeted by them.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The main conclusions are:

- (a) The EC actions are generally relevant to the short-term needs of the main beneficiaries but there should be more emphasis on nutrition for the poorest and monitoring at all levels could be improved. The main weaknesses of the FSVGD programme are its top-down design, short duration and the absence of credit provision. It is understood however that the latter is being alleviated and that bottom-up planning and improved monitoring by the key stakeholders has started. The RMP weakness is the lack of an adequate development link that could move the target women sustainably out of poverty. The Life Nopest and IIRD projects are generally relevant to the needs.
- (b) The effectiveness of the RMP, FSVGD programme and the above-mentioned solely NGO-implemented projects is believed to be fair as reflected by some positive contribution by the results to the achievement of the purposes although it is recognised that this effectiveness is difficult to measure empirically in the absence of proper monitoring. The educational and training needs of the poorest and their training programmes however need to be reassessed in order to make interventions more effective. There could be improvement in monitoring at all levels, the management of the CARE-implemented project and in the NGO selection.
- (c) The cost-efficiency of converting the actions into high-quality results is also thought to be fair as reflected by the fact that the unit costs of achieving many of the logframe's results do not appear to be out of line with those of similarly-performing actions funded by the EC or other donors in other countries. The unit costs of the CARE-implemented project however are considered to be excessive owing to the high fixed-variable cost ratio. Monitoring at all levels and the management of the CARE-implemented project could be improved.
- (d) The sustainability of the food security strategies and actions that refers to the capacity of the final beneficiaries to maintain any improved livelihoods they have achieved during the period they are involved with the project is considered to be poor although this is difficult to verify in the absence of adequate data. It was noted in a study by RESAL on income-generating activities (IGAs) that it may only be possible for less than 50% of the participants to successfully create sustainable IGAs.
- (e) The short term impact on the final beneficiaries appears to be good except in the case of the CARE-implemented Life Nopest project where there is believed to be great unrealised potential.
- (f) The internal and external coherence is believed to be satisfactory.
- (g) Regarding the comparative advantage of Government programme aid vis-à-vis other instruments within the Regulation, it is reported that Government programme aid provides the GOB with more ownership but with less flexibility and less EC control while the NGO call for proposal aid modality provides more flexibility and more control to the EC but with less GOB ownership. It is therefore difficult to determine the net comparative advantage of each aid modality as reflected for

example by frequent mention by EC sources that these aid modalities are indeed complementary and the question of which is better may be irrelevant.

- (h) The comparative advantage of the Regulation vis-à-vis other instruments such as ALA is that its administrative procedures are easier and quicker.
- (i)

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

The main recommendations are:

Based on conclusion a, Recommendation 1:

The EC should recruit at country level an additional foreign food security expert to be located in the EC Delegation in order to assist in the in-depth analysis of food insecurity's causes, the ranking of their importance and the identification of the linkages between them. The expert would also identify the food security impacts of possible interventions, select the most appropriate interventions in planning and expand the use of socio-economic surveys so that the chances of the programmes and projects actually reflecting the final beneficiary needs would be increased. It is understood however that this recruitment process may have already started.

Based on conclusion a, b and c, Recommendation 2:

The EC should recruit at EC level an additional food security expert to improve project and programme planning and implementation. The efficient performance of the latter is currently hampered by the huge work load of AIDCO's food security person who also handles other countries and a horizontal dossier.

Based on conclusion d and e, Recommendation 3:

The FSVGD programme should be extended by 3-5 years to enable sufficient time for the targeted women to become eligible to join other donor/NGO development programmes and the provision of credit should be introduced although it is reported that this may be in the process of being introduced. The RMP's women beneficiaries should be taught how to read and write so that they can optimise the benefits from their accumulated cash savings of 16,000 Taka. It is proposed that the programmes and projects adopt a more flexible approach to the issue of cash income generation.

The EC should encourage more dialogue with the GOB on sustainability in order to help to put in place its required financial and institutional mechanisms. The EC should provide more capacity building in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating including the strengthening of local GOB and administration and with NGOs playing a role in order to help ensure institutional sustainability and therefore the maintenance and continuation of the same level and quality of benefits to the food insecure.

Based on conclusions b, c and e, Recommendation 4:

Improve the NGO selection process so as to ensure that their management structure are in line with the focus to be put on final beneficiaries. This could be achieved by setting up a assessment grid for NGO's work and by promoting a the elaboration of an ethical "code of conduite".

Based on conclusions a, b, c, d and e, Recommendation 5:

Using the newly-recruited technical assistant mentioned in Recommendation 1, the EC should provide more higher-quality support to the local Government for the provision of reliable household data on socio-economics, poverty and food security and make available criteria and indicators that show whether or not household food security is improving. The EC in collaboration with for example the local MOWCA and NGO staff should systematically carry out intervention monitoring and evaluation not only for control but also to generate learning at country and donor level. This would be supervised by appropriately trained EC-financed technical assistance and use would be made of a joint design and monitoring and evaluation system. The technical assistant would focus analytical and advisory actions on improved monitoring and evaluation of the reform implementation as well as assisting in the measurement of the impact before and after interventions.

Based on conclusions a, b, c and d, Recommendation 6:

Steps should be taken to ensure the consistency of services provided by the NGOs and to modify the selection criteria to encourage the most appropriate and competent NGOs to apply.

Based on conclusion f, Recommendation 7:

More efforts should be made by the EC to improve donor cooperation and coordination and to provide additional human resources in order to increase the chances of more effective achievement of the food security objectives assuming that the Regulation continues in its present form

Based on conclusions g, h and i, Recommendation 8:

Bangladesh should adopt a multi-sectoral and decentralised rural development programme that addresses simultaneously the diversity and plethora of causes of both food insecurity and poverty with food security and poverty reduction objectives and actions incorporated into this single mainstream programme. Food security and poverty reduction are separated here because they are not necessarily synonymous.

The programme would be planned participatively and take account of the GOB's, EC's and other donors' complementarity, coordination, coherence, integration and synergy. The programme would include a set of institutional and financial mechanisms that would allow a process planning approach in which detailed projects for example would be planned at decentralised or community level and be financed from criteria-conditional Trust Funds.

The EC has already started to experiment in some African countries with this kind of rural development using finance from only one geographical instrument and performance so far is understood to be good. The advantage of this rural development experiment may therefore be clear: the diversity and plethora of causes of both food insecurity and poverty would be addressed using one budget line whilst simultaneously taking into account the GOB's, EC's, and other donors' complementarity, coordination, coherence, integration, synergy and cross-cutting issues such as governance, the environment and gender.

ANNEXES

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ANNEX 2: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

BANGLADESH INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

- On Reaching the Hard Core Poor: Redefining the NGO Strategy March 1998

DFID

- Bangladesh Country Assistance Plan ‘Women and Girls First’, November 2003
- Accelerating Malnutrition Reduction in Bangladesh: Opportunities for DFID-B to Add Value
- A Nutrition Interventions Scoping Study, January 2004.
- Eliminating Hunger – Strategy for achieving the Millennium Development Goal on hunger, May 2002
- Participatory Poverty Assessments and Public Services: Key Messages for the Poor, September, 1998

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

- Draft Commission Decision: Multi-Annual Food Security Programme 1999 – 2002,
- Bangladesh, October 1999
- Official Letter No. 30.932/99, August 2000
- Official Letter No. 3.448/2000, October 2000
- Official Letter No. 43175/2001, March 2002
- European Strategy to support Food Security for Bangladesh, May 1999
- Financial Services Component of the Food Security for the Vulnerable Group Development Programme, December 2002
- Evaluation of EC Food Aid, Food Security Policy, Food Aid Management and Programmes in Support of Food Security
- Commission Regulation (EC) No 2519/97 of December 16th 1997 laying down general rules for the mobilisation of products to be supplied under Council Regulation (EC) No 1292/96 as Community food aid [Official Journal L 346, 17.12.1997].
- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Evaluation and future orientation of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1292/96 on food aid policy and food aid management and special operations in support of Food Security [COM (2001) 473 final/2].
- Council Regulation (EC) 1292/96 of 27th of June 1996 on food aid policy and food aid management and special operations in support of Food Security [Official Journal L 166, 5.7.1996].
- Regulation 1726/2001 (amendment of article 21 of 1292/96)

- Guidelines for the use of indicators in country performance assessment, 2002

GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH

- Report of the Task Force on Comprehensive Food Security in Bangladesh, July 2000

GOB, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ECONOMIC RELATIONS DIVISION

- A National Strategy for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, April 2002
- National Food Policy 2001 (draft)

INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

- Accelerating Malnutrition Reduction in Bangladesh: The Potential Role of DFID, January 2004

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

- Bangladesh – Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, June 2003

TMSS

- Training for human resource development, undated

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

- Expectations of “Success” and Constraints to Participation Among Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development Women, December 2001
- Brief on Food Security Issues in Bangladesh, February 2003

ANNEX 3: WORKPLAN

29/2/04	Travel from UK to Bangladesh
1/3/04	Arrived in Bangladesh. Meeting with EC Delegation
2/3/04	Document Review
3/3/04	Meeting with EC Delegation
4/3/04	Meeting with EC Delegation
5/3/04	Document Review
6/3/04	Document Review
7/3/04	Meeting with DWA
8/3/04	Meeting with EC Delegation
9/3/04	Meeting with EC Delegation
10/3/04	Meeting with EC Delegation
10/3/04	Meeting with DfID
11/3/04	Document Review and Report Writing
12/3/04	Document Review and Report Writing
12/3/04	1 st Presentation of Aide Memoire to EC Ambassador
13/3/04	Report Writing
14/3/04	2 nd Presentation of Aide Memoire to EC Delegation
14/3/04	3 rd Presentation of Aide Memoire to 1 st Counsellor of EC Delegation
15/3/04	Travel from Bangladesh to UK

ANNEX 4: FOOD SECURITY TASK DISTRIBUTION BY EC UNIT/SERVICE

(i) Programming

Definition of eligibility criteria for Food Security - DG DEV/RELEX

Preparation of guidelines - AIDCO

Definition of standard format for reporting, contract and budgets. - AIDCO

Country Food Security analysis - DELEGATION

Country Strategy Paper - DG DEV/RELEX

National/regional Indicative programs - DG DEV/RELEX

Definition of country multi annual allocation for FSBL - DG DEV/RELEX

(ii) Budget Support

Identification/instruction - DELEGATION

Funding - DELEGATION/AIDCO/DG DEV/RELEX

Implementation - DELEGATION

Evaluation/ Audit - DELEGATION/ AIDCO

(ii) Program Support

Identification/instruction - DELEGATION

Funding - DELEGATION/AIDCO/DG DEV/RELEX

Implementation - DELEGATION

Evaluation/ Audit - DELEGATION/AIDCO

(iii) Call for proposals from NGOs

Identification/instruction - DELEGATION/AIDCO

Funding - DELEGATION/AIDCO/DG DEV/RELEX

Implementation - DELEGATION/AIDCO

Evaluation/ Audit - DELEGATION/AIDCO

(iv) Food Aid

Policy dialogue - DG DEV/RELEX

Identification/instruction - DELEGATION/AIDCO

Funding - AIDCO/DG DEV/RELEX

Implementation - DELEGATION/AIDCO

Evaluation/ Audit - AIDCO

(iv) International Organisations

Policy dialogue - AIDCO/DG DEV/RELEX

Identification/instruction - DELEGATION/AIDCO

Funding - DELEGATION/AIDCO/DG DEV/RELEX/DG RESEARCH

Implementation - DELEGATION/AIDCO

Evaluation/ Audit - DELEGATION/AIDCO

ANNEX 5: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ALA	Asia Latin America
APSA	Association for Social Advancement
BBS	Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
BIDS	Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies
BINP	Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Project
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
BRDB	Bangladesh Rural Development Board
CARE	Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CFPR	?
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DFID	Department for International Development
DWA	Department of Women's Affairs
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FPMU	Food Policy and Management Unit
FSCSP	Food Security Capacity Strengthening Programme
FSP	Food Security Programme
FSPC	Food Security Policy Centre
FSVGD	Food Security for Vulnerable Group Development
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOB	Government of Bangladesh
HKI	Helen Keller International
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IFADEP	Integrated Food Assistance Development Project
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IGA	Income Generating Activity
IIRD	Institute for Integrated Rural Development
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
IPM	Integrated Pest Management

IPRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
kg	kilogramme
LCG	Local Consultative Group
LGED	Local Government Engineering Department
m	million
MOF	Ministry of Food
MOLGRDC	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and Cooperatives
MORDM	Ministry of Relief and Disaster Management
MOWCA	Ministry of Women's and Children's Affairs
NGNESP	NGO Gardening and Nutrition Education and Surveillance Project
NGO	Non Government Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NNP	National Nutrition Project
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PIU	Programme Management Unit
PFDS	Public Food Distribution System
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
QSM	Quality Support Measures
RESAL	Bangladesh European Food Security Network
RMP	Rural Maintenance Programme
t	metric ton
TA	Technical Assistance
TMSS	Thengamana Mahila Sambaya Samity
UP	Union Parishad
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAD	Vitamin A deficiency
VGd	Vulnerable Group Development
WFP	World Food Programme



**Evaluation Thématique de la Politique et de la Gestion de l'Aide Alimentaire et
des Opérations Spéciales en Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire**

BURKINA FASO

Rapport final

**Aart van der Heide
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Juin 2004

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- Annexe 2 : Liste de documents consultés.
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- Annexe 4 : Burkina Faso - Projets de la ligne B720 (1997 – 2002).
- Annexe 5 : Carte du Burkina Faso.

III

Abréviations et Sigles

AA	Aide Alimentaire
ACP	Afrique Caraïbes et Pacifique
AT	Assistance ou Assistant Technique
B7-201	Ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire de AIDCO
B7-6000	Ligne budgétaire cofinancement ONG de AIDCO
CE	Commission Européenne
CfP	Call for Proposals ou Appel à Propositions
CFSAM	Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission
CILSS	Comité Inter- Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel
CISV	ONG partenaire italienne
CNSA	Conseil National de la Sécurité Alimentaire
CODESUR	Comité Départemental des Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation
CONASUR	Comité National des Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation
COPROSUR	Comité Provincial des Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation
CPG	Comité Paritaire de Gestion
CRSPC	Comité de Réflexion et de Suivi de la Politique Céréalière
CRS	Catholic Relief Service
CSLP	Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CT/CCI	Cellule Technique du Comité de Coordination de l'Information
DCSLP	Document Cadre de Stratégie de la Lutte contre la Pauvreté ou PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
DGPSA	Direction Générale des Prévisions et des Statistiques Agricoles
DOS	Document d'Orientation Stratégique
DTP	Document Technique du Pays
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Organisation
EDS	Enquête démographique et de Santé
EU	European Union
EURONAIID	European Consortium of NGO in Food Aid and Food Security
QE	Question Evaluative
F5	Unité technique pour le B7-201
PAFMR	Plan d'Action pour le Financement du Monde Rural
FA/FS	Food Aid/Food Security
FASA	Fond d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire
FED	Fond Européen de Développement
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System

IV

FFW	Food For Work (vivres contre travail)
FODEC	Fonds de Développement Céréaliier
FIAP	Fonds d'Incitation, d'Animation et de Promotion
FICA	Fond d'Intervention Crises Alimentaires
FS	Food Security
FSU	Food Security Unit at Delegation level
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
INSD	Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie
LPDHD	Lettre d'intention de Politique de Développement Humain Durable
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development
NU	Nations Unies
ONG	Organisation Non Gouvernementale
PAOSA	Plan d'Action pour l'Organisation du Secteur Agricole
PAM	Programme Alimentaire Mondial
PAS	Programme d'Ajustement Structurel
PASA	Programme d'Ajustement du Secteur Agricole
PASECT	Programme d'Ajustement du Secteur des Transports
PAU	Politique Agricole Commune de l'Union
PNOC SUR	Plan National d'Organisation et de Coordination des Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PSA	Programme de Sécurité Alimentaire
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSAN	Projet de Sécurité Alimentaire et de Nutrition
PS- ASC	Programme Sectoriel d'Appui au Secteur Céréaliier
SA	Sécurité Alimentaire
SAP	Système d'Alerte Précoce
SIM	Système d'Information sur les Marchés
NSNA	Stratégie Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire
SONAGESS	Société Nationale de Gestion des Stocks de Sécurité
SSE	Service des Statistiques Elevage
TdR	Termes de Référence
UE	Union Européenne
UEMOA	Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine
USAID	USA Agency for International Development

RESUMÉ

Programme évalué au Burkina Faso

Ce rapport a pour objet “l’évaluation thématique de la politique et la gestion de l’Aide Alimentaire et des opérations spéciales en appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire” ou du Règlement 1292/96 portant sur la ligne budgétaire « Aide Alimentaire et Appui aux Opérations de la Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 ». Selon les Termes de Référence, l’évaluation couvre la période 1997-2002 mais le comité de pilotage a choisi de mettre un accent particulier sur les dernières années.

De cette ligne budgétaire au Burkina Faso, il est aussi bien question de l’aide directe de l’aide indirecte. L’aide directe est le financement direct accordé au Gouvernement et aux institutions gouvernementales. L’aide indirecte est l’aide financière accordée aux ONGs à travers des appels à propositions ; dans les autres pays, à travers des agences des Nations Unies. La ligne budgétaire n’a pas financé l’aide alimentaire au Burkina Faso ces dernières années.

Objectifs et méthodologie

Les objectifs de cette évaluation sont:

- Identifier les leçons-clé de la coopération récente de la Commission Européenne en termes d’actions et d’activités en matière d’aide alimentaire et d’appui à la sécurité alimentaire.
- Analyser et évaluer la programmation actuelle des actions d’aide alimentaire et d’appui aux opérations de sécurité alimentaire.
- Faire des recommandations.

Cette évaluation a été réalisée dans le cadre d’une évaluation globale du programme et d’évaluations réalisées dans dix (10) pays, parmi lesquels le Burkina Faso fait partie. Les pays évalués sont caractérisés par le fait qu’ils ont tous bénéficié de cette ligne budgétaire.

Une phase de structuration de l’information sur le programme en général a été effectuée à Bruxelles et suivie de l’évaluation du/des pays, où l’équipe chargée de l’évaluation a interviewé des membres de l’équipe de l’unité de sécurité alimentaire et les employés au niveau de la Délégation. Les partenaires gouvernementaux et non gouvernementaux ont été également interviewés. Des visites sur le terrain ainsi que l’analyse des rapports et des dossiers ont complété le travail.

Questions Evaluatives

Un premier groupe de questions (QE 1-3) analyse le niveau “stratégie” et “politique” de la ligne budgétaire aide et sécurité alimentaire et se concentre sur les questions de cohérence, coordination et complémentarité des différentes opérations et instruments, comme par exemple le CSP et la ligne budgétaire mais aussi le PRSP.

Le Règlement 1292/96 a dix objectifs globaux mais cohérents qui couvrent tout le concept de la sécurité alimentaire et montrent explicitement la plus-value de ce concept en termes de production agricole et d’élevage. Egalement inclus dans les objectifs du

Règlement sont les aspects socio-économiques au niveau des ménages, les rôles spécifiques des hommes et des femmes, la question d'accès à l'eau potable ainsi que les aspects nutritionnels et alimentaires des groupes plus vulnérables. Nous considérons « le ménage » ou « la famille » comme l'unité sociale la plus petite des bénéficiaires pour la quelle l'aide de Règlement est destiné. Ces aspects se sont retrouvés dans quelques projets mais ne font pas systématiquement partie des documents techniques.

Les CSP, le PRSP et le rapport conjoint Gouvernement-CE mentionnent tous l'importance de la sécurité alimentaire, or toujours en termes de développement rural, de production alimentaire etc. mais les éléments clefs de la sécurité alimentaire n'y sont pas du tout mentionnés. Cela signifie qu'il existe une certaine cohérence au niveau national mais qu'il existe cependant des écarts entre les objectifs du règlement et le Programme au Burkina Faso.

Un deuxième groupe de questions (QE 4-7) analyse/cherche à mesurer la plus-value des opérations et des composants du Règlement en comparaison avec les autres instruments et lignes budgétaires. Il s'agit de montrer la plus-value de l'aide alimentaire, de l'aide budgétaire et des actions d'appui aux opérations de sécurité alimentaire, et "autres appuis institutionnels à l'assistance technique" afin de garantir l'accomplissement d'une situation de sécurité alimentaire en général.

La plus-value du Règlement 1292/96 tient à ses objectifs. Ceux-ci sont certes définis de manière globale, mais en réalité, il existe une composante centrale avec la sécurité alimentaire au niveau des ménages. La sécurité alimentaire est aussi un instrument efficace dans les programmes de lutte contre la pauvreté grâce à des objectifs bien centrés sur cette problématique. En outre, elle affecte la production alimentaire, la commercialisation, le commerce, le transport, les prix mais aussi les familles les plus vulnérables, l'état nutritionnel et alimentaire de ces familles, l'aspect genres, les revenus etc.

Les instruments à utiliser sont aussi flexibles : direct ou indirect, aide budgétaire ou aide par programme, assistance technique etc.

Au Burkina Faso, cette aide est bien répartie et il existe une cohérence entre la politique du Gouvernement et la stratégie de la CE. Or, bien que les objectifs du règlement soient clairs, la cohérence avec le programme au Burkina Faso n'est pas totale. Le CSP ne se prononce pas sur les degrés de cohérence.

Un troisième groupe de questions (EQ 8-10) concerne l'analyse des stratégies et des actions en matière d'aide et de sécurité alimentaire dans les différentes phases du Cycle de Gestion de Projet. Il s'agit surtout de voir comment les actions sont identifiées et de suivre le degré d'accomplissement des objectifs (identification des priorités, ciblage des bénéficiaires répartition de travail au niveau de la Délégation).

L'identification des programmes est réalisée à deux niveaux. La plupart des financements de la ligne budgétaire sont consacrés à l'aide directe. Dans le CSP, une analyse de la situation du pays a été réalisée afin de développer la stratégie nécessaire pour atteindre les objectifs du Règlement. Cette analyse a été effectuée conjointement avec le Gouvernement. Il a déjà été mentionné plus haut que les programmes du Gouvernement sont en cohérence avec un certain nombre d'objectifs du Règlement. Ce sont surtout des « macro » programmes de production alimentaire, de commerce, d'appui aux réserves

alimentaires de sécurité etc. Toutefois, l'approche « ménages » en matière de nutrition, situation alimentaire, vulnérabilité, rôles socio-économiques femmes-hommes, question de l'eau potable etc. n'est pas systématiquement développée. Nous respectons le fait que tous les objectifs ne devront pas être pris en compte mais la nécessité devra au moins être analysée et indiquée. De la même manière, le système de suivi et d'indicateurs n'est pas non plus perfectionné.

Au Burkina Faso, l'aide indirecte est principalement allouée au travers des ONGs et de l'instrument « Appel à propositions ». L'Unité F5 à Bruxelles publie le Document Technique Pays et établit les critères pour les types de programmes à proposer. La Délégation analyse les dossiers et donne son point de vue (évaluation technique d'un jury de cinq personnes), l'évaluation administrative est faite au niveau de Bruxelles. Une deuxième évaluation technique est faite à Bruxelles qui conduit à la décision finale. Il a été constaté que les études de base et les évaluations ne sont pas toujours demandées. Il a aussi été constaté que la situation de la vulnérabilité nutritionnelle et alimentaire et le rôle des femmes et des hommes ne sont pas suivis de façon systématique.

Un quatrième groupe de questions (EQ 11-12) traite les aspects spécifiques mentionnés dans le COM 473. Dans ce communiqué, il est requis de porter une attention spéciale à la pérennité/longévité/durabilité des effets et des impacts des politiques et des programmes de la CE tant au niveau de la population-cible qu'au niveau institutionnel et politique, sans oublier de traiter la question de réduction des écarts entre urgence, réhabilitation et développement.

En ce qui concerne les questions de durabilité, il n'est pas possible de se prononcer sur cette question car il s'agit d'un processus long terme. Par ailleurs, les instruments de suivi de qualité requièrent un nombre d'indicateurs spécifiques et doivent être disponibles. Il a été constaté qu'au niveau de l'aide directe, l'Etat dispose de certains instruments de mesure de la situation générale ; toutefois, ces données n'existent pas toujours au niveau des financements de cette ligne budgétaire.

En ce qui concerne les programmes des ONGs, il y a deux aspects à aborder. Le premier est lié au fait qu'il n'existe pas de suivi automatique des financements des appels d'offres. En réalité, il y a peu d'ONGs qui reçoivent le financement pour une seule période. Un autre aspect est lié au fait que ces programmes ne font pas l'objet d'un suivi systématique avec les indicateurs de mesure des impacts, conformément aux objectifs du Règlement. Ceci vient aussi du fait que la Délégation au Burkina Faso ne dispose que d'une unité assez limitée en personnel (deux personnes pour toute la ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire).

APPRECIATION GENERALE

Pertinence

Le Burkina Faso n'est pas un pays structurellement déficitaire sur le plan céréalier. Le pays a connu des années de crises mais aussi des années excédentaires. La problématique est surtout de nature politique : trouver une réponse adéquate aux excédents de la production céréalière et aux problèmes des zones structurellement déficitaires. Le financement des différents instruments de la CE et de la ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire (B7-201) en particulier, a permis d'identifier correctement les problèmes et

les nécessités et de contribuer à l'élaboration d'une solution au niveau national mais aussi régional ou provincial. L'identification des problèmes et des nécessités a aussi eu un caractère pro-actif.

Cependant, il est à noter que toutes les activités ne sont pas liées aux besoins et aux priorités locaux. On a déjà mentionné plus haut que l'approche ménages n'a pas été complètement prise en compte, alors que la politique de la CE indique cela très clairement : « les familles les plus pauvres ou vulnérables ». A l'instigation des ATs, au niveau du CNSA, cette approche est en développement et sera probablement incorporée dans les différentes stratégies de base comme le DSCPI (CSP), le DCSLP (CSPRP) et le rapport Annuel Conjoint. Cela signifie que la Délégation fait bien son travail mais que les initiatives devraient venir surtout des structures gouvernementales. La Délégation pourrait aussi stimuler la création d'un « think tank » au niveau de la société civile par le biais de certaines ONGs spécialisées.

Efficience

Les ressources disponibles sont en général les financements, la main d'œuvre, la qualité de l'appui technique, la capacité des cadres et des responsables locaux à organiser l'exécution des travaux etc. Il a été constaté qu', à tous les niveaux, il y avait des contraintes, comme les retards de décaissements de la part de la CE, le manque de cadres techniques compétents (par exemple, pour mesurer l'impact des actions sur la situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle etc.). En général, l'efficience des travaux techniques comme les barrages, diguettes, systèmes d'irrigation a été suffisamment bonne. Toutefois, pour avoir une idée comment mesurer l'impact de l'efficience sur les résultats définitifs, un tel système n'a pas été développé en détails. Cela doit faire partie d'un système de suivi adapté aux objectifs de la Régulation en général et des objectifs des programmes ou projets en particulier.

Efficacité

Afin de mesurer le degré de réalisation des objectifs, il faut que le programme analyse, au début du programme ou du projet, dans une étude de base, la situation « zéro » à travers des indicateurs-clé. Au Burkina Faso, des études faites par les départements statistiques des Ministères de l'Agriculture, de la Santé fournissent assez de données statistiques qui servent d'indicateurs pour l'état de la sécurité alimentaire. Cependant, ces données ne sont pas utilisables pour évaluer l'efficacité d'un programme ou d'un projet spécifique financé par la ligne budgétaire B7-201. Pour réaliser cette évaluation, il faut définir quelques indicateurs d'impact dérivés des objectifs généraux et spécifiques à partir du démarrage du programme ou projet. Le développement de ces indicateurs donne une réponse à l'efficacité des activités. Il faut reconnaître que cela n'a pas été fait systématiquement. Bien que les interviews avec les bénéficiaires aient en général montré la satisfaction de la population en matière de réalisations, on a vu, en même temps, des enfants sous-alimentés à côté des parcelles où des femmes et des hommes font de la culture maraîchère irriguée avec l'eau d'un barrage. Une grande contrainte a été constatée à chaque niveau d'exécution; Les grands retards de décaissements de la part de Bruxelles ont de fait, certainement, entraîné une influence négative sur l'efficacité.

Impact

Afin de mesurer l'impact d'un programme ou d'un projet, il faut bien connaître sa situation initiale. L'absence de bons indicateurs d'impact au niveau des ménages, mais aussi de la situation géographique locale?, a conduit à ce que l'impact réalisé n'a pas pu être mesuré mais seulement apprécié. La plupart des programmes et projets ont pu présenter des données en forme de résultats (outputs): hectares cultivés, rendements, surplus de céréales etc., mais cela ne se traduit pas en termes de qualité de vie. Autrement dit, le suivi d'impact pourrait être amélioré.

Pérennité - durabilité

Les programmes que la CE finance pour l'Etat, comme les contributions à la CNSA, à la SONAGESS, au SIM, aux ATs etc. sont pérennes, à condition que les connaissances et les expériences accumulées par les cadres et les institutions Burkinabé soient effectivement appliquées. Il existe déjà une longue expérience en la matière au Burkina Faso. Le cas de la Direction Générale des Prévisions et des Statistiques Agricoles, Service de Préventions et de l'Alerte Précoce, qui ont pu profiter d'un financement après l'élaboration d'un programme, conjointement avec les experts de la Délégation, est un exemple révélateur : le financement n'a pas été demandé auprès de la Délégation malgré sa disponibilité.

La pérennité sera surtout garantie si les structures étatiques montrent une créativité, une pro-activité et une capacité analytique afin de s'adapter à toutes les situations nouvelles. Cela aussi est un processus de délégation de responsabilités de la part du Ministère. C'est un processus lent au niveau des structures étatiques qui sont souvent assez hiérarchiques. La structure du programme ONG de la part de la ligne budgétaire B7-210 ne peut pas garantir la pérennité. Le système d'appels d'offres (call for proposals) est limité en volume de financement et les ONGs risquent de recevoir une seule fois le financement. Le financement et l'assistance technique de la part des experts peuvent augmenter la pérennité, à condition que certaines ONGs aient la chance de profiter plusieurs années d'un financement.

Cohérence interne versus externe

Il n'existe pas de problème de cohérence, ni au niveau des instruments de la CE, ni au niveau des partenaires et cela est dû au fait que le concept « sécurité alimentaire » a été défini de manière assez vaste en termes d'activités. Bien que les objectifs soient assez clairs en termes de résultats à atteindre - disponibilité et accessibilité améliorées, situation socio-économique et nutritionnelle améliorée pour les familles les plus vulnérables etc. - l'interprétation n'est cependant pas toujours en cohérence avec les objectifs de la Régulation. Les partenaires peuvent présenter des programmes avec des objectifs assez larges parce que le concept « sécurité alimentaire » est interprété de manière assez large. Une bonne analyse des objectifs du Règlement devrait résulter en un concept cohérent et adapté à la réalité du pays. C'est le défi pour le programme au Burkina Faso.

PRINCIPALES CONCLUSIONS

Les conclusions sont basées sur les données obtenues durant la mission au Burkina Faso et ont été formulées selon les objectifs principaux de l'évaluation tels que formulés dans les Termes de Références et les douze Questions Evaluatives.

L'analyse des quatre groupes de Questions Evaluatives donne les conclusions suivantes :

1. Les objectifs et les instruments du Règlement 1292/96.

Il faut reconnaître que le Règlement a des objectifs vastes, mais en même temps très cohérents, pour couvrir tout le concept de la sécurité alimentaire à tous les niveaux et tous les aspects. Il couvre aussi, d'une part l'approche ménages, famille, nutrition, qualité alimentaire, eau potable, rôle socio-économique des femmes et hommes au niveau du ménage etc., et d'autre part la production alimentaire, le marketing, le transport, les crédits etc..

L'autre valeur est le fait que, le Règlement, dispose de différents instruments pour garantir une mise en valeur optimale en accord avec ses objectifs.

Un tel instrument, s'il est bien appliqué, pourrait être efficace dans la lutte contre la pauvreté et doit être considéré comme unique.

2. La cohérence entre les objectifs du Règlement et le programme de sécurité alimentaire B7-201 au Burkina Faso.

Les objectifs du Règlement qui ont été fortement développés dans les stratégies et programmes :

- La sécurité alimentaire a été utilisée comme approche dans la lutte contre la pauvreté à tous les niveaux (régional, national, provincial et familial);
- La disponibilité et l'accessibilité alimentaire ont été promues au niveau de la population ;
- La dépendance à l'aide alimentaire a été réduite;
- L'indépendance en matière de nourriture a été encouragée, soit par l'augmentation de la production alimentaire soit par le renforcement du pouvoir d'achat ;
- Une attention a été portée aux initiatives en ce qui concerne la lutte contre la pauvreté visant à l'amélioration des conditions de vie comme un des objectifs ;
- Le LRRD a été pris en considération comme une question d'approche.

Les objectifs du Règlement qui ont été faiblement ou non développés dans les stratégies et programmes :

- La bonne nutrition et l'aide à un régime alimentaire n'ont pas été promues systématiquement;
- La question de l'eau potable n'a pas été prise en considération;
- Le développement d'un système de développement socio-économique a été pris en considération, mais sans accorder une attention spéciale aux rôles spécifiques que les hommes et les femmes jouent dans l'économie du ménage.

La **conclusion** est que tous les objectifs du Règlement n'ont pas été réalisés, malgré l'existence d'une nécessité en la matière.

3. Cohérence entre le programme d'Aide et de Sécurité Alimentaire (B7-201) et la situation générale en matière de sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso.

La situation de la sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso est caractérisée par une situation assez stable au niveau national. Depuis deux ans, le pays connaît un surplus en céréales et une grande partie du pays est considérée comme « sans problèmes ». C'est le Nord-Est du pays, la zone semi-aride ou la zone pastorale, qui se trouve, pour une partie de la population, toujours dans une situation d'insécurité alimentaire, avec des concentrations au Nord-Est du pays. Les taux de malnutrition sont, dans certaines zones du pays, assez élevés et pas acceptables, surtout au Nord-Est.

Le programme de Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 est cohérent avec les mesures à prendre pour améliorer la sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso. Le renforcement des structures étatiques, les systèmes d'information, la réserve nationale de sécurité, les programmes sur le terrain etc. sont des mesures qui amélioreront la sécurité alimentaire en général. Cependant, une attention spéciale est nécessaire pour une approche « ménage » plus intensive d'une part, et pour améliorer un des phénomènes mentionnés dans les objectifs du Règlement d'autre part : la nutrition et un régime alimentaire équilibré.

4. Cohérence entre le programme d'Aide et de Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 et la politique du Gouvernement en matière de Sécurité Alimentaire.

La politique et les stratégies développées par le Gouvernement sont claires et assez adaptées à la réalité et aux problèmes en matière de sécurité alimentaire du pays. Cependant, au niveau des structures étatiques, le manque d'une approche « ménage » a été mentionnée notamment par le Ministère de la Santé.

Il existe une grande cohérence entre le programme de sécurité alimentaire B7-201 de la Commission Européenne et la politique du Gouvernement en matière de Sécurité Alimentaire.

5. Evaluation générale du programme d'Aide et de Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 au Burkina Faso et le rôle de la Délégation.

Il a été constaté au point 1 que le programme de Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 est en cohérence avec la plupart des objectifs du Règlement. Cependant, un certain nombre d'objectifs ne sont pas appliqués. Pour cette raison, le programme est orienté surtout vers les problèmes de production, diversification, stock de sécurité, système d'alerte précoce, stratégies nationales etc. Les objectifs focalisés sur la situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle des familles et leur situation socio-économique ne sont pas suffisamment prises en considération. C'est un souci manifesté également par le Ministère de la Santé.

Le rôle de la Délégation est très important; il en résulte des contacts intensifs avec les structures étatiques, les Ministères, les autres bailleurs de fonds et la société civile etc. Selon d'autres partenaires, la Délégation joue un rôle important au niveau des structures étatiques et des bailleurs de fonds en matière de concertation et de développement de nouvelles approches de la sécurité alimentaire.

Cependant, la présence de deux (2) personnes intra-muros n'est pas suffisante pour la gestion d'un programme aussi important. Les aspects de suivi sont, pour cette raison,

négligés., Certes, le suivi est une tâche difficile mais il reste une activité, à développer.

6. Comparaison entre la ligne budgétaire de sécurité alimentaire B7-201 et d'autres lignes budgétaires.

La ligne budgétaire de sécurité alimentaire ainsi que les autres financements en matière de développement rural, agriculture et sécurité alimentaire sont gérées au niveau de la Délégation par l'Unité Développement Rural,. Bien que le financement FED ait d'autres conditions d'exécution (UE et Pays), la ligne budgétaire de sécurité alimentaire opère sous la responsabilité de l'Unité F5 d'AIDCO à Bruxelles avec une représentation de seulement deux personnes au niveau de la Délégation. Cependant, pour la ligne budgétaire de sécurité alimentaire, les décisions sont prises à Bruxelles et pas au niveau de la Délégation. Toutefois, il y a plus de flexibilité au niveau de la Délégation en matière de contacts direct avec les partenaires ainsi que la possibilité de faire des visites de terrain (contrairement à la ligne budgétaire Cofinancement ONG ou B7-6000). Les procédures ne sont pas très différentes selon les instruments. Le suivi administratif au niveau de la Délégation coûte beaucoup de temps, entre autres, pour obtenir une transparence financière ; Ceci fait perdre la visibilité au niveau des partenaires et des représentations des états membres, surtout la possibilité de faire un suivi efficace sur le terrain.

La déconcentration est nécessaire du point de vue « pertinence, efficience, efficacité, impact et cohérence ».Toutefois, si elle augmente fortement la lourdeur des tâches administratives, il est à craindre que le véritable objectif de la déconcentration ne soit pas atteint, et ce malgré le fait que le pouvoir de décision soit déconcentré,.

7. Points forts de la ligne budgétaire B7-210 au Burkina Faso, entre autres, en comparaison avec d'autres lignes budgétaires de la Commission :

- La ligne budgétaire B7-210 a développé une stratégie et une politique assez vaste au Burkina Faso aussi bien en matière de l'Aide Directe qu'Indirecte (voir SVP 1.1. et 3. Profil du Pays).
- Elle a permis d'établir des contacts intensifs et constructifs avec les partenaires.
- Elle est devenue un instrument « leader et pro-crétatif » au niveau des institutions d'état et d'autres bailleurs de fonds.
- Du fait d'une présence assez forte au niveau de la Délégation, l'équipe a pu rapidement obtenir des renseignements sur la situation réelle de la sécurité alimentaire au niveau du pays et des stratégies et des idées au niveau d'autres bailleurs de fonds.

8. Points faibles de la ligne budgétaire B7-210 au Burkina Faso, entre autres, en comparaison avec d'autres lignes budgétaires de la Commission :

- Déconcentrées ou non, les tâches administratives sont très intenses pour obtenir une transparence optimale; mais cette contrainte évite un suivi intensif nécessaire pour l'atteinte de l'impact optimal au niveau des différents programmes et financements.

- Le système de suivi pourrait être plus intensifié avec une attention spéciale à porter à la vérification des objectifs du Règlement et aux indicateurs d'impact.
- L'insuffisance du système de suivi est aussi valable pour les programmes ONG de la ligne budgétaire de sécurité alimentaire. La déconcentration impliquerait un suivi plus intensif et plus systématique.

9. La pérennité - durabilité des effets et impacts

- **Au niveau de la population-cible :** La durabilité des effets et des impacts au niveau de l'aide directe est un souci à long terme. En outre, le suivi est surtout fait par l'ensemble des bailleurs de fonds. Il n'existe pas de méthodologie au niveau des bailleurs de fonds montrant la durabilité des effets et des impacts. Cette méthodologie n'a pas été développée pour le programme ONG de la ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire. Pour cette raison, il n'est pas encore possible de savoir si les effets et les impacts sont durables.
- **Au niveau institutionnel et politique:** Grâce à une stratégie commune des bailleurs de fonds en matière de renforcement des stratégies et politiques, il est en général reconnu que la prise de conscience du Gouvernement en matière de sécurité alimentaire augmente. Cependant, le Gouvernement est fortement dépendant des bailleurs de fonds quant aux finances et nouvelles stratégies.
- **Au niveau de l'écart entre l'urgence d'une part et la réhabilitation et le développement d'autre part (LRRD):**
Le Burkina Faso a pu développer une politique et une stratégie fortes en matière de réponses aux crises alimentaires. Le développement actuel est surtout concentré au niveau des stratégies nécessaires pour la réhabilitation et le développement.

PRINCIPALES RECOMMANDATIONS :

1. **En ce qui concerne les objectifs et les instruments du Règlement 1292/96.**
Les objectifs et les instruments du Règlement 1292/96 sont d'une très bonne qualité pour la mise en œuvre du concept de sécurité alimentaire. La continuation du Règlement est fortement recommandée en raison de la plus-value conceptuelle et institutionnelle et de la synergie entre les différents éléments qui représente plus que l'addition de agriculture + développement rural + nutrition..
2. **En ce qui concerne la cohérence entre les objectifs du Règlement et le programme sécurité alimentaire B7-201 au Burkina Faso.**
Afin d'améliorer la cohérence entre les objectifs du Règlement et le programme B7-201 actuellement en cours, il faut continuer la prise en considération d'une meilleure intégration des objectifs qui sont faiblement représentés dans les programmes. La suggestion des AT extra-muros du renforcement de ces objectifs est pertinente. Cela signifie que les objectifs doivent prendre en compte les ménages, la nutrition, les facteurs socio-économique du rôle des femmes et hommes au niveau du ménage etc.. Ainsi, l'identité réelle du concept de « sécurité alimentaire » sera renforcée. Ceci est le cas pour les canaux des financements directs mais aussi pour les canaux des financements indirects.

3. En ce qui concerne la cohérence entre le programme Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire (B7-201) et la situation générale en matière de sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso.

Le programme actuel touche surtout l'agriculture, le développement rural, le stockage pour l'urgence et le renforcement de l'élaboration des politiques et stratégies nationales. Il faut que dans tous les programmes les objectifs du Règlement 1992/96 faiblement ou non appliqués soient mieux pris en considération afin d'éviter que ces programmes soient considérés comme des programmes agricoles ou de développement rural.

4. En ce qui concerne la cohérence entre le programme Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 et la politique du Gouvernement en matière de Sécurité Alimentaire.

Bien qu'il existe une grande cohérence entre les deux, il faut que la cohérence avec le Règlement 1292/96 soit améliorée par la comparaison des objectifs du Règlement d'une part, et la politique du Gouvernement et le programme Sécurité Alimentaire de la Commission Européenne d'autre part.

5. En ce qui concerne le jugement général du programme Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 au Burkina Faso et le rôle de la Délégation.

- Mieux intégrer les objectifs du Règlement dans le programme actuel.
- Renforcer l'équipe au niveau de la Délégation afin d'améliorer le monitoring.
- Continuer les bons contacts avec les partenaires et le rôle leader en matière de stratégie « sécurité alimentaire ».
- Eviter que la lourdeur administrative causée par la déconcentration puisse avoir un impact négatif sur les activités conceptuels et opérationnelles comme cela a été formulé ci-dessus.

6. En ce qui concerne la comparaison entre la ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire B7-201 en comparaison avec d'autres lignes budgétaires.

Le Règlement a montré des avantages sur le plan conceptuel à travers ses objectifs (vastes et cohérents) et instruments (flexibilité) que les autres lignes n'ont pas ou moins (moins de complémentarité conceptuelle et instrumentale).

Il est fortement recommandé d'être conscient de la plus-value de cette ligne en comparaison avec les autres.

7. En ce qui concerne les points forts de la ligne budgétaire B7-210 au Burkina Faso, entre autre en comparaison avec d'autres lignes budgétaires de la Commission.

Maintenir, systématiser et renforcer les quatre acquis mentionnés au point 7 des conclusions.

8. En ce qui concerne les points faibles de la ligne budgétaire B7-210 au Burkina Faso, entre autre en comparaison avec d'autres lignes budgétaires de la Commission.

- Diminuer la lourdeur des tâches administratives des experts et conseillers en faveur d'un suivi et monitoring plus intensif afin d'éviter que la déconcentration provoque un affaiblissement du suivi et monitoring.
- Le système de monitoring doit être amélioré, renforcé et systématisé tant pour le canal direct qu'indirect.
- Il faut que les faiblesses soient aussi traduites au niveau des indicateurs qui mesurent actuellement surtout l'impact en termes de « outputs » mais pas l'impact en termes « qualité de vie au niveau des ménages ». Les indicateurs à utiliser devront être surtout en ligne avec les objectifs du Règlement. La ligne budgétaire « sécurité alimentaire » est finalement un instrument utilisé pour combattre la pauvreté et cela se mesure au niveau des ménages.
- Le canal aide indirect (ONG), en particulier, doit renforcer l'application du PCM, entre autre par l'introduction des évaluations indépendantes et externes, mais aussi par l'introduction d'un système de monitoring qui mesure l'impact au niveau des ménages.

9. En ce qui concerne la pérennité des effets et impacts.

En ce qui concerne la pérennité des effets et impacts au niveau de la population cible et au niveau institutionnel et politique, il faut que la Délégation développe avec les partenaires des instruments et méthodologies qui mesurent d'une manière adéquate ces effets et impacts. Sur la question de la pérennité, il faut que la population cible participe mieux à ce processus. En ce qui concerne le Gouvernement, il faut que les bailleurs de fonds et le Gouvernement mettent mieux l'accent sur cette question importante, entre autre à travers le développement d'un système de monitoring commun et adapté à la question. Ceci est un grand défi du fait de sa complexité méthodologique. Ceci ne pourra être réalisé qu'à condition d'un renforcement de l'équipe en matière du monitoring.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Contexte de la Mission

Cette mission d'évaluation au Burkina Faso fait partie d'une évaluation thématique de la politique et la gestion de l'aide alimentaire et des opérations d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire par la Commission de l'Union Européenne. Cette évaluation thématique a été exécutée dans dix (10) pays sélectionnés qui tous bénéficient ou ont bénéficié de cet appui. Le Burkina Faso figure parmi ces pays sélectionnés qui sont : le Bangladesh, le Burkina Faso, l'Ethiopie, le Kirghizistan, le Malawi, le Mozambique, la Palestine, le Nicaragua, le Pérou et le Zimbabwe.

L'objectif principal de cette étude est, selon les Termes de Référence :

1. Identification des leçons-clé apprises de la période passée en matière de politique d'Aide et de Sécurité Alimentaire avec accent sur les procédures et l'implantation, mais aussi l'impact des actions en relation avec les objectifs ;
2. Étude du programme actuel mais aussi évaluation ;
3. Formulation de recommandations en ce qui concerne l'implémentation du Règlement 1292/96 (ce qui n'était pas possible durant l'évaluation de 2000).

Un objectif supplémentaire a été formulé par le groupe d'accompagnement; il vise la comparaison de cette ligne avec d'autres instruments, comme la ligne budgétaire « cofinancement ONG » B7-6000 en matière de sécurité alimentaire, et également le financement dans le cadre du FED.

Il est important de connaître la plus-value de cette ligne en comparaison avec d'autres lignes budgétaires en matière de sécurité alimentaire comme la ligne de cofinancement ONG ou d'autres comme par exemple le FED,.

La période concernée par cette évaluation était la période 1997-2002, mais le Comité d'Accompagnement (Steering Group) a préféré que l'évaluation soit concentrée sur la période la plus récente. Ainsi, l'évaluation concerne aussi bien les programmes démarrés il y a quelques années et encore en cours d'application que les programmes récemment achevés.

Une première étude a été réalisée par PARTICIP afin de faire une analyse et une synthèse des différentes lignes budgétaires au niveau de la Commission Européenne, ses objectifs, ses structures et méthodologies d'intervention, avec un accent particulier sur le Règlement 1292/96 qui encadre la ligne budgétaire « sécurité alimentaire » B7-201 du Département AIDCO (EuropeAid).

Le règlement 1292/96 ou la ligne budgétaire d'aide et de sécurité alimentaire a pour objectifs principaux :

1. Promouvoir la sécurité alimentaire comme instrument dans la lutte contre la pauvreté au niveau national, provincial et du ménage ou famille ;
2. Améliorer la nutrition pour les populations bénéficiaires et aider celles-ci à obtenir une alimentation équilibrée ;
3. Prendre en compte la garantie d'accès à l'eau potable ;
4. Promouvoir la disponibilité et l'accès à la nourriture ;
5. Contribuer au développement socio-économique équilibré et mettre l'accent sur les rôles spécifiques des hommes et des femmes au niveau de la vie quotidienne des ménages ;
6. Aider les pays bénéficiaires à améliorer leur production alimentaire à tous les niveaux ;
7. Réduire la dépendance en matière d'aide alimentaire ;
8. Encourager les bénéficiaires à être indépendants en ce qui concerne leur alimentation, grâce à l'augmentation de la production ou de la stimulation ou de l'augmentation de leur pouvoir d'achat ;
9. Prendre le LRRD en considération comme approche et non à travers le développement des nouveaux instruments ;
10. Contribuer aux initiatives qui utilisent la lutte contre la pauvreté comme objectif en vue du développement.

Les objectifs du règlement 1292/96 sont vastes mais cohérents. La sécurité alimentaire est considérée comme une approche qui veut garantir la disponibilité de l'alimentation, l'accès à l'alimentation, la stabilité de l'offre alimentaire et la qualité d'une bonne alimentation à tous les niveaux (régional, national, provincial et familial ou du ménage). Les objectifs portent sur une bonne alimentation, la nutrition, l'eau potable, la production, la diversification, l'accès aux revenus etc. pour tout le monde.

Le Règlement utilise les concepts suivants : Titres, Opérations et Canaux.

Le Règlement utilise les **Titres** suivants : 1) les opérations de l'aide alimentaire 2) les opérations en appui à la sécurité alimentaire et 3) les systèmes de l'alerte précoce et de stockage. Les Opérations sous le Règlement sont les suivantes : Aide alimentaire ; Appui budgétaire ; Opérations en appui à la sécurité alimentaire et autres, comme assistance technique et appui institutionnel.

Les **Canaux** sont : Aide Directe et Aide Indirecte. L'Aide Directe est l'aide financière, gérée par le pays bénéficiaire et la Commission. L'Aide Indirecte est l'aide financière à travers les Organisations Internationales et Régionales et les ONGs.

L'Aide Directe au Burkina Faso concerne le financement du programme de Sécurité Alimentaire (PSA, lettre officielle 20093/2001) et accompagne la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale opérationnelle de sécurité alimentaire adoptée en 2000. Le protocole en a été signé en août 2002 et prévoit :

- Le renforcement de la prévention et la gestion des crises conjoncturelles (2 millions d' Euro) : la contribution au stock financier de sécurité alimentaire (FASA) et la mise en place d'un fonds d'intervention (FICA) pour les crises alimentaires ;
- L'amélioration de la sécurité alimentaire structurelle (2,3 millions d' Euro) traite l'aspect « accès aux produits alimentaires ». Le PSA soutient les plans du secteur agricole, ceux dont l'importance en matière de sécurité alimentaire est primordiale (céréales et niébé), mais aussi par l'extension des systèmes de financement décentralisés dans les régions défavorisées et le renforcement des réseaux structurés de banques de céréales ;
- L'appui institutionnel (1,3 millions d' Euro) est concrétisé à travers une contribution au fonds d'incitation, d'animation et de promotion (FIAP) et la mise en œuvre de systèmes d'informations sur la sécurité alimentaire ;
- L'assistance technique (1,3 millions d' Euro) au niveau des structures de l'état.

L'aide Indirecte au Burkina concerne :

- Des appels à propositions ONG (Calls for Proposals ou CfP) dans leur forme actuelle ont été effectués en 2000 et 2002. Pour les appels en 2000 et 2002, la Délégation a élaboré des Documents Techniques Pays (DTP) qui ont été intégrés dans les lignes directrices. En 1998, 3 projets ont été sélectionnés et financés hors appel à propositions. La formule n'existait pas encore.
- Pas d'organisations des N.U. ou ONGs via EURONAIID en 2003 et 2004.

Le Burkina Faso faisait partie des pays évalués en 2000, des évaluations récentes n'ont pas eu lieu.

Le rapport final de l'étude, basé sur l'étude initiale et sur les résultats des visites de dix pays, devra se prononcer sur l'avenir du Règlement 1992/96 (B7-201).

Durant cette première phase, 12 Questions d'Evaluation (Questions Evaluatives) ont été élaborées ; elles couvrent tout le domaine de l'évaluation. Des questions spécifiques sur l'efficacité, l'efficience, la durabilité, l'impact et la cohérence interne ou externe sont examinées pour l'évaluation en général et pour les instruments de financement par pays en particulier.

Chaque pays a été visité par une équipe composée d'un évaluateur international et d'un évaluateur national originaire du pays visité. Les équipes du Burkina Faso et de l'Ethiopie comptaient également un expert junior.

Les équipes des 10 pays sélectionnés ont développé une méthodologie de terrain durant leur séminaire à Bruxelles; elles ont aussi défini, en même temps, leurs responsabilités et la répartition des tâches des membres des équipes.

La méthodologie était basée sur un questionnaire de 12 questions d'évaluation, les questions 2-12 étant aussi utilisées pour les études-pays.

Des interviews ont été réalisées avec les acteurs à tous les niveaux et en ce qui concerne les différents programmes, à savoir les Ministères et autres structures d'Etat impliquées, la Délégation de l'Union Européenne dans chaque pays, les Ambassades des pays membres de l'U.E., les ONGs et les Organisations Internationales, comme les agences

des Nations Unies, et aussi les bénéficiaires sur le terrain. Des visites de terrain ont été sélectionnées selon des critères établis par les participants du séminaire à Bruxelles. ECHO et EURONAIID figurent aussi sur la liste des instruments de la CE mais ces institutions n'étaient pas présentes au Burkina Faso.

Les annexes 1 et 2 présentent la liste des personnes interviewées, le programme de la mission y compris les visites de terrain organisées et une liste de documents consultés.

L'équipe de la mission d'évaluation a discuté ses résultats, conclusions et recommandations avec la Délégation de la Commission ; un Aide Mémoire élaboré à l'issue de la mission a été remis à la délégation.

1.2. Pourquoi le Burkina Faso ?

Les pays faisant partie de l'évaluation ont été sélectionnés selon un certain nombre de critères:

- Etre un grand bénéficiaire de la ligne budgétaire;
- Avoir un bon équilibre entre Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire dans les financements de la ligne budgétaire ;
- Les pays sélectionnés doivent avoir une représentativité géographique entre ACP, ALA, TACIS, MEDA et CARDS.
- Etre aussi bénéficiaire des programmes d'ECHO, des lignes budgétaires « Réhabilitation », de la ligne budgétaire Cofinancement ONG, être sélectionné pour le LRRD;
- Avoir été évalué durant les deux années passées ;

Les pays finalement retenus sont :

ACP : l'Ethiopie, le Malawi, le Mozambique, le Zimbabwe, le Burkina Faso
 ALA : le Bangladesh, le Pérou, le Nicaragua
 MEDA : la Palestine
 TACIS : le Kirghizstan

Le Burkina Faso a été choisi parmi les 20 pays candidats évalués pour les raisons suivantes :

- Il a été bénéficiaire des programmes d'aide et de sécurité alimentaire ;
- Il est un pays ACP ;
- Il a bénéficié d'un financement F5 régional à travers le CILSS ;
- Il a bénéficié et profite d'un financement F5 national ;
- Il a bénéficié d'un cofinancement ONG F2 ;
- Il a bénéficié d'une aide directe et indirecte ;
- Il n'a pas fait l'objet d'une évaluation durant les deux dernières années;

1.3 Sommaire de la Mission

La mission a été effectuée à partir du jeudi 22 janvier jusqu'au vendredi 6 février 2004.

L'équipe de la mission était composée des personnes suivantes :

- Mr Aart van der Heide, agro-nutritionniste de formation et Chef d'Equipe ;
- Mr Salia Sanon, agro-économiste de formation et Expert National ;
- Mme Cornelia Schmitz, agronome de formation, Expert Junior.

Le programme de la mission, pour ce qui concerne les entretiens, les personnes interviewées et les visites de terrain, est donné en annexe 1 de ce rapport.

1.4 Contraintes de la Mission

Le choix du consultant national n'a été accepté qu'en dernière minute de sorte qu'il n'a pas pu participer au séminaire d'introduction à Bruxelles.

Pour cette même raison, il n'a pas pu élaborer le profil pays avant le démarrage de la mission. La mission a donc démarré sans profil du pays ce qui a provoqué un certain retard dans la perception par les membres de l'équipe venant de l'extérieur du contexte national.

2. PROFIL DU BURKINA FASO : AIDE ET SECURITE ALIMENTAIRE

2.1 Introduction

Le Burkina Faso est un pays sahélien enclavé, dont la population a été estimée à 10.312.000 habitants (recensement de 1996). Dès 1991, le pays s'est engagé dans un processus de réformes de son économie. Les mesures structurelles et la maîtrise des dépenses publiques ont permis une croissance moyenne de 5% sur la période 1997 à 2002. Avec un taux de croissance de sa population de 2,8% et un PIB/ habitant de 230 \$, le Burkina Faso fait partie des pays les moins avancés et se classe au niveau de l'IDH au 171ème rang.

L'économie est dominée par le secteur primaire dont les performances restent dépendantes des aléas climatiques et de la fluctuation des prix du marché. Si, du point de vue de la disponibilité des céréales, la situation est satisfaisante, l'accès aux denrées de base ne présente pas une physionomie homogène selon les régions du pays. Les importations alimentaires¹ (importations commerciales + aide alimentaire) sont passées de 30 milliards de francs CFA au début des années 1990 à 51 milliards en 1996. Elles représentent une part relativement stable, voisine de 20%, des importations totales. Les céréales en constituent la moitié.

Selon les résultats de l'enquête prioritaire sur le « Profil de pauvreté », la pauvreté touche particulièrement les zones rurales, celles des régions du Centre (61,2%), du Nord (50,1%) du Sud-Est (54,4%) et du Centre-Sud (51,4%) en particulier. La cause principale de l'insécurité alimentaire, selon cette enquête, réside dans la pauvreté.

La nouvelle stratégie de sécurité alimentaire adoptée par le gouvernement en 2001 devrait intervenir de manière cohérente aussi bien sur la disponibilité, l'accessibilité, la stabilité et l'utilisation de l'alimentation. La stratégie préconise de privilégier au niveau national l'augmentation durable de la production alimentaire et l'efficacité du marché et de concentrer l'amélioration des revenus et la réduction de la malnutrition en faveur des zones et des groupes de populations les plus vulnérables.

2.2. Evolution du concept de sécurité alimentaire

Le choc des crises alimentaires de 1972/ 1973 et 1984/ 1985 ont montré l'insuffisance de la politique d'autosuffisance alimentaire prônée jusqu'alors par le Burkina Faso et mis en exergue l'importance du marché et l'accès aux produits alimentaires. Ces crises ont aussi dévoilé le rôle non négligeable des aides alimentaires d'urgence sur la production vivrière et les prix des produits vivriers sur les marchés. Cependant, des avancées importantes sont à inscrire au titre de cette période : i) prévention et gestion des crises alimentaires par l'Etat ; ii) création de stocks de sécurité, harmonisation des méthodologies de collecte des données statistiques des pays membres du Comité Inter Etats Contre la Sécheresse au Sahel (CILSS)

¹ Bilan de la libéralisation du commerce des céréales au Burkina Faso – AEDES- IRAM – nov. 2000.

Le concept de sécurité alimentaire pendant cette période a été réduit à la "Prévention et à la gestion des crises alimentaires" par l'Etat

En 1996, le Burkina Faso s'engage à réduire de 50% son taux de malnutrition et adopte la déclaration de Rome (Sommet Mondial de l'Alimentation) qui énonce que "*La sécurité alimentaire existe lorsque tous les êtres humains ont, à tout moment, un accès physique et économique à une nourriture suffisante, saine et nutritive leur permettant de satisfaire leurs besoins énergétiques et leurs préférences alimentaires pour mener une vie saine et active.*"

Le concept est alors pris en considération dans les documents de politiques et stratégies nationales : La Lettre d'intention de Politique de Développement Humain Durable (LPDHD) couvrant la période 1995- 2000 et le Document d'Orientation Stratégique (DOS) du secteur agricole qui précisa à l'horizon 2010 les orientations de la LPDHD.

Malgré l'importance accordée au concept de sécurité alimentaire, aucun document de "*stratégie de sécurité alimentaire*" n'a été élaborée. Cette période est en effet marquée (à partir de 1991) par l'application des mesures du Programme d'Ajustement Structurel (PAS) et la mise en place des structures du dispositif de pilotage de la politique céréalière et de la sécurité alimentaire.

Les actions du dispositif de pilotage sont restées centrées sur la prévention et la gestion des crises alimentaires.

Les résultats de l'enquête prioritaire de 1994 sur le profil de pauvreté mettent en évidence : i) le déficit d'accès de la majorité de la population aux services sociaux de base; ii) l'extrême pauvreté et la malnutrition de la population rurale. Cette situation va engager le gouvernement dans la voie d'un développement durable et équitable. Pour relever le défi de la pauvreté, le gouvernement a adopté en 2000 un Cadre stratégique de lutte contre la pauvreté (CSLP) et élaboré une stratégie nationale de sécurité alimentaire (SNSA) approuvée en 2001.

L'adoption du document de stratégie de sécurité alimentaire marque une étape importante dans la définition d'une politique cohérente de sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso.

2.3. Situation de la sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso (1997 à 2002)

La sécurité alimentaire se définit selon quatre composantes : la disponibilité alimentaire, l'accessibilité alimentaire, la stabilité alimentaire, l'utilisation alimentaire et nutritionnelle. L'insuffisance ou l'absence de l'une de ces quatre composantes conduit à l'insécurité alimentaire qui peut être conjoncturelle ou structurelle.

2.3.1. Disponibilité alimentaire²

Niveau national

La production vivrière (mil, sorgho et maïs) de 1997 à 2002, a été assujettie aux aléas pluviométriques. Selon les bilans céréaliers de la direction générale des prévisions et des statistiques, la production céréalière a couvert 80 à 120% des besoins théoriques du pays sur la base de 190/kg/ hab./an. Les bonnes années pluviométriques ces trois dernières années ont dégagé des excédents de céréales.

Le disponible en céréales est renforcé par la production de tubercules (igname et pommes de terre), de légumineuses (niébé) ainsi que par les importations alimentaires (blé, riz et céréales locales) qui ajustent pour palier les baisses de production des années déficitaires (1997/ 98 et 2000/ 2001). Le marché international et sous-régional sont des marchés de recours ; les importations se stabilisent à 13 kg/ habitant.

Les aides alimentaires sont en baisse au Burkina Faso. L'aide d'urgence n'est fournie qu'en cas de crise alimentaire et à la demande du gouvernement. Les aides alimentaires sont allouées dans le cadre de projets bien précis, destinés à l'éducation, aux cantines scolaires, aux centres de nutrition et à la construction d'infrastructures pour le « Food for Work » Les volumes d'aides alimentaires sont stables sur la période (13% des importations alimentaires).

Ainsi, la problématique de la sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso ne se pose pas en termes de disponibilités alimentaires au niveau national.

Au Niveau des ménages

L'agriculture burkinabée est caractérisée par la petite exploitation (3 à 5 ha) dominée par les céréales (mil, sorgho et maïs) C'est une agriculture pluviale, extensive, utilisant peu d'intrants et qui est peu productive. Les céréales sont surtout cultivées pour l'autoconsommation (85% environ) Le disponible au niveau des ménages reste précaire en raison des aléas climatiques. Les revenus monétaires tirés de la céréaliculture sont faibles (10 à 15% selon le niveau de la production).

Les exploitants pauvres cherchent à diversifier leurs activités afin d'accroître leurs revenus : culture de contre saison, petit commerce, petit élevage, artisanat, migration vers les villes et vers l'étranger.

La problématique de la sécurité alimentaire au niveau des ménages se pose en termes de pouvoir d'achat en cas d'aléas climatiques.

2.3.2. Accessibilité

Niveau national

L'accessibilité peut être analysée sous deux aspects : économique et physique.

² La disponibilité alimentaire correspond à l'ensemble des ressources alimentaires: production nationale, importations commerciales et aides alimentaires.

Dans le premier cas, il est fait référence au pouvoir d'achat des ménages. Pour évaluer la pauvreté, le gouvernement a effectué en 1994, avec l'appui des partenaires, une étude du profil de pauvreté qui a été reconduite en 1998. Selon cette étude, 45% de la population vit en dessous du seuil de pauvreté, estimé en 1998 à

71.609 FCFA par adulte et par an. La pauvreté est concentrée dans les zones rurales où elle touche principalement les petites exploitations pratiquant la culture vivrière (51,5%). Dans les villes, la pauvreté a augmenté de 3,8% en 1994 à 6,1% en 1998. Les dépenses alimentaires représentent 58% des dépenses totales en zone rurale (dont 42% de céréales) et 47% en zone urbaine. Cette étude montre le lien entre pauvreté et insécurité alimentaire pour la majorité de la population.

L'accessibilité physique au niveau des marchés s'est améliorée avec la libéralisation du commerce des céréales et l'augmentation du nombre d'opérateurs. Les commerçants ont développé une efficacité dans l'approvisionnement du marché. Pendant les crises alimentaires (notamment celle de 1997/98), ils ont réussi à intensifier les importations de céréales locales venues des pays voisins (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana et Mali) afin d'accroître l'offre sur les marchés de consommation.

Une étude réalisée en 1999³ met en exergue les forces et faiblesses des opérateurs impliqués dans la commercialisation et formule des recommandations pour améliorer le fonctionnement du marché : facilitation de l'accès au crédit, professionnalisation des commerçants, concertation avec les autres acteurs dont l'Etat, levée des entraves à la libéralisation des échanges.

Au niveau des ménages

Les fluctuations inter-annuelles de la production céréalière entraînent une instabilité des prix préjudiciables au pouvoir d'achat des consommateurs pauvres des centres urbains et les producteurs vivriers des provinces du Nord et du Sahel structurellement déficitaires. Les fortes tensions sur les prix des céréales (1997/1998 et 2000/2001) indiquent que l'offre demeure toutefois insuffisante en cas de crises alimentaires importantes. La chute des prix résultant des bonnes récoltes des trois dernières campagnes agricoles, provoque la baisse du pouvoir d'achat des producteurs vivriers, rendant difficile la satisfaction des autres besoins (santé, scolarité, etc.)

Dans les zones rurales, l'appui à la construction des magasins de stockage et des pistes rurales ; la dotation des banques de céréales par les donateurs (dont l'Union Européenne) et les ONG, ont aussi contribué à une plus grande régularité des approvisionnements des zones rurales. Les projets de développement rural intégré, les projets de développement local, les systèmes financiers décentralisés participent également aux activités génératrices de revenus des ménages

³ « Les flux céréaliers, les stocks commerçants et la stratégie des commerçants de céréales au Burkina Faso », AHT Int, CE, juin 99.

L'accessibilité alimentaire s'est améliorée depuis la crise de 1997/98 ; les prix affichent une baisse nette par rapport à la moyenne des cinq dernières années et les ménages diversifient leurs activités de contre- saison.

2.3.3. Stabilité

La stabilité de l'offre est une notion importante dans la sécurité alimentaire, mais elle rentre dans le concept plus large de la disponibilité. La stabilité de l'offre introduit des notions de variabilité inter et intra-annuelles pour la production nationale et pour la disponibilité totale (importations et aides alimentaires comprises). L'offre des produits céréaliers variant selon les années en fonction des aléas climatiques, la stabilité de l'offre est assurée au Burkina Faso par les importations alimentaires provenant de la sous région (céréales locales) et du marché international pour le blé et le riz.

2.3.4 Situation nutritionnelle

Niveau national

Aucun indicateur de nutrition n'est collecté et analysé au plan national. Néanmoins, les enquêtes démographiques et de santé (EDS) réalisées en 1993 et 1998 par l'INSD, permettent d'apprécier la situation de la malnutrition au Burkina Faso :

- L'accès à la nourriture n'est pas suffisant pour la majorité de la population.
- La situation nutritionnelle des enfants de 0 à 5 ans et des mères ne s'est pas améliorée entre 1993 et 1998 : i) un enfant sur trois (29%) souffrent de retard de croissance et de sous nutrition chronique ; ii) un enfant sur cinq souffrent d'insuffisance pondérale ; iii) 13% des enfants de moins de 5 ans selon l'indice « poids pour taille » souffrent d'insuffisance pondérale.

Niveau ménages

Le régime alimentaire de base est composé à 85% de céréales (mil et de sorgho). Ce type de régime, peu varié et déficient en protéines animales, favorise la malnutrition surtout chez les jeunes et les femmes.

Les aides-projets exécutées par le PAM (Programme Alimentaire Mondial) en relation avec des organismes des Nations Unies (UNICEF, PNUD, FNUAP) et avec d'autres partenaires, notamment le CRS (Catholic Relief Service) apportent une alimentation complémentaire aux groupes vulnérables : i) récupération des enfants souffrant de malnutrition grave, admis dans les centres de récupération et d'éducation nutritionnelle ; ii) femmes enceintes et mères allaitant, fréquentant les centres de santé ; élèves des écoles primaires. Les interventions ciblent les provinces à risques et à déficit alimentaire du Nord et du Sahel.

2.4. Dispositif institutionnel

Depuis la formulation du plan céréaliier en 1990, l'accord-cadre de coopération gouvernement/ partenaires de 1997 définit les modes d'intervention et le financement des structures du dispositif de pilotage de la politique céréalière et de la sécurité alimentaire. Ce dispositif est financé à 88% par l'Union Européenne, principalement la France, l'Allemagne et les Pays-Bas. Le dispositif est bâti autour de quatre pôles :

- Un organe de concertation et de réflexion, le CRSPC (Comité de Réflexion et de Suivi de la Politique Céréalière regroupant les acteurs principaux de la filière et doté d'un Secrétariat Permanent).
- Un outil de financement de la politique céréalière et de la gestion des crises alimentaires : le FODEC (Fonds de Développement Céréaliier), géré par le CPG (Comité Paritaire de Gestion)
- Des structures de gestion des crises alimentaires : la SONAGESS (Société Nationale de Gestion des Stocks de Sécurité) et le CONASSUR (Comité National des Secours d'Urgence et de la Réhabilitation)
- Un système d'information de la sécurité alimentaire bâti sur la CT/CCI (Cellule Technique du Comité de Coordination de l'Information)

En 1999, un audit financier et organisationnel du dispositif de pilotage a été réalisé sur financement de l'Union Européenne. Cet audit a mis en évidence des insuffisances du dispositif : i) Concertation et coordination au niveau du CRSPC ; ii) Coordination insuffisante de l'aide alimentaire ; iii) Faible performance du système d'information sur la sécurité alimentaire ; iv) Non-durabilité du financement des structures. L'audit a aussi formulé des propositions de réduction des stocks réels de sécurité au profit du stock financier.

Ce dispositif est en cours de réajustement (Annexe 1) dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de la stratégie opérationnelle de sécurité alimentaire et du nouveau cadre général de coopération Etat-Partenaires en matière de sécurité alimentaire. Les quatre axes de l'ancien dispositif ont été maintenus, élargis ou renforcés.

2.5. Gestion des crises alimentaires

Les activités du dispositif ont été centrées sur la prévention et la gestion des crises alimentaires de 1997/ 1998 et 2000/ 2001.

2.5.1. La crise alimentaire de 1997/ 1998

Le bilan négatif céréaliier (177.800 tonnes) présenté par la CT/ CCI au CRSPC exposait plusieurs provinces du pays à un risque élevé de crise alimentaire. Le gouvernement a fait appel à la communauté internationale en présentant un programme d'urgence pour assister 800.000 personnes pendant sept mois (de février à août). Ce programme comprenait plusieurs volets :

1) *Aides alimentaires d'urgence*

Les aides alimentaires ont été fournies par : i) L'Etat (3.663 tonnes) ; ii) Le SNS (6.000 tonnes) ; iii) La Libye (3.500 tonnes) Les aides allouées directement au gouvernement ont été distribuées gratuitement ou vendues par le CONASUR et ses structures décentralisées au niveau des provinces, départements et villages.

2) *Programme d'appui aux activités diverses*

- *Activités génératrices de revenus*
Les opérations de petit crédit dans les zones déficitaires ont été financées par le Projet Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutrition (315 millions FCFA) et le FAAGRA (Fonds d'Appui aux Activités Génératrices de Revenus des organisations de femmes (60 millions FCFA)
- *Les programmes d'approvisionnement des banques de céréales.*
Le PAM et l'Union Européenne ont participé au travers des ONG à cette opération.
- *Les activités à haute intensité de main d'œuvre (HIMO)*
Le PSAN et le PAM dans le cadre de leurs programmes réguliers ont redéployé leurs actions dans les zones les plus touchées.
- *Programme nutritionnel en faveur des groupes vulnérables*
LE PAM a redéployé ses actions de nutrition dans les provinces à risques.
- *Programme de sensibilisation et d'information des opérateurs économiques*
Ce programme avait pour but de minimiser la spéculation et d'encourager les échanges avec la sous-région. Du maïs a été importé de Côte d'Ivoire et du Ghana.

2.5.2. La crise alimentaire de 2000/ 2001

L'examen du bilan par le CRSPC n'a pas fait l'objet de consensus entre le gouvernement et les autres partenaires (le déficit a oscillé entre 86.000 et 440.000 tonnes) Le bilan officiel de la récolte 2000/2001 s'est soldé par un déficit de 199.000 tonnes. Le programme d'urgence présenté par le gouvernement a repris les quatre volets du programme d'urgence de 1997/98 a été exécuté selon le volet aides alimentaires d'urgence.

Une première dotation d'aide alimentaire de 4.083 tonnes, achetée par l'Etat, a été distribuée gratuitement dans 18 provinces. Une deuxième dotation de 19.983 tonnes prélevée sur le SNS a été vendue à prix social dans 12 provinces. Les deux opérations ont été conduites par les structures décentralisées du CONASUR.

Le PAM a redéployé ses interventions dans les 18 provinces touchées par la crise.

2.6. Les interventions de l'Union Européenne (de 1997 à 2002)

Depuis 1995, la Commission Européenne est intervenue dans le domaine de la sécurité alimentaire à plusieurs niveaux ; i) Stock national de sécurité (physique et financier) ; ii) Fonctionnement des structures du dispositif ; iii) Elaboration du Plan National d'Organisation et de Coordination des Secours d'Urgence. La CE⁴ a utilisé plusieurs instruments financiers à cet effet :

- La ligne budgétaire de sécurité alimentaire (2001)
- Le 7ème et le 8ème FED
- L'aide indirecte (1998)

2.6.1. Lettres officielles 1278 (Budget PS-ASC-Financement 7ème FED)

Dans le cadre de la LO 1278, la Commission Européenne est intervenue en appui au Gouvernement dans plusieurs domaines :

- La constitution du Stock National de Sécurité (SNS) avec une contribution de 4.150 tonnes pour un montant de 1.025.000 €. L'intervention globale sur le SNS a été de 20.182 tonnes, soit 58% des 35.000 tonnes du stock physique conventionnel ;
- Le fonctionnement des structures du dispositif de pilotage de la politique céréalière : 40 % du budget de fonctionnement de la SONAGESS et du CONASUR pour l'année 1999, portant ainsi l'intervention de la Commission Européenne dans le fonctionnement de ces structures à 2 millions € ;
- L'assistance technique d'appui à la SONAGESS pour un montant de 208.000 € ;
- L'élaboration du Plan National d'Organisation et de Coordination des Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation (PNOCSUR) pour un montant de 260.000 €.

Le reliquat de la lettre officielle 98 a dégagé un solde de 173.714 Euros (113,4 millions FCFA) qui devaient permettre le financement du SAP rénové, et contribuer à la constitution du stock financier qui n'a pas été sollicitée par le gouvernement burkinabé.

2.6.2. Lettre officielle 20091/2001

La lettre 2001 (Financement Ligne sécurité alimentaire) d'un montant de 7 millions d'Euros permettra la mise en oeuvre de quatre composantes :

- 1) Le renforcement de la prévention et de la gestion des crises conjoncturelles (2 millions d'Euros) ;
- 2) L'amélioration de la sécurité alimentaire structurelle (2,3 millions d'Euros) ;
- 3) L'appui institutionnel (1,4 millions d'Euros)
- 4) L'assistance technique et le suivi (1,3 millions d'Euros)

⁴ En plus des deux lignes budgétaires déjà mentionnées (sécurité alimentaire et cofinancement la CE dispose également d'autres lignes budgétaires qui financent les ONG comme les lignes budgétaires droit de l'homme, genre, santé, etc.

2.6.3. Aide directe de la Commission

- L'aide directe de la Commission a concerné la consolidation d'une ligne budgétaire destinée à la Caisse de Solidarité par les fonds de contrepartie du PAS à hauteur de 99.100 €.

2.6.4. Aide indirecte de la Commission

Quatorze projets ONGs sont en cours. Voir les tableaux en annexe.

Il y a depuis janvier 2004 un total de 14 projets en cours d'exécution dont 6 issus de l'appel à propositions 2000 et 8 de l'appel à propositions 2002.

2.6.5. Financement du PAOSA (8ème FED)

Le Plan d'Action pour l'Organisation du Secteur Agricole (PAOSA) a démarré en 1999 pour un montant de 24,2 millions d'Euros, avec d'autres bailleurs : la France, le Danemark, les Pays- Bas ; La Belgique et le FAO.

Ce plan appuie la mise en œuvre de trois plans d'actions prévus par le Plan Stratégique opérationnel du gouvernement :

- Le Plan d'Action pour le Financement du Monde Rural (PA/ FMR)
- Le Plan d'Action pour la Filière Riz (PAFR)
- Le Plan d'Action pour l'émergence des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles (PAOPA)

2.7. Perspectives

La pauvreté est au cœur de la sécurité alimentaire. La nouvelle stratégie de sécurité alimentaire qui s'intègre dans le cadre de référence de lutte contre la pauvreté, doit relever de nombreux défis : croissance des villes, pauvreté, gestion des ressources naturelles, inégalités entre les régions du pays. L'interaction de ces défis impose des approches sectorielles cohérentes et la nécessité de disposer de systèmes d'informations fiables pour l'aide à la décision des acteurs publics et privés.

3. REPONSES AUX QUESTIONS EVALUATIVES

3.1 Question évaluative 1

Quel est le niveau de cohérence entre les politiques, stratégies et objectifs de sécurité alimentaire du Règlement No. 1292/96 et celles des autres instruments géographiques (FED, ALA, MEDA, TACIS, CARDS) et lignes budgétaires comme ECHO, Réhabilitation et cofinancement ONG?

La réponse à cette question sera donnée dans le rapport de synthèse. Au Burkina Faso, il y a seulement la ligne budgétaire « sécurité alimentaire », la ligne de cofinancement ONG et les financements en sécurité alimentaire dans le cadre du FED.

3.2 Question évaluative 2

Quel est le niveau d'intégration de la politique en matière de sécurité alimentaire dans la stratégie de développement de la Commission avec le pays concerné tel qu'il a été établi dans le Document de Stratégie de Coopération et Programme Indicatif ou DSCPI (en anglais : Country Strategy Paper ou CSP)?

Il existe une cohérence entre les objectifs de la politique en matière de sécurité alimentaire et la stratégie de développement, établie dans le DSCPI période 2001-2002. Le DSCPI ne mentionne pas les objectifs de la sécurité alimentaire en détails mais met l'accent surtout sur l'importance que la sécurité alimentaire revêt dans la lutte contre la pauvreté. Il indique clairement que les trois principaux domaines de la coopération sont :

- 1) l'appui au cadre macro-économique à travers l'aide budgétaire (150 millions d'Euro),
- 2) l'appui à deux secteurs de concentration : Infrastructures routières (100 millions d'Euro) et développement rural/sécurité alimentaire (25 millions d'Euro) et
- 3) les actions hors concentration (en particulier l'appui institutionnel).

Dans le rapport annuel conjoint 2002/2003 sur la mise en œuvre des actions de coopération dans le cadre des Conventions ACP-UE au Burkina Faso, chapitre Politique de Développement (Orientations stratégiques du Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté 2000-2003), la sécurité alimentaire est explicitement mentionnée (DEVRUR) et les indicateurs d'impact à suivre figurent en annexe.

Bien que le DSCPI mette l'accent sur la lutte contre la pauvreté, le niveau pauvreté au niveau « ménage » n'est pas mentionné en termes d'impact (situation alimentaire, socio-économique, sanitaire et surtout nutritionnelle des groupes d'âge les plus vulnérables), l'insécurité alimentaire étant surtout ressentie au niveau du ménage.

L'aide alimentaire n'est pas mentionnée, mais cette forme d'aide ne joue pas un rôle déterminant au Burkina Faso, bien que le Règlement 1992/96 mette aussi l'accent sur l'aide alimentaire comme solution à l'établissement de la sécurité alimentaire.

Le DSCPI ne mentionne pas le rôle du Règlement 1292/96, mais le Rapport Annuel Conjoint 2002 sur la mise en œuvre des actions de coopération dans le cadre des

conventions ACP-UE au Burkina Faso, mentionne l'existence d'une ligne budgétaire dédiée à la sécurité alimentaire, lorsque le Gouvernement a adopté « sa stratégie opérationnelle de S.A. ».

Il existe au niveau de la Délégation de la CE une coordination intense entre les interventions de la Commission en matière de sécurité alimentaire. Toutes les activités de S.A. (FED, ligne B7-201 etc.) sont intégrées dans le secteur Développement Rural. Le chef du secteur fait la coordination et les conseillers et assistants techniques concernés se réunissent hebdomadairement. Ceci assure aussi une complémentarité des différents instruments.

3.3 Question évaluative 3

Quel est le niveau de cohérence entre la politique de la Commission Européenne en matière d'aide et de sécurité alimentaire d'une part, et les stratégies des pays bénéficiaires d'autre part, surtout en ce qui concerne les DCSLP (Documents-Cadre de Stratégie de la Lutte contre la Pauvreté)?

Les différentes versions du DCSLP ne développent pas le concept «sécurité alimentaire», tandis que le Règlement 1292/96 stipule très clairement que l'établissement de la sécurité alimentaire est utilisé dans le cadre de la lutte contre la pauvreté. Cependant, le Rapport Annuel Conjoint 2002 sur la mise en œuvre le mentionne très clairement.

Il existe une cohérence entre les objectifs généraux du DCSLP d'une part et le DCSLP (très sommaire) ou d'autres stratégies nationales d'autre part ; mais en réalité, les pratiques sont différentes. Le concept S.A. au niveau de la Délégation est en avance sur les concepts gouvernementaux. La Délégation a développé une approche plus pro-active et analytique tandis que celle du Gouvernement est plus statique et dépendante des bailleurs de fonds.

Le DCSLP ne donne pas une grande importance à l'Aide Alimentaire et la Sécurité Alimentaire contrairement aux autres stratégies nationales, comme la stratégie nationale de sécurité alimentaire. Dans ce sens, le rôle de l'UE n'a pas été établi dans le DCSLP en matière de S.A.

La « logique » d'intervention de l'UE au Burkina Faso est surtout la lutte contre la pauvreté dans les zones où l'insécurité alimentaire existe structurellement, comme dans le Nord et l'Est du pays.

La coordination entre les interventions des bailleurs de fonds et le Gouvernement est assurée au niveau du Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire. (CNSA). Cet organisme joue un rôle important en matière du développement des stratégies sectorielles. Les bailleurs de fonds jouent un rôle important et aussi pro-actif qui n'est pas lié aux financements des interventions. Le rôle de la Délégation est apprécié par d'autres bailleurs de fonds (la France et les Pays-Bas), surtout en ce qui concerne le rôle initiateur de la Délégation.

3.4 Question évaluative 4

Quelle a été la plus-value de l'aide alimentaire afin de réaliser les objectifs pour l'établissement de la sécurité alimentaire en général comme il a été formulé dans le Règlement 1992/96?

Les grandes crises alimentaires au Burkina Faso datent des années 1972/73, 1984/85 mais aussi de 1997/98 et 2000/2001. L'évaluation concerne les deux dernières crises qui ont frappé surtout les provinces du Nord et de l'Est, au total une quinzaine de provinces.

L'importance des stratégies et d'actions de l'aide alimentaire (AA) est claire : l'aide alimentaire a contribué à la survie des ménages les plus pauvres et les plus démunis dans cette zone à risques.

Les dotations en aide alimentaire de la part de l'U.E. ont été allouées au gouvernement au travers du le CONASUR et ses structures décentralisées qui les a distribuées gratuitement ou vendues à un prix subventionné et fixe sur le marché local afin de stabiliser les prix de céréales. Bien que l'U.E. ait fait des contributions au travers des structures étatiques, l'efficacité, l'impact, la pérennité etc. des stratégies et des actions d'aide alimentaire ont été évaluées sur l'initiative du Comité Paritaire de Gestion. Cette évaluation relève que l'aide alimentaire n'a pas perturbé les marchés locaux. Cependant, l'efficacité a été faible pour la réduction de l'insécurité alimentaire des ménages vulnérables.

La comparaison des avantages entre l'aide alimentaire du Règlement avec d'autres instruments n'est pas possible, du fait que la crise alimentaire 2000/ 2001, soit déjà résolue et qu'une autre crise est apparue : baisse de prix à la production résultant de deux années consécutives de productions excédentaires. La qualité du ciblage des bénéficiaires n'est plus mesurable. Le fait que l'efficacité et l'impact aient été faibles ne veut pas directement dire que le ciblage était de faible qualité.

Le fait que toute la gestion de l'aide alimentaire ait été placée sous la responsabilité du CONASUR, structure étatique et ses structures décentralisées, rend la comparaison entre les instruments de l'U.E. difficile.

L'aide alimentaire allouée par l'U.E. (surtout celle de la ligne budgétaire S.A. mais aussi des autres) a le grand avantage d'être fondamentalement différent de l'aide alimentaire allouée par les Etats Unis (l'aide venant des Etats- Unis est conditionnée, sans possibilités d'opérations triangulaires ou de dotations en monnaies). Celle de l'U.E. est plus flexible. L'aide alimentaire peut difficilement contribuer à l'établissement d'une situation de sécurité alimentaire. La nécessité de l'aide alimentaire indique l'absence profonde d'une sécurité alimentaire, mais aussi le manque d'une politique du gouvernement en la matière.

Tout cela indique, entre autres que la ligne budgétaire S.A. a une flexibilité que les autres instruments et aussi certains bailleurs de fonds n'ont pas :

- Flexibilité dans le choix de A.A. et S.A. ;
- Possibilité d'incorporer le LRRD par l'introduction d'activités de S.A. ;
- Disponibilité d'un grand nombre d'objectifs qui sont vastes, mais cohérents et surtout d'une bonne qualité sur le plan conceptuel ;
- Canaux flexibles comme l'aide directe et indirecte.

3.5 Question évaluative 5

Quel est la plus-value de l'appui budgétaire, tel que formulé dans le Règlement afin de réaliser les objectifs pour l'établissement de la sécurité alimentaire?

L'appui budgétaire au Burkina Faso concerne l'aide directe selon la lettre officielle 20093/2001 pour un montant total de 7 millions d'Euro et signé en août 2002. Il s'agit des interventions sur les volets suivants :

- Renforcement de la prévention et de la gestion des conjoncturelles (2 millions d'Euro) : *Contribution au Fonds d'Action pour la Sécurité Alimentaire et au Fonds d'Intervention pour les Crises Alimentaires* ;
- Amélioration de la sécurité alimentaire structurelle (2,3 millions d'Euro) : *Contribution aux Plans d'Action Céréales et Niébé et Appui aux Réseaux de Banques de Céréales et aux Systèmes Financiers Décentralisés* ;
- Appui institutionnel à la stratégie nationale de sécurité alimentaire (1,4 millions d'Euro) : *Contribution au Fonds d'Incitation, d'Animation et de Promotion et Appui aux Systèmes d'Information liés à la sécurité alimentaire* ;
- Assistance technique et suivi (1,3 millions d'Euro) : *2 assistants techniques (2 ans), 2 expertises, revues à mi-parcours et finale et audit* ;

L'importance des stratégies et des activités d'appui budgétaire est claire dans le sens que c'est le Gouvernement du Burkina qui pourra montrer lui-même l'importance donnée aux volets concernés à travers l'impact direct et indirect. Les facteurs de créativité, pro-activité, le niveau d'analyse et l'adaptation adéquate des stratégies seront des indicateurs à suivre. Les appréciations des résultats des indicateurs donneront la mesure de la plus-value. Il a déjà été dit que le fait que le Burkina Faso ne soit pas en mesure de mettre en place des cadres compétents montre la faiblesse et le manque de pérennité des appuis.

L'efficacité, l'efficacité et l'impact ne sont pas encore connus, à cause du retard du démarrage des volets appuyés et le fait que certaines stratégies doivent être reformulées. C'est aussi le cas pour le suivi d'impact en général, mais surtout au niveau des ménages. Un système de suivi grâce à des indicateurs d'impact sera la seule manière de bien suivre l'amélioration pour les familles les plus pauvres.

La comparaison des avantages d'appui budgétaire, données par la ligne de sécurité alimentaire et d'autres instruments comme le FED, ne donne pas de réponse claire. En principe, tous ces programmes financés à travers l'appui budgétaire fonctionnent dans la même section : Développement Rural au niveau de la Délégation et il existe une coopération et coordination étroites. Bien qu'au niveau de la lettre officielle No. 20093/2001 et du programme PAOSA, on trouve, dans le cadre des financements, les mêmes retards de procédures et de décaissements. Cependant, il faut noter qu'au moment de l'évaluation, le programme FED se trouvait dans un processus de déconcentration.

3.6 Question évaluative 6

Quelle est la plus-value des opérations de soutien à la sécurité alimentaire afin de réaliser les objectifs formulés dans le Règlement?

Au Burkina Faso, il s'agit surtout des actions suivantes : programme ONG de la ligne budgétaire S.A. (B7-201), programme ligne budgétaire cofinancement ONG (B-6000) et Appui à la stratégie opérationnelle de sécurité alimentaire (lettre officielle N° 20093/2001). En ce qui concerne les trois types d'actions, ils ont une certaine plus-value, à savoir :

Le programme ONG B7-2001 facilite surtout les actions sur le terrain dont les familles les plus vulnérables peuvent profiter. Cependant, cet instrument pourra être amélioré en ce qui concerne les procédures de sélection, la longueur des décaissements, le suivi d'indicateurs mesurant les progrès faits au niveau des ménages vulnérables (situation alimentaire, nutritionnelle et sanitaire familiale) et l'absence d'une évaluation finale externe qui au moins pourra contribuer à un prolongement dans le cadre de l'objectif « pérennité » des actions.

Le programme de cofinancement ONG est un programme vaste, les experts en développement rural et sécurité alimentaire au niveau de la Délégation n'ont pas une influence directe sur son suivi. Il y avait un seul programme de cette ligne (projet S.A. du CISV à Yako) qui est à son terme. Il a été sélectionné par la ligne S.A. (sans évaluation finale externe et sans utilisation d'indicateurs d'impact au niveau des ménages).

Le programme, dans le cadre de la lettre officielle, est en réalité une aide budgétaire, mais avec une destination très précise (ear-marked ou fonds ciblés). Dans le cadre de cette lettre, plusieurs activités sont financées, comme l'appui au SIM, SONAGESS, AT au niveau du CNSA et les interventions directes sur le terrain. Ces activités pourraient être améliorées après une bonne analyse de l'impact de chaque action. Il a déjà été constaté que les ATs ont déjà montré leur plus-value, mais en ce qui concerne le SIM et la SONAGESS, un exercice de réflexion sur le passé et l'avenir sera très souhaitable. Il a été proposé que la SONAGESS et le SIM fassent un bilan-diagnostic de leurs activités à l'occasion de leur dixième anniversaire en juin 2004.

La coordination entre les différents instruments, tant au niveau de la Délégation qu'au niveau du CNSA, y compris les ATs, la SONAGESS etc. et les autres bailleurs de fonds est constructive et transparente.

3.7 Question évaluative 7

Quelle est la plus-value des autres composantes (assistance technique et appui institutionnel) afin de réaliser les objectifs formulés dans le Règlement?

Aussi bien l'assistance technique que l'appui institutionnel sont financés par la ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire. Au niveau du CNSA, y compris la SONAGESS, trois ATs sont opérationnels comme conseillers. Il s'agit surtout de postes de renforcement de la capacité de réflexion et d'analyse. Ils exercent surtout une fonction de catalyseur en ce qui concerne l'analyse en toute objectivité des stratégies, la formulation des leçons apprises, le développement de nouvelles stratégies dans une organisation historiquement assez hiérarchisée. L'efficacité de leur travail et de leur appui institutionnel est réelle. Une de leurs tâches est le développement des indicateurs d'impact au niveau des ménages en termes de situation alimentaire, sanitaire, nutritionnelle et socio-économique. La réduction de l'appauvrissement de la famille d'une manière durable est en effet un des objectifs du Règlement, mais également l'objectif du DCSLP.

En terme de durabilité, leurs résultats « output » pourront améliorer à long terme la capacité institutionnelle des organismes concernés. Cependant, la question de l'emploi de cadres nationaux compétents par le Burkina Faso reste posée. Est-ce une question de financement et de niveau de salaires ou d'environnement de travail qui ne donne pas assez de créativité et de liberté à un cadre national? Ce sont ces questions qu'il faut poser en ce qui concerne l'emploi des ATs. Si le Burkina Faso n'est pas en mesure d'utiliser ses propres cadres compétents au niveau du développement de politiques aussi importantes, la question de la pérennité des ATs est pertinente.

Les ATs au niveau de la Délégation (intra muros) sont importants dans le sens qu'ils transmettent des informations nécessaires, aussi bien à Bruxelles qu'à la Délégation. Ils sont surtout importants pour garantir une plus-value aux financements des différents instruments, en raison de leur expérience, de leurs connaissances et de leur statut indépendant. Cependant, ils souffrent aussi de la lenteur bureaucratique du siège. Les autorités du Burkina Faso et aussi les autres partenaires utilisent les ATs comme premiers contacts pour adresser leurs inquiétudes par rapport aux délais administratifs.

3.8 Question évaluative 8

Dans quelle mesure le développement des activités d'appui a-t-il facilité le progrès en ce qui concerne la réalisation des objectifs de l'aide et de la sécurité alimentaire? Ceci inclut l'identification de priorités, la sélection de pays, la sélection et l'identification des bénéficiaires et des groupes vulnérables, les opérations et les composantes de financement, le processus d'identification et vérification, la programmation pluriannuelle etc.

Les ressources humaines compétentes pour la programmation en général ne manquent pas, ni au niveau de l'unité de sécurité alimentaire, ni au niveau d' AIDCO (F5), ni au niveau de la Délégation,. Tant au niveau de Bruxelles qu'au niveau de la Délégation, des cadres comme les « desk officers », des conseillers et des ATs avec de l'expérience en la matière et sur le terrain, des cadres qui ont assez d'expérience de terrain et avec le PCM sont en place. Leurs compétences ont été confirmées par les partenaires sur le terrain, les partenaires étatiques et d'autres bailleurs de fonds. Le problème des lenteurs etc. ne se trouve pas à leur niveau mais il est la conséquence de procédures administratives compliquées. C'est surtout à ce niveau qu'une amélioration devra être trouvée.

En ce qui concerne la qualité de la programmation au niveau du pays bénéficiaire, il faut dire que ce sont des programmes pluriannuels et bien décrits au niveau des DSCPI, DCSLP, RAC etc.

Les programmes dans le cadre du FED ont été élaborés conjointement entre l'Etat Burkinabé et la Commission Européenne. Les programmes, dans le cadre de ligne budgétaire S.A., ligne de financement direct et indirect, ont été élaborés d'une manière différente. L'aide directe, dans le cas du Burkina Faso, est le financement des activités dans le cadre de la lettre officielle No. 20093/2001. La programmation a été un processus de négociations avec l'appui des experts intra- et extra-muros. Ces processus sont lents mais donnent la garantie d'un résultat qualitativement positif. Bien que les procédures d'approbation pour les projets ONGs (B7-201) soient connues (appel d'offres, l'appréciation de la part de la Délégation, l'utilisation d'une grille d'évaluation et sélection finale etc.), les procédures sont, selon les ONGs, longues et les ONGs ne reçoivent pas toujours de lettre en cas de décision négative, avec des justifications.

Il n'y a pas d'informations systématiques sur la sélection de chaque composante Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire par rapport à la plus-value de chaque composante qui pourrait indiquer un avantage comparatif par rapport aux autres instruments. Au niveau de la Délégation, tous les programmes de sécurité alimentaire sont contrôlés et suivis par la Section Développement Rural.

Sur le plan de l'existence d'une planification adéquate de répartition des responsabilités dans le PCM, il faut dire qu'elle existe, mais les procédures n'ont pas été exécutées selon les directives du PCM : identification → évaluation etc. L'identification n'est pas faite sous la forme d'une étude de base afin de définir la situation « zéro », le suivi utilise surtout des indicateurs de « output » et pas d'indicateurs d'impact au niveau des bénéficiaires avec le but de suivre l'impact et à la fin du projet, il n'y a souvent pas une évaluation finale avec une partie « leçons apprises ».

L'intégration des éléments « cross-cutting » est souvent présente dans le processus de planification en termes de « genres » etc. mais pas en termes « enfants », « femmes enceintes ou allaitantes » etc.?

3.9 Question évaluative 9

Dans quelle mesure les dispositifs de mise en oeuvre (structures adaptées pour la planification, la mise en oeuvre, le suivi et l'évaluation), les mécanismes, instruments et processus (répartition de tâches et responsabilités, coordination des activités) ont facilité la réalisation des objectifs?

La complémentarité avec d'autres programmes n'est pas claire ; cependant, il n'y a pas de chevauchement. La ligne budgétaire cofinancement ONG B7-6000 a financé un programme de sécurité alimentaire pour le CISV à Yako mais à la fin de l'exécution du programme, la ligne B7-201 a pris ce programme en charge (à travers la procédure d'un appel à proposition).

La répartition des responsabilités est assez claire dans les différentes phases du PCM (gestion du cycle des projets). Il faut cependant signaler que le processus du PCM pourra aussi être amélioré au niveau de la ligne budgétaire B7-201. L'identification au niveau des programmes « aide budgétaire » a été faite conjointement avec le Gouvernement et c'est un processus de négociations. Le programme ONG de la ligne B7-201 suit la logique d'un appel à proposition avec des critères bien détaillés, souvent pour un certain nombre de pays. Les caractéristiques du pays ne sont pas prises en considération. Les ONGs candidates sont obligées d'élaborer une proposition selon des critères généraux et spécifiques contenus dans le document technique pays formulés par la Délégation. Ce document donne des orientations aux ONG dans l'élaboration de leurs propositions. Ce document technique donne un cadre de référence de la situation générale en matière de sécurité alimentaire et de thèmes y afférent. En ce qui concerne les cas d'une situation spécifique dans la zone du projet proposé les procédures de l'appel à propositions n'exigent a priori aucune étude de base fournissant un diagnostic de la situation. Tout dépend des priorités de chaque projet. En outre, une évaluation finale n'est même pas exigée parce que la chance de recevoir un nouveau financement est faible du fait des faibles disponibilités financières lors des appels. Il a déjà été dit que le suivi des indicateurs d'impact au niveau « ménages » n'est pas demandé. La question se pose alors de savoir comment l'impact pourrait être connu.

Les ATs extra-muros participent actuellement à la mise en place d'un système d'indicateurs qui mesurent l'impact à tous les niveaux.

La gestion du programme est surtout assurée par les conseillers de la Délégation en ce qui concerne le contrôle des procédures et le suivi sur le terrain. Les programmes et projets sur le terrain sont exécutés par les services étatiques (SONAGESS, CONASUR, etc.), les structures intermédiaires (PAFR) ou les ONGs.

La Délégation n'exécute pas de programme mais est bailleur de fonds avec une structure d'appui. Elle n'a pas de ressources humaines en nombre pour exécuter un suivi adéquat, du fait de la lourdeur du travail administratif. Le suivi des programmes FED est à mi-parcours de déconcentration, mais il semble que la déconcentration implique plus de travail administratif pour le conseiller chargé du suivi des programmes de développement rural et sécurité alimentaire sous financement FED. Cependant, l'exécution des programmes de sécurité alimentaire sous financement FED (par exemple l'aménagement des bas-fonds) ne diffère pas de celle d'une ONG en ce qui concerne le cycle du projet.

Les systèmes de suivi et d'évaluation ne sont pas adaptés et l'évaluation de l'impact est même incomplète. Le programme ONG n'exige même pas une évaluation finale.

Bien que les ONGs et les structures intermédiaires (PAOSA, PAFMR) élaborent des programmes avec la participation des acteurs, tout doit être préparé selon les critères que Bruxelles exige (voir Grille d'Evaluation des deux lignes B7-6000 et B7-201).

L'utilisation des éléments de «cross-cutting» dans la programmation doit être analysée selon les éléments comme : Genre, femmes en âge de procréation ou enceintes/allaitantes, personnes du troisième âge, degré de vulnérabilité etc. Ceci n'a pas été fait systématiquement. L'impression est que toute programmation est orientée sur les éléments : disponibilité, accessibilité et stabilité en termes de production et financier, sans tenir compte des éléments suivants : qualité de la nourriture au niveau des ménages, situation nutritionnelle des mères et des enfants et le temps disponible pour le soin au niveau des ménages et surtout la mise en œuvre du processus d'intégration de la femme dans le circuit économique, sans la garantie d'une formation adéquate en « sciences et soins ménagers » (« home science and care »). Voir l'étude « aliments produits, porte-monnaie rempli, enfants mal-nourris », étude réalisée par l'Ambassade des Pays-Bas dans un projet de « petits barrages et la culture maraîchère » qui a montré que la mesure dans laquelle la femme rurale est intégrée dans l'économie du marché (sans considération de formation et d'accompagnement) est positivement relatée à la malnutrition infantile et la situation alimentaire en famille. Ceci est aussi le cas dans d'autres projets visités.

3.10 Question évaluative 10

Dans quelle mesure le retrait des actions appuyées a-t-il été planifié et quelle contribution cela a-t-il apporté à la réalisation des objectifs?

Il n'y a pas une stratégie claire de réduction graduelle de l'assistance de l'UE.. En ce qui concerne les actions soutenues, il faut distinguer entre les actions suivantes : programme ONG, programme lettre officielle entre l'U.E. et l'Etat, ligne budgétaire cofinancement ONG, programme FED etc.

La question de l'aide indirecte au travers de « l'appel d'offres » aux ONGs n'est pas opportune. Être choisi pour la période en cours ne donne pas la garantie d'être sélectionné pour le prochain « appel d'offres ». Cette ligne budgétaire ne demande pas aux ONGs sélectionnées une évaluation finale et externe, bien que l'unité F5 au siège demande l'avis du conseiller et des ATs au niveau de la Délégation. Pour les activités exécutées dans le cadre de la lettre officielle, il a déjà été mentionné la mise à la disposition du CNSA (SONAGESS et SIM) des ATs. Leur assistance est prévue pour une période fixe, mais la poursuite de leur assistance n'est pas encore prévue et dépendra de l'effectivité et l'impact de leur travail quant à la réalisation des objectifs.

L'appui institutionnel aux partenaires existe sous la forme de contacts avec les conseillers et l'AT de la Délégation.

Il n'existe pas encore de procédures adéquates pour une transition graduelle.

3.11 Question évaluative 11

Quelle est la pérennité des effets et impacts des politiques et programmes en matière de sécurité alimentaire, tant au niveau de la population bénéficiaire qu'au niveau institutionnel et politique dans les pays partenaires?

La réponse à la durabilité des effets et de l'impact des politiques et programmes en matière de sécurité alimentaire aux différents niveaux est difficile. Les objectifs mentionnés dans la stratégie nationale de sécurité alimentaire du Burkina Faso⁵ et le Règlement E.U. 1292/96⁶ sont clairs. Les deux partenaires mentionnent clairement les objectifs et les bénéficiaires. Il y a un niveau où le suivi, en ce qui concerne l'impact et la pérennité, manque et c'est celui lié aux « ménages ». Bien que les objectifs des deux partenaires mentionnent clairement l'impact au niveau des ménages, y compris en ce qui concerne l'amélioration de la situation nutritionnelle, dans la pratique, ce niveau est presque oublié. Il n'existe dans aucun projet ou programme un suivi au niveau des ménages en termes de situation et d'amélioration de la situation alimentaire, nutritionnelle, socio-économique, sanitaire etc.

L'impact au niveau micro n'est donc pas mesuré. Autrement dit, l'amélioration de la situation au niveau des ménages n'est pas systématiquement mesurée.

⁵Le Burkina Faso a adopté le volet opérationnel de la stratégie nationale de sécurité alimentaire en 1999 et le document a été revu en 2002 afin de le mettre en adéquation avec le cadre stratégique de sécurité alimentaire durable dans une perspective de lutte contre la pauvreté au Sahel, adopté par l'ensemble des pays CILSS. La stratégie a pour objectif global de réduire de 50% le nombre de personnes souffrant de faim et de malnutrition à l'horizon 2010. Elle a les objectifs suivants:

- Augmenter durablement le niveau de la production alimentaire nationale et sa valeur ajoutée ;
- Renforcer les capacités du marché de façon à permettre l'accès des populations aux produits alimentaires ;
- Améliorer durablement les conditions économiques et nutritionnelles des populations pauvres et des groupes vulnérables ;
- Renforcer les capacités des acteurs et promouvoir la bonne gouvernance de la sécurité alimentaire ;
- Renforcer le dispositif de prévention et de gestion des crises conjoncturelles en cohérence avec la construction de la sécurité alimentaire structurelle ;

⁶ Le Règlement 1292/96 (1996) a pour objectifs:

- Promouvoir la sécurité alimentaire centrée sur la lutte contre la pauvreté, au niveau des ménages, aux niveaux local, national et régional ;
- Relever le niveau nutritionnel des populations bénéficiaires ;
- Approvisionner en eau potable ;
- Promouvoir la disponibilité et l'accessibilité des populations aux denrées alimentaires ;
- Contribuer au développement économique et social équilibré des pays bénéficiaires, en milieu rural et urbain, en accordant une attention toute particulière au rôle des femmes et des hommes dans l'économie des ménages et dans la structure sociale ;

Au Burkina Faso, il n'existe pas de stratégie claire afin de réduire la dépendance de l'assistance de la part de l'UE et son effectivité. Bien que le Burkina Faso soit devenu, les deux années passées, un pays excédentaire en céréales, un retrait de la part de l'U.E., des autres bailleurs et des ONGs n'est pas encore envisagé pour le moment. La Délégation est en cours d'exécution d'une adaptation et amélioration des activités au niveau du CNSA en ce qui concerne l'approche « ménages », avec l'intégration d'indicateurs plus centrés sur la situation alimentaire, nutritionnelle, sanitaire et socio-économique. Si le CNSA réussit cette adaptation et introduction, les aspects macro seront ainsi complétés par des informations de dimension « micro ». Il est aussi incontestable que les organismes de l'Etat (CNSA, SONAGESS etc.) s'adaptent à cette nouvelle situation et formulent une politique et stratégie adaptées à la situation des excédents céréaliers. La production céréalière excédentaire provoque un nouveau problème : une baisse de prix à un niveau tel que la production n'est plus intéressante pour les paysans producteurs en termes de leurs revenus. C'est un phénomène considérable pour lequel les institutions de l'Etat doivent trouver une solution et développer une stratégie. L'appui de l'U.E., et surtout l'appui technique par la Délégation, les conseillers et l'assistance technique, auront un rôle important à jouer afin d'éviter qu'en cas de prolongation de bonnes productions, les producteurs ne soient pas les victimes. Quant à l'élaboration de stratégies après le retrait de l'U.E., il est rare que les ONGs profitent d'un deuxième financement de la part de la ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire. Les ONGs ont certes toujours de nouvelles propositions mais elles sont conscientes que les opportunités d'un nouveau financement de la part de l'U.E. sont rares. Elles cherchent ainsi toujours d'autres bailleurs de fonds.

Les effets à long terme ne sont pas systématiquement mesurés ce qui nécessite un système de suivi adapté et permanent.

L'accès équitable pour tous les groupes (indépendamment des genres, religion, ethnie etc.) aux financements de l'UE n'est pas un problème au Burkina Faso. En revanche, la question des procédures des « appels d'offres » pour les ONGs n'est pas claire. Les règles et les critères sont connus, mais les critères de sélection et surtout de non-sélection, sont pour beaucoup d'ONGs inconnues, ce qui laisse un sentiment de suspicion quant à la transparence de la procédure

3.12 Question évaluative 12

Quel est le rôle du Règlement No. 1292/96 afin de réduire l'écart entre l'urgence et la réhabilitation d'une part, et le développement d'autre part ?

Le règlement 1292/96 a l'avantage d'utiliser différents outils - l'aide alimentaire, l'appui à la sécurité alimentaire, l'aide budgétaire à l'Etat et l'appui indirect aux ONGs - qui peuvent être utilisés dans des situations différentes, telles que l'urgence, la réhabilitation et le développement structurel. Les outils pour combattre ces trois situations ont été combinés dans le Règlement 1292/96.

Au Burkina Faso, l'aide alimentaire était l'outil pour combattre les effets négatifs de la sécheresse en 1997/98 et 2000/01. En même temps, l'aide budgétaire a pu aider le fonctionnement du CONASUR et de la SONAGESS en matière d'achats, de transports, stockage et distribution. Le programme ONG est devenu utile au moment de la réhabilitation et du développement afin d'établir des programmes de sécurité alimentaire avec les composantes-clé de disponibilité, d'accès, de stabilité au niveau de la zone et des ménages. Les différents outils sont en principe complémentaires. La seule grande contrainte a été la lourdeur des procédures administratives au niveau de l'unité F5 et le retard des décaissements. En la matière, ECHO a montré dans d'autres pays des procédures plus flexibles, toutefois son intervention ne couvre pas les domaines allant de la réhabilitation jusqu'au développement.

En ce sens, le Règlement révèle déjà une plus-value en termes de réaction plus rapide et plus flexible. La Délégation joue un rôle effectif dans ce processus en raison des contacts au niveau de toutes les institutions (Gouvernements, organisations multinationales, autres bailleurs de fonds et ONGs) et pourra en même temps assurer la coordination entre les instruments et outils.

4. EVALUATION GENERALE

Pertinence

Le Burkina Faso n'est pas un pays structurellement déficitaire sur le plan céréalier. Le pays a connu des années de crises mais aussi des années excédentaires. La problématique est surtout de nature politique : trouver une réponse adéquate aux excédents de la production céréalière et aux problèmes des zones structurellement déficitaires. Le financement des différents instruments de la CE et de la ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire (B7-201) en particulier, a permis d'identifier correctement les problèmes et les nécessités et de contribuer à l'élaboration d'une solution au niveau national mais aussi régional ou provincial. L'identification des problèmes et des nécessités a aussi eu un caractère pro-actif.

Cependant, il est à noter que toutes les activités ne sont pas liées aux besoins et aux priorités locaux. On a déjà mentionné plus haut que l'approche ménages n'a pas été complètement prise en compte, alors que la politique de la CE indique cela très clairement : « les familles les plus pauvres ou vulnérables ». A l'instigation des ATs, au niveau du CNSA, cette approche est en développement et sera probablement incorporée dans les différentes stratégies de base comme le DSCPI (CSP), le DCSLP (CSPRP) et le rapport Annuel Conjoint. Cela signifie que la Délégation fait bien son travail mais que les initiatives devraient venir surtout des structures gouvernementales. La Délégation pourrait aussi stimuler la création d'un « think tank » au niveau de la société civile par le biais de certaines ONGs spécialisées.

Efficience

Les ressources disponibles sont en général les financements, la main d'œuvre, la qualité de l'appui technique, la capacité des cadres et des responsables locaux à organiser l'exécution des travaux etc. Il a été constaté qu', à tous les niveaux, il y avait des contraintes, comme les retards de décaissements de la part de la CE, le manque de cadres techniques compétents (par exemple, pour mesurer l'impact des actions sur la situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle etc.). En général, l'efficience des travaux techniques comme les barrages, diguettes, systèmes d'irrigation a été suffisamment bonne. Toutefois, pour avoir une idée comment mesurer l'impact de l'efficience sur les résultats définitifs, un tel système n'a pas été développé en détails. Cela doit faire partie d'un système de suivi adapté aux objectifs de la Régulation en général et des objectifs des programmes ou projets en particulier.

Efficacité

Afin de mesurer le degré de réalisation des objectifs, il faut que le programme analyse, au début du programme ou du projet, dans une étude de base, la situation « zéro » à travers des indicateurs-clé. Au Burkina Faso, des études faites par les départements statistiques des Ministères de l'Agriculture, de la Santé fournissent assez de données statistiques qui servent d'indicateurs pour l'état de la sécurité alimentaire. Cependant, ces données ne sont pas utilisables pour évaluer l'efficacité d'un programme ou d'un projet spécifique financé par la ligne budgétaire B7-201. Pour réaliser cette évaluation, il faut définir quelques indicateurs d'impact dérivés des objectifs généraux et spécifiques à partir du démarrage du programme ou projet. Le développement de ces indicateurs donne une

réponse à l'efficacité des activités. Il faut reconnaître que cela n'a pas été fait systématiquement. Bien que les interviews avec les bénéficiaires aient en général montré la satisfaction de la population en matière de réalisations, on a vu, en même temps, des enfants sous-alimentés à côté des parcelles où des femmes et des hommes font de la culture maraîchère irriguée avec l'eau d'un barrage. Une grande contrainte a été constatée à chaque niveau d'exécution; Les grands retards de décaissements de la part de Bruxelles ont de fait, certainement, entraîné une influence négative sur l'efficacité.

Impact

Afin de mesurer l'impact d'un programme ou d'un projet, il faut bien connaître sa situation initiale. L'absence de bons indicateurs d'impact au niveau des ménages, mais aussi de la situation géographique locale?, a conduit à ce que l'impact réalisé n'a pas pu être mesuré mais seulement apprécié. La plupart des programmes et projets ont pu présenter des données en forme de résultats (outputs): hectares cultivés, rendements, surplus de céréales etc., mais cela ne se traduit pas en termes de qualité de vie. Autrement dit, le suivi d'impact pourrait être amélioré.

Pérennité - durabilité

Les programmes que la CE finance pour l'Etat, comme les contributions à la CNSA, à la SONAGESS, au SIM, aux ATs etc. sont pérennes, à condition que les connaissances et les expériences accumulées par les cadres et les institutions Burkinabé soient effectivement appliquées. Il existe déjà une longue expérience en la matière au Burkina Faso. Le cas de la Direction Générale des Prévisions et des Statistiques Agricoles, Service de Préventions et de l'Alerte Précoce, qui ont pu profiter d'un financement après l'élaboration d'un programme, conjointement avec les experts de la Délégation, est un exemple révélateur : le financement n'a pas été demandé auprès de la Délégation malgré sa disponibilité.

La pérennité sera surtout garantie si les structures étatiques montrent une créativité, une pro-activité et une capacité analytique afin de s'adapter à toutes les situations nouvelles. Cela aussi est un processus de délégation de responsabilités de la part du Ministère. C'est un processus lent au niveau des structures étatiques qui sont souvent assez hiérarchiques. La structure du programme ONG de la part de la ligne budgétaire B7-210 ne peut pas garantir la pérennité. Le système d'appels d'offres (call for proposals) est limité en volume de financement et les ONGs risquent de recevoir une seule fois le financement. Le financement et l'assistance technique de la part des experts peuvent augmenter la pérennité, à condition que certaines ONGs aient la chance de profiter plusieurs années d'un financement.

Cohérence interne versus externe

Il n'existe pas de problème de cohérence, ni au niveau des instruments de la CE, ni au niveau des partenaires et cela est dû au fait que le concept « sécurité alimentaire » a été défini de manière assez vaste en termes d'activités. Bien que les objectifs soient assez clairs en termes de résultats à atteindre - disponibilité et accessibilité améliorées, situation socio-économique et nutritionnelle améliorée pour les familles les plus vulnérables etc. - l'interprétation n'est cependant pas toujours en cohérence avec les objectifs de la Régulation. Les partenaires peuvent présenter des programmes avec des objectifs assez

larges parce que le concept « sécurité alimentaire » est interprété de manière assez large. Une bonne analyse des objectifs du Règlement devrait résulter en un concept cohérent et adapté à la réalité du pays. C'est le défi pour le programme au Burkina Faso.

5. PRINCIPALES CONCLUSIONS

Les conclusions sont basées sur les données obtenues durant la mission au Burkina Faso et ont été formulées selon les objectifs principaux de l'évaluation tels que formulés dans les Termes de Références et les douze Questions Evaluatives.

L'analyse des quatre groupes de Questions Evaluatives donne les conclusions suivantes :

1. Les objectifs et les instruments du Règlement 1292/96.

Il faut reconnaître que le Règlement a des objectifs vastes, mais en même temps très cohérents, pour couvrir tout le concept de la sécurité alimentaire à tous les niveaux et tous les aspects. Il couvre aussi, d'une part l'approche ménages, famille, nutrition, qualité alimentaire, eau potable, rôle socio-économique des femmes et hommes au niveau du ménage etc., et d'autre part la production alimentaire, le marketing, le transport, les crédits etc..

L'autre valeur est le fait que, le Règlement, dispose de différents instruments pour garantir une mise en valeur optimale en accord avec ses objectifs.

Un tel instrument, s'il est bien appliqué, pourrait être efficace dans la lutte contre la pauvreté et doit être considéré comme unique.

2. La cohérence entre les objectifs du Règlement et le programme de sécurité alimentaire B7-201 au Burkina Faso.

Les objectifs du Règlement qui ont été fortement développés dans les stratégies et programmes :

- La sécurité alimentaire a été utilisée comme approche dans la lutte contre la pauvreté à tous les niveaux (régional, national, provincial et familial);
- La disponibilité et l'accessibilité alimentaire ont été promues au niveau de la population ;
- La dépendance à l'aide alimentaire a été réduite;
- L'indépendance en matière de nourriture a été encouragée, soit par l'augmentation de la production alimentaire soit par le renforcement du pouvoir d'achat ;
- Une attention a été portée aux initiatives en ce qui concerne la lutte contre la pauvreté visant à l'amélioration des conditions de vie comme un des objectifs ;
- Le LRRD a été pris en considération comme une question d'approche.

Les objectifs du Règlement qui ont été faiblement ou non développés dans les stratégies et programmes :

- La bonne nutrition et l'aide à un régime alimentaire n'ont pas été promues systématiquement;
- La question de l'eau potable n'a pas été prise en considération;
- Le développement d'un système de développement socio-économique a été pris en considération, mais sans accorder une attention spéciale aux rôles spécifiques que les hommes et les femmes jouent dans l'économie du ménage.

La **conclusion** est que tous les objectifs du Règlement n'ont pas été réalisés, malgré l'existence d'une nécessité en la matière.

3. Cohérence entre le programme d'Aide et de Sécurité Alimentaire (B7-201) et la situation générale en matière de sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso.

La situation de la sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso est caractérisée par une situation assez stable au niveau national. Depuis deux ans, le pays connaît un surplus en céréales et une grande partie du pays est considérée comme « sans problèmes ». C'est le Nord-Est du pays, la zone semi-aride ou la zone pastorale, qui se trouve, pour une partie de la population, toujours dans une situation d'insécurité alimentaire, avec des concentrations au Nord-Est du pays. Les taux de malnutrition sont, dans certaines zones du pays, assez élevés et pas acceptables, surtout au Nord-Est.

Le programme de Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 est cohérent avec les mesures à prendre pour améliorer la sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso. Le renforcement des structures étatiques, les systèmes d'information, la réserve nationale de sécurité, les programmes sur le terrain etc. sont des mesures qui amélioreront la sécurité alimentaire en général. Cependant, une attention spéciale est nécessaire pour une approche « ménage » plus intensive d'une part, et pour améliorer un des phénomènes mentionnés dans les objectifs du Règlement d'autre part : la nutrition et un régime alimentaire équilibré.

4. Cohérence entre le programme d'Aide et de Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 et la politique du Gouvernement en matière de Sécurité Alimentaire.

La politique et les stratégies développées par le Gouvernement sont claires et assez adaptées à la réalité et aux problèmes en matière de sécurité alimentaire du pays. Cependant, au niveau des structures étatiques, le manque d'une approche « ménage » a été mentionnée notamment par le Ministère de la Santé.

Il existe une grande cohérence entre le programme de sécurité alimentaire B7-201 de la Commission Européenne et la politique du Gouvernement en matière de Sécurité Alimentaire.

5. Evaluation générale du programme d'Aide et de Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 au Burkina Faso et le rôle de la Délégation.

Il a été constaté au point 1 que le programme de Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 est en cohérence avec la plupart des objectifs du Règlement. Cependant, un certain nombre d'objectifs ne sont pas appliqués. Pour cette raison, le programme est orienté surtout vers les problèmes de production, diversification, stock de sécurité, système d'alerte précoce, stratégies nationales etc. Les objectifs focalisés sur la situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle des familles et leur situation socio-économique ne sont pas suffisamment prises en considération. C'est un souci manifesté également par le Ministère de la Santé.

Le rôle de la Délégation est très important; il en résulte des contacts intensifs avec les structures étatiques, les Ministères, les autres bailleurs de fonds et la société civile etc. Selon d'autres partenaires, la Délégation joue un rôle important au niveau des structures étatiques et des bailleurs de fonds en matière de concertation et de développement de nouvelles approches de la sécurité alimentaire.

Cependant, la présence de deux (2) personnes intra-muros n'est pas suffisante pour la gestion d'un programme aussi important. Les aspects de suivi sont, pour cette raison, négligés. Certes, le suivi est une tâche difficile mais il reste une activité, à développer.

6. Comparaison entre la ligne budgétaire de sécurité alimentaire B7-201 et d'autres lignes budgétaires.

La ligne budgétaire de sécurité alimentaire ainsi que les autres financements en matière de développement rural, agriculture et sécurité alimentaire sont gérées au niveau de la Délégation par l'Unité Développement Rural. Bien que le financement FED ait d'autres conditions d'exécution (UE et Pays), la ligne budgétaire de sécurité alimentaire opère sous la responsabilité de l'Unité F5 d'AIDCO à Bruxelles avec une représentation de seulement deux personnes au niveau de la Délégation. Cependant, pour la ligne budgétaire de sécurité alimentaire, les décisions sont prises à Bruxelles et pas au niveau de la Délégation. Toutefois, il y a plus de flexibilité au niveau de la Délégation en matière de contacts direct avec les partenaires ainsi que la possibilité de faire des visites de terrain (contrairement à la ligne budgétaire Cofinancement ONG ou B7-6000). Les procédures ne sont pas très différentes selon les instruments. Le suivi administratif au niveau de la Délégation coûte beaucoup de temps, entre autres, pour obtenir une transparence financière ; Ceci fait perdre la visibilité au niveau des partenaires et des représentations des états membres, surtout la possibilité de faire un suivi efficace sur le terrain.

La déconcentration est nécessaire du point de vue « pertinence, efficience, efficacité, impact et cohérence ». Toutefois, si elle augmente fortement la lourdeur des tâches administratives, il est à craindre que le véritable objectif de la déconcentration ne soit pas atteint, et ce malgré le fait que le pouvoir de décision soit déconcentré.

7. Points forts de la ligne budgétaire B7-210 au Burkina Faso, entre autres, en comparaison avec d'autres lignes budgétaires de la Commission :

- La ligne budgétaire B7-210 a développé une stratégie et une politique assez vaste au Burkina Faso aussi bien en matière de l'Aide Directe qu'Indirecte (voir SVP 1.1. et 3. Profil du Pays).
- Elle a permis d'établir des contacts intensifs et constructifs avec les partenaires.
- Elle est devenue un instrument « leader et pro-crétif » au niveau des institutions d'état et d'autres bailleurs de fonds.
- Du fait d'une présence assez forte au niveau de la Délégation, l'équipe a pu rapidement obtenir des renseignements sur la situation réelle de la sécurité alimentaire au niveau du pays et des stratégies et des idées au niveau d'autres bailleurs de fonds.

8. Points faibles de la ligne budgétaire B7-210 au Burkina Faso, entre autres, en comparaison avec d'autres lignes budgétaires de la Commission :

- Déconcentrées ou non, les tâches administratives sont très intenses pour obtenir une transparence optimale; mais cette contrainte évite un suivi intensif

nécessaire pour l'atteinte de l'impact optimal au niveau des différents programmes et financements.

- Le système de suivi pourrait être plus intensifié avec une attention spéciale à porter à la vérification des objectifs du Règlement et aux indicateurs d'impact.
- L'insuffisance du système de suivi est aussi valable pour les programmes ONG de la ligne budgétaire de sécurité alimentaire. La déconcentration impliquerait un suivi plus intensif et plus systématique.

9. La pérennité - durabilité des effets et impacts

- **Au niveau de la population-cible :** La durabilité des effets et des impacts au niveau de l'aide directe est un souci à long terme. En outre, le suivi est surtout fait par l'ensemble des bailleurs de fonds. Il n'existe pas de méthodologie au niveau des bailleurs de fonds montrant la durabilité des effets et des impacts. Cette méthodologie n'a pas été développée pour le programme ONG de la ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire. Pour cette raison, il n'est pas encore possible de savoir si les effets et les impacts sont durables.
- **Au niveau institutionnel et politique:** Grâce à une stratégie commune des bailleurs de fonds en matière de renforcement des stratégies et politiques, il est en général reconnu que la prise de conscience du Gouvernement en matière de sécurité alimentaire augmente. Cependant, le Gouvernement est fortement dépendant des bailleurs de fonds quant aux finances et nouvelles stratégies.
- **Au niveau de l'écart entre l'urgence d'une part et la réhabilitation et le développement d'autre part (LRRD):**
Le Burkina Faso a pu développer une politique et une stratégie fortes en matière de réponses aux crises alimentaires. Le développement actuel est surtout concentré au niveau des stratégies nécessaires pour la réhabilitation et le développement.

6. PRINCIPALES RECOMMANDATIONS :

1. En ce qui concerne les objectifs et les instruments du Règlement 1292/96.

Les objectifs et les instruments du Règlement 1292/96 sont d'une très bonne qualité pour la mise en œuvre du concept de sécurité alimentaire. La continuation du Règlement est fortement recommandée en raison de la plus-value conceptuelle et institutionnelle et de la synergie entre les différents éléments qui représente plus que l'addition de agriculture + développement rural + nutrition..

2. En ce qui concerne la cohérence entre les objectifs du Règlement et le programme sécurité alimentaire B7-201 au Burkina Faso.

Afin d'améliorer la cohérence entre les objectifs du Règlement et le programme B7-201 actuellement en cours, il faut continuer la prise en considération d'une meilleure intégration des objectifs qui sont faiblement représentés dans les programmes. La suggestion des AT extra-muros du renforcement de ces objectifs est pertinente. Cela signifie que les objectifs doivent prendre en compte les ménages, la nutrition, les facteurs socio-économique du rôle des femmes et hommes au niveau du ménage etc.. Ainsi, l'identité réelle du concept de « sécurité alimentaire » sera renforcée. Ceci est le cas pour les canaux des financements directs mais aussi pour les canaux des financements indirects.

3. En ce qui concerne la cohérence entre le programme Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire (B7-201) et la situation générale en matière de sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso.

Le programme actuel touche surtout l'agriculture, le développement rural, le stockage pour l'urgence et le renforcement de l'élaboration des politiques et stratégies nationales. Il faut que dans tous les programmes les objectifs du Règlement 1292/96 faiblement ou non appliqués soient mieux pris en considération afin d'éviter que ces programmes soient considérés comme des programmes agricoles ou de développement rural.

4. En ce qui concerne la cohérence entre le programme Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 et la politique du Gouvernement en matière de Sécurité Alimentaire.

Bien qu'il existe une grande cohérence entre les deux, il faut que la cohérence avec le Règlement 1292/96 soit améliorée par la comparaison des objectifs du Règlement d'une part, et la politique du Gouvernement et le programme Sécurité Alimentaire de la Commission Européenne d'autre part.

5. En ce qui concerne le jugement général du programme Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire B7-201 au Burkina Faso et le rôle de la Délégation.

- Mieux intégrer les objectifs du Règlement dans le programme actuel.
- Renforcer l'équipe au niveau de la Délégation afin d'améliorer le monitoring.
- Continuer les bons contacts avec les partenaires et le rôle leader en matière de stratégie « sécurité alimentaire ».
- Eviter que la lourdeur administrative causée par la déconcentration puisse avoir un impact négatif sur les activités conceptuels et opérationnelles comme cela a été formulé ci-dessus.

6. En ce qui concerne la comparaison entre la ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire B7-201 en comparaison avec d'autres lignes budgétaires.

Le Règlement a montré des avantages sur le plan conceptuel à travers ses objectifs (vastes et cohérents) et instruments (flexibilité) que les autres lignes n'ont pas ou moins (moins de complémentarité conceptuelle et instrumentale).

Il est fortement recommandé d'être conscient de la plus-value de cette ligne en comparaison avec les autres.

7. En ce qui concerne les points forts de la ligne budgétaire B7-210 au Burkina Faso, entre autre en comparaison avec d'autres lignes budgétaires de la Commission.

Maintenir, systématiser et renforcer les quatre acquis mentionnés au point 7 des conclusions.

8. En ce qui concerne les points faibles de la ligne budgétaire B7-210 au Burkina Faso, entre autre en comparaison avec d'autres lignes budgétaires de la Commission.

- Diminuer la lourdeur des tâches administratives des experts et conseillers en faveur d'un suivi et monitoring plus intensif afin d'éviter que la déconcentration provoque un affaiblissement du suivi et monitoring.
- Le système de monitoring doit être amélioré, renforcé et systématisé tant pour le canal direct qu'indirect.
- Il faut que les faiblesses soient aussi traduites au niveau des indicateurs qui mesurent actuellement surtout l'impact en termes de « outputs » mais pas l'impact en termes « qualité de vie au niveau des ménages ». Les indicateurs à utiliser devront être surtout en ligne avec les objectifs du Règlement. La ligne budgétaire « sécurité alimentaire » est finalement un instrument utilisé pour combattre la pauvreté et cela se mesure au niveau des ménages.
- Le canal aide indirect (ONG), en particulier, doit renforcer l'application du PCM, entre autre par l'introduction des évaluations indépendantes et externes, mais aussi par l'introduction d'un système de monitoring qui mesure l'impact au niveau des ménages.

9. En ce qui concerne la pérennité des effets et impacts.

En ce qui concerne la pérennité des effets et impacts au niveau de la population cible et au niveau institutionnel et politique, il faut que la Délégation développe avec les partenaires des instruments et méthodologies qui mesurent d'une manière adéquate ces effets et impacts. Sur la question de la pérennité, il faut que la population cible participe mieux à ce processus. En ce qui concerne le Gouvernement, il faut que les bailleurs de fonds et le Gouvernement mettent mieux l'accent sur cette question importante, entre autre à travers le développement d'un système de monitoring commun et adapté à la question. Ceci est un grand défi du fait de sa complexité méthodologique. Ceci ne pourra être réalisé qu'à condition d'un renforcement de l'équipe en matière du monitoring.

ANNEXES

ANNEXE 1

Programme de mission au Burkina Faso

Experts : **M Aart van der Heide**
 M Salia Sanon
 MmeCornelia Schmitz

Jeudi 22 janvier 2004

Matin	Réunion à la Délégation de la CE au Burkina Faso
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mme Sari Suomalainen – Chef de la Délégation • M Stéphane Devaux – Expert Régional Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire (Délégation) • M Dekens – Chef Développement Rural (Délégation) • Mme Désirée M.S. Nana – Assistante de Programme Sécurité Alimentaire (Délégation)
Matin	Réunion au bâtiment de SONAGESS
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Pierre-François Pret – Assistant Technique du Programme d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire du Burkina Faso (Délégation) • M Alain Houyoux – Assistant Technique (Expert Systèmes d'Informations) • M Stéphane Devaux – Expert Régional Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire (Délégation) • Mme Anne Etienne- Assistante au programme d'Appui à la SA
Après-midi	Réunion d'équipe des évaluateurs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussion générale concernant le déroulement de la mission • Planification de la mission • Organisation des réunions/interviews

Vendredi 23 janvier 2004

Matin	Réunion au Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Mahama Zoungrana – Directeur Général des Prévisions et des statistiques Agricoles
Matin	Réunion à l'Ambassade de France au Burkina Faso
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Philippe Ospital – Conseiller adjoint de Coopération et d'Action culturelle
Après-midi	Réunion au Comité Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M André Anatole Yameogo – Secrétaire Exécutif du Comité Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire

Lundi 26 janvier 2004	
Matin	Réunion à la Délégation de la CE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Marco Bello – Coordinateur national de CISV
Matin	Réunion au PAM (Programme Alimentaire Mondial / World Food Programm of the United Nations) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Gabriel K. Ayih – Représentant
Matin	Réunion avec la DG SONAGESS (Société Nationale de Gestion du Stock de Sécurité Alimentaire) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mme Pascaline Tamini – Directrice Générale
Midi	Réunion aux CRS (Catholic Relief Services) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mme Dorothy Madison-Seck – Représentante du CRS • M Moussa Dominique Bangre – Coordonnateur des Services de la Programmation • M. Kaboré Amidou – Assistant Technique
M Aart van der Heide M Salia Sanon	
Après-midi	Réunion à la Ambassade des Pays-Bas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Hubert G.M. Hendrix – Premier Conseiller • M Mamadou Sanfo – Conseiller Adjoint Développement Rural
Après-midi	Réunion à Oxfam UK <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Daniel Blais – Représentant pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest • M Dominique Bassole – Chargé de projets
Après-midi	Réunion au Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Ibrahima Kaboré – Secrétaire Général

M Pierre-François Pret
Mme Cornelia Schmitz

Après-midi Soir	Voyage à Djibo pour le suivi du programme SACECA – Soum (Service d’Appui aux Caisses d’Epargne et de Crédit Autogéré de la Région Soum) Première réunion au niveau de SACECA
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- **M Adamou Tamboura** – Président du SACECA-Soum
- **M Moussa Oubri** – Contrôleur / Formateur

Mardi 27 janvier 2004

M Aart van der Heide

M Salia Sanon

Matin	Visite de terrain programme CISV à Yako et entretien avec l’équipe
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M. Mauro Ambrosini - Chef du projet • M Ousmane Ouedrago • M Lassine Ramde
	Visite au groupement de NAAM et visite aux différentes réalisations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Réunion avec le bureau du NAAM • Visite au programme maraîchage, fosse fumière, barrages etc.
Après-midi	Visite au programme GVC à Ouahigouya
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Claudio Gentile - Représentant GVC au Burkina Faso

M Pierre-François Pret

Mme Cornelia Schmitz

Matin	Visite à Digel
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Moussa Oubri – Contrôleur / Formateur • M Kirakoya Boureima – Président d’Association
Matin	Visite à Ouré – Ouverture d’une nouvelle caisse
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Moussa Oubri – Contrôleur / Formateur • M Kirakoya Boureima – Président d’Association • Mme Sana Salamata – Animatrice
Après midi	Visite à Sikiré
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Moussa Oubri – Contrôleur / Formateur
Après midi	Visite à Boukouma
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Moussa Oubri – Contrôleur / Formateur

Mercredi 28 janvier 2004**M Aart van der Heide****M Salia Sanon**

journée	LVIA entretien au bureau Ouagadougou
Mario Civettini - Coordinateur des projets au Burkina	

	LVIA visite de terrain (M. Civettini et M. Aart van der Heide)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Entretien avec le bureau de l'association ASKA • Visite de terrain et entretien avec les bénéficiaires 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Entretien avec M. Dekens, chef Développement Rural à la Délégation (Aart van der Heide). 	

M Pierre-François Pret**Mme Cornelia Schmitz**

Matin	Visite à Gasséliki – Ouverture d'une nouvelle caisse
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Moussa Oubri – Contrôleur / Formateur 	
Après-midi	Retour à Ouagadougou

Jeudi 29 janvier 2004**M Aart van der Heide****Mme Cornelia Schmitz**

Matin	Réunion à Pô, province de Nahouri
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Hodonou Albert – Chef Section Génie Rural de la CG/PAFR (Bobo Dialoasso) • M Tientore Paul – Directeur Régional de l'Agriculture, de l'Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques du Centre Sud • M Tapsoba Z. Désiré - Chef ZAT de Pô 	
Après-midi	Visite à 2 bas fonds réaménagés à Satina et à Boni (Province de Nahouri) et entretiens avec les bénéficiaires des villages.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Hodonou Albert – Chef Section Génie Rural de la CG/PAFR • M Tientore Paul – Directeur Régional de l'Agriculture, de l'Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques du Centre Sud • M Tapsoba Z. Désiré - Chef ZAT de Pô 	

Vendredi 30 janvier 2004

M Aart van der Heide
M Salia Sanon
MmeCornelia Schmitz

Matin	Réunion au Ministère de la Santé, Direction Nationale de la Nutrition
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Somda Jean Célestin – Directeur intérim et Nutritionniste
Matin	Réunion à la Direction Générale des Prévisions et des Statistiques Agricoles
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Zerbo Michel – Directeur des Préventions et de l'Alerte Précoce • M Savadogo Boukary – Service à la Direction des Préventions et de l'Alerte Précoce

Mardi 03 février 2004

Matin	Réunion d'équipe des évaluateurs
Après-midi	Réunion à la Délégation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Stéphane Devaux – Expert Régional Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire (Délégation) • Mme Désirée M.S. Nana – Assistante de Programme Sécurité Alimentaire (Délégation)

Mercredi 04 février 2004

Matin	Réunion à la Délégation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Thierry Bertouille – Conseiller Développement Rural (Délégation)
Après-midi	Réunion d'équipe des évaluateurs

Vendredi 06 février 2004

Matin	« Debriefing - Réunion » à la Délégation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mme Sari Suomalainen – Chef de la Délégation • M Stéphane Devaux – Expert Régional Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire (Délégation) • M Dekens – Chef Développement Rural (Délégation) • M Pierre-François Pret – Assistant Technique du Programme d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire du Burkina Faso (Délégation) • M Alain Houyoux – Assistant Technique (Expert Systèmes d'Informations) • Mme Anne Etienne – Assistante au programme d'Appui à la SA • Mme Désirée M.S. Nana – Assistante de Programme Sécurité Alimentaire (Délégation)

Matin	Réunion à l'organisation Afrique Verte
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Ki Philippe de Kassan – Coordinateur Afrique Verte
	M Aart van der Heide
Après-midi	Réunion au bâtiment de SONAGESS
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M Pierre-François Pret – Assistant Technique du Programme d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire du Burkina Faso (Délégation) • M Alain Houyoux – Assistant Technique (Expert Systèmes d'Informations) • Mme Anne Etienne- Assistante au programme d'Appui à la SA
Vendredi 06 février 2004	
Après-midi	Réunion au Comité Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M André Anatole Yameogo – Secrétaire Exécutif du Comité Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire • M Stéphane Devaux – Expert Régional Aide et Sécurité Alimentaire (Délégation)

Fin de la mission

Annexe 2 Liste de documents Burkina Faso Evaluation

1. Council Regulation 1292/96 of 12 June 1996 on Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security ;
2. Thematic Evaluation of Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security; Desk phase Final Report; January 2004, PARTICIP GmbH ;
3. Document de Stratégie de Coopération et Programme et Programme Indicatif ; Burkina Faso Communauté Européenne, période 2001 – 2007 ;
4. Document-cadre Stratégique de la Lutte contre la Pauvreté de Burkina Faso ;
5. Rapport Annuel Conjoint 2002 – Burkina Faso et Communauté Européenne ;
6. Rapport Annuel Conjoint 2003 – Burkina Faso et Communauté Européenne ;
7. Food Security Country Summery Tables for Burkina Faso, EC Food Security Unit F5, 2004 ;
8. Food Security call for proposals 2002 – list of proposals (europAid/114589/C/G/TPS) ;
9. Lettre officielle no. 20093/2001 du Commissaire de la C.E. au Ministre Délégué auprès du Premier Ministre chargé des Finances et du Budget ;
10. Protocole d'Accord relatif à la Mise en Oeuvre de l'Aide Financière dans le cadre du Programme d'Appui Communautaire à la Sécurité Alimentaire 2001;
11. Burkina Faso: chiffres-clé, BAID/OCDE 2003;
12. Institutional Analysis of the Nutrition System Burkina Faso; July 2003; World Bank ;
13. La Sécurité Alimentaire au Burkina Faso; document non publié; Délégation; prêt;
14. Résumé des Lignes Budgétaires de la Commission Européenne – Société Civile/ONG ;
15. Cadre Général de Coopération Etat-Partenaires en Matière de Sécurité Alimentaire; Etat de Burkina Faso ;
16. Country Technical Document for NGOs participating in the 2002 Call for Proposals for Burkina faso ;
17. Grille d'Evaluation for Call for Proposals of budget lines B7-201 ;
18. Grille d'Evaluation for Call for Proposals of budget lines B7-201 ;
19. EC – 2003 NGO Food Security Programme: Guidelines for grant applicants responding to the call for proposals for 2003 – budget line 210202 ;

20. Aliments produits, porte-monnaie rempli, enfants mal nourris? Impact des barrages aménagés sur la sécurité nutritionnelle des populations bénéficiaires: Août 1998; Burkina Faso, Ambassade Royale des Pays Bas;
21. Programme de Sécurité Alimentaire ONG 2000; deuxième rapport intermédiaire, période novembre 2002- octobre 2003; Centre Nord du pays; code GPR/AIDCO/2000/2015/33/0; LVIA ;
22. Projet de Sécurité Alimentaire Province du Yattenga ; projet GPR/AIDCO/2001/0188/18; situation générale des activités menées par le projet; Décembre 2003; GVC.

Annexe 3 : Burkina Faso - Projets financés par le FED (1997 à 2002)

From	Project number	Project title	Planned	Contracts	Paid	Sector
FED 07	7 ACP BK 61	PROGRAMME REGIONAL FORMATION INFORMATION ENVIRONNEMENT.	593470.1	593470.1	593470.1	PRIMARY EDUCATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 62	ETUDE DE FAISABILITE "LUTTE CONTRE LA DROGUE"	14110	14110	14110	NARCOTICS CONTROL
FED 07	7 ACP BK 63	A.T. PREP/SUIVI TABLE RONDE 1995 BAILLEURS FONDS PAST	40927.93	40927.93	40927.93	TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 64	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 1995-1996.	18300000	18300000	18300000	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 65	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 95-96 (+7BK64).	11597112.23	11597112.23	11597112.23	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 66	PROJET D'APPUI A LA REFORME DU SECTEUR PHARMACEUTIQUE.	114144.26	114144.26	114144.26	MEDICAL SERVICES
FED 07	7 ACP BK 67	ETUDE ORGANISAT.,TECH. ET FIN. DES STRUCTURES MIN TRAV PUBLIC	8736.79	8736.79	8736.79	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 68	APPUI AU PROGRAMME SECTORIEL PASEC	6380441.77	6380441.77	6380441.77	ROAD TRANSPORT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 69	APPUI AU PROGRAMME SECTORIEL PASEC	1664770.21	1664770.21	1664770.21	ROAD TRANSPORT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 70	ETUDE D'EVALUATION SUR LA SOCIETE AFRICAINE DU CINEMA	52466.14	52466.14	52466.14	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 72	ELABORATION D'UN INDICE DE LA PRODUCTION INDUSTRIELLE	27024.98	27024.98	27024.98	INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 73	A.T. CHARGE DU SUIVI SECTEUR EDUCATION DE BASE ET FORMATION.	122310.59	122310.59	122310.59	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 74	CARTOGRAPHIE GEOLOGIQUE.	12363793.64	12160307.56	10988665.67	GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES
FED 07	7 ACP BK 75	REHABILITATION DE LA MINE DE POURA.	8793880.12	8793880.12	8793880.12	MINERAL/MINING POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 76	ETUDE SUR LES ARRIERES INTERIEURS	57888.49	57888.49	57888.49	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 77	FINALISATION INSTRUCTION REQUETE SYSMIN(COMPL. CF 7 BK 51)	0	0	0	MINERAL/MINING POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 78	EVALUATION DE LA PREMIERE PHASE DU PASA	56822.61	56822.61	56822.61	AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 79	APPUI RENFORCEMENT INDEPENDENCE VACCINALE EN AFRIQUE SAHEL.	0	0	0	INFECTIOUS DISEASE CONTROL
FED 07	7 ACP BK 80	SUIVI DE LA MISE EN OEUVRE DES APPUI COM SECT SANTE	63855.81	63855.81	63855.81	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 81	ETUDE EN VUE DU DEVELOPPEMENT DU TOURISME AU BURKINA	0	0	0	TOURISM POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 100	APPUI PROGRAMME AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 96-97 (+7BK99).	1167855	1167855	1167855	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 101	AT MINISTERE ENSEIGNEMENT DE BASE ET ALPHABETISATION	344154.22	344154.22	344154.22	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 102	AUDIT PARTIEL DE GESTION & RES.HUMAINES DE LA SOFITEX	139388.86	139388.86	139388.86	AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 103	ANALYSE MECANISMES ENTREE PRODUCTEURS DS CAPITAL SOFITEX	59120	59120	59120	PRIVATISATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 104	AT MINISTERE ENSEIGNEMENT DE BASE & ALPHABETISATION (MEBA)	337451.3	337451.3	337451.3	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 105	EXPERTISE PREP. PROGR. SOUTIEN INITIATIVES CULTURELLES	44539.24	44539.24	44539.24	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 106	PLAN D'ACTION FINANCEMENT DU MONDE RURAL	55096.2	55096.2	55096.2	FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 107	PLAN D'ACTIONS STRUCTUR. ORGANIS. PROFESS. AGRICOLES (OPA)	59800	59800	59800	AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVES

FED 07	7 ACP BK 108	EXAMEN & APPREC. DOCUMENTAT. & ETUDES PROJET APPROVISION.EAU	103814.92	103814.92	103814.92	WATER AND SANITATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 109	SEMINAIRES FORMATION PROCEDURES FED	63993.54	63993.54	63993.54	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
FED 07	7 ACP BK 110	APPUI ASSOCIATION "TRADITION & MODERNITE"	45840.56	45840.56	45840.56	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 111	AT APPUI MISE EN OEUVRE COOPERATION DECENTRALISEE 8EME FED	226778.29	226778.29	226778.29	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
FED 07	7 ACP BK 112	AMELIORATION FORMATION PROFESSIONNELLE DANS LES ENEP	37914.37	37914.37	37914.37	SECONDARY EDUCATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 113	APPUI A L'ALPHABETISATION ET A LA FORMATION PROFESSIONNELLE	42498.57	42498.57	42498.57	NON-FORMAL EDUCATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 82	SEMINAIRE DE FORMATION SUR LES PROCEDURES FINANCIERES DU FED	45178.83	45178.83	45178.83	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 83	SITARAIL-LOAN A (BEI:71014)	5775326.68	5775326.68	5775326.68	INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 84	SITARAIL-LOAN B (BEI:)	1133786.85	1133786.85	1133786.85	INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 85	EXPERTISE "ETAT DES LIEUX SUR LA DECENTRALISATION AU BK"	26438.49	26438.49	26438.49	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 86	ETUDE DE FAISABILITE DE LA ROUTE NIORDA-MANGA	55491.13	55491.13	55491.13	ROAD TRANSPORT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 87	CONSTRUCTION PAVILLON EXPORT. & CREATIVITE DU SIAO	150469.67	150469.67	150469.67	COTTAGE INDUSTRIES AND HANDICRAFT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 88	ETUDE POUR PROMOTION DE LA GOMME ARABIQUE (PASA)	41141.34	41141.34	41141.34	INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 89	REVERSEMENT EXCEDENT PPRIEMIER PROTOCOLE FINANCIER LOME IV	261077	261077	261077	BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SUPPORT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 90	ECHO/BK-/ART254/96/0100 - PROGRAMME MEDICAL DE LUTTE CONTRE	275865.64	275865.64	275865.64	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF
FED 07	7 ACP BK 91	SOFITEX (71053)	6000000	6000000	6000000	TEXTILES, LEATHER AND SUBSTITUTES
FED 07	7 ACP BK 92	ETUDE SUR LA RIZICULTURE	136878.97	136878.97	136878.97	FOOD CROP PRODUCTION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 93	REVUE DES DEPENSES PUBLIQUES DU SECTEUR AGRICOLE - PASA II	58151.31	58151.31	58151.31	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
FED 07	7 ACP BK 94	CAMPAGNE DE COMMUNICATION SUR LA DECENTRALISATION	176079.32	176079.32	176079.32	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY
FED 07	7 ACP BK 95	ETUDES TRAVAUX ROUTIERS DANS LE CADRE DU PASECT	2539208.9	2539208.9	2539208.9	ROAD TRANSPORT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 96	TRANSFERT 1995 (PEAUX BRUTES)	0	0	0	BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SUPPORT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 97	A.T. AU MINISTERE DE LA SANTE	314210.59	314210.59	314210.59	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 98	APPUI 3EME RECENSEMENT GENERAL POPULATION	831317.16	831317.16	831317.16	RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITES STATISTIQUES
FED 07	7 ACP BK 99	APPUI PROGRAMME AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 96-97 (+7BK100).	5232145	5232145	5232145	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 114	EXPERTISE IDENTIFICATION APPUI PROCESSUS ELECTORAL	44392.91	44392.91	44392.91	ELECTIONS
FED 07	7 ACP BK 115	ETUDE AMELIORATION CONDITIONS DE VIE DES MAITRES	32962.9	32962.9	32962.9	PRIMARY EDUCATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 116	ET. APPUI ORGANISAT. MISE EN PLACE STRUCTURES DECONCENTREES MIN. ENSEIGNEMENT DE BASE	53826.66	53826.66	53826.66	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 117	APPUI A LA REALISATION DU FILM "L'EPOPEE DES MOSSE"	50000	50000	50000	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 118	FINALISATION PROGRAMME ACTIONS SECTEUR AGRICOLE -LOME IV BIS	60000	60000	60000	AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 119	ETUDE ACTUALISATION PROJET MUSEE DE OUAGADOUGOU	99528.22	99528.22	99528.22	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 120	APPUI A L'ASSOCIATION DES MAIRES DU BURKINA FASO	90710.19	90710.19	90710.19	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 121	APPUI FORUM NATIONAL SUR POLITIQUE CULTURELLE	27049.07	27049.07	27049.07	CULTURE AND RECREATION

FED 07	7 ACP BK 122	APPUI A LA FORMATION DE RESPONSABLES CULTURELS	59184.71	59184.71	59184.71	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 123	REOUVERTURE PROJET 5 BK 41	29462.94	29462.94	29462.94	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
FED 07	7 ACP BK 124	APPUI A L'ORGANISATION DES ETATS GENERAUX DU CINEMA	22013.03	22013.03	22013.03	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 125	ETUDE FAISABILITE PROJET SANTE 8 FED	182988.06	182988.06	182988.06	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 126	ETUDE FAISABILITE CREATION CENTRE PROMOTION ARTS PLASTIQUES	28768.61	28768.61	28768.61	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 127	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 1997/1998	5475629.86	5475629.86	5475629.86	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 128	APPUI PROGRAMME AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 1997/1998	5000000	5000000	5000000	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 129	MISE EN OEUVRE 8 FED DANS DOMAINE DÉVELOPPEMENT RURAL	9762	9762	9762	AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 130	AMENAGEMENT FORET CLASSEE VILLE DE OUAGADOUGOU	495000	495000	495000	FORESTRY DEVELOPMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 131	APPUI A LA REALISATION DU FILM "MOI BOUKARI KOUTOU" (1ERE TRANCHE)	0	0	0	EDUCATION FACILITIES AND TRAINING
FED 07	7 ACP BK 132	CENTRE ETUDES EUROPEENNES & INTEGRATION UNIV. OUAGADOUGOU	104179.88	104179.88	104179.88	HIGHER EDUCATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 133	SEMINAIRE FORMATION PROCEDURES FINANCIERES FED	55248.03	55248.03	55248.03	EDUCATION FACILITIES AND TRAINING
FED 07	7 ACP BK 134	APPUI ORGANISATION 4ME EDITION SYMPOSIUM DE SCULPTURE LAONGO	78716.52	78716.52	78716.52	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 135	APPUI TROUPE ROYAL DE LUXE POUR SPECTACLE RETOUR D'AFRIQUE	22226.82	22226.82	22226.82	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 136	MISE EN OEUVRE PASA II	80181.62	80181.62	80181.62	RURAL DEVELOPMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 137	FILSAH SA (71119)	1000000	1000000	1000000	INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 138	MISSION D'APPUI AU MINISTERE DE LA COMMUNICATION & CULTURE	7636.05	7636.05	7636.05	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 139	APPUI CREATION THEATRALE "NOCES"	19970.82	19970.82	19970.82	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 140	ETUDE SUR LE SYSTEME JUDICIAIRE	33562	33562	33562	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 141	MISSION SUIVI REVISION LISTES ELECTORALES	56549.18	56549.18	56549.18	ELECTIONS
FED 07	7 ACP BK 142	MISSION SUIVI REVISION LISTES ELECTORALES	24527.58	24527.58	24527.58	ELECTIONS
FED 07	7 ACP BK 143	CONSERVATION ET UTILISATION RATIONNELLE DES AIRES PROTEGEES	3000000	2001876.8	896409.24	SITE PRESERVATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 144	APPUI INSTITUTIONNEL-RENFORCEMENT SYSTEME JUDICIAIRE	75126.49	75126.49	75126.49	PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 145	APPUI A L'ADMINISTRATION JUDICIAIRE	1350000	1259147.09	1224854.69	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 146	Echo/bfa/254/1999/01000-assistance humanitaire d'urgence aux POPULATIONS BURKINABE EXPULSIES DE CÔTE D'IVOIRE.	200000	200000	100000	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF
FED 07	7 ACP BK 147	APPUI A LA PRODUCTION FILM " GOREL OU LE MIL PROMIS"	45778.72	45778.72	45778.72	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 148	APPUI PRODUCTION FILM "SIRABA"	100000	100000	100000	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 149	PRODUCTION DE FILM "BOUKARY KOUTOU	500000	500000	500000	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 07	7 ACP BK 150	APPUI INSTITUTIONNEL AU SERVICE DE GESTION DES PROGRAMMES DE COOPERATION AVEC L'UE	1400000	860000	123492	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
FED 07	7 ACP BK 151	APPUI AU DEVELOPPEMENT DU SECTEUR PRIVE : PROGRAMME DE RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITES DES ENTREPRISES	6000000	790800	115952.82	BUSINESS SERVICES
FED 07	7 ACP BK 152	ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE LA DIRECTION DE L' HYDRAULIQUE	300000	300000	0	WATER RESOURCES POLICY/ADMIN. MGMT

FED 07	7 ACP BK 153	AUGMENTATION DE PLAFOND PROJET 8 ACP BK 4 APPUI AU PASECT - REHABILITATION ET ENTRETIEN DE 4 ROUTES	5000000	5000000	4495675.87	ROAD TRANSPORT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 154	ETUDES ENTRETIEN PERIODIQUE DE 3 ROUTES BITUMEEES	1370000	1178000	189554.2	ROAD TRANSPORT
FED 07	7 ACP BK 155	FESPACO 2003 18EME EDITION FESTIVAL PANAFRICAIN DU CINEMA	325000	324924.43	324923.52	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 08	8 ACP BK 1	STABEX 1995 PEAUX BRUTES.	658848	658848	658848	BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SUPPORT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 2	STABEX 1996. HARICOTS	100787	100787	100787	BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SUPPORT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 3	APPUI PROGRAMME AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 1997/1998	13350000	13350000	13350000	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 10	ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE.AUPRES DU MINISTERE DE LA SANTE	378414.11	378414.11	378414.11	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 11	CONTRAT CADRE SERVICES AT AJUSTEMET STRUCTUREL AU BURKINA FA SO	750000	529257.27	529257.27	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 4	APPUI PROG.PASEC-T & ENTRET.PERIODIQ.AXES ROUTIERS(2E PHASE)	44000000	43948507.63	42925391.66	ROAD TRANSPORT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 5	APPUI COMPLEMENTAIRE PROGRAMME AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 98/98.	4600000	4600000	4600000	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 6	APPUI COMPLEMENTAIRE PROGRAMME AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 97/98	3000000	3000000	3000000	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 7	ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE AU MINISTERE DE L'EBA	279569.49	279569.49	253027.87	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 8	APPUI A LA DECENTRALISATION	310000	245000	205681.22	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
FED 08	8 ACP BK 9	A.T. AUPRES DU MINISTERE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE BASE ET DE L'ALPHABETISATION (MEBA)	308334.22	308334.22	308334.22	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 12	SOUTIEN AUX INITIATIVES CULTURELLES DECENTRALISEES (PSIC)	1800000	1706361.45	1641075.67	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 08	8 ACP BK 13	PROGRAMME APPUI SECTEUR EDUCATION DE BASE	10000000	9858824.04	8483253.39	PRIMARY EDUCATION
FED 08	8 ACP BK 14	PLAN ACTIONS ORGANISATION SECTEUR AGRICOLE (PAOSA)	24200000	19095755.55	9361928.52	AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 15	ELABORATION & MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA POLITIQUE CULTURELLE B.F.	0	0	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
FED 08	8 ACP BK 16	ETUDE DE FAISABILITÉ D'UN PROGRAMME DE COOPÉRATION DÉCENTRALISÉE	0	0	0	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY
FED 08	8 ACP BK 17	APPUI AU PROGRAMME SECTORIEL PASEC-T	41000000	40677104.75	29057108.07	ROAD TRANSPORT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 18	APPUI A L'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 99/00	39200000	36904205.18	36760645.69	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 19	APPUI A L'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 99/00 (IR)	5900000	5900000	5900000	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 20	APPUI A L'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 99/00 (PPLE)	3900000	3900000	3900000	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 21	CONSOLIDATION PROCESSUS DEMOCRATIQUE	0	0	0	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY
FED 08	8 ACP BK 22	APPUI REGIONAL A L'INTEGRATION (PARI) - UEMOA PHASE 2	1500000	1500000	1175625.71	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
FED 08	8 ACP BK 23	ETUDE FAISABILITE PHASE II PROGRAMME REGIONAL SOLAIRE	74405.94	74405.94	74405.94	SOLAR ENERGY
FED 08	8 ACP BK 24	AT CONTROLE INTERNE PROJET PAPME	34477.4	34477.4	34477.4	BUSINESS SERVICES
FED 08	8 ACP BK 25	PREPARATION 3EME CONFERENCES DES NATIONS-UNIES SUR LES PMA	15698.56	15698.56	15698.56	POPULATION POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 26	ETUDE FAISABILITE DU PROGRAMME DE VALORISATION RESSOURCES EN EAU DU SUD-OUEST, PHASE II (RESO II)	77886.15	77886.15	77886.15	LOW-COST WATER AND SANITATION
FED 08	8 ACP BK 27	PROGRAMME D'APPUI REGIONAL L'INTEGRATION (PARI)-PHASE II - VOLET SECTEUR PRIVE	1500000	1079672	773079.19	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

FED 08	8 ACP BK 28	APPROVISIONNEMENT EN EAU POTABLE DE OUAGADOUGOU	30000000	23899400	2977957.3	WATER AND SANITATION
FED 08	8 ACP BK 29	ETUDE ENTRETIEN PERIODIQUE ROUTE PIEGA-NIGER	400000	376074.5	322618.23	ROAD TRANSPORT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 30	APPUI BUDGETAIRE REDUCTION PAUVRETE 2001 (ABRP 2001)	20400000	16949365.72	16933511.23	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 31	APPUI BUDGETAIRE REDUCTION PAUVRETE 2001 (ABRP 2001)	3100000	3100000	3100000	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 32	PROGRAMME D'APPUI CONSOLIDATION PROCESSUS DEMOCRATIQUE, ETAT DE DROIT & BONNE GOUVERNANCE	12500000	5640916.35	2367400.08	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 33	PROGRAMME REGIONAL SOLAIRE (PHASE II) (PRS II)	9956000	0	0	SOLAR ENERGY
FED 08	8 ACP BK 34	STABEX 99 - HARICOTS	677914	677914	677914	BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SUPPORT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 35	Aep ouagadougou	14000000	14000000	10093000	WATER AND SANITATION
FED 08	8 ACP BK 36	AT SYSTEME LOGICIELS INFORMATIQUES DIR GENERALE DES ROUTES	43905	43905	43905	TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 37	ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE LA DIRECTION DE L' HYDRAULIQUE	450000	404000	0	WATER RESOURCES POLICY/ADMIN. MGMT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 38	VALORISATION DES RESSOURCES EN EAU DANS L OUEST DU BURKINA FASO (VREO)	10000000	1932000	79530.06	WATER RESOURCES POLICY/ADMIN. MGMT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 39	Echo/tps/254/2002/02000 - aide d'urgence en faveur des popu- LATIONS DU BURKINA FASO TOUCHEES PAR L'EPIDÉMIE DE MÏNINGIT	175000	103837.94	103837.94	EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF
FED 08	8 ACP BK 40	Appui budgetaire pour la reduction de la pauvreté ABRP 2002-2004	125000000	122884000	50600000	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 41	ETUDE EVALUATION APPUIS COMMUNAUTAIRES PROGR TRANSPORTS	62300	53900	40939.57	TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 42	AT JURIDIQUE AU MINISTERE DE LA SANTE	59000	57300	48455.9	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT
FED 08	8 ACP BK 43	ETUDE - APPUI A LA SOCIETE CIVILE	80000	80000	79993	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY
FED 08	8 ACP BK 44	Pret global (21875, 21876)	0	0	0	FORMAL SECTOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FED 08	8 ACP BK 45	SOUTIEN AUX INITIATIVES CULTURELLES DECENTRALISEES-PHASE 2 (PSIC2) PROJET 8 ACP BK 45	1900000	1899185.99	682683.55	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-06-BK	FED/BK/FORM/06101/001	PACF/95001 - FORMATION DES AGENTS DE LA D.G. COOPERATION D'INFORMATISATION DES SERVICES	350000	350000	0	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/06017/000	PAST - PROJET D'ENTRETIEN ROUTES OUAGADOUGOU-GHANA,BOBO COTE D'IVOIRE ET BOBO-MALI	29000000	1817482	0	TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANA
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/06017/000	PAST - PROJET D'ENTRETIEN ROUTES OUAGADOUGOU-GHANA,BOBO COTE D'IVOIRE ET BOBO-MALI	29000000	2762201	0	TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANA
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/06017/000	PAST - PROJET D'ENTRETIEN ROUTES OUAGADOUGOU-GHANA,BOBO COTE D'IVOIRE ET BOBO-MALI	29000000	6504612	0	TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANA
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/06017/000	PAST - PROJET D'ENTRETIEN ROUTES OUAGADOUGOU-GHANA,BOBO COTE D'IVOIRE ET BOBO-MALI	29000000	6915705	0	TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANA
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/06017/000	PAST - PROJET D'ENTRETIEN ROUTES OUAGADOUGOU-GHANA,BOBO COTE D'IVOIRE ET BOBO-MALI	29000000	11000000	0	TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANA
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/07017/000	APPUI A LA REFORME DU SECTEUR PHARMACEUTIQUE	1600000	1600000	0	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEM
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/07200/003	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 1995 - 1996	30000000	11700000	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/07200/003	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 1995 - 1996	30000000	18300000	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

PIN-07-BK	PACA/95135	ET. DE FAISABILITE DANS LE CADRE DU PROJET DE LUTTE CONTRE LA DROGUE AU BURKINA FASO	17000	17000	0	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/95173	PREPARATION ET SUIVI DE LA TABLE RONDE 1995 DES BAILLEURS DE FONDS DU PROGRAMME AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL DES TRANSPORTS	60000	60000	0	TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. MANA
PIN-07-BK	PACA/95246	ELABORATION D'UN INDICE DE LA PRODUCTION INDUSTRIELLE	28000	28000	0	INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
PIN-07-BK	PACA/95256	A.T. CHARGEES DU SUIVI DU SECTEUR EDUCATION DE BASE ET FORMATION	180000	180000	0	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANA
PIN-07-BK	PACA/95282	EVALUATION DE LA 1ERE PHASE DU PASA	59900	59900	0	AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ADMIN.
PIN-07-BK	PACA/95299	ETUDE D'EVALUATION SUR LA SOCIETE AFRICAINE DU CINEMA (CINAFRIC)	60000	60000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/95300	ETUDE ARRIERES INTERIEURS AU BURKINA FASO	60000	60000	0	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/95313	SUIVI DE LA MISE EN OEUVRE DES APPUIS COMMUNAUTAIRES AU SECTEUR DE LA SANTE	75000	75000	0	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEM
PIN-07-BK	PACA/95332	ET. ORGANISATIONNELLE TECHNIQUE & FINANCIERE DES STRUCTURES DE CONTROLE AU MIN. DES TRAVAUX PUBLICS DANS LE CADRE PASECT	30000	30000	0	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/95378	EVALUATION D'IDENTIFICATION PROJET DE CONSOLIDATION DU VOLET HYDRAULIQUE SOUTERRAINE DS PROVINCES SOUROU/YATENGA/PASSORE	2500	2500	0	AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/06017/001	ETUDES DE FACTIBILITES ET D'EXECUTION DES TRAVAUX ROUTIERS DANS LE CADRE DU PASECT DU BURKINA FASO	3937500	3937500	0	ROAD TRANSPORT
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/07026/000	APPUI AU 3EME RECENSEMENT GENERAL DE LA POPULATION	935000	935000	0	
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/CULT/07155/002	PACC:96041 - APPUI A L'ASSOCIATION TRADITION ET MODERNITE	46000	46000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/FORM/07024/001	PACA/96186 - CAMPAGNE DE COMMUNICATION SUR LA DECENTRALISATION	400000	400000	0	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY
PIN-07-BK	FED/REG/70001/012	CONSTRUCTION ET EQUIPEMENT DU PAVILLON DE L'EXPORTATION ET DE LA CREATIVITE (SALON INTERNATIONAL DE L'ARTISANAT DE OUAGADOUGOU)	180000	180000	0	COTTAGE INDUSTRIES AND HANDICR
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96015	SEMINAIRE DE FORMATION SUR LES PROCEDURES FINANCIERES DU FED	50296	50296	0	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96102	ETAT DES LIEUX DANS LE SECTEUR DE LA DECENTRALISATION	40000	40000	0	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96113	ET. DE FACTIBILITE DE LA CONSTRUCTION ET DU BITUMAGE DE LA ROUTE NIORIDA-MANGA	60000	60000	0	ROAD TRANSPORT
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96142	ETUDE SUR LA RIZICULTURE	150000	150000	0	FOOD CROP PRODUCTION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96158	ETUDE POUR LA PROMOTION DE LA GOMME ARABIQUE	43000	43000	0	INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND ADMIN. M
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96229	(PASA II) REVUE DES DEPENSES PUBLIQUES ET L'AMELIORATION DU CADRE SECTORIEL DE PROPOSITION/SUIVI INVESTISSEMENTS PUBLICS	59891	59891	0	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANN
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96246	A.T. AU MINISTERE DE LA SANTE	366000	366000	0	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEM
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96275	A.T. AUPRES DU MINISTERE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE BASE ET DE L'ALPHABETISATION (MEBA)	420000	420000	0	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANA
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96302	AUDIT PARTIEL DE LA GESTION ET DES RESSOURCES HUMAINES DE LA SOFITEX	150000	150000	0	AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ADMIN.

PIN-07-BK	PACA/96349	A.T. AUPRES DU MIN. DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE BASE ET DE L'ALPHABETISATION (MEBA) OUAGADOUGOU	250000	250000	0	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANA
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96373	ANALYSE DES MECANISMES D'ENTREE DES PRODUCTEURS DANS LE CAPITAL DE LA SOFITEX	59120	59120	0	PRIVATISATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96400	EXAMEN ETUDES EXISTANTES EN VUE INSTRUCTION PROJET APPROVISIONNEMENT EAU POTABLE VILLE OUAGADOUGOU A PARTIR DE ZIGA	97000	97000	0	WATER AND SANITATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96420	SEMINAIRE DE FORMATION SUR LES PROCEDURES FINANCIERES DU FED	69000	69000	0	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANN
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96423	PLAN D'ACTIONS POUR LE FINANCEMENT DU MONDE RURAL	59500	59500	0	FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. MANA
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96432	PLAN D'ACTIONS POUR LA STRUCTURATION DES ORGANISATIONS PROFESSIONNELLES AGRICOLES (OPA)	59800	59800	0	AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVES
PIN-07-BK	PACA/97003	EXPERTISE ETUDE PREPARATION DU PROGRAMME DE SOUTIEN AUX INITIATIVES CULTURELLES AU BURKINA FASO	60000	60000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	DAGT/97017	ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE AU MINISTERE DE L'AGRICULTURE FINALISATION DU PROGRAMME D'ACTIONS DANS LE SECTEUR AGRICOLE AU TITRE	9762	9762	0	AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ADMIN.
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/07023/000	AMENAGEMENT DE LA FORET CLASSEE DU BARRAGE DE OUAGADOUGOU	495000	495000	0	
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/CULT/07155/003	PACC/97003 APPUI A LA REALISATION DU FILM L'EPOPEE DES MOSSE	50000	50000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/CULT/07155/004	PACC/97006 - APPUI AU FORUM NATIONAL SUR LA POLITIQUE CULTURELLE	28000	28000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/CULT/07155/005	PACC/97009 - APPUI A LA FORMATION DE RESPONSABLES CULTURELS	60000	60000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/CULT/07155/006	PACC/97011-APPUI A L'ORGANISATION DES ETATS GENERAUX DU CINEMA	22000	22000	0	
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/FORM/07024/002	PACA:97091 - APPUI A L'ASSOCIATION DES MAIRES DU BURKINA FASO	93000	93000	0	GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/96439	ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE EN APPUI A LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA COOPERATION DECENTRALISEE DANS LE CADRE DU 8EME FED	209000	209000	0	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANN
PIN-07-BK	PACA/97029	ETUDE SUR L'IDENTIFICATION D'UN APPUI A L'ALPHABETISATION	45000	45000	0	NON-FORMAL EDUCATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/97038	ETUDE VISANT L'AMELIORATION DE LA FORMATION DANS LES ECOLES NORMALES	45000	45000	0	SECONDARY EDUCATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/97057	MISSION DE DIAGNOSTIC ET D'IDENTIFICATION D'APPUIS AU PROCESSUS DEMOCRATIQUE DU BURKINA FASO	45000	45000	0	ELECTIONS
PIN-07-BK	PACA/97063	ETUDE VISANT L'AMELIORATION DES CONDITIONS DE VIE DES MAITRES	47000	47000	0	PRIMARY EDUCATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/97073	ETUDE PORTANT SUR L'APPUI ORGANISATIONNEL A LA MISE EN PLACE DES STRUCTURES DECONCENTREES DU MINISTERE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT	60000	60000	0	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANA
PIN-07-BK	PACA/97080	FINALISATION DU PROGRAMME D'ACTIONS DANS LE SECTEUR RURAL AU TITRE DU 8EME FED INCLUANT LES APPUIS INSTITUTIONNELS	60000	60000	0	AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ADMIN.
PIN-07-BK	PACA/97093	ETUDE D'ACTUALISATION DU PROJET DU MUSEE DE OUAGADOUGOU	100000	100000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	PACA/97231	ETUDE DE FAISABILITE DU PROJET SANTE 8EMEFED	190000	190000	0	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEM
PIN-07-BK	PACA/97301	PROMOTION DES ARTS PLASTIQUES AU BURKINA FASO ET FAISABILITE	26000	26000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION

		D4UN CENTRE DE FORMATION ET DE DIFFUSION				
PIN-07-BK	DAGC/98001	APPUI A LA REALISATION DU FILM "MOI BOUKARI KOUTOU" (1ERE TRANCHE)	200000	200000	0	EDUCATION FACILITIES AND TRAIN
PIN-07-BK	DAGC/98010	APPUI ORGANISATION 4ME EDITION SYMPOSIUM DE SCULPTURE LAONGO	78000	78000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	DAGC/98011	APPUI TROUPE ROYAL DE LUXE POUR SPECTACLE RETOUR D'AFRIQUE	22000	22000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	DAGC/98027	APPUI CREATION THEATRALE "NOCES"	20000	20000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	DAGF/98002	FINANCEMENT DES ACTIVITES DU CENTRE D'ETUDES EUROPEENNES ET DE L'INTEGRATION DE L'UNIVERSITE DE OUAGADOUGOU	108000	0	0	
PIN-07-BK	DAGF/98005	SEMINAIRE FORMATION PROCEDURES FINANCIERES FED	60000	60000	0	EDUCATION FACILITIES AND TRAIN
PIN-07-BK	DAGF/98018	FINANCEMENT DES ACTIVITES DU CENTRE D'ETUDES EUROPEENNES ET DE L'INTEGRATION DE L'UNIVERSITE DE OUAGADOUGOU	108000	108000	0	HIGHER EDUCATION
PIN-07-BK	DAGT/98246	EXAMEN & APPREC. DOCUMENTAT. & ETUDES PROJET APPROVISION.EAU	4000	4000	0	
PIN-07-BK	DAGT/98363	MISE EN OEUVRE PASA II	80000	80000	0	RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PIN-07-BK	DAGT/98455	MISSION D'APPUI AU MINISTERE DE LA COMMUNICATION & CULTURE	8655	8655	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	DAGT/98478	ETUDE SUR LE SYSTEME JUDICIAIRE	36000	36000	0	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/07027/00	APPUI AU POUVOIR JUDICIAIRE	1350000	1350000	0	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
PIN-07-BK	DAGC/00021	APPUI A LA REALISATION DU FILM "MOI BOUKARI KOUTOU" (1ERE TRANCHE)	-200000	0	0	EDUCATION FACILITIES AND TRAIN
PIN-07-BK	DAGC/00022	PRODUCTION DE FILM "BOUKARY KOUTOU	500000	500000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	DAGT/00210	MISE EN OEUVRE PASA II	181.62	181.62	0	
PIN-07-BK	DAGT/01045	MISSION SUIVI REVISION LISTES ELECTORALES	1618	1618	0	
PIN-07-BK	DAGT/01250	ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE LA DIRECTION DE L' HYDRAULIQUE	750000	300000	0	WATER RESOURCES POLICY/ADMIN.
PIN-07-BK	DAGT/01250	ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE LA DIRECTION DE L' HYDRAULIQUE	750000	450000	0	WATER RESOURCES POLICY/ADMIN.
PIN-07-BK	FED/BK/07051/00	APPUI INSTITUTIONNEL AUPRES DES SERVICES DE L'ON	1400000	0	0	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANN
PIN-07-BK	DAGC/02019	FESPACO 2003 FESTIVAL PANAFRICAIN DU CINEMA	400000	36000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	DAGC/02019	FESPACO 2003 FESTIVAL PANAFRICAIN DU CINEMA	400000	39000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-07-BK	DAGC/02019	FESPACO 2003 FESTIVAL PANAFRICAIN DU CINEMA	400000	325000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07200/05	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 1997-1998	37800000	5000000	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07200/05	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 1997-1998	37800000	5850000	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07200/05	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 1997-1998	37800000	26950000	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/98240	ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE EN APPUI A LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA COOPERATION DECENTRALISEE DANS LE CADRE DU 8EME FED	310000	310000	0	ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANN
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/98244	A.T. AUPRES DU MIN. DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE BASE ET DE L'ALPHA-	375000	375000	0	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANA

		BETISATION (MEBA) OUAGADOUGOU				
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/98318	A.T. AUPRES DU MINISTERE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE BASE ET DE L'ALPHABETISATION (MEBA)	330000	330000	0	EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANA
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/98440	ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE.AUPRES DU MINISTERE DE LA SANTE	340000	340000	0	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEM
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/98468	CONTRAT CADRE SERVICES AT AJUSTEMET STRUCTUREL AU BURKINA FA SO	750000	750000	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/06017/02	APPUI AU PROGRAMME SECTORIEL PASEC-T ET A L'ENTRETIEN PERIODIQUE DES AXES ROUTIERS BITUMES (2EME PHASE)	44000000	44000000	0	ROAD TRANSPORT
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/06017/03	ENTRETIEN PERIODIQUE ET AMENAGEMENT DE 1000 KM DE ROUTES EN TERRE	41000000	41000000	0	ROAD TRANSPORT
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07016/00	PROGRAMME D'APPUI AU SECTEUR DE L'EDUCATION DE BASE	10000000	10000000	0	PRIMARY EDUCATION
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07032/00	PLANS D'ACTIONS POUR L'ORGANISATION DU SECTEUR AGRICOLE (PAO SA)	24200000	24200000	0	AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ADMIN.
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07155/00	PROGRAMME DE SOUTIEN AUX INITIATIVES CULTURELLES	1800000	1800000	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07200/06	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL	49000000	3900000	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07200/06	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL	49000000	5900000	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07200/06	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL	49000000	39200000	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/00026	ETUDE FAISABILITE PHASE II PROGRAMME REGIONAL SOLAIRE	80000	80000	0	SOLAR ENERGY
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/00039	AT CONTROLE INTERNE PROJET PAPME	41730	41730	0	BUSINESS SERVICES
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/00104	PREPARATION 3EME CONFERENCES DES NATIONS-UNIES SUR LES PMA	17500	17500	0	POPULATION POLICY AND ADMIN. M
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/00175	ETUDE FAISABILITE DU PROGRAMME DE VALORISATION RESSOURCES EN EAU DU SUD-OUEST, PHASE II (RESO II)	80000	80000	0	LOW-COST WATER AND SANITATION
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/00218	ETUDE ENTRETIEN PERIODIQUE ROUTE PIEGA-NIGER	400000	400000	0	ROAD TRANSPORT
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07029/00	APPROVISIONNEMENT EN EAU POTABLE DE OUAGADOUGOU	30000000	30000000	0	WATER AND SANITATION
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07049/00	PROJET D'APPUI A LA CONSOLIDATION DU PROCESSUS DEMOCRATIQUE, L'ETAT DE DROIT ET LA BONNE GOUVERNANCE	16000000	3500000	0	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07049/00	PROJET D'APPUI A LA CONSOLIDATION DU PROCESSUS DEMOCRATIQUE, L'ETAT DE DROIT ET LA BONNE GOUVERNANCE	16000000	12500000	0	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07200/07	POVERTY REDUCTION BUDGET SUPPORT I (PRBS I)	23500000	3100000	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07200/07	POVERTY REDUCTION BUDGET SUPPORT I (PRBS I)	23500000	20400000	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/01041	ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE.AUPRES DU MINISTERE DE LA SANTE	104800	104800	0	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEM
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/01129	AT SYSTEME LOGICIELS INFORMATIQUES DIR GENERALE DES ROUTES	43905	43905	0	
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/07006/0	APPUI AU DEVELOPPEMENT DU SECTEUR PRIVE, RENFORCEMENT DES	6000000	0	0	BUSINESS SERVICES

	01	CA PACITES DES PME				
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/02100	ETUDE EVALUATION APPUIS COMMUNAUTAIRES PROGR TRANSPORTS	62300	62300	0	
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/02192	ETUDE DE FAISABILITÉ D'UN PROGRAMME DE COOPÉRATION DÉCENTRALISÉE	-175000	-175000	0	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/02212	AT JURIDIQUE AU MINISTERE DE LA SANTE	33000	33000	0	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEM
PIN-08-BK	DAGT/02214	ETUDE - APPUI A LA SOCIETE CIVILE	70000	70000	0	
PIN-08-BK	FED/BK/06020/02	VALORISATION DES RESSOURCES EN EAU DE L'OUEST	10000000	0	0	LOW-COST WATER AND SANITATION
PIN-09-BK	FED/BK/07053/00	APPUI BUDGETAIRE POUR LA REDUCTION DE LA PAUVRETE	125000000	0	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
PMS	PMS/1999/0142	MISSION D'A.T. ET DE FORMATION AUPRES DE LA DCCT DU MINISTE- RE DES INFRASTRUCTURES DE L'HABITAT ET DE L'URBANISME	90000	0	0	
PMS	PMS/1999/0201	ETUDE DE FAISABILITÉ D'UN PROGRAMME DE COOPÉRATION DÉCENTRALISÉE	175000	0	0	STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY
PMS	PMS/2000/0039	PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL DU SECTEUR AGRICOLE PHASE 2	79960	0	0	RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PMS	PMS/2000/0042	MISSION D'APPUI AU MINISTERE DE LA COMMUNICATION & CULTURE DU BURKINA FASO	3220	0	0	CULTURE AND RECREATION
PMS	PMS/2004/0033	ENTRETIEN PERIODIQUE ET AMENAGEMENT DE 1000 KM DE ROUTES EN TERRE	257000	0	0	ROAD TRANSPORT
PMS	PMS/2004/0034	ENTRETIEN PERIODIQUE ET AMENAGEMENT DE 1000 KM DE ROUTES EN TERRE	125000	0	0	ROAD TRANSPORT
PMS	PMS/2003/0094	AT JURIDIQUE AU MINISTERE DE LA SANTE	59000	0	0	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEM
PMS	PMS/2003/0095	AT JURIDIQUE AU MINISTERE DE LA SANTE	-59000	0	0	HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEM
PMS	PMS/2003/0192	PLANS D'ACTIONS POUR L'ORGANISATION DU SECTEUR AGRICOLE (PAO SA)	52000	0	0	AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ADMIN.
PMS	PMS/2003/0194	PLANS D'ACTIONS POUR L'ORGANISATION DU SECTEUR AGRICOLE (PAO SA)	60000	0	0	AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ADMIN.
PMS	PMS/2004/0032	ENTRETIEN PERIODIQUE ET AMENAGEMENT DE 1000 KM DE ROUTES EN TERRE	48000	0	0	ROAD TRANSPORT
REL-P-07-BK	FED/BK/07200/04	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 1996-1997	6400000	1167855	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
REL-P-07-BK	FED/BK/07200/04	APPUI AU PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 1996-1997	6400000	5232145	0	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
SYSP-07-BK	PACA/95288	FINALISATION DE L'INSTRUCTION TECHNIQUE DE LA REQUETE SYSMIN VOLET GEOPHYSIQUE	18000	18000	0	MINERAL/MINING POLICY & ADM MT

Annexe 4 : Burkina Faso - Projets de la ligne B720 (1997 – 2002)

Budget line	Fund center	Commitment creation year	Title	Date limite de Mise en Oeuvre (FDI)	Contract signature date	Committed	Paid	To be paid	Food Aid / Transport / Food Security
B72000	08/BRU	B1998	CER.4.150 T. BURKINA FASO	30/03/2002	08.12.1998	817.550,00	0,00	817550	Food Aid
B720001000	08/BRU	B1998	CER.4.150 T. BURKINA FASO	30/03/2002	08.12.1998	817.550,00	0,00	817550	Food Aid
B72000B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1998	CER.4.150 T. BURKINA FASO	30/03/2002	08.12.1998	817.550,00	686.020,54	131529,46	Food Aid
B72000B00	SCR/BRU	B1998	CER.4.150 T. BURKINA FASO	30/03/2002	08.12.1998	0,00	0,00	0	Food Aid
B72020	08/BRU	B1998	ASSIST.TECHN.AGRER-M. TERPEND	31/12/2002	30/07/1998	250.000,00	145.000,00	105000	Food Aid / Transport
B72020	08/BRU	B1998	TRANSP.BURKINA FASO DEC.7.7.98	30/03/2002	19/08/1998	207.500,00	0,00	207500	Food Aid / Transport
B720201000	08/52/BRU	B1999	AUDIT FINANCIER ET ORGANISATIONNEL DE PCSA BURKINA FASO- 2AC	31/12/2001	27/07/1999	70.000,00	14.902,50	55097,5	Food Aid / Transport
B720201000	08/BRU	B1998	ASSIST.TECHN.AGRER-M. TERPEND	31/12/2002	30/07/1998	105.000,00	84.785,00	20215	Food Aid / Transport
B720201000	08/BRU	B1998	TRANSP.BURKINA FASO DEC.7.7.98	30/03/2002	19/08/1998	207.500,00	0,00	207500	Food Aid / Transport
B72020B00	SCR/BRU	B2001	AGRER/PRET/CN0450/B.FASO	31/12/2004		0,00	0,00	0	Food Aid / Transport
B72020B00	SCR/BRU	B2001	EI _PRET - BURKINA FASO 2001 PRGRAMME D'APPUI	31/12/2004	23/11/2001	442.190,00	0,00	442190	Food Aid / Transport
B72020B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1999	AUDIT FINANCIER ET ORGANISATIONNEL DE PCSA BURKINA FASO- 2AC	31/12/2001	27/07/1999	55.097,50	44.906,84	10190,66	Food Aid / Transport
B72020B00	SCR/BRU	B1999	AUDIT FINANCIER ET ORGANISATIONNEL DE PCSA BURKINA FASO- 2AC	31/12/2001	27/07/1999	0,00	0,00	0	Food Aid / Transport
B72020B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1998	ASSIST.TECHN.AGRER-M. TERPEND	31/12/2002	30/07/1998	20.215,00	14.990,00	5225	Food Aid / Transport
B72020B00	SCR/BRU	B1998	ASSIST.TECHN.AGRER-M. TERPEND	31/12/2002	30/07/1998	5.225,00	1.239,18	3985,82	Food Aid / Transport
B72020B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1998	TRANSP.BURKINA FASO DEC.7.7.98	30/03/2002	19/08/1998	207.500,00	143.502,68	63997,32	Food Aid / Transport
B72020B00	SCR/BRU	B1998	TRANSP.BURKINA FASO DEC.7.7.98	30/03/2002	19/08/1998	63.997,32	0,00	63997,32	Food Aid / Transport
B72020	08/BRU	B1997	AVENANT ENG.B96,96,DG8,001920-A.T.	31/12/2001	01.02.1998	2.700,00	0,00	2.700,00	Food Aid / Transport
B72020	08/BRU	B1997	ASS.TECHN.TERPEND - BURKINA	31/12/2001	01.02.1998	118.000,00	106.200,00	11.800,00	Food Aid / Transport
B720201000	08/BRU	B1997	AVENANT ENG.B96,96,DG8,001920-A.T.	31/12/2001	01.02.1998	2.700,00	0,00	2.700,00	Food Aid / Transport
B720201000	08/BRU	B1997	ASS.TECHN.TERPEND - BURKINA	31/12/2001	01.02.1998	11.800,00	0,00	11.800,00	Food Aid / Transport
B72020B00	SCR/BRU	B1997	AVENANT ENG.B96,96,DG8,001920-A.T.	31/12/2001	01.02.1998	0,00	0,00	0,00	Food Aid / Transport
B72020B00	SCR/BRU	B1997	ASS.TECHN.TERPEND - BURKINA	31/12/2001	01.02.1998	0,00	0,00	0,00	Food Aid / Transport

B72020B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1997	AVENANT ENG.B96,96,DG8,001920-A.T.	31/12/2001	01.02.1998	2.700,00	0,00	2.700,00	Food Aid / Transport
B72020B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1997	ASS.TECHN.TERPEND - BURKINA	31/12/2001	01.02.1998	11.800,00	0,00	11.800,00	Food Aid / Transport
B7201008	08/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ISCOS BURKINQ BANQUE CER.	31/12/2001	06.02.1998	414.738,00	50.000,00	364738	Food Security
B7201008	08/BRU	B1998	APPUI:BURKINA FASO DEC.7.7.98	30/12/2002	19/08/1998	965.000,00	0,00	965000	Food Security
B7201008	08/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2 AFR.VERT BURKINA	30/09/2002	23/11/1998	329.244,00	0,00	329244	Food Security
B7201008	08/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2-CROCEVIA NORD BURKINA	31/12/2004	12.07.1998	211.200,00	0,00	211200	Food Security
B720101000	08/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ISCOS BURKINQ BANQUE CER.	31/12/2001	06.02.1998	364.738,00	246.198,00	118540	Food Security
B720101000	08/BRU	B1998	APPUI:BURKINA FASO DEC.7.7.98	30/12/2002	19/08/1998	965.000,00	600.000,00	365000	Food Security
B720101000	08/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2 AFR.VERT BURKINA	30/09/2002	23/11/1998	329.244,00	50.000,00	279244	Food Security
B720101000	08/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2-CROCEVIA NORD BURKINA	31/12/2004	12.07.1998	211.200,00	50.000,00	161200	Food Security
B72010A00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	AGRER/DEVAUX/BURKINA FASO/CN0577	31/12/2005	04.01.2002	479.868,00	60.000,00	419868	Food Security
B72010A00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	AGRER/DEVAUX/BURKINA FASO/CN0577	31/12/2005	04.01.2002	419.868,00	97.857,33	322010,67	Food Security
B72010A00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	AGRER/HOUYOUX/BURKINA FASO/CN0608 GPR/2002/0371	31/12/2005	06.01.2002	21.151,00	1.118,16	20032,84	Food Security
B72010A00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	AGRER/HOUYOUX/BURKINA FASO/CN0608 GPR/2002/0371	31/12/2005	06.01.2002	20.032,84	0,00	20032,84	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2001	EI _ PRET - BURKINA FASO 2001 PRGRAMME D'APPUI	31/12/2004	23/11/2001	442.190,00	265.314,00	176876	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2001	EI _ PRET - BURKINA FASO 2001 PRGRAMME D'APPUI	31/12/2004	23/11/2001	176.876,00	67.792,26	109083,74	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	CISV GPR/AIDCO/2001/0188/14	30/06/2006	17/04/2002	572.000,00	158.438,00	413562	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	CISV GPR/AIDCO/2001/0188/14	30/06/2006	17/04/2002	413.562,00	206.781,00	206781	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	ISCOS - GPR/AIDCO/2001/0188/15	30/06/2006	05.07.2002	838.913,00	394.839,00	444074	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	ISCOS - GPR/AIDCO/2001/0188/15	30/06/2006	05.07.2002	444.074,00	222.037,00	222037	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	GVC GPR/AIDCO/2001/0188/18	30/06/2006	05.07.2002	469.087,00	220.908,00	248179	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	GVC GPR/AIDCO/2001/0188/18	30/06/2006	05.07.2002	248.179,00	0,00	248179	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	WAITRO 2001/0188/16 -ONG 2001			0,00	0,00	0	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	HOUYOUX/CN/0608 AGRER/BK/2001/0097	31/12/2005	06.05.2002	403.637,00	42.000,00	361637	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	HOUYOUX/CN/0608 AGRER/BK/2001/0097	31/12/2005	06.05.2002	361.637,00	80.499,04	281137,96	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	MOVIMONDO GPR/AIDCO/2001/0188/17	30/06/2006	24/06/2002	772.484,00	381.289,00	391195	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	MOVIMONDO GPR/AIDCO/2001/0188/17	30/06/2006	24/06/2002	391.195,00	0,00	391195	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	MIN. EC.FI - BK/AIDCO/2001/0097/2	31/12/2005	07.04.2002	5.700.000,0 0	2.700.000,0 0	3000000	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	MIN. EC.FI - BK/AIDCO/2001/0097/2	31/12/2005	07.04.2002	3.000.000,0 0	0,00	3000000	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	CRUS GPR/AIDCO/2001/0188/42	30/06/2006	16/10/2002	406.849,00	0,00	406849	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	CRUS GPR/AIDCO/2001/0188/42	30/06/2006	16/10/2002	406.849,00	149.104,00	257745	Food Security

B72010B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ISCOS BURKINQ BANQUE CER.	31/12/2001	06.02.1998	118.540,00	77.066,00	41474	Food Security
B72010B00	SCR/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ISCOS BURKINQ BANQUE CER.	31/12/2001	06.02.1998	0,00	0,00	0	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1998	ASSIST.TECHN.AGRER-M. TERPEND	31/12/2002	30/07/1998	0,00	0,00	0	Food Security
B72010B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1998	APPUI:BURKINA FASO DEC.7.7.98	30/12/2002	19/08/1998	365.000,00	0,00	365000	Food Security
B72010B00	SCR/BRU	B1998	APPUI:BURKINA FASO DEC.7.7.98	30/12/2002	19/08/1998	365.000,00	0,00	365000	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1998	APPUI:BURKINA FASO DEC.7.7.98	30/12/2002	19/08/1998	0,00	0,00	0	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1998	TRANSP.BURKINA FASO DEC.7.7.98	30/03/2002	19/08/1998	0,00	0,00	0	Food Security
B72010B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2 AFR.VERT BURKINA	30/09/2002	23/11/1998	279.244,00	110.683,00	168561	Food Security
B72010B00	SCR/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2 AFR.VERT BURKINA	30/09/2002	23/11/1998	168.561,00	88.540,60	80020,4	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2 AFR.VERT BURKINA	30/09/2002	23/11/1998	75.609,40	75.609,40	0	Food Security
B72010B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2-CROCEVIA NORD BURKINA	31/12/2004	12.07.1998	161.200,00	49.000,00	112200	Food Security
B72010B00	SCR/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2-CROCEVIA NORD BURKINA	31/12/2004	12.07.1998	112.200,00	34.936,40	77263,6	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2-CROCEVIA NORD BURKINA	31/12/2004	12.07.1998	77.263,60	43.715,00	33548,6	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2-CROCEVIA NORD BURKINA	31/12/2004	12.07.1998	33.548,60	11.316,00	22232,6	Food Security

Annexe 5 : Carte du Burkina Faso



Library of the University of Texas: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/burkina_faso.html



**Thematic Evaluation of Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management
and Special Operations in Support of Food Security;**

FIELD REPORT FOR ETHIOPIA

Final Report

**Manfred Metz
Fantu Gola
Martin Steinmeyer**

June 2004

For the

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ANNEXES

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Annex 6: Map of Ethiopia

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CFFS	Coalition for Food Security
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CRDA	Christian Relief and Development Association (NGO umbrella organization)
CSE	Country Strategy Evaluation
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CVF	Countervalue Funds
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAG	Donor Assistance Group
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
EFSR(A)	Emergency Food Security Reserve (Administration)
EGS	Employment Generation Scheme
ETB	Ethiopian Birr (local currency, exchange rate, 03.2004: 1US\$=8.6 ETB, 1 €=10.5 ETB)
EWS	Early Warning System
FA	Financial Agreements
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN
FEF	Foreign Exchange Facility
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System (by USAID)
FSBS	Food Security Budgetary Support
FSCO	Food Security Coordination Office (at regional level)
FSSC	Food Security Steering Committee
FSU	Food Security Unit
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoRD	Ministry of Rural Development
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding

NAO	National Authorizing Officer
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIP	National Indicative Programme
OL	Official Letter
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (called SDPRP in Ethiopia, see below)
RDFS	Rural Development and Food Security Department of the EC Delegation
SDPRP	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SIP	Sector Investment Programme
SNNPRS	Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State
TA	Technical Assistance
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (by WFP)
WB	World Bank
WFP	UN World Food Programme

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world with prevailing food insecurity in regard of all insufficient access, insufficient food supplies and recurrent droughts and emergencies. Over many years, the country has been the major recipient of food aid in Africa.

Since 1996, with the release of the FA/FS Regulation, the EC has been advocating a shift away from food aid towards developmental oriented food security programmes. Yet, an increasing amount and share of the resources provided under the EC Food Aid and Food Security Programme to Ethiopia have been in the form of food aid. This discrepancy between intention and reality was partly caused by the need to respond to two major emergencies following the droughts in 2000 and 2002, but has, to a large extent, also been the result of incoherent government policy (inertia in moving away from the food aid based relief system), strained policy dialogue (e.g. during the Eritrean-Ethiopian war), poor programme design, uncoordinated approaches, bureaucratic hurdles and capacity constraints on all administrative levels.

All these factors have contributed to the slow progress in the implementation of the Food Security Programmes in the past, while, on the other hand, the relief food system has been further refined and developed. Thus, relief food aid has remained the standard response mechanism to food insecurity in Ethiopia, not taking into consideration whether food insecurity was temporary, caused by droughts, or structural and related to poverty.

The relief system was capable to provide and handle large and increasing amounts of food aid – up to 1.6 Million tons in 2003 – and to deliver it to deficit areas in distant and even remote parts of the country. Food aid has been effective in preventing famine and bridging acute food shortages in emergency situations, and it will have to continue to play a role under such conditions when there is virtually no alternative to saving lives.

However, food aid is neither an effective nor an efficient means to tackle the widespread problem of structural poverty and chronic food insecurity. Furthermore, by adversely affecting the local grain markets, food production and farm income, it is likely to compound the very problem it is supposed to alleviate. The year-by-year increasing figures on estimated food aid needs and food aid provisions must be seen in this context. Obviously, an extrapolation of the past trends in food aid supplies is not sustainable.

It has taken some time until all relevant actors – the GoE, international organizations, donors, NGOs – realised that a continuation of the hitherto practised relief food system is not feasible and agreed that fundamental re-orientation, common and coordinated approaches, and decisive steps are required, in order to induce the desired change. Now, with the new Coalition for Food Security initiative launched, the hitherto established Relief System being revised, a National System for Productive Safety Nets being designed and implemented, and specific budgetary allocations for food security made by the GoE (with contributions under the EC FSBS programme), there is a good chance that the propagated shift from relief food aid towards development-oriented and sustainable approaches to improve food security will eventually become reality.

While regulation No. 1292/96 provided a suitable framework for linking relief, rehabilitation and development, there has been, in Ethiopia, always been the risk of falling back on food aid when the other instruments fail.

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 Background to the mission

The EC Regulation No. 1292/96 marked a turning point in the EC food aid / food security policy by more systematically integrating EC's food aid instrument into a general development framework. In November 2001, the Board of the EuropeAid Co-operation Office requested the Evaluation Unit to undertake an evaluation of Food Aid policy and management as well as of special operations in support of food security under Regulation No. 1291/96. The recommendation put forward by the 2000 evaluation report that a second overall evaluation should be carried out in 2003-2004 was endorsed by the Council of Ministers in December 2001.

The desk phase of the overall evaluation of the EC Council regulation 1292/96 on the EC Food Aid and Food Security Policy (Budget line B7-200) was carried out in 2003 and completed in December 2003. The country case study Ethiopia is one of ten country case studies executed under the second (field) phase of the Evaluation.

2.2 Why Ethiopia?

2.2.1 Introduction

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world with prevailing food insecurity in regard of all three aspects: insufficient access, insufficient food supplies and supply instability in the wake of recurrent droughts.

Ethiopia is a major recipient of assistance under EC's Food Aid and Food Security Programme (Budget line 7-200). The EC support comprises all instruments provided for under Council Regulation 1292/96, such as food aid and food security interventions, food security budgetary support (FSBS), technical assistance, direct aid as well as indirect aid channelled through WFP, ICRC and NGOs.

Table 1 gives an overview on the EC food aid and food security programmes which have been implemented in Ethiopia during 2003.¹ Due to the exceptional emergency situation in 2003 in the wake of the 2002 drought, overall food aid to Ethiopia (1.8 million tons pledged, 1.6 million tons delivered) and EC food aid (435,000 tons pledged, 340,000 tons delivered by end of 2003)² reached an unprecedented peak.

However, also in the preceding years since 1996, when the Council Regulation was released and the first EC food security programme was launched (1996 EGS), the volume of food aid had been continuously increasing. While, in 1996, the EC had allocated 33,000 tons of food aid to Ethiopia, the EC allocations were raised to 76,350 tons in 1998, to 200,000 tons in year 2000, and reached the peak of 435,000 tons in 2003. Food aid absorbed, on average, more than 80 % of EC's resources provided under the Food Aid and Food Security budget line. Thus, the planned shift from emergency food aid to measures in support of long-term sustainable food security, as postulated in the Council Regulation, has not yet materialised.

¹ See also Annex 5: EC Food Aid and Security Programmes, direct aid, 1997-2003

² Includes 31,000 tons for reimbursement of the Emergency Food Security Reserve.

Table 1: EC Food Aid and Food Security Programmes in Ethiopia in 2003

<i>Programme</i>	<i>Budget/Pledge</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Food Security Programmes - Direct Aid*		
1998 IFSP	€ 10 Mio	€ 4.3 Mio. disbursed, € 3.0 Mio. (69%) executed by end 2003, for IFSPs in Amhara and Tigray Regions.
2000 IFSP	€ 11 Mio	€ 5.9 Mio. disbursed, € 0.27 Mio. (4.6%) executed by end 2003; IFSPs in Amhara and Tigray Regions.
2002 FSP	€ 25 Mio	€ 22 Mio FSBS, (€ 9.0 Mio. disbursed, € 0 executed by end of 2003); € 3 Mio. for technical assistance. FSBS funds earmarked for Food Security Programmes in Amhara, Oromya, SNNPR and Tigray.
Cash allocations to NGO Food Security Projects		
1998 & 99	€ 12.3 Mio	for 13 projects
2000	€ 10.5 Mio	Call for Proposals 2000: for 10 projects
Total FSPs	€ 68.8 Mio	All direct and indirect 1998 – 2002 allocations
Food Aid - direct (through DPPC)		
2002/3	€ 62 Mio.	Corresponds pledge of 253.5 tonnes, of which 212.5 tonnes delivered by end 2003; includes local (29,000 tons) and regional (20,000 tons from Sudan) purchase, to be delivered in 2004.
Food Aid – Indirect		
NGOs: 2002/3	€ 28 Mio.	through EURONAIID. Corresponds 80,000 tons pledged, 42,400 tons delivered in 2003, 45,000 tons (local purchase) to be delivered in 2004.
ICRC: 2002/3	€ 5 Mio.	Corresponds 15,750 tons, delivered in 2003
WFP: 2003	€ 10 Mio.	Corresponds 32,391 tons, delivered in 2003
Total Food Aid 2002/3	€ 105 Mio	Total pledges: 435,000 tons, total deliveries in 2003: 339,117 tons (remaining balance to be delivered in 2004)

* The 96 FSP (EGS, € 6.6 million budget, € 4.4 disbursed) was closed end of 2002.

Source: EC Delegation

In addition to budget line B7-200, also allocations for food security from other funding sources have been made by the EC, including:

- EDF funds; in the Indicative Programme for 2002-2007, € 54 million EDF funds (EDF 9, Envelope A) have been reserved for food security.³ It was planned to invest these funds in pastoral development, rural infrastructure and food marketing.
- Humanitarian assistance through ECHO, particularly to pastoralists who were affected by the 2000 and 2002 drought. From 1997-2002, humanitarian assistance (mainly non-

³ However, at the High Level Retreat in Oct. 2003 the GoE and the EC agreed that these EDF funds should all be used for general budget support.

food emergency items but also including supplementary food for mothers and children) of € 18.6 Million were provided by ECHO.

- NGO interventions in food security supported under the NGO Co-financing budget line (B7-6000).

2.2.2 Country profile: Food aid and food security: Situation, policy, actors and programmes

2.2.2.1 General Situation in terms of Food Security

(i) General context

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. According to the Human Development Index of the year 2001, Ethiopia ranked 169 out of 175 countries.⁴ Ethiopia's poverty-related indicators signal the challenges to realize equitable economic development. Its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated at \$110. 44% of the population was under the poverty line in 1987-2000. Only 24 percent have access to safe drinking water, and only 15 percent use adequate sanitation facilities. Its infant mortality rate of 112 per 1,000 live births is high even by Sub-Saharan African standards. In the years 1998/2000, 44% of the population was undernourished. 47% of the children were under weight for the age group under five and 52% under height.

Agriculture accounted 54.2% of GDP in the year 2002. Average growth of agriculture was 1.3% and 2.8% during the periods 1982-1992 and 1992-2002 respectively. Total exports/imports amounted to US\$467 million/1 598 million in the year 2002. The requirements for foodgrain imports have almost exclusively been covered by food aid. Food production shows high variability due to dependence on rainfall agriculture and erratic rainfall.

Budget deficit including grants was 10% of GDP in the year 2001. Consumer prices decreased by 7.2% in the year 2002 and again rose by 15% in the year 2003.

Although gross primary school enrolment rates have increased in recent years, it remains low at only 62 percent. Common health problems are communicable and epidemic-prone diseases, nutritional and micro-nutrient deficiencies, as well as vector-borne diseases such as malaria. The HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis pose a severe challenge to Ethiopia's social and economic development and food security.

(ii) In terms of Food Security

Food security, defined as access by all people at all times to sufficient food to lead an active and healthy life, is threatened in Ethiopia with regard to all three aspects: access, availability and stability.

A complex combination of factors has resulted in sharply increased levels of vulnerability to food insecurity for a great number of Ethiopians. These factors include: frequent droughts; widespread land degradation; limited alternative income alternatives and opportunities; increased population pressure; poor market integration; limited access to basic services, inputs, credit and information; primitive technology; and inappropriate national policies and implementation constraints. The extent of food insecurity has become alarm-

⁴ See Annex 3, also for further development, poverty and food security indicators.

ing. As much as 45 percent of the population is affected in drought years. This situation is frequently aggravated by unexpected shocks, and, on average, over five million people have been enlisted for relief food year after year over the last decade, even in years when weather and market conditions have been favourable. Drought-prone areas with low and variable rainfall, high population density and low natural resource endowments are particularly affected.

Ethiopia is one of ancient agrarian countries in Sub-Saharan African. Despite the long tradition of farming, agricultural production and productivity have remained low, much below population increase and the national requirements. Food shortages have been high and chronic during last three decades.

Ethiopia has suitable agro-ecological conditions to grow a fair variety of crops. The major crops are cereals, namely teff, wheat, barley, maize, sorghum, millet and oats, pulses namely horse beans, chick peas, haricot beans, field peas, lentils, vetch and soya bean and oil seeds (Neug, Linseed, Fenugreek, Rape seed, Sunflower groundnuts and sesame). In addition to food grains, the country has a great potential to grow fruits and vegetables. Coffee, cotton and sugar cane are also major export crops (coffee) and are the basis for domestic processing factories.

The smallholder rural agriculture sector, which is made up by about 9 million peasant farmers, produces about 97 percent of the total crop output, including 98 percent of the coffee production. It contributes, on average, about 60 percent of the total agriculture GDP (MEDAC, 1999).

With considerable agricultural potential, the country had been self-sufficient in major staple foods and was classified as net exporter of food grains till the late 1950s. However, since early 1960s, domestic food grain production was unable even to meet the basic minimum domestic food grain requirement and the gap has been filled by imports, mainly food aid. The production of food grains registered a downward trend for several years. During 1980s, it decreased on the average by 1.1 percent per annum. Sharp decline has been particularly observed during the severe drought years 1984/85 (4.46 million tons) and 1985/86 (5.0 million tons).

From 1960/61 to 2001/2 national food grain production increased from 5.66 to 11.61 million tons, which amounts to an annual average growth rate of about 1.54 percent over 42 years. However, per capita food grain production dramatically declined from 240.2 kg to 169.01 kg during the same period which equals a 0.47 percent average annual decrease.

Therefore, domestic food supply has failed to meet the food requirement of the country. The national average calorie intake of 1954 Kcal per adult person per day is well below the recommendation of World Health Organization (WHO) of an adult person's minimum food intake requirement of 2200 Kcal per a day (MOFED 2002).

With its rural population highly dependent on agricultural production, there is an immediate linkage between crop failures and household food deficit. The absence of off-farm income opportunities coupled with the unpredictability of emergency food aid assistance has led to escalating asset depletion and increasing levels of destitution.

In the past decades vulnerable and food insecure households have made urgent demands to have better access to more productive land. Many families have moved spontaneously into forests and national parks. Such movement without organised support may not improve

either their own welfare nor promote the national good. In response to this, the Government is advocating planned voluntary resettlement to relieve this population pressure from food insecure communities while providing the settlers access to improved land.

Since 1992, the Government has been carrying out measures to reduce poverty in the context of a series of reform programs in the political, economic and social spheres. The economy has responded with marked levels of growth, reversing the previous two decades of poor economic performance. It registered a GDP growth around 3.2 percent during the first two years of reform, an exceptional 10.6 percent in 1995-1996, and a further growth of 6.5 percent in 1996-97. Despite the Government's considerable efforts, problems of food insecurity in Ethiopia have remained serious and accelerating.

2.2.2.2 National (and regional) Policy and Strategy for Food Security

The most important national food security policies are laid down in the Rural Development Strategy (since 1991, translated in 2002; Food Security Strategy (1996, updated in 2002), the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (2002) and the new Coalition for Food Security document, presented in December 2003. All these strategies focus on the agricultural sector as the livelihood of 85 percent of the population, as well as being the primary source of surplus to fuel growth in other sectors.

Within the context of the SDPRP, the Rural Development Strategy aims to transform agriculture from subsistence to small-scale commercial farming. According to the Rural Development Strategy, basic directions of agriculture and rural centred development are: Extensive utilization of human labour; proper use and management of land; agro-ecology based development approach; integrated approach to development; targeted interventions for drought-prone and food insecure areas; encouraging the private sector and enhancing benefits of the working people.

Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) is seen as long term strategy to achieve faster growth and economic development by making use of technologies aimed at increasing labour and land productivity, that are labor using, but land augmenting, such as fertilizer and improved seeds. and other economy.

The Federal Food Security Strategy supports this approach, resting on three "pillars": increasing the supply of food, improving access to food, and strengthening Ethiopia's emergency response capabilities. A vital incentive for farmers to invest in their land and improve production are the land administration policies that aim to offer individual households greater land tenure security through a certification process that guarantees land use and transfer rights.

Policies that promote improvements in governance, decentralization of decision-making and greater local empowerment also create an enabling environment for the food security program. To strengthen these efforts, the Government of Ethiopia has been undertaking a program of civil service reform that aims to improve service delivery through better human and financial resource management, concentration on strategic priorities and corruption control measures. This emphasis on improved Government service delivery led to the National Capacity Building Program which aims to develop institutional and human resource capacities in all sectors of the economy. In the agriculture sector, under the Technical Vocational Education and Training (Agri-TVET) program, 25 colleges have been established

with a target of producing about 45,000 agricultural graduates / Development Assistants (DAs) in the program period and so intensify agricultural extension services to farmers. Non agricultural TVET trainings will also be intensified.

Two other national policies are critical for the food security program's achievement: the National Policy for Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM) and the National Population Policy. Central to the NPDPM are social safety nets, which are intended to provide families a cushion against food insecurity while at the same time creating productive assets within the community. Actions defined by the National Population Policy are to reduce population growth, which constitutes a key problem for economic development and is a major determinant of the food insecurity problem in Ethiopia.

2.2.2.3 Main Actors and Programmes

The actors in the field of food aid and food security in Ethiopia are Government Ministries and institutions at federal and regional levels, international organizations, donors and donor organizations, and international as well as national NGOs. They are all part of a relief food system which has evolved in Ethiopia over the last decades.

At federal level, the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) has an overall strategic and coordinating function in matters of food aid and food security. It was created as umbrella ministry in 2002, incorporating the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC), and a Food Security Unit (FSU). The DPPC is mandated with the planning and organization of relief operations. It maintains an Early Warning System (EWS) and has also been responsible for creating relief-development linkages through Employment Generation Schemes (EGS). The future role and structure of DPPC is presently reconsidered. At regional level, food security coordination offices (FSCO) have been established with EC support in four regions (Amhara, Oromyia, SNNPR and Tigray). The FSCOs are in charge of planning, coordinating and monitoring regional food security programmes.

Various international organizations and many donors provide support to food aid and food security programmes. Despite declared Government intentions to a shift policy emphasis from food aid to sustainable food security programmes, , which is supported by the EC and other donor and development organizations, food aid still absorbs by far the lion's share of financial resources and capacities..

The two main objectives of the EC's Food Security Strategy for Ethiopia are: Meeting emergency needs and supporting long-term development and food security. As stated in the 1996 Council Regulation on Food Aid and Food Security it is the declared objective of the European Commission to reduce the size and financial allocation for food aid assistance and increase investment in development-oriented activities aiming at long-term food security. Unfortunately, this shift has not yet taken place, and more than 80% of EC's food security expenditure for Ethiopia has been for food aid. Repeated food crises in Ethiopia have led to a massive 450% increase of food aid quantities between 1996 and 2003.

Major food aid donors to Ethiopia are USAID and the EC, channelling their food aid through WFP, NGOs, and in the case of the EC, also directly to the DPPC. WFP is the largest food aid provider. It also maintains a food aid needs assessment capacity (Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping, VAM) which complements (and partly duplicates) assessments made by DPPC (EWS) and USAID (FEWS).

Apart from food aid, many donors (e.g. CIDA, FAO, EC and EU member states, USAID, World Bank and others) support a wide variety of food security projects and programmes and rural development activities which are relevant for food security.⁵ The EC provides direct project and budgetary support and technical assistance to the GoE for the implementation of food security programmes in four regions, as well as indirect assistance to international and national NGOs. The World Bank is supporting a food security project (with additional contribution by the GoE, CIDA, DFID, Italy and the local communities), a pastoral community development project, an emergency drought recovery project, and a social rehabilitation and development fund project.

Further donor activities in the field of food security comprise:

- Capacity building measures at federal, regional, woreda and community level, supported by different donor organizations,
- Pastoral community development (World Bank, EC support in preparation⁶) for food security.
- Main donors and the Government have formed a “Safety Nets Working Group”, to work out a concept for a national system of productive safety nets and to define common approaches for assistance.⁷
- Establishment of an M&E system for food security programmes.⁸

Many donors channel their assistance through NGOs, and more than 200 international and national NGOs implement projects in the field of food aid, food security, agricultural and rural development, mother and child health care and nutrition. International NGOs have formed the umbrella organization CRDA (Christian Relief and Development Organization) for the exchange of information and coordination of their approaches.

2.2.2.4 The Challenges of Food Security

Food security is a complex task and challenge due to many influencing factors, such as supply and demand issues and technology and policy all of which interact with the four dimensions of food and nutrition security, i.e. food availability, food access, stability and food utilization. Food security remains prominent on the agenda of Ethiopia.

As major challenges of food security in Ethiopia the following can be identified: Backward agricultural production technologies, population pressure, environmental particularly soil degradation, poverty, weak institutional capacity to uproot the causes of food insecurity, inadequate infrastructure and social services and inappropriate policies in the past.

⁵ See Annex 4: Other donors' programmes in the domain of Food Security

⁶ Mokku, Jarso and Robert Walker, 2002, Short term Technical Assistance to Identify Appropriate Pastoral Intervention Areas for EC Support, Consultancy Report, June 2002

⁷ Cf. Joint Government-Multidonor Identification Mission, January 29 – February 13, 2004, Ethiopia Safety Net Programme, Aide Memoire (draft Feb. 13),

⁸ Cf. A Concept Note on Monitoring & Evaluation System for the Food Security Program, Feb. 2004.

(i) Technological Challenges

One of the most significant factors causing food crises in Ethiopia are primitive agricultural practices. The use of traditional farm tools and implements, dependence on rain-fed agriculture, respectively the absence of appropriate irrigation facilities, low- input intensity with regard to fertilizers, improved seed, and pesticide chemicals, inadequate post harvest technologies are critical obstacles to growth of agricultural production in general and of food grain production in particular.

Fertilizers are applied in Ethiopia only in small quantities. In 1971-75, average total annual use of fertilizers was 7685.8 tons or 1.6 kg per hectare. Since 1971 average fertilizer application per hectare increased to 292856 tons, or 36 kg. in year 2000.

Another indicator of inefficient farming practice is the low level of improved seed utilization. E.g., total commercial sales of hybrid seed by Ethiopia Seed Enterprise (ESE), pioneer company in Ethiopia in the agricultural seed business, amounted in 1994/95 1559.3 tons, or about 2 kg per ha equivalent. The situation has still not markedly improved by 1997/98 when the total amount of improved seed distribution (sale) to farmers was 3661.7 tons, which is 4.5 kg per ha or 4.2 per rural household (Seed Agency, 1999).{19}

The present food crises in Ethiopia underscore the importance of increased food production, reduction of post-harvest losses (estimated at 25-30%) and a vigorous promotion of food processing industry. The lack of creative problem-solutions and innovations in the agriculture and agro-industrial sector has led to little technological change.to a general stagnation and even decline in (staple food) crop production and proved to be an obstacle towards the development of a diversified, high quality food processing industry.

One of the critical technical problems which Ethiopian agriculture has to address are the inadequate soil- and water management practices. This particularly applies to clay soil (60% of total cultivated acreage belongs to this soil category) and water logged land. These lands are not used efficiently due to technical constraints.

Other factors which also contribute to backward agricultural practices are: inadequate extension services and poor research-extension-farmer linkages, outdated farm implements and tools, lack of irrigation facilities, and inadequate storing and processing technologies. Another important constraint is a widespread traditional land tenure system, which does not give farmers the needed land use security and thus prevents farmers from investing in land improvement and appropriate soil and water management practices.

(ii) Demographical Challenges

One of the major causes of food crises in Ethiopia is rapid population growth. In 2004 the Ethiopia's population is estimated to exceed 70 million people; at an annual growth rate of 3 percent, the population will double within 23 years. The average population density of the country is about 56 persons per square kilometer, but much higher in the densely populated highlands.

However, Ethiopia does not face food crises because it is increasingly unable to feed its growing population from domestic food production. More importantly - it does not have the financial resources, e.g. earned by a thriving export industry to balance such deficits through commercial imports. Moreover, the growing population pressure in rural areas and the limited potential of expanding total cropped acreage has led to a reduced land - man

ratio. In general, due to population pressure, deforestation, overgrazing, declining availability and productivity of farmlands, rural - urban migration and unemployment have dramatically increased.

Households with small plots seldom produce enough grain to meet their consumption requirements. Subsistence and survival are their overriding concern. Nearly all farm produce as well as any non-farm income is devoted to food. There is no surplus for investment and for input purchase. It has also been confirmed that the quantity of fertilizer application per hectare is directly related to farm size. A similar relationship was also observed for improved seeds, breeds of animals and farm implements. The finding that non- users of improved inputs (fertilizer, seed, farm implements. etc.) cultivate less land than users is inconsistent with the general observation that intensification is higher on small farms to compensate for land shortages. It could be that average farm size in Ethiopia has already fallen below the critical threshold, implying an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. Farmers with very smallholdings lack not only the cash to buy commercial inputs but also oxen for land preparation.

(iii) *Environmental and Land Degradation*

The wealth of Ethiopia depends on its ability to conserve and manage its land resources. Soil degradation not only results in decreased food production, but also causes droughts, ecological imbalances (desertification) and consequently a degradation of the quality of life. In Ethiopia the most conspicuous symptoms of negative impacts of land degradation are stagnating and declining yields of food crops and rising levels of poverty.

Population growth and poverty in many rain-fed areas are causing serious resource degradation. Until recently, natural resources were generally abundant in these areas. Farmers kept fallow land allowing a recovery of soil fertility and practiced crop rotation and shifting cultivation. Moreover, marginal lands have not been cultivated at all. Today, rain fed lands frequently must meet not only increasing food requirements of a growing population, but also provide for basic essentials such as fuel wood and house construction. Without an adequate increase in agricultural productivity, farmers increase their cropping intensity and take marginal lands into cultivation to secure their livelihoods, and so contribute to an accelerated soil degradation and erosion.

Farm and grazing lands have suffered from massive land degradation. The seriousness of the problem becomes apparent considering the fact that nearly 70 percent of the Ethiopian highlands have slopes in excess of 30%. The virtual absence of terracing and other soil and water conservation techniques compounds the problem of soil degradation on such terrain (Report on the Ethiopian Economy, 1999.2000) {20}.

Inadequate and erratic rainfall is another phenomenon causing food crises in many rain fed and drought prone areas. In Ethiopia, more than 95 percent of food grain production stems from rain fed subsistence farms. Due to this fact, rainfall has significant impact on the agricultural sector in general and on food grain production in particular. Studies indicate that a 10 percent drop in rainfall results in a decrease of cereal yields by 4 percent (Webb and Braun, 1994). {21} On the other hand , Ethiopia's major rivers carry vast volumes of water (which however runs off without having been used for irrigation purposes) and carry off enormous quantities of fertile top soil estimated at 50 million tons annually.

Droughts and desertification are closely inter-linked and mutually reinforcing; whereas drought is generally a result of failure or shortage of rainfall), desertification is principally manmade. There are four causes of desertification, each aggravated by population pressure: overgrazing, improper cultivation practices, deforestation and absence of irrigation. Development of drought resistant crop varieties, protection of the environment and increased use of irrigation potentials are, therefore, considered to offer the greatest potentials for achieving food security in Ethiopia.

(iv) Policy Challenges

In Ethiopia, the major policy approach and standard response mechanism to poverty, food insecurity and drought have been public appeals to the international community for relief food aid and the establishment of a relief food aid system. This system has been further developed and refined over the years, so it was capable to handle up to 1.6 million tons of relief food aid in year 2003. However, since increasing relief food operations are neither sustainable nor a solution to the problem of food insecurity in Ethiopia, major policy shifts are required. Apart from the first steps already undertaken (see par. 2 above), more emphasis shall be given to:

- Population policies, to curb population growth;
- Water and irrigation policies, to make better use of the available water resources;
- Land tenure policies, to grant land tenure security and encourage farmers to invest in their land;
- Rural credit policies, to provide the necessary capital for investments in agriculture;
- Marketing policies, to enable the private sector to more effectively fulfil its marketing functions and achieve better integration of the national food economy;
- Appropriate policies specifically targeting women and youth, to promote human resource development.

2.3 Summary of the mission

The field mission in Ethiopia took place from March 5 to 19, 2004. The evaluation team was composed of Manfred Metz, teamleader, Mr. Fantu Gola, national consultant and Mr. Martin Steinmeyer, international consultant.

During the field mission, information has been collected through document reviews and interviews of:

- Members of the EC Delegation,
- Government Representatives at federal level (MoFED, MRD, DPPC)
- UN agencies and other donors (WFP, WB, USAID, Germany, Ireland, Italy)
- EURONAIID & NGOs

A field trip was made to SNNPRS, to contact the relevant regional government authorities and NGOs in Awassa and to visit projects in the Hossana zone supported through the NGOs Farm Africa and SOS-Sahel.

The evaluation team is grateful to the members of the EC Delegation, the Government officials and other contacted persons who readily shared their information and views, for all the support received.

A detailed chronology of the mission and list of persons interviewed is given as Annex 1 of this Country Report.

2.4 Constraints

EC's food aid and food security programme in Ethiopia is highly complex and difficult to adequately cover during a two weeks field mission. Substantial information could, however, be drawn from previous evaluations,⁹ and the fact that two members of this mission (teamleader and national consultant) had also been members of the previous CSP evaluation conducted in November 2003 proved to be both, advantageous and, at the same time, also as a constraint: Presumably due to the fact that not all members of the Delegation had been pleased with the results of the previous CSP evaluation, initial briefing appointments with the head of the RDFS Department of the Delegation had been cancelled and could only be arranged at a later stage.

⁹ Danagro, 2001; Court of Auditors 2001 (country report) / 2003 (special report); Tom Hockley, 2003 (on 1996 Programme); Haulleville/Sohier 2003 (Management Support), MWH-ODI-ECDPM 2003/4 (CSP Evaluation); see References in Annex 2.

3. EVALUATIVE QUESTIONS

3.1 Evaluative Question 1

What is the level of coherence between the food security policies, strategies and objectives of Regulation No.1292/96 and those from other geographical instruments (EDF, ALA, MEDA, TACIS, CARDS) and budget lines (ECHO, Rehabilitation, NGO Cofinancing)?

The evaluative question 1 will be dealt with in the synthesis report.

3.2 Evaluative Question 2

What is the level of integration of the food security policy within the Commission's development strategy with the partner country concerned as laid down in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP)?

Coherence of the overall objectives of the food security policy and the CSP, and Importance of FA-FS issue in CSP

Food Security is one of the three focal 'sectors' of EC support (better: focal areas, the other focal areas being macroeconomic support and infrastructure) as identified in the CSP. Objectives of poverty reduction, sub-objectives of improved access, increased supplies and effective crisis management, as defined in the NIP, are coherent with the food security objectives of the Council Regulation.

Clear definition of the role of the regulation within CSP:

There is only a cross-reference in the CSP/NIP to the Food Security Budget Line (not to the Regulation as such) as one source of funding, EDF being the other source of funding for food security. Although there is no explicit reference in the CSP to the Regulation, the principles of the EC food aid and food security policy, as set out in the Regulation, are well reflected in the CSP. The CSP puts particular emphasis on the need for a paradigm change, to move away from a food aid mentality towards systematic efforts to address structural poverty and chronic food insecurity, and points out the possibility to use the resources from the 9th EDF and the budget line for a multi-annual commitment to support medium-term policies.

Complementarities of the various EC instruments within CSP:

The following complementarities of different EC instruments can be identified:

- The use of general budget support for the promotion of the economic reform programme / PRSP process, and targeted food security budget support to promote the Government's food security programme. The food security programme, again, is part of the PRSP process (see JC 3, below).

- In the CSP, financing of food security interventions through the resources of the FA/FS Budget Line as well as of the 9th EDF had been envisaged.¹⁰

Furthermore, the CSP explicitly points out the importance and the contribution of improved infrastructure (one of EC's other focal areas, see above) to food security.

Coordination of EC interventions:

The CSP refers to the PRSP process – an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) had been presented by the GoE in November 2000; the final PRSP, the SDPRD,¹¹ was released in July 2002 – as the common framework for coordination within the Government and with the donors.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 2:

The CSP sets out food security as one of the three focal “sectors” of EC support in Ethiopia and, although the Council Regulation 96 is not explicitly mentioned in the CSP, the objectives of the Commission's food security policy (improving access, availability and emergency response) are well reflected in the CSP.

¹⁰ The EDF resources, originally allocated for food security, have later (at the High Level Retreat, Sep. 2003) been decided to be transferred to general budget support.

¹¹ FDRE-MOFED, 2002, Ethiopia: Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program, Addis Ababa

3.3 Evaluative Question 3

What is the coherence between EC food aid and food security policy and national strategies of beneficiary countries, especially the PRSP?

Coherence of the overall objectives of CSP and PRSP or national strategies

There is a high degree of coherence between the objectives of the EC food aid and food security policy and national policies and strategies. Apart from the identical overall objective of poverty reduction, the NIP explicitly refers to the three specific objectives of improved access, increased food supplies and effective crisis management, which are set out in the Federal Food Security Strategy and SDPRP.

Importance of FA-FS issue in PRSP or national strategies

The importance of FA-FS issues in the PRS is documented by the fact that the Federal Food Security Strategy became integral part of the SDPRP.

Clear definition of the role of EC within PRSP or national strategies

In the SDPRP, the role of the EC in supporting food security objectives is specifically acknowledged, in particular with regard to Employment Generation Schemes (EGS), capacity building and other integrated programmes. With such interventions, the EC has initiated a policy shift from a primary emergency food aid orientation towards long-term sustainable food security which has subsequently been adopted by the Government of Ethiopia (GoE). This policy shift manifests itself in the Coalition for Food Security initiative as well as in the creation of a budget line for food security by the GoE and the financial resources allocated to it (ETB 1 billion for the budget year 2003/4).

Rationale of EC intervention¹²

The European Commission has a long record of substantial food aid and food security assistance to Ethiopia. The EC has been the second largest food aid donor following the USAID. Since 1996, the Commission has strived to focus on efforts addressing structural food insecurity and to shift resources from emergency food aid to development and sustainable food security. The most important instrument to address food security issues in Ethiopia over the past years has been the Food Aid / Food Security budget line.

Following the adoption of the Federal Food Security Strategy by the GoE, the EC has launched food security programmes (96 EGS, IFSPs 1998 and 2000) aimed at providing supplementary income to targeted chronically food insecure populations in four regions (Amhara, Oromyia, SNNPRS and Tigray) while building productive community assets. In October 2002, a FSBS/Foreign Exchange facility (€25 million, of which € 3 million for

¹² Derived from: EC Delegation, 2003, Food Security Ethiopia, Note prepared as background information of the High Level Retreat of October 2003.

TA) was approved, aiming at strengthening food security public expenditures in the four regions, particularly with respect to establishing safety nets and other activities to enhance food security.

However, in spite of such initiatives and efforts towards longer-term food security, still the major part of EC's assistance remained to be in the form of food aid. Reasons for the moderate result to actually translate the policy intentions of a planned shift from food aid towards food security into reality have been problems in the design of the food security programmes, repeatedly stalled policy dialogue, capacity constraints on all administrative levels, low absorption capacity and slow disbursement of funds.

Coordination of donors and government interventions

The major coordination and cooperation mechanisms established between the GoE, donors and other actors are

- Food Security Steering Committees (FSSC) at federal and regional levels; although the federal FSSC, the overall coordinating body for food security at national level, supposed to meet quarterly, has not convened for more than one year;
- Joint task forces (e.g. the New Coalition) and working groups (e.g. on safety nets);
- High level retreats (HLR) of the GoE and EC (2002 and Oct. 2003), on initiative of the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi;
- Mechanisms for donor coordination are the Donor Assistance Group (DAG) and monthly meetings of the "Agriculture and Food Security Assistance Committee" (AF-SAC); the latter is chaired by the EC but largely confined to information exchange and technical issues.

The various initiatives for coordination have only been partly effective so far: A consensus has been achieved between the GoE and the EC and other donors on some key policy areas (replacement of emergency food aid by sustainable approaches to food security, restructuring of DPPC, promotion of safety nets), there remained, however, dissent on some issues, such as the approaches regarding the implementation of a resettlement programme and on the priorities and pace of implementing the policy shift from food relief to food security. Nevertheless, there are signs of progress: The policy dialogue between the GoE and EC has been reinforced through the High Level Retreats, a joint working group on safety nets has been established, agreement on the deduction of the predictable cases of structural food insecurity from the emergency appeals has been achieved, and the GoE as well as donors have undertaken steps to review and adjust the institutional and coordination structures.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 3:

In terms of the overall objective of poverty alleviation, priority on food security as well as the specific food security objectives - improved access, increased production and availability, effective emergency response - there is a high degree of coherence between the Ethiopian and EC food security policies. However, this coherence in terms of overall food security objectives has not always and fully been translated into actual implementation, due to different priorities of the GoE vis-à-vis the EC and other donors.

3.4 Evaluative Question 4

What is the added value of Food Aid in kind (FA) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

Relevance of FA strategies and actions:

Table 2 presents data on estimated food aid requirements and the EC food aid allocations over the period 1996 – 2003.

Table 2: Estimated food aid requirements and EC food aid allocations 1996-2003

	Population (millions)	Meher Cereals & Pulses Production (Million MT)	Affected Population (%)	Planned-Beneficiaries acc. to DPPC Appeals, No.	Food Aid Requested MT	EC Food Allocation MT*	EC Food Allocations %
1996	56.4	9.642	4,94	2.782.600	295.580	33.000	11
1997	58.1	10.268	5,78	3.360.690	329.451	74.275	23
1998	59.9	6.841	6,88	4.121.115	545.221	76.344	14
1999	61.7	8.415	11,73	7.233.677	775.549	96.128	12
2000	63.5	8.701	16,63	10.560.491	1.380.264	199.948	14
2001	65.3	10.370	7,17	4.685.510	752.341	140.610	19
2002	67.2	9.017	11,71	7.874.353	897.289	197.744	22
2003	69.1	7.369	19,07	13.184.772	1.802.351	435.000**	23

* Part of the EC food aid until year 2000 has been allocated for the Emergency Food Security Reserve.

**Includes 31,000 tons for replenishment of EFSR; actual deliveries in 2003: 339,117 tons

Source: EC Delegation

Food aid is relevant in emergency situations, particularly after major droughts (as has been the case in 2000 and 2002), when it helps to avoid famine, to save lives, and also to preserve assets of the disaster affected populations. It is less appropriate if applied as standard response mechanism to address structural poverty and chronic food insecurity problems, as it has been largely the case in Ethiopia. By providing short-term relief, food aid is rather the option of choice to cure a symptom (justified only when the symptom is a threat to life) than to effectively address the causes of food insecurity (see also following paragraph).

Effectiveness of FA strategies and actions:

Food aid is an effective means to overcome temporary food shortages arising from severe droughts or other disaster situations.

EC food aid has also been provided to build up the **Emergency Food Security Reserve (EFSR)**. The EFSR is effective in bridging the time between the moment when the need for relief aid arises and the time of actual arrival of food aid deliveries, and to cater for the immediate needs which arise in sudden and major emergencies. The current EFSR volume

(target stock level) is 407,000 tons of grain. This should be sufficient to cater for the food needs of about 6 Million people (10 % of the population) for half a year. It should be noted that the EFSR only stores grain and no other supplementary food items.

The short-term effectiveness of food aid in bridging temporary food deficits stands against longer-term problematic effects. Market distortion, caused by massive food aid, is likely to have adverse implications for domestic food production, farm income, market development and self-reliance, perpetuating the dependence on food aid. Such negative effects must be assumed to have occurred in Ethiopia in the past¹³ taking the continuously increasing food aid requirements (see Table 2 above) into consideration.

Efficiency of FA strategies and actions:

Over the years, a grand relief food aid system has (been) developed in Ethiopia with substantial donor support. It functions fairly well, taking into account the large amounts of food aid (1.6 million tons in 2003) being mobilised, handled, and carried to even remote places of the country.

Inefficiencies in terms of delayed deliveries and late arrivals are a notorious and typical phenomenon of EC food aid. Such inefficiencies could be largely compensated by the buffer-stock function of the EFSR, which in turn illustrates the efficiency of emergency reserves well. This, however, only applies to food aid grain stored in the EFSR, not to supplementary food items. According to EURONAIID and NGOs, there have been frequent delays in the supply of supplementary food.

As to **cost-efficiency**: It must be noted that food aid is a relatively costly undertaking. Without considering management costs of the food aid organizations and costs for intermediate storage, the costs of one ton of wheat food aid delivered at distribution site amount to an average of US\$300/ton. Expressed in local currency (ETB) and the usual unit of grain measurement (quintal = 100kg), this equals ETB 264/quintal and compares with a value to beneficiaries, based on average local wheat market prices, of only ETB 155/quintel.¹⁴ Thus, the costs of food aid delivered from abroad are, on average, 70% above the local market prices and the value to beneficiaries. Due to the low cost-efficiency ratio, food aid deliveries are only justified in emergency situations when there is virtually no other alternative for saving lives.

Local purchases are a more cost-efficient alternative to conventional food aid deliveries. Apart from cost-efficiency considerations (see above: comparison of cost for food aid deliveries with local market prices), there are a number of additional advantages of local purchases over conventional food aid deliveries from abroad:

- They are an incentive for market development and market oriented food production, enhancing rural development.

¹³ But no comprehensive and in-depth study of this phenomenon has been undertaken yet.

¹⁴ MWH-ECDPM-ODI: Evaluation of the European Commission's Country Strategy for Ethiopia, Draft final report, Vol. II: Supporting Documentation, Judgement Criterion no. JC 02.2, February 2004

- They contribute to income generation for traders and farmers;
- Donor funding of local purchases increases the foreign exchange earnings of a country;
- Locally purchased products can be mobilised faster than those imported from abroad.

The EC has played a pioneering role in launching local purchase programme. About 30% of its food aid to Ethiopia has been procured through local operations since 1996, and other donors and organisations (WFP, DPPC) have been encouraged to make local purchases as well.

Impact of FA strategies and actions:

Positive short-term impacts of food aid mentioned above (bridging temporary food deficits, helping to save assets, saving lives) contrast with (possibly) problematic medium- and long-term impacts, such as market distortion, price depression, disincentive to domestic production, reducing farm income and causing dependency. Such effects have been observed in certain areas and times,¹⁵ however there is a lack of systematic impact analysis of such effects at national aggregate level. Such lack of impact analysis has to be considered a grave and critical deficiency in Ethiopia where, over many years, food aid has made up a significant share (10 % and above) of domestic food supplies. There is abundant evidence that part of the relief food aid always enters the market.¹⁶

Sustainability of FA strategies and actions:

Taking into consideration the steady and immense increases of food aid to Ethiopia over the last years (see Table 2 above), it can be safely concluded that this trend cannot be maintained. Food aid of such dimension is simply unsustainable.

Comparative advantage of FA to operations in other instruments (outside regulation) dealing with FA:

The EC food aid provided under the Regulation is adapted to the established system in Ethiopia with respect to planning, coordination and implementation of food aid operations, including the function of the EFSR as buffer stock. This ensures that the food aid grain can be rapidly mobilised and brought to the areas in need, even though it usually takes several months until the food aid deliveries actually arrive. There is, on the other hand, a case for ECHO food aid, particularly when there is an urgent need for supplementary food which is not stored in the EFSR. Apart from such situations, ECHO has not been involved in food aid operations in Ethiopia.

¹⁵ MWH-ECDPM-ODI, 2004, Vol. II: Supporting Documentation, Judgement Criterion no. JC 02.3

¹⁶ Although beneficiaries are “officially” not supposed to do so, they often sell part of the relief rations, in order to be able to pay for the transport costs to carry the food home or to cover other expenditures.

Coordination of the various types of operation (within the Regulation) and other instruments dealing with FA:

In exceptional emergencies, as was the case in 2000 and 2002, “normal” food aid operations under the established system of relief food aid are complemented by special operations which are coordinated by special task forces (e.g. Somali region 2000, Afar 2002), composed by DPPC, WFP, donor organisations and NGOs operating in the affected areas. The task forces are particularly concerned with the coordination relief logistics.

Quality (effectiveness) of beneficiary targeting

Targeting of beneficiaries is the most important and, at the same time, the weakest link in the chain of the Ethiopian food aid delivery system. Studies on food aid targeting have revealed that food aid does not necessarily reach the areas where the food shortages are most severe, and that it does not necessarily reach the poorest and most vulnerable households.¹⁷

Due to a lack of monitoring data, little is known about who and where the final beneficiaries are, about the actual time and frequency of distribution, and whether, and to what extent, misappropriation has occurred at the level of distribution. Responsible for such deficiencies are capacity problems at community and woreda level, poor communication links, and insufficient budget allocations for and attention given to the monitoring tasks. The lack of reliable and timely monitoring data precludes a sound assessment of the targeting efficiency and makes corrective actions, if required, impossible. Monitoring of the distribution of emergency food aid 2003 had been planned by the EC to start in June 2003, however, was delayed and actually started in October 2003, that is at a time when most of the emergency food had already been distributed.¹⁸ This substantially reduced the significance of the results.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 4:

The food aid operations have absorbed more than 80% of the EC budget line resources. They have contributed to reach the objective of emergency food aid, namely to improve disaster preparedness, to bridge acute food shortages during critical times, and to save lives. Although the relief system in Ethiopia is well established and capable to mobilise large amounts of food aid, and to carry it to even remote places of the country, the efficiency and effectiveness of the interventions should be further improved, particularly by reducing delays of deliveries, and by ensuring effective targeting through real-time monitoring of the distribution process.

The remarkable flexibility of the 96 regulation regarding the use of different instruments has facilitated a massive expansion of food aid and so contributed to the establishment of an extensive relief food aid system in Ethiopia - at the cost of the proclaimed “paradigm shift” towards more fundamental, longer-term and sustainable approaches for addressing the problem of food insecurity.

¹⁷ See MWH-ECDPM-ODI, 2004, Vol. II Supporting documentation, Judgement Criterion no. JC 02.2.

¹⁸ See Tropical Consults, 2004, Independent Monitoring of the EC Relief Food Aid Operations in Ethiopia During the Year 2003, Mid-term summary, Addis Ababa, January

3.5 Evaluative Question 5

What is the added value of the currency facility-CF / Budgetary Support-BS for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

Relevance of CF-BS strategies and actions:

The instrument of Food Security Budget Support (FSBS) fits, in principle, very well into the present development policy environment in Ethiopia, characterised by the following main features:

- Food security objectives are given highest priority by the Government,
- Adoption of a National Food Security Strategy,
- Ongoing PRSP process, with food security being an integral part of this process,
- On-going economic and institutional reform,
- General budget support by EC and other donors.

FSBS aims at giving the Government greater autonomy, responsibility and flexibility in using the resources for the pursuance of commonly agreed food security objectives.

The regulation regarding the use of the foreign exchange facility for importers of food items is irrelevant in the Ethiopian context.

Effectiveness of CF-BS strategies and actions:

In order to be effective, the instruments of budget support requires a common understanding on the objectives to be pursued and the procedures to be followed. There are some risk factors, which are likely to hamper the achievements of the intended results of CF-BS:

- 1) There is no full agreement between the GoE and the EC on policy approaches and priorities (e.g. resettlement, reform of the relief system, land tenure); an agreement about the priority use of the funds for safety nets has eventually been reached.
- 2) A high number of restrictions (positive and negative list of activities to be/ not to be supported) and conditions for the use of the FSBS substantially reduce the specific and intended properties of budget support (GoE ownership regarding decisions on and flexibility in resource use).
- 3) There have been different perceptions on the nature and importance of conditions and uncertainty how to handle the new and specific instrument of targeted budget support among Government and the EC.

These factors have contributed to extensive delays in the disbursement of funds. The first installment of the EC countervalue funds have been transferred by the central Government to the regional administrations in March 2004 only, i.e. one full year after signature of the MoU.

Apart from different financial arrangements under the budget support programme, there are no substantive conceptual changes regarding implementation if compared to the previous programme support. The EC support is directed to a number of food deficit woredas in the four regions, as it has been the case in the previous EGS/IFSPs (see Table 3). A possible alternative approach, namely to provide *complementary* support for selected critical pur-

poses which are not adequately addressed by other programmes and projects, has apparently not been considered.

Table 3: Distribution of the 1st CVF installment of the EC Block grant to the Regions

No.	Region	Amount Million ETB	No. of beneficiary Woredas	Amount per Woreda Million ETB
1	Tigray	9.616	5	1.923
2	Amhara	17.662	8	2.207
3	Oromiya	12.122	6	2.020
4	SNNPR	6.152	6	1.025
	TOTAL	45.572	25	

Source: Communication MoR to MoFED, 16 Feb 004

As can be seen from Table 3, the formula applied to the allocation of funds to the regions is not based on the number of woredas to be supported, nor - as pointed out in the MoR communication - on submitted workplans,. It remains an open question, how the differences of allocations ranging between ETB 1 million (SNNPR) and 2.2 Million (Amhara) are justified. Furthermore, due to such unlike fund allocations, problems in timely justification of expenditures and delays in the release of the second tranche must be expected (see following paragraph).

Efficiency of CF-BS strategies and actions:

Apart from the delays which have already occurred, the split into 3 forex tranches and 6 CVF tranches is likely to cause an enormous administrative workload for the regional administration, the NAO and the Delegation in terms of consolidating and checking accounts. It is doubtful whether normal government accounting/reporting procedures and time tables can be used matching the FSBS time table for the tranches. Even with special accounting and reporting arrangements, one can safely predict transparency and attribution problems leading to further and accumulating delays. The provision to allow new releases before the funds of the preceding tranche have been almost fully (by 90%) exhausted will become unworkable. While each CVF tranche shall be good for an average four months' implementation-period, the processing of the next tranche release shall be possible when 90% of the previous tranche will have been spent and accounted for. Funding gaps and interrupted programme implementation are thus programmed, all the more if the pace of programme implementation differs in the regions.¹⁹

Impact of CF-BS strategies and actions:

Not applicable since implementation of the programme has not yet started, impacts have not yet materialised.

¹⁹ Cf. MWH-ECDPM-ODI, 2004, Vol. II Supporting documentation, Intervention Assessment Form IF 08, Food Security Programme 2002. See also paragraph above on the issue of different allocations per woreda.

Sustainability of CF-BS strategies and actions:

The GoE has already committed substantial funds from own resources for food security. This gives an indication of a genuine and sustainable commitment to address food security concerns through the normal budgetary process.

Comparative advantage CF-BS in comparison to other types of operations (within the Regulation) and operations in other instruments dealing with BS:

There is a potential for greater flexibility and strengthened ownership of the GoE with the CF-BS, though this potential has not yet been fully realised. The effectiveness is likely to be impaired by the special administrative conditions and already experienced management inefficiencies of the budget support programme.

The special food security budget support is intended to further encourage and reinforce Government's own efforts to promote food security. This will only succeed if linked with an intensive policy dialogue.

It is envisaged that the food security CF-BS will replace in the medium term other instruments of the regulation, including food aid. Thus, the GoE may use CF-BS funds also for the purchase of relief food commodities, either through local purchases or commercial food imports. Such a development can be problematic, if government or a newly established semi-governmental authority would effectively become a commercial agent in the grain- / food market. Alternatively, if purchases were to be delegated to special licensees, the issue of misappropriation or corruption can arise. In any case, to enable the Government to use CF-BS funds for this purpose, the item "food aid" would have to be removed from the negative list of the programme document and a common understanding will have to be reached by the EC and GoE concerning utilisation and monitoring of budget support funds for.

Coordination of the various instruments dealing with BS:

Although the objectives of the general BS (poverty alleviation) and the FSBS (improving food security as one of its important aspects) are closely linked, the general BS and the FSBS are organised and handled quite differently and independently from each other.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 5:

The move towards sector budget support in Ethiopia is innovative and in line with general EU principles of its development policy: Strengthening local ownership, higher efficiency of operations and greater harmonisation among donors. It fits well with the support systems in relation to the SDPRP and general budget support related thereto. However, the specific arrangements (sector import support modality, detailed earmarking through positive and negative lists, and cumbersome administrative demands with respect to handling split instalments and accounting) threaten the effectiveness of the instrument. Due to the delays in implementation and still unsettled differences on policy approaches and priorities, there is a risk that expected results and impacts will not be achieved within the two year implementation period. On the other hand, the government's commitment of own budgetary resources for food security gives rise to hopes that the programme may become effective in medium term.

3.6 Evaluative Question 6

What is the added value of the operations to support food security (FS) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

Relevance of FS strategies and actions:

The targeted areas of the Food Security Programme interventions - EGS 96 (closed end of 2002), IFSPs 98 and 2000, IFSP implemented by NGOs - are food insecure and drought prone woredas. The interventions aim at natural resource conservation, agricultural production and productivity increases, improvement of rural infrastructure, and at the creation of employment and income through cash-for-work arrangements. They are food security relevant and address problems of access and availability.

The planned pastoral development programme is food security relevant because it targets vulnerable areas and beneficiaries. Pastoral areas and pastoralists have been widely neglected in the past, although they do constitute a sizeable portion of the Ethiopian society and have been repeatedly victims of droughts. (Note: the source of financing of the pastoral development programmes still has to be decided. Previously foreseen EDF funds have been re-allocated as general budget support.)

Effectiveness of FS strategies and actions:

The food security interventions have been effective in generating – through cash-for-work – employment and income. However, the effectiveness of the FS interventions has been limited by the late start and slow implementation process (see following paragraph on efficiency).

There is some anecdotal evidence that (some of) the food security interventions have been effective in increasing and stabilising agricultural production at household level. Because of a lack of impact monitoring and evaluation of such programmes, however, not much can be said about the effectiveness of the interventions at community, woreda and programme level. The effectiveness of the EC supported interventions was markedly improved when complemented by technical assistance, management support and capacity building inputs from other sides (e.g. GTZ and Irish Aid in Tigray).

NGO projects appear to be particularly effective and sustainable if close cooperation and coordination with government structures is maintained.

Efficiency of FS strategies and actions:

The efficiency and effectiveness of the food security programmes has been severely affected by the delays in getting the programmes started as well as by further delays which occurred during implementation. Main reasons for the delays were belated signing of MoUs, delayed transfers of funds from Brussels to Ethiopia as well as within the country, restructuring of the Government administration and capacity constraints in planning and implementation at central, regional and woreda levels.

Although food security projects implemented by NGOs suffered less than the direct programmes from capacity constraints and administrative restructuring, they have also been affected by lengthy approval processes and delays in transfer of funds already cited above.

Cash-for-work, as applied in the EGS/IFSPs, is more cost-efficient than food-for-work.²⁰

In the case of NGO food-for-work interventions, the efficiency of project implementation was sometimes hampered by an uncoordinated provision of resources where food and funds would have been needed at the same time. Cash funds and food aid from the EC have been made available at different times, occasionally more than one year apart.

Impact of FS strategies and actions:

There are short-term impacts in terms of improved access due to cash-for-work programmes. Impacts on food production at household and community level, not to speak at woredas, regional and national levels, have been very limited so far, among others because of delays and constraints in implementation (see above). Furthermore, there is no impact monitoring system in place to systematically assess the impacts. Such impact monitoring would also be needed to induce real-time adjustments in programme design and implementation, if deemed necessary.

Sustainability of FS strategies and actions:

The sustainability of those programme components which directly target households and benefit individual farmers (household packages, individual ponds, improvements in farming) depends on their effectiveness: If and as long as they are effective (and are also perceived to be effective by the beneficiaries!), the activities will be continued without substantial further outside support.

Capacity building in programme planning and management, and the establishment of organizational structures at community or woredas level which ensure proper management and maintenance of the works (e.g. feeder roads, service stations, afforestation, irrigation facilities) will help to ensure sustainability.

The fact that the Government has allocated own budgetary resources for the implementation of food security programmes will ensure sustainability of programmes in such fields.

Comparative advantage with regard to other types of operation (within the Regulation) and other instruments dealing with FS:

The food security interventions, if efficiently and effectively implemented (there is scope for improvements in this regard) are a more efficient and more effective approach than food aid in tackling the problem of food insecurity. Therefore, it is highly desirable that - in line with the original intentions of the Regulation - resources in support of food security inter-

²⁰ See Metz, M. & Tesfay Mebrahtu, 2003, Getting over the Dependence on Food Aid through Cash-for-Work and Triticale, GTZ-IFSP South Gonder

ventions will be systematically and drastically expanded at the cost of resources directed to food aid. However, such expansion ought to be guided by a careful selection of such interventions which are highly and directly food security relevant and promise to be highly efficient. When selecting the types of interventions of choice, it will be critical to concentrate on *few* types of strategic importance, a multiplication effect and those which lend themselves for a mode of implementation with campaign character.

Coordination of the various instruments dealing with FS:

In areas where food security programmes with employment and income generation components (cash-for-work) are implemented, the allocations of relief food aid should be reduced. This has not been done in the past but is now being considered in the needs assessment and emergency appeal.

The Technical Assistance (TA) provided by the EC to the regions is closely related to the food security interventions, although largely confined to financial and organisational planning issues and monitoring. Effective implementation often requires complementary technical inputs and capacity building at woreda and community level. Such inputs have, in some cases, been provided by other organizations. Better coordinated approaches among government- and donor organisations would bring about further effectiveness and efficiency gains. The recently formed working group on safety nets is a decisive step in the right direction.

The case of uncoordinated provisions of food and non-food inputs in NGO projects was raised under efficiency considerations (6.3) above.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 6:

By aiming at employment and income generation, natural resource conservation and increased smallholder production, the EC supported food security programmes simultaneously addressing the problems of insufficient access and insufficient production in areas with a high prevalence of food insecurity. Cash-for-work arrangements allow a shift away from food aid. However, almost all programmes suffered from the same interrelated problems during implementation: Delayed start, slow pace of implementation, administrative hindrances, disruption in resource flow, and capacity constraints in planning, management and monitoring on all levels. Due to such constraints, the planned and potential impacts in terms of a significant improvement of the food security situation in the targeted areas have been largely forgone.

3.7 Evaluative Question 7

What is the added value of the “other / Technical assistance and capacity building” component for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

Relevance of “other’s component” strategies and actions:

Serious capacity constraints at all levels, in technical and management fields, are hampering programme implementation and progress. Technical assistance (TA) and capacity building are, therefore, relevant for programme implementation.

EC’s TA support is particularly geared towards the planning and implementation of the food security programmes in the regions (4 TAs, one in each of the selected regions, position of TA in Tigray presently vacant) and towards strategic issues and facilitation of the FSBS implementation at federal level (2 TAs, one in MoFED, position at MoRD presently vacant).

Effectiveness of “other’s component” strategies and actions:

The TAs have been particularly concerned with facilitating the EC supported food security programmes at federal and regional levels.

The role of EC Technical Assistance was perceived differently among Government institutions, depending on role, performance and conduct of the respective Technical Advisors. According to their Terms of Reference, the TAs are supposed to provide support in the preparation, implementation and monitoring of the food security programmes at national respectively regional levels. In fact, however, their capacity is largely absorbed by the support of the specific EC operations.

A positive example for technical assistance is the TA posted in MoFED, whose task is to facilitate the implementation of the FSBS. The TA was instrumental in liaising between the GOE and the EC regarding the conditions of the release of the first tranche to the regions. On the other hand, the TA posted at the MoRD was dismissed on GoE request.

Capacity building is often understood solely as a provision of “hardware” in terms of vehicles, computers, communication equipment, etc. To be effective, such inputs must, however, be related to the tasks to be fulfilled and go hand in hand with upgrading the skills of the staff in fields which are relevant for programme planning and implementation. These tasks are often neglected.

Efficiency of “other’s component” strategies and actions:

A good deal of the TAs’ time and energy is absorbed by the need to reconcile EC and GoE bureaucratic procedures with the existing capacities at regional and woreda level. This limits their capacity to invest more time in conceptual work and capacity development for their counterparts.

The secondment of the TAs to the respective institutions was somewhat late relative to the timetable of the 2002 food security programme. In the SNNPRS for example, the TA

started his work only about two months after the first instalment had been disbursed; also the TA in MoFED started her assignment only in September 2003 (i.e. 4 months after the disbursement of the first instalment). There are also highly qualified national professionals available who can fulfil the role of TAs. Economic considerations, but also reasons of familiarity with the local conditions and the objective to further promote such capacities, call for making an increased use of such capacities.

Impact of “other’s component” strategies and actions:

The impacts of TAs and capacity building measures can only be assessed in the context of the impacts of the overall programme they are contributing to.

Sustainability of “other’s component” strategies and actions:

The GoE has a general critical attitude towards (the need for) technical assistance. TAs are often considered as donor-imposed. Nevertheless, they are well received if highly qualified, if they fill an obvious critical gap, and if they are well integrated into the local organizational structures. Capacity building of the local counterparts by the TAs is best ensured if the TAs are fully integrated into the very organisation and office environment of their respective counterpart institution.

Comparative advantage in comparison with other types of operations (within the Regulation) and operations in other instruments dealing with “other’s component”

The function of the TAs and of capacity building measures is largely complementary to the other types of operations, therefore its comparative advantage is not an issue. However, the role of TAs varies, depending on the type of interventions they are connected with. For example, in the case of project and programme support they will play a more technical role (planning, management support, monitoring), whereas in the case of budgetary support, they will rather be involved in strategy formulation, implementation and hopefully in future also (impact) monitoring related tasks. This has bearing for the selection of a suitable TA.

Coordination of the various instruments dealing with “other's component”

See under 3.4, 3.5, 3.6

Empowerment role of TA:

The empowerment role of TAs has been limited so far, due to various reasons:

- The Government counterpart institutions have only a limited influence in the selection of TAs, and not all TAs actually appointed have been considered as adequately qualified by their Government counterparts.
- The involvement of the TAs has been largely perceived as “islands”, restricted to facilitate the implementation of EC programmes.
- The TAs report to the Delegation but not to their Government counterparts.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 7:

The other components: Technical Assistance and capacity building are required in order to alleviate capacity constraints in planning, implementation and monitoring of the food security programmes. TA has largely been confined to facilitate the specific EC supported programmes and perceived by the Government partners rather as “islands” than as integral part of a common effort to render the overall food security policy and programmes more effective.

3.8 Evaluative Question 8

To what extent has the design of supported actions (phasing in) facilitated progress towards the achievement of food aid and food security objectives? This includes the identification of priorities, the selection of countries, the targeting of beneficiaries / vulnerable groups, the funding operations - components, the identification and appraisal process, the multi-annual programming, etc.?

Quality of the overall programming of resources

This judgement criterion refers to programming processes, procedures and decision making in the EU Headquarters. These predetermine to a great extent the magnitude and nature of EU development assistance and assistance financed under the FA/FS Regulation 1996 and are themselves governed by (foreign) policy considerations and by highly aggregated, *indicative* budgetary assumptions covering a mid-term programming time horizon. Such aspects are not / have not been subject of this country study. Therefore, assessments relating to these issues cannot be made here. They will be dealt with in the synthesis report.

Quality of the country level programming (link to CSP and PRSP, actors participation in programming)

In the CSP and the Indicative Programme, explicit reference is made to the poverty agenda and the PRSP process for the orientation of EC support to food security. It is also pointed out that the EC has been one of the major providers of food aid and other food security related funding over the past decades, that it is EC's strong wish to considerably reduce its food aid deliveries and to engage into more developmental programmes to raise food security, and to fundamentally reorient its food security activities in Ethiopia accordingly (paradigm change).²¹ For the definition of the new programme, reference was made to the forthcoming high-level consultation in 2001. During the high level consultation, the FSBS approach has been agreed upon with the GoE, and a number of conditions were formulated which were considered essential to achieve the planned shift from relief to development and to justify budgetary support (e.g. on reform of the relief system and DPPC; change of the established, routine food aid need assessment methodology and downward adjustments of the annual emergency food aid appeals by *excluding* in future such food aid needs estimates which are attributable to structural poverty and food insecurity causes; review of the regional food security programmes, definition of verifiable indicators for monitoring programme performance, establishment of a M & E system for food security, etc.).

The conditions were meant to encourage the GOE to implement the necessary reforms in their food relief and food security system in such a way that it will allow the European Commission to increasingly pursue a sectoral development approach (i.e. non-targeted (non-conditioned) budget support). However, at the time of the identification of the 2002 FSP, the preconditions for non-targeted budget support have not been in place yet. The programme was thus designed as somewhat of a transitory instrument to a) provide assistance

²¹ EC, CSP and Indicative Programme for the period 2002-2007.

to food security measures of the government, and b) to provide the GOE with the incentive to implement the structural reforms, which the EC considered essential pre-requisites *before* the EC could move to non-targeted budget support.

Apart from the FS budget line, also resources under the 9th EDF had been allocated for food security. The EDF resources were meant to complement the budget line resources and to be used for to financing e activities in the fields of market promotion and pastoral development.²²

Besides direct aid to the GoE, the EC has continued to support food security also through indirect channels (NGOs and WFP). Regarding cooperation with NGOs, a first “Call for Proposals” had been launched in 2000, a second one in February 2004 (from the 2003 budget). The funds for projects under the NGO Call for Proposals are allocated on a *regional* basis (Horn of Africa), broken down in indicative (planning) figures and assigned to individual countries. These figures however, may be modified during the subsequent processing and decision making process, depending on the total number and quality of proposals received from the region.

Quality of the programme approval process

As to food aid, the EC approval process is usually rapid – the same cannot be said about the subsequent process of mobilization and delivery.

As to the new FSBS 2002 programme, the EC and the Government had different perceptions in respect of the necessary planning steps (selection of woredas, workplans) required and conditions to be fulfilled before the funds could be released. This delayed the release of funds and programme start.

The approval process for NGO project is very lengthy and, from the NGO perspective, very cumbersome. Upon the 2000 Call for Proposals, some 450 proposals had been presented to the EC, out of which 25 had been scrutinized in detail by the EC and 10 proposals approved. Furthermore, it took more than one year between the submission of proposals (February 2001) and actual approval (June 2002). Such delays, and the fact that an NGO proposal has only a dim chance to be accepted, adversely affect the motivation of the applicants and quality of the proposals, leading to the need for repeated amendments. During the approval process, the NGO section of the Delegation is not allowed to provide any support or further information to the NGOs. A Country Technical Paper prepared for the new 2003 call for proposals should give the NGOs some guidance on the nature and quality of projects proposals required.

Relevance of EC actions vis à vis beneficiaries' needs

Food aid allocations by the EC, as by other donors, have been based on annual and special food aid needs assessments and public appeals. There is, however, a serious flaw built in the methodology of the need assessment, which generally treats food deficits at household

²² At the High Level Retreat in October 2003, EDF resources allocated for food security had been agreed upon to be transferred to general budget support.

level automatically as *food aid needs*. This has been the routine practice in Ethiopia during the past decades. This approach does not take into account the varied causes of food insecurity at household level, nor the possibility to improve access to food through other and more appropriate means than emergency food aid. This particularly refers to food insecurity of households caused by reasons of structural poverty and chronic food insecurity.

EGS with cash-for-work, Integrated Food Security Programmes and Safety Nets, as supported under EC's and other donors' food security programmes are alternative, more appropriate and effective response strategies to achieve food security than relief food aid.

EC support of food security programmes has been restricted to food deficit areas in the four regions Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPRS and Tigray. Although this concentration on four regions matches those selected by the Government for its regional food security programmes, it implies that other food insecure areas of the country have been excluded from EC support. There is, however, a food security programme for pastoral areas under preparation

NGOs are expected to base their project proposals on needs assessment. Taking the little chance of getting a proposal approved into account,²³ it is not reasonable to expect that the NGOs do a detailed and specific needs assessment. Thorough needs assessments would also raise expectations in the community which eventually can not be fulfilled.

The grant application form for the current call for proposal requires the applicant to describe the relevance of the proposed project to the objectives and priorities of the programme, the identification of perceived needs and constraints in the target country, the list of target groups and estimated number of beneficiaries and the justification for their selection and the relevance of the action to the target group. The usefulness of this information for the EC official evaluating the proposals depends on the quality and accuracy of the submitted analysis. However, the desk officers can only assess the internal consistency, coherence and logic of the justification, whereas existing rules disallow the EC officers to contact the NGOs for verification of the needs assessments. Such rules make no / little sense and should be removed, all the more that they contribute to the need of frequent amendments of agreements.

When determining specific types of interventions – and even when participatory approaches are applied -, there is a certain tendency among woreda administrations, communities and NGOs to select those, which have repeatedly been approved in the past. Such practice has two problematic effects:

- 1) selected projects often do not reflect actually felt needs or the priorities of the community, and
- 2) only few proposals with innovative approaches are submitted.

Selection of adapted (suitable) FA-FS component / channel (ing) (added value of each component compared to the others)

In the past, the GoE, the donors and many NGOs had an evident bias in favour of food aid. While food aid, should be restricted to genuine emergencies, i.e. situations when there is

²³ only 10 out of 450 submitted proposals have been approved under the 2000 Call for Proposals

virtually no other alternative to safe lives, it has been over many years the first choice instrument. The propagated “paradigm change” from a food aid mentality towards developmental and more sustainable approaches has been initiated by Food Security Programmes of the EC; in practice the change, however, still has to take roots. Now, with the PRSP process underway, a National Food Security Strategy released, regional food security programmes defined, and special budgetary allocations for food security been made by the GoE, both sides apparently considered the time ripe to shift from the previous programme approach to a targeted budget support which would give the GoE greater autonomy and flexibility in managing EC resources.

However, apart from the FSBS approach, the programme/project approach to promote food security can be an effective alternative to promote food security, particularly under the following conditions:

- When there exist experience with similar programmes which have proven to be effective and successful (“blue prints”);
- If interventions are planned in particularly sensitive areas (e.g. pastoral communities) or fields (e.g. resettlement), or to promote innovative approaches;
- If specific technical assistance is required for the implementation.

In this regard, there has been and there will also be a future role for NGOs– and of the instrument of indirect aid through NGOs - in promoting food security.

Implementation of food security programmes through Government structures and NGOs make use of specific comparative advantages:

- direct aid through Government: Issue of ownership, replicability of approaches, intended and necessary capacity development effects to ensure sustainability;
- indirect aid through NGOs: Compensating for capacity deficiencies in government administration, strengthening civil society; grass-root and participatory approaches applied by NGOs, NGOs operate in remote areas and in regions not catered for by Government or others, applying innovative approaches.

Clear planning of division of responsibilities in the various PCM phases (programming to Financing)

The financial proposal for the 2002 FSBS programme contains a Logical Framework Matrix with "details" down to the level of activities. Some of the activities are rather vaguely defined and it remains largely unclear who is responsible for what at what stage of programme planning and implementation. This lack of precision has contributed to the dispute about the required steps (selection of woredas, submission of workplans) before the first tranche could be released.²⁴

²⁴ The Logframe Matrix can be a valuable instrument for programme- and project planning and PCM, *provided* the matrix has been prepared thoroughly (logic and language) and with the necessary sincerity and depth. There is, however, a general tendency to fill the boxes of the matrix somehow, so as to comply with a formal obligation, and as a solitary paper exercise of some desk officer without due participation of other stakeholders. Logframe matrices of this type are useless and they can be found originating from all sorts of

Integration of cross cutting issues in programme / project design

Neither in the financial proposal nor in the MoU of the FSBS programme, any reference is made to gender orientation. Some of the NGO projects are specifically designed to address the needs, role and capacities of women.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 8:

There is a marked difference in the design and planning of food aid interventions and other food security programmes. While, in the case of food aid, a relatively well functioning system of planning has been established over the years, starting from needs assessment, public appeals, up to logistics and distribution planning (with the notable exception of monitoring), there have been severe shortcomings in the design and phasing-in of the other development oriented food security interventions. This discrepancy also contributes to the fact that the major part of the human and financial resources is still absorbed by the relief food aid system, while little progress has been achieved in the other food security programmes. A substantial allocation of budgetary resources for food security by the GoE itself and the recent effort to develop, in a coordinated manner, a concept for productive safety nets will hopefully lead to a badly needed change of focus and emphasis.

authors and agencies. This instrument should be used **selectively**, when its preparation does really serve a meaningful purpose (e.g. obtaining clarity or visualising focus of a complex matter; creating a common understanding between partners). Considering for example the often extreme time interval between preparation of a programme-/project proposal incl. corresponding matrix and starting date of identified activities, even well prepared matrices are rendered obsolete by delays in approval and delays in fund releases.

Therefore, the submission of a logframe format should be selectively demanded only and not be made an obligatory, but an *optional* requirement; *at least* for NGOs submitting proposals. A solid narrative describing the planned intervention in adequate detail is preferable in comparison to a lousy logframe matrix. NGOs might be requested to draw up a logframe matrix, once their project has been approved. Such matrix may then even be profitably made use of for the purpose of Project Cycle Management.

3.9 Evaluative Question 9

To what extent have implementation set-ups (i.e. suitable structures for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation), management mechanisms / tools and processes (i.e. division of work and responsibilities, coordination of actions) facilitated the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?

Coordination with other programmes:

Up to 2000, donor coordination was mainly confined to solve technical issues of emergency relief: early warning, needs assessment, response to appeals, coordination of relief logistics, etc. Although all donors recognised the need of policy changes if food security was to be addressed in a more effective manner, there has been no forum and institutionalised mechanism for discussing these issues among donors and with the Government.

The end of the war with Eritrea and the 2000 drought led to a renewed debate on the national food security strategy among donors and with the Government. Several workshops were held among donors and UN organizations to achieve a consensus on key policy issues and to work out common strategies to address them. These initiatives have been partially successful: successful in reaching a consensus on key policy issues, less successful in defining common strategies.

By and large, each donor has developed his own food security programme, often side by side in adjacent woredas, sometimes even in adjacent kebeles of the same woreda, putting a heavy burden on the local administration and communities who struggle to understand the specific features of the different programmes and to comply with varied donor rules, regulations and particularities. Such a messy situation must be considered as intolerable under efficiency considerations, even more so that it absorbs a good deal of the extremely limited capacities at woredas level.

With the “Coalition for Food Security” and the recent establishment of the Working Group on safety nets, new initiatives for coordinated approaches have been made.

Clear division of responsibilities in the various PCM phases (implementation and evaluation):

See 8.6

Empowerment role of technical assistance:

The role of TA assistance is largely confined to facilitate the EC specific food security programmes. On the (so far limited) empowerment role of TA: See under EQ 7.

Adapted procedures for programme management (in time delivery system)

Up to the end of 2002, the EU Local Food Security Unit (LFSU) played a key role in preparing, managing and monitoring the EU supported relief food operations and related projects. It had no clear mandate but tried to accommodate with a kind of hybrid function (ex-

tended arm of Brussels HQ, subsidiary to the Delegation, group of Technical Advisers). The LFSU was dissolved in Dec. 2002 and the sur-place management of the Food Aid and Food Security Programme integrated into the Delegation as Rural Development and Food Security (RDFS) Section.

The role and mandate of the RDFS section has remained unclear to the development partners (Government, NGOs); for them it is often in-transparent where (in Brussels or at the Delegation), by whom, and on what basis decisions are made, and what are the reasons for delays in decisions or actions (e.g. late deliveries, lengthy approval process, delayed transfer of funds) .

As to the implementation of the FSBS programme 2002: The first tranche to the regions was released in March 2004, one year after signing the MoU, with only 12 months remaining for implementation of the planned 2-years programme. Delays in achieving the programme objectives must be expected. The split installment procedure with the "90% regulation" are likely to further hamper smooth programme implementation, particularly in the likely event that programme implementation will not proceed in all regions at the same pace. For example, a new technical advisor has still to be assigned for Tigray which may delay programme implementation there even more.

At federal level, yet another reorganization of Government structures is underway which are relevant for food security (MoRD, MoA, DPPC). This reorganization may also involve a reconsideration and revision of the role of the federal Steering Committee for Food Security (FSCFS). The FSCFS has not met for more than one year.

Adequate resources for programme (EC level) and project (country level) management

The RDFS section of the Delegation has eleven professional staff (7 expatriates, 4 nationals) which is considered adequate for managing the current EC Food Security Programme at the Delegation level. Devolvement of further tasks from Brussels to the Delegation may require revision of the staffing level.

The EC supported food security programmes in the field are implemented through government structures at regional and woreda level (direct aid) and through NGOs (indirect aid). Capacity constraints of Government structures (not necessarily in numbers of staff but in terms of skills and technical equipment) are often a serious handicap for efficient and effective programme implementation.

Adequate M&E including impact assessment

Monitoring has, so far, been the weakest link of EC programme implementation. This refers to both, the monitoring of relief operations, particularly monitoring of relief distribution (targeting efficiency), and to monitoring of the food security programmes.

Due to a lack of sound monitoring of relief distribution, little is known about who and where the final beneficiaries are, about the actual time and frequency of distribution, and whether, and to what extent, misappropriation has occurred at the level of distribution. Responsible for such deficiencies are capacity problems at community and woreda levels, poor communication links, and insufficient means provided for and attention given to the

monitoring tasks. The lack of reliable and timely monitoring information precludes a proper assessment of the targeting efficiency, as well as the possibility to take corrective actions if found necessary.

Monitoring of relief food distribution would have been particularly important during 2003, when an unprecedented amount of relief food (1.6 million tons!) were distributed. Budgetary provisions had been made by the EC for monitoring the food distribution, planned to start in June 2003, and also local consulting firms had been invited by public tender to submit their offers. However, no contracts have been awarded within the declared time frame so that finally, monitoring could only start in October 2003, that is *after* the bulk of the relief food had already been distributed by the DPPC and NGOs. That is why no corrective measures on some critical operational issues could be implemented which had been observed during the monitoring field missions.²⁵ Thus, this monitoring exercise has been rendered irrelevant for the planned and main purpose, and the results may, at best, be useful if considered in future operations.

There should be *one* monitoring system established for all food aid distribution in Ethiopia regardless through which organisation distribution is implemented, regardless where and to whom, and regardless of the origin of food aid. Although the establishment of such monitoring system will come very late, its relevance for the immediate and longer-term future remains high, especially within the current context of the intended policy change emphasising food security interventions to combat structural food insecurity and the implications for the food aid need assessment methodology and emergency appeals.

Deficiencies in monitoring of the Food Security Programmes have already been mentioned under EQ 6 above. The setting up of a monitoring system has been made a condition under the EC FSBS programme 2002, and respective efforts are now underway.²⁶

Actors' participation in programme management / 9.8 Integration of cross cutting issues (gender orientation) in programme implementation

There are only very few women represented in the management teams of food security programmes, particularly those implemented through government structures. In NGO supported food security programmes, female representation is generally higher.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 9:

While the implementation set-ups for relief operations are well established and do function effectively, the management structures for the food security programmes are still in the process of being set up and require further consolidation. Monitoring is generally weak. Efforts are underway for coordinated approaches in food security programmes and to establish a monitoring system, which also is to cover aspects of impact monitoring.

²⁵ Tropical Consults, 2004, Independent Monitoring of the EC Relief Food Aid Operations in Ethiopia During the Year 2003, Mid-term summary, Addis Ababa, January.

²⁶ Cf. NN, A Concept Note on Monitoring & Evaluation System for the Food Security Program, February 2004

3.10 Evaluative Question 10

To what extent has a phasing out of the supported actions been planned and what contribution did it have on the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?

Presence of a clear strategy to gradually reduce dependence on EC assistance

- *Phasing out(here: reduction) of emergency food aid:* Until recently, there had been no phasing out strategy for emergency food aid. In the contrary, donors have been ready to ever enlarge their food aid assistance to Ethiopia, allowing the country's food aid distribution to grow into a well established system of formidable proportions. Food aid of that size promoted dependency and a food aid mentality as well as Governmental policy complacency. In the past, there had been little incentive for the GoE to tackle famine and food security problems in a determined manner.. Only recently, it seems that a qualitative change in Governmental conceptual thinking emerges towards major policy changes, promoted by the EC-GoE policy dialogue on a paradigm shift away from emergency food aid towards more accentuated efforts on the developmental process decreasing food aid dependency. Furthermore, USAID, the largest food aid donor so far, has recently announced its intention to drastically reduce its food aid deliveries to Ethiopia.

The newly developed concept of the promotion of the (productive) safety net provides an avenue for reducing the amount of emergency food aid allocations to the country over time, by distinguishing emergency-caused from structural food deficiencies, and excluding the latter from annual emergency appeals and relief operations. Additionally, local purchases are contributing to sustainable development through their impacts on market development and the stimulation of local food production, thus creating the potential for increased availability of food within the country and / or access to commercially imported food on the household level (increase of purchasing power).

- *Phasing out of support to EFSR:* The EC support to the EFSR has contributed to improve the emergency response capacity on a sustainable basis. EC support to the EFSR has been phased out, the operation costs of the EFSR are borne by the Government through regular budgetary allocations.
- *Phasing out of Food Security Programmes (1996 - 2002):* No specific phasing out strategy exists; neither is such exit strategy relevant for some time to come. In this context it should be noted, that the Government has allocated, since 2001/2, an increasing and substantial amount of own budgetary resources particularly for the implementation of Food Security Programmes.
- *Phasing out provisions of NGO actions (food security):* In their project proposals, NGOs are not required to present a phasing out strategy. Arrangements of handing over operations to local administrations or the communities are generally weak, though there exist also positive examples (see following paragraph 3.10).

Empowerment strategies of partners / Adequate procedures for smooth transition

Among projects visited during this country visit, SOS Sahel had anticipated the phasing out of its support to the communities by implementing the project largely through government structures (woreda level), which built capacities and allowed woreda officials to continue, at least to a certain extent, the activities initiated by the NGO. Thus, a coordination of the NGOs with government structures appears to be a facilitating factor for phasing out and handing over. Yet, only few NGOs have experience in implementing projects through government structures²⁷.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 10:

It has been the explicit strategy of the EC to phase down, and eventually out, its food aid in favour of a shift towards development-oriented approaches to food security, and support to food security programmes (programme and budgetary support) has been provided to this end. Ethiopia will continue to depend on EC and other donors' support in realising such programmes.

²⁷ According to EC / NGO Food Security and Food Aid Programmes - Annual Report 2003.

3.11 Evaluative Question 11

How sustainable are the effects and impacts of EC-supported policies and programmes in the field of food security, both at the level of target populations and at institutional and policy level in the partner countries?

Presence of a clear strategy to reduce dependence on EC assistance:

The explicit intention to replace relief food aid by assistance, which addresses the root causes of food insecurity and aims at long-term and sustainable solutions has been on the EC's agenda since 1996. EGS and food security programmes have been supported to this end but could not yet reach the desired impacts due to various reasons (indecisive policy dialogue and slow decision making by the Government, programme design deficiencies, delays in resource provision, capacity constraints – see EQ 6). On the contrary, since then the Ethiopian Government called for ever more relief food aid and the EC provided ever more relief food aid.

Only recently, with the new “Coalition for Food Security” initiative launched by the Government, a concept for “Productive Safety Nets” being defined and implemented, the readiness of the GoE to treat the cases of structural poverty and food insecurity separately from the emergency appeals, there is a good chance for a substantial step forward towards the propagated “paradigm shift” away from the dependence on relief food aid.

See also previous section EQ 10 on phasing out.

Ability of government / non-government to continue after EC assistance:

Ethiopia will for quite some time continue to depend on substantial donor support, including EC assistance. This applies to relief food aid in the case of major droughts (which are likely to occur again – but food aid should be really restricted to such cases), and also, and particularly so, to the support of safety nets and other food security interventions. The fact that the GoE has allocated own budgetary resources for the improvement of food security – and if it continues to do so – can be understood as an indication that the GoE is ready to shoulder an increased share of the burden.

Ability of service providers to continue service provision after EC assistance:

Up to now, the GoE has been reluctant to accept other than governmental institutions as service providers for the food security programmes. Capacity constraints of government institutions, but also comparative advantages of other service providers (e.g. private companies, NGOs) will, however, necessitate their active participation. This would not only lead to an increased efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of current programmes, but also reinforce sustainability once donor assistance ends.

Ability of beneficiaries to continue accessing the benefits of the EC-supported project after the EC grant has ended:

The potential for sustainability of results and impacts of the projects was increased, when they had been planned and implemented in a participatory manner. In particular EGS / food

for work projects (i.e. for the construction of terraces, etc.) which have been implemented in Ethiopia over many years, did often not yield sustainable results because the outputs were of low quality, limited utility or not appreciated or even needed by the beneficiaries, who only considered them as means to obtain the food rations.

Ability of women and men of different ages, ability, ethnicity, income and religion to have equal access to the benefits of the EC projects

Women, particularly those heading households, belong to the most vulnerable and food insecure population groups. They are among the targeted beneficiaries of relief food, participants of cash-for-work and food-for-work schemes, as well as direct and indirect beneficiaries of food security interventions (e.g. household packages in Tigray, establishment of water points). However, due to a lack of monitoring and evaluation data and gender-specific reporting, little is known about the actual extent and the impacts of the food security interventions with regard to women.

In general, gender specific aspects are insufficiently considered and poorly integrated in the EC supported programmes.

EC support to food security programmes has been concentrated on food deficit areas in the four regions Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPRS and Tigray. This implies that other food insecure areas of the country, particularly the pastoral areas, have been excluded from EC support so far. Pastoralists belong to ethnic minorities and they are not politically influential. A specific food security programme for pastoral communities in the southern / southeastern parts of Ethiopia is, however, now in preparation.

Ability of EC delegation to manage programmes as well as to ensure coherence between different EC different instruments

See EQ 9

There is little coordination among the different EC programmes at country level. With regard to food security, coordination with the other EC focal sectors "infrastructure" and "private sector support" is particularly important and can bear synergy effects.

Improvement of rural infrastructure – construction of feeder roads, road improvement and maintenance – is an important component in many cash-for-work schemes under EGS and IFSPs. By facilitating access to markets and services, such improvements are likely to bring about positive impacts on food security. Often, however, roads built by the communities under food-/cash-for-work arrangements are of sub-standard quality, poorly aligned and designed (the formation of new earth tracks on one or both sides of a new road is an indicator for that). Coordination and cooperation with the roads sector development programmes at regional and national level could help to better link feeder roads with the national and regional grid and to improve their standard. Although there is substantial support by the EC to the road transport sector, there seems to be no or little connection to feeder road construction under the Food Security Programmes, neither at the policy nor the operational level.

The same holds true for private sector support. Food security programmes offer substantial scope for private sector involvement, particularly of local consulting firms with regard to technical design and supervision of construction works. In spite of the capacity constraints in the public sector, the GoE has, so far, largely relied on the technical line departments to

provide such inputs, with the result of frequent delays or of sub-standard quality. A coordinated initiative of the EC private sector support and food security programmes could offer alternative ways to overcome such constraints.

Ability of HQ to define strategies as well as to insure coherence between EC strategy and international food security strategy

Note: Although this question has to be primarily answered on the basis of an assessment at EC Headquarters level, some thoughts on the issue of EC strategy definition, particularly regarding the process to define a country strategy, are inserted here:

The CSP itself is primarily the result of an EU- internal programming effort and directed to harmonise policy objectives of different hierarchical order and priority, and to streamline instruments and programmes derived there from on the basis of critical criteria such as consistence, complementarity, effectiveness and efficiency. It would be highly desirable, that the process of CSP formulation would rather go beyond EU-internal harmonisation and truly represent a common country development strategy of all EU Member States and the EC. It can be reasonably expected that on the basis of such common country strategy, EU Member States will then align their individual country strategies, so that a substantively coordinated assistance package would result. It goes without saying that such EU country development strategy also needs to be formulated in cooperation with the very country concerned and find their concurrence. As important as an EU - internally coordinated strategy may be, it must remain relatively little effective, if it is practically frustrated by an uncoordinated assistance programming practice of donors as a whole, here of the EU and its individual Member States. The observation about an unsatisfactory (internal and external) coordination is ubiquitously valid and tends to degenerate into stereotype (evaluators') ritual. Effective coordination is notoriously observed as the weakest element of development assistance in general since decades - and it seems to little avail.

A sound Poverty Reduction Strategy or SDPRP could well serve the purpose of facilitating the formulation of one EU - consolidated country strategy. However, it seems rather unlikely that a SDPRP itself will be able to bring about an indeed coordinated overall international assistance programme. This depends largely on the commitment and willingness of individual EU Member States (and even other major international donors) to reach a collective consensus, and also act upon it when it comes to the implementation of their respective bilateral assistance programmes. Such commitment and political will remains conspicuously lacking.

There is already a good example of cooperating of two EU member states, Ireland and the Netherlands, in defining a joint country strategy for Ethiopia.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 11:

Recurrent emergencies and inertia in changing the established relief food system have rendered the policy objective and EC's intention to phase out food aid in favour of development oriented and sustainable approaches to food security elusive.

However, the recent new initiatives (Coalition for Food Security, Productive Safety Nets, reform of the relief system, GoE budgetary allocations for food security, EC FSBS,) give rise to the hope that the propagated "paradigm shift" from food aid to development oriented food security programmes will (eventually) become reality.

3.12 Evaluative Question 12

What is the role of Regulation No.1292/96 in the on-going efforts to bridge the gap between relief, rehabilitation and development?

Linking relief, rehabilitation and development has been a core strategic policy issue in Ethiopia for more than 10 years, starting from genuine relief food aid approaches applied in the early nineties, EGS concepts developed under the Disaster Prevention and Management Policy in 1993, the broader Food Security Programme approaches which have evolved in the late nineties, up to the current initiative to establish a National Productive Safety Net. The variety of instruments provided for by the Regulation, the flexibility it offers in applying these instruments, and their actual application in the Ethiopian context, including local purchase of food aid, cash-for-work and the FSBS facility under the current 2002 Programme, leads to the conclusion that the Regulation provided a suitable framework for EC support to the relief-rehabilitation-development process.

The task which remains is to make more effective use of the other instruments, apart from food aid, and not to fall back on food aid as the most "comfortable" – but, at the same time - most problematic and short-sighted approach. This requires continued and intensified policy dialogue and concerted efforts by all actors, or to put it in the words of the New Coalition for Food Security, to “do things differently.”

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 12:

Regulation No. 1292/96 provides, in principle, a suitable framework for linking relief, rehabilitation and development. However, by providing for both, food aid and development oriented food security approaches, there is the risk of falling back on food aid when the other instruments fail, which are the decisive ones to bring about sustainable solutions to the problem of food insecurity.

4. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

4.1 Relevance

Food aid is needed and relevant in situations of major emergencies when there is virtually no other alternative to avoid famine and to save lives. This condition applies, however, only to a part of the food aid provided to Ethiopia in the past years (e.g. in response to the 2000 and 2002 droughts, though not even in these years the full amount requested and delivered fulfilled the criteria above). The assistance provided by the EC for building-up the Emergency Food Security Reserve (EFSR) and in developing a Relief Transport and Logistics Masterplan was relevant for strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the relief system.

The targeted areas of the Food Security Programme interventions are food insecure and drought prone woredas in four regions. The interventions under the programmes are geared towards income generation through cash-for-work as well as natural resource (soil and water) conservation, afforestation, improvement of rural infrastructure and increasing household food production. These interventions simultaneously address the problems of access and availability.

The instrument of Food Security Budget Support (FSBS) fits very well into the present development policy environment in Ethiopia, characterised by the following main features:

- Food security objectives are (now) given highest priority by the Government,
- Adoption of a National Food Security Strategy,
- Ongoing PRSP process, with food security being an integral part of this process,
- On-going economic and institutional reform,
- General budget support assistance by EC and other donors.

FSBS aims at giving the Government greater autonomy, responsibility and flexibility in using the resources for the pursuance of agreed food security objectives.

However, the approach to link foreign exchange transfers to commercial imports of ear-marked food items is obsolete and irrelevant.

Overall conclusion in relation to Relevance:

The interventions under EC's Food Aid and Food Security Programme in Ethiopia, address the issues of access, availability and emergency response capability, thus are relevant for tackling the prevailing food security problems in Ethiopia.

4.2 Effectiveness

Relief food aid has been effective in preventing famine, preserving assets of drought-affected households, and in saving lives in emergency situations. However, due to a lack of monitoring, little is known about who the ultimate beneficiaries are and where they live, about the timeliness and frequency of relief food distribution and whether, and to what extent, misappropriation has occurred at the level of distribution. Previous studies on food aid targeting have revealed that food aid does not necessarily reach the areas with the most severe food shortages, and the poorest and most vulnerable households.²⁸ Monitoring of the 2003 emergency distribution, had been planned by the EC, however started only after most of the food had been already distributed. Its findings, thus could only be of limited significance.

Local purchase operations have been effective in mobilising domestic marketable surpluses and enhancing the local food marketing system.

Relief food aid is not effective in tackling the problems of structural poverty and chronic food insecurity for which purpose, however, it has been utilised to a large extent.

Efforts to replace food aid by development oriented food security programmes have not been successful so far, due to severe delays in getting the programmes started, design problems, further delays in implementation and capacity constraints in programme management. Interventions have been effective where there was a cooperation between different agencies, each one providing complementary inputs. The most tangible effects of the food security programmes have been employment and income generation through cash-for-work.

Overall conclusion in relation to Effectiveness:

The effectiveness of the EC food aid and food security programmes has been largely confined to short-term effects of alleviating acute food crises (relief food aid) and providing temporary employment and income opportunities (food security programmes).

Because of delays, implementation constraints and the absence of a conducive policy environment - which itself negatively reflects on the effectiveness of the EC-GoE policy dialogue -, the food security programmes could so far, only be marginally effective in providing the foundation for a development towards greater self-reliance and sustainable food security.

4.3 Efficiency

In efficiency terms, the relief food system in Ethiopia, which has been developed over decades functions, on the whole, fairly well, taking into consideration the immense amount of food aid being mobilised and carried to even very remote places of the country, the large distances, difficult terrain, poor infrastructure and weak communication links.

²⁸ Cf. MWH-ECDPM-ODI, 2004, Vol. II: Supporting Documentation, Judgement Criteria 02.2; see also monitoring report of Tropical Consults, 2004, on the issue of targeting.

There was, in general, a prompt EC response to emergency appeals in pledging relief food aid. Repeatedly there have been, delays in EC food aid deliveries, which, could be successfully compensated by food aid from other donors and / or by food loans from the EFSR. At times calls on the EFSR's stocks had been so heavy, that due to delayed *replenishment* the reserve reached critically low physical stock levels, affecting its ability to serve as an interim emergency buffer stock and (temporarily) loosing its capacity to cater for the event of a sudden and major emergency.

Local purchases have been a most valuable contribution by the EC and helped to increase the efficiency of food aid operations in Ethiopia. They are more cost-efficient if – as it has been the case in Ethiopia so far – local market prices are significantly below import parity price. Furthermore, they stimulate the development of the local grain market, domestic market-oriented food production and, thus, contribute to generate additional farm income.

Efficiency of all food security programmes has been severely hampered by the delays in getting the programmes started as well as by further delays, which occurred during implementation. Main reasons for the delays were late signing of MoUs, late transfers of funds, delayed reporting, restructuring of the Government administration and capacity constraints in planning and implementation at central, regional and woreda levels. Due to the delays in implementation, one third of the funds allocated for the 96 programme had not been spent at the programme's end in December 2002!

As regards indirect aid through NGOs, the efficiency of project implementation was hampered by an uncoordinated provision of resources in cases when food and funds were needed simultaneously for project implementation (e.g. food-for-work). Cash funds and food aid from EC arrived at different times, sometimes more than one year apart.

Overall conclusion in relation to Efficiency:

The relatively efficiently functioning relief food system which has been established in Ethiopia over the years stands in contrast to severe efficiency problems in getting the development oriented food security programmes started and implemented.

4.4 Sustainability

Food aid as standard response mechanism to food insecurity, as it has been practiced in Ethiopia in the past, is not sustainable. Neither can it be expected that donors will continue to ever increase their annual food aid allocations, nor can massive food aid flows be desirable, taking the enormous costs and the negative implications for development and food self reliance into consideration.

With the promotion of Food Security Programmes, the EC has made first attempts towards more sustainable approaches to food security; problems in design and implementation have, however, hampered the achievement of tangible and sustainable results. Recent concerted efforts made and new initiatives launched (New Coalition for Food Security, joint elaboration of a concept for Productive Safety Nets, GoE budgetary allocations for food security with EC FSBS, establishment of a monitoring system) give rise to the hope that sustainable solutions to food security will eventually be achieved.

Overall conclusion in relation to Sustainability:

A continuation and further expansion of the relief food system, as practiced in the past, is not sustainable. The promotion of Food Security Programmes initiated by the EC will only lead to sustainable solutions if embedded in joint and coordinated approaches at national level, involving all relevant actors, and a conducive policy environment. Efforts in this regard are underway.

4.5 Impact

Due to a general lack of systematic impact monitoring, only plausible assumptions on probable impacts, substantiated by anecdotal evidence, can be made.

Food aid has positive short-term impacts in terms of avoiding famine and saving lives in emergency situations. Food aid is the option of choice when there are no alternatives, if well targeted, if provided in time, and if it is phased out when the emergency is over. If these conditions are not fully met – and there is evidence for such occurrence in Ethiopia – the impacts are rather negative: Food aid creates further dependence, market distortions, discourages local production, and reduces farm income.

Local purchase operations, as initiated by the EC, can, to a certain degree, counter-balance the adverse effects of food aid deliveries. They are likely to have positive impacts on the development of the domestic grain market, on capacity building of traders and institutions concerned, and likely positive impacts on domestic grain production and farmers' income. The impacts on grain production and farmers' income can be very substantial when purchases are properly timed, i.e. done during or shortly after the harvest when the majority of farmers sell grain and grain prices are low. Moreover, there is also positive macro-economic impact on the balance of payment situation: Funds provided by donors for local purchases increase foreign exchange reserves of the recipient country as foreign exchange earnings from exports do.

The most tangible impacts of the EC promoted EGS and Food Security Programmes have been temporary employment and income generation through the Cash-for-Work Schemes under these programmes. Further impacts, particularly with regard to enhanced production and productivity through the programme activities (natural resource conservation, agricultural promotion, improvement of rural infrastructure) can be assumed, although such impacts may have been quite limited so far because of delays and constraints in implementation.

Overall conclusion in relation to Impact:

Both relief food aid as well as the food security programmes had positive impacts in terms of alleviating temporary food shortages. In the case of relief food aid, these short term impacts are coupled with a high risk of adverse medium- and long-term impacts on markets and agriculture. In the case of the food security programmes, positive medium and long-term impacts on markets and agriculture can be assumed which will have to be verified by systematic impact monitoring.

4.6 Internal / external coherence

Since 1996, the EC has been advocating a shift from food aid towards developmental oriented food security programmes. Yet, an increasing amount and share of the resources provided under the EC Food Aid and Food Security Programme to Ethiopia have been in the form of food aid. This discrepancy between intention and reality was partly caused by the need to respond to two major emergencies following the droughts in 2000 and 2002, but has, to a large extent, also been the result of incoherent government policy (inertia in moving away from the food aid based relief system), strained policy dialogue (e.g. during the Eritrean-Ethiopian war), poor programme design, uncoordinated approaches, bureaucratic hurdles and capacity constraints, all factors contributing to slow implementation and little progress of the Food Security Programmes.

Apparently, it has taken some time until all relevant actors – the GoE, international organizations, donors, NGOs – agreed that fundamental re-orientation, common and coordinated approaches, and decisive steps were required, in order to induce the desired change. Now, with the new Coalition for Food Security initiative launched, the hitherto established Relief System being revised, a National System for Productive Safety Nets being designed and implemented, and specific budgetary allocations for food security made by the GoE (with contributions under the EC FSBS programme), there is a good chance that the propagated shift from relief food aid towards development-oriented and sustainable strategies to improve food security will eventually become reality.

Overall conclusion in relation to Internal/External Coherence:

Despite the propagated shift away from relief food aid towards development oriented approaches to food security, food aid has been ever increased over the years, while other programmes suffered from delays and inefficiencies in getting off (or better: on) the ground. Apparently, there has been substantial inertia in moving away from the established relief food system (possibly also due to vested interests of a number of stakeholders benefiting from the system), insufficient policy dialogue to reach a common understanding on where to go, and a lack of political will to make decisive steps and to induce the necessary changes. Recent new initiatives give rise to the hope that the gap between declared intentions and action will narrow

5 CONCLUSIONS

The interventions under EC's Food Aid and Food Security Programme in Ethiopia, address the issues of access, availability and emergency response capability; they are relevant for tackling the food security problems prevailing in Ethiopia.

The effectiveness of the EC food aid and food security programmes has, so far, been largely confined to short-term effects of alleviating acute food crises (relief food aid) and providing temporary employment and income opportunities (food security programmes). Because of delays, implementation constraints and the absence of a conducive policy environment, the food security programmes could so far, only be marginally effective in providing the foundation for a development towards greater self-reliance and sustainable food security.

The relief food system, which has been established over the years functions relatively efficiently. This contrasts with severe efficiency problems in getting development oriented food security programmes started and implemented, due to the reasons mentioned above.

Although there is a general lack of systematic impact assessment, it can be assumed that relief food aid as well as the food security programmes had positive impacts in terms of alleviating temporary food shortages. In the case of relief food aid, these positive short term impacts are juxtaposed adverse medium- and long-term impacts on markets and agriculture. In the case of the food security programmes, positive medium and long-term impacts on markets and agriculture can be expected but these will have to be verified by systematic impact monitoring.

A continuation and further expansion of the relief food system, as practiced in the past, is neither sustainable nor desirable. The promotion of Food Security Programmes initiated by the EC will only lead to sustainable solutions if embedded in joint and coordinated approaches at national level, involving all relevant actors, and a conducive policy environment, to be brought about through further intensive policy dialogue.

Despite the propagated shift away from relief food aid towards development oriented approaches to food security, food aid has been further increased over the years, while other programmes suffered from delays and inefficiencies in getting off (or better: on) the ground. Apparently, there has been substantial inertia in moving away from the established relief food system (possibly also due to vested interests of a number of stakeholders benefiting from the system), insufficient policy dialogue to reach a common understanding on where to go, and a lack of political will to take decisive steps and to induce the necessary changes..

While the Regulation No. 1292/96 provides, in principle, a suitable framework for the intended shift from relief to development, it also permits to fall back on food aid when the other instruments are not properly planned or not diligently applied, and, as a consequence, fail to bring about the desired results. This is what had happened in Ethiopia over so many years, so that food aid remained to be the standard response mechanism to food insecurity, in spite of its problematic implications for development and unsustainable dimensions.

Recent new initiatives, improved policy dialogue, and coordinated approaches among and between the GoE and donors give rise to the hope that the gap between rhetoric and action will narrowed in future.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 On food aid and the relief system

- **Food aid**, instead of being an instrument of first choice in tackling the problems of food insecurity, as it has been practiced in Ethiopia in the past, should become, due to economic and development reasons, **a means of last resort**. Relief food should be restricted to genuine emergencies when there is virtually no other alternative to save lives.
- The intended shift in focus from relief to development will have implications for the future role of the relief system and DPPC. A **reform of the relief system**, as intended by the GoE and agreed with the EC and other donors, should immediately be initiated, taking, however, into consideration that a basic capacity for emergency preparedness (Early Warning) and response must be maintained.
- In genuine emergency situations (see 1 above) and when food aid is still needed to overcome an emergency situation, it should, as much as possible (depending on the local grain market situation) and if economically justified (local grain prices below import parity prices), be mobilised through local purchases.
- A comprehensive **in-depth study on the effects of food aid** on the Ethiopian economy, the grain markets, agricultural and food production, and agricultural income should be undertaken.

6.2 On the other instruments: Food security programmes, FSBS and TA

- The Regulation regarding the **FEF/FSBS arrangements** should be revised, particularly with respect to the antiquated SIP approach to sector budget support which limits the scope for harmonising FSBS with other EC budget support instruments. The currency facility shall not be confined to "eligible import products". A feasible and satisfactory procedure must be found if administrative problems with regard to the release of the CVF tranches shall not unduly jeopardise reasonable efficiency standards and intended effects/impacts.
- Assignments of **Technical Advisors** should be made in close cooperation with the respective Government departments. TAs should be better integrated into the Government structures (e.g. through reporting to counterpart organisation, TA involvement not restricted to EC interventions) and preferably work as integrated experts within the immediate working environment of their counterpart institutions.
- Efforts in **capacity building** (not only in terms of hardware but particularly for improved planning, management and accounting capacities) need to be intensified. For capacity building measures and TAs, existing know-how and capacities at national level should be made use of to the maximum.
- A **grain market information system** should be established. Such system should serve the needs of the GoE and aid agencies in assessing the food security and grain market situation, which will help to improve programming and planning of interventions. Furthermore, a grain information system would also serve information needs of grain traders.

6.3 On programming, planning, implementation and monitoring

- The EC should undertake decisive steps to **increase the transparency and the pace of decision processes** in all aspects (approval of projects, appointment of consultants and TAs, transfer of funds etc.). Speeding up payment procedures regarding NGO operations could be achieved, for example, by opening an operational account at EURONAIID's disposal.
- In order to **rationalize the approval process for NGO projects**, a two-step approach for the submission and selection of NGO project proposals should be applied: As a first step, a brief concept paper to be presented by the NGOs for pre-selection (short-list), and, as a second step, more elaborate proposals shall be requested only from a limited number of short-listed proposals. Such approach will increase work efficiency by reducing waste of planning and programming energies (on the NGOs side) and of assessing a large number of detailed proposals (in the EC side) in no small measure. Furthermore, it reduces frustration since the largest share of elaborated proposals will have to be finally rejected, is likely to increase the quality of the few elaborated proposals and to speed-up decision making by EC. Proposals of NGOs should not be too specific, if participatory planning approaches (interventions defined with community participation) are to be applied. The proposals and agreements should provide for sufficient flexibility. Such revised approach may also reduce the need for frequent amendments of agreements.
- Governmental capacity constraints with respect to programme implementation at regional and programme level call, apart from capacity building measures, for the search and application of **alternative implementation approaches**, such as inclusion of NGOs and private sector agencies for certain functions (e.g. technical planning and supervision, construction contracts, monitoring). This will also have positive capacity building effects with different stakeholder groups.
- Establish a comprehensive and feasible **monitoring system**, covering all stages of the relief food aid chain (up to targeting and distribution), the food security programmes and aspects of impact monitoring. *A coordinated initiative should be made by the GoE, the donors and the NGOs in this regard.*
- **Gender equality issues** are still inadequately considered and integrated in EC strategies and programmes. Systematic mainstreaming of gender requires that explicit and tangible approaches are formulated and implemented.

6.4 On strategic issues and policy dialogue

- Establish a **consolidated EC - CSP** which is the common basis for EC assistance and EU Member States and which allows easier and more effective coordination. It would be highly desirable that the process of CSP formulation would rather go beyond EC-internal harmonisation and truly represent a common country development strategy of all EU Member States and the EC. It can be reasonably expected that on the basis of such common country strategy, EU Member States will then align their individual country strategies, so that a substantively coordinated assistance package would result. It goes without saying that such EU country development strategy also

needs to be formulated in cooperation with the very country concerned and find their concurrence.

- The dissent on the **resettlement issue** has, to a certain extent, strained the recent **policy dialogue** between the GoE and EC. While the Government considers resettlement as major component of its food security strategy and plans to resettle 2.2 million people within three years, the EC stresses four basic principles to be applied in resettlement (voluntary, no time frame, no quota, proper preparation). Taking, however, into account that there is no fundamental dissent on resettlement as such but only on the approach, continued policy dialogue on this issue can lead to a solution, e.g. in form of the promotion of pilot settlement schemes which fulfils the criteria set out by the EC.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: MISSION ITINERARY AND PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Date	Activities and Persons Contacted
04.03.	Arrival of Manfred Metz, Teamleader, and Martin Steinmeyer, Mission member, in Addis Ababa
05.03.	Initial team meeting Scheduled briefing meeting at EC Delegation cancelled / postponed Evening: Meeting with Mr. Winfried Zarges, Coordinator GTZ Food Security Capacity Building Project.
06./07.03	Weekend, team meetings, document review, Sunday: Lunch with Mr. Bernhard Meyer zu Biesen, GAA Representative
08. 03	Meeting with Ato Berhanu Taye, NGO Programme Officer EC Delegation Meeting at MoFED with Ato Fisseha Abera, Head, Multilateral Cooperation Department Ato Sahle, Tilahun, Senior Expert Food Security, EU Coop. Team Ato Belachew Beyene, Senior Expert Agriculture, EU Coop. Team
09.03	Meeting at EURONAIID: Ato Kassaye Chemed, Country Representative Ms. Alizabeth Bekele, Admin. & Finance Manager, Meeting with Mr. Pacal Joannes, Regional Grain Market Expert, EC Delegation
10.03	Meetings with: Ato Beyene Haile, Head Food Security Unit, Ministry of Rural Development Ato Berhane Gizaw, Deputy Commissioner, DPPC Ato Admit Zerihun, Program Officer, Italian Cooperation
11.03	Meeting at: USAID: Ms. Elizabeth Brown, Humanitarian Aid Officer Ato Tsegehun Tessema, Humanitarian Aid Officer EC Delegation: Ms. Veronique Lorenzo, Head, Rural Development and Food Security Trip to Awassa
12.03.	In Awassa: Meetings at/with: Bureau of Agriculture: Ato Bekele, Deputy Head of Agriculture SOS-Sahel: Ato Amare, Regional Coordinator

	<p>Ms. Getinesh, Programme Officer</p> <p>Food Security Coordination Office: Dr. Belay, Head of Unit</p> <p>Mr. Marcello Tenti, EC-TA</p>
13.03.	<p>Trip to Hosaina-Zone:</p> <p>Meeting at Soro woreda office with</p> <p>Ato Tamirat Ergino, Head of Rural Development Office</p> <p>Ato Melese Lopiso, Head Agriculture Desk</p> <p>Ato Eriso Ergicho, Natural Resource Management Expert</p> <p>Visit of SOS-Sahel Integrated Food Security Support Project site, Soro, farm visit and farmer interviews.</p> <p>Visit of Farm Africa “Institutionalization of Farmers’ Participatory Research” project site near Hosaina, farm and farm household visit, farmer interviews.</p>
14.03.	Return trip to Addis Ababa.
15.03.	<p>Meeting at /with:</p> <p>EC Delegation:</p> <p>Mr. Minos Mastrogeorgopoulos, on Food Security Programme</p> <p>Mr. Tim Waites, TA (seconded by DFID), on Pastoral development, Coalition for Food Security, Safety Nets</p> <p>Mr. Francois Leonardi, TA, Agricultural Marketing</p> <p>Mr. René Van Nes, Economic Adviser, on Macro-economic support / General Budgetary Support</p> <p>MoFED:</p> <p>Ms. Sylviane Menard, TA, on Food Security Budgetary Aid</p> <p>Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation: Mr. Hartmut Hesse, Resident Representative</p>
16.03.	<p>Meetings with:</p> <p>Ms. Nuala O’Brian, Development Specialist, Development Cooperation Ireland</p> <p>Mr. Eleftherios Tsiavos, First Secretary – Infrastructure, EC Delegation</p> <p>Ms. Michelle Phillips, Rural Livelihoods Officer, The World Bank</p> <p>Mr. John Hockley, Food Security Consultant (DFID, EC, Ireland Aid)</p> <p>Evening: with Mr. Minos Mastrogeorgopoulos, RDFSD, EC-Delegation, and Mr. Robert Hynderick, EC, Aidco, Brussels</p>
17.03.	<p>Drafting of Aide Memoire</p> <p>Meeting with:</p> <p>Mr. Bernhard Meier zu Biesen, Country Representative, GAA</p>

18.03.	<p>Meetings at WFP with:</p> <p>Ms. Georgia Shaver, WFP Country Director</p> <p>Ms. Deborah Hicks, WFP Emergency Officer</p> <p>Continue drafting of Aide Memoire</p>
19.03.	<p>Presentation of Aid Memoire and debriefing meeting at EC Delegation with:</p> <p>Mr. Jean-Claude Esmieu, Interim Head of Delegation</p> <p>Meeting with Mr. Sergio Giorgi, RDFS/NGO Programme Coordination</p> <p>Evening: Departure of international consultants</p>

ANNEX 2: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

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Annex 3: Economic, Development and Food Security Indicators

Indicator	Reference period	Measure	Value
Human development index	2001	Rank	169/175
	2001	Value	0.359
	1995	Value	0.322
Total population	2001	Million	67.3
Annual population growth	1975-2001	%	2.7
Urban population	2001	% of total	15.9
Population under age 15	2001	% of total	45.8
Life expectancy at birth	2001	Years	45.7
Adult literacy rate, age 15 and above	2001	%	59.7
Female adult literacy rate, 15 and above	2001	%	32.4
Net primary enrolment ration	2000/1	%	47
Combined gross enrolment ratio	2000/1	%	34
GDP per capita	2001	PPP US\$	810
GDP per capita	2001	US\$	95
GDP per capita annual growth rate	1990-2001	%	2.4
People living below \$1 a day	1990-2001	%	81.9
Population below national poverty line	1987-2000	%	44.2
Population without access to safe water	2000	%	76
Children under weight for age	1995-2001	% under 5 years	47
Children under height for age	1995-2001	% under 5 year	52
Undernourished people	1998-2000	% of total	44
Infant mortality rate	2001	per 1000 births	116
Under-five mortality rate	2001	per 1000 births	172
Total exports*	2002	million US\$	467
Total imports*	2002	million US\$	1,598
Share of agriculture in GDP*	2002	%	52.3
Annual agricultural growth rate*	1992-2002	%	2.8

Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report 2003

* World Bank

Annex 4:**Summary of other donors' interventions in the domain of Food Security**

Donor	Sector Specific Support (related to FS)
Germany (BMZ GTZ)	Resource management, Forestry, Water Supply, IFSP, Pastoral Development
Ireland (Irish Aid)	Natural resource conservation, Livelihood & Food Security at HH level, Integrated Food Security Programmes
Italy (Cooperazione Italiana)	Agricultural and rural development (irrigation, micro credits, seeds, rural roads, water supply, fertilisers)
Netherlands	Capacity Building/Education, Environment, Disposal of Pesticides, Rural roads, Agricultural Research, Rural Development, Fertiliser Sector, Emergency
Sweden SIDA	Rural Development, Assets Supply, Support to transport capacity
UK (DFID)	Research & Capacity Building, Livestock, Disposal of pesticides
U.S. (USAID)	Food security programs in selected Woredas, Early Warning (FEWS)
Canada (CIDA)	SWC activities, Rural roads, Capacity Building, Small Scale Irrigation
UNDP	Capacity building, Early warning System, Irrigation, micro-finance, marketing, gender, Agricultural Dev. Prog., Nat. Agric. Inf. Syst., Livestock Health, Environment
AfDB	Livestock enhancement, Agriculture, Forestry, Natural Resources, Rangeland Project, Tea, Sugar
FAO	Irrigation pilot phase
World Bank	Road rehabilitation, Seed System development, National fertilizer sector, water supply development & rehabilitation- Food security programs in selected Woredas, Pastoral community development
WFP	Capacity building, water & sanitation, rural roads, SWC activities, forestry
[FAD	Irrigation, micro-finance
IGAD	Environmental conservation in pastoral areas
UNICEF	Water and sanitation, vaccination campaigns

Source: EC Delegation, amended by mission

Annex 5: EC Food Aid and Food Security Programmes, Ethiopia, Direct Aid, 1997 - 2003

Table A5-1- EC commitments and payments in million Euros

Programme / action/OL	1997	1998	1999	2000	2002 ^a	2002 ^b	2003
OL/ FA No (primary commitment)	17.4141/2.479	19.726	30.929	8464	30516	48219	7845
Amount in OL/FA	38	24	15.5	40	25	41	21
Limit validity OL/FA	31/12/2004	31/12/2004		31/12/ 2004	31/12/2005	30/06/2005	30/06/2005
Amounts contracted (secondary commitment)	34.858	23.039	16.166	27.286	23.483	41	17.036
Disbursed to contractual partners	-	17.055	14.732	21.861	9.229	36.71	-
To be disbursed	3.142	5.984	1.434	5.425	14.254	4.29	3.964
Est. completion date	31/12/2003	31/12/2004	31/12/2003	31/12/ 2004	31/12/2005	30/06/2005	30/06/2005

Table A5-2- Management of funds by contractual partners in million Euros

Programme Action/OL	1997	1998			1999	2000			2002		2003
Components	EFSR	IFSP Ti-gray	IFSP Amhara	DPPC	DPPC	IFSP Tigray	IFSP Amhara	DPPC	FSP	DPPC	DPPC
Amount contracted *	38	4	6	12.5	12.5	5	6	27.5	22	41.00	21.00
Payment deadlines	31/12/04	31/06/2004			31/12/2003	31/12/2004			31/12/2005	30/06/2005	30/06/2005
Amount Disbursed from EC *	34.858	1.943	2.310	11.539	12.807	2.76	3.125	15.175	9	36.71	17.04
Countervalue funds **		14.542	17.714	-	-	23.715	28.542	-	91.144	-	-
Amount Executed **	-	12.821	13.064	-	12.54	4.068	2.676	15.175	0.00	36.71	17.04
Balance **	-	1.721	4.65	-	-	19.647	25.866	-	91.144	-	-
Balance *	3.142			0.97	(0.04)			12.325		4.29	3.96
Bank Deposit	-	0.234	2.114	-	-	12.583	5.268	-	91.144	-	-
Expected completion date	31/12/03	31/12/04			31/12/03	31/12/04			31/12/05	30/06/05	30/06/05


* In Euro

** In ETB

Source: EC AidCo, Desk in F/5

Annex 6:

Administrative Regions and Zones of Ethiopia





Thematic Evaluation of Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security

FIELD REPORT FOR KYRGYZSTAN

**Antony Penney
Robert Brudzynski**

April 2004

For the

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ECDPM
IDC
SEPIA**

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The EC started to finance using budgetary support a Food Security Programme in Kyrgyzstan in 1996. The programme's annual financial cost in current prices is estimated at 10 m euro and presently accounts for more than 60% of the EC's total aid budget to Kyrgyzstan.

The programme's overall objective is to contribute to long term improved food security at household, regional and national level while the programme purpose comprises agricultural-sector institutional and policy reform, safety net development and a contribution to macroeconomic stability and enhanced public financial management.

The Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Food Processing Industry (MAWRPI) and the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection (MLSP) became the targeted GOK institutions because these are responsible mainly for the agricultural and social sector welfare of the food insecure.

The ultimate objective of this report is to determine whether or not Regulation 1292/96 or its components should be terminated or continued in another form. Other objectives of this report include an evaluation of the Regulation-financed food security actions.

The main findings and conclusions are:

- (a) The EC actions are generally relevant to the needs of the direct beneficiaries such as the MAWRPI, the MLSP and the MLSP's indirect beneficiaries and possibly partly relevant to the needs of the food insecure or food deficit households. It was difficult to assess the relevance of the actions for some of the indirect beneficiaries because it was not known with certainty who they were or why they were in food deficit.
- (b) The effectiveness of budgetary support strategies and actions is believed to be fair as reflected by the positive contribution by the programme's results to the achievement of the programme purpose although it is recognised that this effectiveness is difficult to measure empirically in the absence of proper monitoring.
- (c) The cost-efficiency of converting the actions into high-quality results is also thought to be fair as reflected by the fact that the unit costs of achieving many of the logframe's results do not appear to be out of line with those of similarly-performing actions funded by the EC or other donors in other countries.
- (d) It is envisaged that the GOK and perhaps some NGOs would have developed in the medium to long term the ability to elaborate strategies and implement programmes as well as to continue to pursue programme objectives in all areas after EC assistance ceases but on condition that more capacity-building would be provided by the EC and that the budgetary-support's long-term financial and institutional sustainability dialogue be improved. There is no GOK or donor long-term financing plan yet in place but the EC and the GOK in particular have started to put mechanisms in place to provide financial sustainability.
- (e) The institutional and policy impacts of budgetary support strategies and actions are generally positive and moving in the right direction even though it is difficult to adequately evaluate this impact in the absence of long term monitoring and methodologies¹. The impact on the final MLSP beneficiaries appears to be good but the impact on the final agricultural beneficiaries is not clear. Indeed, it may be that the

¹ Some institutional impacts are methodologically difficult to quantify.

agriculturally food secure are receiving benefits instead of the agriculturally food insecure but this cannot be verified without adequate monitoring¹.

- (f) The internal and external coherence is believed to be satisfactory.
- (g) Regarding the comparative advantage of budgetary support vis-à-vis other instruments within the Regulation, it is fair to say that the theoretical advantages are strong enough to argue for budgetary support and it seems that budgetary support is performing quite well in practice. Whether or not it is performing better than other aid modalities cannot be empirically determined owing to the fact that it is the only aid modality used.
- (h) A major comparative advantage of the Regulation vis-à-vis other instruments such as TACIS is that budgetary support cannot be used by TACIS and that its administrative procedures are easier.
- (i) Looking from a wider perspective, it is the feeling of the mission that only a more comprehensive rural livelihoods-oriented development framework may be the optimal instrument for addressing food security problems.

The recommendations are:

Based on conclusion a, **Recommendation 1:**

The EC should recruit at country level an additional local or foreign expert to be located in the MAWRPI, the MOF or the NSC in order to assist in the in-depth analysis of food insecurity's causes, the ranking of their importance and the identification of the linkages between them.

More attention should also be paid to land reform to help alleviate the land tenure constraint to improving food security. The expert would identify the food security impacts of possible interventions, select the most appropriate interventions in planning and expand the use of socio-economic surveys so that the chances of the programme actually reflecting the final beneficiary needs would be increased.

Based on conclusion b, c and g, **Recommendation 2:**

The EC –FSBL should continue to use and develop the component currency facility. Operational solutions to overcome actual constraints by the use of CF should be analysed.

Based on conclusion d, **Recommendation 3:**

The EC should encourage more dialogue with the GOK on budgetary support sustainability in order to help to put in place its required financial and institutional mechanisms. The EC through the FSP or TACIS should provide to the MAWRPI and the MLSP more capacity building in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating including the strengthening of local GOK and administration and perhaps with NGOs playing an interim role in order to help ensure institutional sustainability and therefore the maintenance and continuation of the same level and quality of benefits to the food insecure.

¹ This latter sentence was derived from the most recent MTR and besides, it is not a definitive statement, it is only conditional.

The EC should encourage the GOK to identify a range of possible water tariffs to improve cost recovery, to improve water extension in order to raise household awareness of the need for its financial contribution to the water cost and to identify improved cost recovery mechanisms for other agricultural and rural extension services

Based on conclusions a, b, c, d and e, **Recommendation 4:**

The EC should provide either additional human resources or more capacity building using existing EC resources to provide more higher-quality support to the NSC, the MAWRPI and the MLSP for the provision of reliable household data on socio-economics, poverty and food security and make available criteria and indicators that show whether or not household food security is improving. The EC in collaboration with the local MAWRPI and the MLSP staff should systematically carry out intervention monitoring and evaluation not only for control but also to generate learning at country and donor level. This would be supervised by appropriately trained EC-financed technical assistance and use would be made of a joint design and monitoring and evaluation system. The technical assistant would focus analytical and advisory actions on improved monitoring and evaluation of the reform implementation as well as assisting in the measurement of the impact before and after interventions.

Based on conclusion f, **Recommendation 5:**

More efforts should be made by the EC to improve donor cooperation and coordination and to provide additional human resources in order to increase the chances of more effective achievement of the food security objectives assuming that the Regulation continues in its present form

Based on conclusions g,h and i, Recommendation 6:

More attention should be given to a multi-sectoral and decentralised rural development programme that addresses simultaneously the diversity and plethora of causes of both food insecurity and poverty with food security and poverty reduction objectives and actions incorporated into this single mainstream programme⁹⁴. A particular focus should be put on the comparative advantages of various existing instruments, esp. the synergy between FSBL and TACIS instruments as well as on the GOK's, EC's and other donors' complementarity, coordination, coherence, integration and synergy.

⁹⁴ Food security and poverty reduction are separated here because they are not necessarily synonymous

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1. Background to the mission

This country case study is a review of the food aid and food security programmes in Kyrgyzstan that since 1997 have been funded by the EC, with special emphasis on the period from 2000 onwards. The study forms part of the evaluation of ‘Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security’ which was launched in September 2003³.

This 2003/04 thematic evaluation of EC food aid and food security programmes is a follow-up of the evaluation of the Food Security Budget line (FSBL) that has been established in 1996 (Regulation No. 1292/96), and the review of the functioning of the FSBL by the Court of Auditors presented in 2003, with the main objective to analyse the added value of this budget line compared to other EC instruments and budget lines. The results should provide an assessment of the coherence and complementarity of the EC strategy for food aid and food security, and an assessment of the steps taken by the Commission to improve the efficiency and quality management with regard to programming, targeting and handling of its food aid actions and operations in support of food security.

2.2. Why Kyrgyzstan

2.2.1. Introduction

Countries participating in this evaluation have been selected according to certain criteria:

- Being a beneficiary of the budget line B7-201;
- Having a good balance between Food Aid and support to Food Security activities in this budget line;
- Selected countries must have a good geographical representation among ACP, ALA, TACIS, MEDA and CARDS;
- Selected countries must also be a beneficiary of ECHO, budget lines such as “rehabilitation”, “NGO co finance” and being selected for LRRD;
- Priority is given to countries which were not evaluated during the last two years;

The countries that were finally selected are:

ACP: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Burkina Faso;

ALA: Bangladesh, Peru, and Nicaragua;

MEDA: Palestine;

TACIS: Kyrgyzstan;

³ As part of the 2004 evaluation of the food aid policy and food aid management and special operations in support of food security, ten country field studies have been executed: in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gaza, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru and Zimbabwe.

Kyrgyzstan has been selected among the 20 candidate countries for the following reasons:

- Is an important recipient of the budget line B5-201;
- Is an TACIS country;
- Focus on budgetary support
- Representative of FS programmes in TACIS countries

2.2.2. Country profile: Food aid and food security: Situation, policy, actors and programmes

2.2.2.1. General Situation in terms of Food Security

Kyrgyzstan is a landlocked Central Asian country with an area of nearly 200,000 km² and an estimated population of 5 m. It borders China in the east, Kazakhstan in the north, Uzbekistan in the west and Tajikistan in the south. Nearly 95% of the country is mountainous of which almost 50% is over 3000 m and 90% more than 1500 m above sea level. 54% of the Kyrgyzstan area is agricultural with forest and water 5.3% and 4.4% respectively. The country has a continental climate with little rainfall and an average of 247 sunny days per year. Annual rainfall in the fertile valleys varies between 200 and 300 mm and the temperature ranges are (-4°) to (-6°) C in January and 16° to 24° C in July in the lowlands and (-14°) to (-20°) C in January and 8° to 12° C in July in the highlands.

Kyrgyzstan was one of the poorest republics in the former Soviet Union. A large part of the Kyrgyzstan economy provided Soviet Union needs particularly military ones in the late 1980s. The Kyrgyzstan Government budget was subsidised each year by the central Soviet Union budget by at least 10 percent of Kyrgyzstan's GDP but the Soviet Union collapse and the gaining of Kyrgyzstan independence in 1991 resulted in terms-of-trade shocks and trade pattern dislocations. Between 1992 and 1996, Kyrgyzstan's GDP declined by 50% and subsidies from Moscow were terminated. Half of the population consequently fell into poverty.

However, as an inheritance from the Soviet Union, social development was good as reflected by life expectancy at birth of 67.8 years, adult literacy rate of 97% and gross secondary school enrolment ratio of 83%.

The Kyrgyzstan's economy is dominated by agriculture, which accounted for 36 % of GDP in 2002 while the contribution to GDP was 21% from manufacturing and construction and 36% from services.

Table 1: Kyrgyzstan - Selected Economic Indicators

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
GDP								
Nominal GDP (US\$ m)	1492	1828	1777	1646	1251	1368	1525	1606
GDP per capita (US\$)	330	395	379	341	257	279	308	321
GDP growth (%)	-5,4	7,1	9,9	2,1	3,7	5,4	5,3	0,0
General government finances								
Government revenue (% of GDP)	24,6	23,5	23,0	24,9	22,2	20,3	21,8	22,8
Government expenditure (% of GDP)	39,9	32,1	31,3	33,6	33,1	28,6	25,7	28,0
Government budget balance (% of GDP)	-15,3	-8,6	-8,3	-8,7	-10,9	-8,4	-3,9	-5,5
External sector								
Exports, fob (US\$ m)	409	531	631	535	463	511	480	498
Imports, fob (US\$ m)	531	783	646	756	551	507	440	552
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-15,7	-23,2	-7,8	-22,1	-14,4	-6,6	-3,3	-3,9
CPI index	143,5	132,0	123,4	110,5	135,9	118,7	106,9	102,1
Exchange rate (soms per US\$, average)	10,8	12,8	17,3	20,8	39,0	47,7	48,4	46,9
Human Development Index	0,698	0,679	0,676	0,684	0,694	0,712	n.a.	n.a.

Source: CASE-Kyrgyzstan, IMF, GOK

There are no food supply problems in Kyrgyzstan and a large variety of food is available in the market. Kyrgyzstan is an open market economy, a member of the WTO and the external food trade is not subject to WTO restrictions. Kyrgyzstan's external food trade balance is shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Kyrgyzstan - External Food Trade Balance (US\$ m)

	1999	2000	2001	2001
Trade balance	-88,5	4,0	39,9	-54,0
Exports, fob	462,6	510,9	480,3	498,1
Food exports, fob	73,4	54,0	49,2	54,0
Imports, fob	551,1	506,9	440,4	552,1
Food imports, fob	82,4	81,3	58,5	77,4
Food trade balance	-9	-27,3	-9,3	-23,4

Source: National Bank of Kyrgyzstan

Agriculture has been the main source of GDP growth for several years and yields increased by 62.4% for grains, 61.7% for sugar beet, 128.3% for oil crops, 60.6% for potatoes by 60.6% and 71.8% for vegetables since 1995. Data on the harvested area, gross harvest and yields for major agriculture commodities are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Kyrgyzstan - Main Indicators of Domestic Crop Production

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 ⁴
Harvested area ('000 hectares)					
Grains	623,0	620,8	589,8	641,9	625,7
Wheat	488,6	456,6	443,7	478,5	466,9
Barley	74,7	91,1	70,3	67,3	63,9
Maize for grain	46,3	58,1	58,8	72,6	64,6
Oil crops	55,8	66,4	57,2	59,3	65,7
Potatoes	59,0	64,0	69,0	73,8	52,3
Vegetables	38,4	46,9	47,0	48,6	24,6
Gross harvest, thousand tons					
Grains	1619,0	1629,9	1568,7	1824,2	1752,8
Wheat	1203,7	1109,1	1039,1	1190,6	1162,6
Barley	161,7	179,9	150,2	139,9	149,3
Maize for grain	227,9	308,4	338,3	442,8	373,6
Oil crops	43,8	57,9	53,4	58,8	72,4
Potatoes	773,5	957,2	1045,6	1168,4	842,1
Vegetables	555,9	719,3	746,8	815,3	456,2
Yield, 100 kg/hectare					
Grains	26,0	26,2	26,4	28,3	27,9
Wheat	24,6	24,3	23,4	24,9	24,9
Barley	21,6	19,7	21,4	20,8	23,5
Maize for grain	49,2	53,0	55,8	59,9	57,3
Oil crops	7,9	8,7	9,2	9,7	10,7
Potatoes	131	150	151	157	158
Vegetables	143	152	157	165	175

Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyzstan

The performance of Kyrgyzstan agriculture however is still below potential in spite of significant progress. The main impediment to further development is the lack of human capital since most of the skilled workers emigrated after the collapse of the collective farms. Another problem is a shortage of veterinary services, drugs and agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, pesticide and feed concentrates. Own-produced degenerated seeds and livestock degeneration have also reduced yields while specialised traders and wholesale-trader agromarkets have not yet been established. Another impediment to agricultural development is that up to 15% of the irrigable area lies idle due to poor water management, deficient water conveyance facilities and a lack of maintenance including drainage.

The reduced government budget and liabilities inherited from the Soviet system led to deficiency of the social protection system. The government provides cash allowances and other benefits to wide groups of citizens but scarce financial resources are not properly targeted to the poorest and most vulnerable population. Access to and use of food are consequently denied to a significant part of the population resulting in widespread poverty

⁴ Adjusted for the First Agricultural Census results

and food insecurity. The KPMS poverty studies started in Kyrgyzstan in 1996⁵. The poverty indicators showed some poverty reduction in 1997 but due to huge internal and external imbalances and with the spillover effects from the Russian economic crisis, poverty levels in 1998 escalated to 55% causing 23% of the population to become very poor. A poverty reduction trend started again in 2000 when the population living below the poverty line shrank by 3.3% points. Both the poverty gap and the poverty gap square have consequently been reduced. The main reason why poverty was reduced was the combined growth in GDP and real income of the population. Average per capita disposable income increased by 16% and the same index for the first quintile increased by 13% between 2001 and 2003. The food balance expressed in nutritional values also showed that the national average daily gap between nutritional needs and intake shrank from 22% to 4.3% and for the first quintile from 41% to 25% during the same period.

Table 4: Kyrgyzstan - Poverty in Urban and Rural Areas (%)

	Poor			Of which: Very Poor			Poverty Gap	Poverty Gap Square
	Total	Town	Village	Total	Town	Village		
1996	43,5	30,3	49,6	19,1	10,3	23,3	15,9	7,9
1997	42,9	22,2	55,3	14,8	4,9	20,7	13,9	6,3
1998	54,9	42,2	62,4	23,0	18,3	25,8	19,5	9,2
1999	55,3	42,4	60,0	23,3	17,1	25,6	19,8	9,8
2000	52,0	43,9	56,4	17,8	12,7	20,5	17,7	7,7
2001	47,6	41,2	51,0	13,5	9,6	15,6	13,9	5,6
2002	44,4	39,6	47,0	13,8	12,0	14,7	13,2	5,5

Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyzstan

Poverty in Kyrgyzstan is mainly a rural phenomenon. 65% of the population lived in rural areas and 69% of the poor lived in villages in 2002. The level of extreme poverty in the cities however grew by 2.4% in 2002 and is now close to the village level of extreme poverty. Poor households have on average two more members than non-poor ones and the dependency ratio⁶ was 2.5 for poor households and 2.1 for non-poor ones. In 1997, Households headed by people older than 60 years have the highest poverty rate which reflects problems in the pension system. Poverty is also correlated to the education level since on average the non-poor have 16% more schooling than the extreme poor and 11% more than the poor.

Food represents a substantial consumption share for all income groups. Food nationally represented 50% of total consumption in 2003 but this increased to 66% for the first quintile. The share of total consumption devoted to food however is lower than in 2001 when the national share was 56.7% and for the first quintile was 75.6%. There are also differences in how households obtain food. Home production represented 28% of all food consumption in extreme poor households and 15.4% in non-poor households in 1997. More than half the value of the non-poor's home production came from animal products in contrast to poor households where animal products represent a negligible share of home production.

⁵ KPMS – the Kyrgyz Poverty Monitoring Survey. Before 1991 poverty level calculations were based on Income and Expenditure Survey and quota sampling techniques which allowed estimation of the normative poverty line but was hardly comparable to the KPMS based consumption approach.

⁶ Number of persons who depend on each employed person in the household.

2.2.2.2. National (and regional) Policy and Strategy for Food Security (evolution of policy, dynamics and policy dialogue)

With the Rome Declaration's signing and adoption during the 1996 World Food Summit, Kyrgyzstan as an international community member assumed responsibility to adopt a policy to alleviate poverty and inequality and to provide physical and economic access for all people and at all times to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. The Government of Kyrgyzstan in co-operation with the European Commission formulated in 1999 a National Food Security Policy focused on sustaining reforms in food security-related sectors such as agriculture, health, education and social protection.

Under the World Bank's aegis in 2000, the Kyrgyzstan Government developed its Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) which became an expression of the country's general development vision. The CDF demonstrates consensus among government, civil society and donor organisations on poverty reduction as an overarching goal in Kyrgyzstan development. The National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (NSPR) was adopted in 2002 as the first step in the CDF's implementation (2003-2005) and defined a timeframed set of actions and programmes with actors oriented towards poverty alleviation since poverty was identified as the country's main development obstacle. The CDF's three pillars are also the NSPR's three important elements namely:

- poverty mitigation
- economic growth
- governance reform

The government's role in the NSPR's realisation would be to ensure a favourable climate for entrepreneurship and investment, create and maintain reasonable rules on economic activity for all participants as well as to provide all possible support for the improved functioning of the labour, capital, land and natural resources markets.

The CDF and NSPR documents helped to enhance dialogue among different actors within the Kyrgyzstan government and became the basis for donor co-ordination. Both documents however are criticised for their lack of priorities and absence of financial resources and monitoring mechanisms.

2.2.2.3. Main Actors and Programmes

European Commission

The EC started actions in Kyrgyzstan in 1991 and has since disbursed 159.5 m euro of which allocations comprised 43% through TACIS, 41% through the Food Security Programme (FSP) and the remainder through ECHO, FEOGA and Exceptional Assistance facilities. The FSP started in 1996 in the form of a foreign currency facility (FCF) that provides 10 m euros a year for food imports. This amount is exchanged at the National Bank into a national currency sum and the latter is channeled into the national budget as a grant in order to target food security-improving budget lines. Supported targets and budget lines are defined each year in a Memorandum of Understanding. Most of the FSP grant is allocated to the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources and Processing Industry (MAWRPI) and to the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection (MLSP), as well as to other centrally led departments and institutions of MLSP. The EC grant within the MAWRPI supports non-salary expenditures of the centrally-led departments and the more autonomous Department of Irrigation. Within the MLSP, aid is given to the Department of Social Protection which is in charge of social

welfare policy implementation. At the beginning of FSP's life, part of the financial resources was allocated to the Ministries of Education and Health to finance school and hospital food supplies but poor targeting resulted in a cessation of this financing. Other government agencies that received FSP support were:

- The State Land Agency that is in charge of land register establishment and land property-rights issue. It has an important role in land reform finalisation and the conversion of land use rights into property rights.
- The State Wheat Reserve whose main task is to stabilise the wheat market and guarantee wheat security in Kyrgyzstan.
- The National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyzstan which issues a Food Security Information Bulletin in order to provide up-to date and reliable information on Kyrgyzstan food security.

The final beneficiary of the FSP - the most food insecure and vulnerable Kyrgyz household - would be targeted indirectly. The poor in Kyrgyzstan are not directly involved in the FSP's planning, implementation and evaluation.

IMF

Kyrgyzstan joined the IMF in 1992 and the first financial agreement (ESAF, SDR 88 m) was approved in 1994. The IMF to date has disbursed SDR 178 m and has been the main international authority on Kyrgyzstan's macroeconomic reform. The objective of the last agreement under a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) for SDR 73 m (equivalent to about US\$ 93 m) is to support the Kyrgyzstan Government's economic 2001-2004 programme. Among the main orientations of the PRGF, the Government is committed to strengthening governance and economic policy and to improving transparency and public finance accountability.

World Bank

Kyrgyzstan joined the World Bank in 1992 and since then received commitments of US\$ 649 m for twenty seven IDA-funded projects out of which about US\$ 479 m has been disbursed. Six structural adjustment credits have already been completed and they provided quick disbursing support for the Government's economic reform programmes in privatisation, enterprise restructuring, agricultural policy, financial sector, public sector resource management and pension reform. Six investment operations have also been completed supporting reform and rehabilitation of the telecommunication sector, social safety nets, health, rural finance and livestock development. The ongoing projects may be divided into the following four categories:

- Agricultural development compiled from the following credits: Agricultural Support Services, Land and Real Estate Registration, Rural Finance Development, On-farm Irrigation and Irrigation Rehabilitation and Flood Emergency and Village Investment.
- Human development from a Health Sector Reform Credit.
- Infrastructure rehabilitation compiled from the following credits: Urban Transport, Power and District Heating Rehabilitation and Rural Water Supply and Sanitation.
- Macro economy and governance reforms compiled from the following credits: Consolidated Structural Adjustment, Governance Structural Adjustment and Governance Technical Assistance.

International Finance Corporation

Kyrgyzstan joined the International Finance Corporation in 1992 and opened in 1997 an IFC liaison office. The IFC focused on institution building, technical assistance and strategic

investments and played an instrumental role in the establishment of the largest bank in Kyrgyzstan (KICB) with a US\$ 1.4 m equity investment and the development of a micro credit fund (FINCA) with a US\$ 1 m investment.

MIGA

The MIGA supported private sector development in Kyrgyzstan by extending guarantees to foreign direct investments in four projects in the manufacturing, services and mining sectors. Three are currently outstanding - two related to airport services and one related to gold mining. The total amount of foreign direct investment facilitated by MIGA guarantees is over US\$ 360 m.

Asian Development Bank

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) operations in Kyrgyzstan commenced in 1994. The ADB to date approved 22 loans totaling US\$ 553 m out of which allocations were 27% to transport and communications, 21% to the financial sector, 17% to social infrastructure, 16% to agriculture and natural resources and 6% to energy. Besides loan operations, the ADB has extended technical assistance grants totaling US\$ 32 m since 1994. The new ADB country strategy was approved in November 2003 and its overall objective is to reduce poverty. This will be addressed by supporting:

- agriculture and rural development to further productivity growth and to expand exports
- the financial sector to strengthen banking, improve depositor confidence and deepen bank intermediation
- regional cooperation to reduce cross-border, transport and trade bottlenecks

The ADB would assist the Kyrgyzstan Government through these initiatives in meeting the first Millennium Development Goal's target of halving poverty by 2015.

EBRD

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) approved 21 projects at a total cost of US\$ 710 m out of which the Bank financed 26% and disbursed US\$ 186 m. According to the EBRD's country strategy, Kyrgyzstan's priorities are the promotion of a healthy SME sector, facilitation of privatisation of the remaining major state enterprises, support to the development of the financial sector and help to attract investment for key natural resources projects.

UNDP

The UNDP country office was opened in 1993 and has since been involved in various actions in building the country's development capacity. The First Country Programme (1993-96) focused on aid-management and coordination, management development and democratisation. As a result of the February 2003 programme review, the UNDP in Kyrgyzstan launched a new programme framework with focus on poverty reduction, local self-governance, preventive development, national governance, HIV/AIDS prevention and GEF/LIFE programmes.

The overall objective of the poverty reduction direction is to complement the efforts of the Kyrgyzstan Government, civil society and other organisations to reduce rural poverty in accordance with national development goals set out in the NSPR and the Millennium Development Goals. The on-going and planned actions of the poverty reduction programme are compiled into four clearly distinguishable sets of components: policy advice, social mobilisation, micro-finance development and small-scale business development.

The bilateral donors

The bilateral donor community has wide representation in Kyrgyzstan. The main bilateral donors are the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Swiss SECO and SDC, the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), the British DFID, the German GTZ and the Turkish International Co-operation Agency (TICA). These organisations play a significant role in sustainable development and poverty reduction.

Aid co-ordination mechanism

Despite frequent official meetings and formal co-ordination mechanisms within the CDF and the NSPR realisation monitoring framework, donor-activity co-ordination is not at the desired level. The macroeconomic reform conditionalities framework is agreed between the Kyrgyzstan Government and the Bretton Wood Institutions and the EC's Food Security Programme has mainly relied on expertise from these institutions. Each year the EC attaches to its FSP general conditions concerning the satisfactory implementation of the macroeconomic programme agreed with the IMF and the World Bank and this condition is a precondition for FSP implementation. The fulfilment however by the Kyrgyzstan Government of the FSP specific conditionalities is not a precondition for the implementation of Bretton Wood Institutions programmes. When some of the FSP conditions were not met in 2003, the EC postponed a 4 m euro instalment while the IMF assessed Government performance and disbursed its next PRGF instalment.

Donors' interventions often overlap, increase foreign debt pressure and compete for attention from scarce human capital in the Government. The reason can be explained by differences in goals, cultures and organisation of work between the donors. In order to increase aid efficiency, there is a need for consolidation of all donors and it should be done at a high institutional level as well as in the field.

2.2.2.4. Major challenges/constraints encountered in achieving food security

Poverty Reduction is the most important challenge facing the Kyrgyzstan Government and the only strategy to tackle this problem is through boosting economic growth for Kyrgyzstan, as for other developing countries. The most important single growth determinant is the international technology transfer. The size of this transfer in turn is related to physical and human capital investment which reactivates the importance of national savings and capital accumulation as the key growth determinant.

An increase in the public sector saving rates is one of the most effective policy instruments to increase national savings and growth. Fiscal adjustment therefore should comprise the following:

- current expenditure reduction should be focused on employment reduction. This should be a part of broader public administration reform with the main accent on increasing government transparency and fighting corruption.
- subsidies to public enterprises should be cut. Telecommunications and electric power generation sectors are potentially competitive and after tariff reform, providing that tariffs reflect costs and payment by users is enforced, should be privatised. This reform should envisage some protection for the most vulnerable part of the population.

- taking into account the inability to meet its future debt obligations, Kyrgyzstan should restructure its debt repayments schedule in order to lower interest payments.
- spending on social services, health and education should be protected. The social protection system should be rationalised and targeting of the poor and the most vulnerable part of the population improved.
- with respect to capital spending, reduction and rationalisation of major public investment projects is required. However, public spending plays a significant role in promoting growth in all those areas in which positive externalities are present. These areas include physical infrastructure and education where public spending has been radically curtailed during the first decade of the transition. In transport, the overall system capacity and geographical and functional mismatch are strong impediments to economic growth. Taking into account the amount of financial resources required, high risk and public capacity of such kinds of projects, the budget involvement would be indispensable. The private sector however should be attracted in sharing the transport infrastructure project risk.

On the revenue side, strong measures should be implemented to improve tax administration and to broaden the tax base.

Another strong impediment to sustainable growth is the underdeveloped and inefficient financial system. The Kyrgyzstan banking system experienced three severe crises in the last 12 years leading to the closure of several of the country's largest financial institutions and a general loss of bank confidence. The only way to restore credibility to and confidence in the banking system in the foreseeable future is to import both from abroad. Government policy therefore should be focused on the attraction of renowned international banks, which could bring high corporate governance standards and increase banking sector capitalisation and efficiency.

2.3. Summary of the mission

The field mission was conducted between the 22nd January and the 8th February 2004.

A detailed chronology of the mission and a list of persons interviewed are shown in Annexes 1 and 3 respectively in this Country Report.

2.4. Constraints

The main constraints were lack of time and data.

3. EVALUATIVE QUESTIONS

3.1. Evaluative Question 1

“What is the level of coherence between the food security policies, strategies and objectives of Regulation No.1292/96 and those from other geographical instruments (EDF, ALA, MEDA, TACIS, CARDS) and budget lines (ECHO, Rehabilitation, NGO Cofinancing)? “

The evaluative question 1 will be dealt within the synthesis report.

3.2. Evaluative Question 2

‘What is the level of integration of the food security policy within the Commission’s development strategy with the partner country concerned as laid down in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP)?’

Coherence of the overall objectives of the food security policy and the RSP

The overall objective⁷ of the food security policy is “long-term food security supporting sustainable development, economic growth and poverty reduction” while the overall objectives of the 2002-2006 Regional Strategy Paper⁸ (RSP) are “to promote the stability and security of the countries of Central Asia and to assist in their pursuit of sustainable economic development and poverty reduction.” These overall objectives are fully coherent since the RSP’s poverty reduction objective is assumed to encapsulate food security improvement⁹. The quality of the food security cross-references is considered to be satisfactory.

Importance of FS issue in RSP

Food security is important in the RSP as reflected by the number of its references in it although it is not a single overarching objective and is therefore less likely to be reflected in a greater degree of attempted “mainstreaming of such an objective” within the EC¹⁰. The RSP specifically mentions EC Food Security Programme¹¹ support but some of the food security references are unclear and could therefore be improved¹². Food security is also important in terms of the financial cost level of its interventions as they accounted for over 60% of the total EC aid to the country in 2002/03. The quality of the food security cross-references is fair.

⁷ Source: Court of Auditors Report 2/2003

⁸ The Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) is more correctly termed “Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Central Asia” but hereinafter will be referred to as the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP)

⁹ Since food security may not necessarily be synonymous with poverty reduction

¹⁰ This means the extent to which all actions and all levels of the organisation are committed to this end. The EC does however have a formal commitment to poverty reduction as a priority objective and has subscribed to the International Development Targets.

¹¹ Page 25 of the RSP

¹² Although it’s not the mission’s task to fully evaluate the RSP

Clear definition of the role of the regulation within RSP

Food security's references in the RSP relate particularly to the Food Security Programme (FSP) but there is no mention of Regulation 1292/96 that finances it. Assuming however that mention of the FSP is synonymous with this Regulation, its roles within the RSP would be to:

- reduce poverty
- reform the public sector¹³
- enhance food availability¹⁴ and income¹⁵ for the majority of the population
- complement other EC instruments¹⁶ and coordinate with other donors in programming, programme and project design and implementation.

These roles are derived in principle from food security's causes but there seems to be a lack of conceptual clarity of these causes¹⁷, their relative importance and identification of the linkages between them. A key food security objective for example is identified as "food accessibility rather than food supply" in one RSP section¹⁸ but as "food availability" and income (food accessibility)" in another²⁰. The effectiveness of the Regulation's role within the RSP depends on the quality of food security data and analysis and on the articulation of the linkages between the nature and extent of food security and the EC's interventions. Food security data do not appear to be shaping the RSP as it should and the extent to which this data is feeding into inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral priority setting is unclear. It is accepted that a major role of the FSP is upstream public sector reform but attention to this should not undermine sensitivity to and focus on the needs of the food insecure²¹. The quality of the food security cross-references is poor.

Complementarities of the various EC instruments within RSP

The provision of policy advice and capacity building by the FSP and TACIS is seen to be contributing to complementarity in reaching common objectives such as poverty reduction and public sector reform. This complementarity as well as that between the EC and other donors in programming, programme and project design and implementation is also being strengthened by the Almaty-based EC Delegation through regular consultation within the EC as well as with other actors. The consequent quality of the proposed and operational cooperation and coordination of EC interventions is therefore good.

¹³ Through the provision of policy advice and institutional support including capacity building to food security-oriented GOK institutions

¹⁴ Assumed to be synonymous with food supply

¹⁵ Food accessibility

¹⁶ Such as TACIS technical assistance

¹⁷ The 2002 Mid-Term Review inferred that (i) agricultural wage labourers are not targeted despite being perhaps more food insecure than farmers (ii) lack of credit is a food security constraint but there was no mention of how to alleviate it and (iii) land tenure is a food security constraint but little effort was made to address it. While most of the broad food security roles of the RSP's are quite clear, it is unclear how some of the detailed interventions would be translated into improved household food security but this would be addressed in 5.1.

¹⁸ Section 4.1, page 14

¹⁹ It is assumed that food availability is equivalent to food supply

²⁰ Annex IV, page 39

²¹ It should be pointed out however that the success of the MLSP in delivering benefits to its target groups is generally good. It is the linkage between the MAWRPI and the final beneficiaries that is unclear but this will be addressed in 5.1.

Coordination of EC interventions

The coordination of EC interventions is facilitated by the NPRS, the FSP, the PCAs and the TCA and this is considered to be adequate while the Almaty-based EC Delegation is ensuring coordination of the EC interventions with other donors in programming, programme and project design and implementation. There are no new coordination mechanisms planned at present.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 2:

The overall objectives of the EC's food security policy and the RSP are fully coherent since it is assumed that the RSP's poverty reduction objective encapsulates food security improvement. Food security is important in the RSP as reflected by the number of its references in it and in terms of the cost of its interventions as it accounted for over 60% of the total EC aid to the country in 2002/03.

The role of the Regulation in the RSP however seems unclear owing to a lack of conceptual clarity of food security's causes, their relative importance and identification of the linkages between them. Food security data therefore do not seem to be shaping the RSP as it should.

A major role of the FSP is upstream public sector reform but attention to this should not undermine sensitivity to and focus on the needs of the food insecure. The complementarities of the various EC instruments within the RSP and the coordination of the EC interventions are considered to be fair

3.3. Evaluative Question 3

‘What is the coherence between EC food aid and food security policy and national strategies of beneficiary countries, especially the PRSP?’

Coherence of the overall objectives of RSP and NPRS

The overall objective of the 2003-2005 National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS)²² is assumed²³ to be “reduction of poverty through sustainable economic growth and active continuation of reforms in the social, political and economic areas” while the overall objectives of the 2002-2006 Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) are “to promote the stability and security of the countries of Central Asia and to assist in their pursuit of sustainable economic development and poverty reduction.” These overall objectives are considered to be coherent and the quality of the RSP’s and the NPRS’s food security cross-references is considered to be good.

Importance of FS issue in NPRS

Although food security is not an overarching²⁴ NPRS objective, it is mentioned several times in the NPRS especially in relation to the EC’s Food Security Programme (FSP) whose objectives include poverty reduction through balance of payments support²⁵ and agricultural and social sector reform²⁶. The quality of some of these references is uncertain²⁷.

Clear definition of the role of EC within NPRS

The NPRS refers to the EC’s role as poverty reduction through balance of payments support and agricultural and social sector reform²⁸ as mentioned above. The EC’s role is also referred to in Annex C²⁹ under the agriculture heading as support to the Government in carrying out structural reforms in the sectors or spheres related to ensuring food security. But there is no mention of the MLSP’s role in food security.

²² This 3-year strategy is intended to implement programmes and projects whose objectives are in line with those of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), an umbrella with broad objectives including an overall one “to achieve political and social well being, economic prosperity of the people of Kyrgyzstan, together with freedom, human dignity and equal opportunities for all”

²³ The NPRS’s overall objectives are unclear although reference is made to vision, broad strategic goals and “key priority”. It is assumed therefore that this “key priority” (paragraph 23, page 11) would be the NPRS’s overall objective.

²⁴ It is therefore less likely to be reflected in a greater degree of attempted “mainstreaming of such an objective” within the NPRS which means the extent to which all actions are committed to this end. The GOB and donors do however have a formal commitment to poverty reduction as a priority objective and have subscribed to the International Development Targets.

²⁵ Some persons would argue that the FSP does not provide balance-of-payments support but the technicalities of this will not be discussed here. Let it suffice to say that this does not affect this report’s final analysis.

²⁶ Including a functional review and institutional development of the MAWRPI and the MLSP.

²⁷ The NPRS contains several unclear food security statements such as “Increasing prices for foodstuffs and growth of imported foods, hamper the process of ensuring food security” (paragraph 487, page 137) but it’s not this mission’s task to fully evaluate the NPRS.

²⁸ Through the FSP for example

²⁹ Annex C is “Current and Indicated Program Funding and Grants”.

The NPRS also mentions that a contribution to food security may be achieved through increasing domestic agricultural production but this may conflict with a previous RSP reference where increasing food production is not seen as a priority unless another donor in the NPRS is supporting production. The importance of land reform is also highlighted in the NPRS.

The effectiveness of budgetary support strategies and actions that were derived partly from the NPRS depends on the quality of the food security data and analysis but the food security data do not appear to be shaping the NPRS and the extent to which this data is feeding into inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral priority setting is unclear.

The EC however is building the GOK capacity to undertake high-quality food security assessments and monitoring and the preparation of a more carefully drafted NPRS developed participatively and based on good food security analysis would be an important first step for the EC to maximise its impact on food security. It would however amount to no more than window dressing unless the NPRS results in dialogue and interventions that result in practical benefits being delivered to poor.

The NPRS could become more effective for mainstreaming country level food security if more attention were given to monitoring how far food security objectives set out in the RSP are in fact achieved. But some of the logframe's performance indicators are vague

The role of the EC's sectoral budget support would need to be analysed more carefully in the context of the NPRS process in which visions for poverty reduction are cross-sectoral, priorities driven by participatory approaches³⁰ and implementation decentralised to the extent possible. The quality of some of the food security cross references is less than satisfactory.

Rationale of EC intervention

The FSP is generally considered to be in line with the NPRS since it contributes to development although many of the agriculturally food insecure are not targeted by it.

No adequate stakeholder analysis has been carried out however so no one knows with certainty of the real household needs and therefore whether or not the EC interventions perfectly match them. The chances of the FSP actually reflecting the real beneficiary needs and the consequent rationale for EC intervention would therefore be increased were socio-economic surveys and adequate impact monitoring and assessments conducted.

Whether or not the MAWRPI and the MLSP would receive other donor support in the absence of EC support cannot be answered with certainty but it is likely given the political and strategic importance attached by the donors to Kyrgyzstan.

Coordination of donors and government interventions

The coordination of donors' and government interventions is reported to be fair as a result of regular meetings although feedback is not always provided by certain parts of the Government. The focus of these meetings would be on coordination and not just on data sharing.

³⁰ i.e. from the 'bottom up'

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 3:

The overall objectives of the RSP and the NPRS are considered to be coherent and food security is important in the NPRS although it is not an overarching objective. The food security data however do not appear to be shaping the NPRS as it should and the extent to which this data is feeding into inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral priority setting is unclear. The FSP however is generally considered to be broadly in line with the NPRS since it contributes to development although many of the agriculturally food insecure are not targeted by it. The coordination of donors' and government interventions is reported to be fair

3.4. Evaluative Question 4

‘What is the added value of the Food Aid in-kind (FA) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 4:

Kyrgyzstan does not receive Regulation-financed relief or developmental food aid based on the belief that it is not needed owing to the achievement by the country of some degree of national food self-sufficiency.

3.5. Evaluative Question 5

‘What is the added value of the currency facility (CF) / Budgetary Support (BS) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

Relevance of BS Strategies and Actions

The food security-oriented needs identified include (i) GOK institutional and policy reform³¹ and (ii) economic restructuring and macroeconomic reform. The budgetary support strategies and actions are considered relevant³² to address these needs mainly or partly because of the following:

- disadvantages of project aid and advantages of programme aid particularly in regard to its effects on Kyrgyzstan’s institutional structure
- ineffectiveness of project aid-linked policy conditionality
- expectation that national systems support to facilitate policy making would have better results
- belief that sustained food security improvement requires effective government accountable to its people and that aid should support this objective and avoid utilising approaches which undermine accountability and ownership.

The pre-conditions for using such budgetary support include the presence of the IMF or IBRD support.

(i) GOK Institutional and Policy Reform

Budgetary support strategies and actions are considered relevant for the reform of the GOK institutions particularly in governance³³, in their ability to formulate and implement policy and in their capacity to deliver goods and services to the final target groups. The latter are broadly identified as the most food insecure and comprise the vulnerable population³⁴ and the agricultural poor³⁵. The GOK institutions that are mainly responsible for the welfare of these groups are the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection (MLSP) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Processing Industry (MAWRPI) respectively. These institutions were therefore targeted by the EC.

³¹ This GOK institutional and policy reform would be sectorally targeted

³² Relevance may be defined as the appropriateness of the budgetary support strategies and actions to the problems, needs and priorities of target groups that these strategies and actions are supposed to address and to the physical and policy environment within which it operates.

³³ Improved governance would be achieved by (i) reduced transaction costs associated with development assistance (ii) increased public-spending allocative efficiency (iii) increased external resource-flow predictability (iv) increased state and public administration effectiveness and (v) strengthening of democratic-accountability structures and processes.

³⁴ The vulnerable population comprises the elderly, the physically and mentally handicapped, infants under 18-months old, pregnant mothers and unemployed. Many of them require social protection or safety nets to mitigate at least the immediate adverse effects of economic restructuring.

³⁵ It was concluded from national poverty surveys that most of the poor live in the rural sector or derive a living from agriculture. It is also understood that agriculture was targeted because it accounted for 60% of the labour force but only 35% of GDP in 1997.

Budgetary support strategies and actions are considered relevant for the targeted support through the MLSP to improve food security of the most vulnerable groups since this targeting is generally good.

The targeting of the food insecure in agriculture however seems unclear perhaps because there is some confusion concerning the causes and effects of food insecurity that is due to the complexity of the problem and to a lack of conceptual clarity. The 2003-2004 RSP Financing Proposal implied that the causes of food security were related to factors such as unemployment and lack of access to inputs and credit while the 2002 Mid-Term Review stated that “it appears likely that the people who are most vulnerable are not those officially working the land but their employees”. But the FSP logframe does imply that the core problem in agriculture is weak institutions and policy rather than household food insecurity and consequently assumes that reform by itself of the MAWRPI and of agricultural policy would automatically lead to improved household food security. It is not possible to say therefore without adequate impact monitoring whether or not some of the agricultural sector institutional and policy reforms are relevant to improving household food security but this will be explored further in 5.4.

The institutional reform of the National Statistical Committee (NSC) is considered relevant because the identification of target groups and of food insecurity’s causes together with the setting of inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral priorities require the production of high quality food security data and analysis.

Budgetary support strategies and actions are considered relevant for achieving GOK policy reform partly or mainly because of the political leverage associated with them and the fact that a good policy environment is normally considered essential for food security alleviation or poverty reduction³⁶.

(ii) Economic Restructuring and Macroeconomic Reform

Budgetary support strategies and actions are considered to be relevant to economic restructuring and macroeconomic reform because it is expected that they would lead to increased public income and foreign exchange earnings that in turn may be used to finance food security-improving actions. This economic restructuring that would ensure that future resource allocation is founded on market prices rather than on centralised control requires macroeconomic reform particularly through the control and reduction of the public budget³⁷ and foreign exchange deficits and through sharpening the public spending focus.

Effectiveness of BS Strategies and Actions

The effectiveness of budgetary support strategies and actions is difficult to measure adequately in the absence of proper monitoring but it is reported that there has been a contribution by the programme’s expected results to achievement of the programme purpose as reflected in the positive changes in the following selected logframe indicators:

- Ministry of Agriculture implements a rationalised operation and management³⁸
- agricultural statistical data
- % increase in allowances to the most vulnerable children

³⁶ Although this may not be a sufficient condition.

³⁷ The GOK’s public deficit declined from 12% of GDP in 1997 to 5% of GDP in 2003.

³⁸ The ultimate test of any institution however is not whether it exists or sustains itself but whether it does something useful.

- % decrease of acute undernourished children
- decreased number of children living in institutions due to family poverty
- decline³⁹ in the budget deficit and inflation
- reduction in poverty rate⁴⁰

Other improvements include on-time payments to MLSP beneficiaries, improved budgetary discipline and increased GOK ownership. The extent to which these improvements⁴¹ are attributable to the budgetary support strategies and actions is difficult to say but the link between them is understood to be positive.

Efficiency of BS Strategies and Actions

Budgetary support is considered an appropriate programme implementing aid modality as mentioned above. There is some budget line flexibility that may be carried out through reallocation⁴² and reasonable progress in achieving objectives as mentioned above. It was difficult to measure efficiency because of data and time constraints but it may be concluded from discussions with the EC Delegation staff in Almaty and Bishkek that the unit costs of achieving many of the logframe's expected results do not appear to be out of line with those of similarly-performing actions funded by the EC and other donors in other countries. One of the advantages of externally-funded budgetary support is indeed its low transaction cost as mentioned in 5.1.

Impact of BS Strategies and Actions

The impact of budgetary support strategies and actions may be categorised as (i) GOK Institutional and Policy (ii) Economic Restructuring and Macroeconomic Reform and (iii) Household⁴³.

(i) GOK Institutional and Policy Reform

The institutional impact of budgetary support strategies and actions is considered to be positive and includes the reform⁴⁴ of the MAWRPI and the MLSP through the grant-financing of investment and recurrent costs such as office equipment, transport, training,

³⁹ Decline in the budget deficit from -9.1% of GDP in 1998 to 1.1% of GDP in 2003 and decline in consumer price index from 135.9 in 1999 to 102.4 in the first 9 months of 2003 (Source: Ministry of Finance, IMF).

⁴⁰ Decline from 54.9% in 1998 to 44.4% in 2002 and based on national definition and on per capita expenditure adjusted for household size (IMF, IBRD and GOK).

⁴¹ With the exception of external debt which rose from 90.6% of GDP in 1998 to 93.0% of GDP in the 2nd quarter of 2003 (Source: National Bank of Kyrgyzstan).

⁴² This reallocation may be made by the Quarterly Steering Committee that comprises the FSP's technical assistants and representatives from the MOF, MLSP, MAWRPI, NSC, Treasury and EU Delegation.

⁴³ The Programme design assumes that there would be some positive contribution to household food security through achievement of part of the Programme purpose namely, agricultural sector institutional and policy reform.

⁴⁴ The institutional impact in general terms comprises government empowerment, lower transaction costs and greater allocative efficiency, fund predictability, state effectiveness and democratic accountability.

food, medicine and public utilities. These strategies and actions are therefore contributing to achievement of the programme purpose.

A major impact of budgetary support strategies and actions is also policy reform⁴⁵ and this is also contributing to achievement of the programme purpose. The GOK is reported to be satisfied with the budgetary support's implementation modalities and pre-conditions.

(ii) Economic Restructuring and Macroeconomic Reform

The main macroeconomic impact of budgetary support strategies and actions is a contribution to an increase in the GOK's income and foreign exchange earnings. Although this budgetary support accounts on average for only 3-5% of total public income equivalent to about 0.5% of GDP, it is large in both absolute terms and political leverage and may have contributed therefore to macro-economic reform⁴⁶ and to improved macroeconomic performance.

There has been positive growth in real GDP and real GDP per capita and an improvement in the fiscal balance⁴⁷ and consumer price inflation⁴⁸ since the start of the EC's budgetary support in 1997. The extent to which these improvements are due to the EC's budgetary support strategies and actions, to other donor-funded interventions, to GOK's willingness and capacity to implement reform or to a combination of all of these is difficult to say but the link between the EC's budgetary support strategies and actions and improved macroeconomic performance is probably positive.

It is also reported by the GOK and donor officials that appropriate tax policies are being implemented and consequently present little risk of budgetary support-induced fiscal dependence. It is still important however that the GOK assesses its total resources available and incorporates the effects and timing of the generation and disbursement of budgetary support funds in planning particularly in Kyrgyzstan where budgetary support is used to fund recurrent costs thereby giving great importance to assured fund continuity⁴⁹.

(iii) Household

The theoretical links between budgetary support strategies and actions and household food security impact are derived solely from EC documents and are shown in Figure 1 in Annex 4 while Figure 2 in Annex 5 shows the actual links derived from field discussions with the GOK and EC officials. The derivation of some of these actual links may be discerned below.

One of the logframe's activities that refers to the securing of priority budgetary spending in agriculture may be disaggregated for example into interventions such as the improvement in the supply of high quality seed, irrigation water, plant protection and extension. These interventions are expected to lead to benefits such as lower unit production costs⁵⁰ and sufficient household access to food according to Figure 1.

It is not known whether or not unit production costs for food and cash crops and livestock diminished because of lack of data but the MAWRPI data did demonstrate that food or cash

⁴⁵ Including improved general and food security-oriented policy formulation and implementation and the provision to the EC with the means to influence the GOK policy by for example giving the MLSP bargaining power vis-à-vis the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister's Office.

⁴⁶ Together with aid and "pressure" from the IBRD, IMF and perhaps other donors

⁴⁷ Except in 2002

⁴⁸ Except in 2003

⁴⁹ It is preferable not to use budgetary support to finance recurrent costs if future flows are uncertain.

⁵⁰ For food crops, cash crops and livestock.

crop production increased⁵¹ since the start of the EC's budgetary support strategies and actions. If the improvement in the supply of high quality seed, irrigation water, plant protection and extension contributed to this increased production and to the consequent sufficient household access to food through either direct entitlement from one own's production or indirect entitlement through purchase from the market, it may be concluded that the EC's budgetary support strategies and actions contributed to improved household food security.

Who the final beneficiaries are however and whether or not all of them were previously food insecure is not known because of a lack of impact monitoring⁵².

Although part of the programme purpose⁵³ is institutional and policy reform with the MAWRPI as the main target group and the sustainable benefits being defined therefore as the securing of the most important MAWRPI services⁵⁴ aiming at protecting farmers' assets⁵⁵ and at maintaining irrigation services, the FSP design does assume that some contribution towards improved household food security would be made from this institutional and policy reform as mentioned earlier in 5.4. It is recommended therefore that household food security impact be monitored⁵⁶ and evaluated so that remedial measures may be taken if necessary.

The EC's budgetary support strategies and actions are also leading to more animals being vaccinated and probably to increased production. The MAWRPI data showed that annual production of cattle, sheep, horses, milk and eggs increased for farmers since the start of the EC's budgetary support in 1997 by 17.7% to 99.2% but decreased for households by 0.9% to 6.6% for cattle, sheep, pork, milk and eggs⁵⁷. The assumption of a positive link between this increased production and more vaccinated animals would therefore imply that the EC's budgetary support strategies and actions contributed to improved farmer food security. Household production however declined and if this exacerbated household food insecurity⁵⁸, it would seem to be confirmed by the 2002 Mid-Term Review statement already mentioned above. Possible remedial action may therefore be required to ensure that the "non-farmer" or "household" group would benefit from the EC's budgetary support strategies and actions.

⁵¹ National production of wheat, potatoes and vegetables recorded annual growth rates of 0.5%, 12.9% and 11.6% respectively since the start of the EC's budgetary support strategies and actions and this was accompanied by annual increases in production for farmers of 9.3% to 38.4% for wheat, sugarbeet, potatoes and vegetables and 5.9% to 8.2% for potatoes, vegetables and maize for households. These crops were selected because they are the most important in terms of quantity produced although the definitional difference between farmer and household is unclear.

⁵² The evidence of the impact of EC budgetary support strategies and actions on the welfare of the food insecure is weak because the EC's monitoring and evaluation system gives little attention to the distributional impact of interventions. A 2002 Mid-Term Review of these strategies and actions concluded that "it appears likely that the people who are most vulnerable are not those officially working the land but their employees" as mentioned above. The conventional selection criteria for food security-improving interventions typically include effectiveness, efficiency, administrative feasibility, political acceptability and long term sustainability but it seems that long term sustainability has not received a high ranking and weighting priority. Some of the beneficiaries were therefore denied the opportunity to produce or earn their own way out of food insecurity.

⁵³ The programme purpose is the programme's central objective. This purpose should address the core problem and be defined in terms of the sustainable benefits for the target group according to PCM methodology.

⁵⁴ Livestock vaccination and crop protection

⁵⁵ Crops and livestock

⁵⁶ Not only for control but also for learning.

⁵⁷ These products were chosen for trend analysis because they comprise the largest shares by volume of total livestock and livestock production but the definitional difference between farmer and household is unclear as mentioned above.

⁵⁸ Assuming livestock contributes to household food security

Another part of the programme purpose addresses safety net development⁵⁹ and may be defined in terms of the sustainable benefits⁶⁰ to the main target groups. It is understood that the targeting of spending in the MLSP did lead to increased food consumption and improved nutrition and that these benefits were delivered on time and in cash to many beneficiaries⁶¹ in 2003. It is therefore concluded that the EC's budgetary support strategies and actions contributed to sufficient household or institutional access to food which led to improved food consumption and nutrition. The number of beneficiaries however was reported to remain the same without the EC support according to EC sources.

The GOK is believed to be satisfied with budgetary support since it is also used by the GOK to achieve its own objectives and it gives the MLSP for example bargaining power vis-à-vis the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister's Office.

The third part of the programme purpose relates to the contribution to macroeconomic stability and enhanced public financial management. The links between these and improved household food security are difficult to trace but they are probably positive for some households.

Impact Diagram

Figures 1 and 2 also show some of the theoretical and actual links between other instruments such as TACIS and household food security impact. One of the pre-conditions for a given instrument use is "Only after analysis of added value of regulation compared to other instruments" but the added value from financing technical assistance under the Regulation vis-a-vis TACIS is unclear apart from the commonly provided explanation that the former is procedurally easier. There could therefore be duplication here.

Another pre-condition for a given instrument use is "Focus on vulnerable groups" but this would only be satisfied for the targeted support by the MLSP and not by the MAWRPI⁶². Regarding the budgetary support aid modality choice, this is clear since it can only be made under the Regulation.

The financing of non-technical assistance GOK expenditures by budgetary support and technical assistance by TACIS would imply complementarity but a recent TACIS initiative however to fund a poverty reduction scheme piloted in 2-3 target regions and focusing on poverty alleviation, community and rural development and centred on the most vulnerable groups could be a possible source of duplication with the Regulation.

It is the view of the consultants that neither the Regulation nor TACIS may be considered sufficient by itself to achieve a more optimal food security-oriented development. It may be more appropriate to adopt a more comprehensive development instrument that addresses food insecurity within a wider improved-livelihoods framework.

The new way of "doing business" in development, poverty reduction and improving food security would be to move away from fixed plans, centralised and controlled decision-making

⁵⁹ A safety net may be considered as a mechanism to at least mitigate the negative impact of economic restructuring and macroeconomic reform by transferring food, medicine and cash to target groups.

⁶⁰ The benefits comprise institutional support of residential homes and the provision of Unified Monthly Benefits (UMB), social allowances, allowances to children less than 18 months old and maternity benefits while the main beneficiaries may be characterised as the elderly, physically and mentally disabled, young, unemployed and those with low income.

⁶¹ The exact number of beneficiaries could not be ascertained.

⁶² But of course this may only be verified with proper impact monitoring and assessment.

and sectoral planning and towards adaptive dynamic management approaches, shared understanding, transparency, cooperation and concerted action and integrated planning.

The comprehensive rural livelihood-oriented multi-sectoral development programme would aim to establish a common direction for development, poverty reduction and food security-improving interventions. It would seek to strengthen the synergies and complementarities of numerous policies, programmes and plans of Government, donor agencies and Non-State Actors (NSAs²) – planned or already under implementation - that target development, poverty reduction and improved food security. Finding common denominators in order to enhance the impact of the individual actions would be a key programme objective.

The programme would be embedded in a supportive and coherent policy framework with the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) as its overarching policy and would be fully consistent with the priorities of the programme of cooperation between the aid-recipient country and the European Community (EC). The programme would draw strength from this existing policy support and in turn contribute to strengthening it further.

The programme's selected mode of support for the delivery of development actions to poor rural communities would be to provide access to resources and services such as effective governance and programme management at regional and national levels, water, roads, land and support services and infrastructure for a wide range of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and other rural production activities. The programme's purpose would be to increase sustainable economic activity amongst the rural communities particularly the very poor by putting in place an enabling programme framework. This framework could be made up for example of the following components:

- 1 – to provide institutional support for the effective management of the programme at all levels;
- 2 – to provide rural access roads in selected regions;
- 3 – to develop new rural water supply resources and empower rural communities to effectively manage their water points;
- 4 – to strengthen capacities of various institutions for land reform and help improve the implementation of land reform;
- 5 – to provide access to support services and infrastructure for SME development and rural production activities through decentralised demand driven (DDD) actions.

The programme would put in place or strengthen coordination mechanisms such as regional-level Development Coordinating Committees (DCCs) and national-level Management and Steering Committees (MC and SC). The programme would also provide for critical technical and managerial support in the form of Technical Support Facilitators (TSFs) at regional and national levels and a Technical Programme Manager (TPM) at national level to enhance the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms (DCCs and MC in particular) and further build the technical and managerial capacity of both the DCCs and of MC member institutions, the Ministry of Planning in particular.

The programme's sustainability would hinge on the integrated multi-sectoral approach to programme design and implementation as well as an emphasis on holistic system development as opposed to implementation mechanisms focusing on individual programme

² Non-governmental organisations, community based organisations, cooperative, trade unions and the private sector.

components and sectoral action. The new ways of thinking and working would become institutionalised as the programme is being implemented and would be expected to continue to guide development, poverty reduction and food security-improving interventions in the country long after the programme is completed.

Due consideration would be given to the mechanisms, checks and balances and conditions that are set out for the implementation of this programme.

Regarding the links between some of the specific actions, outputs and outcomes, it may be concluded from the first part of section (iii) above that some of the links between the MAWRPI actions and improved household food security are unclear. It is not clear for example whether or not the specific actions of improving the supply of high quality seeds, vaccine, irrigation water and plant protection to produce food and cash crops and livestock has led to the output of diminished input costs although it is likely that this specific action has led to the outcome of improved availability and accessibility of food stuffs and purchasing power. Figure 2 in Appendix 2 shows the actual or probable⁶³ links between the specific actions, outputs and outcomes.

Sustainability of BS Strategies and Actions

MLSP

It's unlikely that the same level of EC-financed benefits currently delivered to the vulnerable groups through the MLSP would continue were the EC funding to end soon.

Some of the Unified Monthly Benefits are currently targeted to beneficiaries for employment and cash-income-generation and if successful could be further developed as this directly addresses one of food insecurity's structural causes. This initiative would be assisted by the current EC-financed efforts to develop labour policy through Bistro support provision.

The UMBs are not in principle targeted to unemployed people but this recently changed to employment and cash-income-generation for selected beneficiaries. Indeed it has been reported that one of the employment-targeted UMB beneficiaries now holds a senior Government Ministerial position.

While the provision of safety nets to residential homes may be seen as essential, it may also be viewed as transitional while a plan for the implementation of a de-institutionalisation strategy developed by the MLSP and other donors is being developed through training programmes for care in the community⁶⁴.

The MLSP is the major recipient in terms of the GOK and EC absolute fund allocations implying that short-term safety net provision one of Kyrgyzstan's priorities. Part of these funds however is allocated to vocational training in order to increase the beneficiaries' chances of labour market entry and sustainable cash-income protection or generation.

MAWRPI

In terms of the percentage of the total ministerial budget funded externally, the main recipient is the MAWRPI implying that long term food security also receives priority. The EC's budgetary support strategies and actions contribute to the financing of the MAWRPI extension services but these services are not provided to all farmers. Some of the farmers

⁶³ In contrast to theoretical

⁶⁴ Including re-training of MLSP social workers.

currently receive training and advice in crop production, soil fertility, animal breeding, marketing and processing through the Rural Advisory Service (RAS) that is supported by the Swiss Development Corporation, the World Bank and IFAD. But these services would probably cease once donor funding ends because the required institutional and financial sustainability mechanisms have not yet been set up. It is believed that total reliance on the MAWRPI extension services may not be effective in improving the food security of all farmers and it may be too early for the RAS to finance itself through farmer contributions. A solution would need to be found in order to generate extension-service sustainability and therefore maintain its contribution to improved food security.

The EC's budgetary support strategies and actions contribute to the financing of the rehabilitation and maintenance of primary on-farm irrigation channels for the production of important food and cash crops. This finance accounts for over 80% of the Water Economy Department's spending and 100% of the Rural Water Protection Department's recurrent spending.

Efforts to achieve some degree of financial sustainability are being made by the Water Economy Department through the imposition of water-use tariffs and the current recovery rate is 30%. This rate is expected to increase through EC pressure on the GOK so that it would be able to take over by itself the funding of these rehabilitation and maintenance costs in the medium to long term.

Similar cost recovery efforts are also being made in the provision of livestock vaccines with the expectation that the EC would be able to cease its funding without threatening the continued public or private provision of food security oriented goods and services once a specified cost recovery level would be achieved.

Institutional Sustainability

The capacity of the MAWRPI and the MLSP to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate food security interventions is not considered adequate to ensure institutional sustainability at present and it is reported that the EC's budget support-financed technical assistance has neither sufficient time nor the capacity nor even the mandate to provide this capacity building. It has indeed been stated that the main task of the technical assistants is to monitor spending.

Macroeconomic

It is estimated by the Ministry of Finance that the fiscal balance of the GOK would eventually improve allowing it to finance the targeted support to the MAWRPI and the MLSP using its own resources instead of EC ones assuming that the GOK continues to be successful in the implementation of EC and other donor-assisted economic restructuring and macro-economic reform. The time period for this transition would probably be in the medium to long term.

Any risk of budgetary support-induced fiscal dependency is considered to be low owing to the small percentage of the GOK's development budget that is financed by aid. The issue of long-term sustainability takes on added importance since budgetary support may be used more easily to finance recurrent costs.

NSC

The EC is building the NSC's capacity to undertake higher-quality food security monitoring and assessments rather than seeking to improve the quality of its own data and analyses.

Comparative advantage BS in comparison to other types of operations (within the Regulation) and operations in other instruments dealing with BS

The EC-financed food security-oriented aid modalities⁶⁵ other than budgetary support such as food aid⁶⁶, project aid or NGO call for proposal are not present in Kyrgyzstan so only a hypothetical scenario is presented here. The comparative advantage of budgetary support vis-à-vis other types of aid modalities within the Regulation is considered to be that it:

- relies on the governments' own allocation, procurement and accounting systems⁶⁷
- lowers transaction costs
- improves donor coordination
- improves aid-flow predictability
- enhances public policy's allocative efficiency
- enhances public sector performance and accountability
- together with the PRSP allows donors' coherent contributions to the GOK budget and processes

The budgetary support logic is therefore that it helps the GOK to respond to its citizens' needs through public investment, service provision and the facilitation and regulation of the private sector with poverty reduction priorities being identified through the PRSP. Some of the above-mentioned comparative advantages are already being demonstrated thus adding weight to the continuation of budgetary support vis-à-vis project aid or NGO call for proposal.

Although it is widely believed that previous aid-conditionality types showed disappointing results with many uncoordinated and unsustainable projects and limited government ownership, it is argued that budgetary support effectiveness may be further improved if accompanied by project aid or NGOs⁶⁸. Whilst the budgetary support logic is persuasive, flexible arrangements may be needed in Kyrgyzstan which allow 'project'-type or NGO actions to be pursued either within or outside budgetary support. These actions may be organised so that over time such 'blends' of actions evolve towards budgetary support. An evolutionary approach would allow time for the donors and other stakeholders to upgrade the modality types they can offer. For as long as 'blends' are appropriate, each stakeholder would be able to offer its piece of the 'cake' in the way it prefers or is best at doing. This option would be useful in order to engage NGOs⁶⁹ and the private sector in planning in places where the GOK is unwilling or unable⁷⁰ to organise civil society participation effectively.

⁶⁵ Within the Regulation

⁶⁶ Food aid is provided to only crisis countries and this excludes Kyrgyzstan.

⁶⁷ But it is recognised that there may be a need to strengthen these.

⁶⁸ ⁴ Indeed, it was mentioned above that efforts to de-institutionalise the residential homes might best be achieved through project aid or NGO cofinancing in order to reach sustainability. The use of project aid or NGO as an additional aid modality to budgetary support would also assume added importance in view of the apparently poor record by the MAWRPI in targeting the food insecure.

⁶⁹ Especially the advocacy types.

⁷⁰ Lacking capacity, organisation or methodology.

Budgetary support therefore may be considered advantageous from the point of view that the GOK could minimise its involvement in actions in which the private sector might normally be expected to engage taking on instead an effective role as regulator and facilitator of the private sector and as provider of public goods and services. An increased share of budgetary support would be fine on condition that the private sector and the NGOs would not be crowded out.

The degree of ownership and commitment by the GOK to the PRSP is reported to be generally good although there are some less committed GOK elements. It seems however that these elements are gradually becoming more committed owing to prolonged EC-financed technical assistance-promoted dialogue.

The comparative advantage of budgetary support also includes the political leverage to force reform, an increased GOK budget, timely funds-delivery and payments to final beneficiaries in cash instead of part cash and part food and fewer procedural constraints especially vis-a-vis TACIS although the latter could still be used to provide capacity building to FSP.

The comparative advantage of budgetary support may also be assessed in budgeting and implementation through medium-term financial frameworks and public expenditure reviews for example but this was not carried out owing to time constraints.

TACIS cannot provide programme aid including budgetary support and can only manage small technical assistance projects. One cannot therefore compare budgetary support under the Regulation with other budgetary support instruments.

Since the contribution of the EC however is small relative to the total Kyrgyzstan aid budget, it could be argued that the aid modality⁷¹ it specifies is hardly relevant⁷² since the GOK can switch around other donor funds and its own budget to meet its requirements. It is concluded however that the EC contribution in absolute terms to Kyrgyzstan is important.

Coordination of the various instruments dealing with BS

Budgetary support is used in conjunction with the support from the IMF and it is understood that there is coordination between them. There is also good coordination between the FSP's technical assistance and the allocated expenditure funds.

Coherence between BS and the new financial regulation and EC guideline on budgetary support

There is coherence since budgetary support is defined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the disbursement modalities are based on budgetary support, the financial regulation and the EC budgetary support guidelines. The technical assistants are obliged to and do follow the EC budgetary support guidelines.

⁷¹ In this case budgetary support

⁷² Except to the donor's 'home' constituency.

3.6. Evaluative Question 6

‘What is the added value of the operations to support food security (FS) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 6:

The EC resources that finance the actions that are expected to contribute to the achievement of the Regulation’s food security objectives are channelled to Kyrgyzstan using only the budgetary-support aid modality. It was therefore not possible to assess the added value of this aid modality vis-à-vis another one although an evaluation of the budgetary support itself against the standard evaluation criteria was conducted.

The EC actions are generally relevant to the needs of the main beneficiaries such as the MAWRPI, the MLSP and the MLSP’s final beneficiaries and only partly or possibly relevant to the needs of the agriculturally food insecure while the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of budgetary support strategies and actions are believed to be fair. In contrast, the sustainability of these EC actions is poor.

The institutional and policy impacts of budgetary support strategies and actions are generally positive and moving in the right direction and the impact on the final MLSP beneficiaries appears to be good. The impact on the final agricultural beneficiaries however is not clear. Indeed, it may be that the agriculturally food secure are receiving benefits instead of the agriculturally food insecure but this cannot be verified without adequate monitoring.

3.7. Evaluative Question 7

‘What is the added value of the ‘other / technical assistance and capacity building’ component for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 7:

The technical assistance in Kyrgyzstan is considered to be part of the budgetary support aid modality since its main or sole task is to monitor expenditure and not to capacity build. This explains why the added value of the ‘other/technical assistance and capacity building’ component for achieving the Regulation’s overall food security objectives has not been assessed.

3.8. Evaluative Question 8

‘To what extent has the design of supported action (phasing in) facilitated progress towards the achievement of food aid and food security objectives? This includes the identification of priorities, the selection of countries, the targeting of beneficiaries / vulnerable groups, the funding operations – components, the identification and appraisal process, the multi-annual programming, etc.?’

Quality of the overall programming of resources

The criteria for EC-resource allocation to Kyrgyzstan include its classification as a Lower-Middle Income Country (LMIC)⁷³, chronic food insecurity, EC policy priorities, absorption capacity, political priorities of other donors, comparative advantage of the Regulation 1292/96 vis-à-vis other budget lines and economic-structural constraints.

The initial sectoral and sub-sectoral priorities were identified as agriculture, land reform, health and education but these were limited later to agriculture and health based on the premise that a more focused approach would have a higher improved food security impact. This was reinforced by the allocation by other donors such as the IBRD of large aid volumes to education and land reform with the consequent avoidance of duplication and the contribution to complementarity.

The budgetary support selection criteria were mainly its financial and political leverage in facilitating food security-related reform in an economy undergoing the planned-to-market transition.

The main beneficiary groups are the MAWRPI⁷⁴ and the MLSP since they are the main GOK institutions responsible for agricultural and social sector welfare respectively while the indirect beneficiary groups are broadly defined as the food insecure and vulnerable population. The further categorisation into and targeting of quite well defined sub-groups are made by the MLSP but not by the MAWRPI. The latter would need to identify the range of socio-economic groups within the food insecure group were it to decide to target⁷⁵ because this food insecure group is too broadly defined using the current poverty and income data and it is likely that the various socio-economic groups would require different sets of food security-improving interventions.

The quality of overall resources programming is therefore considered to be poor to fair⁷⁶.

Quality of the country level of programming (link to RSP and PRSP, actors' participation in programming)

The quality of the EC country level programming is described as being below potential⁷⁷ as reflected for example by assertions that the RSP is a document made by TACIS for TACIS

⁷³ With a per capita GNP in the range US\$676-2695 in 1992 prices (Source: IBRD).

⁷⁴ The targeting of the MAWRPI and the MLSP was reported to be based partly or mainly on the need for bread market liberalisation.

⁷⁵ Based on the conclusion that the assumption that agricultural-sector institutional and policy reform would by itself automatically improve household food security may be questionable.

⁷⁶ Although there are some doubts about the EC's global aid distribution because some of the less poor countries receive more aid per capita than the poor ones but this issue probably falls outside this mission's terms of reference.

and that the Financing Proposal may simply be a justification for increasing the EC expenditure or for meeting the EC expenditure deadlines. The latter may explain why insufficient attention was paid to the initial FSP design as reflected in its perhaps bold assumption that agricultural-sector institutional and policy reform would by itself automatically improve household food security.

The phasing-in strategies prior to the interventions and the coordination mechanisms to programme resources and plan actions are made in the EC headquarters and it is stated that the country level programming quality is low because of a human resources shortage.

There are regular programming stakeholder workshops and meetings but these do not work as they should because perhaps focus is on data sharing instead of coordination. The coordination with other donors is based on personal contacts and is therefore informal. The EC has however set up Quality Support Groups (QSG) to improve the programming quality at national, programme and project level.

Quality of the programme approval process

The quality of the budget support FSP approval process is reported to be low because the inter-ministerial budget lines or resource-allocations are difficult to change once they are determined and officially accepted. There is some room for manoeuvre however for intra-ministerial budget line changes during the fiscal year.

The technical assistants are not in control of moving funds from one spending category to another but a request for such would flow from Bishkek to the Almaty-based EC Delegation and then to Brussels with final approval taking about 3 months.

Furthermore, if some of the policy or institutional reform conditionalities are not met, it would be possible for the EC to stop the entire programme or to allocate funds to another ministry or department. It may be prudent therefore to graduate punishment by for example reducing the installment by the amount of money targeted for fulfillment of unmet conditions.

Relevance of EC actions vis-à-vis beneficiaries needs

The EC actions are generally relevant to the needs of the main beneficiaries such as the MAWRPI and the MLSP and only partly or possibly relevant to the needs of the indirect beneficiaries. There is little or no comprehensive in-depth needs-assessment analysis of the indirect beneficiaries although some basic analysis is conducted for the MLSP's indirect beneficiaries. More funds would be required to do sound needs-assessments analysis.

The quality of the needs assessment analysis is good for the MAWRPI and the MLSP, quite good for the MLSP beneficiaries but poor for the agriculturally food insecure.

The broad characteristics of the MLSP's beneficiaries include children less than 18 months old, pregnant women, the elderly, physically and mentally disabled, young, unemployed and those with low income. These people are believed to be widely dispersed in Kyrgyzstan.

The characteristics of the agriculturally food insecure are not clearly defined. It is not possible to determine whether the regional distribution of agriculturally food insecure households was matched by the spatial pattern of agricultural food security-improving interventions because there are no targeted interventions by the MAWRPI as already mentioned. It is understood however that the MLSP targets nationwide.

⁷⁷ Even though this programming is linked to the RSP and the PRSP although the latter was not officially formulated until 2003 or 6 years after the completion of the FSP's original design.

The NSC data showed that food insecurity⁷⁸ and extreme poverty⁷⁹ were greatest in the Issyk-Kul and Naryn Regions while ordinary poverty⁸⁰ was greatest in the Naryn and Talas Regions in 2003. This regional poverty distribution may change however if poverty is measured in absolute population-number terms.

Selection of adapted (suitable) FA-FS component / channel (ing) (added value of each component compared to the others)

One of the technical assistants using her own initiative visits the villages monthly with the MLSP staff and conducts a simple needs-assessment analysis. The programme design such as budgetary support, food aid, NGO call for proposal or project aid is based on stakeholder analysis and national priorities taking account of relevance, complementarity, coherence and some co-ordination.

The budgetary support selection criteria were mainly its financial and political leverage in facilitating food security-related reform in an economy undergoing the planned-to-market transition as already mentioned in 8.1.

Clear planning of division of responsibilities in the various PCM phases (programming to Financing)

There is generally a clear division of responsibilities in the programming-to-financing phases with most of them being conducted in the EC Headquarters. The technical assistants however do have an input into these phases and this is taken into account by the EC Headquarters.

An updated logframe is available and programme selection is still made in the EC Headquarters although budget lines within the MAWRPI and the MLSP are chosen by the technical assistants in Bishkek.

Integration of cross cutting issues in programme design

A checklist covering cross-cutting issues such as governance and environment is found in the Memorandum of Understanding and Policy Matrix. There is no specific gender-oriented criteria checklist however for programme design because it is not required in Kyrgyzstan owing to the socio-cultural, political and historical factors that tend to provide equal status to men and women.

⁷⁸ Measured as daily per capita calorie intake.

⁷⁹ Measured as percentage of the total national population that is below the officially-defined extreme poverty line.

⁸⁰ Measured as percentage of the total national population that is below the officially-defined poverty line.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 8:

The quality of the overall resources programming is considered to be poor to fair while the quality of the EC country level programming and budget support programme approval process is described as being below potential.

The EC actions are however generally relevant to the needs of the main beneficiaries such as the MAWRPI and the MLSP while they are only partly relevant to the needs of the indirect beneficiaries.

The main selection criteria for budgetary support were its financial and political leverage in facilitating food security-related institutional and policy reform in an economy undergoing the long-term planned-to-market transition.

There is generally a clear division of responsibilities in the programming-to-financing phases and cross cutting issues are generally integrated in programme design

3.9. Evaluative Question 9

‘To what extent have implementation set-ups (i.e. suitable structures for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation), management mechanisms / tools and processes (i.e. division of work and responsibilities, coordination of actions) facilitated the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?’

The location of the technical assistants in the MOF and the MAWRPI has facilitated achievement of food security objectives but the extent of this achievement is difficult to determine. These technical assistants have helped to strengthen coordination between these Ministries and the Prime Minister’s Office or President’s Administration while intra-ministerial coordination was already reported to be good.

Complementarity with other programmes

There is complementarity with other programmes owing to donor meetings⁸¹ and to the public listing of all donor actions. The TACIS and the FSP could be made more complementary by improving coordination between Almaty and Bishkek.

Clear division of responsibilities in the various PCM phases (implementation and evaluation)

Implementation and internal evaluation⁸² are carried out by the technical assistants while external evaluations such as Mid-Term Reviews (MTRs) and Final Reviews are managed by the EC Headquarters.

The proposed deconcentrated task distribution between the EC Headquarters and the EC Delegations is summarised in Annex 6.

Empowerment role of technical assistance

The technical assistants’ terms of reference are focused on expenditure monitoring with limited or no attention paid to capacity building although in practice the technical assistants do provide some daily on-the-job training in simple report writing or problem-solving. The technical assistants’ performance is considered to be sound when their achievements are measured against their terms of reference but the latter are not designed to significantly improve the empowerment of local persons.

Adapted procedures for programme management (in time delivery mechanisms)

The technical assistants monitor the balance-of-payments and the policy matrix, execute the budgets and assist in reform implementation.

⁸¹ Even though they are held on an ad hoc basis.

⁸² Internal evaluation is carried out daily and through monthly progress reporting to AIDCO and the Almaty-based EC Delegation.

Adequate resources for programme (EC level) and project (country level) management.

There are inadequate resources for EC level management but this is being significantly improved with deconcentration as reflected in the forthcoming recruitment of one additional FSP staff in Almaty.

There are also inadequate resources for country level management partly or mainly because of procedural constraints but it is anticipated that these would be alleviated by deconcentration. The additional resource requirements would include one veterinary advisory, other external consultants for impact and social passport assessment and some full-time local staff.

Adequate M & E including impact assessment system (Early warning systems and information systems, food security assessments, coordination mechanisms, impact assessment)

The quality of the monitoring system is low because its main focus is on monitoring of expenditure and conditionalities implementation and little impact assessment although the technical assistants do make spot checks and there is a special local staff person in the MLSP for social passport assessment.

It is acknowledged however that the technical assistants (i) ensure that agreed budget lines are financed (ii) review monthly budget execution reports provided by the Treasury (iii) review reports from beneficiary organizations (iv) carry out ad hoc visits to beneficiary institutions and (v) inspect works.

It is also acknowledged that early warning and other information systems do exist in Kyrgyzstan such as the EC-funded FAO project "Food Security Information Bulletin"

A one-person poverty assessment unit however has recently been set up in the Almaty-based EC Delegation and a poverty impact assessment is expected to be carried out in 2005 by external consultants.

There have been 8 Mid-Term Reviews (MTRs) and 7 Final Reviews since the start of the EC's budgetary support with the most recent MTR being carried out in October 2003 and it is reported that the Final Reviews' recommendations have been taken into account.

Actors' participation in programme management

The actors' participation in programme management is exemplified by the regular steering committee meetings where the actors' implementation capacity is improved. The MLSP is women-dominated while the MAWRPI and MOF are gender-balanced but gender and ethnicity are not considered to be development constraints in Kyrgyzstan.

Integration of cross cutting issues in programme / project implementation

A checklist covering cross-cutting issues such as governance and environment is found in the Memorandum of Understanding and the Policy Matrix. There is no specific gender-oriented criteria checklist however for programme design because it is considered to be unnecessary in Kyrgyzstan owing to its socio-cultural, political and historical factors that tend to allow men and women equal access to development opportunities.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 9:

There is complementarity with other programmes owing to donor meetings and there is also a clear division of responsibilities in the implementation-to-evaluation phases. There are however inadequate resources for EC level and country level management. The actors' participation in programme management is considered to be fair and cross cutting issues are generally implicitly integrated in programme design.

3.10. Evaluative Question 10

‘To what extent has a phasing-out of the supported actions been planned and what contribution did it have on the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?’

Presence of a clear strategy to gradually reduce dependence on EC assistance and its effectiveness

There is no explicit strategy to gradually reduce dependence on EC assistance⁸³ and there is no phasing-out strategy document but the GOK has started to establish institutional and financial mechanisms to reduce this dependence as mentioned in 5.5 and 11.2 although this would probably be a long term process.

Empowerment strategies of partners - actors (Capacity building)

Limited empowerment is being provided through some informal on-the-job training by the technical assistants but there are no specific training schemes⁸⁴ probably because the technical assistants's main or sole task is to monitor spending and not to capacity build as already mentioned.

Adequate procedures for smooth transition

There are no adequate procedures for smooth transition but this could be partly alleviated were some of the technical assistant-trained local persons to be recruited by the Ministry of Finance or the Almaty EC Delegation.. Although the transition from a planned economy to a market one is normally a long term process, it may be prudent for the EC to start preparing procedures to facilitate also the smooth transition from an aid-dependent to an aid-independent Kyrgyzstan.

Flexibility of procedures

Procedure flexibility could be improved were local persons recruited by the Ministry of Finance or the Almaty-based EC Delegation as mentioned above and perhaps the EC Delegation may start now to identify additional mechanisms that would improve procedure flexibility in order to facilitate the eventual transition process.

⁸³ See 11.1

⁸⁴ See 11.2

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 10:

There is no explicit strategy to gradually reduce EC-assistance dependence and there is no phasing-out strategy document. The GOK has started however to establish mechanisms to reduce this dependence although this process would probably be a long term one. Empowerment strategies are not firmly in place since the technical assistants' main or sole task is to monitor expenditure. Kyrgyzstan is in transition from a planned economy to a market one and the resulting high level of social and economic costs would take time to mitigate. The EC therefore should continue to provide assistance whilst simultaneously identifying dependence-reducing interventions in preparation for the medium term to long term, phasing out.

3.11. Evaluative Question 11

‘How sustainable are the effects and impacts of EC-supported policies and programmes in the field of food security, both at the level of target populations and at institutional and policy level in the partner countries?’

Presence of a clear strategy to gradually reduce dependence on EC assistance and its effectiveness

There is no explicit strategy to gradually reduce dependence on EC assistance. A National Food Security Policy was adopted in October 1999 but there is no document identifying a strategy to ensure financial sustainability and access to services. The GOK has started however to put mechanisms in place to provide this sustainability⁸⁵ and access to services as mentioned in 5.5 and 11.2.

Ability of Government (and non-government) institutions to elaborate strategies and implement programmes as well as to continue to pursue programme objectives in all areas after EC assistance ceases.

It is reported that the GOK and perhaps some NGOs⁸⁶ would have developed in the medium to long term the ability to elaborate strategies and implement programmes as well as to continue to pursue programme objectives in all areas after EC assistance ceases but on condition that more capacity-building would be provided by the EC and that the budgetary-support's long-term sustainability dialogue be improved. The FSP⁸⁷ and TACIS⁸⁸ are already providing some capacity building in budgetary support design and management, policy-analysis and decision-making but more would be needed to help ensure both financial and institutional sustainability.

Financial sustainability⁸⁹ mechanisms are being introduced by (i) cessation of commercial borrowing by the GOK and restricting its borrowing⁹⁰ from donors to productive and high-return investments and (ii) improving the fiscal base⁹¹ and tax collection⁹². There is no GOK or donor long-term financing plan yet in place.

⁸⁵ The litmus test of institution-building is its sustainability when external funding ends but the ultimate test of any institution is not whether it exists or sustains itself but whether it manages to do something useful as mentioned earlier.

⁸⁶ NGOs would be considered sustainable only if Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) were set up.

⁸⁷ The FSP technical assistants have for example transferred some know-how to local persons although it was mentioned in 9.3 that expenditure monitoring rather than capacity-building is their major focus.

⁸⁸ Through the Good Governance and Civil Service Reform Projects.

⁸⁹ The low proportion of the GOK's development budget that is financed by external aid is seen to pose little risk to budgetary support-induced aid dependency and is therefore not considered to be a constraint to achieving financial sustainability. The latter however could be threatened were the IMF to stop funding the GOK due for example to the failure to meet conditionalities because other donors might then also withdraw their support.

⁹⁰ The GOK's external borrowing is currently limited to 5% of GDP.

⁹¹ The GOK recently introduced agricultural VAT and real estate tax

⁹² The tax collection rate recently improved from 11% to 14.8% of GDP (excluding social contributions).

A National Food Security Policy was adopted by the GOK in 1999 and food security data and analyses are available at the appropriate time to policy and decision makers but the quality of these data and analyses could be improved.

Ability of service providers to continue provision of services in the long term.

Local persons are being trained particularly under TACIS but many of them leave afterwards for the more financially-attractive private sector in Kyrgyzstan or abroad. More of these persons would remain in the country were real public-sector salary levels to increase.

Ability of beneficiaries to continue accessing the benefits of the EC-supported programme after the EC grant has ended.

It is envisaged that about ten years would be required before the GOK would be able to continue and maintain the delivery of the same level and quality of benefits to the final beneficiaries without EC funds. The NGOs may also be able to provide these benefits to the beneficiaries after the EC funds end.

Ability of women and men of different ages, ability, ethnicity, income and religion to have equal access to the benefits of the EC projects

Gender, age, ability, ethnicity, income and religion are not considered to be constraints to the equal accessing of EC programme benefits in Kyrgyzstan owing to its particular set of socio-cultural, political and historical factors.

Ability of EC delegation to manage programmes as well as to insure coherence between EC different instruments

The ability of the Almaty-based EC Delegation to manage programmes is reported to be developing well given the on-going deconcentration and this ability is expected to be adequate for future programmes. Complementarity and mutual support are also being ensured between the various instruments such as TACIS for example where geographical and institutional synergies have been established as reflected in recent Action and Indicative Programmes.

There are two food security staff in the Almaty-based EC Delegation and the approximate linkages⁹³ between the various units or services working on food aid and food security may be discerned from Annex 6.

Ability of EC headquarter to define strategies as well as to insure coherence between EC strategy and international food security strategy

It is reported that the EC Headquarter's ability to define strategies is considered to be good since food security actions including policy analysis are conducted by AIDCO itself as a single unit. The latter also analyses policies formulated by DG Dev's Food Security Unit. It is

⁹³ Sourced from "Deconcentration Guidelines, European Commission, Food Security Program" (draft), AIDCO, Horizontal Operations and RRD, Food Security and Thematic Support, October 2003

also understood that coherence between the EC strategy and the international food security strategy is ensured.

There is only one EC Headquarters food security staff and she is responsible for seven countries including Kyrgyzstan as well as a horizontal dossier.

The approximate linkages between the various units or services working on food aid and food security may be discerned from Annex 6. The FSP staff in Bishkek reports to the Almaty-based EC Delegation and to AIDCO's F5 Food Security Unit in Brussels and vice-versa.

The DG Dev is formally responsible for food security programming which it conducts with the input of various EC departments such as AIDCO's Food Security Unit and other parts of the DG Dev, DG Relex and AIDCO.

The technical assistants have direct contracts with the EC whilst the TACIS technical assistants are contracted through consultancy companies.

There are two budget lines each of which has subdivisions but the lines are managed together and coordination between the two budget lines is good according to EC sources.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 11:

There is no explicit strategy to gradually reduce dependence on EC assistance although some institutional and financial mechanisms are being put in place. The EC actions are considered to be currently unsustainable but it is expected that sustainability would be achieved in the long term.

4. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

4.1. Relevance

The EC actions are generally relevant to the needs of the main beneficiaries such as the MAWRPI and the MLSP mainly or partly because of the following:

- disadvantages of project aid and advantages of programme aid particularly in regard to its effects on Kyrgyzstan's institutional structure
- ineffectiveness of project aid-linked policy conditionality
- expectation that national systems support to facilitate policy making would have better results
- belief that sustained food security improvement requires effective government accountable to its people and that aid should support this objective and avoid utilising approaches which undermine accountability and ownership.

The EC actions are also generally relevant to the MLSP's indirect beneficiaries but only partly or possibly relevant to the needs of the agriculturally food insecure. Indeed, it may be that the agriculturally food secure are receiving programme benefits instead of the agriculturally food insecure.

This is because the role of the Regulation in the RSP seems unclear owing to a lack of conceptual clarity of food security's causes, their relative importance and identification of the linkages between them. Food security data therefore do not seem to be shaping the RSP as it should.

4.2. Effectiveness

The effectiveness of budgetary support strategies and actions is difficult to measure adequately in the absence of proper monitoring but it is reported that there has been a contribution by the programme's expected results to achievement of the programme purpose as reflected in the positive changes in the following selected logframe indicators:

- Ministry of Agriculture implements a rationalised operation and management
- agricultural statistical data
- % increase in allowances to the most vulnerable children
- % decrease of acute undernourished children
- decreased number of children living in institutions due to family poverty
- decline in the budget deficit and inflation in most years
- reduction in poverty rate

Other improvements include on-time payments to MLSP beneficiaries, improved budgetary discipline and increased GOK ownership. The extent to which these improvements are attributable to the budgetary support strategies and actions is difficult to say but the link between them is understood to be positive.

4.3. Efficiency

Budgetary support is considered an appropriate programme implementing aid modality. There is some budget line flexibility that may be carried out through reallocation and reasonable

progress in achieving objectives. It was difficult to adequately measure efficiency because of data and time constraints but it may be concluded from anecdotal evidence and from discussions with the EC Delegation staff in Almaty and Bishkek that the unit costs of achieving many of the logframe's expected results do not appear to be out of line with those of similarly-performing actions funded by the EC and other donors in other countries. One of the advantages of externally-funded budgetary support is indeed its low transaction cost.

4.4. Sustainability

The capacity of the MAWRPI and the MLSP to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate food security interventions is not considered adequate to ensure institutional sustainability at present and it is reported that the EC's budget support-financed technical assistance has neither sufficient time nor the capacity nor even the mandate to provide this capacity building. It has indeed been stated that the main task of the technical assistants is to monitor spending.

The MLSP is the major recipient in terms of the GOK and EC absolute fund allocations implying that short-term safety net provision one of Kyrgyzstan's priorities. Part of these funds however is allocated to vocational training in order to increase the beneficiaries' chances of labour market entry and sustainable cash-income protection or generation.

It is estimated by the Ministry of Finance that the fiscal balance of the GOK would eventually improve allowing it to finance the targeted support to the MAWRPI and the MLSP using its own resources instead of EC ones assuming that the GOK continues to be successful in the implementation of EC and other donor-assisted economic restructuring and macro-economic reform. The time period for this transition would probably be in the medium to long term.

Any risk of budgetary support-induced fiscal dependency is considered to be low owing to the small percentage of the GOK's development budget that is financed by aid. The issue of long-term sustainability takes on added importance since budgetary support may be used more easily to finance recurrent costs.

4.5. Impact

The institutional impact of budgetary support strategies and actions is considered to be positive and includes the reform of the MAWRPI and the MLSP through the grant-financing of investment and recurrent costs such as office equipment, transport, training, food, medicine and public utilities. These strategies and actions are therefore contributing to achievement of the programme purpose.

A major impact of budgetary support strategies and actions is also policy reform and this is also contributing to achievement of the programme purpose. The GOK is reported to be satisfied with the budgetary support's implementation modalities and pre-conditions.

The main macroeconomic impact of budgetary support strategies and actions is a contribution to an increase in the GOK's income and foreign exchange earnings. Although this budgetary support accounts on average for only 3-5% of total public income equivalent to about 0.5% of GDP, it is large in both absolute terms and political leverage and may have contributed therefore to macro-economic reform and to improved macroeconomic performance.

The MAWRPI data did demonstrate that food or cash crop production increased since the start of the EC's budgetary support strategies and actions. If the improvement in the supply of high quality seed, irrigation water, plant protection and extension contributed to this increased production and to the consequent sufficient household access to food through either direct entitlement from one own's production or indirect entitlement through purchase from the market, it may be concluded that the EC's budgetary support strategies and actions contributed to improved household food security.

Who the final beneficiaries are however and whether or not all of them were previously food insecure is not known because of a lack of impact monitoring.

It is understood that the targeting of spending in the MLSP did lead to increased food consumption and improved nutrition and that these benefits were delivered on time and in cash to many beneficiaries in 2003. It is therefore concluded that the EC's budgetary support strategies and actions contributed to sufficient household or institutional access to food which led to improved food consumption and nutrition.

4.6. Internal / external coherence

The internal and external coherence are believed to be satisfactory.

The overall objectives of the EC's food security policy and the RSP are fully coherent since it is assumed that the RSP's poverty reduction objective encapsulates food security improvement. The role of the Regulation in the RSP however seems unclear owing to a lack of conceptual clarity of food security's causes, their relative importance and identification of the linkages between them. Food security data therefore do not seem to be shaping the RSP as it should.

A major role of the FSP is upstream public sector reform but attention to this should not undermine sensitivity to and focus on the needs of the food insecure. The complementarities of the various EC instruments within the RSP and the coordination of the EC interventions are considered to be fair

The overall objectives of the RSP and the NPRS are considered to be coherent and food security is important in the NPRS even though it is not an overarching objective. The food security data however again do not appear to be shaping the NPRS as it should and the extent to which this data is feeding into inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral priority setting is unclear. The FSP however is generally considered to be broadly in line with the NPRS since it contributes to development although many of the food insecure appear not to be targeted by it. The coordination of donors' and government interventions is reported to be fair.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The main conclusions are:

- (j) The EC actions are generally relevant to the needs of the main beneficiaries such as the MAWRPI, the MLSP and the MLSP's indirect beneficiaries and only partly relevant to the needs of the agriculturally food insecure.
- (k) The effectiveness of budgetary support strategies and actions is believed to be fair as reflected by the positive contribution by the programme's results to the achievement of the programme purpose although it is recognised that this effectiveness is difficult to measure empirically in the absence of proper monitoring.
- (l) The cost-efficiency of converting the actions into high-quality results is also thought to be fair as reflected by the fact that the unit costs of achieving many of the logframe's results do not appear to be out of line with those of similarly-performing actions funded by the EC or other donors in other countries.
- (m) It is envisaged that the GOK and perhaps some NGOs would have developed in the medium to long term the ability to elaborate strategies and implement programmes as well as to continue to pursue programme objectives in all areas after EC assistance ceases but on condition that more capacity-building would be provided by the EC and that the budgetary-support's long-term financial and institutional sustainability dialogue be improved. There is no GOK or donor long-term financing plan yet in place but the EC and the GOK in particular have started to put mechanisms in place to provide financial sustainability. In contrast, the sustainability of the EC's budgetary support strategies and actions is considered to be poor.
- (n) The institutional and policy impacts of budgetary support strategies and actions are generally positive and moving in the right direction even though it is difficult to adequately evaluate this impact in the absence of long term monitoring and methodologies¹. The impact on the final MLSP beneficiaries appears to be good but the impact on the final agricultural beneficiaries is not clear. Indeed, it may be that the agriculturally food secure are receiving benefits instead of the agriculturally food insecure but this cannot be verified without adequate monitoring.
- (o) The internal and external coherence is believed to be satisfactory but there seems to be a lack of conceptual clarity of food security's causes, their relative importance and identification of the linkages between them. Food security data therefore do not seem to be shaping the RSP and the NPRS as it should.
- (p) Regarding the comparative advantage of budgetary support vis-à-vis other instruments within the Regulation, it is fair to say that the theoretical advantages are strong enough to argue for budgetary support and it seems that budgetary support is performing quite well in practice. Whether or not it is performing better than other aid modalities cannot be empirically determined owing to the fact that it is the only aid modality used.

¹ Some institutional impacts are methodologically difficult to quantify.

- (q) A major comparative advantage of the Regulation vis-à-vis other instruments such as TACIS is that budgetary support cannot be used by TACIS and that its administrative procedures are easier.
- (r) Looking from a wider perspective, it is the feeling of the mission that only a more comprehensive rural livelihoods-oriented development framework may be the optimal instrument for addressing food security problems.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on conclusion a,, Recommendation 1:

The EC should recruit at country level an additional local or foreign expert to be located in the MAWRPI, the MOF or the NSC in order to assist in the in-depth analysis of food insecurity's causes, the ranking of their importance and the identification of the linkages between them. More attention should also be paid to land reform to help alleviate the land tenure constraint to improving food security. The expert would identify the food security impacts of possible interventions, select the most appropriate interventions in planning and expand the use of socio-economic surveys so that the chances of the programme actually reflecting the final beneficiary needs would be increased.

Based on conclusion b, c and g, Recommendation 2:

The EC –FSBL should continue to use and develop the component currency facility. Operational solutions to overcome actual constraints by the use of CF should be analysed.

Based on conclusion d, Recommendation 3:

The EC should encourage more dialogue with the GOK on budgetary support sustainability in order to help to put in place its required financial and institutional mechanisms. The EC through the FSP or TACIS should provide to the MAWRPI and the MLSP more capacity building in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating including the strengthening of local GOK and administration and perhaps with NGOs playing an interim role in order to help ensure institutional sustainability and therefore the maintenance and continuation of the same level and quality of benefits to the food insecure.

The EC should encourage the GOK to identify a range of possible water tariffs to improve cost recovery, to improve water extension in order to raise household awareness of the need for its financial contribution to the water cost and to identify improved cost recovery mechanisms for other agricultural and rural extension services

Based on conclusions a, b, c,d and e, Recommendation 4:

The EC should provide either additional human resources or more capacity building using existing EC resources to provide more higher-quality support to the NSC, the MAWRPI and the MLSP for the provision of reliable household data on socio-economics, poverty and food security and make available criteria and indicators that show whether or not household food security is improving. The EC in collaboration with the local MAWRPI and the MLSP staff should systematically carry out intervention monitoring and evaluation not only for control but also to generate learning at country and donor level. This would be supervised by appropriately trained EC-financed technical assistance and use would be made of a joint design and monitoring and evaluation system. The technical assistant would focus analytical and advisory actions on improved monitoring and evaluation of the reform implementation as well as assisting in the measurement of the impact before and after interventions.

Based on conclusion f, Recommendation 5:

More efforts should be made by the EC to improve donor cooperation and coordination and to provide additional human resources in order to increase the chances of more effective

achievement of the food security objectives assuming that the Regulation continues in its present form

Based on conclusions g,h and i, Recommendation 6:

More attention should be given to a multi-sectoral and decentralised rural development programme that addresses simultaneously the diversity and plethora of causes of both food insecurity and poverty with food security and poverty reduction objectives and actions incorporated into this single mainstream programme⁹⁴. A particular focus should be put on the comparative advantages of various existing instruments, esp. the synergy between FSBL and TACIS instruments as well as on the GOK's, EC's and other donors' complementarity, coordination, coherence, integration and synergy.

⁹⁴ Food security and poverty reduction are separated here because they are not necessarily synonymous

ANNEXES

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ANNEX 2: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Official Policy Documents

Commission Regulation (EC) No 2519/97 of December 16th 1997 laying down general rules for the mobilisation of products to be supplied under Council Regulation (EC) No 1292/96 as Community food aid [Official Journal L 346, 17.12.1997].

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ANNEX 3: WORKPLAN

22/1/04 Travel from Belgium to Kyrgyzstan
 24/1/04 Arrived in Kyrgyzstan
 25/1/04 Document Review
 26/1/04 Meeting with MOF, MAWRPI and EC Delegation
 27/1/04 Meeting with MAWRPI
 28/1/04 Meeting with MAWRPI and EC Delegation
 29/1/04 Meeting with DfID, GTZ and IMF
 30/1/04 Meeting with MLSP and NSC
 31/1/04 Meeting with MOF
 1/2/04 Document Review
 2/2/04 Meeting with EC Delegation in Almaty
 3/2/04 Meeting with MOF
 4/2/04 Meeting with MOF
 5/2/04 Report Writing
 6/2/04 Presentation of Aide Memoire
 7/2/04 Report Writing
 8/2/04 Travel from Kyrgyzstan to UK

ANNEX 4: FIGURE 1 – REGULATION 1292/96 IMPACT DIAGRAM DERIVED FROM DOCUMENTS

Pre-Conditions	Operation/ Instruments	Actions	Outputs	Outcomes	Impact	Global Impact
Only after analysis of added value of regulation compared to other instruments	Budgetary Support (Regulation 1292/96)	Awareness actions	Food availability improved	Gender balanced economic and social development supported	Food security on regional level improved	Poverty Reduction
Specific list of eligible countries		Training for government staff, actors and beneficiaries	Food production at regional, national, local family level improved	Availability and accessibility of food stuffs improved	Adequate food and water availability at national level	
Focus on vulnerable groups		Supply of seeds, tools and inputs to produce food crops	Input costs for food production diminished	Purchasing power increased	Sufficient access to food at household level	
Close coordination with intervention by other donors		Operation concerning the marketing, transport, distribution and processing of food products	Improved culture of traditional crops	Standard of hygiene and nutrition raised	Adequate food use and nutrition at individual level	

Pre-Conditions	Operation/ Instruments	Actions	Outputs	Outcomes	Impact	Global Impact
Aid shall be integrated into development policy particularly those on agriculture and agrifoodstuffs and food strategies of countries concerned		Support of private sector development for commercial development	Awareness in hygiene and nutrition improved			
		Applied research and field training	Increased opportunities for income-generating activities			
		Strengthening production of food crops	Early warning systems established at national/regional level			
		Support national early warning systems	Functioning information systems on food security			
		Support to Food Security Information systems	Expert network to support management of FSP established			
		Carry out preparatory studies	Food security strategies improved			

ANNEX 5: FIGURE 2 – REGULATION 1292/96 IMPACT DIAGRAM DERIVED FROM DOCUMENTS AND FIELD PHASE

Pre-Conditions	Operation/ Instruments	Actions	Outputs	Outcomes	Impact	Global Impact
Only after analysis of added value of regulation compared to other instruments	Budgetary Support (Regulation 1292/96)	Awareness actions	Food availability (supply) improved	Gender balanced economic and social development supported	Food security on regional level may have improved	Poverty Reduction
Specific list of eligible countries		Training for government staff, actors and beneficiaries	Food production at regional, national, local family level improved	Availability and accessibility of food stuffs improved	Food and irrigation water availability at national level	
Focus on vulnerable groups		Supply of seeds, vaccine, irrigation water and plant protection to produce food and cash crops and livestock	Unit input costs for food production may have diminished	Purchasing power increased ⁹⁶	Sufficient access to food for some households	
Close coordination with intervention by other donors		Operation concerning the marketing, transport, distribution and processing of food products	Culture of traditional crops may have improved	Standard of hygiene and nutrition raised for MLSP interventions	Adequate food use and nutrition at individual level for some households	

⁹⁶ Assuming that any production increase is greater than any associated price decline if any

Pre-Conditions	Operation/ Instruments	Actions	Outputs	Outcomes	Impact	Global Impact
Aid shall be integrated into development policy particularly those on agriculture and agrifoodstuffs and food strategies of countries concerned		Support of private sector development for commercial development	Awareness in hygiene and nutrition improved			
		Applied research and field training	Increased opportunities for income-generating activities			
		Strengthening production of food crops	Early warning systems established at national/regional level			
		Support national early warning systems	Functioning information systems on food security			
		Support to Food Security Information systems	Expert network to support management of FSP established			
		Carry out preparatory studies	Food security strategies may have improved			

ANNEX 6: FOOD SECURITY TASK DISTRIBUTION BY EC UNIT/ SERVICE

(i) Programming

Definition of eligibility criteria for Food Security - DG DEV/RELEX

Preparation of guidelines - AIDCO

Definition of standard format for reporting, contract and budgets. - AIDCO

Country Food Security analysis - DELEGATION

Country Strategy Paper - DG DEV/RELEX

National/regional Indicative programs - DG DEV/RELEX

Definition of country multi annual allocation for FSBL - DG DEV/RELEX

(ii) Budget Support

Identification/instruction - DELEGATION

Funding - DELEGATION/AIDCO/DG DEV/RELEX

Implementation - DELEGATION

Evaluation/ Audit - DELEGATION/ AIDCO

(ii) Program Support

Identification/instruction - DELEGATION

Funding - DELEGATION/AIDCO/DG DEV/RELEX

Implementation - DELEGATION

Evaluation/ Audit - DELEGATION/AIDCO

(iii) Call for proposals from NGOs

Identification/instruction - DELEGATION/AIDCO

Funding - DELEGATION/AIDCO/DG DEV/RELEX

Implementation - DELEGATION/AIDCO

Evaluation/ Audit - DELEGATION/AIDCO

(iv) Food Aid

Policy dialogue - DG DEV/RELEX

Identification/instruction - DELEGATION/AIDCO

Funding - AIDCO/DG DEV/RELEX

Implementation - DELEGATION/AIDCO

Evaluation/ Audit - AIDCO

(iv) International Organisations

Policy dialogue - AIDCO/DG DEV/RELEX

Identification/instruction - DELEGATION/AIDCO

Funding - DELEGATION/AIDCO/DG DEV/RELEX/DG RESEARCH

Implementation - DELEGATION/AIDCO

Evaluation/ Audit - DELEGATION/AIDCO

ANNEX 7: European Commission assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic

<i>(Thousand euros)</i>	TACIS	Food Security Programmes in 000 €		ECHO	FEOGA	Exceptional Assistance	Total
1991	700,0	-	-	-	-	-	700,0
1992	9 230,0	-	-	-	-	-	9 230,0
1993	10 000,0	-	-	-	-	-	10 000,0
1994	-	-	-	261,0	14 000,0	-	14 261,0
1995	8 000,0	-	of which:	18,0	5 000,0	-	13 018,0
1996	-	10 000,0	1 000,0	0,1	1 000,0	-	11 000,1
1997	13 000,0	8 500,0	500,0	602,0	-	-	22 102,0
1998	-	8 500,0	500,0	1 800,0	-	-	10 300,0
1999	12 000,0	8 500,0	500,0	415,0	-	2 000,0	22 915,0
2000	-	10 000,0	500,0	-	-	-	10 000,0
2001	10 000,0	10 000,0	500,0	-	-	-	20 000,0
2002- 2003 Forecast	6 000,0	10 000,0	500,0	-	-	-	16 000,0
<i>Total</i>	68 930,0	65 500,0	4 000,0	3 096,1	20 000,0	2 000,0	159 526,1

ANNEX 8: Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADB		Asian Development Bank
CDF	:	Comprehensive Development Framework
EC	:	European Community
EBRD		European Bank for Reconstruction and Developemnt
FSP	:	Food Security Programme
GDP	:	Gross Domestic Product
GOK	:	Government of Kyrgyzstan
GTZ		German Development Corporation
IBRD		International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IFC		International Finance Corporation
IMF	:	International Monetary Fund
MAWRPI	:	Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Processing Industry
MOF	:	Ministry of Finance
MLSP	:	Ministry of Labour and Social Protection
MOU	:	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	:	Non Governmental Organisation
NPRS	:	National Poverty Reduction Strategy
NSC	:	National Statistics Committee
PCA		Preferential Cooperation Agreement
RAS	:	Rural Advisory Services
TA	:	Technical Assistance
TACIS	:	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TCA		Technical Cooperation Agreement
TOR	:	Terms of Reference
UMB	:	Unified Monthly Benefit
UNDP		United Nations Development Programme



**Thematic Evaluation of Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management
and Special Operations in Support of Food Security**

FIELD REPORT FOR MALAWI

Final Report

**Annemarie Hoogendoorn
Doreen Chanje**

June 2004

For the

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background and objectives of the study

This country case study forms part of the EC evaluation on 'Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security' that was executed by Particip GmbH in 2003/04. The study reviews the food aid and food security programmes in Malawi that have been funded by the EC since 1997, with special emphasis on the period from 2000 onwards. The main objective of the study is to analyse the added value of the EC Food Security Budgetline (FSBL) compared to other EC instruments and budgetlines, focussing on coherence and complementarity of the EC strategies, and the efficiency and quality management with regard to programming, targeting and handling of food aid actions and operations in support of food security. The study in Malawi was carried out by Mrs. Annemarie Hoogendoorn as the international expert and Mrs. Doreen Chanje as the national expert. The visit to Malawi took place between the 3rd and 18th of March 2004.

Use of Reg/96 funds in Malawi

Since 1998, the FSBL has funded two food aid allocations and two three-year food security programmes in Malawi. The implementation of a third three-year food security programme is expected to start early 2005. Including this new commitment, the FSBL will have provided a total budget of € 146.4 million to Malawi. The funds have been used for provision of food aid, a foreign currency facility to the GoM (among others for support to the management of the strategic grain reserve, development and implementation of a Food Security and Nutrition Policy, several agricultural development programmes, a programme for distribution of agricultural inputs, and a public works programme), cofinancing to NGO's for food security projects, and the provision of technical assistance to the GoM.

Answers to the evaluative questions

The methodology for all country case studies within this EC evaluation has been based upon a set of evaluative questions that was developed during the desk phase. The main conclusions of this exercise for the Malawi country case study are listed here:

- EQ 1: to be answered in the synthesis report.
- EQ 2: Very satisfactory integration of the food security policy within the EC's development strategy for Malawi as laid down in the CSP, with good coherence and complementarity of the various EC instruments.
- EQ 3: Satisfactory degree of coherence between the EC food aid and food security policy and the national strategies of Malawi as laid down in the Malawi

PRSP, but a common overall donor approach to the cooperation with the GoM in the agricultural sector is lacking.

- EQ 4: The food aid provided by the FSBL in Malawi has shown to have added value to EDF- and ECHO-funds because of its speedy and timely commitment, and its flexible use both for general and targeted food distributions and for stocking of the Strategic Grain Reserve.
- EQ 5: The foreign currency facility provided to Malawi by the FSBL has been complementary to EDF-funds in its flexible support to a widely ranging but still coherent and complementary package of relevant and effective food security-related interventions at both policy and operational levels.
- EQ 6: The operations that were funded by the FSBL to support food security in Malawi provide well-appreciated services that stimulate agricultural and livestock production, although the impact at national level up to now is somewhat limited and not all projects are expected to be sustainable.
- EQ 7: The FSBL has provided substantial and increasing budgets for technical assistance (TA) in Malawi, but a comprehensive inventory of the tasks and responsibilities of the TA's and available tools (like a monitoring system) is lacking. More clarity is needed how to strike the balance between operational management and planning tasks on one hand, and capacity building within the Ministries on the other.
- EQ 8: The phasing in of the actions supported by the FSBL in Malawi has been very satisfactory. The continuous stream of funding together with the relative flexibility of the FSBL have enabled a swift response to food aid and food security needs, both to improve '*food availability*' and '*access to food*'. For some of the projects and programmes, the design of the activities tends to be a bit top-down in nature, although the local communities usually participate in operational decision making during the implementation phase, and most projects try to ensure sustainability through the establishment of local management structures.
- EQ 9: The implementation of the actions supported by the FSBL in Malawi is also very satisfactory. There is a clear focus on poverty reduction through agricultural development, good overall coordination with other donors, and a recent shift to an integrated management structure for all EC support to the agriculture and food security sector.
- EQ 10: The food aid allocations in 1998 and 2002 were of a short-term nature and are now being phased out satisfactorily. For the food security interventions, the time has not yet come in Malawi to start planning for a complete phase out, but phasing over or phasing out within the coming years of some components is recommended.
- EQ 11: The EC-supported policies and programmes in the field of food security have varying sustainability levels. The sustainability of the interventions at institutional and policy levels, like the support to the management of the Strategic Grain Reserve, the development of a new Food Security and Nutrition Policy and the new support to nutrition programmes of MoH, mainly depends upon GoM governance issues. The sustainability of the impact at the level of the target

populations of operational interventions like APIP, the road maintenance component of the Public Works Programme and some NGO-projects is not expected to be very satisfactory.

- EQ 12: In Malawi, the FSBL funds have played a major and very positive role to bridge the gap between relief, rehabilitation and development, and has complemented both EDF and ECHO funds for Malawi.

Overall assessment

Next to the evaluative questions, also the regular evaluation criteria were used for the assessment of the use of the FSBL funds in Malawi. The balanced package of interventions is found to be coherent with the CSP and the Malawi PRSP, and it relevantly addresses '*food availability*' and '*access to food*' issues. The operational interventions like APIP and the Public Works programme are rated as effective. The effectiveness of the policy-oriented interventions however mainly depends on governance issues within the GoM. Although there are considerable differences between the various interventions, on average, the efficiency and the sustainability of the FSBL interventions are rated as fair, and the impact as satisfactory.

Main recommendations

- The EC should continue with its integrated approach of relief, rehabilitation and development efforts in Malawi. The LRRD-concept should be introduced, and more attention should be paid to the interface of the HIV/AIDS pandemic with food security and nutrition issues.
- The FSBL needs to continue with its flexible programme approach and continuous streams of funding for Malawi to be able to timely phase in and phase out adequate interventions to increase the '*food availability*' and '*access to food*' in the country as a complement to EDF funds for agriculture and the social sector, and to ECHO support during major food crises:
 - Continued FSBL support to GoM to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of food aid operations and food security and nutrition policy development and implementation.
 - Gradual phasing out of the FSBL support to the APIP agricultural inputs programme or phasing over to a real sustainable rural credit system with larger coverage than the current programme.
 - Expansion of the FSBL support to the EDF-funded Public Works Programme to the Southern Region of Malawi, and improvement of the medium- to long-term sustainability of the roads rehabilitation/maintenance component through a better link with the National Roads Authority or the district authorities / local communities.
 - Continued FSBL support to NGO projects for replication of successful and sustainable interventions that really have an impact.

- To back a decision for further allocation of funds for TA's, there is a need for a comprehensive inventory of the tasks and responsibilities of the TA's and available tools. This could take the form of a specific evaluation of the technical assistance and capacity building that is provided in Malawi by the FSBL. More clarity is needed on the exact role and function of the TA's, which should provide an answer how to strike the balance between operational management and planning tasks on one hand, and capacity building within the Ministries on the other.
- As monitoring of programme implementation is an important aspect of the work of the TA's, a clear Management Information System should be established for monitoring of the project implementation. This should be a joint exercise together with the GoM. The system should be based on clear, specific and verifiable indicators.
- The EC Delegation should try to improve the participation of the various stakeholders during the design of the interventions, and also should involve them in the monitoring of the project implementation.
- A comparative evaluation is recommended of the efficiency in terms of operations and costs levels of the APIP and the Public Works programmes. This should include a reflection on the advantages and disadvantages of the contracting of the project implementation to a consulting firm versus EC project management.

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 Background to the mission

This country case study is a review of the food aid and food security programmes in Malawi that since 1997 have been funded by the EC, with special emphasis on the period from 2000 onwards. The study forms part of the evaluation of 'Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security' which was launched in September 2003¹.

This 2003/04 thematic evaluation of EC food aid and food security programmes is a follow-up of the evaluation of the Food Security Budgetline (FSBL) that has been established in 1996 (Regulation No. 1292/96), and the review of the functioning of the FSBL by the Court of Auditors presented in 2003, with the main objective to analyse the added value of this budgetline compared to other EC instruments and budgetlines. The results should provide an assessment of the coherence and complementarity of the EC strategy for food aid and food security, and an assessment of the steps taken by the Commission to improve the efficiency and quality management with regard to programming, targeting and handling of its food aid actions and operations in support of food security.

2.2 Why Malawi?

2.2.1. Introduction

The FSBL has funded two consecutive three-year food security programmes in Malawi (3-year FSP of € 32.4 million for July 1998 - June 2001, and the MAFSP of € 52.4 million for 2001-2004). Another three-year food security programme for Malawi (MAFSP II of € 45 million for 2004-2007) has just been approved in March 2004; a MoU for the first commitment in this new programme is expected later on in 2004, with implementation to start from 2005 onwards. On top of the consecutive three-year programmes, the budgetline since 1997 has provided two food aid allocations for Malawi: in 1998 for local/regional purchase of 30,000 MT of maize grain, and in 2002 € 16 million for emergency food aid.

The contributions from the FSBL are to be assessed in the context of other EC allocations to Malawi: out of EDF funds, STABEX, other thematic budgetlines, and ECHO funding. For the period 1995 – 2002, the total of primary commitments excluding ECHO funds was € 629 million, out of which € 385 had been disbursed by the end of 2002². In response to the cholera outbreak in 2001 and the food crisis in 2001/02, in 2002 and 2003 ECHO provided emergency funds for nutrition projects

¹ As part of the 2004 evaluation of the food aid policy and food aid management and special operations in support of food security, ten country field studies have been executed: in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gaza, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru and Zimbabwe.

² Data taken from: MWH – ECDPM – ODI 'Evaluation of the European Commission's Country Strategy for Malawi', May 2003.

and water & sanitation activities, with a total value of € 5.3 million. ECHO is currently phasing out from Malawi, with no further funding from July 2004 onwards.

In Malawi, the FSBL has been used as follows:

1998 Food Aid Allocation

Similar to earlier food aid allocations to Malawi in e.g. 1994, 1995 and 1996, the FSBL provided funds for the regional purchase of 30,000 MT of maize grain as a contribution to the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) in Malawi. This food aid somehow went ‘missing’ and was not used in 1998 or following years. Luckily, upon request by the EC Delegation in Malawi, the Government of Malawi (GoM) was able to retrieve it and the food aid was used during the recent food crisis in 2002. 15,000 MT was distributed as food aid in-kind through national and international NGO’s (8,000 MT; April – August 2002) and for the WFP nutritional support programme (7,000 MT; November 2002 onwards), and the other 15,000 MT was used for monetisation to generate counterpart funds, of which € 2.1 million was used for the financial costs of the NGO food distributions, and the remainder was used for an OPV maize seed multiplication project.

3-year Food Security Programme (1998 – 2001)

The 3-year FSP consisted of a ‘Sectoral Import Programme’ (€ 30 million of direct aid) that provided counterpart funds to the GoM. The yearly MoU’s for this programme state indicative amounts for the various programme components. However, it is difficult to say how much exactly has been spent for each component. The division of the indicative amounts over the programme components is as follows: € 17 for an agricultural productivity investment programme (APIP), € 4 million for feeder roads rehabilitation, € 5 million for the Maize Productivity Task Force (MPTF), € 2 million for PROSCARP (in addition to the EDF-budget for this soil conservation and agricultural recovery programme), € 1 million for small-scale micro-irrigation projects, and € 0.765 million for a monitoring system for crop estimates and market prices. On top of this, there was an EC budget provision for Technical Assistance (€ 2.4 million) alongside the 3-year FSP. The audit statement for the 3-year FSP rejected an expenditure total of € 6.2 million which was spread over the various components of the programme, of which a part was later on recovered from the GoM. € 2.3 million of this repayment was reallocated to pay for the cash component of the WFP nutritional support programme (November 2002 – March 2004).

Multi-annual Food Security Programme (2001 – 2004)

The MAFSP provided an indicative total of € 32.4 million of direct aid (Title I, foreign currency facility) to the GoM divided as follows³: € 1.5 million for the MPTF, € 6 million for the public works programme (including the feeder roads rehabilitation), € 9.9 million for APIP, € 10 million for the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA), € 2 million for a trust fund on diversification, € 2 million for capacity building within the MoAIFS and the National Economic Council (not existing anymore), and finally € 1 million for a management information system. Next to the direct aid, the MAFSP consisted of a € 15.6 million Title II operation in support of food security through NGO-cofinancing. In October 2000, an NGO Call for Proposals was issued, which led to the award of contract to 10 NGO's in September 2002. The MAFSP also had a budget of € 5.0 million for the provision of Technical Assistance (also Title II operation in support of food security). In reaction to the 2001/02 food crisis, the second amendment to the MAFSP allocated funds for regional purchase of maize, with the first round of tenders in July 2002 and the second round in December 2002. Complemented with € 1.3 million from the 2002 Food Aid allocation (see underneath), in total 30,000 MT of maize were procured for distribution through WFP in the JEFAP⁴-programme in the period January-April 2003, and 23,000 MT for restocking of the SGR.

2002 Emergency Food Aid

In October 2002, the FSBL committed € 16 million for emergency food aid through the use of the urgent procedure at Brussels level. Although the commitment for this fund was quickly made, the disbursement took place nearly one year later. Thus, first EC responses to the food crisis in 2001/02 were made with the recovered 1998 Food Aid allocation (30,000 MT of maize grain) and with the repayment by the GoM of ineligible funds for the 3-year FSP (see above). The 2002 Emergency Food Aid allocation has been used flexibly to complement other food aid resources and to meet remaining food crisis programming needs. Up to now, the 2002 food aid allocation has been used as follows: € 4.2 million was provided to WFP as cash component for the distribution of 30,000 MT of maize grain (January – April 2003), and € 3 million was put in the SGR financial reserve account. Currently remaining funds amount to € 7.5 million; allocations are being processed of € 5.1 million for the replenishment of the SGR with 30,000 MT of maize grain (the same amount that was given out to WFP in 2002), and € 2.4 million to WFP for the 2004 nutritional support programme.

³ Source: the three MoU's signed between the EC and the GoM for the MAFSP.

⁴ JEFAP stands for Joint Emergency Food Aid Programme

Multi-annual Food Security Programme 2 (2004 – 2007)

The new MAFSP II builds upon the previous programme, and has a total budget of € 45 million for three years. It is planned to provide a total of € 21.3 as foreign currency facility for the government (€ 2.8 million for Food Security and Nutrition Policy (FSNP) implementation, € 3.7 for SGR management, € 1 million for improvement of institutional capacity in trade policy, € 9 million for income generation projects – public works, agricultural inputs - and € 4.8 million for nutritional support), € 3 million for SGR stock replenishment costs, € 3 million for the farm inputs (new APIP) programme, € 4 million for provision of nutritional products through WFP, € 5.7 million for a new round of NGO-cofinancing, and finally a total of € 8 for technical assistance, various studies and monitoring and evaluation.

Table 1: Breakdown of the various budgets made available to Malawi out of the Regulation 1292/96 FSBL budgetline (all in € million):

	1998 Food Aid	3-yr FSP 1998- 2001	MAFSP 2001- 2004	Emergency FA 2002/03	Subtotal	MAFSP2 2004-2007	Total
Direct aid	p.m.: 30,000 MT maize grain	30.0	32.4	8.1	70.5	25.3	95.8
Inputs alongside the direct aid	-	-	-	-	-	6.0	6.0
NGO- cofinancing	-	-	15.6	-	15.6	5.7	21.3
Technical Assistance, external studies	-	2.4	5.0	-	7.4	8.0	15.4
Indirect aid (cash/food components)	-	-	-	7.9	7.9	-	7.9
Total	p.m.: 30,000 MT maize grain	32.4	53.0	16.0	101.4	45.0	146.4

2.2.2. Country profile: Food aid and food security: Situation, policy, actors and programmes

2.2.2.1. General Situation in terms of Food Security

Malawi remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Over the past twenty years, the country has received high and growing levels of international aid, e.g. a total ODA per capita of US\$ 405 million or US\$ 40 per capita in 1998⁵. The UNDP Human Development Report of 2003 ranks Malawi as number 169 out of 175 countries, with a deteriorating Human Development Index since 1995, and a per capita GDP as low as US\$ 180 per year⁶. Malawi's population is estimated at 11 million, 85% of whom living in the rural areas early all subsisting on rain-fed agriculture. More than half of the rural households cultivate less than one hectare, with one out of four households only farming half a hectare of land. Maize remains the main staple food providing more than two-thirds of the average daily energy intake. Tobacco is the main cash crop, earning about 70% of the country's foreign exchange.

According to the Malawi Country Report⁷ on the progress towards the MDG's, in 2000 approximately 54% of the population was rated as poor, with an income less than US\$ 0.34 per person per day. As explained in the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP)⁸, this poverty is caused by a myriad of factors: restricted access to land and limited agricultural productivity because of rapid environmental degradation and deforestation, limited labour availability because of low levels of education and a poor health status of the population, and a lack of off-farm employment. The gloomy poverty condition is worsened by a rather high population growth of more than 2% per year, and a weak institutional capacity in Malawi. The key constraints on capital include the reduced access to credit due to very high real interest rates around 40% per annum, and the high cost of imported capital goods (related to the 25% depreciation of the Malawi Kwacha against the US dollar in 2003). Other unfavourable economic conditions are poor access to input supplies and markets, a lack of savings, credit sources and credit collateral, and absence of proper land ownership rights. These factors together result in a very low economic productivity of the land, labour, capital and technology that is available in Malawi.

The health indicators for Malawi are not very encouraging: an underfive mortality rate of 183 and child mortality of 289 per 1000 livebirths, and a maternal mortality of about 620 per 100,000 livebirths. For the past 10 years, the level of stunting among underfive children has remained static around 49%, which clearly indicates the chronic nature of food deprivation and insufficient access to safe drinking water, health facilities and good quality education. Acute malnutrition (wasting) is static around 6%, with hardly any improvement during the past decade 1990-2000. In

⁵ IFAD, 'Appraisal Report for the Rural Livelihoods Support Programme', Lilongwe, 2000.


⁶ UNDP Human Development Report, New York, 2003.

⁷ UNDP Malawi Country Report 2002, Lilongwe, 2002.

⁸ MoFEP, 'The Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper', Lilongwe, May 2002.

recent years, the impact from the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Malawi has a rather high prevalence around 20-25%) has exacerbated the situation, leading to increased severely acute malnutrition levels.

Fig. 1: National Maize Production 1995-2003



Source: National Crop Estimates figures, MoEPD

The majority of the Malawi population is caught in a situation where they have to try to produce their own food in a rain-dependent agricultural system with small plot sizes (over 50% of the households cultivate less than 1 ha). In addition to this, daily labour, '*ganyu*', is a very important source of income, especially in the lean season from January up to April. The rural population has minimal economic resources. The productivity of manpower is restricted by the impact of chronic under-nutrition and HIV/AIDS. It is under such circumstances that livelihoods including the food security situation have become very fragile. The high dependence on maize as a staple contributes to the country's vulnerability⁹. It therefore is no surprise that the livelihoods of the poor in Malawi are threatened repeatedly.

For the national food balance sheets, the gross domestic consumption needs are set at 2.013 million MT of maize¹⁰. Both 1998/99 and 1999/00 were good years with enough maize production to cover national consumption. These results were reversed during the drought-affected year 2001/02 (see figure 1). In terms of maize production, the harvest in the 1998/1999 season has been the best of the past years. It serves as a

⁹ GoM integrated household surveys found that 73% of the total energy consumption is through maize. Taking an average consumption level of 2,200 kCal per person per day, this implies that the annual per capita consumption needs amount to 167 kg of maize meal.

¹⁰ See: <http://www.sadc-fanr.org.zw/rewu/qfsb/balances/mwbal.htm>

benchmark of adequate supplies at both household and national level, despite the fact that even then there were some pockets of vulnerability in the country. Prospects for the 2003/2004 season are still unclear: there was a late onset of the rains¹¹, but as the rains are continuing well into March, the harvest results might be reasonable. Recent vulnerability assessments¹² nevertheless indicate that some districts in the Southern Region of Malawi may have a very poor harvest.

2.2.2.2. National (and regional) Policy and Strategy for Food Security (evolution of policy, dynamics and policy dialogue)

The attainment of food security is one of the priorities of the Malawian government. Both the vision and mission statement of the Ministry of Agriculture focus on equitable improvement in household food security. Since 1990, the 'Food Security and Nutrition Policy Statement', an addendum to the 'Statement of Development Policies of 1987-1996', has been guiding GoM's strategies in terms of food security. The Agricultural and Livestock Development Strategy and Action Plan (ALDSAP) of 1995 is the guiding policy that is implemented through the Malawi Agricultural Sector Investment Plan (MASIP). MASIP is a rolling instrument that is continuously updated seeking to prioritise and match development objectives with available resources. MASIP has recently been updated to accommodate the agricultural development aspirations and objectives that were outlined in the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP). A Food Crisis Joint Task Force was established in 2002 to deal with the emergency food aid and other food shortage response operations. In this Task Force, it became apparent that Malawi was in need to revise its policy on Food Security and Nutrition. A one-year working group to draft the policy was established in June 2003, as a technical team that falls under the Food Security Policy Sub-committee.

Because of the 2001/02 drought that hit various countries in Southern Africa¹³, the improvement of food security conditions came to be seen as a regional priority. Major regional bodies such as the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) all developed strategies for the facilitation and attainment of food security within the region. These strategies include activities for monitoring of agricultural production systems and vulnerability assessments, the monitoring of weather patterns, the facilitation of trade, the facilitation of input availability, and the sharing of technical and natural resources.

¹¹ SADC Seasonal Outlook Statement, 6th February 2004

¹² WFP/FEWSNET/USAID/SC-UK/GoM Rapid Food Security Assessment Mission, February 2004.

¹³ See e.g.: Valid International, 'A Stitch in Time? Independent Evaluation of the Disasters Emergency Committee's Southern Africa Crisis Appeal July 2002 to June 2003', 2004.

2.2.2.3. Main Actors and Programmes

- **Government programmes**

Various ministries of the GoM are involved in policy development, definition and implementation. In food security issues, the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Food Security (MoAIFS) logically is the main driver, but other departments like the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Planning & Development, the Ministry of Health, and the Department for Relief and Disaster Preparedness also play a role. The MoAIFS is divided into eight Agricultural Development Divisions (ADD's) that cover the whole country. At community level, the ministry is represented by field staff, each responsible for their own section (usually a group of villages). The National Statistical Office of Malawi regularly prepares crop forecasting reports. This is done in close collaboration with MoAIFS (including the FEWS-section) and also linked up with the regional (SADC) food security early warning system.

The national grain marketing board ADMARC¹⁴ was established by the GoM in 1971. At its peak, ADMARC had over 1,000 storage facilities in Malawi. For the first 25 years of its operations, ADMARC intervened at fixed prices that were set by the government. This system had a considerable subsidy element and discouraged the private sector. The losses made in input provision and maize trading were covered by the government through trading in other cash crops, especially tobacco. Under the structural adjustment programme in 1987, ADMARC lost its monopoly and the private sector became to play a bigger role. However, ADMARC continued to buy and sell maize at government set prices until 1995 when it was started to buy and sell within a price band. ADMARC is still in the process of a phased commercialisation.

In 1981, ADMARC's trading activities were supplemented by the building of the silos at Kanengo where a 180,000 MT Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) was stored. This SGR was intended to cover full consumption needs in the country for three months. This SGR should be seen within the context of at that time insecure import routes to Malawi through Mozambique and South Africa. Although the SGR ownership was transferred to the GoM in the late eighties, until recently ADMARC has continued to manage the SGR. In 1999, the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) was established with the objective of to maintain the SGR. The NFRA is directed by a Board of Trustees, and has its own management and staff. An amendment of the Trust Deed in 2000 extended the area of NFRA intervention to the stabilisation of the grain market price, and the import and export of grain for the GoM. In the past years, the NFRA has been involved in the procurement of maize for commercial purposes and for the replenishment of the SGR. In 2002/03, NFRA procured 235,000 MT of maize for commercial sale on behalf of the government,

¹⁴ ADMARC is the Agricultural Development and Marketing Cooperation.

while the SGR was replenished with help of EU and USAID support up to a level of 73,706 MT physical maize stock (procured locally by NFRA and USAID) plus a cash reserve provided by the EU equivalent to 40,000 MT of maize. The strategy for upgrading of the NFRA to properly manage the SGR was formalised in 2002, with involvement of the GoM, EU, DFID and USAID. As part of its MAFSP, the EU has since provided both financial and technical support to the NFRA for the management of the SGR.

- **Donors**

In Malawi, the main donors are DFID, the EC, USAID and the World Bank. The donors hold regular coordination meetings, and also meet each other in the various sub-committees under the Food Crisis Joint Task Force.

DFID is the biggest donor: through a three-year framework, about € 100 million of bilateral support per year is provided, more or less equally divided in budgets for governance issues (police, prison management, community empowerment), service delivery (health and education) and for livelihood and growth. Within the last chapter, DFID is funding the Targeted Inputs Programme (TIP) which started in 1998 as a continuation of their former Starterpack programme. The TIP is a food safety net intervention that provides free inputs to needy farmers¹⁵. The programme is still evolving every year. The modalities of change include the replacement of DFID central procurement with a tender system for local purchase in Malawi, the increasing involvement of the MoAIFS in the management of the programme, and a gradual move away from the universal coverage in 1998 to a more targeted approach. In 2002, the TIP started also to distribute wintercropping inputs. In 2003, the TIP covered 1.7 million households (= 75% coverage of rural households), in 2004 this will be reduced to 1.3 – 1.5 households.

The EC Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for the 9th EDF covering 2001 – 2007 concentrates on two main focal sectors: agriculture and natural resources (€ 60 million, for increase and diversification of rural incomes, sustainable natural resources management, and safety nets for the poor), and transport infrastructure (€ 90 million, support to the National Roads Authority for the main road network, and a labour-intensive Public Works programme for feeder roads upgrading and maintenance). The EC is also engaged in macro-economic support (€ 70 million, especially for the education and health sector), and in micro-projects (€ 56 million). The total envelope A indicative commitment for Malawi is € 276 million, while the B

¹⁵ The TIP package consists of 2 kg of maize seeds (for 0.1 ha), 5 kg basal dressing fertiliser and 5 kg top dressing fertiliser, and 1 kg of legume seeds (pigeon pea, soy beans, or groundnuts). Including transport and distribution costs, the package has a cost of US\$ 7 per household, and in principle is enough to produce 160 kg of maize (covering about 2 months consumption needs for an average household of 5.5 members).

envelope to cover unforeseen needs is € 69 million. The commitments from the FSBL are not included in these totals as they fall outside the EDF.

For the period 2005-2007, USAID in Malawi will focus on recovery operations. The proposed set of interventions for economic growth, with a budget of US\$ 30 million per year, aims a) to increase agricultural productivity, b) to create employment in agriculture-linked enterprises, c) to increase household revenues from community-based natural resources management, and d) to reduce vulnerability to the food price volatility. The promotion of agricultural productivity takes the form of support to the National Smallholder Association of Malawi (NASFAM), a dairy industries programme, and support to the International Fertiliser Development Centre for import of fertiliser into the country. Also, there will be food safety net activities amounting to about US\$ 15 million per year through a direct assistance programme (DAP) implemented by American NGO's. This is a continuation of the C-Safe operations that were started during the recent food crisis in Southern Africa. Next to these funds for economic growth interventions and the food safety net, USAID will also provide considerable funds for the health and education sectors.

Due to lack of progress towards the macro-economic stabilisation targets, the World Bank budget support to Malawi was suspended for two years starting in 2001. Disbursements were resumed early 2004 after a July 2003 IMF mission had recognised considerable progress. In 2002, the World Bank provided some drought-related support to WFP (US\$ 0.5 million for logistics), to FAO (in total US\$ 1 million for disease-free cassava and a water harvesting project) and US\$ 2 million for small-scale irrigation projects. Currently, the World Bank has entered into a drought recovery project with the GoM of US\$ 50 million (half loan, half budgetary support). The current 'Country Assistance Strategy' (CAS) for Malawi is aimed at the creation of broad-based, labour intensive growth and the fostering of environmental sustainability and human development. These objectives are pursued through support to the MoAIFS crop estimates system, support to the decentralisation process, a land reform programme of US\$ 30 million (assisted land reallocation and land procurement / input support), a MASAF (Malawi Social Action Fund) programme for support to rural livelihoods of US\$ 30 million (including treadle pumps, refined contract farming, and public works programmes), plus a US\$ 70 million grant for HIV/AIDS activities.

• The United Nations organisations

WFP, globally involved in emergency and development work, has been present in Malawi for over 20 years. WFP has been actively involved in the Mozambican refugees programmes in the south of Malawi up to 1995. Most of the assistance to the local population has been provided through MoH (food for nutrition rehabilitation units and for HIV/AIDS home-based care), and through MoE (schoolfeeding programmes). During the 2001/02 food crisis, these programmes have been intensified, and also there has been some general food aid distribution through NGO's. The types of food that WFP provides in Malawi are Likuni Phala (a locally

manufactured fortified corn-soy blend) and/or CSB for malnourished children, and fortified maize meal for pregnant and lactating mothers and for adults accompanying malnourished children. Maize or maize meal has been used for food-for-work (FFW) programmes and for general food aid. Funding for the WFP operations in the past years has come from many different sources. Malawi was included in the 10200 and 10290 regional EMOP's for Southern Africa, which were supported with Malawi-level funds from the FSBL. From July 2004 onwards, WFP will move to a three-year PRRO for Malawi.

As part of an initiative implemented in all COMESA countries, FAO has been implementing a special programme on food security in Malawi. The objective is to assist member countries to increase their agricultural production and productivity in an economically and environmentally sustainable manner. Since the food crisis in 2002, FAO emergency and recovery assistance has consisted of various elements, mostly pilot programmes: a) establishment of an agricultural coordination unit, b) distribution of agricultural inputs to 50,000 vulnerable farmers, c) support to five nurseries for production of disease-free cassava (with World Bank funding), d) establishment of a vegetable gardening programme at targeted NRU's (will be funded by EU out of the remainder of the MAFSP), and e) promotion of small-scale irrigation technology, involving 80 to 100 clubs and cultivation of 200 hectares. Planned activities for 2004 include support to community-based seed production systems (with CIDA funding), a programme providing agricultural inputs and training to HIV/AIDS affected households, establishment of school garden programmes (in collaboration with WFP), and an agricultural inputs for work programme (jointly with WFP).

UNICEF is a main player in HIV/AIDS programmes in Malawi, and is engaged in the revitalisation of the micro-nutrients programme. The organisation also has been actively involved in the recent food crisis response, through provision of technical support for improvement of the therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes (together with Concern and AAH-UK), and for the establishment of a nutritional surveillance system (together with AAH-UK). The emergency nutrition activities are currently being phased out, and it is still uncertain what form the UNICEF assistance to Malawi will take from 2005 onwards.

- **Non-governmental organisations**

In Malawi, a range of national and international NGO's was involved in food aid operations during the food crisis. During the peak of the food aid operation from January – April 2003, the WFP Joint Emergency Food Aid Programme (JEFAP) operated through a smooth partnership with the NGO Food Aid Consortium (group of 12 NGO's led by CARE). In 2002/03, USAID had a substantial food safety net programme through its C-Safe partners CARE, World Vision and CRS. In the coming years, these US organisations (now renamed DAP-partners) will continue to provide targeted feeding as part of a food safety net funded by USAID. During the past food

crisis, DFID has provided funds for the Southern Africa regional VAC (system of vulnerability assessments), which included participation of many NGO's to collect the field data. Although quite a few international NGO's have left by now, some have stayed on to undertake recovery food security projects, and also some new NGO's have arrived to undertake recovery / development interventions.

Ten NGO's secured funding through the October 2000 EC NGO Call for Proposals for food security projects in Malawi. This is the NGO-cofinancing component of the MAFSP, with a project duration ranging from two to five years. The programmes include interventions for agricultural input distribution, commodity marketing, extension services, crop production, livestock production, and nutrition education. Some of the NGO's that were awarded with a grant were present in Malawi during the food crisis, and been active in emergency distributions, food for work programmes and/or feeding programmes, but others have newly arrived in the country.

Recently, the Ministry of Health requested through NAO whether it is possible to support, through FSBL funds, the continuation of the activities of AAH-UK (Action Against Hunger) that have been financed by ECHO up to June 2004. A two-year continuation of the programme is seen as needed to finish the NRU capacity building programme, and for the further establishment of a Malawi nutritional surveillance system in collaboration with MoH.

2.2.2.4. Major challenges/constraints encountered in achieving food security

Despite many years of investment in the agricultural sector, with various development strategies, it is worrying that Malawi is still food insecure. The following issues are seen as contributing factors to the food insecurity situation that represent challenges that need to be addressed:

Identification of suitable agricultural/rural development models

In order to visibly make progress in poverty reduction, Malawi needs to achieve higher economic growth, and new development models are urgently needed. Despite continuous development, reform and structural adjustment programmes, the basic structure of the economy in Malawi has seen very little change over the past three decades, and annual economic growth figures have remained low. Constraints to economic growth such as limited capital, both technological and human, poor (rural) infrastructure, isolation from markets etc. have not yet been removed in a substantial way. The agricultural sector accounts for only 35% of the GDP, although over 85% of the population is still working in agriculture, primarily in the smallholder sector. Tobacco remains the dominant cash crop for export, earning 70% of the country's foreign exchange.

Governance and institutional set-up

The food insecurity in Malawi results from an inter-play of several factors. One factor that perpetuates food insecurity is the ineffectiveness and/or inefficiency of many government and other institutions. The recent food crisis provides various lessons regarding the institutional requirements and pre-conditions for food security. It is hoped that these lessons will be learned, and that necessary changes will be put in place. Changes could include redefinition of institutional roles, governance procedures and better accountability measures.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic

The HIV/AIDS prevalence in Malawi is estimated at 20-25% of the adult population. The disease has put enormous strains on the country's already limited resources. A reconsideration of the economic policies as well as welfare policies is needed. In terms of food security, the achievement and maintenance of household level access to adequate and nutritious food is an enormous challenge.

Loss of human capital

Due to the high HIV/AIDS prevalence, especially among the more urbanised and higher educated parts of the population, and because of a considerable brain drain of professionals to international organisations present in Malawi and significant labour migration to South Africa and countries overseas, Malawi is facing a serious reduction of its human capital base. Unfortunately, these trends are still continuing, and undermine a lot of development efforts. The people that leave the GoM often represent highly experienced and qualified personnel that may not be easily replaced. For example, within the MoAI, more than 50% of the established positions are currently vacant.

2.3. Summary of the mission

The evaluation study in Malawi was carried out by Mrs. Annemarie Hoogendoorn as the international expert and Mrs. Doreen Chanje as the national expert. The visit to Malawi took place between the 3rd and 18th of March 2004. A detailed chronology of the mission and list of persons interviewed is given as Annex 1 and Annex 3 of this Country Report, while a list of consulted documents is attached as Annex 2.

The mission consisted of a two-week country visit by an evaluation team of two members only. Both evaluators had a background in food aid and food security projects, and were already familiar with some of the interventions supported by the FSBL in Malawi. Considering the variety and magnitude of the food aid and food security interventions that have been funded since 1996, together with various specific issues that are at stake in the Malawi context, the evaluation team nevertheless had to work hard to obtain sufficient insight in the various components

of the programmes. The EC ‘Rural Development and Food Security’ section in Lilongwe has been very helpful, and provided much appreciated support to our work. The methodology adopted for this evaluation consisted of:

- a) a meeting with the AIDCO/F-5 Desk Officer for Malawi (Brussels),
- b) a meeting with the ECHO Desk Officer for Malawi (Brussels),
- c) extensive discussions with the EC staff team involved in the food aid and food security interventions (Lilongwe),
- d) review of some general food security background information on Malawi,
- e) review of the EC Country Strategy Paper and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for Malawi,
- f) review of available briefing information and monitoring and evaluation reports for components of the FSBL programme in Malawi,
- g) meetings with various stakeholders in Malawi (various Ministries of the GoM, the main donors, UN organisations, and implementing partners; all in Lilongwe),
- h) the organisation of an NGO-workshop to discuss the evaluative questions (Lilongwe),
- i) field visits to four different projects (each representing another component of the programme; within Dedza and Lilongwe district),
- j) debriefing with the EC Head of Delegation and the EC staff involved in rural development based on an Aide Memoire.

2.4. Constraints

Malawi has a FSBL history from 1998 onwards, with an extensive package of food aid and food security interventions. Therefore, the main constraint for this case study has been the relatively short time that was allocated to the country visit, together with the fact that the evaluation team consisted of two people only. Although the team managed to have appointments with nearly all relevant stakeholders in Malawi, it was regretted that the Food Security and Nutrition Policy Working Group could not be met, and also that there was no time to have more general meetings on the food security conditions of Malawi, e.g. with policy researchers and staff of Bunda College of Agriculture. Out of necessity, the emphasis in this evaluation mission has been on meetings with key stakeholders present in Lilongwe. The time for field visits has been limited; to minimise travel time only some projects close to Lilongwe were visited.

3. EVALUATIVE QUESTIONS

3.1 Evaluative Question 1

‘What is the level of coherence between the food security policies, strategies and objectives of Regulation No.1292/96 and those from other geographical instruments (EDF, ALA, MEDA, TACIS, CARDS) and budget lines (ECHO, Rehabilitation, NGO Cofinancing)?’

The evaluative question 1 will be dealt with in the synthesis report.

3.2 Evaluative Question 2

‘What is the level of integration of the food security policy within the Commission’s development strategy with the partner country concerned as laid down in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP)?’

The objectives of the Food Security Policy are similar to those of the EC Malawi Country Strategy Paper (2001-2007). The final objective of the Food Security Policy is poverty alleviation through promotion of food security. This includes the improvement of food production and purchasing power, a raising of the nutrition standard, ensured supply of drinking water, sufficient availability and accessibility of foodstuffs, and a contribution towards balanced economic and social development with no dependence on food aid. The CSP for Malawi also seeks to contribute to poverty alleviation. This is done through funding of two focal areas: agriculture and transport, and through budgetary support. Specific EC cooperation objectives for the agricultural sector include the improvement of national food security and household food self sufficiency, increasing and diversifying rural incomes, sustainable management of natural resources, provision of safety nets for the poor, and improving institutional capacity. The two focal areas in the CSP are in line with the specific areas of cooperation as described in Articles 19 and 20 of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (signed in Cotonou in June 2000), which also emphasise on poverty reduction through the encouragement of local ownership of development strategies. These two focal areas are among the six priority areas identified in the Overall Policy Statement for EC development cooperation adopted by the EC Development Council in November 2000.

Within the CSP for Malawi, emphasis is placed on the strengthening of the institutional and human capacity of the country so that reliance on food aid is reduced. However, the CSP also recognises that some sections of the Malawi population, specifically the poor and other vulnerable groups, require continued assistance through safety nets. The CSP has planned for this under its support to the targeted nutrition programmes, targeted inputs programme and the labour intensive feeder road rehabilitation programmes. These are inherently short-term interventions. The general idea is that the impact of other long-term structural interventions, either

through the EDF or from other donors, will slowly reduce the need for safety nets. However, in the case of Malawi, the depth of the problems implies that the safety nets will still be required for the foreseeable future. On the specific issue of food aid, the CSP indicates that this is planned as a safety net. The logframe indicates that the EC wants to see a reduction in the need for Food-For-Work (FFW) and supplementary feeding programmes. This is in line with the objectives of the Regulation, in which a gradual withdrawal of food aid is one of the main objectives.

The CSP mentions the role of other EC instruments in contributing towards the achievement of the objectives for the Malawi development programme. Within the Malawi Delegation, food security and agriculture-related programmes are seen as one sector, for which several EU sources, including the FSBL, STABEX and EDF, are used. Such complementarity is possible largely due to the FSBL that provides for necessary inter-linkages and flexibility in the pursuance of programme objectives.

The EU office has recently been restructured so as to ensure proper coordination of related EC interventions. The coordination of all programmes that focus on agriculture, food security and natural resources has been placed in the new 'Rural Development and Food Security' section. At the same time, various Technical Assistants that used to be based in the former Food Security Unit (executing programmes funded by the FSBL) have been moved out of the EC offices and were seconded to various departments within the MoAI.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 2:

Within the CSP for Malawi, there is clear complementarity between the various EC instruments. A very good coherence exists between the overall objectives of the food security policy and those of the CSP, and the FSBL and STABEX funds clearly aim to be complementary to the interventions through the EDF. In Malawi, the FSBL has been used flexibly to complement consecutive EDF's. The recent food crisis in Malawi has underscored the importance of good coordination of the package of EC interventions. This has resulted in a re-grouping of the coordination of all EC interventions in the area of agriculture, food security and natural resources under the 'Rural Development and Food Security' section.

3.3 Evaluative Question 3

‘What is the coherence between EC food aid and food security policy and national strategies of beneficiary countries, especially the PRSP?’

The Malawi CSP was developed through a consultative process that involved government, non-state actors, and other donors. The MPRSP builds on the Malawi Poverty Alleviation Programme, although its approach is different in that it seeks to actively involve the poor in the process, rather than perceiving them as helpless individuals in need of welfare handouts. Although the MPRSP was still under development in August 2000, the CSP managed to draw upon the general views and aspirations of the country’s development objectives. The CSP therefore reflects and builds upon the MPRSP, through its focus on poverty alleviation as a major development goal. The two focal areas of EU assistance were chosen in recognition of the intentions within the donor matrix. For instance, with GTZ shifting its support from agriculture to human rights, and the Danish Embassy closing down, the EC took over support to the Land Reform Process.

The MPRSP recognises that the agricultural sector is the source of growth for the country and defines the strategy that needs to be pursued to achieve such growth. This national objective is complemented very well by the choice of agriculture as one of the focal areas for the EC’s development cooperation. Further coherence is seen in the choice of interventions within the CSP and the MPRSP. E.g., both policies include provision of services for the supply of agricultural inputs and the promotion of improved agricultural technologies, and similarly recognise that safety nets will be required for the very poor segments of Malawian society.

The MPRSP acknowledges the contribution made by different development partners. For instance, the role of the EU funded micro-projects which started under the Poverty Alleviation Programme is explicitly mentioned. The MPRSP further recognises the importance of negotiating for preferential non-reciprocal trade arrangements, especially within the EU’s ‘Everything But Arms Initiative’, as one way of fostering external trade for economic growth. The MPRSP further acknowledges that its implementation relies heavily on donors honouring their pledges, and it is implicit throughout the MPRSP that the support of various donors will be crucial to facilitate the development process.

Largely because of recent food shortages in 2001-2002, a strong coordination system was set up within Malawi, which up to now continues to be functional. Among the donors, there are various systems in place, such as CABS (Common Approach to Budgetary Support) and the donor agriculture committee. However, despite the existence of such coordination, there are still very obvious differences in the vision

and adopted approaches among the main donors present in Malawi (DFID, EU, USAID and World Bank).

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 3:

There is a high degree of coherence between the use of the FSBL and the MPRSP. The CSP, in which the food security policy is firmly embedded, builds upon and supports the objectives of the MPRSP. Poverty reduction is the central goal in both documents. Within the MPRSP, agriculture is identified as the main sectoral source of growth. This is reinforced by the CSP that concentrates on agriculture as one of the two focal areas of EU development cooperation in Malawi. Although various coordination systems have been established, especially among the donors involved in agriculture, up to now there is no common donor approach to the cooperation with the GoM in the agricultural sector. It is important that the donor dialogue is maintained.

3.4 Evaluative Question 4

‘What is the added value of the Food Aid in-kind (FA) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

Since 1997, the FSBL several times has provided funds for food aid programmes in Malawi. There was a Food Aid allocation in 1998 to Malawi of 30,000 MT of maize grain, and a 2002 Emergency Food Aid allocation of € 16 million. Next to this, additional budgets for food and cash components of food aid programmes during the food crisis in 2002/03 were made available from the balance of the 3-year Food Security Programme (1998–2001) and as an amendment within the Multi-annual Food Security Programme (2001–2004). Specifically, the following EC funds have been used for food aid programmes:

- Recovery of the 1998 Food Aid allocation for regional purchase of 30,000 MT of white maize grain for the SGR that had gone ‘missing’. Upon enquiry by the EC, the maize was retrieved in 2002 and was used during the 2002/03 food crisis: 15,000 MT as food aid in-kind distributed through national and international NGO’s and WFP, and the other 15,000 MT for monetisation to generate counterpart funds of which € 2.1 million was used for the financial costs of the food distributions (the remainder was used for an OPV maize seed multiplication project).
- Out of the balance of the 3-year FSP (1998–2001), € 2.3 million was reallocated to pay for the cash-component of the WFP nutritional support programme (November 2002 – March 2004)¹⁶.
- The second amendment to the MAFSP (2001–2004) allocated € 4 million of funds for the regional purchase of maize grain, the first round in July 2002 and the second round in December 2002 (complemented with € 1.3 million from the 2002 Food Aid allocation, see next bullet point). In total, 30,000 MT of maize were procured for distribution through WFP in the JEFAP¹⁷-programme in the period January – April 2003¹⁸, and 23,000 MT for restocking of the SGR.
- A 2002 Emergency Food Aid allocation amounting to € 16 million. Although the commitment for this fund was quickly made in October 2002, the disbursement took place nearly one year later. This amount was used flexibly to complement other food aid resources and programming needs during the food crisis. € 4.2 million was provided to WFP as cash component for the distribution of 30,000 MT of maize grain (January – April 2003), and € 3 million was put in the SGR financial reserve account. Currently remaining funds amount to € 7.5 million; allocations are being processed of € 5.1 million for the replenishment of the SGR

¹⁶ See: WFP, Narrative Draft Final Report Form, EC/MALAWI Nutritional Emergency Support.

¹⁷ JEFAP stands for Joint Emergency Food Aid Programme.

¹⁸ See: WFP, Narrative Final Report Form, EC/MALAWI 2002 FOOD AID /2003/01- 30,000 MT.

with 30,000 MT of maize grain, the same amount that was given out to WFP in 2002, and € 2.4 million to WFP for the 2004 nutritional support programme.

While the actual food crisis in Malawi had already started in December 2001, the international humanitarian response was late and the EC was one of the first donors providing substantial amounts of food aid during 2002. Because of the GMO-issue which blocked the maize pipeline to Southern Africa mid-2002, the FSBL allocation for local procurement of maize (both for distribution and for stocking of the SGR) both have been very relevant to fill the gaps in the food pipeline. The FSBL has shown to be able to react quickly and timely to the emerging food aid needs in Malawi, probably as an effect of its presence in the country with food security programmes. The food aid effectively avoided further deterioration of the food situation in Malawi in the first phase of the crisis response. The nutrition situation during the recent food crisis never has been out of control, and global acute malnutrition rates have remained stable around 6-7%. By its very nature, relief food aid operations are non-sustainable and only have short-term effects. However, it is noted that a decline of the food situation could have had serious long-term negative effects, especially because of the rather high HIV/AIDS prevalence in Malawi. The new MAFSP 2 (2004-2007) includes a structural food aid component to WFP of € 4 million for provision of nutritional products for safety net interventions.

The food aid operations that were supported by the FSBL generally have been very efficient. Despite some delays within the joint food aid programme (JEFAP) in 2002 because of limited milling capacity within the country (the distribution of GMO-maize was only allowed in milled form), and some logistical constraints, there were no serious setbacks, and all food aid programmes funded out of the FSBL have been on-time and smooth operations.

The involvement of ECHO in food aid operations in Malawi has been limited only. This should be seen in the context of the fact that the FSBL already provided a timely support to food aid operations in Malawi from April 2002 onwards. Another factor for ECHO to refrain from funding of emergency food aid was the fact that the GAM rates in Malawi were well below the usual emergency threshold level of 10%. The ECHO-funded operations have been complementary to the MAFSP and the Emergency Food Aid (1998 and 2002) as provided by the FSBL. In Malawi, ECHO has phased in during the third quarter of 2002, and is now preparing to phase out from July 2004 onwards. During a period of 2 years, ECHO in total has provided € 5.4 million of funds for nutrition support to malnourished children (to WFP), support to national nutrition monitoring systems during the food crisis and thereafter (to AAH-UK), support to the development of Malawi national guidelines for management of severe and moderate malnutrition (in collaboration with UNICEF and MoH), food security support to HIV/AIDS affected households (Concern-Worldwide), and some cholera preparedness operations (MoH). A take-over of some

projects in the nutrition sector that are not yet concluded by the FSBL is currently being discussed.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 4:

The FSBL has reacted quickly and timely to the emerging food aid needs in Malawi during 2002, probably as an effect of its flexibility and the presence in the country with food security programmes. From 1997 up to now, including the last allocations out of the 2002 Emergency Food Aid budget that are currently being planned, the FSBL will have provided a total of 113,000 MT of maize for various food aid programmes and the SGR, an amount of € 3 million to the NFRA as a financial reserve, and € 8.9 million for cash components associated with food aid programmes. The JEFAP-model food aid operations guided by WFP were smooth and efficient. Although food aid is not sustainable, and only has short-term effects, the impact is seen in terms of avoidance of a further decline of the household food situation, especially in the context of the rather high HIV/AIDS prevalence in Malawi. ECHO phased in during the third quarter of 2002 with funds for nutrition and cholera prevention projects. A take-over of some nutrition projects by the FSBL after their phase out in July 2004 is currently being discussed.

3.5 Evaluative Question 5

‘What is the added value of the currency facility (CF) / Budgetary Support (BS) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

As described in paragraphs 2.2.1, the FSBL in Malawi has funded two consecutive food security programmes from 1998 onwards, while a new 3-year programme for 2005-2007 was just approved in Brussels in February 2004. The focus here will be on the foreign currency facility components in the Multi-annual Food Security Programme (2001 to 2004) that was provided to the GoM as direct aid (€ 32.4 million). In June 2002, the MAFSP was amended at Malawi level to use € 4 million for procurement of maize as support to the NFRA and for general food distribution during the crisis (see under EQ 4). The following section reviews the various components of the MAFSP and draws partly from the results of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the MAFSP that was executed in March 2003¹⁹.

• Food Crisis Joint Task Force / Technical Secretariat

A Food Crisis Joint Task Force (FCJTF) was established in April 2002 with a mandate to respond to emergencies, to investigate and report on various aspects of it, and to oversee the design of a new food security policy and to propose the outlines of an institution to coordinate its implementation. The Task Force is composed of representatives of various Ministries and representatives of the main donors and NGO's present in Malawi. The Task Force is chaired by the Deputy Minister for Agriculture. Under the Task Force, six sub-committees have been established, all of which are active up to now: a) Food Security Policy and Programming (responsible for the drafting of a revised GoM policy on food security and nutrition), b) Commercial Maize (for monitoring of the commercial GoM imports), c) Strategic Grain Reserve, d) Humanitarian Response, e) Information Systems, and f) Imports and logistics. Partially as a result of the support provided by the EC through the MAFSP, the Food Crisis Joint Task Force and its sub-committees have been able to meet regularly.

The Task Force is supported by the Technical Secretariat that acts as an interface between the GoM, the donors and the civil society within Malawi, and that organises the Task Force meetings. The Secretariat is comprised of a full team of Malawi and EU experts based at the MoAI. It is funded out of the foreign currency facility provided by the FSBL (€ 2 million out of MAFSP 2001 – 2004). This new element was not in the original plan for the MAFSP but was included in the yearly amendments for the use of the counterpart funds as support to national capacity building. Up to the February 2004, the Technical Secretariat has made the following

¹⁹ Transtec/AFCon, ‘Mid Term External Evaluation of the EC Multi Annual Food Security Programme 2001-2004 in Malawi’, May 2003.

achievements: execution of an evaluation of the functioning of the FCJTF, establishment of a database on all agriculture-food security projects in Malawi, organisation of training courses for GoM officials on sector-wide approaches and project cycle management, and the planning of a study to identify impact indicators for the new Food Security and Nutrition Policy.

The main stakeholders like key donors, the NGO-community and the office of the Permanent Secretary of the MoAIFS all regard the Technical Secretariat as highly relevant and necessary. The currency facility within the MAFSP has appeared to be a very good and appropriate mechanism for the provision of funding to GoM to link up food aid relief interventions to national policymaking for recovery and development. The MTR concludes that the Technical Secretariat was established in time and has gained the support of all stakeholders. The professional staff have effectively provided leadership, guidance and co-ordination. The various sub-committees have achieved varying levels of effectiveness, which is due to the will of the members and the support that is received by the donors. Obviously, currently it is too early to assess the impact and sustainability of the results attained by the Technical Secretariat. The MTR proposed a merger of the Secretariat with the MASIP office (Malawi Agricultural Sector Investment Programme) as this would harmonise the policy support and promote efficiency of the decision-making within the various sub-committees. At the time of this evaluation, the merger was still being discussed but had not yet been effectuated.

- **Support to the Food Security and Nutrition Policy Working Group**

The EC MAFSP in Malawi has advocated and consequently agreed to fund the drafting of a Malawi Food Security and Nutrition Policy. The process is intended to lead to a coherent policy document facilitating the achievement of overall food security in Malawi. The process was started late 2002 with the execution of a literature review, a study tour to other SADC countries, and a situation analysis by contracted experts in the fields of macro-economics, nutrition and health, agro-economics, poverty, trade and investment, emergencies and natural disasters, and information systems. The results were presented to the Joint Task Force in January 2004. After initial stakeholder consultations including some field missions, a policy analysis matrix was presented in February 2004. The process will continue in the coming months with more stakeholder consultations, a second study tour, and two national workshops. This is planned to result in the submission of a draft policy document to GoM in July 2004, with eventual submission of a final policy document to the Cabinet Committee mid-September 2004.

The development and later on implementation of a proper Malawi Food Security and Nutrition Policy is potentially very relevant for the long-term improvement of the food security in the country. It should be noted that the new policy is being developed within the broader policy framework for sustainable development and poverty reduction as laid down in the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The MTR

and this mission noted that DFID and to a lesser extent the World Bank do not really subscribe to the overall approach that is adopted by Working Group and continue to propose alternatives, which obviously reduces the effectiveness of the functioning of the Working Group. Currently, the impact and sustainability of the results attained by the Food Security and Nutrition Policy Working Group cannot yet be assessed.

• **NFRA / Management of the SGR**

In the Malawi context, the Strategic Grain Reserve is an essential in-country buffer stock which enables the GoM to quickly respond to pressing consumption needs during a food crisis. Already in 1998, the FSBL funded support for studies how to improve the management of the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) in Malawi. Nevertheless, the food crisis in 2002 was partly caused by the fact the GoM had already disposed of the SGR before it was forecasted that the maize harvest was going to be lower than normal. To avoid further mismanagement, the EC then took up an involvement in the restructuring of the SGR. Excluding the 1998 Food Aid allocation²⁰, but including the plans for use of the remaining funds out of the 2002 Emergency Food aid allocation, the FSBL since 1997 will have funded a) the replenishment of the SGR with 53,000 MT in kind²¹ and the establishment of a financial reserve of € 3 million, b) financial support to the management of the SGR by the NFRA (National Food Reserve Agency) and for silos rehabilitation, and c) technical assistance (two experts seconded to the NFRA, and one expert to the MoAIFS) aimed at strengthening of the design and a better functioning of the SGR. The technical support will be further reviewed under EQ 7.

Under formal instruction of the MoAIFS, the NFRA in 2002 took over the GoM lease from ADMARC for the use of the silos in Malawi. Jointly funded by the FSBL, DFID and other donors, an external audit of the NFRA was undertaken from February to August 2003. An international and national firm jointly evaluated the functioning of the NFRA in the fiscal years 1999/00, 2000/01 and 2001/02²². It was concluded that the NFRA lacked proper procedures and controls, and that the institutional set-up needed to be revised. The audit also recommended specific improvements in the NFRA financial information systems and human resource management. After a restricted tender procedure, Veritas was contracted in August 2003 for a formal certification of the quality of the SGR maize stocks according to international standards. A workshop was organised in June 2003 for Malawi decision makers on the functioning of the South African grain market. This led to the contracting of South African grain trading company AFGRI as a consultant to NFRA

²⁰ Upon enquiry by the EC, the ‘missing’ 1998 Food Aid allocation to the SGR of 30,000 MT was recovered in 2002. The food was used in 2002 as first answer to the 2001/02 food crisis in Malawi.

²¹ As explained under EQ 4, an additional total amount of 45,000 MT of maize meal was made available by the FSBL counterpart funds for humanitarian operations in Malawi in 2002/03.

²² Economic Resources Ltd – Ernst & Young, ‘External Audit of NFRA and Management of National Grain Stocks’, Lilongwe, May 2003.

in silos management and grain handling in September 2003. Another consultancy mission was ordered at the same time to assess the structural stability of the grain silos at Kanengo.

Since the onset of the food crisis in the first quarter of 2002, the management of the SGR has greatly been improved, and the NFRA has acquired full ownership of the strategic grain stores. It is widely acknowledged in Malawi that the EC support to the NFRA has been very effective for the achievement of these changes. The new NFRA system in principle recovers the maize procurement costs, but overhead costs for purchase and storage etc. still have to be paid from outside (donor) sources. Another issue raised by the MTR is the possibility of dependence by the NFRA on the technical expertise provided by the EC. The MTR recommended that the technical assistance to the NFRA become time-bound and financially limited, so that the GoM in the near future will have to take over full financial and managerial responsibility for the NFRA and the SGR.

- **Agricultural Productivity Investment Programme (APIP)**

The APIP was started in 1997 within the 3-year FSP, with the principal objective to improve national and household food security, and to promote the integration of smallholders into the productive market and financial service sectors. APIP widened their access to agricultural inputs provided as credit in-kind through a new parallel mechanism that collaborated with various implementing agencies (ADMARC, NGO's, private sector companies). The APIP achievements from 1997/98 up to 2000/01 were impressive: from 150,000 to 275,000 households were reached by the in-kind loans of maize seed and fertiliser, and the effects in terms of incremental production were enormous. However, after some years of operation, it became a point of concern that these results were not sustainable, because of a considerable high loan default rate, the continuous subsidy element, and the undesirable market distortions that were caused by APIP.

A joint Task Force was established in 2000 to work on the redesign of APIP for the MAFSP. This led to a new APIP with the following characteristics: a) concentration on districts with high repayment rates and avoidance of geographic areas that are drought or floods prone, b) targeting of households with at least 0.5 ha. of land which are engaged as well in other sources of income apart from maize growing, and which have a good loan repayment history, c) selection of Financial Service Providers (FSP's) that have good loan repayments rates, and avail of a 100% bank guarantee and/or collateral security – this did not apply to the NGO's as they had shown high repayment rates - and FSP's that have cleared the outstanding debts from the previous campaign, d) capacity building for the small FSP's²³ and a search for new

²³ During the 3-year FSP, APIP distribution of credits in-kind was done for 85% by ADMARC and FFC (Farmers' Financing Committee), and the other 11 implementing partners only served 15% of the beneficiaries.

implementing agencies, e) 50/50 sharing of administration and transport costs and 50/50 risk sharing for non-recovered loans between the FSP and APIP, f) introduction of a voucher system through Malawian input suppliers, and g) a change in the loan package²⁴ to include cash-earning legumes as well. Although these changes led to a sharp reduction in beneficiaries in the year 2001/02, they effectively led to an increase in the average loan repayment rate and a reduction of the subsidy element because of higher recovery of costs for overheads and non-repayment risks. It is acknowledged by the evaluation team that APIP is still far away from a sustainable rural credit institution, and cannot forever continue in the same way. In 2001/02, APIP ran an international tender for the agricultural inputs (done in smaller lots to encourage the medium suppliers to get involved in APIP), but from 2002 onwards the FSP's were required to procure directly from input suppliers (based on comparison of quotations), so that APIP itself could gradually be converted into a Financial Ltd. Trust.

The MTR of the MAFSP commented that the project design of the new APIP is still in line with the original objectives. Unfortunately, the introduction of the new APIP system led to a reduction of impact at national levels because of the huge decline in the number of beneficiaries: whereas 275,000 rural households were reached in 1999/00, there were only 41,800 beneficiary households in 2001/02 and this has only gradually been increased in the past two years. The overall efficiency of the original APIP programme was not very good due to the high loan defaulting (recovery rates about 70-75%). As a result, the total loan fund was reduced every year. Therefore, it is very positive that the new APIP system has been able to bring the loan repayment to a satisfactory level of over 90%²⁵, which has tremendously increased the sustainability of the APIP programme. Despite all commotion over the problems with APIP, this mission concludes that APIP has certainly had a function to boost maize production levels and to introduce a realistic cost-benefit orientation among the farming households that were reached. This latter element contrasts with the Starterpack/TIP programme funded by DFID. This food safety intervention that hands out a free package of agricultural inputs (with massive coverage of the rural population) effectively reduces the dependence on food aid distributions, but still should be marked as short-term relief only, with the risk that it might lead to donor dependency for farming inputs. It is recognised by this evaluation mission that over the past years any rural credit scheme would have suffered from some key aspects of the agro-economy in Malawi: primarily subsistence-based and not very lucrative smallholder maize farming, extremely high commercial interest rates (up to 40-45%), and steep declines in the Malawi Kwacha exchange rate (which heavily increased the cost burden of fertiliser imports). Although it is difficult to say what will be the final

²⁴ The loan package under the MAFSP consisted of 50 kg basal and 50 kg top dressing fertiliser, 10 kg of maize seed (either hybrid or OPV), and a legumes package (either groundnuts, beans or soy beans) as a soil fertiliser and a cash crop.

²⁵ The better loan recovery rate can be attributed to a better selection of creditworthy households, the provision of legume cash crop seeds alongside the maize inputs, and a stronger and more integrated follow-up by the FSP's.

answer to micro-credits in Malawi (if there is any answer at all), a way forward might be the increased involvement of farmer associations and the introduction of a savings element next to the credit provision.

- **Public Works Programme (PWP)**

The PWP is one of the pillars within the food safety net approach of the GoM. It is designed to maximise the portion of funding that is paid to the communities by utilising, among others, labour-intensive and appropriate technology methods. Attention is paid to an equal participation of women who would traditionally not be involved in projects of this nature. The PWP is currently targeting all districts within the Central Region of Malawi. The PWP is funded out of 8th EDF funds (US\$ 16.5 million for the period April 2001 – April 2005), with supplementary funds from MAFSP for a short 9-month intervention to inject cash in rural communities after the food crisis (US\$ 8.5 million, January – September 2003). The programme aims at an overall socio-economic improvement through a) the improvement of the accessibility of rural areas, b) the development of sustainable fuelwood and timber supplies, c) the promotion of wintercropping, and d) the provision of cash-paid jobs to needy communities that replace food handouts²⁶. After an open tender procedure, Africon Ltd. was contracted to execute the programme. A Programme Steering Committee was formed with representatives of various ministries and the National Roads Authority (NRA) and the EC. Africon runs an office in Lilongwe for the PWP Programme Management Unit. The total personnel force for the project consists of approximately 110 staff (of whom only 4 expatriates).

Overall, the PWP has been very successful, and the adopted approach proved to be very effective to alleviate poverty, with both short-term and long-term effects. The overall Public Works Programme funded by EDF/FSBL up to January 2004 has made the following progress:

- Completed rehabilitation of 1797 km of feeder road, 895 km of feeder road under maintenance (through a length-man system that possibly could be taken over by the District Assemblies as a sustainable long-term set-up), and replacement of 55 timber bridge decks with concrete decks. The total costs of these road works have been US\$ 4.5 million, of which US\$ 1.4 million (31%) were paid to the communities in the form of wages. On average, 600 person-days are needed per kilometre of road rehabilitated, and 1,400 person-days per bridge-work. The quality of the rehabilitation work has proven to be according to prevailing industry standards for conventional construction techniques.
- Planting of 15.1 million trees, and establishment and capacity building of 1,510 village forestry clubs. Total costs for this have been US\$ 0.98 million, of

²⁶ The PWP is designed to maximise the portion of funding that is paid to the communities by utilising, amongst other, labour-intensive and appropriate technology methods. Attention is paid to an equal participation of women who would traditionally not be involved in projects of this nature.

which U\$ 0.22 million (23%) for payment of incentives to village forestry clubs.

- Issue of 2,779 treadle pumps (on repayment basis) with agricultural inputs packages²⁷, construction of 15 channel irrigation schemes and 12 holding ponds (with World Vision as the sub-contractor). Up to January 2004, 3,262 farmers were covered, and 385 irrigation clubs were established. The achieved area under irrigation is 288 ha.
- Execution of 109 District Assembly 'Cash-for-Assets' projects in order to support the GoM's decentralisation drive, with a total value of MK 15.5 million.

The MTR in March 2003 commented on the limited participation of community beneficiaries in project M&E. The average expenditure per beneficiary including 25% overhead costs (for the Programme Management Unit and visiting consultants) is € 198 (source: MTR). The PWP includes the establishment and training of road workers clubs. However, the MTR commented that no training was provided to the road workers how to establish 'savings clubs' in order to become engaged in economic activities.

²⁷ An inputs package consists of 1 kg of maize seed, 4 packets of vegetable seed, 10 kg basal and 10 kg top dressing fertiliser, which enables the farmer to plant at least 0.1 ha.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 5:

The MAFSP from 2001 to 2004 provides a foreign currency facility to the GoM with a total value of € 32.4 million for the following components:

- **The support to Technical Secretariat for the Food Crisis Joint Task Force (€ 2 million) is rated at highly relevant, timely and effective. Also the support to the Food Security and Nutrition Policy Working Group is seen as potentially very relevant for a long-term improvement of the food security in the country. The impact and sustainability of these activities currently cannot yet be assessed.**
- **The support to the NFRA has been very effective for the improvement of the management of the SGR. In 2003, the NFRA has acquired full ownership of the strategic grain stores. The new NFRA system in principle recovers the maize procurement costs, but overhead costs for purchase and storage expenses etc. still have to be paid by outside (donor) sources. Potential dependency on the EC for continued technical assistance should be avoided.**
- **Over the past years, APIP has had a major function to boost maize production levels and to introduce a realistic cost-benefit orientation among the farming households that were reached. The redesign of APIP in 2000-01 has led to a more efficient system, but with substantial reduction of the impact at national level because of the huge decline in the number of beneficiaries. Further evolution of the APIP programme is still needed.**
- **The Public Works Programme (€ 8.5 million from MAFSP for January – September 2003 alongside EDF funds) concentrates on labour-intensive feeder road rehabilitation, tree planting, promotion of micro-irrigation with the use of treadle pumps and through river diversion works, and District Assembly ‘Cash-for-Assets’ projects to support the decentralisation and to ensure ownership. The approach generally is very effective to alleviate poverty, with both short-term and long-term effects.**

3.6 Evaluative Question 6

‘What is the added value of the operations to support food security (FS) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

In the context of Malawi, operations to support food security relate to the NGO Call for Proposals. Four NGO-projects were funded from the 3-year FSP and ten projects were supported from the MAFSP Call for Proposals that was launched by the delegation in October 2000. The following text primarily draws from the findings of a recent external evaluation of the NGO-projects in Malawi that are funded by the FSBL²⁸. Due to limitations in time allocated to the field phase, the evaluation team has only been able to visit one NGO-project in the field.

The EC NGO Food Security programme is consistent with the country co-operation strategy which envisages that assistance in the agriculture/natural resources sector will build upon inter-linked programmes (like PROSCARP and other components of the MAFSP), and will target diversified rural production and income generation, and management of natural resources. The Call for Proposals was very consistent with the CSP, and was very clear about the objectives of the NGO-programme and the type of projects that would be considered. There is good coherence between the country strategy, the NGO Call for Proposals and the selected projects in terms of addressing the overall EC objectives of sustainable economic and social development. The MPRSP sets sustainable pro-poor growth as one of its main pillars, and the NGO-programme funded by the FSBL is consistent with this, both in design and in implementation. The NGO-projects usually are facilitating the delivery of well-appreciated services that stimulate agricultural and livestock production.

The effectiveness of the NGO projects is generally expected to be good. The external evaluation of the EC food security projects noted that *“although it is early days in the implementation of some of the NGO-projects, nevertheless it can be seen that some projects are already achieving significant results, whilst others have the potential to achieve good results”*. It was further noted that replication of successes should be built into the next round of NGO-projects, so as to achieve a high degrees of effectiveness.

The same evaluation notes that the efficiency of the NGO-projects is more variable, and that the projects are not necessarily directly comparable. A number of cost efficient, high quality, and potentially sustainable projects and interventions are being implemented. However, there are other NGO-projects that lack these characteristics, which are unsustainable due to either high establishment cost, high recurring cost, or

²⁸ Agriconsulting, ‘External Evaluation of the EC Food Security Projects in Malawi’, December 2003.

poor impact. The calculated cost per household per annum ranged between € 31.85 and € 2380. Considering that the average annual income in rural areas is about US\$ 100 per person per annum, the latter cost level represents quite an ineffective use of financial resources.

In terms of impact upon individual beneficiaries, the recent external evaluation considered that not more than 50,000 households are reached by the project activities. Thus, the overall impact at national level is actually quite small. As all projects are still in the early years of implementation, their impact on nutritional status, beneficiary behaviour and prices currently cannot be determined. It will take a few more years to be able to assess this impact. Nevertheless, there are already some early signs that household incomes have improved, particularly for those engaged in winter cropping activities.

The recent evaluation notes that in terms of sustainability, *“there are many low cost initiatives being implemented which could and will be sustainable if the correct replication approach is adopted”*. Nevertheless, on balance the sustainability of the NGO-projects was rated as one of the weaknesses in the EC programme design. Most NGO-projects are designed to be phased over to local communities, in support of the governments’ decentralisation policy. However, due to the low household income levels in rural areas in Malawi, real sustainable initiatives should require very low capital inputs and low recurring costs. In this respect, the current NGO-programme includes a number of unsustainable projects.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 6:

The FS strategies and actions funded through the NGO Call for Proposals are consistent with the EC country co-operation strategy. Some projects are already achieving significant results, whilst others have the potential to achieve good results in the near future. Most projects and interventions are cost efficient, of high quality, and potentially sustainable, but some projects lack these characteristics and are unsustainable due to either high establishment costs, high recurring costs, or poor impact prospects. The impact at national level is somewhat limited, as the NGO’s are reaching out to about 50,000 households only. Because of the relatively expensive capital inputs and rather high recurrent cost levels, the sustainability of various of the NGO-projects is less optimal.

3.7 Evaluative Question 7

‘What is the added value of the ‘other / technical assistance and capacity building’ component for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

From 1998 onwards, each of the consecutive three-year food security programmes of the EC in Malawi has had a substantial budget component for technical assistance (TA). The budget for TA’s and external studies by consultants has gradually increased from on average € 0.8 million per year for the first programme in 1998-2001 to € 2.7 million per year for the new programme for 2004-2007. This meant also a considerable relative increase from 7.4% of the total budget in the first three-year programme to 17.8% in the new three-year programme that just has been approved.

At the time of this evaluation mission, eight TA’s were employed by the EC Delegation in Malawi. Four of them (two international and two local) were based within the ‘Rural Development and Food Security’ section of the EC Delegation as ‘intra muros’ staff under the Rural Development Advisor. The other TA’s were all international ‘extra muros’ staff supporting understaffed ministries that lack the human resources to properly absorb the FSBL funds in a participatory way: one TA was working within the NAO²⁹ Support Unit within the Ministry of Finance, and three TA’s were seconded to the MoAIFS (one to the NFRA, one to the Technical Secretariat, and one to APIP). An expansion of the number of TA’s in the near future is foreseen when one international TA will be based within the MoH to provide technical support to the nutrition programmes (new component as a follow-up after the food crisis). The Delegation stated that, as a result of the deconcentration process, the ‘intra muros’ staff for the FSBL are now part of the Delegation staff. Maybe they should not be called technical assistants anymore.

This evaluation study has been greatly facilitated by the TA’s within the EC ‘Rural Development and Food Security’ section who provided a lot of documentation on the use of the FSBL in Malawi. Together with several of the seconded TA’s, they have also participated in various discussions during this mission on the added value of the FSBL. During the short timeframe for this country case study, the evaluation mission has primarily focussed on an assessment of the use of the other instruments within the FSBL. The mission was not able to meet all technical assistants and could not visit them all in their work settings. Detailed secondary data on the TA’s was not available, e.g. the TA-component up to now has not subject to a separate evaluation study.


The evaluation of the 3-year FSP (Euronet Consulting, 2001) mentions that the main role for the TA’s is to monitor project execution and to assist in the tender processes.

²⁹ National Authorising Officer, the official link between the EC Delegation and the GoM.

Euronet Consulting concluded that the EC Food Security Unit in Malawi is understaffed, and that clear financial management structures are lacking. The mid-term review of the MAFSP (Transtec/AFCon, 2003) concludes that the MAFSP management provides very effective leadership, guidance and advice, not only to the GoM but also to other stakeholders in the food sector. Project experiences highlighted the importance of continual technical guidance and supervision at an overall programming level, but that a clear monitoring system with verifiable indicators (as part of a Management Information System) is lacking. The current evaluation mission shares this opinion. During one of the interviews with representatives of the GoM it was mentioned that the Technical Assistants tend to be too much involved in operational management issues and the planning for the new MAFSP2 while their main role should be the provision of technical support for capacity building within the ministries. It was further said that the responsibilities of the TA's are not always clear. This mission agrees with the general opinion within the EC Delegation that the 'Rural Development and Food Security' unit continues to be understaffed. The staffing level indeed is low taking into consideration the size and complexity of the FSBL programmes in Malawi. There is a need for a comprehensive inventory of the tasks and responsibilities of the TA's and available tools (like the above mentioned monitoring system).

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 7:

From 1998 onwards, the three-year food security programmes of the EC in Malawi have provided substantial and increasing budgets for technical assistance (TA). At the time of this evaluation mission, eight TA's were employed by the EC Delegation in Malawi, four within the 'Rural Development and Food Security' section of the EC Delegation, and four on secondment to the GoM supporting understaffed ministries that lack the human resources to properly absorb the FSBL funds in a participatory way. It is suggested by the EC Delegation in Malawi that the institutional and liaison role of the TA's within the Delegation should not be called technical assistance, but that these people should be seen as EC Delegation staff. Taking into consideration the size and complexity of the FSBL programmes in Malawi, this mission agrees with the general opinion within the EC Delegation that the 'Rural Development and Food Security' unit is understaffed. The MTR mentions that the TA's are generally felt to provide sufficient leadership, guidance and advice. There was a comment from the side of the Government of Malawi how much the TA's should be involved in operational management and planning issues, in comparison to their main task to support capacity building within the Ministries. Although monitoring of programme implementation is an important aspect of the work of the TA's, a clear monitoring system with verifiable indicators (as part of a Management Information System) is lacking. There is a need for a comprehensive inventory of the tasks and responsibilities of the TA's and available tools.



3.8 Evaluative Question 8

‘To what extent has the design of supported action (phasing in) facilitated progress towards the achievement of food aid and food security objectives? This includes the identification of priorities, the selection of countries, the targeting of beneficiaries / vulnerable groups, the funding operations – components, the identification and appraisal process, the multi-annual programming, etc.?’

As Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a vulnerable food security situation due to the high dependence on rain-fed agriculture, and restricted access to land and farm inputs, the selection of Malawi as one of the countries to be covered by funding out of the FSBL can easily be justified. This situation is further compounded by the ineffectiveness and/or inefficiency of many government institutions and the rather high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. As the problems within Malawi are of a chronic nature, the FSBL has rightfully supplied funding for a programme rather than a project approach. In the case of Malawi, the design of the supported actions is elaborate, and there is a variety of interventions that are funded by the FSBL. The continuous stream of funding together with the relative flexibility of the FSBL have enabled a swift response to food aid and food security needs of vulnerable population groups in Malawi. Although the final disbursement for the EC 2002 emergency food aid came very late (nearly one year after the proposal was approved through the urgent procedure), the Delegation skilfully managed to quickly provide necessary financial support for the large-scale food aid operation from mid-2002 onwards. This was possible through the flexible use of remaining funds of earlier FSBL allocations to Malawi.

The FSBL has provided support to Malawi from 1998 onwards, with both food aid allocations and consecutive three-year food security programmes. The funded interventions are certainly relevant for the achievement of the FSBL objectives as they address the issue of food insecurity in a number of ways. In all cases, the interventions were identified jointly together with the GoM. The bottom-line in all three-year programmes is the improvement of ‘*food availability*’ through higher agricultural productivity among smallholder households in rural Malawi. The evolution over the years from the first three-year programme (1998-2001) to the latest three-year programme that just has been approved (2004-2007) shows that gradually other elements aimed at good governance issues have become included as well: support to the GoM for the development of a national Food Security and Nutrition Policy, improved management of the Strategic Grain Reserve, and support to MoH for renewed development and planning of their nutrition programmes. The increasing focus on government-level issues is balanced with a rather substantial budget for NGO food security projects that are mainly executed below district level. The Public Works Programme is a new element focussing on ‘*access to food*’; it was added to the current three-year programme in response to the 2001/02 food crisis, and will continue in the next three-year programme MAFSP2. For both the NGO projects and the Public Works programme, the design of the activities in most cases has been

rather top-down in nature. On the other hand it should be said that local communities usually participate in operational decision making, and that nearly all projects include the establishment of local management structures to ensure sustainability. The free food distributions and the targeted nutrition programmes that were supported by the FSBL during this recent food crisis also have served to improve '*access to food*'. Currently, some small pilot projects are being planned on the interface between HIV/AIDS and food security/nutrition. However, the EC funding in this field up to now is very limited considering the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS problem in Malawi.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 8:

As the food security problems within Malawi are of a chronic and severe nature, the FSBL has rightfully supplied considerable amounts of funding to the country, and it has justifiably adopted a programme rather than a project approach. The continuous stream of funding together with the relative flexibility of the FSBL have enabled a swift response to food aid and food security needs of vulnerable population groups in Malawi. The bottom-line in all funded interventions is the improvement of '*food availability*' through higher agricultural productivity among smallholder households in rural Malawi. Gradually other elements aimed at good governance issues have become included as well, which is balanced with substantial budgets for NGO food security projects mainly at below district level. For both the NGO projects and the Public Works programme, the design of the activities in most cases has been rather top-down in nature. The Public Works Programme, free food distributions and the targeted nutrition programmes all aim at better '*access to food*'; these components were added in response to the 2001/02 food crisis. Because of the high HIV/AIDS prevalence in Malawi, the FSBL should become more involved in programmes on the interface of this pandemic with food security and nutrition issues.

3.9 Evaluative Question 9

‘To what extent have implementation set-ups (i.e. suitable structures for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation), management mechanisms / tools and processes (i.e. division of work and responsibilities, coordination of actions) facilitated the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?’

As mentioned in paragraph 2.2.2.3, in Malawi there are only a handful of main donors. These donors regularly hold coordination meetings, and also meet in the various sub-committees under the Food Crisis Joint Task Force. All donors focus on poverty reduction, among others through agricultural development and food safety net interventions. Because of differences in focus (more market-oriented versus a welfare approach), the donors do not always apply methodologies that are fully coherent with each other. In global terms however, the activities that are funded by various donor sources are complementary to each other. Various donors (but not so much the EC) are providing support for early warning systems and vulnerability assessments. The planned EC support for the establishment of a nutritional surveillance system in collaboration with MoH will be very useful to complement these data systems with impact information.

Within the package of assistance provided by the EC, the FSBL and the EDF programmes were found to have very similar objectives, and both put emphasis on the strengthening of institutional and human capacity so that reliance on food aid is reduced. The FSBL is mainly seen as a fund for short-term food security interventions, while the EDF funded programmes aim at long-term improvement of the food security. The recent restructuring of the EC office to put all programmes that focus on agriculture, food security and natural resources in one ‘Rural Development and Food Security’ section, aims to further improve the coordination of related EC interventions. At the same time, the TA’s have been seconded to various departments within the MoAI. Now, they have become part of the day-to-day operations within the Malawi government.

The actors participation during the implementation of the operational projects that are funded by the FSBL is generally good. The local communities usually participate in operational decision making during implementation, and most projects try to ensure sustainability through the establishment of local management structures. Recently, various evaluation studies of the use of the FSBL and the CSP programme have been carried out in Malawi, and various recommendations are currently being put in practice, e.g. for the improvement of the management of the SGR. In line with a recommendation of the NGO-evaluation study executed late 2003, the section has plans to start with the establishment of a structured monitoring and evaluation mechanism to keep track of the progress of the funded interventions.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 9:

All donors in Malawi focus on poverty reduction, among others through agricultural development and food safety net interventions. The donors hold regular coordination meetings and the funded activities generally complement one another. Sometimes applied methodologies are not fully coherent with others (more market-oriented versus a welfare approach). The planned EC support for the establishment of a nutritional surveillance system in collaboration with MoH will provide impact data as a complement to other data systems for early warning and vulnerability assessments. The new ‘Rural Development and Food Security’ section within the EC Delegation puts all programmes together that focus on agriculture, food security and natural resources. At the same time, the TA’s have been seconded to various departments within the MoAI. The section plans to establish a structured monitoring and evaluation mechanism to keep track of the progress of the funded NGO-projects. The actors participation during the implementation of the operational projects that are funded by the FSBL is generally good.

3.10 Evaluative Question 10

‘To what extent has a phasing-out of the supported actions been planned and what contribution did it have on the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?’

Related to the chronic nature of the poverty conditions and food insecurity situation in Malawi, the FSBL since 1998 has continuously been providing funding to Malawi. The FSBL assistance was provided for consecutive three-year food security programmes plus some food aid allocations:

- The 1998 Food Aid allocation was the last in a series of one-off contributions to the Strategic Grain Reserve (similar contributions were done in e.g. 1994, 1995 and 1996). Upon enquiry by the EC, this final allocation of food aid to the SGR was recovered from the GoM, and was used during the food crisis in 2002. This use was in line with the purpose of the SGR and of the EC food allocation.
- The 2002 Food Aid allocation was provided in response to the food emergency in Malawi. The food aid has been used during the crisis response and for restocking of the SGR. It was planned as a short-term intervention and indeed in Malawi the general food distributions have been phased out quickly.
- The consecutive three-year food security programmes are still evolving, and certainly the time has not yet come to start planning for a complete ‘phasing out’. The various components in the current MAFSP and the new MAFSP2 are a mixture of short-term, medium-term and long-term interventions. For short-term interventions like the Public Works Programme (primarily funded by EDF-funds!) a phasing-out or phasing over to either the GoM or EDF-funding is foreseen within the coming years. Other interventions like the support to the SGR and the development of a new Food Security and Nutrition Policy are of a medium-term nature. These interventions include institutional strengthening and a lot of capacity building, and will have to continue for some more time to achieve sustainable effects. The APIP agricultural inputs programme originally started off as a short-term intervention to boost maize production levels in the country. At that time, the credit mechanism primarily served to reduce the costs per household so that the number of beneficiaries could be high. During MAFSP, the APIP credit system was made more cost-efficient but still remained heavily donor-dependent. Within MAFSP2, decisions will have to be made about its future course, either a gradual phasing out or a phasing over into a proper sustainable rural credit institution. The NGO-projects in principle are supposed to be designed in such a way that they can be phased out at the end of the project duration. However, the recent external evaluation of the NGO-projects in Malawi concluded that some projects lack proper phasing out strategies, which will negatively affect the sustainability of the project

results. Overall, the NGO's now have started to think more about strategic links with more permanent service providers in Malawi, which will facilitate their project phase-out. The nutrition component in the new MAFSP2 comprises medium- to long-term capacity building and institutional strengthening within MoH structures, plus the more short-term provision of nutritional products. The latter is seen as a sound phasing over of the 2002 food aid operations into a more targeted approach. Given the high HIV/AIDS prevalence and the chronic nature of the malnutrition problems in Malawi, this nutrition support will be needed for many more years, and is a logical intervention to be taken up by the EC FSBL.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 10:

Since 1998, the FSBL has continuously been providing funding to Malawi, both for consecutive three-year food security programmes and some food aid allocations. The 1998 and 2002 food aid allocations both have been used during the recent food crisis response and for restocking of the SGR. These short-term interventions are now phased out. The current MAFSP and the new MAFSP2 programmes are a mixture of short-term, medium-term and long-term interventions. Certainly the time has not yet come in Malawi to start planning for a complete 'phasing out' of this support. Phasing-out or phasing over of the Public Works Programme to either the GoM or EDF-funding is foreseen within the coming years. The support to the SGR and the development of a new Food Security and Nutrition Policy are of a medium-term nature with strong focus on institutional strengthening and capacity building. The APIP agricultural inputs system was changed during MAFSP into a more medium-term intervention, but still is heavily donor-dependent and far away from a sustainable rural credit institution. As a positive result of the recent external evaluation of their projects, the NGO's now are focussing on their project phase-out through strategic links with more permanent service providers in Malawi. The nutrition component in MAFSP2 comprises medium- to long-term support to MoH structures, plus short-term provision of nutritional products as a phasing over of the 2002 food aid operations into a more targeted approach.

3.11 Evaluative Question 11

‘How sustainable are the effects and impacts of EC-supported policies and programmes in the field of food security, both at the level of target populations and at institutional and policy level in the partner countries?’

For the assessment of the effects and impacts of the FSBL interventions in Malawi, the food aid allocations and consecutive three-year food security programmes will be dealt with separately.

The 1998 Food Aid allocation was a one-off contribution to the Strategic Grain Reserve; it was used during the food crisis in 2002. The 2002 Food Aid allocation also has been used during the crisis response plus, slightly more sustainably, for the restocking of the SGR. The food aid that was distributed during the crisis primarily had short-term effects. The impact however is seen in terms of avoidance of a further decline of the household food situation, especially important in the context of the rather high HIV/AIDS prevalence in Malawi. The sustainability of this impact at population level depends on the food situation in the coming years. The support for restocking of the SGR could have a long lasting sustainable impact at policy level if the GoM is capable to adhere to the new management systems that were established in collaboration with the EC.

The consecutive three-year food security programmes are a mixture of short-term, medium-term and long-term interventions, with varying degrees of sustainability. The sustainability of the effects and impacts of the components of the MAFSP are briefly reviewed here:

- The support to the Food Crisis Joint Task Force and the Technical Secretariat currently cannot yet be assessed.
- The support to the SGR and the development and implementation of a new Food Security and Nutrition Policy both aim at sustainability through the impacts of institutional strengthening and capacity building. The successfulness of these interventions however mainly depends upon good governance by GoM.
- The APIP agricultural inputs programme was made more cost-efficient during MAFSP, but still remains heavily donor-dependent and is not very sustainable at institutional level. Within MAFSP2, decisions will have to be made about its future course, either a gradual phasing out or a phasing over into a proper sustainable rural credit institution. At the level of the target population, the distribution of the agricultural inputs presumably has had tangible effects on yields, with positive impact on household food security. These results are short-term and not sustainable, but nevertheless are important as the inputs distribution has helped many households to overcome the past lean years.
- A phasing over to the GoM or to continued EDF-funding will increase the institutional sustainability of the Public Works Programme, especially for

the main road maintenance component. The micro-irrigation component has shown to be very successful, with at least some medium-term sustainability of the effects and impacts at target population level. The forestry component is designed for sustainability at community level, especially through the establishment of village forestry clubs and the emphasis on capacity building. The medium-term financial sustainability however still has to be awaited.

- Some NGO-projects appeared to be stand-alone activities that were not designed for institutional sustainability and lacked a proper phasing out strategy. However, these NGO's now have been made to identify strategic links with more permanent service providers in Malawi in order to facilitate the project phase-out and to increase sustainability.
- The nutrition component in the new MAFSP2 is potentially very sustainable with regard to the capacity building and institutional strengthening within MoH structures. The provision of nutritional products is not sustainable, but nevertheless is a sound phasing over of the 2002 food aid operations into a more targeted approach. The new nutritional surveillance system will enable policymakers to further target this nutrition support.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 11:

The interventions funded by the FSBL in Malawi have varying sustainability levels. Some are primarily short-term to overcome lean years at population level, while others are designed to have a sustainable impact at policy and institutional level. The food aid allocations were used during the crisis response and for the restocking of the SGR. The support to the SGR could have a long lasting sustainable impact at policy level if the GoM is capable to adhere to the new management systems that were established in collaboration with the EC. The same applies to the development and implementation of a new Food Security and Nutrition Policy. The APIP agricultural inputs programme with positive impact on household food security is still heavily donor-dependent and not very sustainable at institutional level. The sustainability of the Public Works Programme still has to be awaited, but might be rather good for at least the micro-irrigation and forestry components. Some NGO-projects that appeared to be stand-alone activities, currently are establishing strategic links with more permanent service providers in Malawi in order to increase their institutional sustainability. The support to the nutrition programme of MoH in the new MAFSP2 potentially can lead to sustainable results at policy and institutional level, but the targeted distribution of nutritional products is a short-term intervention with effects for the target groups only.

3.12 Evaluative Question 12

‘What is the role of the Regulation No. 1292/96 in the on-going efforts to bridge the gap between relief, rehabilitation and development?’

Although the term LRRD is not mentioned, the EC policy approach in Malawi throughout is marked by integration of relief, rehabilitation and development efforts. Both the EDF and the FSBL interventions in Malawi ultimately aim to reduce reliance on food aid through strengthening of institutional and human capacity. Both EC funds recognise the need to provide safety nets to poor and vulnerable groups in the society, and both budgets also provide substantial funds for interventions in the field of agriculture and food security. The EC Delegation was restructured in the course of 2002 to place the coordination of all programmes that focus on agriculture, food security and natural resources within one ‘Rural Development and Food Security’ section.

Overall, the EDF and FSBL funding sources are found to complement each other to cover the whole spectrum from relief to development. In Malawi, the FSBL has sometimes been used to top up EDF-funds, or to bridge a gap between consecutive EDF’s. The involvement of ECHO in food operations in Malawi during the recent food crisis primarily has been limited to nutrition programmes in supplement to the two ongoing EC programmes that provided funds for food aid and other emergency support. The nutrition component with MoH is planned to be taken over by the FSBL after the withdrawal of ECHO from Malawi in July 2004. The interventions are a combination of relief and development efforts.

While the FSBL support to the SGR can still be said to be of a relief/recovery nature (despite its focus on medium-term effects), the funding for the establishment of a new Food Security and Nutrition Policy obviously falls within the domain of development, and touches upon other support to the MoAIFS like PROSCARP that is paid out of EDF-funds. The APIP is slowly moving into the direction of a development programme but currently is mainly seen as an agricultural recovery programme. In the case of the Public Works programme, the FSBL provided additional funds on top of the EDF-programme as a relief measure after the food crisis in 2001/02 in order to improve the ‘access to food’ through better purchasing power as a result of participation in labour-intensive works. The NGO-projects mainly focus on agricultural recovery activities, but various projects also include the creation of farmers’ associations etc.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 12:

Although the term LRRD is not mentioned, the EC policy approach in Malawi is marked by an integration of relief, rehabilitation and development efforts. Both the EDF and FSBL funds provide substantial funds in the field of agriculture and food security, and also for safety nets to poor and vulnerable groups in the society. The coordination of all these programmes that focus on agriculture, food security and natural resources now is placed within one EC 'Rural Development and Food Security' section. The EC funding sources complement each other. Sometimes the FSBL has been used to top up EDF-funds, or to bridge a gap between consecutive EDF's. ECHO involvement in Malawi has been limited to nutrition programmes as a supplement to the ongoing EC-programmes that provided funds for food aid and other emergency support. After the withdrawal of ECHO from Malawi in July 2004, this nutrition component is planned to be taken over by the FSBL.

4. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

4.1. Relevance

The relevance of the various interventions funded by the FSBL is rated as very satisfactory:

- The food aid in-kind has been a quick, timely and adequate response to the food crisis in Malawi during 2002/03. The food aid was distributed as part of general rations and targeted nutritional support programmes during and as a follow-up to the crisis, and has also been used for stocking of the Strategic Grain Reserve.
- The support to Technical Secretariat for the Food Crisis Joint Task Force is rated as timely and highly relevant. The Task Force and its six sub-committees were set up to coordinate the responses during the recent food crisis, and are currently evolving into a platform for the coordination of issues related to food security. The structures are highly relevant in the post-crisis period.
- The support to the Food Security and Nutrition Policy Working Group is seen as potentially very relevant for a long-term improvement of the food security in the country.
- The EU support to the NFRA for the management of the SGR is very relevant, given the strategic importance for Malawi to maintain food stocks.
- The APIP agricultural productivity investment programme is a very relevant intervention. The APIP has enabled many poor farmers to access farm inputs at a time when the government had stopped subsidising agricultural inputs as a result of the WB/IMF structural adjustment programme. Given the structural nature of the problems of poor farmers in accessing farm inputs, there is an obvious need to continue with credit schemes for agricultural inputs and thus to promote the integration of smallholders into the productive market and financial service sectors.
- The Public Works Programme is also a very relevant intervention, and forms one of the pillars within the Poverty Alleviation Plan of the GoM. It is currently targeting all districts within the Central Region of Malawi. Through this partnership programme, the poorest segments of Malawian society are given an opportunity to participate in interventions that will potentially improve their socio-economic status.
- The food security strategies and actions within the NGO projects are relevant as they address the overall objective of sustainable economic and social development.

Overall conclusion in relation to Relevance:

All programmes in Malawi that are funded by the FSBL are rated as very relevant to increase the ‘*food availability*’ and ‘*access to food*’. The budgetline funds a balanced package of interventions that combines support to policy development and improvement of the functioning of the GoM with funding for operational food security programmes and projects directly addressing the chronic poverty situation in the country.

4.2. Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the interventions funded by the FSBL is variable but overall satisfactory:

- In the first phase of the crisis response in 2002, the EC support to the general food distribution was effective to avoid deterioration of the food situation in Malawi. The nutritional support programme through WFP that is still on-going provides food to NRU's and MCH-centres for effective therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes. The effectiveness of the support to the Strategic Grain Reserve is more difficult to assess as it completely depends upon GoM governance issues.
- The EC support to the Technical Secretariat for the Food Crisis Joint Task Force is effective, as it enables the existence of a well-functioning interface between the GoM, the donors and the civil society in Malawi. The support to the Working Group on the Food Security and Nutrition Policy is potentially very effective, but of course the results still have to be awaited.
- The EC support to the NFRA has been very effective for the improvement of the management procedures of the SGR.
- Over the past years, APIP certainly has had a function to boost maize production levels and effectively has served to reduce dependence on food aid distributions. Although the coverage after the redesign in 2000/01 has been much reduced, overall many households have been reached by the programme. Through the in-kind loans of maize seed and fertiliser, major effects in terms of incremental production have been achieved.
- The PWP approach of concentrating on labour-intensive projects for road rehabilitation, forestry, micro-irrigation, and District Assembly ‘Cash-for-Assets’ projects, is very effective in alleviating poverty, with both short-term and long-term effects.
- Some of the NGO projects are already achieving significant results, whilst others have the potential to achieve good results in the near future

Overall conclusion in relation to Effectiveness:

The FSBL programmes in Malawi generally are effectively addressing food insecurity. Operational interventions like the support to feeding programmes, the APIP and PWP, usually are smooth and effective. For some of the policy-oriented interventions, the results mainly depend on governance issues and still have to be awaited.

4.3. Efficiency

The efficiency of the interventions in Malawi that were funded by the FSBL is rated as fair:

- The food aid operations overall have been very well coordinated and efficiently distributed food to the intended beneficiaries. As the disbursement of the funds for the 2002 Emergency Food Aid allocation was seriously delayed, the achieved efficiency was only possible because of very flexible and inventive management by the EC Delegation in Malawi.
- Although this evaluation mission was too short to obtain detailed insights, the overall efficiency of the Technical Secretariat for the Food Crisis Joint Task Force and the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group is rated as sufficient because of the clear gradual progress towards the achievement of the intended objectives.
- There has been great efficiency in the introduction of the procedural changes for the management of the SGR, which is a major step towards the proper functioning of the NFRA.
- The redesign of APIP in 2000-01 has led to a more efficient system, although with substantial reduction of the impact at national level because of the huge decline in the number of beneficiaries. The loan repayment rates now are much higher than before, and the subsidy element for overhead costs has been reduced.
- The contracting of the PWP programme to Africon Ltd. has led to a very smooth and well-executed programme. Given the management requirements of this complicated and extensive labour-intensive programme, this is seen as a major achievement. The overall feeling at the EC Delegation is that the cost-efficiency of the Africon programme is very good. Logically, the projects that are undertaken in the PWP require substantial overheads. A review of the

expenditure overview provided by Africon³⁰ shows that the overall overhead costs for the PWP amount to 37% (25% for the programme management unit, 12 % for the subcontractors), 38% is spent on inputs and supplies, and 25% on cash transfers to the workers.

- The recent external evaluation of the NGO-projects in December 2003 noted that the projects are not always directly comparable and that the efficiency of the projects is variable. The overhead level of the projects varies between 50% and 65%. Some projects were found to have unacceptably high costs per beneficiary, either due to high establishment costs or high recurring costs.

Overall conclusion in relation to Efficiency:

The efficiency of the FSBL programmes in Malawi is variable, but overall is rated as fair. This evaluation mission was too short to obtain detailed insight into the cost structures and functioning of all programmes, especially for the large operational programmes like the food aid operations and APIP. The operational efficiency of the Public Works programme was found to be very good, with acceptable financial efficiency. For the policy-oriented interventions, it was noted that clear steps have been taken with gradual progress towards the set objectives. Thus, the overall efficiency of these programmes is seen as sufficient to good, despite the fact that these really are long-term processes, which finally depend upon good governance by the GoM. The NGO projects are not very cost-efficient, and some projects have unacceptably high establishment and recurring costs.

4.4 Sustainability

The sustainability of the FSBL interventions in Malawi is very variable but overall of a fair level:

- The food aid during the crisis primarily had the short-term effect to keep the nutrition situation under control. The current nutritional support programme through WFP is seen as a safety net intervention that is necessary and well-targeted. As this programme fully depends upon external donor funding, impossibly it can be called sustainable. More sustainable is the food and cash input by the EC in the Strategic Grain Reserve (see underneath).

³⁰ Upon request, Africon provided the evaluation team with a PWP expenditure overview per programme component and per cost sort including all costs (combined for both the EDF and MAFSP funds) since the inception of the programme up to February 2004.

- The sustainability of the EC support to the Food Crisis Joint Task Force as well as the Food Security and Nutrition Policy Working Group currently cannot yet be assessed.
- Although its functioning ultimately remains dependent upon good governance by the GoM, the management of the strategic grain reserve has become much more sustainable than before. In principle, the NFRA now has very clear procedures for the management of the SGR including the recovery of maize procurement costs. The introduction of a financial reserve kept in a double signatory Euro-account in Brussels avoids misuse of the stock and thus is another big step improving the sustainability of the SGR. Overhead costs etc. for the NFRA still mainly have to be covered by outside (donor) sources. It is important that such dependence is gradually reduced through means that do not undermine the objectives of the NFRA.
- Even with the redesign, the current APIP programme still is a very donor-dependent rural credit institution. Up to now, it mainly functions as a short-term relief intervention that effectively reduces dependence on food aid.
- The sustainability of the Public Works Programme depends on the type of activity. The forestry and micro-irrigation components have a very strong in-built sustainability aspect. The road rehabilitation works are leading to the short-term effect of a major cash injection into the communities, and a longer-term effect of better accessibility. The latter however is only sustainable if a properly functioning road maintenance system is taken over by the National Roads Authority, the District Authorities or the local communities.
- The recent external evaluation of the NGO projects rated the sustainability of the projects as rather weak. Real sustainable initiatives require very low capital costs and low recurring costs, which is not the case in some of the funded projects.

Overall conclusion in relation to Sustainability:

Overall, the sustainability of the FSBL interventions in Malawi is rated as fair. However, as the character of the funded interventions varies a lot, the sustainability also varies a lot. The food aid operations, the APIP and the Public Works programme all require major levels of inputs and therefore are dependent upon external donor funding. The food aid is mainly a short-term safety net intervention, but the APIP is based on partial cost recovery with the potential to develop into a more sustainable rural credit institution. While the forestry and micro-irrigation components of the Public Works programme have a very strong in-built sustainability, it is still to be awaited whether the road maintenance component will prove to be sustainable. The sustainability of the Food Crisis Joint Task Force, the Food Security and Nutrition Policy Working Group and the NFRA currently cannot yet be assessed. The sustainability of some of the NGO-projects is rather weak.

4.5 Impact

Also the impact of the FSBL interventions in Malawi is rated as variable but satisfactory on average:

- The impact of the food aid operations during the recent food crisis has been large, as a further decline of the household food situation has been avoided. This was especially important in the light of the rather high HIV/AIDS prevalence in Malawi.
- Currently it is too early to assess the impact of the support to the Technical Secretariat for the Food Crisis Joint Task Force, the Food Security and Nutrition Policy Working Group and the NFRA.
- The impact of the APIP programme has been substantial, especially in the first years when up to 275,000 farmer households were supplied with farming inputs. APIP has had a major function to boost maize production levels and to introduce a realistic cost-benefit orientation among the farmer households that were reached.
- The Public Works programme has had a major impact and served as one of the main safety net interventions in reaction to the recent food crisis. Due to the large scale of the programme, the longer-term impact with regards to improvement of the accessibility of rural areas and the short-term impact through injection of cash into local communities have been enormous. The forestry and micro-irrigation components are expected to have a substantial longer-term positive impact leading to reduced poverty at household level.
- The impact of the NGO-projects is somewhat limited because the NGO's are reaching out to about 50,000 households only, while the potential beneficiary group consists of some 1.6 million households countrywide.

Overall conclusion in relation to Impact:

The impact of the FSBL interventions in Malawi is expected to be satisfactory. The food aid has had a large impact in that it avoided a decline in the nutrition situation, which was especially important because of the rather high HIV/AIDS prevalence. The longer-term impact of the FSBL support to the GoM (Technical Secretariat, Food Security and Nutrition Policy Group, NFRA) currently cannot be assessed. Both the APIP and the Public Works programme have a major short-term and longer-term impact on the food security situation in Malawi. For APIP, the impact has been reduced after the redesign in 2000/01 when there was a fierce drop in the number of beneficiaries. The impact of the NGO-projects is a bit limited as only 50,000 households are reached in total.



4.6. Internal / external coherence

In Malawi, a very good coherence exists between the overall objectives of the various programmes that are funded by the EC. Both the CSP (2001-2007) and the FSBL interventions aim at poverty reduction through strengthening of the institutional and human capacity of the country, and through the provision of safety nets. As mentioned within the Country Strategy Paper, the FSBL complements the focus on the agricultural and natural resources sector within the EDF programme (PROSCARP and the Social Forestry project). The CSP recognises the need for the FSBL also to focus on policy development and institutional capacity development within GoM. Through the Public Works component, the FSBL complements the transport sector focus within the CSP. Through an internal restructuring, in 2002 all EC interventions in the area of agriculture, food security and natural resources were brought together in one 'Rural Development and Food Security' section.

The external coherence of the FSBL interventions with the Malawi PRSP is also very good. Similar to the CSP, the MPRSP recognises that the agricultural sector is the source of growth for Malawi (it includes the provision of services for the supply of agricultural inputs and the promotion of improved agricultural technologies), and also recognises the need for safety nets for the very poor segments of Malawian society.

Overall conclusion in relation to Internal/External Coherence:

The FSBL interventions in Malawi are very coherent with the other EC programmes within in Malawi (the agriculture and natural resources sector and the transport sector are the two focal areas in the CSP). Also, there is a very good external coherence with the Malawi PRSP.

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1. Food security situation in Malawi

The rural population in Malawi is generally poor to ultra-poor with minimal economic resources. The productivity of manpower is restricted by the impact of chronic under-nutrition and HIV/AIDS. The high dependence on maize as a staple contributes to the country's vulnerability, and livelihoods including the food security situation are fragile.

Despite the focus of GoM on equitable improvement in household food security, the ineffectiveness and/or inefficiency of many government and other institutions are factors that perpetuate food insecurity in Malawi is. This is compounded by the effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and a considerable brain drain.

5.2. Coherence and complementarity of the Reg/96 FA/FS policy

Within the CSP, there is clear complementarity between the various EC instruments. A very good coherence exists between the overall objectives of the food security policy and those of the CSP.

There is also a high degree of coherence between the use of the FSBL (Food Security Budgetline) as part of the CSP and the MPRSP. Poverty reduction is the central goal in both documents, and agriculture is identified by both as the main sectoral source of growth.

The FSBL is used as a complementary source of funding for short-term interventions that can bridge the gap between consecutive EDF's, and also can take over food/nutrition related projects when ECHO is phasing out.

The main donors in Malawi (DFID, the EC, USAID and World Bank) all focus on poverty reduction, among others through agricultural development and safety net interventions. As a result of differences in focus (market-oriented development versus safety net interventions), these donors do not always apply coherent approaches, despite regular coordination meetings.

5.3. Added value of the instruments available under Reg/96

The FSBL has reacted quickly and timely to meet emerging food aid needs in 2002/03, which was possible because of existing FSBL involvement in Malawi. The funded food aid programmes (both free food distributions and targeted nutrition support) generally have been very smooth and efficient, and have helped to avoid a

further decline of the food situation, especially in the context of the rather high HIV/AIDS prevalence in Malawi.

The current MAFSP (2001-2004) has flexibly responded to the food aid and food security needs and issues in Malawi after the recent food crisis in 2001/02, both at policy and at operational levels. Relevant and effective assistance has been and is still being provided to the GoM through the foreign currency facility within the FSBL. This FSBL support has been complementary to ongoing agricultural and social sector programmes funded by the EDF.

- The EC support to Technical Secretariat for the Food Crisis Joint Task Force that started in 2002 is appreciated by all major stakeholders, as it is an important venue for discussions on policy and management issues in relation to food aid and food security.
- The Food Security and Nutrition Policy Working Group started in 2002 during the recent food crisis when it became apparent that Malawi was in need to revise or redraft its policy on food security and nutrition. The EC support to this Working Group is seen as potentially very relevant for a long-term improvement of the food security in the country. The impact and sustainability currently cannot yet be assessed.
- The EC support to the NFRA started in 2002, and contributes to the improvement of the management procedures of the Strategic Grain Reserve.
- Over the past years, the FSBL has had a major function to boost maize production levels through the APIP agricultural inputs programme. The redesign of APIP in 2000-01 has led to a more efficient system, although the impact at national level was substantially reduced because of a huge decline in the number of beneficiaries.
- On top of the EDF funds for the Public Works Programme, the FSBL provided supplementary funds in 2003 for a short 9-month intervention to inject cash in rural communities after the food crisis. The programme concentrates on labour-intensive projects in Central Region for road rehabilitation, forestry, micro-irrigation, and District Assembly 'Cash-for-Assets' projects. This approach is very effective to alleviate poverty, with both short-term and long-term effects.

The operations in support of food security funded by the FSBL through the Malawi NGO Call for Proposals are relevant, and consistent with the EC Country Strategy Paper. Some projects are already achieving significant results, whilst others have the potential to achieve good results in the near future. Most projects and interventions are cost efficient and of high quality. Some projects lack these characteristics, either due to high establishment costs, high recurring costs, or poor impact. As the NGO's are reaching out to about 50,000 households only, the overall impact of the NGO programme at national level is limited. The sustainability of the current NGO projects

is one of the weaknesses in the EC programme design, but on balance there are various low-cost initiatives which can be sustainable if the correct replication approach is adopted.

The FSBL has provided substantial and increasing budgets for technical assistance (TA) in Malawi, but an overview of the tasks and responsibilities of the TA's and the available tools is lacking. At the time of this evaluation mission, eight TA's were employed by the EC Delegation in Malawi, four within the 'Rural Development and Food Security' section of the EC Delegation, and four on secondment to the GoM. It is suggested by the EC Delegation in Malawi that the institutional and liaison role of the TA's within the Delegation should not be called technical assistance, but that these people should be seen as EC Delegation staff. The TA's are generally felt to provide sufficient leadership, guidance and advice. There is some debate how much the TA's should be involved in operational management issues and planning, and how this influences their main task to support capacity building within the Ministries. Although monitoring of programme implementation is an important aspect of the work of the TA's, a clear monitoring system with verifiable indicators (as part of a Management Information System) is lacking.

5.4. Project cycle management

As the food security problems within Malawi are of a chronic and severe nature, the FSBL has rightfully supplied considerable amounts of funding to the country, and it has justifiably adopted a programme rather than a project approach. The continuous stream of funding together with the relative flexibility of the FSBL have enabled a swift response to food aid and food security needs of vulnerable population groups in Malawi.

The bottom-line in most FSBL interventions in Malawi is the improvement of '*food availability*' through higher agricultural productivity of smallholder households. Good governance elements were gradually included since 2001/02; these are balanced with substantial budgets for NGO food security projects that mainly operate at below district level. Some components like the Public Works Programme, the free food distributions and the targeted nutrition programmes were phased in to increase the '*access to food*' as a response to the 2001/02 food crisis.

For both the NGO projects and the Public Works programme, the design of the activities tends to be a bit top-down in nature. The local communities usually participate in operational decision making during implementation, and most projects try to ensure sustainability through the establishment of local management structures. Recently, the EC has started to support the decentralisation process in Malawi through more participation of the district assemblies in the design and implementation of activities.

The planned FSBL support for establishment of a nutritional surveillance system in collaboration with MoH is very relevant as it will provide impact data that can complement other data systems for early warning and vulnerability assessments.

The new 'Rural Development and Food Security' section within the EC Delegation puts all programmes together that focus on agriculture, food security and natural resources. At the same time, the TA's have been seconded to various departments within the MoAI. The section is currently working on the establishment of a structured monitoring and evaluation mechanism to keep track of the progress of the funded NGO-projects.

- The 1998 and 2002 food aid allocations both have been used during the recent food crisis response and for restocking of the SGR. These short-term interventions are now phased out.
- The current MAFSP and the new MAFSP2 programmes are a mixture of short-term, medium-term and long-term interventions. Certainly the time has not yet come in Malawi to start planning for a complete 'phasing out' of this support:
- Phasing-out or phasing over of the Public Works Programme to either the GoM or EDF-funding is foreseen within the coming years.
- The support to the SGR and the development of a new Food Security and Nutrition Policy are of a medium-term nature with strong focus on institutional strengthening and capacity building.
- The APIP agricultural inputs system was changed during MAFSP into a more medium-term intervention, but still is heavily donor-dependent and far away from a sustainable rural credit institution.
- As a positive result of the recent external evaluation of their projects, the NGO's now are focussing on their project phase-out through strategic links with more permanent service providers in Malawi.
- The nutrition component in MAFSP2 comprises medium- to long-term support to MoH structures, plus short-term provision of nutritional products as a phasing over of the 2002 food aid operations into a more targeted approach.

5.5. Sustainability and LRRD

The interventions funded by the FSBL in Malawi have fair but varying sustainability levels:

- The food aid allocations were used during the crisis response and, slightly more sustainably, for the restocking of the SGR.
- The sustainability of the use of the foreign currency facility in the various three-year food security programmes on average is fair. The sustainability of

the support to the Strategic Grain Reserve and the development and implementation of a new Food Security and Nutrition Policy mainly depends upon GoM governance issues. The APIP agricultural inputs programme has positive impact on household food security but at institutional level is still heavily donor-dependent. The Public Works Programme sustainability at the level of the target population might be rather good for at least the micro-irrigation and forestry components. The support to the nutrition programme of MoH in the new MAFSP2 potentially can lead to sustainable results at institutional and policy level.

- Some NGO-projects currently are increasing their institutional sustainability through establishment of strategic links with more permanent service providers in Malawi.

Although the term LRRD is not mentioned, the EC policy approach in Malawi is marked by an integration of relief, rehabilitation and development efforts. The EDF and FSBL both provide substantial and complementing funds in the field of agriculture and food security, and also for safety nets to poor and vulnerable groups in the society. Sometimes the FSBL has been used to top up EDF-funds, or to bridge a gap between consecutive EDF's.

ECHO involvement in Malawi has been limited to nutrition programmes; after its withdrawal from Malawi in July 2004, the nutrition component is planned to be taken over by the FSBL.

5.6. Overall assessment

Based on the 'classical' evaluation criteria, the FSBL interventions are rated as follows:

- A very relevant and balanced package of interventions aimed at an increase in '*food availability*' and '*access to food*' through both policy-oriented and operational programmes.
- The operational interventions like the feeding programmes, APIP and Public Works are rated as effective. The effectiveness of the funded policy-oriented interventions is found to be mainly depends on governance issues within the GoM.
- The funded interventions have a variable efficiency, which overall is rated as fair. The mission was too short to properly evaluate the cost-efficiency of all operational programmes. The NGO projects were found to have high overhead levels (between 50% and 65%), while the PWP overhead is of a more acceptable level (37%). The policy-oriented interventions are a long-term process, they gradually progress towards the set objectives.

- On average, the sustainability of the interventions is rated as fair. The large operational programmes all require major input levels. In their current form, they are not very sustainable. They are either short-term relief or safety net interventions, or longer-term interventions that need continued external donor funding. The institutional sustainability of the policy-oriented interventions basically depends on good governance of the GoM. The institutional sustainability of the NGO-projects is currently being improved.
- The impact of the funded interventions on average is rated as satisfactory. The food aid operations effectively avoided a decline in the nutrition situation during the recent food crisis. The other two operational programmes APIP and Public Works have a major positive short-term and long-term impact on the food security situation. The impact of the NGO-projects is a bit limited due to the rather low coverage figures. The impact of the policy-oriented interventions currently cannot yet be assessed.
- The package of interventions is very coherent with the EC Country Strategy Paper for Malawi and the Malawi PRSP.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Food security situation in Malawi

In order to make progress in poverty reduction, new economic development initiatives that address the fragile food security situation in Malawi are urgently needed.

Because of the high HIV/AIDS prevalence in Malawi, the FSBL should become more involved in programmes on the interface of this pandemic with food security and nutrition issues.

6.2. Coherence and complementarity of the Reg/96 FA/FS policy

In line with the Malawi PRSP that sees agriculture as the main sectoral source of growth., the FSBL should continue to provide funding for food security and nutrition interventions as a flexible complement to EDF funds for agriculture and the social sector, and as a follow-up to ECHO support to Malawi during major food crises.

Despite the existence of various donor coordination systems, there is still a need to better coordinate the different approaches to poverty reduction of the main donors in Malawi (DFID, the EC, USAID and World Bank). The variation in emphasis on either market-oriented development or provision of safety nets should be acknowledged, and the overall donor support to Malawi should provide a coherent and complementary package of interventions.

6.3. Added value of the instruments available under Reg/96

The FSBL should continue to be available as an appropriate flexible mechanism for quick and timely response to emergency food aid needs in Malawi. Most households in Malawi depend on fragile agricultural production systems, and serious food scarcity would lead to a quick and irreversible deterioration of the health conditions of HIV/AIDS affected people in the country. Because of the existing presence in Malawi with substantial programmes, also with the SGR, the FSBL had a major advantage over ECHO to become involved in the food crisis response during the past years.

As a flexible complement to ongoing agricultural and social sector programmes funded by the EC and other donors, the FSBL through the foreign currency facility should continue to provide tailor-made support to the GoM to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of food and nutrition policy development and operational performance for relevant GoM interventions in the field of food aid and food security:

- The FSBL should continue to provide support to the APIP agricultural inputs programme for some more time, but further evolution of the programme is still needed to make it sustainable and independent from external donors.

- The FSBL support to the EDF-funded Public Works Programme should be expanded, so as to address poverty in the Southern Region of Malawi as well, with both short-term and long-term effects.
- The FSBL support to NGO projects on food security in Malawi should continue for some more time to achieve better coverage of the rural population through replication of successful and sustainable interventions that really have an impact.

The FSBL has provided substantial and increasing budgets for technical assistance (TA) in Malawi. There is a need for a comprehensive inventory of the tasks and responsibilities of the TA's and available tools. The institutional and liaison role of the 'intra muros' TA's within the Delegation can be distinguished from a more 'technical support role' for capacity building and support to the planning and implementation of FSBL programmes. This is related to the need for clarification of the exact role and function of the 'extra muros' TA's, which should be a joint exercise together with the GoM.

As monitoring of programme implementation is an important aspect of the work of the TA's, a clear Management Information System should be established for monitoring of the project implementation based on clear, specific and verifiable indicators.

Within the short timeframe for this country case study, it was not possible to collect detailed information on the added value of the TA. Because of the substantial amounts of funds for TA, it is recommended to execute a separate assessment of this instrument in Malawi.

6.4. Project cycle management

The FSBL should continue with its flexible programme approach and continuous streams of funding for Malawi to be able to timely phase in and phase out adequate interventions to increase the '*food availability*' and '*access to food*' of vulnerable population groups in the country, and to provide support to the policy development efforts and operational performance of GoM.

The EC Delegation in Malawi should maintain its current structural set-up with one combined 'Rural Development and Food Security' section for all programmes on agriculture, food security and natural resources, and also should continue to second TA's to GoM departments.

The EC Delegation should try to improve the participation of the various stakeholders during the design of the interventions, and also should involve them in the monitoring of the project implementation.

6.5. Sustainability and LRRD

The long-term sustainability of FSBL-funded support to GoM for proper management of the Strategic Grain Reserve and the development and implementation of a new

Food Security and Nutrition policy mainly depends upon governance issues outside the scope of the EC.

The medium- to long-term institutional sustainability of various FSBL-funded interventions in Malawi should be improved:

- The APIP agricultural inputs programme should either evolve into a sustainable rural credit institution.
- The institutional sustainability of the road rehabilitation/maintenance component of the Public Works Programme should be improved, either through a better link with the National Roads Authority or through a link with the district authorities and the local communities.
- Some of the NGO food security projects should establish strategic links with more permanent service providers in Malawi in order to increase their sustainability.

The EC should continue with its integrated approach of relief, rehabilitation and development efforts in Malawi, possibly with the introduction of the LRRD-concept.

6.6. Overall recommendations

The FSBL should continue to fund a balanced package in Malawi that combines policy-oriented and operational interventions aimed at an increase in *'food availability'* and *'access to food'*.

In order to have a substantial and potentially longer-term impact upon the food security situation in Malawi, the coverage figures for the APIP programme and the NGO-projects should be increased.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

EC Delegation Malawi

Mr Wiepke van der Goot	Head of Delegation
Bart Missinne	Second Secretary, Rural Development Advisor, Bart.Missinne@cec.eu.int

EC Technical Assistants Malawi

Paul Ginies	Food Security Expert
Nadia Lamhandaz	NGO/Food Security Expert
Marika Uotila	Junior Expert Rural Development
Andrea Pozza	Food Crisis Joint Task Force (MoAIFS)
Isabelle Lenormand	National Food Reserve Agency (MoAIFS)
Tomaida Msiska	

EC AIDCO F-5 unit, EU Brussels

Franco Tranquilli	Malawi Desk Officer
Jose Munaiz	Desk Officer FAO/CGIAR
Michel Gauche	Desk Officer Euronaid

ECHO, Brussels

Angela Pollitzer	Malawi Desk Officer
------------------	---------------------

Malawi Government Institutions

Dr Matabwa	Principal Secretary MoAIFS
Various members	Food Security and Nutrition Policy Sub-Committee, MoAIFS
Patrick Kabambe	Director of Planning, MoAIFS
Mr Kamphale	Head of NAO Support Unit
Chimwemwe Mabulekesi	Agriculture and Natural Resources Officer, NAO support unit
Janet Msosa,	Accountant, NAO support unit
Teresa Banda	Deputy Director Clinical and Population Services, MoH

Sam Chimwaza	Country Representative FEWSNET schimwaza@fews.net
Evance Chapasuka	Deputy Country Representative FEWSNET echapasuka@fews.net

Other Donors

Dr Harry Potter	DFID Malawi Livelihoods Advisor, h-potter@dfid.gov.uk
Dr Kenneth Wiyo	USAID, Programme Development Specialist Agriculture, kwiyo@usaid.gov
Stanley Hiwa	World Bank Malawi Office, Senior Agricultural Economist, SHIWA@WORLDBANK.ORG

UN Agencies

Gerard van Dijk	Country Representative WFP, gerard.vandijk@wfp.org
Lola Castro	Head of Programme, WFP
Lazarus Gonani	Nutrition Officer, WFP
Dominique Blariaux	Emergency Programme Coordinator, FAO
Peter Hailey	Nutrition Project Officer, UNICEF Malawi. phailey@unicef.org

Implementing Partners

Jacob Mapemba	Deputy Programme Manager, Concern Universal, Dedza
Barbara Chibambo	Project Manager Concern Universal. barbara.chibambo@concern-universal.org
Joseph Nagoli	Project Manager Concern Universal
Austin Chilembwe	Programme Director, APIP
Guy Chimimba	Finance Manager, APIP
Girma Bisrat	Technical Manager, APIP
Bertrand Ficini	Head of Mission, Action Against Hunger. aah@globemw.net
Adriaan Esterhuizen	Programme Manager, GoM/EU Public Works programme. adriaan@pwp.co.mw
Luisa Clarke	Communications Advisor Story Workshop
Redge Masupayi	Project Director Story Workshop

Christopher Yohane	National Coordinator CISP
Everton Muwalo	Technical Coordinator KKCP
Chrispin Magombo	Project Manager MSFSP – World Vision
Aggrey Mfuné	Executive Director Maleza
Brian Lewis	Programme Advisor SHMPA
Fabrice Vandesutte	Project Officer Inter-Aide
Nicolas Grondard	Project Officer Inter-Aide
Carlo de Rosa	Project Agronomist Movimondo

ANNEX 2: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

- Agriconsulting, '*External Evaluation of the EC Food Security Projects in Malawi*', December 2003.
- EC, '*Malawi Country Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for the period 2001 – 2007*', Lilongwe, 2000.
- Economic Resources Ltd – Ernst & Young, '*External Audit of NFRA and Management of National Grain Stocks*', Lilongwe, May 2003.
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- Groupe 2 AC (Transtec – Ernst&Young), '*Audit of EC Food Security Programme in Malawi*', November-December 2000.
- IFAD, '*Appraisal Report for the Rural Livelihoods Support Programme*', Lilongwe, 2000.
- MWH – ECDPM – ODI, '*Evaluation of the European Commission's Country Strategy for Malawi*', May 2003.
- Phiri, A.R., '*Final Report – Emergency Drought Recovery Project*', Lilongwe, February 2004.
- SADC '*Seasonal Outlook Statement*', 6th February 2004.
- Stranieri, P., '*Evaluation of Public Works Programme in Malawi*', Lilongwe, June 2003.
- Transtec/AFCon, '*Mid Term External Evaluation of the EC Multi Annual Food Security Programme 2001-2004 in Malawi*', May 2003.
- UNDP '*Malawi Country Report 2002*', Lilongwe, 2002.
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- Valid International, '*A Stitch in Time? – Independent Evaluation of the Disasters Emergency Committee's Southern Africa Crisis Appeal July 2002 – June 2003*', January 2004.
- WFP/FEWSNET/USAID/SC-UK/GoM '*Rapid Food Security Assessment Mission*', February 2004.
- WFP, '*Narrative Draft Final Report Form, EC/MALAWI Nutritional Emergency Support*', Lilongwe, 2004.
- WFP, '*Narrative Final Report Form, EC/MALAWI 2002 FOOD AID/2003/01-30,000 MT*', Lilongwe, 2004.

ANNEX 3: WORKPLAN

Date	Time	Institution/Dept.	Person(s) met
Th 4 th March	15:00-16:30	Briefing FSU staff	Paul Ginies
Fr 5 th March	8:00-10:00	NAO	Yona Kamphale, Janet Msosa, Chimwenwe Mablekisi
	10:30 –12:00	MoAIFS	Patrick Kabambe
	14:30-15:00	MoH	Teresa Banda
Sat 6 th March	8:30-15:00	Concern Universal, Site visit Dedza	Barbara Chibambo, Jacob Mapemba, Joseph Nagoli
Mo 8 th March	8:00-10:00	FAO	Dominique Blariaux
	11:30–12:30	Briefing FSU staff	Bart Missine
	13:30-15:00	WFP	Gerard van Dijk, Lola Castro, Lazarus Gonani
	15:00-16:30	NAO (continuation)	Janet Msosa
Tu 9 th March	8:00-9:00	AAH-UK	Bertrand Ficini
	10:30-12:00	DFID	Harry Potter
	13:30-15:00	World Bank	Stanley Hiwa
We 10 th March	8:00-9:00	FSU staff	Nadia Lamhandaz
	9:00-12:00	Food Security Policy Sub-Committee	Various
	13:30-15:00	FEWSNET	Sam Chimwaza
	16:00-17:00	USAID	Kenneth Wiyo
Th 11 th March	8:00-10:00	APIP	Austin Chilembwe, Guy Chimimba, Girma Bisrat
	10:30-12:30	NFRA	Isabelle Lenormand
	13:30-16:00	Site visit NRU Mlale Hospital	(with Lola and Lazarus of WFP)
Fr 12 th March	8:00-12:30	Meeting Africon and Site visit Public Works programme	Adriaan Esterhuizen, Francois Joubert, Christien, Tim, Rose, and others
Sat 13 th March	8:00-12:00	Site visit APIP to Maleza/Liweza	Aggrey Mfune and others

Mo 15 th March	10:00-12:00	Workshop FSU unit	Nadia Lamhandaz, Marika Uotila, Isabel Lenormand, Paul Ginies, Andrea Pozza
	16:30-17:30	UNICEF	Peter Hailey
Tu 16 th March	9:30-12:00	Workshop NGO's	Representatives from Story Workshop, CISP, KKCP, World Vision, Maleza/Coopi/Cospe, SHIPA, Inter-Aide, Movimondo, Concern Universal
	14:30-15:30	Debriefing EC HoD	Mr. Van der Goot
	16:30-17:30	Debriefing FSU staff	Bart Missine, Nadia Lamhandaz, Paul Ginies, Philippe Poulain, Mia Frick, Marika Uotila.
	18:00-19:00	Debriefing MoAIFS	Dr. Matabwa
We 17 th March	9:00-10:00	FSU staff	Nadia Lamhandaz

Thematic Evaluation of Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security

MOZAMBIQUE

Final report

**Aart van der Heide
Nathalie Bockel**

June 2004

For the

Consortium composed by

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ECDPM

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SEPIA

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PARTICIP GmbH has prepared this report for the Commission of the European Communities. The authors accept sole responsibility for this report. The report does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Commission.



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III

Acronyms

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AMODER	Associação Moçambicana de Desenvolvimento Rural
ANE	National Road Administration
AT	Assistência ou Assistente Técnica/
BAT	Bureau de Assistance Technique
B7-201	food security budget line of AidCO
B7-6000	co-financing NGO's of AidCo
CARE	International Relief and Development Organisation
CE	Comissão Europeia
CfP	Call for Proposals
CFSAM	Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission
CF/BS	Currency Facility/Budget Support
CLUSA	Cooperative League of the USA
COM 473	E.C. communication
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DEP	Departamento das Estradas e dos Pontos
DFID	Department for International Development of the UK
DNPO	Direcção Nacional de Plano e Orçamento
DPADR	Direcção Provincial de Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural
DPGC	Direcção Provincial da Gestão das Calamidades
DPICON	Direcção Provincial de Industria e Comercio
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Organisation
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
EURONAIID	Consortium of NGOs dealing in FA/FS
EQ	Evaluation Question
FA/FS	Food Aid/Food Security
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FSBL	Food Security Budget Line
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FSBL	Food Security Budget Line

IV

FS&A	Food Security and Agriculture section at Delegation (OP IV)
FSU	Food Security Unit
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FED	Fundo Europeia de Desenvolvimento
GAPI	Credit Organization
GOM	Government of Mozambique
GTZ	Gesellschaft fur Technischen Zusammenarbeit
IAM	Instituto do Algodão de Moçambique
ID	Identity refers to identity card
INAM	Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia
INCAJU	Instituto Nacional do Caju
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development
MADER	Ministério da Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural
MAP	Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery (former MADER)
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MIC	Ministério da Industria e do Comercio
MICAS	Ministério da Coordenação da Acção Social
MICOA	Ministério da Coordenação Ambiental
MOPH	Ministério das Obras Públicas e Habitação
MPF	Ministério do Plano e das Finanças
MSF	Medicos Sem Fronteiras
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
ONG	Organização Não Governamental
PARPA	PRSP = Programa da Acção de Redução da Pobreza Absoluta
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PMA	Programa Mundial Alimentar
PROAGRI	Agricultural Investment Programme
PRONAR	Programa Nacional das Aguas Rurais
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SCF UK	Save the Children UK
SETSAN	National Executive Secretariat of Food Security and Nutrition
SISTAFE	Sistema de Administração Financeira do Estado
SODAN	Sociedade de Desenvolvimento de Algodão de Nampula (Cotton Firm)

V

TA	technical assistance or assistant
ToR	Terms of Reference
UE	União Europeia
UEM	Universidade Eduardo Mondlane
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	Unites Nations Childrens Fund
USAID	USA Agency for International Development
VAC	Vulnerability Assessment Committee
WFP	World Food Programme
WV	World Vision

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Programme evaluated in Mozambique.

This evaluation concerns the “thematic evaluation of Food-Aid Policy and Food-Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security”, or the evaluation of the FSBL food security budget line B7-201 between 1997-2002 in Mozambique with special emphasis on the last years.

It evaluates the Direct and Indirect Aid in Mozambique. Direct Aid is the funding of the Food Security Activities of the various Ministries and Government Agencies. Indirect Aid is the funding of the NGO programme through the Call for Proposals and the UN agencies such as the FAO.

This budget line did not fund food aid operations in Mozambique since 1995.

1.2 Aims and methodology.

The main aims of this evaluation are:

- To identify key lessons from the Commission’s past cooperation in Food-Aid actions and operations in support of food security;
- To assess and judge the current programming in food-aid actions and operations in support of food security;
- To make recommendations;

The methodology of the country evaluation in Mozambique consists of preparation in Brussels, two weeks of work in Mozambique where the members of the food security and agriculture section of the Delegation, extra-muros food security technical assistants, other Delegation staff, governmental and no governmental partners and other agencies met. The Delegation provided all necessary documents in relation to this evaluation.

1.3 Evaluation questions

The **first set of questions (EQ 1-3)** analyses the strategy and policy level of FA/FS and addresses issues of coherence, coordination and complementarity of the various operations and instruments: CSP and FA/FS; CSP and PRSP;

On a national level, there is enough coherence in the analysis of strategy and policy. This is seen in the various documents such as CSP, PRSP and the joint annual EU/Government performance documents. The different documents mention Food Security as an important issue but do not specify it in detail in terms of approach and operations. It is mainly linked to agriculture and rural development. It has already been mentioned that taking the real objectives of the Regulation into account as mentioned in chapter 2.1. can strengthen these approaches.

A **second set of questions (EQ 4-7)** focuses on the added value of the various operations/components of the Regulation compared to the other instruments and budget lines. It concerns the added value of Food Aid, of Currency Facility/Budgetary Support (CF/BS), of Operations to Support Food Security Actions and of “other”/Technical Assistance/Capacity Building” for achieving the overall food security objectives.

In Mozambique, food aid is not funded and the other instruments of the EC (other budget lines) are not used for food security activities. The added value of the budget line B7-202 is mainly the strong presence in the Delegation of qualified and motivated experts – as well the experts 'extra-muros' – having contact with the field reality, with government institutions and civil society. This makes the budget line more effective and efficient compared with other instruments.

A **third set of questions (EQ 8-10)** deals with the analysis of FA/FS strategies and actions within the different phases of the PCM. It concerns how the phasing in of the supported actions facilitated progress towards the achievement of the objectives, including the identification of priorities, the targeting of the beneficiaries etc. It also considers the set-up of division of work in the Delegation. Lastly, it concerns the phasing out process.

The phasing in of the different programmes is a process, which takes into account the various administrative procedures of the Commission. Outsiders do not always readily understand the logic of these procedures. One side, based on transparency (very visible and logical) causes the other side to experience a series of delays which make the whole process again not readily understood by outsiders, one example is the CfP for NGO's. It seems that staff of the Delegation find themselves between the Head Quarters in Brussels and the partners in Mozambique. All interventions are elaborated jointly with the government authorities and field partners and the various PCM elements are respected: identification, monitoring and evaluation. It has already been mentioned that the monitoring process must be strengthened on the Delegation level, given its importance.

A **fourth set of questions (EQ 11-12)** focuses on specific issues mentioned in the COM 473. Here, information is requested concerning the sustainability of effects and impacts of EC policies and programmes both at the level of target populations and at the institutional and policy level. It also requests that the role of the Regulation be to bridge the gap between relief rehabilitation and development.

This is an important question. Part of the funding is for direct operations in the field such as NGO and the outsourcing operations. The other part is for Direct aid such as budget support activities for PROAGRI. These are long-term processes that needs good monitoring at all levels but also discipline at the donor level. This must be combined with good monitoring and direct impact measuring at beneficiaries' level. This intensive monitoring will guarantee that impact will be sustainable.

1.4 Evaluation criteria

This evaluation mainly concerns the overall assessment of the Regulation 1292/96 in relation to the Mozambique programme, and the programme in relation to the reality of the food security situation, and all related subjects in Mozambique and last but not least the vision and development of policies and strategies of the Government.

- **Relevance:** The programme is relevant, but given the objectives in Regulation 1292/96 it can be improved by taking all objectives into consideration. In the Mozambican programme, the main concerns are the objectives related to nutrition, household food situation and role of men and women in the households. In general the Relevance of the programme is satisfactory.
- **Effectiveness:** The final impact is an indication of the effectiveness of the program. In most programmes the effectiveness is known through the “outputs” corresponding to what have been realized; which is satisfactory. However, this is related to activities of the programmes and not to the objectives of the Regulation. A strong monitoring system and real indicators for measuring the impact are needed (according to the objectives of the regulation). Given the total funding, the effectiveness of the monitoring can be improved through a stronger presence in the Delegation of a monitoring section. This is a cost-effectiveness issue and should be well analysed and respected. In general, the effectiveness is fair.
- **Efficiency:** Efficiency means the use of “time” and/or “energy” in a good way without wasting it. Procedures are in general time consuming and in deconcentrated procedures they cost extra time. These procedures depend on the various institutional levels: Brussels, Delegation and Partners. The fact that the budget line must be deconcentrated is a sign of recognition that the programme can be carried out with more efficiency. An intensive follow-up of all steps in PCM of all funded programmes is not possible because it is too time-consuming. Important steps, like monitoring and real impact measurement are therefore quite weak. The efficiency can be improved.
- **Impact:** Impact is measured by means of a number of indicators directly derived from the objectives of the Regulation. In the case of the Mozambican B7-201 food security budget line, impact of the programmes is mainly known through the “outputs” and not through a series of indicators related to the objectives. The actual indications about impact are based on “outputs” and are quite positive but we do not know in detail whether the concerned households improved their living situation. As this is the main objective of the Regulation, any impact assessment should focus on that.
- **Sustainability:** In some programmes, the objective was to ensure and to strengthen sustainability. However, it depends upon what level sustainability is considered. The direct aid concerns mainly Ministries and that means an investment giving impact in the long term. The indirect aid mainly concerns the programmes in the field at the beneficiary level. In general, the expectation of sustainability for direct aid is fair. The sustainability of the indirect aid (CfP for NGOs and the UN funding) is different.
- **Coherence:** There is coherence between the programme and the state policy. However, there is not always coherence at all levels between the programme and the objectives of the Regulation.

1.5 Conclusions.

(i) **Relevance of the objectives and instruments of the Regulation.**

The regulation has clear, vast and coherent objectives covering, in reality, the whole spectrum of what can be considered food security. This is also the case of the instruments used by the Regulation. The Regulation reaches most sectors of the society and the economy. In that way it is very comprehensive and useful as an instrument in poverty alleviation.

(ii) **Coherence between Regulation objectives and the B7-201 programme in Mozambique.**

One part of the objectives of the Regulation have been taken into consideration in the B7-201 Mozambique programme, while another part was not, and without clear reason.

This means that mere agro-economic and agro-production objectives and less household oriented objectives have been realized while needs in this sector remained unaddressed.

(iii) **Coherence between the B7-201 programme and the general food security situation in Mozambique.**

There is a large coherence between the B7-201 programme and the general food security situation in Mozambique. However, this programme can become a stronger food security issue when larger aspects of food security are taken into consideration, such as a better household approach in relation to the household food and nutrition situation.

(iv) **Coherence between the B7-201 Programme and Government policy in Mozambique.**

The B7-201 strategies in Mozambique are in general in coherence with government policies.

(v) **Overall assessment of the B7-201 programme in Mozambique and the role of the Delegation.**

The programme is quite diverse due to its vast objectives and diverse instruments. The overall assessment of the FSU of the Delegation does an important job. Other donors and agencies appreciate the work of this unit. It fulfils, at the donor level, a very pro-active and innovative role and tries to make the Government responsible for its own food security programme.

(vi) **Comparison between the food security budget line B7-201 and other budget lines (see general comments).**

The food security budget line B7-201 is a strong application in Mozambique compared with the food security programmes through EDF and Co funding NGO.

The B7-201 model is preferred because of the number of intramural and extramural delegate food security experts who have influence on the programme,

from the identification through the application and to the follow-up. This is very favourable for the execution of the programmes.

(vii) Strong points of the B7-210 food security budget line in Mozambique.

- The unit has developed a broad strategy of interventions in Mozambique through direct aid (PROAGRI, OUTSOURCING etc.) and indirect aid (CfP, UN bodies etc.) and this is possible due to the flexibility and vast, but coherent, objectives of this budget line;
- Through intensive contact with partners and good field knowledge of the food security situation;
- Strong presence in donor fora and pro-creative performance in partner and governmental organizations like PROAGRI.

(viii) Weak points of the B7-210 food security budget line in Mozambique.

- Due to the many administrative tasks, there is less time for field visits, monitoring and information collection for new policy development;
- More systematic attention should be given to monitoring indicators directly derived from main objectives of the B7-201 budget line;
- Strong monitoring is also desired for the direct aid programmes in order to prevent failure at the government level;
- Too many decisions are still made in Brussels and a programme such as the CfP could easily be decentralised at the Delegation level. Devolution of FSBL is foreseen for July 2004. Budgetary aid (foreign exchange facility) will not be devolved.

(ix) The sustainability of effects and impacts.

- **At the beneficiary level:** Sustainability at the beneficiary level in the short term is not a problem, either at the direct or indirect aid level. However, sustainability in the long term is not certain while funding is not guaranteed.
- **At the institutional and political levels:** Donors increasingly share a common strategy and these strategies have been developed in participation with Government institutions. This is a positive sign. However, the FSU in the Delegation is aware of certain weaknesses in the implementation of the programmes at the government level.
- **At LRRD level, concerning the gap between the relief situation on one side and the rehabilitation and development on the other:** The B7-201 budget line in Mozambique did not have this problem.

1.6 Recommendations

- (i) The objectives and the instruments of the Regulation 1292/96 are of a high quality and therefore the continuation of the Regulation is strongly recommended.
- (ii) In order to create an added value of the ongoing programmes the objectives of the Regulation 1292/96 should be better taken into consideration
- (iii) The special budget line B7-201 food security has to integrate the SETSAN approach into their programme and to advocate for it at the level of the governmental partners.
- (iv) This approach should also be taken into consideration in the country's strategy and policy papers.
- (v) The many positive lessons learned from the past should be well analysed in order to serve as an example for other budget lines and donors.
- (vi) Analyse the advantages and disadvantages of the de-concentration process in a professional way to prevent a higher workload for the Delegation
- (vii) The monitoring process must be strengthened in order to get a better insight into what is happening at the household, village and district levels.
- (viii) Despite the full attention for the sustainability question it would be good to develop, jointly with partners, a methodology for the implementation of a system that guarantees sustainability.

2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Background to the mission

This evaluation mission in Mozambique is part of a general thematic evaluation of the policy and management of Food Aid and support operations to Food Security – known as Regulation 1292/96. This evaluation is carried out in 10 countries worldwide which all have benefited from support through funding of this budget line (B7-201). Mozambique was one of the countries selected. The other selected countries were: Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kirghizstan, Malawi, Mozambique, Palestine, Nicaragua, Peru and Zimbabwe.

Regulation 1292/96 integrates food aid into a broader food security strategy and according to the text of the Regulation has “**Main Objectives, Titles, Operations and Channels**”

The **Main Objectives** of the Regulations 1292/96 are:

- To promote food security geared to alleviating poverty and to help the population at household, local, national and regional levels;
- To raise the standard nutrition of the recipient population and help it to obtain a balanced diet;
- To ensure drinking water;
- To promote the availability and accessibility of food to the public;
- To contribute towards a balanced economic and social development in the rural and urban environment, by paying special attention to the respective roles of men and women in the household economy;
- To reduce dependence on food aid;
- To encourage the population to be independent from food aid, either by increasing production, or by enhancing and increasing purchasing power;
- To take the LRRD into consideration is more a question of approach than the need to develop new instruments.

The **Titles** under the Regulation are 1) Food Aid operations; 2) Operations in Support of Food Security; 3) Early Warning Systems and Storage Programmes;

The **Operations** under the Regulation are: Food aid, foreign currency, Operations to support food security, and others – Technical assistance and capacity building.

The **Channels** use Direct and Indirect Aid:

Direct Aid is aid managed both by the recipient country and the Commission. In Mozambique this is:

- Sectoral budget support;
- Technical Assistance to support Government Institutions;
- Outsourcing;

N.B. Please find detailed information about the programme at the end of the country profile and in the annexes.

Indirect Aid is aid through international or regional organisations and NGOs. In Mozambique this means:

- Cooperation with NGOs by means of a call for proposals (CfP 1999 and 2002) in Northern high potential areas and in Southern low potential areas;
- Support to FAO in form of Technical Assistance etc.

This Evaluation:

The global objectives of this evaluation are extensively described in the Terms of Reference but they will briefly be repeated here. It is a global evaluation of the Regulation 1292/96 on Food Aid and Food Security that is substantially different from other budget lines or instruments such as the co-financing line (B7-6000) and the EDF.

In this evaluation the main aims are:

- To identify the key lessons learned from the Commission's past-co-operation in FA-FS policy – focussing on procedures and implementation issues and the way they affected the impact of specific actions against their objectives;
- The assessment and judgement of the current programming of FA actions and operations in support of FS;
- To make recommendations especially with regard to the implementation of Regulation 1292/96 (this was not evaluated during the 2000 evaluation because this implementation had sufficiently not progressed).

This is a **thematic evaluation of EC FA/FS policy** and is broader than the evaluation of the Regulation only. It is important to know what the added value of this budget line is as compared with the other lines and instruments.

The period to be covered was initially to be 1997-2002; however, the Steering group expressed the view that the study should also include 2003.

Evaluation Questions:

For the overall evaluation in the 10 concerned countries, there are 12 main evaluation questions (EQ) to be answered. During the country missions EQ 2-12 has to be answered but this only applied to the parts concerning the specific country programme.

Results of former Evaluations:

Earlier evaluations of the FA/FS programme were carried out in the years 2000 and 2002. The 2000 evaluation focussed on the Regulation but due to the short period of implementation couldn't assess its impact, which was also carried out in various countries. Its main aim was to contribute to the global evaluation of the Regulation 1292/96. The 2002 FS evaluation was a programme evaluation of the FS programme in Mozambique.

April 2000 evaluation:

This was an evaluation of the budget line that was carried out in various countries. The main conclusions about the relevance, coherence and the focus on special problems were quite positive. Some of the components were not very effective and sustainability could not be evaluated due to short-term duration of the programme. The co-operation with EU member states and other donors was good.

Main recommendations were to continue this programme (financial facilities) but with more efficiency in certain sectors, to continue funding PROAGRI, institutional help for the Early Warning systems, direct approbation of the CfP on Delegation level and to extend NGO budgets for more years (sustainability). There was a need for extra funds on Delegation level for studies and to organise extra meetings. A special recommendation was to re-evaluate the regulation 1292/96 in 2004 in order to be sure of the progress of the implementation of the regulation. The ongoing evaluation is the implementation of this recommendation.

April 2002 evaluation:

This evaluation was a mid-term review looking more in-depth at the coherence of the FSU programme and its different components. There were 7 lessons learned dealing with delays in both the late arrival of staff in relation to the quite optimistic start of the interventions and delays in disbursements of commitments from Brussels having a negative impact on efficiency. The combination of budget support and technical assistance works well. However, the start up of similar systems in different organisations should be avoided. The evaluation was quite positive about the partnership between government-private-NGO sectors in the field programmes. The FSU has been very effective in its co-ordination with other donors.

Most of the recommendations have been taken into consideration.

Field visits during the 2004 evaluation

Field visits were carried out to the Nampula and Gaza Provinces. In Nampula, an outsourcing programme of IAM (Cotton Institute) with SODAN (cotton firm) and CLUSA and CARE were visited, as well as the World Vision Nampula Food Security project funded by the Call for proposals in 2000. In Gaza, the cashew improving outsourcing project of INCAJU with ADRA was visited. Field visits involved visits to the communities, interviews with the main stakeholders such as beneficiaries and staff of the partner organisation etc.

A visit to the CARE drought mitigation project (older project, funding from 1996 budget, closing down at the end of the year) in Govuro was planned but did not take place.

2.2 Why Mozambique?

2.2.1 Introduction

Countries participating in this evaluation have been selected according to certain criteria:

- Being a beneficiary of the budget line B7-201;
- Having a good balance between Food Aid and support to Food Security activities in this budget line;
- Selected countries must have a good geographical representation among ACP, ALA, TACIS, MEDA and CARDS;
- Selected countries must also be a beneficiary of ECHO, budget lines such as “rehabilitation”, “NGO co finance” and being selected for LRRD;
- Priority is given to countries that were not evaluated during the last two years.

The countries that were finally selected are:

ACP:	Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Burkina Faso
ALA:	Bangladesh, Peru, and Nicaragua
MEDA:	Palestine
TACIS:	Kyrgyzstan

Mozambique has been selected among the 20 candidate countries for the following reasons:

- Is an important recipient of the budget line B7-201;
- Is an ACP country (hence EDF is main financial instrument);
- Direct and indirect aid such as NGO and FAO;
- Programme with mainly all food security components including FAO;
- Mozambique receives funding through the B7-6000 NGO co-funding budget line.

2.2.2 Country Profile: Food aid and food security: Situation, policy, actors and programmes

2.2.2.1 General situation in terms of food security.

The World Food Summit (1996) defined that Food Security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food in order to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Therefore, Food security must deal with issues of food availability, access to food, stability of production, adequate distribution and sound prices, and food quality. This should not only be dealt with in nutritional terms but also in terms of intra-family distribution. These issues have to be analysed at national, provincial, district, community and household levels.

Food security is directly related to vulnerability, to poverty, to national disasters, to (lack of) income, to availability and access to food, health, hygiene, and nutrition. The Vulnerability Access Committee makes an in-depth assessment of the situation with relation to vulnerability and the factors affecting it.

In principle, Mozambique is a country that can produce a surplus of food, given its available arable land, fertile soils and low population density. Mozambique's history shows that in colonial times the country used to produce a surplus of food and used to export cash crops such as cashew, cotton, cereals, and tea. This was an important source of income. Seventy percent (70%) of the population depends on agriculture. The increasing migration to main urban areas is a phenomenon to be concerned about. Other sources of income consist of the private sector, especially in urban areas, export of agricultural and fishing industry products and the migration of labour to the neighbouring countries.

Concerning agriculture production, the country can be divided in two main areas.

On the one hand, there are the Northern provinces of Nampula, Niassa, Zambezia and Cabo Delgado. These provinces are fertile and the climate is favourable for agricultural production. Therefore it is called a "high potential" area. It is a surplus area in cereal production and therefore it is said to have an intensive production system.

On the other hand, there are the southern provinces which are less fertile. Here, climatic conditions are not favourable for agriculture production (except cashew). These provinces are considered to be semi-arid and arid areas where extensive livestock breeding is the dominant production system.

Last but not least, there are the coastal areas, which are rich fishing grounds. Here small-scale fishery is practised in an extensive way providing many families with a source of income. In the southern and central provinces, small scale and medium scale irrigation was and is, a widespread production activity. Irrigation is important for income as well as food production. This activity needs further development and full attention.

Although the country has excellent conditions for food production, and full food security for all households is feasible, it still faces many constraints. Disasters, lack of a good and well developed agricultural credit system, full application of the food security concept in agricultural policies and adequate technical assistance to farmers are factors which are negatively impacting on the overall situation of food security. In Mozambique - as in many other countries – the food security policy is being considered as a mainly agricultural policy. Household approaches are being neglected.

The country is often hit by periodical droughts according to a cyclic pattern. This is a well-known phenomenon in the eastern and southern African countries. Often the result is crop failure. This means that the food security policy has to deal with this phenomenon too. Another problem is cyclones that periodically hit the central coastal areas and destroy food and crops. Mozambique's history shows regularly returning floods in the central coastal areas. These disasters are natural but in some ways they are also man-made.

Mozambique's history of agriculture is complex, but also interesting. Agriculture developed from a peasant subsistence production system during the colonial period into the current mixed system of subsistence and commercial production. In this system, marketing was traditionally carried out through a network of small rural traders called the "cantinheiros". They were the buyers of the surplus production of small farmers, which they then sold to bigger provincial traders. The small farmers would buy production inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, equipment and household goods from the cantinheiros. This system was fully operational. It brought some welfare (in an economic sense) to the rural producers. The system was an ideal instrument to incorporate the rural population into the provincial and national market economy as well. It also provided minimum conditions for achieving minimal household food security.

After independence this system completely disappeared. Many of the cantinheiros fled and the system completely collapsed. The new independent Government tried to replace this system by means of national and state owned market boards for trade and supply. This system suffered from many problems such as incompetent management, lack of means of transport and unrealistic price settings. It did not take the traditional African production system into account. Although the socialist Government tried to implement this new system, the war that started in the early eighties destroyed all production and marketing structures. Most of the country was not producing and therefore experienced a shortage of food.

After the peace was signed in 1993, Mozambique started moving in the direction of a market economy. Agriculture policy became in full line with the conditions of the Breton wood

institutions: a free market system, no trade barriers in order to protect national production and a free price system for national agriculture products.

At all levels, Mozambique's actual food security situation can be characterized as follows:

- The northern provinces are a high potential area for production. They are potential export areas but important investments are needed both for commercial and traditional agriculture;
- The southern provinces are low potential areas for agricultural production. Traditionally, they are livestock areas. Cereal production has always been a risk; the climate is arid or semi-arid. Intervention must focus on the livestock sector;
- The national food balance sheets, which are published by MIC, show an overall surplus in food production. However, these also show surplus areas in the north and deficit areas in the south of the country. Intra-national food balances show that a balanced situation can be achieved among others by transport from the north to the south but the trade policy explicitly says that the North can export to neighbouring countries (mainly Malawi) while the south will have to import from RSA. On the contrary, the trade policy explicitly says that the North can export to neighbouring countries (mainly Malawi) while the south will have to import from RSA.
- Because of the war, Mozambique is still suffering from an enormous transport and logistic problem, which impedes a sound commercialisation system. It is also a very big country and the distance from Maputo to Manica is greater than the distance to Johannesburg or Free state.
- A logical solution would be the commercialisation and transportation of the northern surpluses to the southern areas with deficits. However there is no system of transport by road or by sea and such a system would not be feasible. Imports from South Africa are cheaper and protection of internal markets is impossible.
- The occurrence of disasters such as droughts, cyclones and floods is periodical and limited to certain areas or pockets. However, no appropriate way has been developed to cope with these phenomena in terms of food security.
- The free market policy that is dictated by the Institutions of Brettonwoods, favours the commercial agricultural production. It does not encourage traditional production systems. In contrast to price protection, the open price policy causes misbalances in marketing by stimulating the production of cash crops at the level of small farmers.
- The absence of an effective agricultural policy instrument - for matters such as a credit system that functions well, a competent extension system, a technically competent ministry delegation at provincial and district levels - does not have a positive impact on the creation of a situation in which food security is balanced. This is precisely the kind of long term investment that PROAGRI is meant to bring.
- The government's policy with relation to food security is mostly oriented towards production and marketing. Household approaches have not been taken into account in a serious way despite the creation of the VAC/SETSAN. The SETSAN is multi-sectoral and the health ministry (nutrition) is not active enough.

- Malnutrition rates as an indicator of household food security are not overly high. There is no relation between higher malnutrition rates among young children in the north and lower malnutrition rates in the southern provinces or any connection to the fact that food production in the north is better than that in the south. In general, it is to be expected that high potential areas have lower malnutrition rates. This again shows us that the relation between food security and agricultural production is important but that other factors also play a role.
- A new phenomenon is the rather high rates of HIV/AIDS in the Beira corridor, its surroundings and in the southern provinces. The rates are upwards of 30%. Its short-term negative impact on household food security and its negative impact on the availability of labour in agriculture is a new issue of concern.
- Last but not least, it must be mentioned that 60% of the government budget depends on foreign donors; even though policy development is strongly conditioned by them.

2.2.2.2 National Policy and Strategy for Food Security.

In this chapter we will look at the policies and strategies for Food Security that have been developed by the Government of Mozambique. A policy is a set of ideas or plans that have officially been agreed upon and which are being used as a basis for decision-making. A strategy is the art of planning in order to achieve a policy in the best way possible.

In fact, Mozambique has developed a strong and coherent set of policies and strategies for achieving food and nutritional security with a strong support of NGO and UN agencies. After the war, there was a strong development of translating food security and vulnerability concepts into policies and strategies. The Government was strongly supported by a group of NGOs and UN agencies. NGO's such as MSF and SCF-UK were pioneers in vulnerability assessments, food security assessments and information systems. The Vulnerability and Mapping Unit of the WFP also contributed to this in a constructive way. In Mozambique, this led to a strong development of policies and strategies in which the concepts of vulnerability, food and nutrition security were included.

In December 1998, the Council of Ministers approved the Food and Nutrition Security Strategy. The decision was taken that the working group should be transformed into a Technical Secretariat (SETSAN) under the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture. They should play a role in the elaboration, co-ordination and implementation of the Food and Nutrition Security Action Plan. They should also assume a collective responsibility to ensure that all recommendations and initiatives in this field would be elaborated and implemented within an inter-sectoral framework.

This means that the Food Security policies and strategies developed by the Government of Mozambique are, in principle, inter-ministerial. The ministries that are most concerned are the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER), the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC), and the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF) and to a lesser degree, the Ministry of Health (MS).

The most important policies and strategies related to the Food Security situation are the Food and Nutrition Security Strategy (1998), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP = PARPA) and the strategy for economic and social development.

The main objectives in all strategies are:

- The development of human capital;
- The rehabilitation of key infrastructures;
- The restoration of agricultural production;
- The creation of an environment that is favourable to the development of private initiative.

Policy and programme measures have been implemented. These contribute to minimising the causes of food and nutrition insecurity:

- **Agriculture policy:** recuperation of agricultural production and increasing the levels of commercialisation of export products. Within the implementation of this policy, the National Programme for Agricultural Development PROAGRI was developed.
- **Revision of Land Legislation:** to secure land ownership and to secure the use of land, particularly by the family sector;
- **Transport and communication infrastructures:** to improve communication between the centres of production and consumption for development. Special attention is paid to the rehabilitation of secondary and tertiary roads using methods based on intensive labour.
- **Commercial policy:** rehabilitation, construction and modernisation of the commercial network;
- **Promotion of the spread of knowledge, the improvement of food attitudes and the improvement of food habits:** this aim is to improve nutritional status;
- **Primary health care:** providing primary health care services and vaccination programmes;
- **Improved access to drinking water:** access to drinking water is improved by means of the National Programme of Rural Drinking water PRONAR.

In order to improve food and nutritional security over the long term, a set of strategies has been developed in order:

- **To promote the increasing availability of food:** land ownership, commercial networks, transfer of technologies, rural financial systems, permits to import essential products and favour export of food products;
- **To improve access to food for families:** rehabilitation and construction of the access roads, establishment of the market information system, establishment of the regulation system for commercialisation, improvement of the capital market, improve capacity building and extension of the judicial system;
- **To improve utilisation of food by families:** survey and prevention of nutritional situation, prevention and control of infectious diseases, improve the hygienic quality of food, improve the nutritional education and childcare, improve the access to drinking water.

The government's food and nutritional security strategy has led to the creation of the technical secretariat of food security and nutrition (SETSAN). The secretariat was constituted by MADER in order to elaborate, coordinate and implement the food and nutrition security action plans. The move from MPF to MADER leadership was seen to have negative effects. The strategy now tends to focus on production whereas food security should be approached in a multi-sectoral way. Experts belonging to the various ministries and external consultants are working on specific food security themes. There are two units: 1) Coordination of early warning and food security information (of which the Vulnerability Analysis Committee (VAC) which is in charge of the collection and diffusion of data on vulnerability is a working group) and 2) a unit dealing with the formulation of policy and implementation at field level.

An activity which is more visible - and the one which interests most donors - is the assessment of the vulnerable population. This activity is undertaken by the VAC by means of field surveys (at the moment, with a long term goal to move away from annual surveys). Secondary data are also used.

The VAC is composed of several Ministries (Min. of Agriculture, Min. of Trading, Min. of Health and Min. of Plan and Finance), the National Institute of Disaster Management, several UN Agencies (FAO, UNICEF, WFP), Save the Children UK and the FEWS net. Donors such as the EC can attend and are members of the technical secretariat of SETSAN what is a higher level. As from August 2003 onwards, the data are published in a bulletin named Info Flash.

SETSAN tries to decentralize its activities. Public officers of the province and district directories of agriculture represent this organization at the local level. This is not only a function of them but it is also a function of many others. The food security approach is a new concept. Few public officers are familiar with it and hence, external help is still necessary. GTZ is supporting the decentralization of SETSAN in 3 provinces. It is undertaking the elaboration of the provincial agenda of food security. This should allow a district food security diagnosis to be conducted that, in time, might be used to influence the policies.

The multi-sectoral status of SETSAN makes the functioning of the institution problematic; especially in relation to the funding that should be provided by the different Ministries.

Another important policy is the one meant to alleviate poverty as described in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP or PARPA). For the period 2001-2005, the main objective of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper's plan of action (PARPA), is the reduction of the incidence of absolute poverty. Absolute poverty should be reduced from the current figure of 69%, to 59% in 2005 and to 50% by 2010. It incorporates and captures the core elements. It has a high impact on poverty reduction in the agriculture sector and in the trade sector.

It focuses on 6 (six) main areas:

- *Good governance, legality and justice;*
- *Macro-economics, financial and trade policies;*
- *Education;*
- *Health;*

- *Agriculture and rural development;*
- *Infrastructure, transport, energy and water supply.*

The last household income and expenditure survey conducted in 2003 shows that poverty has decreased to 54%. If this figure is correct, then the reduction occurred more quickly than thought.

Food security is part of the agricultural and rural development sector. It has the objective to improve agricultural production, including the cashew sector. It also has the objective to diminish the number of districts, which suffer from severe and moderate food insecurity. Specific food security approaches have not been developed, as it is part of the agricultural sector and rural development sector.

Criticism from, among others, the NGO world in Mozambique on the PRSP approach is that it is mainly developed for the reduction of the external debt. In the case of Mozambique, the external debt is about US\$ 2 billion. Regarding the potential impact that PRSP could have on poverty reduction, and hence on food security, it is being doubted that it will have very much effect. Nevertheless, the PRSP or PARPA is an attempt of MPF to develop a multi-sectoral coordination with common objectives.

Agricultural policy.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development has translated the agriculture policy into PROAGRI. PROAGRI is not an approach but a programme. It is the consequence of the need to implement the policy in an effective way in order to ensure the creation of a positive impact. That is why it is also a reorganisation programme of the Ministry.

Given the fact that the majority of the population relies on agricultural production to satisfy their basic needs, the Ministry in charge of agriculture has a major responsibility for reaching a situation of food security. The main objective of the agricultural policy is to reach food security by means of diversified production for consumption, national industries and export¹.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development elaborated the multi-annual development program (PROAGRI). Ten (10) donors through a common funding system and technical assistance supported them. PROAGRI was designed to strengthen the institutional capacity of MADER. This was done in order to focus on the agreed core functions related to the creation of an environment, which could enable the development of the agricultural sector.

PROAGRI is not an approach but a multi-donor coordination system of reorganizing the ministry of agriculture and livestock. PROAGRI is not an instrument, which can be used to achieve food security. However, it can promote the conditions in which food security can be guaranteed. The three basic aims of PROAGRI are: 1) institutional support to MADER, including the reform of institutional organisation and the human resources; 2) improved public service provision and 3) better management of natural resources (land, water and forests).

The coordination between the 10 donors that support PROAGRI and MADER is not an easy task. This is due to the different points of view with regard to the role which MADER has to

¹ MAP. 1998. Programa nacional de desenvolvimento agrícola. Document master.

play in order to promote agricultural development. And this in relation to the strategy of implementation of that development as well as in relation to the output that is expected. However, this program contributed to the improvement of the performance of MADER with relation to its management and planning capacities, the formulation of laws, the formulation of policies and strategies, as well as in the decentralization of planning and resources.

Trading and Markets policies

Policies addressing the improvement of trading and market infrastructures are the responsibility of MIC. MIC designed an agriculture marketing strategy². Its main activities are the collection and diffusion of national and international data on food production in addition to the collection and diffusion of data on prices and availability of food products. However, it has had difficulty in developing a collection and diffusion system of data at the provincial and district levels. As a consequence, the information does not reach the producers. It only reaches the traders and factories at a national level.

MIC also has a role in the multi-sectoral coordination that aims to promote synergy in order to reach a situation in which access to food products has improved. In addition to this, MIC implements the credit activities together with NGO's that aim to support private traders.

According to its own agriculture trading strategy, MIC should support the organization of rural fairs (MADER). MADER puts the ideas into practice.

Local initiatives that rely on external supports have to construct and provide for of a formal market in rural areas. In many cases, Municipalities and District administrations manage those infrastructures that provide local revenues. However, maintenance issues, especially garbage collection, water supply and sanitation have proven to be recurring problems for the local administrations

The construction or rehabilitation of warehouses, shops and the acquisition of means of transport for commercialisation is still left to the initiative of the private sector. In general, this private sector has no capital to invest and it has no access to credit. A credit fund to support economic rehabilitation (FARE) was provided to small rural traders to allow them to rehabilitate rural shops and acquire a means of transport. However, the outputs were limited. At the same time, MIC was supposed to propose measures to improve the efficiency of this fund. No information has been provided in relation to this specific activity.

Policy aiming to improve infrastructures and roads

Within the Ministry of public works and housing (MOPH), the road sector was significantly transformed during the last year. The National Road Administration (ANE) is responsible for primary and secondary roads, while tertiary roads are the responsibility of the provincial road and bridges department (DEP). Non-classified roads are currently the responsibility of the district authorities. Urban roads are to be taken care of by the municipalities.

District administrations are generally unable to meet the requirements of the intra-district roads and non-classified roads because of a lack of funds and a lack of technical capacity. As such, ANE adopted a pragmatic approach aiming to guaranty access during critical times of the year. ANE relied on spot improvement and labour-based maintenance contracts. The roads-policy contemplates local level public-private partnerships through the private sector

² Conselho de Ministros. 2001. Estratégia da comercialização agrícola para 2000-2004.

and/or community based road associations. However, until now, no methodological guidelines or practical experiences are available to make use of this provision³.

2.2.2.3. Main Actors and Programmes.

Food security activities in Mozambique are strongly developed. A good cooperation and coordination system exists between the Government, donors, NGO's and the UN agencies.

Special attention must be paid to the following actors: VAC/SETSAN, PROAGRI, the Ministry of Health, MIC, the Delegation of the European Commission and member states, USAID, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, SCF-UK and agencies dealing with disaster preparedness.

There is a general consensus on the concept of Food Security but it is interesting to note that VAC/SETSAN uses the phrase Food and Nutrition security. The official food and nutrition security strategy takes health, nutrition, adequate food intake, hygiene, drinking water and education into consideration. The other Ministries focus mainly on production, marketing and transport.

Coordination of the interventions of the Government and all other actors present in the "food economy" is guaranteed as follows:

- The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is responsible for the overall coordination of the Food and Nutrition Security Action Plan;
- The Ministry of Planning and Finance is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the action plan by means of the DNPO.

N.B. The Ministry of Health who is responsible for the health and nutrition sector does not play an important role. This Ministry is a member of SETSAN but MADER, MIC and MPF are the main actors in the food security policy. In the eighties and nineties the Nutrition Department of MISAU was a very active department in Mozambique and provided good and reliable nutritional data from province and district level. This is not more the case.

Donors

Important donors who are funding the food security sector are the EU, its member states (such as the United Kingdom (DFID), Germany (GTZ), the Netherlands, Ireland and USA (USAID).

The Delegation of the European Commission is strongly involved in the PROAGRI process by means of funding and technical assistance. The Delegation is also strongly involved in the outsourcing programmes by means of the Government (INCAJU and IAM) – NGO – private sector. NGO's are funded by a Call for Proposal programme. Main funding of the E.U. comes through the Food Security Budget line (B7-201). USAID is strongly involved in the PROAGRI programme through funding and technical advice. GTZ is involved in many food security programmes but the SETSAN receives special attention. DFID is also involved in PROAGRI. The Netherlands focuses on natural resources, education and health. They support the PROAGRI by means of their natural resources funding.

³ MPF. 2003. Guideline for sectoral coordination of small-scale rural investment. Decentralised planning and finance program.

A consortium of donors namely the EU, Canada, USA, Netherlands, Ireland, World Bank etc funds the PROAGRI. The SETSAN is also supported by a consortium of donors (EC, USA (through FEWS net), UK, Germany etc.).

NGO sector

The NGO's have played an important role in the development of the food and nutrition security policies and strategies. They have actively participated in VAC/SETSAN. A strong contribution was made by SCF-UK.

The NGO sector played an important role after the war in rehabilitation. It also played an important role in the emergency aid during the floods in 2000 and 2001, the droughts in 2002-2003 and other natural disasters such as the cyclones in 2000 and 2003. Their efforts have had an important impact. The National Institute coordinated all this for Disaster Management INGC. This institute is responsible for contingency planning and the emergency response. NGO's are quite independent and not controlled by the Government. This, however, is also the main concern. The Government does not control their funding and it does not the activities of the NGO's. New interventions can also be characterised as outsourcing activities and the Government controls them. An example is the EU provincial outsourcing component in the new programme (2003-05) where provinces will be responsible for launching calls for proposals for the provision of public services and signing contracts and monitoring implementation.

UN agencies

WFP or PMA is specialized in food distribution during and after the war. It played an important role during the periods of floods, droughts and cyclones. Its role is appreciated in general but there are doubts concerning the needs and the number of beneficiaries presented. In general, these are thought to be over-estimated. WFP is now focussing on the current and future victims of HIV/AIDS in two areas: the Beira corridor and the Southern provinces of Mozambique. These have high rates of HIV/AIDS prevalence (>30%).

The Vulnerability and Mapping Unit of the WFP provides important information with regard to the situation of food insecurity in the country. WFP participates in the annual national crop assessment together with MADER and FAO as well.

UNICEF plays an active role in the SETSAN activities. It carries out regular assessments on the nutrition situation in Mozambique. It pays special attention to the household approach and the food and nutritional situation of children. This information combined with the VAC information is of great importance for the planning of activities and for the development of future strategies.

FAO plays an important role in assisting the SETSAN and the MIC information system by means of providing technical assistance. The FAO actively participates in the annual crop assessment together with MADER and WFP.

In the strategy papers, the **Private Sector** is mentioned as a sector, which plays an important role in reaching the food and nutrition security policies through support and integration. The outsourcing programme in which the Government contracts service providers for selected

sectors is a hopeful development. A good example of this is the cashew sector in Gaza (INCAJU, private enterprise-NGO) and the cotton sector in Nampula (IAM-SODAN-NGO).

Summary of EC Food Security Activities since 1996.

The following table has information from the EC Mozambique Summary Fiche last update February 2004. Detailed information will be found in the tables in annexe.

Direct Aid:

- **Sectoral budget support committed since 1996:**

MIC and INAM are support and decentralisation programme;

PROAGRI is support to a sectoral investment programme;

MIC, INAM and PROAGRI: committed **35.2 M Euro**

Approved **23.5 M Euro**

- **Technical Assistance to support government institutions:**

Technical Assistance is given to MADER (PROAGRI) and MIC and SETSAN through FAO: committed since 1996 **11.3 M Euro**;

- **Outsourcing through MIC, IAM and INCAJU:**

MIC concerns agricultural marketing credit to traders: **2 M Euro**;

IAM and INCAJU concerns crop diversification in cotton and cashew for a total amount of **11 M Euro**;

Total outsourcing since 1996 is **23 M Euro**.

Indirect Aid:

- Preparation of Country Technical Paper for Call of proposals in 1999 and 2002 and other technical documents for both CfP (2 for the 1999 one and 3 for the 2002 one);

- **NGO CfP 1999 and 2002** in northern High Potential areas (Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia) and southern low potential areas (Gaza and Inhambane): total budget since 1996 **> 27 M Euro**;

- **Cooperation with partners:**

Technical assistance to MIC (marketing management assistance for food security) and SETSAN (assistance to national early warning systems, to food security formulation and other systems) through FAO:

total assistance since 1996 was **10,818,293 Euro**;

Total commitments since 1996 for Direct and Indirect Aid stands at **160 M Euro** of which 127 M Euro are ongoing. N.B. These figures do not include new programmes.

2.2.2.4. Major challenges and constraints encountered in achieving food security.

This chapter deals with the lessons learned and both strong and weak points.

- (i) A first observation is that Mozambique is fairly advanced in food security and nutrition policies and strategies. There is a strong co-ordination between the Government, donors, NGO and private sector. Multi-donor co-ordination has been achieved in certain sectors such as the PROAGRI programme. VAC/SETSAN has an integral concept and approach in food and nutrition security.
- (ii) The assessment of the vulnerability and food security situation is carried out by various agencies. The quality of the results and information is good. The issue of consequent implementation is a challenge.
- (iii) VAC/SETSAN is an important instrument in which a strong influence of foreign agencies can be observed. The concept is important but it is felt that this multi-sector instrument is not fully owned by the Government. In general, strategies are more production (MADER) and marketing (MIC) oriented while less importance is given to health, nutrition and hygiene (MoH). In order to prevent a situation in which the practical food security approach and implementation is considered as being a merely agricultural approach, these elements should be taken into consideration. A better integration in the food security approach according to the official food and nutrition security strategy is needed.
- (iv) Disaster contingency management and food security implementation are often considered consecutive activities. Food insecurity can be a result of a disaster. However, good preparedness does not necessarily lead to new food insecurity
- (v) Food security in Mozambique is officially approached in an inter-sectoral way. This is of great value and this principle must be maintained. However, this is not always carried out in practise and therefore the strategies should be tested and reviewed.
- (vi) PROAGRI is an example of good donor co-operation and co-ordination. The main and most difficult objective is the implementation of this reorganisation in the provinces and districts. There is an awareness of the fact that this is the most challenging operation, also in terms of impact. A more realistic approach of the programme is needed. However, the optimistic echoes in the donor world can be a sign of wishful thinking but not based on empiric field information. A strong monitoring system in the field can only give a final answer.

2.3 Summary of the mission

Aart van der Heide (team leader) and Natalie Bockel (national expert) carried out the mission between the 15th of February and the 1st of March 2004. The mission started on the 16th of February in Maputo where the first 4 days were used for discussions with EU staff at the Delegation, with Governmental, Multilateral mainly UN partners, other donors and NGOs. From the 20th of February till the 24th of February field visits were carried out in Nampula and Gaza Provinces where outsourcing projects IAM-SODAN-CLUSA-CARE-community and INCAJU-ADRA-community and the WV CfP Nampula Food Security project were visited. From 25th – 27th of February more discussions were held in Maputo and Friday the 7th of February a debriefing was given for the Head of the Delegation.

On the 1st of March, a debriefing was given to the staff, both intra- and extra-muros, of the Food Security and agriculture section of the Delegation.

A detailed chronology of the mission and list of persons interviewed is presented in Annex 1 of this Country Report.

2.4 Constraints

The mission did not meet any constraints during the two weeks. What could be considered, as a constraint was the fact that the Terms of Reference were quite broad. Given the limited time, this made it difficult to give answers to the detailed questions that were formulated.

3 EVALUATIVE QUESTIONS

A first set of questions (EQ 1-3) analyses the strategy and policy level of FA/FS and address the issues of coherence, coordination and complementarity of the various operations and instruments: CSP and FA/FS; CSP and PRSP.

3.1 Evaluative Question 1

What is the level of coherence between the food security policies, strategies and objectives of Regulation No.1292/96 and those from other geographical instruments (EDF, ALA, MEDA, TACIS, CARDS) and budget lines (ECHO, Rehabilitation, NGO Cofinancing)?

This question does not need to be answered by the teams at the country level. Mozambique is an ACP country benefiting of the EDF. ECHO is not operational through funding in Mozambique and the co-funding budget line B7-6000 does fund NGOs.

3.2 Evaluative Question 2

What is the level of integration of the food security policy within the Commission's development strategy with the partner country concerned as laid down in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP)?

The coherence of the overall objectives of the FS policy and the CSP is an alleviation of poverty, which is seen as the main constraint faced by households to have access to market products. The objective expressed in the CSP is to promote a domestic market demand and the FS policy aims to ensure that each household has the purchase power necessary to get access to food. The importance of the FA-FS in the CSP is that FS and agriculture is one of the three focal sectors. The specific objective is to "support the establishment of sustainable food security within a market economy". However, the strategy as described in the CSP is limited to the issues of production and commercialisation of production. There is no mention of the Regulation 1292/96 in the CSP. FS is analysed as a problem of economic and physical access to food, but also due to low diversity of production and lack of access to markets.

In order to answer the question whether there are complementarities of the various EC instruments within CSP it is important to know that the CSP in Mozambique distinguishes 3 focal sectors, which are: transport, FS/agriculture and budget support. Other areas are also considered such as health, good governance and support to non-state actors. A complementarity can only be found between the transport infrastructure sector (EDF) and the FS budget line through the rehabilitation of rural roads. That establishes a link between the activities of the FS budget line, which seeks to improve the production and commercialisation one side and projects in transport, which aim to boost the national and international trading. However, to achieve complementarity of other instruments or budget lines with the Regulation 1292/96 objectives it must be recognized that interventions financed by other instruments like EDF, B7-600 are certainly complementary to these broad objectives. All health, drinking water, and education programmes do directly or indirectly contribute to the food security on household level.

There is an incipient coordination of EC interventions at the Delegation's level between the various sections through meetings of all technical staff (task managers).

3.3. Evaluative Question 3

What is the coherence between EC food aid and food security policy and national strategies of beneficiary countries, especially the PRSP?

The overall objective of the Mozambican PRSP (PARPA) is to reduce the level of poverty through the improvement of capacities and opportunities for all Mozambicans, especially the poor. The CSP is clearly supporting the government's poverty reduction strategy. The CSP refers to PRSP objectives, strategies and proposed actions. The CSP analyses each area of cooperation in terms of its contribution to poverty reduction. Good governance, seen as a fundamental condition for the success of the PRSP, is largely addressed by the CSP through the support to the public sector reform and public finance management. In general, there exists enough coherence between the CSP and the PRSP.

In the PRSP FS is treated in the health and agricultural sectors. In the health sector, this is the nutrition component. In the agricultural and rural development sector, the Food and Nutritional Security Strategy is mentioned but that is all. Reduction of the vulnerability of households to chronic food insecurity is one of the 4 objectives of this sector and the indicator to measure progress in this sector is the "percentage of districts suffering from food insecurity".

Improvement of the infrastructure sector, like roads, is one of the objectives of the PRSP but it is not mentioned as a factor contributing to the improvement of food security but mainly as improving access to rural markets.

The role of EC funding is not mentioned in the PRSP. The PRSP does mention, however, some of the funding such as the ROAD III programme. In the agriculture and rural development sector, the government programmes supported by the EC are cited as contributing to food security. This is the case of the pluri-annual agriculture programme (PROAGRI) and the food and nutritional security strategy. Some of the measures that the PRSP plans to undertake correspond to projects supported by the FS budget line: outsourcing as a way to strengthen the extension service of the MADER; support the consolidation of rural micro-finance institutions; encouragement of farmer's associations to become involved in marketing of production; and dissemination of regular market information.

The Rationale of EC intervention is mainly based on the policies and strategies also adopted by the Government. The macro-economic budgetary support is necessary in order to sustain the financial needs of the government, which in turn provides support to the public sector reform and finance management. The road sector is one of the priorities of the Mozambican government and EC, after considerable financial support to rehabilitation projects, and concentrates its support on the maintenance issue. Given the importance of agriculture activities for almost 80% of the population, as well as the concentration of poverty in rural areas, agriculture and rural development is one of the key areas for the government. EC is one of the main donors that support the institutional strengthening of MADER. This support is complemented by support to semi-autonomous MADER bodies (INCAJU and IAM), to rural micro-credit institutions or support to producers associations.

Coordination between donors and the government does exist. The Delegation of the EC is participating in some of them, especially the judiciary/legal sector, the public sector reform and in the decentralization, budget support, SISTAFE, agriculture, road and costal shipping

and the HIV working groups. It is difficult to assess the operational efficacy of all these working groups. The Delegation is an important member of the PROAGRI-donor working group both in terms of development of new ideas and monitoring of activities.

A second set of questions (EQ 4-7) focuses on the added value of the various operations/components of the Regulation compared with the other instruments (such as EDF) and budget lines. It concerns the added value of Food Aid, of Currency Facility/Budgetary Support (CF/BS), of Operations to Support Food Security Actions and of “other”/Technical Assistance/Capacity Building” for achieving the overall food security objectives.

3.4. Evaluative Question 4

What is the added value of Food Aid in kind (FA) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

The **relevance** of food aid strategies and actions is an issue of historic discussion. It is generally recognized that food aid in situations of disasters, war, and refugees is necessary as a humanitarian instrument: feeding people who have no access to food in situations where food is unavailable. Food aid during a rehabilitation period can be a necessary instrument but with many risks: people can easily become dependent. The EC B7-201 budget line in Mozambique has not been used for funding of food aid since 1995. The relevance for this budget line was not important for food aid, despite the floods, cyclones and droughts during the last years in certain pockets in the country. Emphasis was on support for food security actions and activities, also in those areas. ECHO was according to the Delegation and the instrument for emergency situations. On a global level, the FSBL contributes to the WFP, to the tune of 100 million €. EURONAIID is another instrument, but has not been active in Mozambique, as the Delegation has preferred to provide **financial** support for NGOs to carry out developmental activities in the field of food security. The position of this policy is correct and justified.

The concern about whether food aid strategies and actions were **effective and efficient** is not in question; food aid was not given. However, the general experience with food aid wherever in the world, is mostly the same: food aid actions are rarely efficient due to the typically complex situations encountered to carry it out. The question of whether it is effective depends on the objectives of the operation and that means what do we and what can we achieve and what are the alternatives? This mainly concerns logistic problems and the huge volumes and weights of food. Another issue is the very difficult and complex targeting problem.

This means that FA strategies and actions are rarely sustainable. It keeps people in difficult humanitarian situations alive and sustainability can only be achieved when it is carried out jointly with rehabilitation and development. These goals can only be achieved through support to food security strategies and actions.

Since the B7-201 budget line is not dealing with funding of food aid, neither the comparative advantages of FA to operations in other instruments (outside the Regulation) dealing with FA nor the coordination of the various types of operations (within the Regulation) and other instruments dealing with FA cannot be assessed for Mozambique. As

mentioned above, the FSBL finances WFP (in cash) to buy and provide food aid, ideally through local or regional purchases.

3.5 Evaluative Question 5

What is the added value of the currency facility-CF / Budgetary Support-BS for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

The CF/BS concerns the **Sectoral Budget Support** to PROAGRI (MADER), MIC and INAM, the **Technical Assistance Support** to Government Institutions. According to EC classification, sectoral budget support is different from targeted (or earmarked). In the case of PROAGRI (10 donors) it is sectoral and non-targeted. In the case of MIC and INAM there is a degree of targeting in the sense that the EC is the only donor providing budget support to these institutions, and funds are aimed at implementing institutional reform and decentralisation programmes, which are additional, and figure in the budget of the institution as an addition.

The **Sectoral Budget Support** to the Government institutions provides funding for sectoral reforms and investment programmes, such as the PROAGRI of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER), which is a sectoral investment programme with 10 other donors. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) and the National Mozambican Institute for Meteorology (INAM) also benefit from support given to a reform and decentralisation programme.

The **Technical Assistance Support** is, strictly speaking, not a currency facility. It is given in the form of technical assistants to support government institutions like PROAGRI, and SETSAN and MIC through FAO. It is the policy of EC to encourage Ministries to put this TA on budget and to have managerial and contractual responsibility over the technical assistance. This has been achieved gradually for Louis Berger and FAO support to MADER and, for now, FAO support to MIC. Previous evaluations have shown that it is useful to provide TA in addition to Sectoral budget support.

The **Relevance** of CF-BS strategies and actions is at least a guarantee for more sector oriented sustainable development of the mentioned sectors by means of government public finance mechanisms. It mainly concerns the agriculture sector in general (PROAGRI) and the cashew and cotton sectors in particular. In the case of PROAGRI, it guarantees a good sector policy dialogue with MADER but also with other donors. The technical assistance has a double added value: on the one hand, it gives the needed external technical input and on the other hand, it keeps an eye on the use of funds in order to provide confidence for donors to pool the funds in PROAGRI.

The **Effectiveness** of CF-BS strategies and actions is not yet proven but was a hypothetical assumption. Before, funds were mainly channelled through projects in ministries and NGOs. Before PROAGRI was introduced, MADER contained about 100 different projects, all with different procedures and funding. In terms of sustainable development and good governance, the state will select the final one that is responsible for the development of the various sectors. The private sector and the civil society have their own role to play. This approach is the most effective way of progress. It shows the responsibility of the Government when outputs and impact are good and when they are not good. Sending funds through projects of ministries and NGO's has not always been the most effective way.

The **Efficiency** of CF-BS strategies and actions is theoretically satisfactory when the PCM works completely. With respect to the efficiency of the first phase of PROAGRI, this phase has been assessed as reasonable. However, the last evaluation clearly mentions weak elements, among others, in financial administration. PROAGRI is due to decentralise as soon as possible towards the Provinces and Districts. Here it is feared that a bottleneck of the operation will be encountered. It is also feared that this will be the most difficult operation of phase II. It is fully dependent on the motivation and political willingness. A pro-active attitude is needed in decentralisation of decision-making. In addition to this, good and qualified staff at the district level is needed. This kind of staff will also be needed in the other Governmental institutions. Qualified staff and the need to develop a pro-active way of policy and strategy management is a basic need for progress. This phenomenon was difficult to develop due to the existing hierarchical system that was inherited from the colonial and socialist eras. This remains a major concern for donors: when and how will PROAGRI come down to the District level and how will progress and performances be monitored? What indicators will be measured and how? The Delegation states that to a certain extent there is already a fair degree of decentralisation to the districts but proper methodology needs to be devised by MADER to capture this trend.

The **Impact** of CF-BS strategies and actions depends on the formulation of the strategies but also on the implementation and institutional set up. These should be linked to the objectives of the Regulation as well as linked with the outcomes and final results. This all depends on a good monitoring system and clear indicators for measuring progress and impact. PROAGRI is a process and impact can only be measured after many years. If the objectives of the Regulation are directed at the national, provincial and household levels; if water, adequate nutrition and balanced diets, social-economic roles of men and women in the process and in the households; and if production and income generation are key elements for the availability of food; and if access to food is a main element, then impact must be measured in relation to these objectives. For PROAGRI, it will be difficult to measure this at the household level due to the fact that many other factors play a role. In addition to this, the national information systems VAC/SETSAN measure the vulnerability and the food-nutrition situation at the district level but this is only measured by means of a sample of households (and does not measure extreme situations).

It is too early to say anything about the **Sustainability** of CF-BS strategies and actions. This is the main responsibility of the Government. A follow-up by means of an intensive monitoring system will be necessary.

It is unknown what the **Comparative advantage** of CF-BS is in comparison to other types of operations (within the Regulation) and operations in other instruments dealing with BS. Often positive indications are given. However, in some cases this seems to be a kind of wishful thinking of donors instead of a clear analysis based on objective results. This must be taken very seriously into consideration.

There is a professional **Coordination** of the various instruments that deal with BS at the Delegation level. Regular meetings are organised and progress reports concerning the different instruments are prepared. This is thanks to the dedicated and motivated staff who have a very good relationship with the other donors, for instance in the PROAGRI donor pool. The other donors generally say that the EC is one of the bigger donors in the area of food security and agriculture but it is also a “leader” in the development of new ideas. The representations of member states of the EU confirm this.

3.6 Evaluative Question 6

What is the added value of the operations to support food security (FS) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

The operations to support food security mainly consist of the Call for Proposals for NGO's, the co-operation with UN organisations, the Outsourcing through the Government and all other direct aid (to the Government). The last one is, in fact, an earmarked budget support system.

Calls for proposals (CfP) for NGOs have gone out in 1999 and in 2002. Aims have been well specified in a preliminary study that selected the activities and areas (the high potentials northern provinces and the low potential southern provinces). Selection has been carried out according to strict criteria.

Cooperation with the UN mainly concerns the funding of TA for important Ministries and Governmental Institution and eventually support to special studies necessary for a better understanding of the food security situation and related subjects.

The Outsourcing of programmes is a way of giving "earmarked" budget support. Since 1996 35.2 M Euro have been committed and another 23.5 M Euro have been approved for the latest programme. The government receives targeted budget support in order to contract service providers, and monitor implementation in order to concentrate expertise from the governmental, commercial and NGO sector.

The Outsourcing provides the government with funds to contract service providers (private companies and/or NGOs) to promote diversification in cotton areas through the cotton institute (IAM) and to cotton companies in consortium with NGOs. In two districts of Nampula province, the cotton company SODAN is associated with CLUSA and CARE. Outsourcing to provide public services in the field of cashew production and marketing is done through the cashew institute (INCAJU) to NGOs. In two districts of Gaza province INCAJU works with ADRA.

The **Relevance** of these FS strategies and actions is important. NGO programmes, through CfP, are moving towards mixed forms of co-operation, for example "outsourcing". NGO's have played an important role in Mozambique with respect to humanitarian assistance during and after the war and during the disasters. In Mozambique, NGO's are generally perceived to be institutions with money that can work where they want. The CfP, and specially the outsourcing programmes, are already a step ahead: they deal with planned and controlled interventions where capacity, performance and specialisation are important factors for selection. The CfP are based on a balanced intervention plan and analysis. Selection is carried out according to these criteria. The way the FSU changed its strategy from 1995, merits its relevance through this strategy. The Government has increasingly taken its responsibility.

The **Effectiveness and Efficiency** of these FS strategies and actions are well known. Selection has been carried out in a very transparent way. NGO's are well informed and they have to prepare proposals according to what the Call is requesting in consultation with the Government. The fact that selection must be done in a very transparent way makes it slow and time consuming. The risk is that in the meantime, the situation may have changed and the proposal is no longer relevant. For the EC, the CfP is the most efficient way of funding NGO's but NGO's complain about the long procedures. The procedures are transparent but

still NGO's complain about "lack of transparency". The mission has checked one case: Christian Aids case in 1999 CfP. It was determined that Christian Aid was wrong and procedures were well carried out. The 1999 CfP has published an extended and detailed document about its procedures and the results of the selection process. This was very transparent.

With respect to the methodology, one could easily observe that selection is according to a desk study analysing the quality of the proposal. A good analysis of the institutional capacity of the NGO could be a complementary tool.

The **Impact** of these FS strategies and actions is measured with a set of indicators. In 2003, the FSU prepared a document on how to choose indicators and how to measure and interpret them. There is one major concern: most indicators are not directly derived from the objectives of the Regulation. Many indicators deal with output and not with the impact on the beneficiary level. This should be done, and the FSU is aware of it, but argues that more time and resources are needed in that case.

The outsourcing programmes can be monitored by means of specific impact indicators at the household and district level but this can only be done if indicators are directly derived from the objectives. This, however, is not done systematically in the case of the EC funding. Indicators are strongly output-oriented but they focus less on household level than they should according to the objectives of the Regulation. An example is the IAM-SODAN-CLUSA-CARE Nampula outsourcing project. Twenty-four indicators were formulated, most of which were output oriented. There was only one indicator that measured the "food security situation", but it is unclear how and at what level it is being measured.

The **Sustainability** of these FS strategies and actions cannot always be guaranteed. In cases of rehabilitation, sustainability is more easily guaranteed than the link from rehabilitation towards development; as this link is not an automatic one. The fact that a NGO can be selected during this very CfP does not mean that it will be selected the following CfP. This means that continuation is not automatically assured.

The **Comparative advantage** with regard to other types of operations (within the Regulation) and other instruments dealing with FS is not obvious. Food aid was not increased since 1995 and this was a right decision. The EDF programmes are only indirectly linked to food security through the transport and the road sector but several EDF sectors also contribute indirectly to the improvement of the food security situation of the beneficiaries.

According to what we have heard from other donors and agencies, and according to our own observations, the **Coordination** of the various instruments dealing with FS within the Delegation and the coordination among other donors and agencies is very professional. The EC Delegation (Food Security and Agriculture section) is well appreciated with regard to its taking of new initiatives and its approach to networking.

3.7 Evaluative Question 7

What is the added value of the “other / Technical assistance and capacity building” component for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

This question has to answer whether the “other and/or technical assistance and capacity building” components add value for achieving the objectives of the Regulation. It concerns the strong team of experts in the EC Delegation (intra-muros), the extra-muros technical assistants at MADER (contracted and funded directly by the EC), the programme technical assistance to PROAGRI (Louis Berger), to MIC (FAO) and to SETSAN (FAO). By “other” we mean the training seminars and the formal and informal assistance through the FSU team.

The **Relevance** of these components is that the programme recognizes that technical assistance and a capacity building component is an important condition for implementing the strategies in a positive way. It also shows that the programmes in terms of “level” are quite ambitious and it poses the question whether the Mozambican state does not have competent staff at its disposal. The final question will be whether the Mozambican Government will consider the programmes as their “ownership” or simply as “cash for institutional empowerment”. Having Ministries contracting technical assistants for MADER, MIC and SETSAN is relevant in terms of getting optimal information about the mechanisms in favour of the new institutions, but also to better know the institutional constraints. This will give the ministry control over the TA, thereby increasing ownership and having the TA included in the budget of the institution, therefore allowing for continual funding after donor support has phased out. This is an opportunity for donors in general and for the Delegation in particular. The relevance of a well-motivated and professional team of experts at the Delegation level and as extra-muros is unquestionable and guarantees good communication and confidence between partners and other donors.

The **Effectiveness and Efficiency** of the “others component” strategies and actions can only be assessed after a certain period of implementation. Comparative assessments are not possible given the fact that one cannot compare the “with” situation to the “without” situation. It also means that assessments evaluate the added value of the assistance and that can only be done through an analysis of the influence of the assistance on the output and impact of the strategies. This means that the Delegation needs a good monitoring instrument in order to measure progress and impact. A simple assessment of performance of the technical assistance intra- and extra-muros is no part of this evaluation, although this is very important. Their employer, the EC, makes no performance evaluation. This question touches the **Impact** issue. It is recognized by the fact that donors and UN agencies keep an eye on these programmes through their technical assistance which gives the necessary information about the programmes. However, one main condition is that competences of the assistants must be high, effective and also appreciated in terms of proven added-value and that is not always guaranteed. This evaluation did not have the time nor the competence to evaluate this issue in a methodologically acceptable manner. This should be a special independent evaluation subject where the Government and the Delegation will participate.

The **Sustainability** of technical assistance is not *sine qua non* automatically. This depends on the experts capability to contribute his/her special skills in a way the Ministry can profit from it in a sustainable way: innovations, improvements, new visions. It depends

completely on the competence, willingness and pro-creativity of the assistants. There have been no comparative advantage identified. Other instruments of the E.C. have only intra-muros experts (actually ALAT) such as the advisers in the infrastructure programmes.

The **Coordination** is effective both with other EC instruments and with other donors and agencies.

A third set of questions (EQ 8-10) deals with the analysis of FA/FS strategies and actions within the different phases of the PCM. It concerns how the phasing in of the supported actions facilitated progress towards the achievement of the objectives, also including the identification of priorities and the targeting of the beneficiaries. throughout the whole PCM. It also concerns the set-up of divisions of work in the Delegation. Lastly, it concerns the phasing out process.

3.8 Evaluative Question 8

To what extent has the design of supported actions (phasing in) facilitated progress towards the achievement of food aid and food security objectives? This includes the identification of priorities, the selection of countries, the targeting of beneficiaries / vulnerable groups, the funding operations - components, the identification and appraisal process, the multi-annual programming?

It must be mentioned that the very broad objectives of the Regulation (production, diversification, income generating, household and gender approach, nutrition and balanced diets) do not always correspond with the Government's perception of Food Security. This explains the fact that the general orientation of the B7-201 food security concept in Mozambique is more agriculture-production-trade-inputs-outputs oriented than the household food economy and vulnerability approach. We have already explained that the FSNS is a strong and complete approach including all related subjects. This may also explain why the SETSAN is respected but with quite poor influence at the ministry and policy levels. Officially, it has to coordinate several ministries but in their case it is MADER which is the main motivator. The FSU in the Delegation prepares the programmes jointly with the Government institutions based on government policies, on the one hand, and the objectives of the Regulation, on the other. These two concepts are not fully coherent. It does not have strong influence on the targeting of beneficiaries or vulnerable groups but certainly on activities carried out and indicators monitored. Indicators used for the monitoring of the situation at the household level are mentioned in the objectives of the Regulation – nutrition and balanced diets, production or income generation activities, different roles of men and women, especially as care takers – are not or nearly not monitored despite the monitoring instructions prepared by the food security and agriculture sector of the EC Delegation.

Given the type and background for the eligible programmes, the quality of the overall programming is done in a professional way and based on proper analysis and priorities. The programme approval process concerning direct aid is subject to negotiation with the Government structures and for indirect aid, in particular the CfP for NGO, is based on strong criteria for the type of programme and also the quality. This is based on a general policy paper the F5 unit prepares for various countries and in the country paper for the

specific country in terms of priorities, activities and geographical zones. This is not done with full participation of the target group. Actors are participating in this process but Brussels does the setting of this process through the objectives of the Regulation and its interpretation. The only fear is that Brussels interprets the objectives in a way in which the household approach is weakly represented.

The quality of the programme approval process is done in a professional and transparent way according to a selection process, where selection criteria are known in advance to the potential partners. All the proposals of the pre-selected NGO are appraised according to strict criteria and a final ranking is made. Brussels, however, makes the final choice.

The **Relevance** of EC actions with regard to the needs of the beneficiaries is recognised in theory but not always in practice. When infant malnutrition is quite high, with high mortality and morbidity, and the main interventions concentrate on food availability and access, the real needs of the beneficiaries are not properly taken into consideration. How is it possible to integrate all possible beneficiaries in this process? The EC makes the choice for the type of interventions, activities and geographical areas. Potential partners write their proposals according to the criteria of the CfP, the Governmental structures have a voice in the approval process and the potential beneficiaries depend on what the NGO or the outsourcing cluster prepares for them. This is the way it currently works. The way to improve this system is to request partners to take these issues into consideration through clear baseline studies looking at these special household issues and through special household indicators measuring the impact. This will require a lot of extra work for the partners and extra monitoring for the FSU, but that makes the FSBL a real Food Security Household programme and a strong instrument for poverty reduction.

There is a clear **Planning** of division of responsibilities in the various **PCM phases**. Identification is done both by the Delegation together with the Government, and also with the CfP, where national and provincial Governments are involved and NGO eligible countries are informed about criteria. Most programmes take into account the strategies developed by the Delegation.

The integration of **Cross cutting issues** in the programme / project design is an important issue. The objectives speak about “households”, “special attention for roles for men and women in the households”. Nowadays, there is also a need for special attention to HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting issue. It has already been said that these cross-cutting issues have not been taken into consideration.

3.9 Evaluative Question 9

To what extent have implementation set-ups (i.e. suitable structures for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation), management mechanisms / tools and processes (i.e. division of work and responsibilities, coordination of actions) facilitated the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?

The objectives of the Regulation are vast, but coherent, which means that extra flexibility at the PCM level is needed because of the (necessary) multi-sector approach (agriculture, livestock, transport, trade, health, training etc.)

Complementarity with other programmes of the EC budget lines and instruments concerns only the infrastructure components of the EDF IV and a few projects funded under the NGO co-funding budget line B7-6000. In terms of the objectives of the FSBL there are more complementarities because many sectors are part of the general food security approach and contribute directly or indirectly to food security at the household level. The complementarity with Governmental policies exist by means of inter-ministerial committees at central and provincial levels. This does not contribute to multi-sectoral synergy since food security is not a priority for the sectoral Ministries. The complementarity with other donors exists only in PROAGRI. A PROAGRI working group consists of representatives of the 10 donor agencies that are funding the PROAGRI and MADER staff. Joint identification, planning and management and monitoring issues are discussed in this working group.

In addition to PROAGRI, there is institutional support to INAM, which is also financed by Finland and Spain. For food security planning issues SETSAN is supported by GTZ, AMODER is supported by Ireland. Exchange of information, joint missions and regular meetings allows coordination between the donors.

There is no clear division of responsibilities between sections in the Delegation concerning the various budget lines. This is about to change with the de-evolution of thematic budget line, including co-financing. Projects related to agriculture or food security will be followed by this sector, even if financing is from a different budget line. Within the FS and agriculture section this division is present. The coordination with other donors or the government agencies takes the form of *ad hoc* or regular arrangements. They are all dealing with one of the components of FS. There is no multi-sectoral coordination aiming to address FS.

The empowerment role of TA is done by means of the transfer of contractual and managerial responsibility for TA government. This allows for the government to assess if the TA is providing adequate support. The TA provided to PROAGRI contributes to the improvement of the financial and budgetary capacity of MADER at central and provincial levels. This corresponds to the need and is complemented by a significant budget support provided by 10 donors. This contributes to strengthen the institutional capacity of MADER and to attract complementary funds from others donors, making MADER more efficient. However, the impact to improving food production is limited. This is due to the technical weakness of extension and external factors (state of roads, lack of credit, lack of guaranteed market to producers).

The TA provided to MIC and SETSAN have less impact on the efficiency of the institution because (qualified) staff and budget are lacking. Most of the benefits of the TA are at a support level such as policy elaboration, capacity building, bulletin diffusion, and guidelines. For example, MIC can't collect production data, stocks or prices at district level. Also SETSAN does not have sufficient staff or budget to conduct studies in the Districts that are necessary for the elaboration of appropriate policies.

Are there adapted procedures for program management? For the outsourcing projects and indirect aid, the monitoring mechanism is under the responsibility of the government institution (INCAJU and IAM for outsourcing) or the NGO (indirect aid). They have to do a baseline study and are supposed to update these data regularly. The support of the Delegation includes technical and financial support related to the M&E system. The M&E mechanism still needs to improve, mainly on the choice of indicators derived to meet the objectives. Field visits, as well as coordination and technical seminars with the implementing partners (mainly outsourcing and indirect aid), allow an ongoing analysis and adaptation of project implementation. Extra-muros experts are following the institutional support and outsourcing projects, conducting joint analysis of reports and regular discussions.

Are there adequate resources for project management? For each component of the FS programme (budget support, outsourcing, indirect aid) there is an adviser, intra- or extra-muros, which has contact with the field, government institutions and civil society, such as NGO.

Is there an adequate M&E-inclusive impact assessment system? What is currently done is the assessment of malnutrition (by the VAC/SETSAN, supported by other donors and NGO's) or the estimation of the food deficit (by FAO-WFP and MIC). This is mostly done in districts that are potentially affected.

Monitoring and evaluation receives special attention. Monitoring is done by both the partners and the FSU. External persons carry out midterm reviews and evaluations regularly with the results used as a monitoring and new planning instrument. As has already been said, the bigger direct aid programmes with the Government need extra monitoring of finances (see midterm evaluation), monitoring of outputs and impact. Although the FSU has a strong team, this team does not have the means and sufficient staff to do the monitoring in an intensive and professional way. Monitoring in accordance with the objectives of the Regulation is of great importance because it shows the added value of the food security budget line programmes compared with other agriculture and rural development projects. Despite the special attention for the monitoring and evaluation issue, there is no systematic M&E system of indicators related the objectives of the Regulation. Therefore, this aspect must be taken into consideration in a more systematic way.

The actor's participation in programme management main concern is the institutional partners of the programme, who are responsible to manage the budget and their activities. EC experts, either intra- or extra-muros, mainly do coordination. .

Cross-cutting issues in programme or project implementation are not very respected. Issues like gender-balance or HIV/AIDS do not have a visible priority. In general, NGOs have more attention for them than Government agencies.

3.10 Evaluative Question 10

To what extent has a phasing out of the supported actions been planned and what contribution did it have on the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?

Concerning the presence of a clear strategy to gradually reduce dependence on EC assistance and its effectiveness we can say the following:

For the public institutions that are supported by the B7-201 budget line, the strategy consists of integrating them into the financial system of the general budgeting system of MPF (SISTAFE). This is the case for PROAGRI and the institutions financed through it (INCAJU, IAM). The decision to decentralize the management of the outsourcing projects corresponds to the same phase-out strategy. Those projects will be included in the DPADR annual plan and it is expected that in the future, the PROAGRI budget will finance such activities. Furthermore, the DPADR's are better able to estimate the needs they have as a recourse to outsourcing, and to manage the different contracts and monitor the projects.

Regarding indirect aid projects, one of the selection criteria is the exit strategy for the phasing out of the action. The phasing out strategy is also one of the themes treated in the provincial coordination seminars where most of the programme's field partners and others actors are present.

INAM elaborated a development plan with a view to create the conditions (provision of services corresponding to customers' requirements) able to generate revenues and in that way to decrease the dependency of external support. However, the success can only rely on the purchase power of potential clients.

It is expected that the credit institutions that are supported (AMODER, GAPI) will reach financial autonomy. There is no specific exit strategy for MIC's budget support.

More broadly, it is important to note that the food security budget line is phasing out of Mozambique, in view of LRRD considerations and the intention to focus B7-2001 as an instrument to improve that link. As Mozambique is a country which, despite regular emergencies, has clearly entered a developmental phase, it is logical to phase out of this budget line, ideally accompanied by a phasing in of the main geographical financial instrument, in this case the EDF. This is why a request for 35 million EUR has been made to the Mid-term review of the 9th EDF. Should sufficient funds be forthcoming this would allow the EC to continue to be an important partner of GoM in the field of food security and agriculture. This focal area of our cooperation with Mozambique is presently, and mainly, funded by the FSBL.

What are the empowerment strategies of partners (capacity building)?

One of the empowerment strategies used is to link budget support to TA that contributes to strengthening the managerial and financial capacity of the supported institutions at the central and provincial levels. Another strategy is to transfer the responsibility of the management of the contracts of TA and outsourcing partners to the government.

The projects implemented by NGOs (indirect aid or outsourcing) aim to strengthen the producers and traders through the creation and legalisation of associations, as well as connecting them to legal services (land claims, licences, bank institutions), which is not an easy task. Remember, that most people do not even have a birth certificate. The weakness of the administrative services that deliver ID or licences is another matter of concern. In

general terms, NGOs allow the improvement of the capacity of communities to manage common services (water point, small credit) or to overcome some technical problems, but these actions have little effect on the external constraints (state of the road, lack of traders, difficulty to establish agreements between traders and producers, costs of the improved inputs). The NGOs also provide capacity building to the permanent extension structures (MADER and private farm's technicians).

There are adequate procedures for smooth transition but this can only be achieved in long-term activities. The procedures implemented for smooth transition are:

- To continue budget support till the consolidation of the institutional reforms (in course such as MIC and INAM);
- To provide institutional support to the institutions to perform their functions as defined through institutional and functional analysis (IAM, INCAJU);
- To consolidate and extend the strengthening of institutional and financial capacities of credit organizations (GAPI and AMODER);
- To assist and extend support to the DPADR and DPICOM to organise the outsourcing call for proposal and management of contracts;

A fourth set of questions (EQ 11-12) focusses on the specific issues mentioned in the COM 473. Here information is asked concerning the sustainability of effects and impacts of EC policies and programmes, both at the level of target populations and at the institutional and policy levels. The role of the Regulation in bridging the gap between relief rehabilitation and development is also considered.

3.11 Evaluation Question 11

How sustainable are the effects and impacts of EC-supported policies and programmes in the field of food security, both at the level of target populations and at institutional and policy levels in the partner countries?

This question speaks about the sustainability of effects and impacts of the supported programmes both at the beneficiary and institutional and policy levels. The new approach as in PROAGRI and OUTSOURCING is quite new and experimental. Expectations are quite positive but one is aware of the risks if donors, for example in PROAGRI, walk out in which case monitoring will not be too intense. In the case of the B7-201 food security budget line a lot of effort and energy went into this new approach and programmes. This needs a long-term commitment in order to obtain at least sustainable effects and impacts. At the targeted population level this aspect will be different. Most programmes are “support programmes” to food security through the private and NGO sector. Sustainability of effects and impacts will be the responsibility of these institutions but on the condition that prolonged activities will be necessary and that depends upon new availability of funding.

It is well known that funding of the B7-201 food security budget line will stop at the end of 2005. This means that in this situation for the targeted population either through direct or

indirect aid, that the institutional and policy level sustainable effects and impacts through EC funding is not guaranteed. Beneficiaries do not know about it. The Government (direct aid) should know about it and these considerations should be taken into account when joint identification is carried out.

The EC is looking for alternative funding when the FSBL will start its activities in Mozambique, eventually through the EDF funds.

The ability of Government (and non-government) institutions to elaborate strategies and implement programmes as well as to continue to pursue programme objectives in all areas after EC assistance ceases, is not guaranteed. It is mainly budgetary support and as long as donors mainly fund the Mozambican state budget, one cannot expect immediate solutions. This is also the problem for NGO. They also depend on external funding and if not found, NGO will also close their doors. To plan for this is also one of the responsibilities of the Government, at both the national and provincial levels. Funding institutions like the Delegation have to take this into consideration at the beginning of all funding negotiations.

The ability of service providers to continue providing services on long term basis depends upon the good planning of both governments and donors.

The ability of beneficiaries to continue accessing the benefits of the EC-supported project after the EC grant has ended depends entirely on the strategy of the project. In fact, all activities in the projects must incorporate this element from the beginning.

The ability of women and men of different ages, ability, ethnicity, income and religion to have equal access to the benefits of the EC projects is, in principle, taken into consideration by partners. However, there are cross-cutting issues which have not always explicitly been monitored and this means that it is not possible to answer this question in detail.

The EC delegation has, in principle, the ability to manage programmes as well as to ensure coherence between the EC's different instruments. These depend upon what Brussels wants and the Government policy. The Delegation needs more flexibility in order to have a hands-off approach and extra funds in order to operate towards finding solutions for these differences. This is foreseen with the de-evolution of the food security budget line as of July 2004.

The EC headquarters has the ability to define strategies as well as to insure coherence between the EC strategy and the international food security strategy. The objectives of the Regulation are very clear and broad, covering different aspects of food security (including various cross-cutting issues). However, their chosen strategies make it look as though the programmes are not always taking all aspects into consideration. Production, diversification, and trade have more emphasis than the household or family approach, which should, according to the objectives, take precedence.

The FSU makes clear it that the wide objectives of the Regulation 1292/96 have been overtaken by a focus on poverty reduction, which is the overall objective of PARPA and the EC CSP for Mozambique

3.12 Evaluation Question 12

What is the role of Regulation No.1292/96 in the on-going efforts to bridge the gap between relief, rehabilitation and development?

There is an agreement on the definition of the LRRD process within the unit and the other budget lines as far as the ongoing programmes and projects are concerned. Mozambique has a complex history in terms of LRRD. The colonial situation with respect to food security is known: subsistence versus commercial agriculture with a good infrastructure of roads and means of transport. Small farm producers did all commercialisation through small middleman (cantineiros) living in the countryside and in this way providing an excellent network for trade and selling. This structure was broken down after independence, when the “cantineiros” disappeared and no network was left.

Under state ideology the new government tried to replace this by state owned firms responsible for selling and also buying inputs. Small farmers were forced to live in the “aldeias comunais”, similar to the situation in Tanzania after independence in the Ujama villages. During the 10 years of war this system was completely destroyed, agriculture production decreased enormously and after the war not any structure was left. At this stage, relief and rehabilitation had to start. Before 1995 the FSU invested mainly in food aid and food security or agriculture rehabilitation programmes. After 1995 the main accent was on rehabilitation and development. This was a well-reflected choice based on the conviction that rehabilitation and development had to go together.

The objectives of the Regulation are vast, but coherent, and give this very instrument the necessary flexibility to bridge this gap. The current food security programme in Mozambique is an example of how to make people independent of food aid through the support of food security action. This is despite the fact that other instruments like ECHO and the co-funding of NGO budget line are complementary instruments where, in emergency cases or development situations, the B7-210 cannot intervene.

This flexibility is rather vast, but coherent objectives furnish the added value of the Regulation while the FSBL focuses on enabling LRRD.

However, the problem is coordination. Some of the instruments are fully managed by AIDCO in Brussels and others are in a de-concentration process or have experts at delegation level like the FSU. Coordination is done at the Delegation level but often without the presence of final decision makers.

4 EVALUATION CRITERIA

The judgement of the special evaluation questions as described in the former chapter is a very detailed process and needs a lot of input. This evaluation deals primarily with the judgement of the Regulation 1292/96 (see for the objectives 1.2. or the ToR) in relation to the Mozambique programme and the programme in relation to the reality of the food security and all related subjects in Mozambique; last, but not least, the vision and development of policies and strategies of the Government. The answers on the special evaluation questions resulted in the following judgement of the mentioned evaluation criteria.

- **Relevance:** The programme is relevant but given the objectives in Regulation 1292/96 it can be improved by taking all objectives into consideration. In the Mozambican programme, this concerns the incorporation of the objectives related to nutrition, household food situation and the role of men and women in the households. In general the Relevance of the programme is satisfactory.
- **Effectiveness:** The final impact is a result of the effectiveness. In most programmes the effectiveness is known through the “outputs” corresponding to what have been realized; which is satisfactory. However, this is related to activities of the programmes and not to the objectives of the Regulation. A strong monitoring system is needed in addition to real indicators measuring the impact (according to the objectives of the regulation). Given the total funding, the effectiveness of the monitoring can be improved through a stronger presence in the Delegation of a monitoring section. This is a cost-effectiveness issue and should be well analysed and respected. In general the effectiveness is fair.
- **Efficiency:** Efficiency is the best use of time, energy and money without any waste. The FSBL has several instruments and channels to carry out the programmes. Work is partly done in Brussels, at Delegation or Partners level and that means various institutional levels. Communication and procedures cost time and in the case of the FSBL it is often heard that procedures are slow. The fact that the budget line must be deconcentrated is a sign of recognition that the programme can be carried out with more efficiency. The midterm reviews do analyse, among other things, this issue. The outsourcing programmes are still in a phase of building up and efficiency will be an issue of the programme evaluations. The Call for Proposals for the NGOs is a transparent but complex and time-consuming process. It takes quite a long time for decision-making. It is a choice between transparency and efficiency to be measured through a strong monitoring system of the Delegation. Most programmes are visited once a year and that means that real efficiency cannot be controlled in any adequate way. In general, this means that “efficiency” is monitored but, given the volume of the budget and the reduced capacity of the FSU to carry out a systematic monitoring, this can be improved.
- **Impact:** Impact is measured by means of a number of indicators directly derived from the objectives of the Regulation. In the case of the Mozambican B7-201 food security budget line, impact of the programmes is assessed mainly through the “outputs” and not through a series of indicators related to the objectives. The national information systems such as the VAC/SETSAN present regularly the

results of series of indicators related to the real food and nutrition situation of the households in general but this is not related to the programmes funded by the food security budget line. A monitoring system already exists, but this monitoring system could be adapted to better address the objectives. Actual indications about the impact are quite positive but we do not know in detail whether the concerned households improved their living situation. This is the main objective of the Regulation and impact assessments should focus on that. In some cases (PROAGRI or OUTSOURCING), real impact and also sustainability are only measurable in the longer term. By combining evaluation results, mid-term reviews, progress reports of partners, the “outcomes” and VAC/SETSAN information, the situation of households does seem to be improving but the specific impact of the B7-201 is not explicitly measurable. This must be carried out by the partners in the monitoring system of each programme through specific indicators related to the objectives of the Regulation.

- **Sustainability:** In some programmes the objective was to ensure and to strengthen sustainability; however, it depends upon what level sustainability is considered. The direct aid concerns mainly Ministries and that means an investment in the long term. Indirect aid mainly concerns the programmes in the field at the beneficiary level. In general, the expectation for sustainability for direct aid is fair. The sustainability of the indirect aid (CfP for NGOs and the UN funding) is different. The NGO programmes consider sustainability as an important objective and their activities in the field show that. The UN funding considers the technical assistance to the MIC and the VAC/SETSAN. This cannot be viewed in terms of sustainability, but does contribute to it; which in Mozambique is the case.
- **Coherence:** There is coherence between the programme and the state policy. However, there is not always coherence at all levels between the programme and the objectives of the Regulation. This can be improved in order to obtain strategies and policies according to the objectives. This will give the B7-201 activities in Mozambique a complete food security approach and identity. In general the coherence is fair.

5 CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions are based on the findings of the Mission in Mozambique and formulated according to the main aims of the evaluation in the Terms of Reference.

The analysis of the four groups of Evaluation Questions leads towards the following conclusions.

5.1 Relevance of the objectives and instruments of the Regulation

The regulation has clear, vast and coherent objectives covering the whole spectrum of what is typically considered as food security. It deals with production, access, availability, nutrition, health, water, transport, trade, gender, poverty, and vulnerability, all aspects having an impact on the food security situation of the household.

This is also the case of the instruments used by the Regulation. The Regulation attempts to reach most sectors of society and the economy. In that way it is very comprehensive and useful as an instrument in poverty alleviation.

5.2 Coherence between Regulation objectives and the B7-201 programme in Mozambique

The objectives of the Regulation, which are strongly developed in the strategies and programmes:

- To promote food security geared toward alleviating poverty and to help the population at the household, local, national and regional levels;
- To promote the availability and accessibility of food stuffs to the public;
- To reduce dependence on food aid;
- To encourage them to be independent in food, either by increasing production, or by enhancing and increasing purchasing power;
- To take the LRRD into consideration as a question of approach;

The objectives of the Regulation, which are weakly or not at all developed in the strategies and programmes:

- To raise the standard nutrition of the recipient population and help it to obtain a balanced diet;
- To ensure adequate, clean drinking water;
- To contribute towards the balanced economic and social development in the rural and urban environment, by paying special attention to the respective roles of men and women in the household economy;

This means that merely agro-economic and agro-production objectives and less household oriented objectives have been realized while needs in this sector certainly existed.

5.3 Coherence between the B7-201 programme and the general food security situation in Mozambique

The general food security situation in Mozambique at this moment is characterized by a series of pockets of emergencies with food insecurity for the population caused by droughts, floods or cyclones. The northern provinces have high potential and the southern have low potential with respect to food production. Availability of food at the national level is no problem: total production is enough to feed everybody. The food insecurity exists at the district level. Access is a problem in isolated districts suffering from drought or other calamities, and this is directly related to poverty and lack of access to income. A good market economy with good transport facilities and roads is the weak point in the Mozambican economy. HIV/AIDS will become a new threat of food security. Malnutrition rates are not too high for an African country. Wasting rates (actual malnutrition = weight/height) are in general lower than 10% and wasting rates (chronic malnutrition = height/age) are from 35-40%. There is no correlation between malnutrition rates and food availability.

The FSBL in Mozambique works through direct aid to the Government and through indirect aid through the NGOs and UN agencies. The direct aid works for production and diversification improvement at national, provincial and finally district levels and the reorganisation and formulation of policies of individual Ministries. Results and impact will be known after a long-term process. NGO and UN agencies work more according to a holistic approach in which the Government approach is combined with the household food security approach. NGOs work in emergency, rehabilitation or short-term development more directly with the beneficiaries, which are the families or households.

This means that the general FSBL programme is rather in coherence with the general food security situation but needs a more household approach.

5.4 Coherence between the B7-201 Programme and Government policy in Mozambique

The Government policy is clear. The food security approach and strategies are macro and production-commerce-infrastructure oriented. The policy promoted by VAC/SETSAN is more household-economy and nutrition-gender oriented and integrated into the overall government food security concept. This philosophy of great scale production among others still practised by MADER, finds its roots in the great-scale socialist agriculture production ideology of postcolonial independence.

The B7-201 strategies in Mozambique are in coherence with the government policies. Institutions such as SETSAN and FAO agree with this finding. Their hope is that the Delegation's FSBL (B7-201) will incorporate this concept in a more comprehensive manner by requesting for the partners special attention and measure impacts for household, nutritional and income issues, as has been requested for years with respect to the gender-issue.

5.5 Overall assessment of the B7-201 programme in Mozambique and the role of the Delegation

The overall assessment of the FSU of the Delegation is that this unit does an important job. Other donors and agencies appreciate the work of this unit. It fulfils, at the donor level, a very pro-active and innovative role and tries to make the Government responsible for its own food security policy. The programme is quite diverse, but its approach can move more towards a general execution of the objectives of the Regulation. The team of the food security unit is motivated and professional. They provide a good analysis of the situation and their concepts of intervention are clear, but could achieve more coherence with the overall objectives of the Regulation. A strong monitoring of the funded programmes is necessary but not possible. The highly innovative approach of the ongoing programmes and the need for good progress and impact measurement makes this a priority in order to prevent eventual failures. This fact needs special attention.

5.6 Comparison between the food security budget line B7-201 and other budget lines

The food security budget line B7-201 has a strong presence in Mozambique compared with the “food security programmes” through EDF and Co funding NGO. The EDF and the NGO co-funding budget line have projects complementary to the programmes funded by the FSBL such as road construction and other infrastructures, health, agriculture etc. which have directly and indirectly influence on the food security situation of the households but are in fact no food security projects. This complementary must not be forgotten because it can contribute to improving food security on household level in an important way.

The B7-201 model is preferred because of the numbers of intramural experts and extramural delegated food security experts who have influence on the programme at many levels, from the identification through the application and to the follow-up. This is very favourable for the execution and follow-up of the programmes.

The FSBL is a coherent instrument because it is broad and complete in its objectives and instruments and therefore flexible as budget line.

5.7 Strong points of the B7-210 food security budget line in Mozambique

- The unit has developed a broad strategy of interventions in Mozambique through direct aid (PROAGRI, OUTSOURCING etc.) and indirect aid (CfP, UN bodies etc.) and this is possible due to the flexibility and vast, but coherent, objectives of this budget line;
- Through intensive contact with partners and good in the field knowledge of the food security situation;
- Strong presence in donor fora and pro-creative performance in organizations like PROAGRI;

5.8 Weak points of the B7-210 food security budget line in Mozambique.

- Due to the many administrative tasks, less time for field visits, monitoring and information collection for new policy development;
- More systematic attention should be given to monitoring indicators directly derived from the main objectives of the B7-201 budget line;
- Strong monitoring is also desired for the direct aid programmes in order to prevent failures at the government level;
- Too many decisions are still made in Brussels and a programme such as the CfP could easily be decentralised at the Delegation level;

5.9 The sustainability of effects and impacts

- **At beneficiaries' level:** Sustainability at the beneficiaries' level in the short term is not a problem at either the direct or indirect aid level. However, sustainability in the long term is uncertain while funding is not guaranteed. Not all partners have developed strategies to ensure long-term sustainability. This question also relates to the absence of a good methodology of measuring the results and impact indicators in order to verify the question whether objectives of the Regulation have been achieved.
- **At institutional and politic level:** Donors are increasingly sharing a common strategy and these strategies have been developed in participation with Government institutions. For the FS programme in Mozambique, there are enough signs showing that the lessons learned by the Government and also by the donors will guarantee sustainability. This is a positive sign. However, the FSU in the Delegation is aware of certain weaknesses in the implication of the programmes at government level.
- **At LRRD level concerning the gap between the relief situation one side and the rehabilitation and development on the other side:** The B7-201 budget line in Mozambique did not have this problem. The need for food aid has been well analysed and the decision has been taken in 1995 to work mainly on food security. This was a good decision and partners, except for the WFP, have never felt a gap.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS

- (i) The objectives and the instruments of the Regulation 1292/96 are of the high quality needed for the achievement of a real food security strategy. This is the reason that continuation of the Regulation is strongly recommended.
- (ii) In order to create an added value of the ongoing programmes, the objectives of the Regulation 1292/96 should be better taken into consideration. This means that in the case of the Mozambique programme, the objectives concerning the household approach in terms of economy, nutrition, food situation and the role for men and women should be integrated into the programme based on need.
- (iii) The SETSAN has emphasised this approach at the government level. The special budget line B7-201 food security has to integrate the SETSAB approach into their programme and to advocate for it at the level of the governmental partners. Real food security integrates nutrition security and that depends not only on food availability but better access. That is the real objective of the B7-201 budget line.
- (iv) This approach should also be considered with respect to the country's strategy and policy papers on which new financial support will be based;
- (v) The many positive lessons learned from the programme – flexibility in selection of programmes, vast and coherent objectives for programme design, various instruments in order to guarantee effectiveness and efficiency, intensive contacts with partners and last but not least a proven instrument that contributes to poverty reduction through food and nutrition security – should be well analysed in order to become an example for other budget lines and donors.
- (vi) Analyse the advantages but also the disadvantages of the de-concentration process in a professional way. This will prevent a higher workload for the Delegation by providing more flexibility, more time for the necessary monitoring and improving of the developed strategies. This is also felt at the level of the Delegation. Invest in the quality of the programme.
- (vii) The monitoring process must be strengthened in order to get better insights into what is happening at the household, village and district levels. At this moment there is not enough time to do effective monitoring which can guarantee full application of the objectives of the Regulation and optimal impact in favour of the beneficiaries. The FSU is very aware of this constraint. This means, in practice, that it is unacceptable to increase the administrative workload in the name of the de-concentration without reviewing the monitoring process.
- (viii) Despite the full attention for the sustainability question it will be good to develop jointly with partners a methodology for the implementation of a system that guarantees sustainability. This is linked with what has been recommended in recommendation 7 concerning the strengthening of the monitoring system.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AND MISSION PROGRAMME.

Persons met in Maputo

Delegation of the European Commission

Jose Pinto Teixeira	head of delegation
Jean Risopoulus	food security officer, responsible for the food security programme
Albert Losseau	food security officer NGO
Ana Maria Ribeiro	Institutional Reform technical assistant based at MADER
Giancarlo Monteforte	Field operations technical assistant based at MADER
Bernard Lyonnaz-Perrouz	regional food security officer
Sylvie Millot Wathier	first secretary political and economic affairs
Roman Boitard	social sector adviser
Alexander Bohr	Press and Information officer, also responsible for follow-up of projects financed by co-financing budget line, until de-evolution of thematic budget lines.
Inez Alves Teixeira	coordination cooperation
Brij Bowry	engineering adviser
Sigvard Bjorck	engineering adviser
Elias Ainadine	head sub-office FS EC in Nampula

Donors

Julia Compton	DFID rural development
Christine Voest	Rural Incomes team leader USAID
Wijnand J. van IJssel	Netherlands embassy first secretary environment
Celia Jordao	Netherlands embassy, programme officer

Government

Fernando Songane	MADER, PROAGRI coordinator
Olga Munguambe	MIC, deputy national director of commerce
Frans van de Ven	MIC, technical adviser Marketing Management Assistance
Emilia Silvestre	MPF, head of department of contra-valores of the DNT
Eugenio Fazenda Grove	IAM, National Director of Mozambique Cotton Institute
Noberto Mahalambe	IAM, head department for development studies and projects
Clementina Machungo	INCAJU, Director Instituto de Fomento do Caju
Humberto B.A. Guibunda	INCAJU, agronomist
Marcela Libombo	SETSAN, coordinator

Raul Varela	FAO/SETSAN
Filipe Domingos F. Lúcio	INAM, Director Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia.

Parliament

Aurélio Amândio Zilhão	president of commission for social affairs, gender and environment
Raquel Carlos José Damião	Member of Parliament and of the commission for social affairs, gender and environment

UN organisations

Peter Vador	FAO representative in Mozambique
Margarida Silva	FAO, assistant to representative
Jeff Marzilli	FAO adviser to SETSAN
Owen Calvert	WFP, VAM regional officer
Georg-Friedrich Heymell	WFP, deputy country director
Thomas Shortley	WFP, head of programme

NGO

Matthew Pickard	director of Christian Aid
Lori Bell	director SCF UK
Kerry Selvester	F.S.N. adviser of SCF UK

Persons met in Nampula

Jeronimo Garopa	SODAN, director
Nuna Garepa	SODAN agronomist
Extension workers	CLUSA
Extension workers	CARE
Nick Dexter	World Vision Nampula F.S. project

Persons met in Gaza

Mahomed Vala	Director DPA
Constantino S.F. Muianga	ADRA project administrator

ANNEX 2: PROGRAMME MOZAMBIQUE EVALUATION

Date	Programme
16/02 (Monday)	Briefing with EU Delegation Interview with food security experts of EU delegation, concerning food security regulation Interviews with EU delegation experts concerning other instruments (FED, co-financing) Idem Idem Christian AID UK
17/02 (Tuesday)	IAM WFP (VAM UNIT) INAM (National Institute of meteorology) Interview with EU delegation experts concerning other instruments (FED, co-financing) Food Security Adviser
18/02 (Wednesday)	SETSAN/VAC (Technical secretary of food security) PROAGRI working group (Agricultural Investment programme) MADER (Ministry of agriculture) USAID
19/02 (Thursday)	MIC/FAO (Trade Ministry) MPF (Plan and Finance Ministry) Netherlands Embassy
20/02 (Friday)	Maputo-Nampula Meeting with NGO (indirect aid) and outsourcing partners (INCAJU, IAM and Implementing entities) Visit the outsourcing project in Meconta
21/02 (Saturday)	Visit World Vision Nampula food security project (indirect aid) Visit of districts of Mossuril and Ilha de Moçambique
22/02 (Sunday)	Flight back to Maputo
23/02 (Monday)	INCAJU (Cashew Institute) SCF UK

	Xai-Xai: meeting with ADRA and INCAJU
24/02 (Tuesday)	Visit INCAJU outsourcing project in Gaza Chibuto and Manjacaze- return to Maputo
25/02 (Wednesday)	DFID
26/02 (Thursday)	(Head of emergency committee in National assembly) FAO
27/02 (Friday)	Debriefing with Ambassador EC WFP deputy director and programme director/PMA
01/03 (Monday)	Present main findings – delivery of Aide Memoire Departure

ANNEX 3: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

1. Regulation 1292/96 Food Aid Management and Support to Food Security.
2. Thematic Evaluation of Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security; Desk phase Final Report; January 2004, PARTICIP GmbH.
3. Country Strategy Paper 2001 – 2007 with Annexes
4. PRSP (PARPA) Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2001-2005);
5. Food Security Country Summary Tables for Mozambique, EC Food Security Unit F5, 2004;
6. Mozambique, Mid-term External Evaluation of the European Commission Food Security Programme; final report; 2002;
7. Summary of the additional analysis of the demographic, nutrition and health findings – SETSAN-UNICEF, November 2003;
8. Food and Nutrition Strategy Mozambique; SETSAN 2002;
9. Food Security Assistance Scheme – Mozambique (report prepared for the Government of Mozambique by FAO-UN), Rome, 2004;
10. Assembleia da Republica, Commissao dos Assuntos Sociais, do Genere e Ambientais, relatorios diversos sobre as visitas de tereno no ano 2003;
11. Multianual Food Security Programme 2000-2002;
12. Executive Summary First Audit – Foreign Exchange Facility;
13. Mid Term External Evaluation of EC – Final Report;
14. EU Delegation of the E.C. in Mozambique: Annual Report March 2002- August 2003 – Food security officer (Jean Risopoulos);
15. Joint Annual Report 2002 European Commission and Government of Mozambique;
16. Multiannual Food Security programme 2000-2002 of the European Commission for Mozambique Component: Foreign Exchange Facility Budget Support for the Institutional Strengthening of Government Institutions: First Audit; Executif Summary, 25 November, 2002; GFA;
17. EC Food Security Programme 2003-2005;
18. PROAGRI Evaluation – volume 1 and 2 – Final Report – May 2003;
19. PROAGRI II - Draft Strategy Document
20. PROAGRI Annual Review 3-5 June 2003 – Aide Memoire
21. PROGRI – 2^a Revisao Annual 4-5 December de 2003 – Aide Memoire
22. Annual Report – “Louis Berger” - Technical Financial Assistant do PROAGRI
23. Terminal Report FAO - Early Warning System (GCPS/MOZ/060/EC); Rome 2003;
24. Terminal Report FAO - Food Security Policy (GCPS/MOZ/061/EC)

25. Terminal Report FAO - Marketing Management Assistance for Food Security (Phase 2); Rome, 2004;
26. Memoranda of Understanding – Support to Agriculture Sector
27. Provincial Outsourcing – Operative Manual
28. Food Security call for proposals 2002 – list of proposals (europAid/114589/C/G/TPS);
29. Country Technical Document for NGOs participating in the 2002 Call for Proposals for Mozambique;
30. Towards Improving M&E Systems: Integration of Baseline Results in Project's Evaluation; Delegation of the European Commission in Mozambique; January 2003;
31. MFP 2003. Guideline for Sectoral Coordination of small-scale rural investments. Decentralized planning and finance programme.
32. Conselho de Ministros 2001. Estrategia de comercializacao agricola para 2000-2004.
33. Annual Report 2002 – ADRA, province of Gaza, Outsourcing project;
34. World Vision Mozambique – Nampula Food Security project – half year report November 2002 – April 2003 and may 2003 – October 2003;
35. Financial Report – June 2002 – may 2003 – SODAN;
36. PADZAM: SODAN/CARE/CLUSA – Relatorio Quadrimestrel Junho à Setembro 2003 submetido ao IAM:
37. Report on 2º Mission of project Supervision
38. Coordination Seminar (North and South) I, II, III, IV 2002-2003
39. Activity evaluation on food security in Gaza (JFDetry-Inhambane)
40. RESAL – Seminar Intervention Options (Bilene Gaza 5-6 Junho 2000)
41. Food and Nutrition Security Strategy 2002
42. Call for proposal for NGO (September 1999) – The appraisal Process
43. Summary of the Additional Analysis of the Demographic, Nutrition and Health Findings – Nov. 2003
44. Grille d'Evaluation for Call for Proposals of budget lines B7-201 and B7-6000;
45. EC – 2003 NGO Food Security Programme: Guidelines for grant applicants responding to the call for proposals for 2003 – budget line 210202.

ANNEX 4: COMMITMENTS UNDER THE EDF FOR MOZAMBIQUE (1997 – 2002)

From	Year	Project number	Project title	Planned	Contracts	Paid	Sector
FED 07	1997	7 ACP MOZ 99	ANALYSING THE FUTURE ROLE & CAPACITY OF IDIL	59.934	59.934	59.934	Industry / SME / Commerce
FED 07	1997	7 ACP MOZ 90	DESIGNIN INSTIT. SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR MIN. OF STATE ADMINIS	49.211	49.211	49.211	Banking and financial sector
FED 07	1997	7 ACP MOZ 98	ETUDE POUR ANALYSER LES CAUSES DE PAUVRETÉ EN MOZAMBIQUE	19.354	19.354	19.354	Civil Society
FED 07	1997	7 ACP MOZ 95	EVALUATION BESOINS MIN. COORD. DE L'ACTION SOCIALE EN MATIERE DE FORMATION ET DE SYSTEME D'INFORMATION	43.120	43.120	43.120	Government/Administ ration
FED 08	1997	8 ACP MOZ 2	GENERAL IMPORT PROGRAMME (GIP III)	15.000.000	15.000.000	15.000.000	Structural Adjustment
FED 08	1997	8 ACP MOZ 3	General import programme (gip iii)	45.900.000	45.896.868	45.876.932	Structural Adjustment
FED 07	1997	7 ACP MOZ 105	MICROPROJECT COORDINATION UNIT	443.699	443.699	443.699	Multisector Aid
FED 08	1997	8 ACP MOZ 1	MOZAL ALUMINIUM SMELTER (71106)	16.108.865	16.108.865	16.108.865	Industry / SME / Commerce
FED 06	1997	6 ACP MOZ 109	OPERATION DE JUMELAGE INTER UNIVERSITES	104.976	104.976	104.976	Education
PIN-07-MOZ	1997	FED/MOZ/CULT/071 55/000	PACC:97007 - SUPPORT FOR SADC THEATRE FESTIVAL, MAPUTO	260.000	260.000	0	Civil Society
PIN-07-MOZ	1997	PACA/97166	PARTICIPATORY STUDY ON POVERTY IN MOZAMBIQUE - 3RD PHASE	60.000	60.000	0	Civil Society
FED 06	1997	6 ACP MOZ 106	POPULATION CENSUS	1.958.891	1.958.891	1.958.891	Government/Administ ration
PIN-07-MOZ	1997	PACA/97205	PRELIMINARY STUDY FOR THE INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT TO THE MINIS TRYOF THE COORDINATION OF THE SOCIAL ACTION	52.000	52.000	0	others
FED 07	1997	7 ACP MOZ 100	PREPARATION ROAD DVLPMPT PROGRAMME NORTH WEST.REGION ZAMBEZIA	51.251	51.251	51.251	Transport
FED 06	1997	6 ACP MOZ 107	PROGRAMME OFFICER FOR SUPPORT TO MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS	171.063	171.063	171.063	Civil Society

From	Year	Project number	Project title	Planned	Contracts	Paid	Sector
FED 07	1997	7 ACP MOZ 96	STUDY ON IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT	40.295	40.295	40.295	Banking and financial sector
PIN-07-MOZ	1997	DAGT/97049	STUDY ON THE FUTURE ROLE & CAPACITY OF IDIL-INSTITUTE FOR THE SUPPORT OF SMALL INDUSTRY	60.000	60.000	0	Industry / SME / Commerce
FED 07	1997	7 ACP MOZ 104	SUPPORT FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS	8.775.000	8.154.512	6.815.579	Civil Society
FED 07	1997	7 ACP MOZ 103	SUPPORT FOR SADC THEATR FESTIVAL, MAPUTO	222.487	222.487	222.487	Civil Society
PIN-06-MOZ	1997	FED/MOZ/07027/000	SUPPORT FOR THE POPULATION CENSUS	2.000.000	2.000.000	0	Government/Administration
FED 07	1997	7 ACP MOZ 101	SURVEY & DESIGN OF THE MANIAMBIA TO METANGULA ROAD	25.099	25.099	25.099	Transport
FED 07	1997	7 ACP MOZ 97	TA FOR THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE FOR ROADS AND BRIDGES	516.418	516.418	516.418	Transport
FED 07	1998	7 ACP MOZ 107	BEIRA WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE - FEASIBILITY STUDY	271.825	271.825	271.825	Water and Sanitation
FED 07	1998	7 ACP MOZ 106	ELABORATION OF REHABILITATION OF PUBLIC LIBRARIES	38.503	38.503	38.503	Education
FED 08	1998	8 ACP MOZ 7	EVALUATION OF EC FUNDED REHABILITATION ACTIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE	41.409	41.409	41.409	Industry / SME / Commerce
FED 07	1998	7 ACP MOZ 111	EVALUATION OF EC FUNDED REHABILITATION ACTIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE	46.471	46.471	46.471	Industry / SME / Commerce
PIN-07-MOZ	1998	DAGT/98254	EXPERIMENTS & EDUC. ON NATURAL FISH CONSERVATION TECHNOLOGY	59.900	59.900	0	Fishery and Forestry
FED 08	1998	8 ACP MOZ 4	General import programme (gip iii)	6.900.000	6.473.961	6.394.066	Structural Adjustment
PIN-07-MOZ	1998	DAGT/98397	IDENTIFICATION STUDY, TECHNICAL STUDY/PREPARATION OF ROAD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME FOR NORTH-WESTERN REGION OF ZAMBEZIA	116.540	116.540	0	Transport
FED 08	1998	8 ACP MOZ 8	MICRO-PROJECTS REGIONAL PROGRAMMES	4.800.000	4.782.498	3.781.453	Industry / SME / Commerce

From	Year	Project number	Project title	Planned	Contracts	Paid	Sector
FED 07	1998	7 ACP MOZ 110	PROGRAMME OFFICER FOR SUPPORT TO MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS	17.849	17.849	17.849	Civil Society
FED 08	1998	8 ACP MOZ 6	SADC REGIONAL MONITORING, CONTROL & SURVEILLANCE OF FISHING	2.280.000	1.405.906	355.805	Fishery and Forestry
PIN-08-MOZ	1998	FED/MOZ/07200/002	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT SUPPORT PROGRAMME - GENERAL IMPORT PROGRAMME III	67.800.000	45.900.000	0	Structural Adjustment
FED 07	1998	7 ACP MOZ 108	STUDY: TRADE DEVELOPMENT NEEDS ANALYSIS FOR MOZAMBIQUE	15.758	15.758	15.758	Industry/SME/Commerce
FED 06	1998	6 ACP MOZ 110	STUDY: TRADE DEVELOPMENT NEEDS ANALYSIS FOR MOZAMBIQUE	77.213	77.213	77.213	Industry/SME/Commerce
PIN-07-MOZ	1998	DAGT/98256	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE FOR ROADS AND BRIDGES	102.000	0	0	Transport
PIN-07-MOZ	1998	DAGT/98407	TECHNICAL STUDY	80.000	80.000	0	Transport
FED 08	1998	8 ACP MOZ 5	ZAMBEZE VALLEY INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES AND RURAL WATER SUPPLY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT	73.697	73.697	73.697	Health
FED 08	1999	8 ACP MOZ 13	APPRAISAL ON EC SUPPORT TO ROADS SECTOR	56.525	56.525	56.525	Transport
FED 07	1999	7 ACP MOZ 114	ASSESSMENT OF THE LIVESTOCK SITUATION	76.224	76.224	76.224	Livestock
PIN-08-MOZ	1999	FED/MOZ/07036/000	BEIRA WATER SUPPLY PROJECT	15.000.000	0	0	Water and Sanitation
FED 07	1999	7 ACP MOZ 112	EDF COORDINATION TEAM FOR JOINT OBSERVATION MISSION-ELECTION	73.954	73.954	73.954	Civil Society
FED 08	1999	8 ACP MOZ 14	EU-MOZAMBIQUE PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPT PROG.	4.800.000	4.440.000	1.788.405	Industry / SME / Commerce
FED 08	1999	8 ACP MOZ 12	MARAGRA ACUCAR (20353)	3.500.000	3.500.000	3.500.000	Agriculture
FED 08	1999	8 ACP MOZ 20	MARAGRA SUGAR A (20352)	427.599	427.599	427.599	Agriculture
PIN-08-MOZ	1999	DAGM/98019	MICRO-PROJECTS REGIONAL PROGRAMMES	4.800.000	4.800.000	0	Industry / SME / Commerce
FED 08	1999	8 ACP MOZ 17	MONAPO (20186)	1.000.000	1.000.000	1.000.000	Industry / SME / Commerce
FED 08	1999	8 ACP MOZ 16	MOTRACO A (20132)	3.454.997	3.454.997	3.454.997	Industry / SME / Commerce

From	Year	Project number	Project title	Planned	Contracts	Paid	Sector
FED 08	1999	8 ACP MOZ 18	MOZAMBIQUE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	30.000.000	0	0	Rural Development
FED 08	1999	8 ACP MOZ 15	NAMPULA TO NACALA ROAD REHABILITATION	36.580.000	21.573.543	15.181.302	Transport
PIN-08-MOZ	1999	FED/MOZ/07044/000	PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	5.500.000	5.500.000	0	Industry / SME / Commerce
PIN-08-MOZ	1999	FED/MOZ/07045/000	REHABILITATION OF THE ROAD NAMPULA-NACALA	36.580.000	36.580.000	0	Transport
FED 07	1999	7 ACP MOZ 113	SECTORAL BASELINE STUDY FOR THE RDP'S IMPLEMENTATION	71.359	71.359	71.359	Industry / SME / Commerce
FED 08	1999	8 ACP MOZ 11	SUPPORT TO PRIVATE SECTOR STUDY	33.330	33.330	33.330	Industry / SME / Commerce
FED 08	1999	8 ACP MOZ 9	SUPPORT TO THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN 1999	17.750.000	17.031.945	15.041.923	Civil Society
FED 08	1999	8 ACP MOZ 10	TA TO EDF PROJECT SUPPORT TO GENERAL ELECTIONS 1999	39.542	39.542	39.542	Civil Society
FED 08	1999	8 ACP MOZ 19	WATER RESOURCES MGMT/RURAL WTR SUPPLIES ZAMBESI RIVER BASIN	11.639.901	10.088.846	2.538.310	Multisector Aid
PIN-08-MOZ	1999	FED/MOZ/07037/000	ZAMBEZE VALLEY INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES AND WATER SUPPLY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT	11.639.901	11.639.901	0	Water and Sanitation
FED 07	2000	7 ACP MOZ 118	3RD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON LDC	78.000	38.591	38.591	Health
--	2000	PMS/2000/0121	CONSULTANCY SERVICES FOR THE SURVEY AND DESIGN OF THE MANIAMBAM-METANGULA ROAD	30.205	0	0	Transport
FED 08	2000	8 ACP MOZ 22	FEASIBILITY STUDY OF ROAD NMACURRA-RIO LIGONHA IN ZAMBEZIA PROVINCE	1.600.000	1.424.900	1.303.519	Transport
FED 08	2000	8 ACP MOZ 23	FLOOD RECOVERY PROGRAMME-TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SUPPORT	1.965.000	1.816.000	1.815.875	Environment
FED 08	2000	8 ACP MOZ 25	GENERAL IMPORT PROGRAMME III (AUG.PLAF. CF 6023/MOZ)	13.500.000	13.500.000	13.500.000	Structural Adjustment
FED 08	2000	8 ACP MOZ 24	POST-FLOOD RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME IN GAZA PROVINCE	18.035.000	16.561.118	11.735.661	Environment
FED 08	2000	8 ACP MOZ 26	POVERTY REDUCTION BUDGET SUPPORT (PRBS1).	26.400.000	26.319.850	26.095.656	Structural Adjustment

From	Year	Project number	Project title	Planned	Contracts	Paid	Sector
FED 08	2000	8 ACP MOZ 21	Private sector support (20363)	5.589.920	5.589.920	5.589.920	Banking and financial sector
FED 07	2000	7 ACP MOZ 116	TA TP NIP	36.000	36.000	36.000	Industry / SME / Commerce
FED 08	2000	8 ACP MOZ 30	TDM TELECOMMUNICATIONS (20907)	6.000.000	6.000.000	6.000.000	others
FED 07	2000	7 ACP MOZ 117	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN INFRASTRUCTURES	37.402	37.402	37.402	Industry / SME / Commerce
FED 07	2001	7 ACP MOZ 119	Echo/moz/254/2001/01000 - further emergency humanitarian ASSISTANCE FOR FLOOD VICTIMS IN MOZAMBIQUE	840.000	740.939	740.939	Refugees
FED 08	2001	8 ACP MOZ 36	FEASIBILITY STUDY - ON SECTIONS OF THE NACALA TRANSPORT CORR IDOR	150.000	121.956	59.953	Transport
FED 08	2001	8 ACP MOZ 35	FEASIBILITY STUDY EDM BEIRA	373.982	373.982	373.982	Energy
FED 08	2001	8 ACP MOZ 33	HEALTH SECTOR SUPPORT PROGRAMME	30.000.000	4.945.902	2.429.791	Health
FED 08	2001	8 ACP MOZ 34	Mozal ii (21398)	20.000.000	20.000.000	13.160.711	Industry / SME / Commerce
FED 06	2001	6 ACP MOZ 111	Private sector support (21061)	2.923.293	2.923.293	982.226	Banking and financial sector
FED 08	2001	8 ACP MOZ 32	SUPPORT TO THE MICRO-PROJECTS COORDINATION UNIT WITHIN THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT	360.000	233.960	157.270	Rural Development
FED 08	2001	8 ACP MOZ 31	TDM TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROJECT (20906)	292.689	292.689	292.689	others
FED 08	2002	8 ACP MOZ 37	Accord amorim hotels	4.000.000	4.000.000	4.000.000	Industry/SME/Commerce
FED 08	2002	8 ACP MOZ 45	ASSESSMENT REFORM PROCESS JUDICIARY SECTOR & FEASIB. STUDY	70.077	70.077	63.552	Government/Administration
FED 07	2002	7 ACP MOZ 120	BEIRA SANITATION PROJECT-DESIGN	1.850.000	1.195.000	0	Water and Sanitation
FED 08	2002	8 ACP MOZ 38	EVALUATION - SUPPORT TO THE GENERAL ELECTIONS 1999 (8 MOZ 9)	43.390	38.157	38.157	Civil Society
FED 08	2002	8 ACP MOZ 43	FEASIBILITY STUDY - PROGRAMME SUPPORT FISHERIES SECTOR	15.500	13.521	13.521	Fishery and Forestry

From	Year	Project number	Project title	Planned	Contracts	Paid	Sector
FED 08	2002	8 ACP MOZ 41	POVERTY REDUCTION BUDGET SUPPORT II (PRBS II) 2002-2005	18.000.000	17.081.100	41.650	Structural Adjustment
FED 08	2002	8 ACP MOZ 40	POVERTY REDUCTION BUDGET SUPPORT II (PRBS II) 2002-2005	150.000.000	150.000.000	71.067.000	Structural Adjustment
FED 08	2002	8 ACP MOZ 39	REGULARISATION DE CONTRAT AVEC ERNST & YOUNG	85.670	85.670	85.670	Structural Adjustment
FED 08	2002	8 ACP MOZ 44	Rsa natural gas project	35.000.000	0	0	Energy
PIN-07-MOZ	2002	DAGT/02123	TA FOR THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE FOR ROADS AND BRIDGES	1.062	1.062	0	others

ANNEX 5: COMMITMENTS UNDER B720 FOR MOZAMBIQUE (1997-2002)

et line	Fund center	Commitment creation year	Title	Final date of implemen- tation	Contract signature date	Committed	Paid	To be paid	Food Aid / Transport / Food Security
B72010B00	SCR/BRU	B1997	APPUI:MOZAMBIQUE LO 17.428	30/06/2002	01.02.1998	3.000.000	3.000.000	0	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1997	ASSIST.TECHN.MOZAMBIQUE LO 17.428	31/12/2004	01.02.1998	473.374	9.895	463.478	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1997	ASSIST.TECHN.MOZAMBIQUE LO 17.428	31/12/2004	01.02.1998	583.585	110.211	473.374	Food Security
B72020B00	SCR/BRU	B1997	ASSIST.TECHN.MOZAMBIQUE LO 17.428	31/12/2004	01.02.1998	868.562	284.977	583.585	Food Aid / Transport
B72020B00	DEV/SCR/BR U	B1997	ASSIST.TECHN.MOZAMBIQUE LO 17.428	31/12/2004	01.02.1998	1.876.485	1.007.923	868.562	Food Aid / Transport
B720201000	08/BRU	B1997	ASSIST.TECHN.MOZAMBIQUE LO 17.428	31/12/2004	01.02.1998	2.286.518	410.033	1.876.485	Food Aid / Transport
B72020	08/BRU	B1997	ASSIST.TECHN.MOZAMBIQUE LO 17.428	31/12/2004	01.02.1998	2.440.000	0	2.440.000	Food Aid / Transport
B72020	08/BRU	B1997	ASSIST.TECHN.MOZAMBIQUE LO 17.428	31/12/2004	01.02.1998	2.440.000	153.482	2.286.518	Food Aid / Transport
B72000B00	DEV/SCR/BR U	B1997	FAC.DEVISES:MOZAMBIQUE LO 17.428	30/06/2002	01.02.1998	5.000.000	0	5.000.000	Food Aid
B72000B00	SCR/BRU	B1997	FAC.DEVISES:MOZAMBIQUE LO 17.428	30/06/2002	01.02.1998	5.000.000	5.000.000	0	Food Aid
B720001000	08/BRU	B1997	FAC.DEVISES:MOZAMBIQUE LO 17.428	30/06/2002	01.02.1998	10.000.000	5.000.000	5.000.000	Food Aid
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1997	ONG:ACTION NORD SUD-MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2002	01.02.1998	33.383	33.383	0	Food Security
B720101000	08/BRU	B1997	ONG:ACTION NORD SUD-MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2002	01.02.1998	159.350	125.967	33.383	Food Security
B7201008	08/BRU	B1997	ONG:ACTION NORD SUD-MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2002	01.02.1998	209.350	50.000	159.350	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1997	ONG:OIKO-MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2003	01.02.1998	69.528	0	69.528	Food Security
B72010B00	DEV/SCR/BR U	B1997	ONG:OIKO-MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2003	01.02.1998	354.372	284.844	69.528	Food Security
B7201008	08/BRU	B1997	ONG:OIKO-MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2003	01.02.1998	695.283	340.911	354.372	Food

et line	Fund center	Commitment creation year	Title	Final date of implementation	Contract signature date	Committed	Paid	To be paid	Food Aid / Transport / Food Security
									Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1998	APPUI:FAO (SFSP) _ MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2003	08.05.1998	41.000	0	41.000	Food Security
B72010B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1998	APPUI:FAO (SFSP) _ MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2003	08.05.1998	492.000	451.000	41.000	Food Security
B7201008	08/BRU	B1998	APPUI:FAO (SFSP) _ MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2003	08.05.1998	820.000	328.000	492.000	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2 MOVIMONDO MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2004	26/08/1998	1.117.214	446.623	670.591	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2 MOVIMONDO MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2004	26/08/1998	1.443.113	325.899	1.117.214	Food Security
B72010B00	SCR/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2 MOVIMONDO MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2004	26/08/1998	1.700.771	257.658	1.443.113	Food Security
B720101000	08/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG2 MOVIMONDO MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2004	26/08/1998	2.498.820	798.049	1.700.771	Food Security
B72010B00	SCR/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG-MSF(B):INFORM.SYSTEM MOZA	31/12/2003	17/08/1998	153.917	12.757	141.160	Food Security
B72010B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG-MSF(B):INFORM.SYSTEM MOZA	31/12/2003	17/08/1998	754.496	600.579	153.917	Food Security
B720101000	08/BRU	B1998	APPUI:ONG-MSF(B):INFORM.SYSTEM MOZA	31/12/2003	17/08/1998	1.411.600	657.104	754.496	Food Security
B72020	08/BRU	B1998	PR.ANTER.1990 MOZAMB.LO 44495	31/12/1998	15/04/1998	96.986	96.985	1	Food Aid / Transport
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1998	SAP: FAO - MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2003	08.05.1998	64.500	0	64.500	Food Security
B720101000	08/BRU	B1998	SAP: FAO - MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2003	08.05.1998	774.000	709.500	64.500	Food Security
B7201008	08/BRU	B1998	SAP: FAO - MOZAMBIQUE	31/12/2003	08.05.1998	1.290.000	516.000	774.000	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1999	MOZAMBIQUE 1999 - APPUI	31/12/2005	01.01.2000	7.548.376	2.169.417	5.378.959	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1999	MOZAMBIQUE 1999 - APPUI	31/12/2005	01.01.2000	10.581.876	3.033.500	7.548.376	Food Security
B72010B00	SCR/BRU	B1999	MOZAMBIQUE 1999 - APPUI	31/12/2005	01.01.2000	15.262.674	4.680.798	10.581.876	Food Security

et line	Fund center	Commitment creation year	Title	Final date of implementation	Contract signature date	Committed	Paid	To be paid	Food Aid / Transport / Food Security
B72010B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B1999	MOZAMBIQUE 1999 - APPUI	31/12/2005	01.01.2000	16.300.000	1.037.326	15.262.674	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1999	REPUBLIQUE DU MOZAMBIQUE - AT 1999	31/12/2005	13/08/1999	529.358	56.022	473.336	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B1999	REPUBLIQUE DU MOZAMBIQUE - AT 1999	31/12/2005	13/08/1999	969.924	440.566	529.358	Food Security
B72020B00	SCR/BRU	B1999	REPUBLIQUE DU MOZAMBIQUE - AT 1999	31/12/2005	13/08/1999	1.700.000	730.076	969.924	Food Aid / Transport
B72010B00	DEV/SCR/BRU	B2000	MOZAMBIQUE 2000 APPUI/STOCK/INFO A53	30/06/2006	15/09/2001	5.000.000	0	5.000.000	Food Security
B72010B00	SCR/BRU	B2000	MOZAMBIQUE 2000 APPUI/STOCK/INFO A53	30/06/2006	15/09/2001	5.000.000	5.000.000	0	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2000	MOZAMBIQUE 2000 ASSIST. TECHNIQUE A53	30/06/2004	15/09/2001	336.016	0	336.016	Food Security
B72010B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2000	MOZAMBIQUE 2000 ASSIST. TECHNIQUE A53	30/06/2004	15/09/2001	400.000	63.984	336.016	Food Security
B72020B00	SCR/BRU	B2000	MOZAMBIQUE 2000 ASSIST. TECHNIQUE A53	30/06/2004	15/09/2001	1.200.000	800.000	400.000	Food Aid / Transport
B72000B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2000	MOZAMBIQUE 2000 FACILITE EN DEVISE A53	30/06/2004	28/12/2001	200.000	0	200.000	Food Aid
B72000B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2000	MOZAMBIQUE 2000 FACILITE EN DEVISE A53	30/06/2004	28/12/2001	8.400.000	8.200.000	200.000	Food Aid
B72010A00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	AGRER/EX-RESAL/RISOPOULOS/MOZAMBIQU	31/12/2006	27/02/2002	210.288	78.199	132.089	Food Security
B72010A00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	AGRER/EX-RESAL/RISOPOULOS/MOZAMBIQU	31/12/2006	27/02/2002	360.288	150.000	210.288	Food Security
B72010A00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	CC AMS/451-2002/27383	31/12/2006	08.01.2002	32.885	0	32.885	Food Security
B72010A00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	CC AMS/451-2002/27383	31/12/2006	08.01.2002	164.426	131.541	32.885	Food Security
B72010A00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	GARRIDO CELL.MOZ AIDCO/2002/0371/15			0	0	0	Food Security
B72010A00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	LIONNAZ-PERROUX/MOZAMBIQUE/CN562	31/12/2006	04.05.2002	311.179	106.399	204.780	Food Security
B72010A00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	LIONNAZ-PERROUX/MOZAMBIQUE/CN562	31/12/2006	04.05.2002	421.179	110.000	311.179	Food Security

et line	Fund center	Commitment creation year	Title	Final date of implemen- tation	Contract signature date	Committed	Paid	To be paid	Food Aid / Transport / Food Security
B72000B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	MOZAMBIQUE 2001 ALLOCATION GLOBALE FACILITES DEVISES	30/06/2007	28/12/2001	8.400.000	8.400.000	0	Food Aid
B72000B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	Multiannual Food Security Programme in Mozambique 2000-2002; foreign exchange fa	01.01.2007	19/12/2002	3.400.000	0	3.400.000	Food Aid
B72000B00	AIDCO/BRU	B2002	Multiannual Food Security Programme in Mozambique 2000-2002; foreign exchange fa	01.01.2007	19/12/2002	8.400.000	5.000.000	3.400.000	Food Aid





Comisión Europea

Evaluación Temática de la Política de ayuda alimentaria y de las Operaciones Especiales en Apoyo de la Seguridad Alimentaria;

PARTICIP GmbH

**INFORME DE TERRENO
DE NICARAGUA**

-CENTROAMERICA-

**Pierre Van Roosbroeck
Herminio Castillo**

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1 RESUMEN EXECUTIVO

El presente informe es el resultado del análisis correspondiente a la fase de terreno en Nicaragua (Centroamérica), en el marco de la Evaluación de las acciones financiadas a través de la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria de la Comisión Europea en los países ACP/ALA/MED/TACIS. Dicha Evaluación tiene como objetivo principal, situar el Reglamento 1292/96 en su contexto siete años después de su entrada en vigor y de la implementación, en los países objeto del Reglamento, de su contenido, estrategia y política.

La fase de terreno, de la cual es una muestra el presente documento, responde al estudio previo realizado en la *desk phase*, mediante el cual se identificó la necesidad de argumentar el resultado de la puesta en práctica del Reglamento 1292/96 mediante diez muestras significativas.

1.1 Objetivos y Metodología

Una de estas muestras elegidas, fue Nicaragua. Pero es preciso señalar que de las diez elegidas, la correspondiente a Nicaragua tiene, en su concepción, tres características peculiares:

- En primer lugar, no se trata, técnicamente de una muestra en un país; sino en una “región geográfica” que está envuelta actualmente en un complicado proceso de integración social, política y económica.
- En segundo lugar, esta muestra fue diseñada de una forma ambiciosa; por que pretende el análisis de la Regulación 1292/96 en cuatro países de la región centroamericana, los que forman el CA-4: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador y Guatemala. En los cuales existen dos sedes de Delegaciones de la Comisión Europea: Nicaragua y Guatemala.
- En tercer lugar, la muestra tiene un carácter regional; a pesar de que las intervenciones de la Comisión Europea en cada uno de los cuatro países tiene características propias, se identificó esta fase de terreno como una unidad; es decir, tratando de analizar, con una visión regional, las acciones derivadas de la puesta en marcha del Reglamento a principios del año 97.

Estas tres características, suponen un marco especial dentro de las diez muestras previstas; ya que es el único lugar de muestreo que no responde ni a un solo país ni a una sola Delegación de la Unión Europea.

En la “*desk phase*” anterior a la fase de terreno, se determinó la metodología general de la evaluación: A través de 12 preguntas evaluativas generales para las diez muestras de terreno, se analizaría el valor añadido del Instrumento Seguridad Alimentaria y de los mecanismos que lo componen, en aras de analizar y visualizar el futuro de esta Línea presupuestaria. Estas preguntas evaluativas marcaron sobre el terreno el desarrollo de la evaluación y son, junto con los 5 parámetros generales de medición (Pertinencia, Eficiencia, Eficacia, Impacto y Coherencia) el cuerpo principal del presente informe.

1.2 Los Marcos conceptuales de la evaluación en Centroamérica

Para abordar el tema de la Seguridad Alimentaria en Centroamérica y las implicaciones de la política (o la ausencia de ella) de la Comisión en este tema, es importante centrarlo en los marcos conceptuales en los que en el presente se desarrolla el tema:

- En primer lugar, los Planes Nacionales de Desarrollo de los gobiernos centroamericanos y los documentos de Estrategia de Reducción de Pobreza (ERCPs): Encuadran el tema -SA- en las políticas públicas estatales.
- En segundo lugar, los CSPs de la Comisión para cada país y el novedoso RSP para la Región: Encuadran el tema -SA- en la política de la Comisión para los países y para la región.
- En tercer lugar, el nuevo Reglamento Financiero de la Comisión y la estrategia futura de cooperación a través del “Apoyo presupuestario o Sectorial”: Encuadran el tema -SA- en la estrategia de cooperación de la Comisión para los países y para la región.
- En cuarto lugar y como marco general de intervención, que englobaría a los otros tres: Los mandatos internacionales (Cumbre del Milenio, etc.) versus incidencia política de la Comisión en la Región: Encuadran el tema -SA- entre la reducción de pobreza versus integración centroamericana y crecimiento macroeconómico.

El desarrollo y las consecuencias de estos cuatro marcos conceptuales son desarrollados en las conclusiones del presente documento.

1.3 La Seguridad Alimentaria en Centroamérica

Es un punto de partida imprescindible para esta evaluación, mencionar que los datos de Inseguridad Alimentaria que se manejan en la Región por las diferentes fuentes (estatales, organizaciones internacionales y regionales) que los miden, son alarmantes. Han ido creciendo en la última década de forma progresiva. Si unimos, los habitantes en Inseguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional con los que están en Riesgo de InSAN, la conclusión es que entre un 35 y un 45 % de la población de los cuatro países centroamericanos analizados presentan niveles de InSAN.

Varios factores han contribuido a esta situación (Huracán Mitch, sequías, Fenómenos niño-niña) pero las causas de la Inseguridad Alimentaria son estructurales, responden a procesos históricos y políticos y son, con matices, las mismas en los cuatro países del área.

En el perfil de País que presentamos se aborda con profundidad esta situación, ahora basta decir la InSAN existe y es bastante importante; otra cosa son las medidas de políticas públicas que se están tomando y la postura de los grandes donantes e instituciones internacionales en el tema.

1.4 El Programa Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria

Actualmente existe en Centroamérica, un esfuerzo por parte de la Delegación de echar a caminar un Programa Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria que ya ha sido formalmente aprobado y que tendrá su inicio en el segundo semestre del año. Este esfuerzo, pionero en cuanto a su concepción y en cuanto a su temática, tratará de poner sobre la mesa la importancia de dotar a

Centroamérica de unos niveles adecuados de Seguridad Alimentaria como base para un posterior desarrollo. Nunca se había abordado esta temática de forma regional desde la Comisión y este esfuerzo piloto ha tenido un primer resultado (además de conseguir reunir a las Instituciones nacionales, regionales e internacionales que tratan el tema en la región) en forma de una *Memoria del Programa Regional* que ha sido la fuente mas importante en la elaboración del siguiente Perfil Regional.

1.5 Conclusión

A modo de Conclusión, debemos decir que en Centroamérica, los espacios para enmarcar una política de Seguridad Alimentaria en la Región no están lo suficientemente abiertos.

1. No lo están en los Planes Nacionales de Desarrollo (PNDs) de los gobiernos centroamericanos ni en los documentos de Estrategia de Reducción de Pobreza (ERCPs).
2. No lo están en los CSPs de la Comisión para cada país ni en el nuevo RSP para la Región, documentos que definen la política y la estrategia de la Comisión para los países y para la región.
3. No lo están en el ámbito del nuevo Reglamento Financiero de la Comisión y la estrategia futura de cooperación a través del “Apoyo presupuestario o Sectorial”.

Sin embargo, la necesidad de abrir esos espacios está ahí. No hay mas que estudiar los indicadores de Inseguridad Alimentaria que presenta la región, que además van en aumento en los últimos años, para demostrar esa necesidad.

Además, si entendemos que el fin último de la cooperación europea (según acuerdos internacionales, el propio mandato de la Comisión, la Cumbre del Milenio, etc) son las acciones para la reducción de la pobreza, queda claro que el espacio teórico existe para darle un marco político a una estrategia prioritaria de Seguridad Alimentaria. Pero no parece que sea ese el camino a seguir en Centroamérica.

El argumento de la Delegación para no priorizar la temática de Seguridad Alimentaria en el proceso de reducción de pobreza, es que hay otras formas de reducir pobreza. Por ejemplo a través del fortalecimiento de las instituciones regionales, de la unión aduanera, de procesos de crecimiento macroeconómico con ajustes en los gastos públicos, de fomento de las exportaciones selectivas, de bajar los costos de la deuda externa e interna como primer paso para conseguir el crecimiento de la región que por “el efecto dominó” o “el efecto de los vasos desbordantes” redundará también en beneficio de las capas mas desfavorecidas.

Sin embargo esto es difícil de demostrar. En opinión de los consultores, sin medidas estrictamente dirigidas hacia estas capas desfavorecidas, no se consigue aliviar su situación a corto y medio plazo; quizá se pueda a largo plazo pero muy difícil en Centroamérica donde los medios de producción, las tierras y los recursos financieros están en muy pocas manos y estas elites son las que salen favorecidas de este supuesto crecimiento macroeconómico del país.

Por tanto el futuro de la línea específica de Seguridad Alimentaria en Centroamérica pasa, en primer lugar, por definirla. Si la entendemos como una **línea proactiva**, pilar básico del desarrollo, punto primario para acciones de desarrollo local e intervenciones en desarrollo rural

o por el contrario la entendemos como una **línea reactiva**, mas cercana a la ayuda alimentaria que al desarrollo, mas cercana a ECHO que a los proyectos ALA, mas cercana, en definitiva, a paliar situaciones puntuales y no como una estrategia primaria y necesaria para el posterior desarrollo.

Los consultores firmantes de este informe apuestan por la primera acepción; con las consecuencias que eso traería para la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria en Centroamérica.

Cabe mencionar por último, la importancia del PSA, **el nuevo Programa Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria (12 Millones de Euros)**, que constituye un esfuerzo por parte de la Delegación de regionalizar el tema; siguiendo con la lógica de apoyo a la integración regional y del fortalecimiento a las instituciones regionales.

Además, el PSA, tratará de poner sobre la mesa la importancia de dotar a Centroamérica de unos índices adecuados de Seguridad Alimentaria como base para un posterior desarrollo, conceptualizando la SA como puente y nexo de unión de la lógica VARD y dándole a la línea de SA en Centroamérica un importante valor añadido que habrá que monitorear en un futuro próximo para observar su valor como experiencia piloto.

1.6 Recomendación

A modo de resumen, se recomienda:

- Redefinición del instrumento (Reglamento 1296) y sus mecanismos metodológicos para lograr una Línea mas específica centrada en la población meta en situación de riesgo o de Inseguridad Alimentaria. Esto implica quitar del Reglamento algunos mecanismos no tan propios para ese grupo meta (ver Recomendaciones).
- Fortalecimiento de la línea a nivel administrativo y de recursos humanos y financieros, para acoger la futura desconcentración de la línea con nueva estrategia de fortalecimiento interno en aras de ser mas ambiciosos y lograr mayores impactos en SA.
- Rescatar una estrategia general de SA en la Delegación de Centroamérica para que sea uno de los puntos importantes de la cooperación europea en cada país de la región.

2 INTRODUCCION

La Misión de evaluación de las intervenciones en materia de seguridad alimentaria por parte de la Comisión Europea en Nicaragua se ha llevado a cabo en un contexto de cambios en las modalidades de ejecución de los instrumentos de cooperación así como de la forma de implementar las políticas de la CE en la Región. De tal forma que el análisis que se desprende del presente documento puede aportar claves de entendimiento y discusión para un futuro próximo de las acciones de la Comisión en la Región, fundamentalmente en lo referente a las intervenciones que tengan como meta un compromiso con la Seguridad Alimentaria.

2.1 Antecedentes y justificación

En la “*desk phase*” anterior a la fase de terreno, se determinó la metodología general de la evaluación: A través de 12 preguntas evaluativas generales para las diez muestras de terreno, se analizaría el valor añadido del Instrumento Seguridad Alimentaria y de los mecanismos que lo componen, en aras de analizar y visualizar el futuro de esta Línea presupuestaria. Estas preguntas evaluativas marcaron sobre el terreno el desarrollo de la evaluación y son, junto con los 5 parámetros generales de medición (Pertinencia, Eficiencia, Eficacia, Impacto y Coherencia) el cuerpo principal del presente informe.

En el presente informe de terreno, se utilizará '*la región*' para designar la parte del istmo centroamericano conformada por los cuatro países Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras y Nicaragua. Se reconoce no obstante que los vínculos con Chiapas al norte y con Costa Rica al sur son muy importantes en los territorios fronterizos respectivos.

En el análisis situacional que se aborda en este documento, se revisan los datos disponibles en cada país, ordenándolos en función del abordaje metodológico en el cual están sustentados, para luego compararlos entre los países en aras de buscar conclusiones de la situación de SA en la Región y del papel de la Comisión en las políticas y estrategias de SA..

Cabe guardar siempre en mente que el juicio que la misión puede dar sobre la inSAN en la región es necesariamente tributario de la información primaria existente, la cual está siendo generada y procesada bajo diferentes enfoques, y que la puesta en coherencia, de los análisis resultantes para dar cuenta de la "realidad" de la inSAN, es todavía incipiente.

2.2 Porqué Nicaragua (Centroamérica)

2.2.1 Introduction

La Delegación de la Comisión en Nicaragua es una de las mas grandes en volumen financiero y de recursos humanos por ser la sede para toda la región y representar a la Comisión en una de las áreas de mayor nivel de subdesarrollo del continente americano.

Nicaragua, Honduras y Guatemala son, junto con Haití, los cuatro países con mayores índices de subdesarrollo en América según el Informe de Desarrollo Humano de las NN.UU (PNUD). Cada uno de los países de la región presenta peculiaridades propias tanto desde el punto de vista social como político y económico pero en alguna medida, las causas estructurales de la pobreza

y de la exclusión responden a los mismos parámetros en los cuatro países mas desfavorecidos de la Región.

Estos países que conforman actualmente el CA-4, están envueltos junto con los otros tres países de la Región en un proceso de construcción política de la integración centroamericana que marcará el futuro de la región a corto plazo.

Se estima (PNUD, FAO, PMA) que entre el 35 y el 40% de los habitantes de los cuatro países (Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador y Guatemala) de la región centroamericana están actualmente en situación de Inseguridad Alimentaria o en riesgo de ella. Estos datos hablan por si solo de la necesidad de implementar estrategias tendentes no sólo a integrar políticamente a estos países sino de avanzar, como tema prioritario, en la seguridad alimentaria de sus habitantes.

En este sentido, el *Perfil de País*, que a continuación se presenta, tiene un marcado enfoque regional, tratando de presentar los datos y estadísticas de la región en el tema de la Seguridad Alimentaria pero al mismo tiempo presentando las claves y las causas de esta situación y analizando sus consecuencias para dar, por último, algunas pautas que tiendan hacia posibles soluciones.

2.2.2 Perfil de País

2.2.2.1 Consideraciones Previas

El presente documento tiene, en el marco de la Evaluación del Reglamento 1292/96 sobre Seguridad Alimentaria, vocación de complementariedad a la parte sustantiva de la evaluación de la mencionada línea presupuestaria de la Comisión Europea en su fase de terreno – Centroamérica-.

En la “desk phase” de la presente evaluación se identificaron los países que formarían la fase de terreno, siendo Centroamérica uno de ellos. En este sentido es importante destacar tres consideraciones previas al perfil de País:

- Dada la peculiaridad de la “muestra de terreno” en Centroamérica por ser la única que corresponde a una región geográfica (que abarca un conjunto de países y no a un país individualmente), se ha intentado obtener una visión regional a través de los datos y las consideraciones que a continuación se expresan.

Dicha visión regional presenta connotaciones propias por ser una región geográfica pero no política ni institucional; una región solamente en proceso de construcción que tiene la integración como una meta futura en la que aún se están dando los primeros pasos.

Esto constituye una dificultad añadida para lograr un perfil de región que tenga una estructura homogénea. A pesar de esto, ciertas instituciones con carácter regional como el INCAP (Instituto de Nutrición de Centroamérica y Panamá) ó internacionales como el PMA, el PNUD o las propias delegaciones de la Comisión Europea en Centroamérica están haciendo importantes esfuerzos para tener criterios regionales en el tema de la seguridad Alimentaria que son recogidas en este documento.

- En el marco de este carácter regional se ha escogido Nicaragua dentro de los países de la región, como el país en el que se enfatiza no sólo en este Perfil introductorio sino en la propia evaluación.
- Para la elaboración de este Perfil Regional se han utilizado fundamentalmente seis documentos perteneciente a cuatro Instituciones con el fin de sistematizar lo máximo posible y dar una visión global en cuanto al tratamiento del tema en la región.

Dichas Instituciones y documentos son:

- “La Iniciativa de Seguridad Alimentaria Nutricional en Centroamérica”, INCAP, 2002.
- “Resumen anual” INCAP, 2003.
- “Informe de Desarrollo Humano Regional –Centroamérica–” PNUD, 2002
- “Taller regional del PMA (WFP) sobre Seguridad Alimentaria” PMA, 2003.
- “Evaluación final de las intervenciones en materia de Seguridad Alimentaria de la Comisión Europea en Nicaragua” CE, 2002.
- “Memoria de Identificación del Programa Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria de la Comisión Europea” CE, 2003.

2.2.2.2 Introducción

La Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional es un estado en el cual todas las personas gozan, en forma oportuna y permanente, de acceso físico, económico y social a los alimentos que necesitan, en cantidad y calidad, para su adecuado consumo y utilización biológica, garantizándoles un estado de bienestar general que coadyuve al logro de su desarrollo.

El retardo del crecimiento físico, el desarrollo mental deficiente, la baja productividad y los altos índices de morbilidad y mortalidad infantil y preescolar, así como la obesidad y varias enfermedades cardiovasculares, endocrinas y cáncer, son algunas de las manifestaciones de la mala alimentación y nutrición de la población. Las causas básicas de estos problemas están directamente relacionados al estado de Inseguridad Alimentaria Nutricional en que viven importantes grupos de la población, el que a su vez está determinado por limitaciones en la disponibilidad y el acceso a los alimentos, por la educación y la cultura alimentaria nutricional de la población y por la condición sanitaria de la misma.

Considerando lo anterior, grupos técnicos y políticos han estado promoviendo la estrategia de la seguridad alimentaria nutricional, como una idea de fuerza, cuya aplicación contribuya a la corrección de los problemas nutricionales actuales y que promueva las condiciones básicas, en términos de aumentar la disponibilidad y accesibilidad de alimentos y cambios en estilo de vida y dietas saludables, que garanticen que esos problemas no se reproduzcan. Vamos a repasar de forma resumida las bases conceptuales de la Seguridad Alimentaria Nutricional a nivel familiar y comunitario:

Cuatro son los pilares necesarios para poder establecer una situación de seguridad alimentaria. Los cuatro factores están interrelacionados de tal forma que la ausencia de uno de ellos es suficiente para entrar en situación de Inseguridad Alimentaria:

Para asegurarse la alimentación, de acuerdo a este esquema, la cadena se inicia con el alimento, que en situación de Seguridad Alimentaria Nutricional, debería estar disponible (disponibilidad) para 100% de la población. Para ciertos grupos de población, sin embargo, la condición de inseguridad alimentaria está determinada por la falta de disponibilidad, lo que a su vez determina la inaccesibilidad a los mismos (acceso). En otros grupos de la población los alimentos pueden estar disponibles pero no todos tendrán acceso a los mismos, debido a limitaciones económicas, de distribución y otras. Es decir, la inseguridad alimentaria nutricional puede acumularse con cada eslabón de la cadena o ser afectada independientemente por el eslabón previo.

Además de la disponibilidad y accesibilidad, existen factores de carácter cultural y social que afectan la aceptabilidad y el consumo de los alimentos convirtiéndose, a veces, en obstáculos adicionales para la seguridad alimentaria nutricional (consumo).

Finalmente, la existencia de alimentos, la accesibilidad, la disponibilidad y el consumo por individuos y poblaciones no son garantía de un óptimo estado nutricional; los factores que afectan la utilización biológica de los alimentos consumidos son múltiples y complejos, por lo que la seguridad alimentaria constituye una condición necesaria, pero no suficiente, para garantizar la seguridad nutricional.

Además de los cuatro factores estructurales y sus encadenamientos, es posible observar factores exógenos, no controlados por la oferta ni por la demanda, que pueden influir fuertemente, de manera temporal aunque periódica, sobre la disponibilidad de alimentos.

Al estudiar la geografía de la variabilidad de estos factores, como los climáticos, se puede cartografiar las amenazas sobre la oferta y, al analizar la distribución de las limitaciones de los suelos y la del acceso a la tierra es posible establecer la cartografía de la vulnerabilidad de los productores, y por ende de la oferta.

En cuanto a la variabilidad del acceso a los alimentos, en el lado de la demanda, ella depende de la sensibilidad de la economía a los shocks externos (amenazas), como por ejemplo la caída del precio del café. Esta sensibilidad de la economía es un tipo de vulnerabilidad que depende, para los distintos estratos de productores, de su nivel de activos y de su capacidad de trasladar, sobre sus costos, la reducción experimentada en sus ingresos. En conclusión, podemos apreciar que hay una dimensión probabilística a la inSAN, que algunos llaman 'el riesgo de caer en inseguridad alimentaria y nutricional' que es distinta de la situación estructural de inSAN. La llamamos RinSAN, para distinguirla de la otra.

2.2.2.3 Situación General (regional) en términos de Seguridad Alimentaria

En este perfil, se utilizará 'la región' para designar la parte del istmo centroamericano conformada por los cuatro países Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras y Nicaragua. Se reconoce no obstante que los vínculos con Chiapas al norte y con Costa Rica al sur son muy importantes en los territorios fronterizos respectivos.

En el análisis situacional que sigue, se revisan los datos disponibles en cada país, ordenándolos en función del abordaje metodológico en el cual están sustentados, para luego compararlos entre los países.

Cabe guardar siempre en mente que el juicio que la misión puede dar sobre la inSAN en la región es necesariamente tributario de la información primaria existente, la cual está siendo generada y procesada bajo diferentes enfoques, y que la puesta en coherencia, de los análisis resultantes para dar cuenta de la "realidad" de la inSAN, es todavía incipiente.

En Centroamérica, en la última década, el número de personas subnutridas ha aumentado mucho más rápidamente que la población. Mientras la tasa de crecimiento observada de la población ha sido del orden de 2.5 por ciento por año en las últimas dos décadas, el número de personas subnutridas ha crecido en 4.7 por ciento anualmente en los 90, mientras este mismo crecimiento había sido de 0.7 por ciento, en base a los datos del último informe de FAO para la región. La situación es muy similar en los cuatro países más pobres de la región, como son Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala y El Salvador, en los cuales el crecimiento de las personas subnutridas fue de 5.4 por ciento.

Las frecuencias de personas desnutridas se encuentran en el primer cuadro anexo. Se puede apreciar que es Guatemala la que más ha perdido en su posición relativa, pues a inicios de los 90 hacia parte del grupo de los menos de 20 por ciento (con 14) cerca de El Salvador que tenía 12. Honduras ocupaba una posición mediana con 23 y Nicaragua la peor con 30.

En el paso a la década siguiente (los datos representan promedios trienales), Honduras es el único que ha mejorado un poco, mientras El Salvador ha empeorado y Guatemala ha casi duplicado su porcentaje, acercándose a Nicaragua, mientras ese último ha mejorado un punto. Esta evolución negativa de la seguridad alimentaria en la región contrasta con la reducción lograda en la incidencia promedio de la subnutrición en América Latina y el Caribe, la cual disminuyó de 13 a 11 por ciento, y con el promedio general del mundo en desarrollo, el cual han pasado de 20 a 17 por ciento. Para el continente africano la cifra es de 35 por ciento.

Ver Appendice I Anexo I Cuadro 1

Estos datos deben ser tomados con reservas, como una primera aproximación, dado el estado deficitario de las estadísticas nacionales (en base a las cuales FAO hace estos cálculos).

Se considera generalmente que la causa más importante de la inseguridad alimentaria en Centroamérica es la pobreza (de ingreso), puesto que impide a las familias acceder a los alimentos disponibles en el mercado. El análisis de la relación entre pobreza y desnutrición muestra que ambas están positivamente correlacionadas, pero con un desajuste importante en los casos de Guatemala y de Honduras. En Guatemala, la subnutrición parece alcanzar un nivel mucho mayor (aún más la desnutrición infantil, como ya se mencionó) en relación al nivel oficial de la pobreza y en Honduras sucede lo contrario, lo que puede también indicar un subregistro de la desnutrición.

Ver Appendice I Anexo I Cuadro 2

La correlación es mayor con la pobreza rural extrema, lo que es consistente con la tesis según la cual la población que más sufre de la inseguridad alimentaria son los productores agrícolas con

menos recursos, para quien la limitación de la disponibilidad es también una limitación de acceso, pues su principal fuente de ingreso es la producción de alimentos básicos, salvo cuando dependen aún más del salario, justamente porque no pueden garantizar su autosuficiencia. Efectivamente la pobreza es mucho más frecuente en medio rural, y más aún la extrema pobreza. En El Salvador y Guatemala la proporción de pobres en el medio rural es alrededor de 60%, en Nicaragua llega a 73% y en Honduras a 82% .

La situación es prácticamente el doble en las áreas rurales (38%) que en las ciudades (19%) y alcanza niveles altamente significativos, llegando a 40% en Guatemala, 53% en Nicaragua, y 63% en Honduras. Esta distancia entre lo rural y lo urbano crece netamente con ingreso medio de los países, y por tanto es mucho más acentuada en El Salvador y en Guatemala, lo que indica claramente que el tipo de generación de ingreso que más aporta al PIB en estos países no contribuye a reducir la extrema pobreza rural .

Ver Appendice 1 Anexo 1 Cuadro 3

Los datos mencionados antes indican no obstante que la situación es diferente en cada país y por tanto la combinación de factores que inciden en la inSAN en cada uno de ellos puede ser diferente. Dado que la distribución territorial de la población varía, así como la distribución estructural de la riqueza, es de esperar que también sean distintos los factores de la inSAN en cada país, o en cada territorio de cada país.

2.2.2.4 Políticas y estrategias regionales en Seguridad Alimentaria

Las negociaciones de un Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Centroamérica (CA) y Estados Unidos (EUA), cuya primera ronda se inicia a finales de enero de 2003 en Costa Rica, tienen como escenario un sector agropecuario y agroindustrial sumergido en una profunda crisis.

Esta crisis no se reduce únicamente a los bajos niveles de rentabilidad y crecimiento que desde hace varios años experimenta el sector en la región centroamericana. También se manifiesta en los altos índices de pobreza rural y en la creciente presión sobre los recursos naturales, especialmente sobre el uso de los suelos, los recursos hídricos y forestales de la región. Los factores generadores de la crisis son de naturaleza diversa y los instrumentos y políticas aplicadas en los últimos años han contribuido muy poco a superar la situación.

Considerando la fragilidad del sector agropecuario en la región, las posibles oportunidades del TLC se ven muy limitadas para el sector, ya que difícilmente éste instrumento comercial cumplirá, por sí solo y sin medidas complementarias, el objetivo de lograr para la producción agropecuaria centroamericana mejores condiciones de acceso al mercado estadounidense.

Por ello, para importantes segmentos de productores agropecuarios crece la preocupación en la medida que se acerca el momento en el cual tengan que competir con bienes producidos al amparo de una amplia estructura de subvenciones que fundamenta la política agrícola estadounidense. Las distorsiones en los mercados agrícolas derivados de estas políticas han contribuido a la ruina de infinidad de productores en los países del Sur. EUA ha sido enfático en manifestar su indisposición a negociar su política agrícola y, en particular, las subvenciones en el marco del TLC con Centroamérica.

Estas disposiciones vienen a sumarse a una ampliación de los programas de apoyo a los productores agrícolas estadounidenses. Por ejemplo, la nueva Ley Agrícola de 2002, otorgará unos 180,000 millones de dólares a los granjeros estadounidenses en los próximos diez años, ampliando subsidios que históricamente han recibido los conglomerados alimentarios estadounidenses. Los subsidios a productos que sirven como materia prima para la agroindustria, constituirán una competencia desleal para las exportaciones centroamericanas de productos agrícolas procesados.

Ciertamente no estamos en contra de los subsidios, ni del uso de éstos como instrumento de política económica. Sin embargo, sí destacamos el hecho del importante peso que tienen los subsidios en un país con altos niveles de productividad, y las enormes asimetrías que de ello se derivan. Por tanto, un tratamiento inadecuado de éstas podría conducir a un acuerdo agrícola desventajoso para CA, el cual lejos de reactivar las actividades agrícolas y fortalecer las capacidades productivas y de exportación, puede terminar por afectar áreas estratégicas de la agricultura regional, con el consiguiente impacto adverso en el ámbito social.

También hay que tomar en cuenta que paralelamente a las negociaciones con los EUA, los países centroamericanos deberán esforzarse en la conformación de una Unión Aduanera.

Las políticas e intervenciones en seguridad alimentaria y nutricional en los países de la región:

Por la transversalidad del concepto de SAN, la misión ha buscado hacer una aproximación a la política de SAN y a las políticas públicas que deben o deberían integrar el concepto. La amplitud del espectro de estas políticas y la diversidad de las intervenciones públicas / privadas así como de la cooperación internacional han llevado la misión a numerosas consultas. Los cuadros siguientes buscan sintetizar la información recopilada.

Ver Appendice 1 Anexo 1 Cuadro 4

Ver Appendice 1 Anexo 1 Cuadro 5

Ver Appendice 1 Anexo 1 Cuadro 6

Ver Appendice 1 Anexo 1 Cuadro 7

Ver Appendice 1 Anexo 1 Cuadro 8

Luego de esta revisión de las políticas e intervenciones en los cuatro países con mayor grado de inseguridad alimentaria y de las iniciativas de la integración en materia de SAN, se puede concluir:

- El sistema institucional de la Integración está introduciendo en forma oportuna la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional en su agenda, de manera que un programa regional de SAN promovido por la Unión Europea encuentra un marco favorable y estimulante para su desarrollo y su inserción al más alto nivel en las instituciones regionales;
- El contexto político de los países está marcado por recientes conflictos bélicos de los cuales salen con modelos sociales de relacionamiento más incluyentes pero aún débiles, razón por la cual se puede hablar de “vulnerabilidad institucional”;

- Las políticas públicas en la región están mayormente orientadas hacia el crecimiento económico y la apertura a la globalidad, y, generalmente, carecen aún de un enfoque equilibrado entre política económica y política social;
- Las políticas de SAN están desigualmente desarrolladas según los países y es necesario hacer un esfuerzo para promoverlas en el sentido de una mayor intersectorialidad, de una mayor visibilidad en las políticas públicas y de una mayor articulación gobierno / sociedad civil;
- El análisis de la situación de inseguridad alimentaria y las políticas de SAN, al nivel nacional como local, no pueden desarrollarse satisfactoriamente por la falta de sistemas de información de SAN suficientemente institucionalizados;
- Las intervenciones de los diferentes actores no son suficientemente coordinadas, cada actor teniendo conceptos y modalidades de trabajo distintas, lo que dificulta la adopción de métodos de trabajo más consensuadas por parte de las políticas públicas;
- Los gobiernos locales no toman suficientemente en cuenta la SAN como eje de planificación de las acciones de desarrollo local;
- Sin embargo, la SAN constituye un eje integrador del desarrollo local y de los diferentes actores, como lo ha mostrado la experiencia del INCAP en el ámbito municipal.

2.2.2.5 Principales retos e inconvenientes para lograr Seguridad alimentaria en la Región

Actualmente, el énfasis en el nivel individual y la divergencia que se ha producido entre este enfoque de SAN a nivel de las personas, por un lado y el enfoque 'sectorial' (agricultura, economía) por otro, minimizando la importancia del enfoque comercial y 'macro'. La introducción del enfoque de salud, aunque también es sectorial, atrae también el concepto hacia el enfoque del individuo.

La primera constatación es que el síntoma común en la región es la subnutrición, de la cual la evidencia de la desnutrición crónica en niños es uno de los aspectos más visibles, como se ve en el cuadro recapitulativo siguiente .

No cabe duda sobre la intensidad del fenómeno de inSAN en la región a partir de la constatación de los valores expuestos en el cuadro. Además, de la lectura del síntoma de la inSAN mediante los tres indicadores anteriores, se puede suponer que la situación ha estado empeorando en los últimos años en Nicaragua y en Honduras, mejorando en El Salvador y se ha mantenido estable en Guatemala, siendo esta la peor situación de los 4 países, mientras que la de El Salvador es relativamente mejor que las otras.

Ver Appendice I Anexo I Cuadro 9

Los principales inconvenientes para la Seguridad Alimentaria en la región, son:

- Existen campesinos cuya racionalidad es de producir sus alimentos básicos en la medida de lo posible. Pero la mayoría de ellos tiene acceso a menos tierra de lo que se requiere para al menos sustentar la alimentación de su familia. La inSAN para ellos es un problema a la vez de disponibilidad (ellos mismos podrían producirla) y de acceso: al trabajar estacionalmente por un salario, su ingreso depende de los factores que afectan ese ingreso. Son el 50 - 55 por ciento de las familias rurales que dependen parcial o totalmente de la agricultura.
- Existe también una capacidad de oferta de alimentos locales subutilizada en la región, activable a corto plazo. Esta se encuentra en el otro 45 - 55 por ciento de familias, especialmente en el sector de los campesinos finqueros, el 25 por ciento, que tienen sistemas productivos flexibles y diversificados, pero están siendo continuamente desincentivados por la dificultad de organizarse para articular las cadenas y los mercados de alimentos, de tal forma que aun la demanda solvente no llega a ser una "señal de mercado" para ellos.
- Con excepción de El Salvador, al menos a corto plazo, los equilibrios macrofinancieros (balanza de pagos y fiscal) no son favorables para absorber una factura alimentaria creciente, que distrae recursos que serían más productivamente transformados en demanda efectiva para una producción local dinamizadora de economías rurales locales.
- Aunque en proporciones distintas según los países, el poder de compra agregado es netamente insuficiente y los mercados de alimentos son doblemente oligopólicos, de tal manera que los agricultores sufren permanentemente y a la vez de una insuficiencia de demanda y de una puesta en mercado desfavorable en la cual tienen casi nulo poder de negociación. Las donaciones alimentarias no monetizadas empeoran la situación, aun cuando hay un déficit de oferta sectorial. Las monetizadas afectan como cualquier otra importación de bienes subsidiados en su país de origen. Esta situación afecta a largo plazo la oferta sectorial.
- Hay una 'deuda social' en toda la región, especialmente hacia el mundo rural y las ciudades intermedias, en materia de provisión de servicios públicos, de educación, de salud, la cual indica la magnitud del problema para incrementar la productividad y los niveles de remuneración. A largo plazo también, una nutrición saludable y suficiente es imprescindible para desarrollar las capacidades de aprendizaje y para minimizar el impacto de otros factores patógenos, haciendo más sostenible la inversión en salud.
- Se está produciendo un cambio en los valores culturales que erosiona los patrones de consumo y el reconocimiento de los recursos alimenticios tradicionales. Este fenómeno es patente con el auge del consumo globalizado en las ciudades, pero también en el campo, cuando la distribución de comida chatarra barata es mucho más organizada y eficiente que el abastecimiento de los mercados por productos locales.
- Aunque ha habido una tendencia larga hacia la mejora de los indicadores sociales, de la cual es testigo el mejoramiento de los índices mortalidad infantil y materna y los de morbilidad en las últimas décadas, en todos los países de la región, el beneficio del progreso, que se refleja en el avance de la transición demográfica, ha sido desigual.

Por estas razones, las combinaciones de factores estructurales de SAN son distintas en cada país, así como lo son los niveles medios de inSAN y más aún su estratificación social y su dispersión territorial.

En El Salvador, el problema estructural apareció, en las estadísticas, como menos grave tanto desde el punto de vista del acceso como de la utilización biológica, lo que es consistente con la clasificación de FAO, que lo considera como el único país de los cuatro considerados, que está por debajo del 20 por ciento (nivel mediano-bajo) de subnutrición en general. La menor tasa de pobreza coincide con la menor tasa de desnutrición crónica, en los promedios nacionales.

En Guatemala, el problema estructural aparece, al contrario, como muy grave, tanto desde el punto de vista del consumo y de la utilización biológica, con un nivel de 50 por ciento (nivel muy alto para un promedio nacional) de desnutrición infantil crónica y 25 por ciento de subnutrición en general. Pero la mayor tasa de desnutrición, que se ha incrementada en la última década, no coincide al rango según el nivel de pobreza en los promedios nacionales.

En Honduras, el problema estructural aparece como grave, tanto desde el punto de vista del consumo y de la utilización biológica, con un nivel de 40 por ciento (nivel alto para un promedio nacional) de desnutrición infantil crónica y 21 por ciento de subnutrición en general.

En Nicaragua, el problema estructural aparece también como grave, tanto desde el punto de vista del consumo y de la utilización biológica, con un nivel de 33 por ciento (nivel alto para un promedio nacional) de desnutrición infantil crónica y 29 por ciento de subnutrición en general. La alta tasa de desnutrición, que se ha incrementada en la última década, coincide el alto rango según el nivel de pobreza en los promedios nacionales.

2.2.2.6 Conclusiones

- No existe por el momento, cuantificaciones sistemáticas de la situación relativa a la SAN en la región, que siga una aproximación territorial, combinando a la vez el análisis de las amenazas y los factores estructurales, luego que estos últimos se transforman en “vulnerabilidades”, en caso de amenazas.
- El diagnóstico de la situación de inseguridad alimentaria en los cuatro países se basa en el enfoque “disponibilidad-acceso-utilización biológica” que describe las diferentes dimensiones de la inseguridad alimentaria y nutricional (inSAN).
- La SAN no es un sector si no una situación multidimensional, sobre la que es posible actuar a partir de muchos sectores de actividad. La descripción de la situación requiere por lo tanto de una aproximación coherente en los diagnósticos. Es lo que el abordaje Disponibilidad-Acceso-utilización biológica intenta hacer. Los diagnósticos de la situación de inseguridad alimentaria en los cuatro países se basa, esencialmente, en este enfoque.
- Las estadísticas y estudios disponibles en la región concluyen que existe una situación cierta de déficit de oferta, del orden del 30% de cereales básicos, y más entonces si uno toma en cuenta los productos agroindustriales. Este déficit varía ampliamente por país. Se confirma igualmente un fuerte déficit en cuanto al acceso ligado a la insuficiencia del poder de compra debido a la pobreza de los ingresos.
- A pesar de la diversidad de enfoques en el análisis de esta situación, el carácter estructural del problema es reconocido por todos los actores. La inseguridad alimentaria y nutricional es, en promedio, elevada en la región, aunque en una menor medida en El Salvador. En el seno de la sociedad y entre los territorios, las diferencias son muy grandes. Mas el acceso es

el factor limitante de la SAN, mayores son las diferencias entre los estratos sociales, en tanto que las diferencias territoriales son sobre todo debidas a la oferta .

- Adicionalmente, las amenazas fuertes (principalmente climáticas) pesan sobre esta situación, según una distribución geográfica que coincide ampliamente con las regiones más pobladas, afectando más particularmente las localidades y las familias mas económicamente vulnerables.
- La insuficiencia en el poder de compra se convierte en un problema estructural de fondo para los pequeños productores familiares que no producen mas que para el mercado poco remunerador. Esta situación de fondo presenta condiciones perfectas para el desarrollo de crisis alimentarias severas cuando sobrevienen factores que ni los productores ni los consumidores pueden evitar o mitigar.
- La distribución humanitaria de alimentos prolongada más allá de un ciclo agrícola, no hace más que empeorar la situación, incluyendo, la de aquellos que producen normalmente para su propio consumo, pero terminan reduciendo su esfuerzo porque cuentan con los alimentos donados.
- Para resumir los argumentos y presentarlos en forma comparativa entre los países, se propone el cuadro siguiente, en el cual se considera que en la escala del nivel de desnutrición se encuentra: moderado en El Salvador, alto en Nicaragua y muy alto en Guatemala y Honduras. Esta escala se relaciona directamente con la de gravedad de diversos factores estructurales, pero en Nicaragua y El Salvador el potencial empeoramiento de la situación por amenazas sobre la oferta o el acceso es mayor.

Ver Appendice I Anexo I Cuadro 10

2.3 Sumario de la Misión

La Misión en Centroamérica fue llevada a cabo por Pierre Van Roosbroeck, consultor europeo, como team leader y Herminio Castillo, consultor europeo radicado en Nicaragua durante los días correspondientes al año 2004, entre el 29 de Enero y el 21 de Febrero. Previamente ambos consultores participaron en la Comisión en Bruselas de un Seminario de cinco días con los restantes consultores que desarrollan las muestras en los otros nueve países y con los técnicos de la F5 para la preparación de la Evaluación en su fase de terreno.

Debido al carácter regional de esta Misión, se efectuó una visita de terreno a la Delegación de Guatemala y a la sede del Programa-país de Seguridad Alimentaria en Honduras. Al mismo tiempo se visitaron dos instituciones con carácter regional que tendrán un marcado protagonismo en la gestión e implementación del cercano Programa regional de Seguridad Alimentaria que ya ha sido aprobado por la Comisión: El INCAP (Instituto de Nutrición de Centroamérica y Panamá) y el CEPREDENAC (Centro de Coordinación para la Prevención de Desastres Naturales en América Central).

De igual modo se realizó una visita a uno de los proyectos de la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria, en concreto del Instrumento relativo a la “Llamada a propuestas” para ONGs, En Nicaragua. Un detalle cronológico de la Misión (Plan de Trabajo) y la Lista general de las personas entrevistadas se incluye como anexo en este Informe de País.

Siguiendo la propuesta realizada en el Informe de la Primera Fase, la metodología ha sido muy variada, incluyendo los siguientes aspectos:

- **Análisis documental:** Se han analizado (ver Anexos) tanto documentos generales de la Comisión como los documentos de proyecto de muchos de ellos, así como otros documentos de seguimiento y evaluación anteriores a la Misión. Al mismo tiempo, se consideró oportuno analizar las fichas de monitoreo externo de aquellos proyectos que las tuvieran, contrastando sus resultados con nuestros propios análisis. Nos parecía adecuado poner en valor y buscar sinergias entre los distintos instrumentos de seguimiento de los que dispone la Comisión.
- **Entrevistas:** Se han realizado diversos tipos de entrevistas, más o menos dirigidas o cerradas, con los diversos implicados en la materia, tanto responsables o gestores, como representantes de organismos, ONG participantes a diversos niveles, etc.....En algunos casos se siguió un cuestionario más fijo mientras que en otros se trato de entrevistas más abiertas y cualitativas.
- **Seminarios o Talleres de trabajo:** Con los responsables (Directores y Administradores) del programa País de Seguridad Alimentaria en Honduras se mantuvo un taller de trabajo de un día de duración, siguiendo con algunas modificaciones el método DAFO (Dificultades, amenazas, fortalezas, oportunidades) del Programa en Honduras. Es éste un método muy utilizado en planificación y evaluación y resultó muy útil en nuestro caso.
- **Visitas al terreno:** Se visitaron algunos proyectos donde aparte de las entrevistas con los responsables se pudo tener contactos con beneficiarios directos, entidades participantes, comunidades, etc.
- **Análisis:** Para el análisis de datos, hemos usado en algunos casos matrices o plantillas de análisis con los criterios habituales de evaluación: pertinencia, eficacia, eficiencia, impacto y sostenibilidad, así como con otros más propios del trabajo de la Comisión Europea como coordinación, coherencia, complementariedad, visibilidad,....

2.4 Limitaciones

En general, pese a lo corto de la misión para una temática de tanta envergadura, hemos tenido un acceso suficiente a fuentes documentales o de otro tipo del programa. La colaboración de los responsables de los proyectos y de los miembros de la Delegación ha sido buena y la de las entidades beneficiarias, Administraciones públicas de la región y ONG, también.

Sin embargo, creemos necesario hacer algunas consideraciones que deben permitir poner en su contexto el presente informe:

- No se trató de elaborar una evaluación la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria en la Región. La Línea en Nicaragua ha sido evaluada recientemente y en profundidad (*Evaluación Final de las intervenciones de Seguridad Alimentaria de la Comisión Europea en Nicaragua, en Septiembre 2002*) sino mas bien de estudiar y analizar las estratégicas y las políticas que se desprenden de la aplicación del Reglamento 1292/96. Por tanto, aunque el punto de partida era el año 97, fecha de inicio de la implementación del Reglamento, se han priorizado las

políticas y las estrategias mas actuales sin olvidar el contenido “histórico” de la Línea en al Región.

- Enfoque regional. Al tratarse nuestra muestra de terreno de una muestra que se centraba en Nicaragua como país pero con el enfoque regional anteriormente comentado, las dificultades han sido mayores por tratarse de una región que únicamente esté en el proceso político de constitución, muy alejada de funcionar actualmente, como región. Por tanto no hay una institucionalidad regional fuerte y establecida que pueda servir de apoyo para las intervenciones y tampoco, en la misma medida, para monitorearlas y/o evaluarlas.
- El factor tiempo. Las menos de cuatro semanas que estaban estipuladas para el presente análisis no han sido tiempo suficiente para entrar en profundidad en la situación de los cuatro países. A pesar de que se contó con dos días mas que en las otra nueve muestras geográficas que componen el cuerpo general de la presente evaluación, algunas circunstancias importante no han podido ser objeto de seguimiento por la escasez de tiempo. No se pudo visitar El Salvador ni profundizar en la situación de Guatemala y Honduras. (un día de visita únicamente por país). También faltó tiempo para profundizar en entrevistas locales; decidimos centrarnos en escuchar fundamentalmente al entorno de la Delegación (Técnicos, funcionarios, consultores) y quedó la carencia de las opiniones de las Instituciones nicaragüenses, las contrapartes nacionales que implementan proyectos, las Alcaldías, Organizaciones sociales, Ministerios, etc.
- El Programa Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria, ha sido recientemente aprobado y a pesar de ser uno de los pilares de nuestro evaluación, resulta difícil valorarlo cuando únicamente se puede analizar, su estrategia conceptual, su identificación y su planificación futura. Peor no se puede aún valorar los resultados, impactos y cumplimientos de objetivos que inicialmente están previstos y que son muy interesantes desde el punto de vista de que pretender aportar un novedoso enfoque regional a la temática de la Seguridad Alimentaria en Centroamérica.-

2.5 Agradecimientos

Los consultores agradecen la colaboración prestada a todo el personal técnico y administrativo de la Delegación de la Comisión en Managua así como a los entrevistados de ONGs, Organismos Regionales, técnicos de SA en Honduras, técnicos de proyectos y consultores.

Queremos mostrar un agradecimiento especial a Vitor Serrano por su incondicional apoyo durante los días de la Misión y a Luis Nunes de Carvahó por su acogida y disposición de permitir a los consultores trabajar por tres semanas dentro de la sede de la Delegación.

3 QUESTIONES EVALUATIVAS

3.1 Cuestión Evaluativa 1

No esta a considerar en la parte de la mision de terreno

3.2 Cuestión Evaluativa 2

Cual es el nivel de integración de las políticas de SA en la estrategia de desarrollo de la Comisión definidas en el RSP de la Región y en cada uno de los CSPs?

La primera consideración general que es necesario hacer es en relación al enfoque y al ámbito de esta cuestión evaluativa, es en relación a la Misión de terreno que se estudia en el presente documento:

Siendo esta Misión una misión con un claro enfoque regional, la respuesta ha esta pregunta ha de tener necesariamente tres vertientes; una de ellas relacionada con el Documento Regional de Estrategia de la Comisión –RSP- la segunda con cada uno de los cuatro Documentos de Estrategia de País y la tercera con la relación (coherencia, coordinación complementariedad) entre el documento regional y cada uno de los documentos de país. Todo ello bajo la perspectiva de la Seguridad alimentaria, su política y su estrategia.

I.- En Relación con el RSP. Documento Regional de Estrategia de la Comisión

El Documento de Estrategia Regional para Centroamérica -RSP-, abarca la estrategia europea en el periodo de tiempo entre el 2002 y el 2006. Tres son los objetivos generales que se plantea la Comisión para la cooperación con la región centroamericana:

- El apoyo al desarrollo económico y social sostenibles,
- La integración de forma gradual de los países en vía de desarrollo en la economía mundial.
- La lucha contra la pobreza.

En particular la *Declaración Conjunta del Consejo de Ministros* y de la Comisión Europea sobre la Política Comunitaria de Desarrollo (Nov.2000) establece que la cooperación de la Unión Europea debe enfocarse principalmente en la reducción y progresiva eliminación de la pobreza.

La Declaración hace una interpretación amplia del concepto de la pobreza definida “no únicamente por la falta de ingresos y recursos económicos, sino que también incluye el

concepto de vulnerabilidad y factores como la imposibilidad de acceder a una alimentación adecuada, a la educación y a la sanidad, a los recursos naturales y al agua potable, a la tierra, al trabajo, y al crédito, a la información y a la participación política.

Sin embargo, el RSP a la hora de diseñar la estrategia para conseguir estos objetivos, focaliza su intervención en los procesos de integración centroamericano, al apoyo a la institucionalidad y la reducción de la vulnerabilidad ante desastres naturales; minimizando el papel en la estrategia de la reducción de la pobreza sin mencionar, por ejemplo, la posibilidad de implementar Programas de Seguridad Alimentaria.

Los tres ejes prioritarios que marca el RSP como estrategia, *apoyo al proceso de integración regional* (60% del presupuesto), *fortalecimiento del rol de la sociedad civil* (10% del presupuesto) y *reducción de vulnerabilidad* (30% del presupuesto), dejan de lado el concepto y la implementación de la Seguridad Alimentaria. Ni tan siquiera en los ejes transversales que propone el RSP, aparece la Seguridad Alimentaria como parte de la estrategia.

II.- En Relación con los CSP de los cuatro países de la Región

Guatemala

El CSP de Guatemala establece que el objetivo general de la cooperación comunitaria con este país consiste en contribuir a la aplicación de los Acuerdos de Paz firmados en diciembre de 1996.

Dentro del Marco de los acuerdos de Paz, se definieron, estratégicamente, tres ejes para la cooperación de la Comisión Europea;

- Democratización y Derechos Humanos.
- Desarrollo local y descentralización del Estado.
- Crecimiento sostenible de la economía y del empleo.

En el segundo eje, se establecen dos programas prioritarios (Apoyo a la descentralización y Apoyo al desarrollo local) y se dice textualmente que “*estos dos programas podrían incluir una estrategia de Seguridad Alimentaria*”

Por tanto en la estrategia de la Comisión para Guatemala queda mencionada la posibilidad de establecer acciones en Seguridad alimentaria pero sólo como una posibilidad y no como un Programa concreto.

El Salvador

El CSP de El Salvador, establece tres ejes prioritarios para la cooperación de la Comisión Europea: Consolidación y modernización del Estado, Desarrollo Local integral y sostenible y Crecimiento de la economía y del empleo.

En el eje prioritario de desarrollo local se establecen una serie de acciones prioritarias donde no quedan incluidas acciones tendentes a disminuir la inseguridad alimentaria. Tampoco en los ejes transversales.

Por tanto Seguridad Alimentaria no es un tema prioritario para la estrategia de la Comisión en El Salvador en el periodo 2002-2006.

Honduras

El CSP de Honduras establece en su programa de trabajo, tres sectores prioritarios de intervención y unos temas transversales. Como sectores prioritarios la Comisión marca trabajar en

- Gestión sostenible de los recursos naturales (45% de los fondos)
- Apoyo al desarrollo local y a la descentralización (26% de los fondos)
- Apoyo al sector educación (21% de los fondos)

Por tanto no se considera prioritario dentro de los sectores de actuación para la Comisión, la seguridad alimentaria que no es mencionada en el sector de apoyo al desarrollo local ni tampoco en los temas transversales, a pesar de los datos alarmantes de inseguridad alimentaria en el país. Tampoco es recogida el concepto como tema transversal.

Nicaragua

El CSP de Nicaragua prevé cuatro ámbitos de intervención;

- Desarrollo socioeconómico en el ámbito rural (118 millones de Euros)
- Inversión en capital humano, principalmente educación (40 millones)
- Gobernanza y consolidación de la democracia (15 millones)
- Ayuda Macroeconómica (aportación al presupuesto de la Republica)

El primero de ellos, podría estar ligado a reducir la inseguridad alimentaria pero no se menciona de forma inequívoca. La Seguridad alimentaria por tanto, no aparece en el CSP como un ámbito de intervención prioritaria.

III.- Relación del RSP con los CSP de los cuatro países de la Región en el ámbito de la Seguridad Alimentaria

Los cuatro CSPs de la región son coherentes con el RSP en tanto que en ninguno de ellos se hace mención especial y prioritaria a la Seguridad Alimentaria de los países ni de la región. En ese sentido se puede aseverar que son documentos de estrategia complementarios porque siguen lógicas muy similares en cuanto al diseño de los sectores prioritarios de intervención de la Comisión.

Pero desde el punto de vista de la Seguridad Alimentaria ninguno de ellos rescata el tema para abordarlo en su estrategia de intervención. La Regulación 1292/96 carece de relevancia en estos documentos de estrategia.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 2:

El concepto de Seguridad alimentaria no aparece como sector de interés prioritario para las acciones de la Comisión en ninguno de los Documentos de Estrategia Nacionales ni tampoco en el Regional. Las acciones que se derivan de la Regulación 1292/96 carecen de importancia, desde el punto de vista de las prioridades, en la estrategia diseñada por la Comisión para la Región.

Sin embargo los índices de Inseguridad Alimentaria son alarmantes en los cuatro países, principalmente en el sector rural. Esto constituye una contradicción importante; ya que si los indicadores muestran la situación de Inseguridad Alimentaria de casi un 30% como media en los países de la región, se debería priorizar estrategias de Seguridad Alimentaria en los CSPs, máxime cuando la reducción de la pobreza es el objetivo final de la Comisión y tender hacia la Seguridad Alimentaria reduce sin dudas, los niveles de pobreza.

El RSP establece como objetivo general para la Región la reducción de la pobreza, pero sin embargo focaliza la intervención de la Comisión en otros procesos como la integración centroamericana o la búsqueda de mayor gobernabilidad de los países de la región.

Los CSPs de los cuatro países establecen como prioritario el desarrollo rural-local pero sin el enfoque de la Seguridad alimentaria en cuanto al acceso, disponibilidad y uso de los alimentos para lograr unos índices nutricionales normalizados.

Por tanto parece que el desarrollo rural (y por ende las intervenciones en Seguridad Alimentaria) no es considerado como parte importante de la estrategia de crecimiento de la región.

3.3 Cuestión Evaluativa 3

Cuál es la coherencia entre las políticas y estrategias en Seguridad Alimentaria de la Comisión con las estrategias nacionales, específicamente en la ERCEP?

Valoración de la ERCEP en cada país en relación a las políticas y estrategias de los CSPs:

Nicaragua: La ERCEP (julio 2001) no trata el tema de la SA, únicamente menciona la malnutrición (p 10) con algunos datos muy generales. Esta basado sobre cuatro pilares: Crecimiento económico, inversión en capital humano, protección de los grupos vulnerables, apoyo institucional y buena gobernabilidad. Pero el tercer pilar no fue desarrollado. Tampoco toca los problemas de tenencia de la tierra. Actualmente se está empezando a formular una ERCP de segunda generación que se supone revertirá las carencias de este documento de estrategia.

Además, el Plan Nacional de desarrollo no retoma la lógica política de la ERCP y desarrolla un tratamiento de políticas basado en el crecimiento del país a través de la competitividad productiva sin analizar las capas de población que quedan fuera de estas dinámicas.

En la actualidad el gobierno está discutiendo con los donantes una ERCP de segunda generación, que sería incluido en el PND a petición del grupo de donantes que forman el Budget Support Club (FMI, BID, BM, UN, CE y Estados Miembros)

Actualmente El PND fomenta mas la inseguridad alimentaria que la seguridad alimentaria porque trata de desarrollar zonas geográficas con potencial pero no toca a los grupos vulnerables fuera de estas zonas. Las ultimas estadísticas muestran que la malnutrición aumenta en los últimos años.

Honduras :

La ERCEP (Agosto 2001) menciona algunas palabras de desnutrición infantil (p. 84) y sobre la sostenibilidad (p. 74) de la asistencia alimentaria pero no establece una política de SA ni una estrategia para reducir pobreza; sino que establece prioridades de crecimiento macroeconómico.

Guatemala :

El Memorando de Entendimiento del Gobierno con la CE menciona la SA como medio de intervención en la Lucha contra la Pobreza. Todavía la SA no es considerada como sector estratégico a desarrollar. Hay 3 prioridades para la lucha contra la pobreza (p15): Educación-Salud-Desarrollo Sostenible en las áreas costeras del Pacífico. No existe una nota sobre la SA..

Sin embargo, el nuevo gobierno entrante (Dic.2003) parece que ha establecido la lucha contra la pobreza como un punto estratégico dentro de sus políticas públicas y está fomentando un “Acuerdo social contra la pobreza” que se implementará a partir de este año.

Nicaragua:

El PND de Nicaragua únicamente menciona el término Seguridad Alimentaria en dos ocasiones. El PND no considera el desarrollo rural como un medio estratégico para el desarrollo del país. La estrategia de intervención está basada en los “Clusters” o Polos de Desarrollo donde se focalizará la inversión pública y extranjera. valoriza la agricultura como medio de desarrollo rural pero se focaliza sobre las zonas de potencial de inversión extranjera. Estos polos geográficos de desarrollo tendrán la misión de ser la “maquina que arrastra el resto del tren”, lo que viene a significar que las zonas sin potencial para el PND, quedarán excluidas y sus pobladores obligados a migrar para intentar salir de la miseria.

El PND no menciona ninguna estrategias de apoyo a los grupos vulnerables. Las conclusiones de la Evaluación de los proyectos de SA de la CE (2002) ya mencionaba que habría que desarrollar zonas geográficas con potencial, pero mencionaba también que habría que definir estrategias de apoyo a los grupos vulnerables. El PND ha olvidado mencionar este ultimo aspecto. Para equilibrar esta situación sería importante definir y coordinar estrategias desde los grandes organismos donantes en relación a estos enormes sectores de población vulnerable. Sin embargo, no parece que sea esta la política de la Comisión; al menos no está reflejada en el CSP, que es cierto que es un documento anterior al PND pero la estrategia actual de la Delegación, en palabras de sus máximos funcionarios, es enmarcar las acciones e intervenciones futuras de la CE dentro de este PND. Lo que significa alejarse de una posible estrategia de reducción de pobreza y punto de partida del desarrollo a través de intervenciones estratégicas y priorizadas en Seguridad Alimentaria.

La Memoria de las Estrategias Regionales de SA (documento en borrador). Este documento determina las coherencias e incoherencias de las experiencias, estrategias y políticas de las instituciones de SA nacionales y regionales, y define las orientaciones de las políticas de SAN a nivel regional con orientaciones nacionales. También el Programa Regional de la Delegación en SAN tratará de coordinar las políticas nacionales de SAN en cada país, y de reforzar las capacidades de análisis y los sistemas de información existentes en estos países.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 3:

La política de SA no es prioritaria en los CSPs de la región.

El enfoque de SA tampoco está tratado en las ERCEPs, sólo de una manera general a través del enfoque de la lucha contra la pobreza. No parece que la SA sea una prioridad estratégica en las políticas de los países centroamericanos. Sin embargo los datos demuestran que la malnutrición está creciendo en los últimos años en cada país.

En consecuencia, se puede decir que hay una coherencia de la política CE para la SA en el sentido que como no es una prioridad en los ERCEP y tampoco en las políticas nacionales; la política de la CE (a través de los CSPs y del RSP) de igual manera no prioriza el tema.

Podemos concluir entonces que es una coherencia negativa, por la omisión en ambas políticas, siendo un tema clave para la reducción de pobreza y según los indicadores de desnutrición, que van creciendo, resulta extraño no priorizar la seguridad alimentaria como punto focal estratégico para la región con políticas propias, legislación e intervenciones definidas. Resulta extraña esta ausencia tanto en las políticas de los gobiernos a nivel centroamericano como en las estrategias de apoyo y cooperación de la CE, que teniendo como máximo objetivo, la reducción de la pobreza, no intenta abordarla con intervenciones y estrategias a corto plazo; sino priorizando el fomento de la integración regional, la unión aduanera, el crecimiento macroeconómico a través de incrementar la competitividad y el fortalecimiento institucional que quizá a largo plazo contribuyan a mejorar los problemas estructurales de la región pero que a corto plazo, no contribuyen a reducir los altos indicadores de pobreza y desnutrición de la región.

La nueva política de descentralización en los Estados de Centroamérica, podría permitir un nuevo enfoque en la temática de SA porque la responsabilidad de la gestión de los recursos naturales locales pasará a manos de las municipalidades. Por tanto se podrá abordar el tema desde los donantes a través de un apoyo a nivel municipal. La identificación y la implementación de proyectos de SA estarán hechos con una participación mas fuerte de los beneficiarios. El estado se quedara mas dentro un papel de normalizador y regulador de las intervenciones.

3.4 Cuestión Evaluativa 4

Cual es el valor añadido de la Ayuda en Especie en aras de contribuir a que se consigan los objetivos generales marcados en la Regulación para Seguridad alimentaria?

Es importante destacar que tanto la Regulación 1296/92 como el Marco Estratégico derivado de la Cumbre de los Jefes de estado de la Región, tienen como punto en común reducir la dependencia hacia la ayuda alimentaria externa, por tanto reducir la importancia de la Ayuda en Especie y dejarla únicamente vinculada a situaciones de urgencia o emergencia.

El Marco Estratégico de la Cumbre de Jefes de Estado de la Región, establece la posibilidad de recurrir a apoyos puntuales a los hogares en extrema pobreza para paliar las consecuencias de la actual y prolongada sequía en zonas específicas de la región centroamericana. En este contexto, la Ayuda en Especie ha de estar focalizada hacia esfuerzos de Seguridad Alimentaria como estrategia clave y no ser utilizada en intervenciones aisladas.

Por tanto es pertinente preguntarse cual es el valor añadido de las acciones e intervenciones con ayuda en especie en el marco de los objetivos de la Regulación 1292/96 y de los documentos de estrategia y desarrollo de los países de la Región.

Y la respuesta es que en términos generales la Ayuda en Especie no contribuye al logro de los objetivos de Seguridad Alimentaria establecidos en el Reglamento.

En los documentos de identificación para el Programa Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria realizados por la Delegación, puede leerse textualmente *“La distribución humanitaria de alimentos prolongada más allá de un ciclo agrícola, no hace más que empeorar la situación, incluyendo, la de aquellos campesinos que producen normalmente para su propio consumo, pero terminan reduciendo su esfuerzo porque cuentan con los alimentos donados.”*

En ese sentido, el papel de EURONAIID en la región, tuvo importancia tras el Huracán Mitch (Nov,98) en el trabajo de Emergencia de las ONGs implementadoras de los fondos Euronaid. Pero actualmente, cinco años después del huracán y sin emergencias en la región mas allá de la propia inseguridad alimentaria, el rol que debe jugar Euronaid queda fuera de las acciones e intervenciones propias de Seguridad Alimentaria y por tanto fuera de lo establecido por el Reglamento 1292/96.

Actualmente en la región, el rol de Euronaid puede ser entendido en una doble vía: Como socio implementador de los proyectos ECHO en la entrega de herramientas, semillas, etc y en la coordinación de mesas sectoriales de trabajo entre las ONGs. Este papel de Euronaid como facilitador de procesos y como nexo de unión de las ONGs europeas está llevándose a cabo desde la evaluación de Euronaid en la región que sugirió un nuevo papel para el Organismo. La nueva coordinadora regional ha trasladado su puesto a Nicaragua (mas acorde con el resto de instituciones europeas que trabajan con carácter regional) y ha

comenzado su papel como facilitadora de las ONGs en temas como la Seguridad Alimentaria y como puente entre éstas y la propia delegación.

Por otra parte la coordinación de acciones entre Euronaid y la Delegación en temas de Seguridad Alimentaria ha sido nula hasta el momento. En la implementación de proyectos sobre el terreno, Euronaid actuó con su propia dinámica ajena a cualquier coordinación con la Delegación, lo cual debería ser cambiado en el futuro.

En cuanto a la Línea ECHO, sin ser ésta una línea propia de Seguridad Alimentaria, de hecho a implementado proyectos en la región que tenían como esencia buscar mayores índices de Seguridad Alimentaria entre las comunidades beneficiarias, (sólo el 10% del dinero que implementó ECHO post-Mitch fue dedicado a Ayuda alimentaria) con el handicap del poco tiempo de los proyectos (seis meses) propio de intervenciones de emergencia.

En cualquier caso la coordinación entre ECHO y las acciones de Seguridad Alimentaria de la Delegación sólo ocurrió en casos puntuales después del Huracán Mitch, y no de forma metodológica. Este tema se aborda con mayor profundidad en la pregunta evaluativa 12, correspondiente a la lógica Emergencia-Rehabilitación-Desarrollo.

Evaluar el papel de la ayuda alimentaria a muy corto plazo; estamos de acuerdo que los efectos a largo plazo son negativos pero después del Mitch, ayuda alimentaria podría haber jugado un papel importante para asegurar un nivel mínimo de alimentar a la población pobre

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 4:

La estrategia de la Delegación en Centroamérica está lejos de convertir la Ayuda en Especie como uno de los pilares para la Seguridad Alimentaria de la Región. En el marco de la Regulación 1292/96 y en seguimiento al Marco estratégico de la Cumbre (Dic 2002) firmada por los Presidentes de los siete países de la Región para enfrentar la situación de Inseguridad Alimentaria y nutricional, se considera que el enfoque para disminuir la inseguridad alimentaria debe pasar a través de proyectos integrales de desarrollo productivo hacia la población mas expuesta.

De esta manera, se pretende dar un enfoque multisectorial con alcance regional para el tratamiento de la inseguridad alimentaria, que impida la dependencia de los países de la región hacia la ayuda alimentaria y fomente la visión integral del acceso, disponibilidad y consumo de los recursos como capital vital.

Parecería lógico, al menos desde una perspectiva de la región centroamericana, vincular la Ayuda en especie (Euronaid) a otro Reglamento específico o a otra línea presupuestaria de la Comisión; y no tanto a intervenciones en Seguridad Alimentaria. Las intervenciones de ayuda en especie, podrían ligarse en este sentido, a la Línea ECHO en lugar de estar dentro del Reglamento de Seguridad Alimentaria.

El diseño del Programa regional de Seguridad Alimentaria de la Delegación, que empezará a implementarse a lo largo del año en curso, menciona expresamente la necesidad de alejarse de la ayuda alimentaria pues puede tener en muchos casos efectos incluso negativos (dependencia, influencia en los precios de los mercados locales) para los municipios y comunidades de la región.

3.5 Cuestión Evaluativa 5

Cual es el valor añadido del mecanismo “Apoyo al presupuestario (AP)” de la Regulación con relación a los objetivos de SA que la propia regulación plantea?

Como proyectos que se puedan enmarcar dentro del apoyo presupuestario, se encuentran únicamente dos proyectos en la Región y ambos están en Honduras:

El Proyecto Tierra en Honduras es gestionado por el Ministerio de Hacienda, pero hubo un proceso de transferencia progresiva de la UESA al Ministerio. Tierra debe ser considerado como proyecto piloto que apoya a la titularización de tierras en 43 municipios repartidos en 3 departamentos. Tierra esta coordinado también con dos otros proyectos de la CE/SA (FINAPROVI para micro-crédito y Proacta para comercialización).

El crédito otorgado únicamente a corto plazo por los bancos comerciales prohíbe lograr a un crédito a largo plazo para comprar tierras. Por suerte existe el proyecto CE/SA con FONAPROVI que permite lograr crédito para comprar tierras. Tampoco es fácil lograr financiamiento para la producción, transformación y comercialización de los productos agrícolas. El crédito informal en medio rural de 240 % anual que prohíbe la inversión en el sector agrícola tanto de producción como de comercialización. El proyecto CE/SA Proacta apoya a la comercialización de productos con créditos de 20% anual otorgados a cooperativas y asociaciones de productores.

El Programa de micro-crédito FINSA: El crédito esta otorgado por el banco de segundo piso FONAPROVI a organizaciones no convencionales de crédito (ONGs, cooperativas de ahorro y crédito). En este sistema de crédito existe realmente una oportunidad de apoyar a los campesinos mas pobres en situación de alta inseguridad alimentaria. Es una realidad regional que los pequeños productores agrícolas son los mas vulnerable en relación a la SA. El apoyo de la CE a esta institución de segundo piso es esencial para la posibilidad de realizar un crédito no convencional que es el crédito que atiende a los beneficiarios mas vulnerables. El crédito formal de los bancos comerciales no tiene la flexibilidad (garantías no están reconocidas) de prestar a las poblaciones mas pobres en situación de vulnerabilidad alimentaria. Entonces los bancos que hacen un crédito formal no están interesadas hacer crédito a pequeños agricultores sin tierras. También el crédito informal tiene una tasa de interés de 20% mensual (240% anual), y el crédito otorgado a instituciones no convencionales a través una organización de segundo piso tiene una tasa de 20 % anual. El apoyo CE a la comercialización de productos agrícolas a través el micro-crédito ha fortalecido la política del estado porque esta insertado en una institución ya sea un banco comercial o del estado.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 5:

En la teoría, el Apoyo Presupuestario es un mecanismo que tiene buena capacidad de atender a las poblaciones meta por su capacidad de integrarse en el dispositivo nacional, regional y local del estado. El AP permite incrementar la absorción porque los impactos del Proyecto atiende a una mayor parte de la población. La sostenibilidad esta mas garantizada si las instituciones estatales se apropian del Proyecto. Existe la dificultad de que el estado no pueda cumplir con los indicadores requeridos porque sus Instituciones no están capacitadas para hacerlo. El montaje de un proyecto presupuestario esta complicado porque precisa de muchas condiciones que no existen a la hora de implementar el proyecto (condiciones complementares como estadísticas, planes de desarrollo, crédito apropiado, apoyo a la producción, transformación y comercialización de productos.

En conclusión no parece que los países de CA tengan actualmente una gran capacidad para beneficiarse de un apoyo presupuestario relacionado a la SA de sus poblaciones.

3.6 Cuestión Evaluativa 6

Cual es el valor añadido de las operaciones de apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria (Títulos II y III del Reglamento 1292/96) para lograr los objetivos generales marcados en el mismo?

Para la valoración de los Proyectos de Seguridad Alimentaria que se han implementado desde el 97 en la región a través del Instrumento de “llamada a propuestas” nos remitimos a las evaluaciones realizadas para los mismos y para las unidades estratégicas de Seguridad Alimentaria. En términos generales, concluimos que dichas evaluaciones fueron bastante positivas en cuanto al impacto de estos proyectos pero en una escala muy baja en cuanto a solución o mejora de problemas estructurales. Sin embargo a nivel local, si tuvieron resultados interesantes que no han podido ser seguidos (falta de criterios de sostenibilidad) por no continuar el instrumento hasta el momento actual.

La “llamada a propuestas” generaba un trabajo administrativo grande tanto en la Comisión como en la Delegación, por el número de proyectos y por el desconocimiento de las ONGs de los procedimientos de la Comisión. En ese sentido, si se reabre el Instrumento se deberían poner “reglas de juego” mas sencillas teniendo en cuenta que los implementadores (ONGs europeas y sus socios locales) no siempre pueden asumir esa carga administrativa tan pesada de los proyectos, que va en perjuicio de la calidad del impacto por el tiempo dedicado a la calidad y transparencia del procedimiento.

De los cinco proyectos que actualmente se ejecutan en Nicaragua con los fondos de la llamada del 2000 (y la firma del Convenio hasta el 2002 por problemas administrativos), dos acabarán en el 2005 y los otros tres en el 2004, las ONGs europeas que ejecutan estos proyectos son:

- COPIBO (Ong belga) Proyecto de comercialización de productos orgánicos que se evaluará a mediados del 2005. Es un proyecto exitoso que ha conseguido fortalecer la organización comunitaria y crear capacidades a la vez que otorga crédito y comercializa a Europa productos orgánicos. (este proyecto fue visitado por la presente Misión e evaluación)
- OXFAM Intermon. Proyecto de Servicios legales rurales a campesinos a través de Promotorías legales en los municipios que resuelven conflictos de tenencia de tierra. Se evaluará a mediados del 2005 y está teniendo un impacto positivo pero muy reducido en relación al costo-beneficio.
- Acción Contra El Hambre. Proyecto de estudio agrosocioeconómico de un Departamento del país. Sin impacto en la Seguridad Alimentaria de la zona. Se evaluará a finales del 2005.
- CIRC (ong italiana). Proyecto para la creación de una granja-escuela demostrativa para la producción avícola y porcina. Exitoso con un buen impacto en la comercialización local pero muy atrasado en su ejecución. Se evaluará a mediados del presente año.

- ACTED (ong francesa) Proyecto productivo con capacitación en tecnología. Poco impacto y poca sostenibilidad futura. Se evaluará a finales del 2004.

Estos Proyectos tienen algunas características comunes, según los técnicos de la delegación:

- Se desconocen los criterios que la Comisión establece para seleccionar unos y dejar fuera otros dentro de cada llamada a propuestas. En la última llamada de Nicaragua, los técnicos de la Delegación sugirieron unos proyectos y descartaron otros que fueron precisamente los elegidos.
- Los problemas administrativos que acarrearán retardos importantes en los desembolsos para los proyectos de las ONGs, (retardos de hasta ocho meses) tienen como consecuencia carencias en la eficacia de los proyectos y en su impacto final. Con la cercana desconcentración de la Línea de SA, la gestión puede que se agilice.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 6:

Consideramos que en las dos Delegaciones de Centroamérica, el uso que se ha hecho del Reglamento en cuanto a “operaciones en apoyo de la Seguridad Alimentaria” ha quedado circunscrito a la ayuda indirecta a través del “calls for proposals” para las ONGs europeas y sus socios nacionales y locales.

En este sentido es importante señalar, que tanto en Nicaragua como en Honduras y El Salvador no se ha abierto la llamada a propuestas de las ONGs desde el 2000 y que tampoco en el 2004 está previsto hacerlo. La llamada del año 2000 tuvo su implementación real con la firma de los Convenios con las ONGs en el año 2002 y por tanto no hubo llamada en los años 01,02, y 03. Sólo la Delegación de Guatemala ha seguido ejecutando la llamada a propuestas de las ONGs con un perfil muy bajo en los últimos años y también lo harán en el presente 2004. Seguramente la razón para que no se utilice este mecanismo en la Delegación de Nicaragua sea que al no estar aún desconcentrado y dado el volumen de trabajo que generan las ONGs se decide no hacerlo. Otra razón sería que no se hizo con el fin de priorizar, dentro de este instrumento, zonas geográficas con mas urgencia para este tipo de trabajo como puede ser África Subsahariana por motivo, entonces de estrategia sectorial.

En cuanto al valor añadido de este tipo de operaciones en aras de colaborar para el cumplimiento de los objetivos del Reglamento, podemos decir, a tenor de las evaluaciones hechas a los proyectos de las ONGs y las UESAs desde el 97 que su impacto fue positivo; reducido por la poca envergadura presupuestaria, pero en líneas generales muy adecuado. Son proyectos que contribuyen en términos muy locales, a reducir los niveles de Inseguridad Alimentaria entre los beneficiarios pero con el problema en general de la poca sostenibilidad cuando estos acaban .

Actualmente en la Región, aún se están ejecutando proyectos de las ONGs de la última llamada 2001-2002. 4 en Honduras, 5 en Nicaragua, 4 en El Salvador y 4 en Guatemala; (se valoran estos proyectos y su contribución en el siguiente epígrafe de desarrollo de esta

respuesta evaluativa).

Por último tres indicaciones importantes:

- ECHO tiene una “llamada a propuestas” de ONGs que a juicio de los evaluadores y en sintonía con la apreciación de las ONGs, es mas eficaz por su rapidez (no necesita licitación, ni cofinanciación) y fundamentalmente porque las propuestas se pueden renegociar en función de las necesidades del terreno y de las circunstancias que vayan surgiendo en la implementación (flexibilidad). Esta llamada, esta siendo utilizada en la práctica centroamericana para proyectos de Seguridad Alimentaria a escala pequeña (con el handicap del plazo máximo de seis meses) y no para emergencia. Se deberían coordinar ambas “llamadas” o fortalecer la de ECHO con mas plazo y sacar la propuesta a llamadas de la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria porque ciertamente no se está utilizando actualmente y cuando se hizo, se duplicaban esfuerzos en relación a ECHO en lugar de coordinarse ambos instrumentos.
- Sin embargo la futura desconcentración de la Línea de SA puede traer mas flexibilidad y eficacia en la llamada a propuestas de ONGs en función de si la Delegación establece como prioritario, y le dedica esfuerzo y recursos humanos a este instrumento del Reglamento.
- Las ONGs europeas que han implementado proyectos de SA bajo la llamada a propuestas entienden que el hecho de haber cortado drásticamente la misma, va en perjuicio del seguimiento de las comunidades y de los beneficiarios de los proyectos que se implementaron, en definitiva en perjuicio de la sostenibilidad de aquellos proyectos.

3.7 Cuestión Evaluativa 7

Cual es el valor añadido del componente « Otros/ asistencia técnica y Apoyo institucional » para lograr a los objetivos de SA en el Reglamento.

Los Programas de Apoyo Institucional en Nicaragua no han tenido el éxito esperado. La debilidad de las instituciones para absorber los proyectos y su gestión y la falta de sostenibilidad son sus principales problemas.

En Guatemala, el gobierno entrante (Dic.2003) ha creado un Pacto social de Lucha contra la Pobreza y a puesto en marcha una nueva Secretaría Ministerial de SA que estará mas adaptada al tema o al menos con mayor grado de sensibilidad hacia el problema de inseguridad alimentaria. En este caso parece muy acertado para un futuro próximo apoyar el fortalecimiento en temáticas de SA porque corresponde a una voluntad política del país.

En Nicaragua los proyectos que se pueden considerar dentro del mecanismo que establece el Reglamento como “Apoyo Institucional” no han tenido mucho éxito y urge replantearse en el futuro este tipo de proyectos, sobre todo pensando en la cercana estrategia de apoyo sectorial. Las Instituciones beneficiadas (MAGFOR, INEC, INETER, UNAG (Organización de Sociedad Civil), FUNDE (Microfinanciera privada) y UNICAFE (Cooperativa) han tenido impactos desiguales:

- MAGFOR: Había una necesidad hacer un censo agropecuario actualizado pero una vez hecho, no se ha utilizado hasta el momento. El Mag For ha sido modernizado pero hubo poca transparencia en los resultados. Fue un proyecto demasiado artificial (la gente se desmide o disminuye el salario después de la cerrada del proyecto) orientado principalmente para captar fondos. No se ve el impacto a los beneficiarios principales que sufren de hambre y desnutrición.
- INETER: Se construyeron estaciones pluviométricas pero el manejo actual por parte de Ineter es muy caro.
- FUNDE: Se paralizaron las entregas presupuestarias para el proyecto una vez iniciado por no estar de acuerdo en la Delegación con sus planteamientos. La tasa de interés del crédito otorgado a los campesinos ha sido demasiado alta.
- UNICAFE: Hubo un relativo éxito porque el AI fue ligado también a la sobrevivencia de los productores de café que tenían que diversificar sus producciones para mantener la viabilidad de sus producciones de café. El valor añadido existe cuando se trata de problemas de SA ligados a los miembros de la organización.

La eficacia ha sido variable y relacionada a la definición de objetivos claros, como en el caso de Inec, Ineter y Unicafe. La eficiencia no fue tan buena porque hubo varios bloqueos

de transferencia por razón de no lograr a los objetivos. El impacto ha sido variable para Fonde y Unag, no tanto visible para Magfor y positivo para Inec, Ineter y Unicafe. La sostenibilidad es variable, pequeño para Fonde y Unag, indefinida para Magfor, positiva para Inec, Ineter y Unicafe. La desventaja comparativa es que este tipo de apoyo tiene el riesgo de no atender a los beneficiarios principales.

En relación a la línea ALA no parece que existe una ventaja comparativa específico de hacer este tipo de apoyo a través la línea 1292. Dentro de la Línea no se ve claramente que existe un ventaja comparativa tampoco en los proyectos de ONGs, en el proyecto de comercialización y en el nuevo programa de apoyo presupuestario al INIFOM.

El programa Prodelsa de apoyo institucional a las municipalidades, que comenzará en breve, parece apropiado para ser exitoso para los beneficiarios. El proceso de apoyo se desarrollara mas cerca de los beneficiarios. Hay dos fondos de inversión: uno para inversiones sociales (5 M. Euros) y uno para inversión de proyectos de mujeres (3 M Euros). Todavía es muy pronto para estimar el impacto de este proyecto pero es pertinente tener todo un proceso de identificación mas cerca de los beneficiarios y que se haga a través un proceso democrático con las comunidades rurales. Es un apoyo presupuestario a primer nivel que podría tener un éxito como se ve en otros países que han implementado el mismo tipo de programa de apoyo a las municipalidades (Bolivia, Perú). Existe también un componente de apoyo institucional a las municipalidades para reforzar sus capacidades de planificación, así como un componente de monitoreo.

La Asistencia técnica de SA ha sido especializada en el apoyo a los programas de SA. Ahora esta integrada en la delegación y pierde sus capacidades específicas de apoyo técnico a los proyectos. Además no está integrada como unidad o como sección, sino desperdigada por las diferentes secciones. La AT tiene demasiadas responsabilidades administrativos y pocos técnicos. Todavía no esta definida las funciones de los AT; no tiene TDRs.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 7:

El Apoyo Institucional tiene un valor añadido interesante en tres marcos actuales y conceptuales: En el marco de la descentralización que promueven actualmente los gobiernos de Centroamérica, en el marco de la próxima desconcentración de la Línea y en el marco de la nueva estrategia de la Delegación de intervenir a través del Apoyo Sectorial.

A nivel municipal, con la descentralización del Estado, surgirá una mayor participación de los beneficiarios y de las asociaciones que los representan en la identificación de los Programas de SA.

A nivel de las instituciones centrales es menos visible el valor añadido, en el sentido que la problemática de SA se trata a un nivel más formal, más teórico y sobre todo más lejos de los beneficiarios. Por ejemplo el MagFor en Nicaragua no se considera como la institución encargada de la SA, tampoco el SAG en Honduras.

El ejemplo del trato de la Línea de SA en Bolivia y en Perú, donde se aúnan proyectos de refuerzo municipal y de fondos de inversión, es contrario en Centroamérica donde este tipo de proyectos se lleva por la Línea ALA. Como el Prolancho en Honduras (1998-2004). En Honduras, el Proyecto-País de SA ha intentado coordinar 3 tipos de intervenciones en proyectos de SA (Apoyo institucional: Proacta; apoyo presupuestario: Fonaprovi, Tierra), aunque todavía restringido a un número reducido de beneficiarios en comparación a las necesidades (demandas) que existen en el país y en la Región.

El Proyecto Regional de SA (PRSA) permitirá en primer lugar coordinar las políticas nacionales y fortalecer las instituciones de SA de cada uno de los 4 países de acuerdo a un mejoramiento del monitoreo y intercambios de datos de la SA, y también implementar proyectos específicos de carácter regional previamente identificados en el ámbito municipal.

El Apoyo Institucional permite incrementar las capacidades de absorción de fondos y de gestión, sobre todo en el ámbito local, donde se requieren las inversiones sociales y productivas. Los Planes de Desarrollo Municipal son esenciales para la comprensión de las prioridades locales.

En resumen se puede afirmar que las Instituciones apoyadas precisaban el Apoyo Institucional pero no parece que el AI en SA sea adaptada a sus necesidades dentro de sus prioridades. En consecuencia, este AI, no dota de un valor añadido importante a la aplicación del Reglamento en Centroamérica., fundamentalmente por la debilidad institucional de los organismos que se pretende fortalecer que aceptan cualquier tipo de intervención si existen recursos financieros sin importarles si la intervención es prioritaria o no dentro de su estrategia y si la sostenibilidad futura se podrá alcanzar una vez terminado el Proyecto.

El AI debería impulsar la temática de SA alrededor de los beneficiarios. Pero para ello debe existir una voluntad política por parte del gobierno de turno y por parte también de las prioridades que consigne la Delegación al tema. Con una mayor voluntad política y compromiso con la importancia que tiene la SA, se podría valorizar el AI dentro de los Organismos gubernamentales.

3.8 Cuestión Evaluativa 8

Hasta que punto el diseño en su fase de identificación de las acciones en Ayuda Alimentaria y Seguridad Alimentaria han facilitado el logro de los objetivos marcados? Esto incluye la identificación de prioridades, la selección de países, de beneficiarios, de los componentes, de las operaciones a financiar, la identificación y valoración de los procesos, la programación multianual, etc.?

Anteriormente a la entrada en vigor del Reglamento 1292/96, las metodologías de trabajo giraban en torno a dos conceptos: ayuda Alimentaria y Fondos Contravalor. Esto termina con el Reglamento que tiene su traducción en la elaboración en el 97 de dos “Programas-país”, en Nicaragua y en Honduras. En El Salvador y En Guatemala, con la entrada el reglamento no se ponen en marcha Programas-Países de Seguridad alimentaria y se trabaja la Seguridad Alimentaria únicamente a través del “Llamado a propuestas” de las ONGs europeas y sus socios locales.

Con el nuevo Reglamento, se instauran (97) los dos Programas País en Seguridad Alimentaria comentados. Sin embargo, a pesar de que las intervenciones en algunos casos fueron bien evaluadas por la evaluación correspondiente de la Comisión, no se trató de Programas-Países propiamente dichos, con metodología y estrategia de País, sino mas bien intervenciones aisladas en Seguridad Alimentaria.

En el año 2002, se elabora por primera vez un “Regional Strategy Paper” que tiene como puntos focales el apoyo a la integración centroamericana y a su institucionalidad. En ese contexto, parece positivo que dados que los indicadores de Inseguridad Alimentaria seguían creciendo en la región (*ver cuadros 1 y 2 del Perfil de País*) y dada la oportunidad al mismo tiempo de fortalecer las Instituciones regionales que trabajan el tema de la Seguridad Alimentaria, se identificará un Programa Regional.

Dicho Programa cuenta con el handicap de la ausencia de Seguridad Alimentaria en las temáticas de los Planes Nacionales de Desarrollo de los Países de la Región, (*ver pregunta 3*) que minimizan los datos de Inseguridad Alimentaria al creer, que con una estrategia de crecimiento general del país en términos competitivos, ese crecimiento en los polos de desarrollo o Clusters, hará salir de su situación también a las zonas marginadas y a los sectores de pequeños productores y campesinos sin tierra por un efecto “domino”.

Sin embargo, al igual que pensaron los técnicos de la Delegación y las Instituciones Regionales involucradas (INCAP, SICA –SISCA-, CEPREDENAC) y los propios Organismos de cooperación (FAO, PMA, PNUD, Delegación) es difícil creer que con la estrategia de crecimiento competitivo del país se pueda revertir la situación, a menos no a corto y medio plazo, de las capas sociales mas desfavorecidas.

Por este motivo, la identificación del Programa regional, tiene una clara pertinencia en cuanto a su concepto y al intento de fortalecer instituciones regionales que llenarán el vacío de los planes de desarrollo de los países del área en temas de Seguridad Alimentaria. Por

otro lado, las causas de Inseguridad Alimentaria en la Región son estructurales por tanto son las mismas en toda la región con matices locales.

La identificación del Programa Regional, ha llevado una lógica inversa a la habitual en cuanto a su metodología: Se creó el Programa y a través del mismo se ponen los cimientos para que se construya una estrategia regional. No corresponde a la lógica habitual de disponer de una estrategia y a raíz de ella formular programas o proyectos que la implementen; sino que en la identificación del Programa se vio la carencia de una estrategia regional para el tema y se formularon dos componentes (Políticas y refuerzo de la capacidad de análisis) que tienen como parte de sus objetivos consensuar dicha estrategia.

Por otro lado, es positiva la identificación del Programa en cuanto al intento de otorgarle un valor añadido regional. Tratar de que sea, por vez primera, un Programa regional que trate el tema en su conjunto para toda la región y no como una serie de proyectos aislados. Para ello, se estudiaron las lecciones aprendidas de cada programa-País y se formuló un Programa que complementa las acciones que ya existían en los países.

En este sentido el Programa Regional, (que estaba dotado de 9 millones de Euros y que finalmente se convirtió en 12, sumándole tres millones que no pudieron ser implementados por la Delegación de Guatemala (¿?)) identificó cuatro componentes en un Programa con un enfoque integral para el tema y que comenzará a implementarse a mediados del presente año.

Los cuatro componentes responden a la creación de un sistema general de SA en la Región que trate el tema como algo prioritario y reduzca los niveles de Inseguridad alimentaria en los lugares que los propios actores locales elijan. Porque el componente del Fondo monetario (6 millones de Euros, 50% del presupuesto total del Programa) será definido por los actores locales en función de las necesidades del área y del consenso de las Instituciones gestoras del Proyecto. El componente Sistema de Información, (2 millones de euros) compilará la información que hay en la región y completará la inexistente con modelos estandarizados. El componente Refuerzo Capacidad de Análisis fortalecerá las Instituciones Regionales que trabajan en el tema y que actualmente tienen el “expertise” pero no los recursos económicos. Por último el componente de Políticas rescatará los elementos que ya hay en cuanto a Políticas públicas en el tema y en la Región para ayudar, junto con la información obtenida del Sistema, crear políticas de Seguridad alimentaria regionales y nacionales.

Por último, cuatro ventajas mas del Programa:

- Se ha hecho un esfuerzo por lograr mecanismos de coordinación efectiva y participación en el programa de diferentes instrumentos de la Comisión. (ECHO, por ejemplo)
- Se ha hecho un esfuerzo porque el Programa tenga en su contenido una coherencia interna y una interrelación de los cuatro componentes, de tal manera que ninguno de ellos tendrían sentido por separado y que cada uno de ellos complementa a los otros.
- El Programa ya ha tenido un primer impacto antes de ponerse en funcionamiento; ha conseguido por primera vez que las Instituciones regionales que abordan el tema desde

distintas perspectivas se coordinen en el marco del SISCA (Secretaría de Integración Social en Centroamérica) y comiencen a planificar juntos.

- Se ha hecho un esfuerzo por incluir la vertiente nutricional dentro del enfoque de Seguridad Alimentaria además del acceso, la disponibilidad y el consumo; como cuarto pilar. De hecho el Programa tiene por título “Programa Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional”.

En cuanto a los problemas o puntos negativos que tiene la identificación de este Programa, podemos mencionar diez:

- 1) El PNUD será el organismo a cargo de la administración financiera del Programa con un costo de 5 % del monto total del proyecto. Esta decisión es difícil de comprender, pues aunque esta administración será exclusivamente financiera y no política ni de gestión, no queda claro cual es el valor añadido de que lo haga este organismo de las Naciones Unidas. Máxime cuando el Programa tiene como objetivo fortalecer instituciones regionales y existen varias que podrían adquirir ese rol y que además tienen otras responsabilidades en el programa (SICA, INCAP). El propio BICE (Banco de Integración Centroamericana) podría adquirir esa responsabilidad y estaría mas acorde con el mandato del Programa: Fortalecer el proceso de Integración Centroamericana. Dotándole al BICE de la responsabilidad del manejo de los fondos, esta entidad financiera con presencia en toda la región y con clara vocación integradora saldría fortalecida y el Programa tendría una visión mas regional, sin manejo de fondos por parte de la cooperación externa.
- 2) La FAO será el Organismo encargado del componente del Sistema de Información. Tampoco se comprende esta decisión si pensamos que el INCAP (Institución mas antigua con carácter regional, creada en los años 50) tiene, precisamente como mandato los Sistemas de Información sobre Seguridad alimentaria y de hecho ya trabajan en un sistema propio desde hace tiempo. Además, el SISAN (Sistema de Información estandarizado por la FAO) es a juicio de los técnicos del INCAP, un Sistema de Información basado en las causas de la Inseguridad Alimentaria pero que no tiene como objetivo valorar las consecuencias de la misma y esto supone una carencia importante.
- 3) De igual manera ocurre con los *Observatorios de Seguridad Alimentaria* que dentro del componente de Refuerzo de la Capacidad de Análisis se pretenden crear en cada país de la Región. El INCAP tiene como mandato “observar y monitorear” la situación alimentaria y ya ha creado observatorios que podrían reforzarse y utilizarse dentro del Programa en lugar de crear cuatro nuevos observatorios en cada país.
- 4) Las contrapartes nacionales para implementar el Programa están aún sin identificar se supone que esto ocurrirá en los próximos meses pero por el momento es una carencia del Programa.
- 5) El SISCA jugará un papel primordial en el Programa. Como Institución gestora, hará funciones de paraguas institucional para el resto de Instituciones y organismos involucrados y gestionará el día a día del Proyecto. Sin embargo, esta Secretaría

General dependiente del SICA es muy débil actualmente. Además el cargo de Secretario General (que será la persona clave para el Programa como máximo gestos del mismo) está vacante. La persona que participó en la identificación del Programa ya no labora para la Institución y la nueva persona tendrá que empezar de cero a conocer todo el proceso e intenciones del Programa.

- 6) En la formulación del proyecto falta un rubro sobre visibilidad-comunicación-difusión. Siendo un programa de envergadura regional, sería importante contar en el presupuesto con una cantidad para difundir el propio Programa, en aras de fortalecer todas las acciones relacionadas con la integración regional desde el punto de vista de la comunicación social.
- 7) Tampoco aparece en el Programa el tema Indígena como un tema propio, siendo realmente importante en la región.
- 8) Sería importante establecer mecanismos que vinculen el Programa a otros esfuerzos de la Comisión y de otros donantes en el tema.
- 9) La agencia de Cooperación Norteamericana, USAID, va a implementar con fondos propios un Sistema de Información sobre Nutrición y SA en la Región. Sería importante coordinar acciones para no duplicar esfuerzos.
- 10) Por último es llamativo en el Programa, la ausencia de las ONGs internacionales y sus contrapartes locales que han trabajado como socios implementadores de la Comisión en temas de Seguridad alimentaria, dentro de la “llamada a propuestas” y que tienen *expertise* suficiente sobre el terreno como para poder tener un espacio en el Programa regional.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 8:

Abordamos esta pregunta desde una doble perspectiva: Regional y Nacional; enfatizando en el enfoque regional, aprovechando la existencia por vez primera en la región de una Programa de Seguridad Alimentaria Regional.

Desde una perspectiva nacional, es necesario decir que los “Programas-País” de Seguridad Alimentaria no son verdaderos Programas, en el sentido de que son un conjunto de proyectos de mayor o menor envergadura pero que no tienen entre si una lógica de Programa, una estrategia única que argumentar que existen verdaderos Programa-País en el tema de la Seguridad Alimentaria.

Por tanto en cuanto a los “Programas-País”, la identificación de los mismos no ha contribuido a lograr los objetivos marcados en el Reglamento. Basta como ejemplo, el hecho de que los técnicos que laboran en Seguridad Alimentaria tanto en la Delegación de Nicaragua como en la de Guatemala no trabajan en las mismas secciones orgánicas, sino que están distribuidos por varias secciones, sin mas nexos comunes que los meramente administrativos. Esto dificulta enormemente la posibilidad de establecer estrategias propias de Seguridad Alimentaria en cada País, unido a, como se comentaba en la segunda cuestión, que los CSPs no proponen la seguridad Alimentaria como tema prioritario y estratégico.

En cuanto a la identificación del Programa Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria, fue desde su concepción, un programa ampliamente consultado con Instituciones y con otros Instrumentos de la Comisión aunque no tanto con los Organismos y las asociaciones sociales que trabajan en el tema y que representan a la sociedad civil de los países de la Región. Al mismo tiempo que consultado, puede asegurarse por las entrevistas mantenidas, que también fue un Programa consensuado con las Instituciones contrapartes en cuanto a su concepción, estrategia, metodologías y modo de implementación. Con algunas pequeñas contradicciones que se comentan a continuación en el análisis de la pregunta.

En el tema de la Programación general de las intervenciones de la Línea, no es claro quién programa. La gestión es llevada desde la Delegación pero para la Programación; no queda claro cuál es papel de la RELEX porque no se habla de programación en los CSPs. De esta manera, resulta mas difícil la identificación de programas y proyectos por la falta de coordinación con otras líneas presupuestarias y por la falta de claridad del papel protagonista en la planificación.; esto contribuye a que la Línea este aislada y que no se entienda bien la necesidad de atacar la Inseguridad alimentaria de una forma estructural, que requiere la coordinación F5-Delegación-RELEX-Gobiernos nacionales para enfocar el problema de identificar conjuntamente la estrategia y las operaciones a financiar.

3.9 Cuestión Evaluativa 9

Hasta que punto la preparación para la implementación de los proyectos y programas (mecanismos de manejo/ mecanismos y procedimientos, p.e. repartición del trabajo y responsabilidades, coordinación de acciones) han facilitado el camino para lograr a los objetivos de SA marcados por el Reglamento 1292/96?

Nicaragua: Debería existir mas coordinación con otras líneas CE, particularmente con los proyectos de desarrollo rural para la diversificación de las fincas, los sistemas de micro-riego y la economía del patio. Hay que ver la SA a través la problemática de la economía rural, y la cuestión de la tierra es también un aspecto fundamental.

No hay una coordinación formal con los otros donadores (NU, Japón, Estados Miembros). Los EM hacen apoyo alimentario a través del PMA. Es una incoherencia porque la CE ha cerrado este tipo de apoyo porque se estima que se precisa cada vez mas un apoyo estructural a las problemáticas de SA y no apoyo alimentario, sino un apoyo estructural que sea también de lucha contra la pobreza .

El PMA ha planteado la problemática del « Corredor de la sequía » pero no parece que existe una dinámica y coordinación de las estrategias de SA alrededor de esta noción. El PND plantea sus estrategias en una visión de desarrollo de las zonas con mas potencial, es una forma de explicitar que la población tiene que abandonar las zonas secas y emigrar en las zonas con mas potencial. No hay un estudio de factibilidad en relación a este propuesta, que por otro lado es poco sensible con los problemas de SA cuando asegura, que la solución es la migración y el abandono de sus tierras.

El monitoreo hecho por la AT/Delegacion es cada vez mas un monitoreo de proceso mas que de calidad del impacto de los proyectos. Existe un monitoreo externo pero no sistematizado. Se ha hecho solo una vez el monitoreo externos de los programas SA en Nicaragua (Eptisa) con monitoreo de los proyectos del ayuda institucional y a la sociedad civil, y de un proyecto ONG. Hay informes internos de ejecución técnicas de los proyectos que están mandados regularmente a la CE. El impacto de las actividades no esta estimado, sino mas bien en relación a las actividades cumplidas.

La UESA ya ha sido evaluada recientemente. (ver evaluación final)

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 9:

El objetivo de reducción de pobreza mediante la utilización del reglamento 1292/96, es claramente pertinente si atendemos a los indicadores que expresan que las capas mas desfavorecidas de Centroamérica tienen que gastar de 30 hasta 60 % de sus ingresos para comprar alimentos.

La propia implementación de la regulación ha ido mejorando desde su inicio en el 97 en la medida en que en los países de la Región se ha ido fortaleciendo el proceso de mayor institucionalidad y mayor descentralización del Estado. En Centroamérica se ha ido pasando de un apoyo únicamente a través de ONGs con ayuda alimentaria a un apoyo cada vez mas selectivo, utilizando los mecanismos del Reglamento que permiten hacer apoyo institucional y que permitirán en el futuro hacer apoyo presupuestario focalizado. Pero todavía los mecanismos tienen que estar cada vez mas integrados en las políticas de los gobiernos para lograr una intervención en profundidad, mas estructurada, que es la única manera de atender a las capas sociales mas vulnerables, que son al mismo tiempo, los mas difíciles de atender a través de Proyectos tanto de SA como de desarrollo rural.

Los mecanismos de los estados para descentralizarse, facilitan un apoyo mas eficiente, sostenible y con mayor impacto en las poblaciones metas. Todavía se precisa siempre mas coordinación de las políticas y acciones de los donantes y de los Estados.

El proyecto CE a nivel regional en SA permitirá una mejor definición e intervención de las políticas de SA de los gobiernos de Centroamérica con los otros donantes y con la propia Comisión.

El manejo de los Proyectos ONGs es mas problemático. El proceso de llamada es lento porque pide hasta 15 meses de procedimientos administrativos hasta que se firma el contrato.

Es decir que la situación local puede cambiar dentro el momento de la identificación hasta que se realiza el proyecto. Todo este tiempo es tiempo perdido para los beneficiarios. También los procesos de desembolso son lentos, en consecuencia las ONG deben trabajar con fondos propios durante una parte del proyecto.

La AT de SA de la CE esta integrada en la Delegaciones en las diferentes secciones geográficas y de esta forma corre el riesgo de perder su especificidad de apoyo en SA porque esta AT esta afectada por tramites cada vez mas administrativos ligados a procesos de implementación y desembolsos mas que relacionados a la calidad de la intervención CE.

El hecho de que existan técnicos de la Delegación trabajando en exclusividad el tema de la seguridad alimentaria no es óbice para que exista mayor sensibilidad política sobre la necesidad de rescatar el tema de SA en los CSPs y en el RSP. El papel de los técnicos queda minimizado bajo una carga administrativa que les impide teorizar sobre los modelos de SA que serían mas eficientes en los países. Los técnicos no consiguen hacer el “lobby” suficiente como para conseguir que se le otorgue al tema la importancia que tiene en cuanto a las prioridades es de la Delegación, que quedan marcadas por otros temas como la integración centroamericana, la unión aduanera o la competitividad de los polos de desarrollo.

3.10 Cuestión Evaluativa 10

Hasta que punto la Fase de entrega/cierre de las acciones apoyadas ha sido planeada y que contribución tuvo en el cumplimiento de los objetivos generales marcados?

En el caso del Proyecto en Nicaragua, Prodelsa, de apoyo institucional a través de la Línea, se recomienda que no sólo se apoye la creación de planes de desarrollo municipales sino también dinamizar cada municipalidad (o un conjunto de municipalidades) para buscar nuevas fuentes de fondos para financiar sus planes de desarrollo por que las inversiones no paran una vez terminados los fondos de inversión del proyecto CE.

Esta dinamización tiene que estar planteada desde el inicio del proyecto, en aras de capacitar cada municipalidad a buscar nuevas fuentes de financiamiento.

La entrega o cierre de los Proyectos de SA ha sido mas segura cuando se trata de un manejo de equipamiento (Ineter) o de valorizar/diversificar un producto (Unicafé) pero menos dentro un fortalecimiento institucional, ya sea estatal o de la sociedad civil, porque la garantía de sobre vivencia del apoyo realizado es hipotética porque depende de que se logrará después del apoyo. Hay una mejor tasa de éxito después de la entrega del proyecto cuando se liga también un fondo de inversión al apoyo institucional (caso Prodelsa) porque existe la posibilidad de poner rápidamente en practica el apoyo realizado. El proyecto hará una mejor entrega si el fortalecimiento tenga aplicaciones concretas. No ha sido el caso para varios proyectos (Unag, Inec).

Los proyectos de comercialización (Proacta en Honduras, Pac en Nicaragua) han previsto sus entregas en el Ministerio de Agricultura. Esta contraparte ha sido determinado después del inicio del proyecto porque la entrega del proyecto no había sido determinada en la identificación. No parece seguro, tampoco adecuado, entregar un proyecto comercial a una entidad estatal, sobretodo porque no es el papel del MAGFOR hacer un apoyo de crédito a entidades privadas sino que ese es el papel de un banco, ya sea estatal o de segundo piso.

El apoyo presupuestario desligado prevé por ejemplo dar fondos a municipalidades una vez que se hayan realizado los planes de inversión (= indicador) pero no se prevé el mecanismo para realizar los planes de inversión. Es poner el nivel demasiado alto y el riesgo no es que no se inicie el proyecto sino mas bien que al no cumplirse el indicador, que nunca se entregara el dinero al municipio. Actualmente las tendencias de inversión de los donadores es hacer este tipo de apoyo presupuestario desligado. En el caso de la SA se hace únicamente un apoyo presupuestario focalizado a instituciones gubernamentales (Honduras : Tierra al Ministerio de Hacienda, Finsa al banco estatal de segundo piso Finaprovi). La entrega esta prevista de una manera mas suave porque ya es el beneficiario que maneja el proyecto. El objetivo es que el beneficiario se responsabilice desde el inicio

del proyecto y que no exista un cambio al cierre de proyecto. Todavía es pronto para estimar si funcionara a largo plazo porque existe también riesgos políticos difícil a prever : un cambio de mayoría gubernamental puede cerrar un tipo de proyecto demasiado ligado a sensibilidades políticas (Proyecto Tierra en Honduras).

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 10:

La fase de entrega o cierre es esencial como factor que garantice la posterior sostenibilidad de las intervenciones en SA. Los objetivos en SA en los proyectos o programas suelen ser mas ambiciosos que la duración media de los proyectos (cuatro años) Los proyectos están a priori preparados para dinamizar un proceso que sigue después de la entrega del proyecto, pero no parece que están bien preparados para seguir después del « Cabo » de la entrega.

En el caso de la ayuda indirecta, las ONGs suelen buscar otras fuentes de financiamiento que les permita trabajar con los mismos beneficiarios para conseguir salir de las situaciones de Inseguridad alimentaria. En los proyectos de apoyo directo se plantea usualmente la sostenibilidad del proyecto que prevé siempre los detalles de la entrega a la contraparte. Los objetivos no deberían ser únicamente lograr un numero de resultados, sino mas bien iniciar una dinámica que tiene que ampliarse en el futuro. El apoyo a una organización civil debe tener en cuenta no sólo el grupo beneficiario meta sino también la capacidad de ese grupo a seguir con otras acciones después de la entrega. En varios casos este no ha sido planteado en la identificación del proyecto (Funde, Inec, Unag, MagFor) que no pudieron aprovechar los beneficios y las oportunidades del proyecto para valorizar los resultados logrados durante la existencia del proyecto. Esta situación no esta solamente una falta dentro el proceso de identificación sino mas bien una falta de visión a largo plazo, porque se prevén los resultados a lograr durante la fase del proyecto y se prevén (no siempre) una sostenibilidad todavía hipotética pero no se prevé lo que hará el organismo beneficiario después del apoyo del proyecto. El cambio de situación después de la entrega es demasiado alto : salarios que bajaran, personal que sobra, actividades que terminan, departamento que cierra, por tanto el Apoyo Institucional tiene que ser considerado como el inicio de un proceso y no como la finalización del mismo.

3.11 Cuestión Evaluativa 11

Cual es la sostenibilidad de los efectos y de los impactos de las políticas y los programas de la CE en SA, a nivel de la población, a nivel institucional y de la política propia en el país beneficiario?

Hasta la fecha los programas y proyectos de SA en la Región, tienen un impacto reducido en comparación, no sólo con las necesidades existentes de SA en CA, sino también con lo planificado a priori en las propuestas. Hay un cierto impacto en la población meta pero esta población meta está todavía reducida en comparación a la población que sufre de Inseguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional. El impacto total de los proyectos de la CE en SA ha sido reducido en relación a las necesidades y las problemáticas en la región porque la población meta de los proyectos está reducida en comparación a la población que sufre de InSAN.

En palabras de los técnicos de la delegación de Nicaragua, los proyectos no se preparan bajo una disciplina de sostenibilidad. Es decir, no se identifican y formulan priorizando que ocurrirá cuando el proyecto acabe. No se prepara desde un inicio la transferencia al final de la intervención con una metodología de sostenibilidad.

En Nicaragua, los Proyectos del Programa-País de Seguridad Alimentaria que han tenido una contraparte gubernamental, no tienen una sostenibilidad fácil. En la mayor parte de los casos las acciones no tendrán continuidad. En cuanto a los proyectos hechos a través de la ayuda indirecta con ONGs, no tienen fondos propios para sostenibilidad. Lo cual dificulta la entrega de los proyectos a las contrapartes locales.

La UESA de Nicaragua ha sido “desintegrada” dentro de la Delegación. La memoria histórica de los proyectos no ha sido aún recuperada y los técnicos de SA están en diferentes secciones dentro de la misma, sin un trabajo común ni estrategia reconocida con excepción del caso del Programa Regional que intentará marcar estrategias comunes.

Honduras: la SA no está como estrategia prioritaria en las políticas del gobierno; sin embargo aun cuando la Comisión tampoco tiene una política estratégica propia de SA en ese País, hay efectos positivos de los proyectos del Programa-País de SA:

El programa de micro-crédito, FINSA trabaja con una institución gubernamental de segundo piso, FONAPROVI, para otorgar micro-créditos a instituciones no convencionales. Los efectos son positivos para los beneficiarios que pueden pedir un préstamo con una tasa de interés de 20 % al año, en comparación a los 240 % al año a través el circuito informal. Sobre todo el proyecto FONAPROVI ha dado la posibilidad de manejo de crédito a organismos de crédito no convencionales como las ONGs y las cooperativas. El impacto garantiza la existencia de organismos de crédito en el medio rural porque los bancos comerciales no están interesados en hacer crédito de pequeños montos. La garantía no es la tierra, que de todas maneras no es propiedad del campesino, sino su

producción, que esta acopiada en el organismo prestador de crédito. El potencial de sostenibilidad institucional, es alto.

FINSA se enmarca dentro de una institución financiera de segundo piso, lo que la aleja de los mayores riesgos por incumplimiento de los micro créditos. En cuanto a la sostenibilidad social, no ha desarrollado una vinculación con la población meta, ni a nivel de las intermediarias financieras y menos a nivel de FINSA; por el contrario, enfrenta algunas dificultades, principalmente para llegar y monitorear a la población meta, hay poca promoción por parte de las IFIs y del mismo FINSA.

Sería conveniente desarrollar mecanismos con una mayor vinculación con la población meta (p.e.: establecer fideicomisos con organizaciones locales o comunitarias), y que éstas se comprometan a manejar estos fondos con apoyo y monitoreo del fiduciario.

El Programa PROACTA tiene también una sostenibilidad institucional pero hay que considerar el costo elevado de la intervención por grupo beneficiario. También el nivel de inversión por grupo beneficiario es alto: 15000 US\$ por grupo, lo que no permite un impacto amplio del proyecto. La sostenibilidad sufre de una deficiencia institucional de los grupos beneficiarios en cuanto a la identificación y montaje institucional de proyectos.

El Programa de apoyo presupuestario Tierra que también cumple con el acceso de tierras agrícolas a través el micro-crédito otorgado por FINSA. Su sostenibilidad se hace a través un proceso de fortalecimiento de instituciones locales y estatales.

Guatemala: Existen únicamente 4 proyectos de ONGs en SA. Existe también unas DTPs sobre Seguridad Alimentaria, pero no un Programa-País sobre el tema. De hecho, la Delegación de Guatemala tenía 3 millones de euros para Seguridad alimentaria que “cedieron” a los fondos del futuro Programa Regional porque ellos no pudieron implementar esos fondos. No parece que hay impacto de la política del gobierno, que no esta orientada en la SA, cuando existen 62 % de los municipios en alto riesgo de inseguridad alimentaria.

Los proyectos ONGs no han sido evaluados, pero se estima que había un impacto sobre las poblaciones metas. No se sabe la sostenibilidad del impacto.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 11:

El apoyo institucional de la CE en SA no tiene la sostenibilidad necesaria porque al terminar las acciones del proyecto, debido a la debilidad de las instituciones, no existe mas financiamiento para continuar con el desarrollo de las acciones. Es el caso de los Proyectos de SA en Nicaragua que apoyaron a INETER, MAGFOR y el INEC. En el caso de las ONGs, cada una tiene que buscar soluciones de viabilidad de sus intervenciones, y la dificultad es de garantizar la sostenibilidad a través los organismos locales.

La política de SA de la CE en la Región, no tiene una definición estratégica clara. En realidad, no existe una política de Seguridad alimentaria propiamente dicha ni a nivel país ni a nivel regional. No está incluida en los CSPs y tampoco en los Planes estratégicos de desarrollo de los gobiernos de CA, únicamente existen acciones aisladas de la Comisión en desarrollo rural.

El Proyecto Regional que empezará a implementarse en breve, trata de llenar ese vacío a nivel Regional, pero a nivel de los países tratados individualmente, no hay una política de la Comisión en Seguridad alimentaria..

Al mismo tiempo, la situación actual es que las políticas nacionales tienen la capacidad de fomentar la inseguridad alimentaria, como en el caso de Nicaragua donde se priorizan paquetes de desarrollo basados en la competitividad, las inversiones extranjeras y un pequeño mercado de exportaciones de productos agrícolas, pero sin medidas complementarias, de cohesión, para los sectores mas vulnerables urbanos y fundamentalmente rurales. La estrategia de apertura del mercado local a granos básicos (consecuencia de la firma del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos), tienen también riesgos relacionados con la SA de los mas vulnerables que no podrán competir con sus pequeñas y caras producciones locales.

El Proyecto Regional de SA tratará de coordinar una intervención mas sostenible a través del apoyo a la definición de políticas nacionales y a través del reforzamiento de la capacidad de análisis y de la utilización del nuevo Sistema de información. Las estrategias regionales de SA de la CE han sido definidas en el borrador de la Memoria del Programa Regional de SA. La coordinación con otros donantes y su participación el PRSA garantizarán una mejor integración de las recomendaciones y estrategias de los donantes con el fin de lograr una mayor sostenibilidad de las políticas e intervenciones en SA.

3.12 Cuestión Evaluativa 12


Cual es el rol de la Regulación 1292/96 en los esfuerzos de ser un puente en la lógica emergencia – rehabilitación – desarrollo?

Los diferentes instrumentos que usa la Comisión para distribuir los recursos (ya sea a través de las delegaciones o de forma directa) están diseminados en diferentes líneas financieras que a su vez suponen diferentes tratamientos conceptuales.

La Delegación de Nicaragua canaliza estos recursos de una forma, hasta el momento, carente de metodología en cuanto a la coordinación; es decir no hay una estructura que funcione con la “lógica de cadena” entre los diferentes instrumentos; de tal forma que el final de uno suponga el principio del siguiente en las mismas comunidades y para los mismos beneficiarios.

Muy al contrario, la lógica empleada es la independencia de las líneas y su tratamiento conceptual separado que hace que las contrapartes institucionales sean diferentes, que las metodologías de trabajo y la sociedad civil (comunidades, beneficiarios) receptoras del apoyo sean también independientes de una lógica de trabajo común y concatenado.

El Reglamento 1292/96 no tuvo en su concepción, un ánimo claro y abierto de jugar el rol de “puente” entre la emergencia y la rehabilitación, pero la experiencia acumulada ha hecho que sea ideal concebirlo de esa manera. Como es ideal concebir los proyectos bajo la línea de cooperación técnica y financiera bajo la lógica de puente entre la rehabilitación y el desarrollo.



Este rol, de lograr un mecanismo que haga de puente entre las intervenciones en Emergencia y en Rehabilitación, es absolutamente necesario para que los proyectos de la Delegación no queden como pequeñas islas y la línea de Seguridad Alimentaria podría adquirirlo; sobre todo pensando que en algunos casos los socios implementadores tanto de ECHO como de SA son los mismos: Las ONGs nacionales e internacionales que tienen la

experiencia sobre el terreno y que podrían ser uno de los factores para que ese puente fuera una realidad.

Además de eso, planificar en conjunto (ECHO y SA) las intervenciones, y tener la coordinación de medios y de recursos como un punto clave y prioritario, podrán ser otros de los elementos.

Existen algunos ejemplos de coordinación surgidos como consecuencia del Huracán Mitch entre ECHO en Honduras y la UESA de aquel país. Los mismos socios implementadores trabajaron primero en la emergencia y después en el puente hacia la rehabilitación con programas gestionados por la línea de seguridad alimentaria a través de la UESA.

Actualmente, en el diseño del programa Regional de Seguridad alimentaria (ver cuestión evaluativa 8) se ha coordinado con ECHO mecanismos conjuntos para el Sistema de Información y en concreto la apuesta regional de ECHO para el próximo año (520.000 Euros), que consiste en el establecimiento de un Sistema de Información Nutricional estandarizado liderado por acción Contra el Hambre, se va a utilizar como insumo propio del Programa de Seguridad Alimentaria Regional.

En cuanto a la Rehabilitación, en Centroamérica hubo un esfuerzo presupuestario por parte de la Comisión, de establecer un Programa Regional de Reconstrucción de América Central (PRRAC) que contó con la importante cantidad de 250 millones de euros para la Región y que, en aras de la reciente evaluación del citado Programa, quedo como un Programa aislado de catorce proyectos individuales sin ningún nexo en común entre ellos y menos aún, sin ningún esfuerzo de coordinación con otros Instrumentos de la Comisión.

El PRRAC, a pesar de ser concebido como Rehabilitación Post-Mitch, está aproximadamente en un 25% de implementación de sus actividades, habiendo transcurrido mas de seis años desde su identificación y aprobación. No ha sido un Programa que, por su concepción temática tan dispersa, haya facilitado la coordinación entre los Instrumentos, además su gestión lenta y los criterios de calidad utilizados (basados en la calidad de los procedimientos y no en la calidad del impacto) y la pobre relación coste-beneficio para los beneficiarios, hacen que este Programa no pueda ser considerado como un ejemplo a seguir dentro de buscar una lógica de coordinación entre emergencia, rehabilitación y desarrollo; constituyendo una importante oportunidad perdida para trabajar en ese sentido, dado el volumen de fondos que maneja el citado Programa.

La futura desconcentración de la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria, podrá contribuir a lograr que se establezcan esos mecanismos de coordinación, ya que, estando en manos de las Delegaciones el peso de las decisiones organizativas y conceptuales de sus líneas presupuestaria, será mas fácil establecer grados de coordinación concretos.

Asimismo, el cambio que va a suponer la aplicación del nuevo Reglamento Financiero y la estrategia de la Delegación de Nicaragua (expresada claramente por su delegado, Sr. Giorgio Mambertto) de “apostar” por al apoyo sectorial y presupuestario al presupuesto general de la república, puede también ser un punto de partida para trabajar en un solo sentido y coordinar esfuerzos para que desde la teoría se conciban el apoyo dentro de esa lógica de cadena entre la emergencia, la rehabilitación y el desarrollo. Del mismo modo, la sostenibilidad futura de las acciones, que hasta ahora nunca fue tomada en cuenta como “lo fundamental” de las intervenciones podrá ser retomada bajo la perspectiva de las Instituciones propias de cada país.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 12:

En la región centroamericana, la coordinación necesaria entre los diferentes instrumentos de la Comisión para conseguir que la lógica “emergencia-rehabilitación-desarrollo” tenga un sentido práctico y no sólo teórico, no ha sido llevada a cabo. Dicha coordinación fue un hecho en algún momento puntual después del Mitch, con coordinación efectivas entre ECHO y las Unidades Estratégicas de Seguridad Alimentaria (UESA) en Nicaragua y en Honduras. También fue un hecho en tiempos del Mitch entre los socios implementadores de ambos instrumentos (ECHO y Seguridad Alimentaria) fundamentalmente las ONGs que en algún caso hicieron el papel de puente financiadas con fondos de la Comisión.

Pero en líneas generales, se puede asegurar que aún no se han puesto en marcha mecanismos en la Región que puedan servir para que, a través de la línea de Seguridad Alimentaria, se establezcan acciones tendentes a fortalecer la lógica de trabajo entre la emergencia, la rehabilitación y el desarrollo.

Sin embargo, precisamente esto, sería un valor añadido de la línea, en caso de que en el futuro los mecanismos de coordinación entre los distintos instrumentos sean un hecho y a través de esta línea se puedan implementar acciones de tal naturaleza.

4 ANALYSIS GENERAL

4.1 Pertinencia

La pertinencia de realizar intervenciones en Seguridad Alimentaria en la Región (y por tanto de una línea presupuestaria propia) es clara si atendemos a los Indicadores de Inseguridad Alimentaria y de riesgo de Inseguridad Alimentaria: Entre el 30 y el 40% del total de población de los cuatro países centroamericanos que componen el CA-4 (Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala y El Salvador).

Ahora bien, la pregunta clave es si la Comisión está dispuesta a priorizar las Intervenciones de Seguridad Alimentaria dentro de su estrategia y su política para Centroamérica. A tenor de los CSPs y del RSP, la respuesta sería un no.

Pero en el caso de que la Comisión considerara que es una prioridad dedicar los fondos de la cooperación a intervenciones de seguridad alimentaria como algo estratégico y por tanto como punto focal de la intervención, en aras de cumplir el mandato de reducir pobreza, la pregunta, entonces, sería cuál es la manera mas eficaz de intervenir en Seguridad Alimentaria con los mecanismos e instrumentos de intervención habitualmente usados por la Comisión.

En este caso, y a juicio de los consultores, la respuesta sería que a pesar de la flexibilidad del reglamento y de la línea de SA, en caso de priorizar un intervención haría falta reforzar los mecanismos para lograr un impacto mas ambicioso. Porque los resultados de los Programas y proyectos hasta ahora concebidos, suelen cumplirse en mayor a o menos medida pero el impacto es pequeño y muy focalizado en espacios pequeños de intervención. Si se quiere ser mas ambicioso es necesario una especie de “pacto social” con el resto de sonantes importantes y con los propios gobiernos de la Región para lograr metas mayores. En este sentido una Línea autónoma, con mayores recursos humanos y financieros, con técnicos capaces de apoyar a los gobiernos en la creación de políticas públicas integrales sería una posible solución.

Es un hecho que la población meta de la Línea de SA no es atendida ni por los Proyectos ECHO, ni por Rehabilitación (PRRAC en Centroamérica) ni por los Proyectos de Desarrollo Rural que aunque tengan un enfoque de SA, van dirigidos hacia capas menos vulnerables que las que están en situación de Inseguridad Alimentaria, hacia capas sociales que pueden aspirar a producir para comercializar, a obtener créditos, etc.

Este grupo meta en Inseguridad Alimentaria precisa un enfoque especificado en cuanto al tipo de apoyo. El Reglamento 1292/96 tiene flexibilidad de adaptación mas grande que otras líneas de la cooperación CE. Es necesario tener esta flexibilidad para adaptar el instrumento a una población meta que precisa que sean definidos objetivos específicos a sus problemas.

La pertinencia de acciones de SA en Centroamérica es bastante obvia. La clave es el grado de ambición de la intervención (prioridad política y estratégica o simple apoyo con proyectos o programas aislados).

En caso de ser un tema prioritario habrá que definir el instrumento adecuado o el mecanismo dentro del Reglamento 1292/96.

4.2 Eficacia

La Línea tienen varios mecanismos y dependiendo de cual se use se han logrado mayores o menores grados de eficacia, dependiendo también de otros factores, como la institucionalidad del país receptor, la calidad de las ONGs, etc.:

1.- La *ayuda en especie* a través de Euronaid no ha resultado particularmente eficaz en el pasado en Centroamérica. La propia evaluación que se le hizo a Euronaid sugería cambios en la metodología para la Región que parece se están empezando a llevar a cabo. En cualquier caso, la ayuda en especie no parece que tenga mucho sentido dentro del Reglamento de Seguridad Alimentaria. Tendría mas sentido cercano a ECHO o con Reglamento propio para situaciones de Emergencia.

2. Las *llamadas a ONGs* tiene algunas ventajas comparativas que aportan grados de eficacia: La población meta está bien identificada por la experiencia de las ONGs y sus contrapartes locales en el terreno. El proceso de identificación es usualmente bien hecho, con un alto nivel de participación de los beneficiarios a todos los niveles del proyecto. La desventaja reside en el aspecto de la sostenibilidad. Es difícil lograr a una sostenibilidad financiera, institucional y económica en el tiempo de los proyectos ONGs, que no suele exceder de cuatro años. Usualmente las ONGs tienen que buscar otras fuentes de financiamiento después de la cierre de las finanzas del proyecto CE. La lentitud de la administración de la Comisión hacia los proyectos ONGs va en perjuicio de su eficacia.

3. El *apoyo institucional*, suele depender del nivel de desarrollo y de gestión de las instituciones del país beneficiario. En Nicaragua han existido experiencias interesantes y exitosas cuando el proyecto estuvo ligado a objetivos específicos (censo agropecuario de INEC, estaciones meteorológicas de INETER, diversificación del cultivo del café con UNICAFÉ), pero menos positivos cuando la sostenibilidad del proceso no había sido planteada en la identificación del proyecto (UNAG, FONDE, MAGFOR).

El nuevo proyecto “Prodelsa” tiene el aspecto de apoyo institucional a través del fortalecimiento de las Municipalidades y sus planes de desarrollo. Se acompaña de fondos de inversiones para que este apoyo institucional se traduce de manera concreta en inversiones identificadas por los grupos metas de la sociedad civil. Este conjunto de dos sistemas, apoyo institucional y a la sociedad civil, quizá permita la sostenibilidad de ambos procesos.

Como conclusión decir que el apoyo institucional es fundamental para elevar las capacidades de manejo de las instituciones públicas y de la sociedad civil, y en consecuencia eleva las capacidades de absorción de fondos de estas instituciones, lo que es positivo para el no muy lejano apoyo sectorial. Las intervenciones tienen mas éxito si están ligadas a un enfoque de realización concreta.

4. El *apoyo presupuestario* tiene la ventaja de que se puede llegar a poblaciones metas mas grandes pero no es el caso en Centroamérica porque los proyectos que se han hecho en SA bajo este mecanismo del Reglamento llegaron a una población reducida (Proyecto Tierra y Fonaprovi del Programa-País de Honduras). El potencial de este tipo de apoyo es mayor dentro un apoyo presupuestario que esté incluido en la política nacional del país. Por tanto para este mecanismo del Reglamento se necesita una política estatal o al menos un estrategia sectorial por parte de los gobiernos locales en SA, y este no es el caso actualmente en los países de Centroamérica.

El Apoyo presupuestario tiene sus límites en CA porque los países no tienen una capacidad institucional fuerte para manejar los requisitos de este mecanismo del Reglamento.

Se puede considerar éxitos variables en relación a los objetivos considerados pero todavía muy reducidos en relación a las problemáticas existentes.

4.3 Eficiencia

El hecho de que la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria, sea una Línea transversal y no geográfica; es decir el hecho de que la línea pueda tener presencia a nivel mundial, puede ser una ventaja comparativa, en términos de eficiencia.

Los fondos pueden moverse de un país al otro en función de las necesidades y prioridades de la SA. Todavía el sistema está lento en situación de emergencia a través llamada a propuestas y Euronaid, pero la línea SA debería tener su ámbito de actuación más ligado al desarrollo que a las emergencias; porque las causas de Inseguridad Alimentaria no son causas de crisis sino causas estructurales.

Se precisa un montaje de proyecto más complicado que en situación de urgencia o rehabilitación porque las poblaciones metas en Inseguridad alimentaria son las más difíciles de atender, porque se precisa una intervención verdaderamente sostenible.

1.- La *ayuda en especie* a través de Euronaid, no resultó muy eficiente en Centroamérica a tenor de la evaluación anteriormente comentada. Entendemos que la ausencia de la ayuda en especie en una posible revisión del Reglamento, sería positiva; en aras de dotarle de mayor especificidad a las intervenciones en SA.

2.- La *llamada a ONGs*: El sistema de llamada a propuestas no es muy eficiente porque el ciclo total entre el momento de la llamada y la firma del contrato dura demasiado tiempo (hasta 15 meses). Un sistema de pre-calificación de proyectos por la Delegación puede ser muy efectivo. El sistema de llamada tiene la ventaja que las propuestas están identificadas más de común acuerdo con los beneficiarios.

3.- *Apoyo institucional*: En Centroamérica varios desembolsos de fondos han sido bloqueados por no estar de acuerdo con el funcionamiento de los proyectos (FONDE, UNAG) y por no lograr los objetivos previstos. Esto puede ser un síntoma de eficacia administrativa por parte de la Delegación/Comisión.

4.- *Apoyo Presupuestario* los dos proyectos actuales, ambos en Honduras, funcionan de forma eficiente en el camino para el cumplimiento de los resultados previstos: Fonaprovi: Este sistema funciona bien con una institución estatal de segundo piso y organizaciones no convencionales de crédito (ONGs, Cooperativas). Existe una demora de solamente 2 % con los fondos otorgados a campesinos. Proyecto Tierra: El proyecto de titularización acaba de ser integrado en el Ministerio de Haciendas que se está apropiando del proceso.

Lentitud en general pero funcionamiento adecuado de los mecanismos del Reglamento.

4.4 Sostenibilidad

De manera general los proyectos SA de la CE no son identificados teniendo en cuenta como algo prioritario su sostenibilidad futura. Además, cada proyecto es considerado como un caso aislado sin una estrategia común propia de Programa-País. El Programa Regional de SA que ese implementará pronto, puede ser una excepción en este sentido, si se consigue empoderar a las Instituciones regionales que los gestionarán y si una vez terminado el Proyecto, estas están lo suficientemente fortalecidas como para poder caminar sin el apoyo exterior.

Para los Proyectos de ayuda en especie y de llamadas a ONGs, la sostenibilidad es el gran reto a solucionar. Son Proyectos de corta duración que dejan mayor o menor impacto pero que a larga no son sostenibles por los beneficiarios .

En apoyo institucional ha habido importantes fracasos desde el punto de vista de la sostenibilidad futura: En el programa Tierra de Honduras, se identificó la contraparte después de iniciado el Proyecto, FONDE y UNAG en Nicaragua tuvieron problemas de sostenibilidad después del cierre de ambos proyectos. En el Proyecto de apoyo al MAGFOR, Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Fomento rural ,una vez terminado el proyecto, se redujeron no sólo las actividades que se hacían, sino también los propios salarios de los trabajadores del Ministerio, habiendo incluso, despidos por la ausencia de recursos una vez cerrado el Proyecto.

La sostenibilidad de los proyectos e intervenciones en general en SA de la Comisión en Centroamérica es una asignatura pendiente. Puede mejorar con la estrategia futura de apoyo sectorial, si se van logrando los indicadores intermedios que tendrá que proponer la Delegación.

4.5 Impacto

Hasta la fecha los programas y proyectos de SA en la Región, tienen un impacto reducido en comparación, no sólo con las necesidades existentes de SA en CA, sino también con lo planificado a priori en las propuestas Hay un cierto impacto en la población meta pero esta población meta esta todavía reducida en comparación a la población que sufre de Inseguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional. El impacto total de los proyectos de la CE en SA ha sido reducido en relación a las necesidades y las problemáticas en la región porque la población meta de los proyectos está reducida en comparación a la población que sufre de InSAN (los indicadores de Honduras muestran una situación de malnutrición peor que Bangladesh).

Los impactos de los Proyectos Euronaid y de la llamada a ONGs son muy poco ambiciosos y por tanto muy reducidos a ámbitos muy locales con el problema añadido que este pequeño impacto es difícil de convertirlo en sostenible.

El impacto del apoyo institucional no es visible porque los indicadores de Inseguridad Alimentaria han continuado creciendo en lugar de disminuir. cia de malnutrición en CA. No hubo un impacto fuerte a nivel sectorial y tampoco en la sociedad civil. Se puede

considerar que hubo un fortalecimiento de instituciones estatales y organizaciones civiles, pero el impacto es mínimo en comparación al esfuerzo requerido por las instituciones publicas para mejorar la SA en los países de CA. Los proyectos institucional parecen proyectos pilotos que faltan de reproductividad a un nivel mas amplio dentro la política sectorial.

El Apoyo Presupuestario es un mecanismo potencialmente fuerte en términos de atender una parte más grande de la población una vez que el sistema estará en camino a través las leyes del país beneficiario y a través de la coordinación con el resto de donantes. El impacto es muy reducido en cuanto a la priorización de las políticas de SA en los Erceps, políticas nacionales, CSPs y RSP.

El impacto es apenas satisfactorio en relación a los objetivos definidos en la planificación de los proyectos pero todavía muy reducido en cuanto a las necesidades y la priorización de la SA por los gobiernos de CA y por la propia Comisión.

4.6 Coherencia interna y externa

Se puede concluir que existe coherencia con las problemáticas nacionales y regionales en cuanto a la necesidad de establecer criterios (en el caso de la Comisión, una Línea de financiamiento específica) en la problemática de la Región en Seguridad Alimentaria. Pero las políticas nacionales no están priorizando el tema y la Comisión tampoco en sus CSPs y el RSP. Esto puede ser coherente en el sentido de focalizar por el mismo camino que van los gobiernos; es decir; Integración centroamericana, unión aduanera, crecimiento macroeconómico a través de aumentar la competitividad de los productos a exportar, reducción del gasto público, etc. pero quedan olvidadas grandes bolsas de población que no muestran los niveles de competitividad exigidos como para que los gobiernos apuesten por ellos en sus políticas públicas. Estos segmentos grandes de población, son precisamente los que están en Inseguridad alimentaria y nutricional o en riesgo de ello.

La Comisión es coherente en sus documentos de estrategia con las políticas de los gobiernos. Sería mas coherente si fuera de la mano de los indicadores de InSAN en el momento de establecer estrategias y no de la mano del gobierno de turno, en el caso que hubiera un acuerdo dentro los donadores y el gobierno sobre los indicadores a utilizar. Sobre todo si se asume que la reducción de la pobreza es el objetivo mas importante para la Delegación en seguimiento de los Acuerdos de la Cumbre del Milenio y del propio mandato fundacional de la cooperación europea.

La coherencia entre las actuaciones de los principales donantes tampoco está muy “trabajada” en Centroamérica; los donantes actúan a un nivel de consideración de una población meta, y los prestadores (BM, FMI) a un nivel de un estado meta. En Nicaragua existe una tentativa de coherencia y a la vez de coordinación de los grandes donantes y prestadores, el “*budget support club*” donde se ponen los primeros pasos para la estrategia de apoyo sectorial; sin embargo la SA no está en la agenda de este grupo que impulsa la delegación de la Comisión Europea.

En definitiva, la CE no tiene una política definida en relación al instrumento de SA. y tampoco en relación a los otros instrumentos de cooperación al desarrollo.

En cuanto a la *ayuda en especie*, no parece coherente mantener este mecanismo dentro del Reglamento porque precisamente la Comisión trata en varias comunicaciones de circunscribir de la ayuda en especie a situaciones de urgencia y como mecanismo para ser usado previa reflexión de sus efectos sobre las poblaciones y sobre los mercados locales.

Ni tan siquiera ECHO está utilizando la ayuda en especie como estrategia. En la crisis provocada por el Huracán Mitch en Centroamérica, solo el 10% del apoyo de ECHO fue destinado a ayuda en especie.

El *apoyo indirecto a través de las ONGs* es coherente con el objetivo de reducir la inSA en los países centroamericanos. Los proyectos apoyados por las ONGs son orientados hacia una población en riesgo o en InSAN; por tanto hay coherencia interna. Además las ONGs tienen que trabajar con las organizaciones de la sociedad civil (cooperativas, asociaciones, etc.) de acuerdo a objetivos de SA.

En *apoyo institucional* podría ser coherente con la problemática de la seguridad alimentaria de Nicaragua y Honduras (no existe AI en Guatemala). El problema son los planes de desarrollo de los gobiernos actuales que no le otorgan la debida importancia a la Seguridad Alimentaria, seguramente porque no consideran estas acciones como acciones propias de desarrollo. Y se centran en producir con mas competitividad a través de los polos de desarrollo. Los países centroamericanos están en proceso de descentralizar su estado hacia los departamentos, provincias y alcaldías. En este sentido es coherente el apoyo institucional con este proceso de descentralización de los estados centroamericanos.

El Programa Regional de SA en su fase de inicio, ha mostrado coherencia en cuanto al apoyo a las instituciones regionales para el fortalecimiento de la integración regional y en el tratamiento de un tema prioritario como la SA para Reducir pobreza.

El *apoyo presupuestario* esta coherente con las necesidades del desarrollo económico y social de Honduras (no existe AP en Nicaragua y Guatemala), y también con las políticas nacionales de desarrollo porque ha sido asimilado por el Estado, todavía a un nivel piloto con un enfoque reducido.

Los proyectos de SA son coherente con los proyectos de desarrollo rural (Prolancho, Jicatuyo, Totonicapán, Huenatinango, ...). El reglamento 1292/96 es también mas un instrumento de desarrollo rural que un instrumento reactivo a situación de urgencias.

Coordinación: La SA ha sido manejado por la sede de la CE, pero sin una coordinación con las otras líneas de cooperación. Tenia su sentido al principio de su implementación porque se precisa tener una flexibilidad fuerte para responder a las situaciones de inSA lo mas pronto posible. La Línea hizo su evolución desde 1997 para ir respondiendo a situaciones de inSA estructurales tratando de incidir en el fortalecimiento de los Estados beneficiarios para poder hacer una respuesta de la inSA a un nivel sectorial.

Pero con la desaparición de la SA como tema clave en los CSPs del 2002, se puede afirmar que la línea ha sido marginalizada del proceso de la preparación del documento de base de las intervenciones de la Comisión en los países centroamericanos.

No existe coordinación del trabajo en SA de la Comisión y de los respectivos trabajos bilaterales de los Estados miembros.

El Programa regional de SA es un intento de coordinar a varios organismos e instituciones regionales, nacionales e internacionales (NNUU y Comisión) de trabajar en aras de un esfuerzo común.

Complementariedad: Existe una complementariedad sólo formal (falta de mecanismos de complementariedad) dentro las líneas de cooperación CE. No existen mecanismos para implementar la Comunicación VARD, la lógica emergencia-rehabilitación-desarrollo no se pone en práctica en las delegaciones centroamericanas. No existe una complementariedad con otros donadores. El Programa Regional también busca esa complementariedad de las acciones que ya existen a nivel país para rescatarlas y utilizarlas junto con los nuevos componentes diseñados.

Dependiendo de qué coherencia analicemos (entre la Línea de SA y las otras líneas, con la política de la Comisión, con las acciones de los estados miembros, con las políticas nacionales, con el programa regional, etc) la respuesta es distinta.

5 CONCLUSIONES

Es importante reseñar, que con anterioridad a la puesta en marcha del Reglamento 1292/96, la intervención de la Comisión en Seguridad Alimentaria, apenas existía. Se basaba en proyectos y programas de ayuda alimentaria y de fondos contravalor.

En este sentido, el cambio cualitativo siete años mas tarde, es grande. El Reglamento vino a llenar un vacío y a sentar las bases de intervenciones mas centradas y cercanas a la realidad. Sin embargo, algunos mecanismos del Reglamento, como la Ayuda en Especie, las llamadas a ONGs o el Apoyo Institucional, no han tenido los resultados previstos y en una futura revisión del Reglamento deberían ser sacados del mismo, en términos de conseguir un reglamento mas específico para SA, en cuanto a la población meta y a la metodología de intervención.

La constante evolución de los mecanismos de cooperación de la Comisión, afectan también al tratamiento de la SA y afectan a las intervenciones en Centroamérica como región y en los países en particular. Las nuevas estrategias de Apoyo Presupuestario que suponen una confianza mayor en los gobiernos de los países de la región, van a afectar el tratamiento de la SA, su priorización o no; la importancia mayor o menor de los desembolsos financieros para el tema, la apuesta por apoyar los procesos de descentralización de los Estados y en definitiva, la contribución mayor o menor, de la Comisión en apoyar a disminuir los altos niveles de Inseguridad Alimentaria.

A modo de conclusión, es necesario enmarcar la Seguridad alimentaria en la Región y su tratamiento por parte de la Comisión/Delegación en cuatro marcos generales que nos permiten un acercamiento al tema desde una perspectiva global para después analizarlo desde una perspectiva mas específica.

Estos marcos conceptuales son los que actualmente tienen sentido para englobar el tema en la Región; es decir son *la actualidad* en la que, las implicaciones de la política (o la ausencia de ella) de la Comisión y de los Estados de la Región, se moverán en un furo próximo:

- En primer lugar, los Planes Nacionales de Desarrollo de los gobiernos centroamericanos y los documentos de Estrategia de Reducción de Pobreza (ERCPs). Este marco encuadra el tema -SA- en las políticas públicas estatales.
- En segundo lugar, los CSPs de la Comisión para cada país y el novedoso RSP para la Región. Este marco encuadra el tema -SA- en la política de la Comisión para los países y para la región.
- En tercer lugar, el nuevo Reglamento Financiero de la Comisión y la estrategia futura de cooperación a través del “Apoyo presupuestario o Sectorial”: Este marco encuadra el tema -SA- en la estrategia de cooperación de la Comisión para los países y para la región.
- En cuarto lugar y como marco general de intervención, que englobaría a los otros tres: Los mandatos internacionales (Cumbre del Milenio, etc.) versus incidencia política de la Comisión en la Región: Este marco encuadra el tema -SA- entre la reducción de pobreza versus integración centroamericana y crecimiento macroeconómico. Este último marco conceptual, es de gran importancia porque define la intervención política de la

Comisión y su estrategia y voluntad desde una perspectiva macro. En palabras del Primer Secretario de la Delegación, Sr. García Álvarez, las prioridades políticas de la CE para la Región vienen dadas en función de la demanda de los gobiernos y no de la oferta que pueda hacer la Comisión. Por tanto la SA no es un tema prioritario porque tampoco ocupa un lugar de importancia para las estrategias de los gobiernos.

Sin embargo, el tema que prioriza como asunto de vital importancia y en el que la Comisión trata de tener incidencia política es el proceso de integración centroamericano en el que parece que si hay consenso Gobiernos región-Delegación para darle un tratamiento prioritario.

Si la Seguridad Alimentaria de la Región fuera una prioridad política tanto para los gobiernos actuales como para la Comisión, la estrategia de intervención de toda la Delegación podría estar en función de la Seguridad Alimentaria y de proponer los mecanismos metodológicos y financieros para ayudar a lograr una mejora sustancial en el tema. Si al mismo tiempo fuera prioridad de los gobiernos, se podría llegar a hablar de Soberanía alimentaria como punto focal de máxima estrategia para la Región; que en términos de fomento del desarrollo local y del sector agro sería viable en Centroamérica trabajar en la línea de reducir al mínimo la Inseguridad Alimentaria de sus ciudadano como un primer paso para el posterior desarrollo.

Sin embargo la estrategia de los gobiernos de la región apoyados por la Delegación, no va en el sentido de proteger el sector agrario y ganadero a través de políticas proteccionistas hacia los pequeños productores y hacia los propios productos; con subsidios, créditos bajos, etc.; sino que mas bien la estrategia gira en torno a los conceptos de *clusters* o polos de desarrollo, para fomentar ciertas área geográficas con potencial, olvidando las capas sociales mas vulnerables y en inseguridad alimentaria.

Al contrario de lo que hacen los países europeos y Estados Unidos con su agricultura (proteccionismo estatal, subvenciones, etc.), en Centroamérica no se apoyan ese tipo de políticas. Los resultados son los niveles de Inseguridad Alimentaria que siguen creciendo en los últimos años en la Región y que tienen el riesgo de agravarse con la nueva apertura de los mercados con Estados Unidos y con Europa si no existen medidas específicas para mejorar la SA de la población la mas sencilla a los efectos secundarios del libre comercio.

Por tanto parece que la estrategia política de la Comisión está vinculada a la Integración centroamericana y a abrir mercados futuros para Europa (que se ha convertido en el mayor bloque comercial del mundo y que necesita siempre nuevos mercados para sus productos industriales, agrarios y tecnológicos) mas que a proporcionar las herramientas para lograr superar los niveles de Inseguridad alimentaria en la región.

Los otros tres marcos conceptuales sobre los que gira actualmente el tema de la Seguridad Alimentaria en la Región (planes de Desarrollo nacionales, CSPs y RSP de la Delegación y la nueva apuesta metodológica de cooperación a través del apoyo directo al presupuesto del Estado -en Nicaragua, este proceso está muy avanzado-) tienen en este momento una relación escasa con estrategias hacia procesos de Seguridad Alimentaria:

Los PND nacionales (excepto la idea del nuevo gobierno en Guatemala) no tratan la Seguridad Alimentaria como mecanismo primario de desarrollo sino como respuestas asistenciales, priorizando el crecimiento macroeconómico a través de fuertes ajustes en el gasto público.

Los CSPs de la Comisión para los países (2002-2006) del área no le dan suficiente importancia al tema en función de los indicadores crecientes de Inseguridad Alimentaria. El novedoso RSP, aunque es un paso adelante en el apoyo al tratamiento de los temas regionales de forma unitaria, no toca el tema de la Seguridad Alimentaria y sobre todo focaliza su estrategia en la Integración, fortalecimiento de Instituciones regionales y Unión Aduanera, quizá porque sea mas acorde y mas rentable para los intereses comerciales de Europa con Centroamérica. (Aunque en términos de rentabilidad comercial, pudiera ser mas interesante el mercado centroamericano si sus ciudadanos tuvieran resuelta la cuestión alimentaria básica, estarían mejor preparados para consumir y para ser población meta del comercio, por tanto incluso desde ese punto de vista, podría ser rentable una mayor Seguridad Alimentaria en la Región).

La nueva estrategia en Nicaragua de apoyo directo al presupuesto de la Republica de los fondos de la cooperación europea no abre sufisamente espacios al tratamiento de la Seguridad Alimentaria: Por el escaso interés del gobierno actual en el tema (escaso interés que se plasma en el PND), por la poca capacidad de absorción de dichos fondos que tendrán las instituciones nicaragüenses por su debilidad estructural, de gestión y de recursos financieros y humanos y por último por la dificultad actual en priorizar el tema.

Sin embargo el fin último de la cooperación europea (según acuerdos internacionales, el propio mandato, la cumbre del milenio, etc) son las acciones para la reducción de la pobreza, queda claro que el espacio teórico existe para darle un marco político a una estrategia prioritaria de Seguridad Alimentaria.

La Delegación tiene varias formas de apoyo para reducir pobreza: el fortalecimiento de las instituciones regionales, la unión aduanera, de procesos de crecimiento macroeconómico con ajustes en los gastos públicos, el fomento de las exportaciones selectivas, y bajar los costos de la deuda externa e interna como primer paso para conseguir el crecimiento de la región que por “ el efecto dominó” o “el efecto de los vasos desbordantes” redundará también en beneficio de las capas mas desfavorecidas.

Sin embargo se precisa tambien medidas estrictamente dirigidas hacia estas capas desfavorecidas, para conseguir aliviar su situación a corto y medio plazo; quizá se pueda a largo plazo pero muy difícil en Centroamérica donde los medios de producción, las tierras y lo recursos financieros están en muy pocas manos y estas elites son las que salen favorecidas de este supuesto crecimiento macroeconómico del país.

Por tanto el futuro de la línea específica de Seguridad Alimentaria en Centroamérica pasa, en primer lugar, por definirla. Si la entendemos como una línea proactiva, pilar basico del desarrollo, punto primario para acciones de desarrollo local e intervenciones en desarrollo rural o por el contrario la entendemos como una línea reactiva, mas cercana a la ayuda alimentaria que al desarrollo, mas cercana a ECHO que a los proyectos ALA, mas cercana, en definitiva, a paliar situaciones puntuales y no como una estrategia primaria y necesaria para el posterior desarrollo.

Los consultores firmantes de este informe apuestan por la primera acepción; con las consecuencias que eso traería para la Línea:

Redefinición del instrumento (Reglamento 1296) y sus mecanismos metodológicos para lograr una Línea mas específica centrada en la población meta en situación de riesgo o de

Inseguridad Alimentaria. Esto implica quitar del Reglamento algunos mecanismos no tan propios para ese grupo meta (ver Recomendaciones)

Fortalecimiento de la línea a nivel administrativo y de recursos humanos y financieros, para acoger la futura desconcentración de la línea con nueva estrategia de fortalecimiento interno en aras de ser mas ambiciosos y lograr mayores impactos en SA.

Rescatar una estrategia general de SA en la Delegación para que sea uno de los puntos importantes de la cooperación europea en cada país de la región.

Por último, El PSA, el nuevo Programa Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria (12 Millones de Euros), constituye un esfuerzo por parte de la unidad de SA de regionalizar el tema; siguiendo con la lógica de apoyo a la integración regional y del fortalecimiento a las instituciones regionales. Además, el PSA, tratará de poner sobre la mesa la importancia de dotar a Centroamérica de unos índices adecuados de Seguridad Alimentaria como base para un posterior desarrollo, conceptualizando a la SA como puente y nexo de unión de la lógica VARD y dándole a la línea de SA en Centroamérica un importante valor añadido que habrá que monitorear para observar su valor como experiencia piloto.

6 RECOMENDACIONES

En términos de dotar al presente informe de mayor orden y con el fin de agrupar las recomendaciones en función de su contenido, las hemos categorizado en dos grupos:

Macro

- 1) Se recomienda una redefinición de la aplicación del Reglamento 1292/96 en Centroamérica: Esa redefinición pasa, en primer lugar, por darle una conceptualización clara: El Reglamento de la Línea presupuestaria de Seguridad Alimentaria en Centroamérica ha de ser concebido como proactivo, y no como reactivo, es decir tiene que entenderse como base primaria de futuros planes, proyectos o programas de desarrollo y no como cercano a la urgencia o a la emergencia por situaciones puntuales.
- 2) Se precisa un análisis y posterior valoración de la información disponible en la Región sobre Seguridad Alimentaria que permita poder visualizar el alcance del problema, que en función de los indicadores que se manejan actualmente parece bastante grave. Dicho estudio, análisis o diagnóstico tendría como propósito enfocar con claridad cual es la población meta actual en situación de Inseguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional o en riesgo de ello. Con el fin de tener una línea específica con una población meta específica.
- 3) En aras de lograr esa especificidad de la Línea que le otorgue su *leitmotiv*; su razón de existir y por tanto el valor añadido como Línea propia, se recomienda reducir los mecanismos en una futura revisión del Reglamento 1292/96 que actualmente se utilizan dentro de la Línea:
 - La ayuda en especie no tiene valor añadido dentro de Seguridad Alimentaria y si lo tendría mas cercano a las líneas de crisis o emergencia.
 - El apoyo institucional en Centroamérica dentro de SA, tiene que realizarse con mucha cautela y estudiando previamente las posibilidades de la *institución fortalecida* de dotar de sostenibilidad a la intervención cuando esta termina. Además se debe analizar junto con los gobiernos que instituciones son estratégicas para el tema; priorizando las instituciones municipales y gremiales.
 - La *llamada a ONGs* en caso de utilizarse, tiene que estar vinculada a la lógica VARD y para ello es necesario articular mecanismos entre ellas mismas y entre ellas y las delegaciones que permitan poner en práctica la comunicación VARD con acciones concretas.
- 4) Se precisa entender la importancia de lograr mejorar los indicadores de InSAN en la Región y el apoyo que para ello necesitan los gobiernos de la región. Para ello, una vez definido la población meta, y el marco metodológico y conceptual con la revisión del Reglamento, se precisa el fortalecimiento de la línea a nivel administrativo y de recursos humanos y financieros, para acoger la futura desconcentración de la línea con una nueva estrategia de fortalecimiento interno que permita ser mas ambiciosos en el apoyo para lograr mayores impactos en SA y mejorar, en trabajo conjunto con los gobiernos nacionales y municipales, los niveles de Seguridad Alimentaria en Centroamérica.

- 5) Se precisa rescatar una estrategia general de SA en la Delegación. Es decir, se precisa la existencia de verdaderos Programas-Países en SA que vayan mas allá de un conjunto de proyectos mas o menos aislados entres si. Una estrategia definida que identifique la Seguridad Alimentaria como uno de los puntos mas importantes de la cooperación europea en cada país de la región, para ello se recomienda en la revisión de los CSPs de la región, que está previsto se efectúe pronto, incluir con detalle el tema en cuestión y su problemática como eje de intervención.
- 6) Además de este fortalecimiento de la línea a nivel vertical para tener un impacto ambicioso en la mejora de los niveles de SA en la población, se recomienda al mismo tiempo que la temática de SA sea incluida a nivel horizontal; es decir que sea incluida en los otros programas de la cooperación de la CE como eje transversal para poder tener mas incidencia en las políticas nacionales.
- 7) La estrategia próxima de la Comisión de centrar las intervenciones en el apoyo directo al presupuesto de la República, tiene que ser flexible con temas como la Seguridad Alimentaria porque si se pretende responsabilizar al Estado de todos los desembolsos de la Comisión, se debe previamente llegar a consensos sobre los temas prioritarios. Además, las capacidades de actuales de los Ministerios no son aún las adecuadas para absorber grandes cantidades de fondos. En este sentido se precisará definir con rigor los indicadores de cumplimiento, entre los que tendrán que estar indicadores propios de Seguridad Alimentaria e indicadores nutricionales.
- 8) El apoyo directo al presupuesto debe, también ser flexible en otro sentido: La coherencia con el seguimiento de los procesos de descentralización de los Estados centroamericanos. El apoyo sectorial, debería tener modalidades “focalizadas”; es decir, que el apoyo pueda ir a instituciones municipales (Alcaldías) u organismos autónomos descentralizados. Fundamentalmente en temas como SA, donde el papel de los actores locales supera en importancia en la implementación de los proyectos a las instituciones nacionales.
- 9) Se precisa mejorar los mecanismos de coordinación de las políticas de cooperación de los donantes mas importantes; sobre todo con las instituciones prestamistas para llegar a una política conjunta y tener un impacto significativo. Existe en Nicaragua el « *Budget Support Club* » que es un esfuerzo reciente por empezar a coordinar políticas y decisiones de los organismos multilaterales como bilaterales en la nueva estrategia de empoderamiento del Estado nicaragüense para que asuma el protagonismo principal en el apoyo de estas organizaciones a través del apoyo directo al presupuesto estatal. Y que sea discutida la temática con los Estados Miembros a fin de tener políticas comunes.
- 10) Se recomienda establecer una matriz general que guíe la política de la Delegación en Managua en cuanto a sus objetivos y resultados esperados. El rol protagónico que debería tener la lucha contra la pobreza y por ende el tratamiento adecuado y prioritario de la SA en términos de entender la InSAN como el primero factor de pobreza.
- 11) Se recomienda dar un seguimiento pormenorizado a la propuesta de intervención del Programa Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria que comenzará a mediados del presente año en cuanto a la posibilidad de que esa experiencia novedosa, pueda servir como modelo metodológico en Programas de SA que afecten a mas de un país. Este Programa pretende rescatar la temática de la SA y la necesidad de los estados de establecer políticas públicas

en torno a este concepto. Será importante medir su impacto en términos de poder ser replicado en otras regiones geográficas.

12) Dando por hecho que el porcentaje de InSAN en la región ligado a situaciones de emergencia es mucho mas bajo que el que está ligado a causas estructurales mas profundas y arraigadas en el tiempo, se recomienda que el futuro apoyo directo al presupuesto de los países, tenga en cuenta esta circunstancia y actúe en consecuencia. Los problemas con causas estructurales necesitan soluciones o al menos apoyos ambiciosos que enfoquen las causas: Reformas agrarias que incluyan el tema de la tenencia de la tierra, revalorización de los productos de los pequeños productores y campesinos, programas de educación, y descentralización del Estado hacia las municipalidades. Por tanto la incidencia política, en los Planes de Desarrollo Nacionales y en los ERCPs, además de hacerse en temas de integración política y comercial de Centroamérica, tiene que ir también en el sentido de tender hacia la Seguridad Alimentaria en la Región, que con medios, políticas y apoyo externo no es un logro utópico en Centroamérica.

13) Se precisa que los nuevos proyectos de desarrollo rural (por la Línea de Cooperación Técnica-Financiera) en Centroamérica, tengan un enfoque alto de Seguridad Alimentaria en sus propuestas conceptuales. En cualquier caso, se debería priorizar los Programas de SA por encima de los de desarrollo rural; estos últimos tienen una población meta menos excluida. Con mayor acceso a los mercados para comprar y vender sus productos. Es mas adecuado priorizar la intervención en poblaciones meta en InSAN, si el objetivo es la lucha contra la pobreza.

14) Se recomienda acelerar el proceso de desconcentración de la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria hacia la Delegación en Managua en cuanto a la gestión política o toma de decisiones y en cuanto a la gestión administrativa. Los máximos responsables de la Delegación afirman que la Línea de SA no es una línea programable con tiempo y por tanto difícil de incluir en las estrategias que se establecen a priori. El proceso de desconcentración en la línea podría dotar de mayores argumentos para programarla en conjunto con la Comisión, con mas tiempo para que pueda ser una línea estratégica.

15) Recientemente los países de Centroamérica han firmado un Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos. Todos los analistas coinciden en que considerando la fragilidad del sector agropecuario en la región, las posibles oportunidades del TLC se ven muy limitadas para el sector, ya que difícilmente éste instrumento comercial cumplirá, por sí solo y sin medidas complementarias, el objetivo de lograr para la producción agropecuaria centroamericana mejores condiciones de acceso al mercado estadounidense. En este sentido se recomienda un monitoreo de la situación que se va producir, proponiendo indicadores temáticos en Seguridad Alimentaria y promocionando, junto con los países de la región, el seguimiento de las consecuencias futuras del tratado comercial firmado.

16) En el proceso de apertura de las fronteras dentro la mundialización, se precisa que los países de CA protejan sus producciones agrícolas contra los riesgos de importación masiva a bajo precio de varios productos de la canasta básica (maíz, frijol). Es vital para estos países proteger, y desarrollar las producciones agrícolas de los pequeños y medianos campesinos. Por tanto se precisará hacer un estudio del impacto en SA que la futura negociación de la Comisión Europea con la Región en bloque para un Tratado comercial

Europa-Centroamérica y las implicaciones para la región de tener acceso a los productos europeos (subvencionados por los Estados) a bajos precios.

17) La línea de Seguridad Alimentaria podría desnaturalizarse en el contexto actual de la región: Poca importancia de políticas de Estado en el tema unido al apoyo directo de la Comisión al presupuesto de la república como nueva estrategia de cooperación. Para no desnaturalizar el contenido y el propósito de la línea en este contexto contrario y en aras de balancear el apoyo que se brindará (todo gestionado por el Estado) se propone para equilibrar los tipos y metodologías de la ayuda, no incluir esta línea en la dinámica general de apoyo presupuestario y fortalecerla en recursos técnicos y administrativos para dotarla de mayor independencia.

18) La línea de SA tiene su especificidad en cuanto a que trata de cambiar situaciones (reducir pobreza a través de cambiar situaciones de las comunidades, municipios o personales) en cambio a través de la línea ALA (Cooperación Técnico-Financiera) se tratan de cambiar condiciones (reducir pobreza como condición). Ciertas intervenciones de crédito agrícola hechas a través de la línea SA, no se hubieran podido hacer a través de la línea ALA porque la población meta no es la que fomentan los gobiernos de la región, que priorizan y fomentan en función de las potencialidades y no de las necesidades. Por ello, fortalecer la Línea SA y mantenerla con independencia del nuevo tratamiento estratégico puede ser, además de un balance oportuno, una oportunidad para la Comisión de apoyar capas sociales vulnerables que no van a ser especialmente atendidas por el gobierno.

19) Podría existir mas peso de la CE dentro las discusiones con el gobierno en relación a las políticas de SA, ya que el gobierno no tiene una política específica de SA aunque existe a través de su política de desarrollo rural (todavía borrador). La CE no entra en el debate político en relación a la SA de Nicaragua porque en realidad no existe un debate de SA a nivel nacional. La CE podría promover un debate de SA a través su estrategia global de desarrollo y de lucha contra la pobreza.

20) En apoyo presupuestario se puede lograr un mejor nivel de sostenibilidad si se logra un buen nivel de apropiación por parte del gobierno beneficiario. Los ejemplos son los dos programas de Honduras : FINSA a través del banco estatal de segundo piso Finaprovi, y Tierra a través el Ministerio de Hacienda.

Micro

1) La Línea de SA y las intervenciones en el, podrían tener mas peso en la Región si se dotará a la Delegación de mayores recursos humanos, técnicos y de una organización mas lógica en cuanto a su distribución en el organigrama. Una sección o subsección propia de SA podría ser una forma de conseguirlo sobre todo pensando en la próxima desconcentración de la línea y en que la SA no es un sector sino una situación multidimensional, sobre la que es posible actuar a partir de muchos sectores de actividad.

2) Se recomienda apoyar a Euronaid en la redefinición de su concepto de intervención en una doble vía: Como socio implementador de los proyectos ECHO en la entrega de herramientas, semillas, etc.; y en la coordinación de mesas sectoriales de trabajo entre las ONGs, es decir como facilitador entre las ONGs y la Delegación y entre las ONGs y las instituciones gubernamentales.

3) Las llamadas a propuestas de las ONGs han tenido impactos positivos aunque limitados a pequeños espacios locales desde la entrada en vigor del Reglamento 1292/96. La “llamada” no tenía lógica política propia y no se coordinaban los diferentes esfuerzos de las ONGs entre ellos ni con otros proyectos similares de la Delegación. Esta llamada, esta siendo utilizada en la práctica centroamericana para proyectos de Seguridad Alimentaria a escala pequeña (con el handicap del plazo máximo de seis meses) y no para emergencia. Se deberían coordinar ambas “llamadas” o fortalecer la de ECHO con mas plazo y sacar la propuesta a llamadas de la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria porque ciertamente no se está utilizando actualmente y cuando se hizo, se duplicaban esfuerzos en relación a ECHO en lugar de coordinarse ambos instrumentos.

Sin embargo la futura desconcentración de la Línea de SA puede traer mas flexibilidad y eficacia en la llamada a propuestas de ONGs en función de si la Delegación establece como prioritario, y le dedica esfuerzo y recursos humanos a este instrumento del Reglamento.

4) El Apoyo Institucional como mecanismo del Reglamento tiene que ser revisado por los resultados que ha mostrado hasta ahora que indican que las Instituciones beneficiadas no pueden asumir la sostenibilidad de las acciones emprendidas y que además, en muchos casos, éstas no son estratégicas y son aprobadas por las Instituciones porque aportan fondos. Por tanto no hay una institucionalidad regional fuerte y establecida que pueda servir de apoyo para las intervenciones y tampoco, en la misma medida, para monitorearlas y/o evaluarlas.

El apoyo Institucional debe abordar la temática e impulsarla alrededor de los beneficiarios. Pero para ello debe existir una voluntad política por parte del gobierno de turno y por parte también de las prioridades que consigne la Delegación al tema. Con una mayor voluntad política y compromiso con la importancia que tiene la SA, se podría valorizar el AI dentro los organismos gubernamentales.

5) El Programa Regional de Seguridad Alimentaria va a utilizar al PNUD para las finanzas y la metodología de la FAO para los sistemas de información. . No queda claro cual es el valor añadido de la participación de estos organismos de las Naciones Unidas. Máxime cuando el Programa tiene como objetivo fortalecer instituciones regionales y existen varias que podrían adquirir ese rol, BICE las finanzas y el INCAP la metodología de los sistemas de información. Dotándole al BICE de la responsabilidad del manejo de los fondos, está entidad financiera con presencia en toda la región y con clara vocación integradora saldría fortalecida y el Programa tendría una visión mas regional, al igual que con el INCAP, la institución regional mas veterana de la región con un adecuado *expertise* en los Sistemas de Información y recopilación de datos.

6) El PRSA ha sido identificado con un carácter regional muy importante y pretende tener una incidencia política grande en cuanto a la definición de estrategias y creación de políticas públicas para el tema en la Región. Se recomienda monitorear este Programa con visión de posible experiencia digna de ser repetida o multiplicada en otras áreas geográficas. Al mismo tiempo se recomienda analizar los diez puntos que se proponen en la página 58 del presente informe (cuestión evaluativa 8) antes de la puesta en marcha del Programa.

7) Se recomienda poner en práctica los mecanismos de coordinación necesarios y las intervenciones convenientes para que la Comunicación VARD (“emergencia-

rehabilitación-desarrollo”) se ponga en práctica como estrategia en la región. Esto sería un valor añadido de la línea, en caso de que en el futuro los mecanismos de coordinación entre los distintos instrumentos sean un hecho y a través de la línea SA se puedan implementar acciones de tal naturaleza.

8) El PND de Nicaragua va a ser reforzado con una ERCP de segunda generación que se empezará a discutir entre el gobierno y los donantes en breve. Se recomienda establecer parámetros de incidencia política para que la SA en Nicaragua sea tenida en cuenta en esta ocasión.

9) Se recomienda promover desde la Delegación, indicadores de SA idénticos a otros donadores y del gobierno beneficiario.

10) Se recomienda en el proyecto PRODELSA, apoyo institucional dentro del Programa-País de SA en Nicaragua, que dicho apoyo busque desde el principio la sostenibilidad de la propuesta dinamizando entre las municipalidades los procesos de búsqueda sistemática de fondos para financiar sus planes de desarrollo.

11) La Delegación debe definir su política de cooperación en SA y en desarrollo rural para impulsar el sector agrario en los países de CA, favoreciendo estrategias regionales de producción agropecuarias que contengan la creación de pequeñas y medias empresas agrícolas. Hay un potencial de comercialización de los productos agrícolas porque no existe suficientes de empresas que pueden valorizar, condicionar, transformar y empaquetar los productos agrícolas. Los Proyectos de SA para la comercialización, como Proacta y PAC, tienen que estar valorizados para que se defina una mejor estrategia para impulsar este sector a nivel político nacional y regional, teniendo en cuenta siempre que la población meta en Inseguridad Alimentaria o en riesgo de ello es muy específica.

12) La Delegación pone el énfasis en los aspectos administrativos y financieros en el monitoreo y seguimiento de los programas y proyectos de SA, dejando a un lado el monitoreo de la calidad de la ejecución y de la calidad del impacto. Se necesita equilibrar ambos monitoreos e incluso darle mas importancia a la calidad del impacto aprovechando el *expertise* de los técnicos en SA que gran parte de su tiempo, lo están dedicando a labores administrativas.

APENDICES

Apéndice 1 Anexos del perfil país

Anexo 1: Cuadros 1 a 10

Anexo 2: Actores e intervenciones en Seguridad Alimentaria en la Región

Anexo 3: VAM Nicaragua (WFP)

Cuadro 1. Prevalencia de la subnutrición en los cuatro países y en la región


País	Población			% Población subnutrida		
	1979 - 81	1990 - 92	1998 - 00	1979 - 81	1990 - 92	1998 - 00
El Salvador	4.6	5.2	6.2	17	12	14
Guatemala	6.8	9.0	11.1	18	14	25
Honduras	3.6	5.0	6.3	31	23	21
Nicaragua	2.9	3.9	4.9	26	30	29
Subtotal	17.9	23.1	28.5	22	18	21
Centroamérica	22.1	28.7	35.2	20	17	20

Fuente: FAO, El estado de la inseguridad alimentaria en el mundo, 2002.

Cuadro 2. Incidencia de la pobreza en los cuatro países

País	Población pobre total			Población indigente		
	% total	% urbana	% rural	% total	% urbana	% rural
El Salvador	43.5	34.0	59.0	18.3	11.1	29.3
Guatemala	53.5	38.8	64.7	28.0	12.9	39.6
Honduras	74.3	65.6	82.3	50.6	37.1	63.2
Nicaragua	65.1	59.3	72.2	40.1	30.7	52.6

Fuente: FAO, El estado de la inseguridad alimentaria en el mundo, 2002.



Cuadro 3

Fuente: Delegación CE en Nicaragua

Cuadro 4

COMPARACION DE LAS POLITICAS E INTERVENCIONES EN SAN POR PAIS

EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	NICARAGUA
CONTEXTO POLITICO			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acuerdo de Paz de 1992 • Estado fuerte • Poca participación de Soc. Civil • Esfuerzo propositivo CND 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acuerdos de Paz de 1996 cierran el ciclo de conflictos en AC • Grupo consultivo de Washington • Grupo consultivo para mayo 2003 • Gobierno debilitado • Sociedad Civil movilizada 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gobierno civil desde 1981 con alternancia política • Gobierno débil, regiones fuertes • Contexto marcado por Mitch • Participación de FONAC parapúblico e Interforos más crítico 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflicto interno terminado con reconocimiento de la legitimidad de las elecciones de 1990 • Polarización de las fuerzas políticas pero con Pacto • Problema de integración de Costa Caribe • Litigios pendientes con vecinos
POLITICAS PUBLICAS DE DESARROLLO			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconstrucción luego de los terremotos de 2001 • Política económica de apertura sobre el exterior y dolarización • Muy abierto a la Integración 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acuerdo fiscal y equidad • ERP con mención en SAN pero poco consultada • ERP focalizada sobre 120 municipios • SEGEPLAN único en región 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plan Maestro de Reconstrucción y Transformación Nacional y Grupo consultivo de Estocolmo • ERP en vista de HIPC meta alrededor de la cual se organiza el Estado: Mini. Presidencia, Sec. Finanzas, Sec. Gobernación y Gabinete Social • 80 municipios priorizados con indicadores del PMA • Actualización en 2003 bajo la presión de la suspensión apoyo FMI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ERCERP en vista de la HIPC con insuficiente participación final • 1° informe de avances 2002 muestra dificultades económicas y no es aparentemente de prioridad • END en preparación, sobre concepto de conglomerados de negocios orientaría la política económica

Cuadro 5

EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	NICARAGUA
POLITICAS DE SEGURIDAD ALIMENTARIA			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Texto (no publicado) bajo el impulso del Min. Salud • Propone un sistema de información • Propone reactivar la CONAN y SECONAN intersectoriales • Cuál es el espacio de esta política en el gobierno? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Política SAN 2001 sencilla • Toma el municipio como unidad básica de acciones SAN intersectorial • CONSAN derogada en 2003 por <u>Vice</u> Ministerio de Alimentación • Tendrá la capacidad de liderar una política <u>intersectorial?</u> • Iniciativa de ley de SAN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No hay política explícita de SAN pero existen todos los elementos • Gobierno no está interesado en una política de SAN, sin embargo los ministerios actúan con elementos de política de SAN • Designada Presidencial prepara política SAN con apoyo de la FAO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Política definida en 2000 de manera muy participativa, y plan de acción • Organización con COTESAN intersectorial y con participación SC • Designación de responsabilidades por sector Ley presentada en la Asamblea Nacional • La política más avanzada en la región
POLITICAS DE DESARROLLO RURAL			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intento frustrado del CDR • Mayor impacto del CENTA pero declinando • ISTA inactivo sobre el problema de la tierra • Plan de acción contra la sequía en el marco del cambio climático en vía de preparación 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Propuesta de política en marco de Mesas intersectoriales bien enfocada • Pero muchos limitantes aparecen en el diagnóstico: <u>multifondos</u>, ICTA débil, extensión inexistente, FONTIERRAS poco funcional • Propuesta de la Sociedad Civil más radical con problema de la tierra • Intervención en sequía de 2001 • Proyecto PESA de FAO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ley de desarrollo rural con carácter intersectorial • Mesa Agrícola con preparación de una política para la agricultura 2003-2021 • PRONADERS desarrolla 18 proyectos muchos orientados a pequeños productores • Proceso de titulación de tierras con BM y UE • Creación del COMUS intersectorial para prevenir sequía con apoyo del PMA • FAO prepara creación de una unidad de SA en SAG • Proyecto PESA de FAO 	<p>MAG-FOR responsable de disponibilidad y acceso de alimentos</p> <p>Creó un Departamento de SA</p> <p>Reelaboró una política de SAN desarrollando disponibilidad y acceso</p> <p>Encargado del SISSAN</p> <p>Diferentes proyectos de reducción de la pobreza con BID, PNUD, PMA</p> <p>Proyecto PESA de FAO</p>

Cuadro 6

EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	NICARAGUA
POLITICAS DE SALUD / NUTRICION			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buena cobertura de centros de salud 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vigilancia del estado nutricional dio alerta en 2001 • Prevención deficiencia <u>micronutrientes</u> y fortificación alimentos • Lactancia materna y alimentación infantil • Educación <u>alimentaria</u> y nutricional • Regulación y control de alimentos • Emergencia del 2001: se hizo censo de talla y Centros de recuperación 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programa nacional de seguridad <u>alimentaria</u> y nutricional se propone crear un SISVAN • Encuestas de nutrición del PMA con tratamiento de la información mejor que en otros países de la región 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vigilancia estado nutricional con muy poca cobertura • Prevención deficiencia de <u>micronutrientes</u> y fortificación de alimentos • Lactancia materna y alimentación infantil • Educación <u>alimentaria</u> y nutricional • Comité Codees <u>alimentarias</u> • Comisiones de SAN locales en San Juan del Sur y otros con INCAP

Cuadro 7

EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	NICARAGUA
PROGRAMAS DE APOYO ALIMENTARIO			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergencia por crisis del café con PMA y otros • Atención <u>pre</u> - escolar • Escuelas saludables • Nutriendo con amor (1° Dama) • Refrigerio escolar con PMA y USAID 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desayuno y almuerzo escolar • PMA cubre 37 municipios y apoyo en la emergencia • USAID con ONG • Bono escolar del MAGA en 41 municipios financiado con recursos nacionales 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Red de seguridad social con PRAF (BID): bono de compensación escolar • Gran interés por promover la merienda escolar por parte del Presidente que podría llegar a 1 millón de niños, objetivo único en la región • PMA con apoyo a mujeres y niños de menos de 2 años, escolares, alimento por trabajo 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comedores infantiles • Nutrición escolar • Programa de bono escolar con BID en fase piloto • PMA el más importante de la región: emergencia en Matagalpa, atención a madres y niños, atención a escolares, alimento por trabajo
POLITICAS DE PREVENCION DE RIESGOS			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COEN viejo sistema de defensa civil • SNET reciente, con gestión de riesgos y ordenamiento territorial, coordina con CEPREDENAC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CONRED mejor equipada de la región • INSIVUMEH para información de base • MAGA con Unidad de planificación geográfica y gestión de riesgos la de más desempeño 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COPECO en vía de modernización después de <u>Mitch</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creación del SNPMAD en 2000 • Será reforzado con proyecto del BM • INETER con progresos por hacer gestión de riesgos
POLITICAS DE DESARROLLO LOCAL			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6% del presupuesto para municipios • ENDL disponible • Municipios serán organizados para prevención y mitigación • ISDEN, COMURES, FIS-DL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Descentralización avanzada con importantes transferencias de fondos a los municipios • Desarrollo de mancomunidades • INFOM y asociación de municipalidades ANAM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRODEL en preparación • Ordenamiento territorial en preparación • AMHON muy activa 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Descentralización lenta y con poca <u>trasferencia</u> de recursos a los municipios, pero se está organizando • INIFOM, AMUNIC, FISE

Cuadro 8

EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	NICARAGUA
INTERVENCIONES DE LA COMISION EUROPEA			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ayuda indirecta reciente 2001 • 3 ONG: ACSUR (E) SI (E) CARE (F) • <u>EuronAid</u> • 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Mesodiálogo</u> con CE, Estados Miembros, Gobierno, Sociedad Civil europea y nacional • Proyectos futuros con SA como eje transversal, único en la región • Ayuda indirecta con ONG • Perspectiva de un programa nacional inscribiéndose en programa regional 	<p>Ayuda directa:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financiamiento rural (FINSIA) con FONAPROVI de cobertura nacional con innovación reciente a favor de servicios financieros de base (SIFAR) • Programa tierra de compra y titulación de tierras, así como de apoyo a municipios • Programa de comercialización (PRO-ACTA) con apoyo a proyectos • Proyecto de semilla con FAO y CIAT • Proyecto post cosecha • <p>Ayuda indirecta:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rehabilitación post <u>Mitch</u> • Proyectos con ONG <p>Perspectiva:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integración de los programas a nivel municipal 	<p>Ayuda directa:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fondos de contravalor de AA • Programa de apoyo a la comercialización PAC, • Programa de apoyo a MAGFOR, INEC, INETER • Programa de refuerzo a FUNDE, UNAG, UNICAFE • Programa de fortalecimiento de IFI <p>Ayuda indirecta:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rehabilitación post <u>Mitch</u> • Proyectos de ONG • Proyectos piloto • Proyectos <u>EuronAid</u> <p>Perspectiva:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programa de apoyo a municipios a través de INIFOM y AMUNIC • Programa de apoyo a sistema de información del MAGFOR

Cuadro 9

Intensidad de la inSAN en la región	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Nicaragua	"Región"
% Desnutrición aguda (ratio peso / talla)	1.5	2.5	1.4	3.3	1.5 - 3.3
% Desnutrición crónica (ratio talla / edad ≤ 5 años)	22.8 (93) 23.3 (98)	49.7 (95)	40.6 (97) 36.2 (00)	28 (93) 33	23 - 50
% Desnutrición crónica (ratio talla / edad 6 - 9 años)	30 (88)	51 (86)	35 (91) 41 (97)	19 (86)	19 - 51

Fuente: Consolidación de cuadros anteriores.

Cuadro 10

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Cuadro 5: Peso relativo de los factores estructurales y de los riesgos de empeoramiento por país

Factores estructurales y Riesgos de inSAN	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Nicaragua
Factores de inSAN	+	+++	+++	++
Riesgo de inSAN	++	+	+	++
Síntomas	+	+++	+++	++

Anexo 2

Actores e intervenciones en Seguridad Alimentaria en la Región

Los problemas de seguridad alimentaria y nutricional han sido reconocidos en América Central desde los años 40, luego de la Conferencia de las NNUU sobre la alimentación y la agricultura de 1943. Luego, las políticas han evolucionado bajo el impulso de la Conferencia internacional sobre la nutrición de 1992 y la Cumbre mundial de 1996 y 2002. Al nivel centroamericano, el impulso ha venido de las XIV y XV Reuniones de los Presidentes de 1993 y 1994 para la formulación de estrategias de promoción del bienestar nutricional de la población.

Sin embargo, es el huracán Mitch en 1998 quien hizo tomar conciencia de la vulnerabilidad de la región y que llevó a introducir en los análisis la gestión de riesgos, transformando las viejas políticas de Defensa Civil e introduciendo la noción de inseguridad alimentaria. Es en este contexto, que las instancias regionales han adoptado el Quinquenio para la reducción de la vulnerabilidad y del impacto de las amenazas, en el curso del cual se creó el CEPREDENAC.

La recurrencia de las sequías ligadas al fenómeno del Niño y al cambio climático así como la crisis del café se han conjugado para crear las condiciones de una hambruna que no se había visto desde los años 70. Esto llevó a los Presidentes de la Integración Centroamericana a adoptar la Declaración de San José en 2002 que incluye un “Marco estratégico para enfrentar la situación de inseguridad alimentaria y nutricional asociada a las condiciones de sequía y cambio climático”, así como un “Plan de acción agropecuario para hacer frente a cambios climáticos”. Muchas proposiciones están avanzadas:


- a) La prevención y mitigación de las amenazas asociadas a las sequías;
- b) La superación de las condiciones de pobreza y de vulnerabilidad alimentaria y nutricional con un enfoque de género.
- c) La preparación de una proposición de creación de un seguro alimentario regional o de un fondo de contingencias;
- d) La creación de un equipo regional para enfrentar las crisis alimentarias;
- e) La creación de un bono alimentario para las mujeres jefes de familia en situación de extrema pobreza;
- f) La ampliación de los programas de desarrollo integral con un enfoque de género entre las familias más vulnerables sobre la base de las experiencias exitosas desarrolladas por el INCAP;
- g) El reforzamiento de las acciones de vigilancia y de alerta rápida de riesgos de desnutrición de los niños, de las mujeres gestantes y lactantes y otros grupos vulnerables;
- h) El coordinar los apoyos de la cooperación internacional.

Por otro lado, en el marco del Plan Puebla-Panamá (PPP), los Ministros de Salud y de Agricultura acordaron incorporar mecanismos para abordar colectivamente la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional.

En este marco, varias iniciativas regionales se están desarrollando por parte del INCAP (“Municipios fronterizos”, “Despertar”), de la FAO (“Seguridad alimentaria en Mesoamérica”, “PESA”), del PMA (PRRO regional). La Unión Europea tiene varios programas y proyectos regionales, algunos que están o serán de apoyo a las instituciones regionales (“Unión Aduanera”, “Instituciones y políticas comunes”) y otros que actúan simplemente a nivel de Centroamérica como ECHO.

Para mayor detalle de los actores e intervenciones en cada País, ver la “*Memoria del Seminario Regional para la Propuesta de una Estrategia regional de Seguridad alimentaria y Nutricional y de su Plan de acción*” editada por la Delegación de la CE en Managua.

**Niveles de Inseguridad Alimentaria
(Análisis de datos secundarios)**



Fuente : VAM Nicaragua

Apéndice 2

Listado de Reuniones y Entrevistados en Bruselas

Fecha	7 LUGAR	8 NOMBRE	9 CARGO
Martes 20 Ene	Bruselas	Simeon Moutaftchieff	Desk Officer F5
Miércoles 21	Bruselas	Soraya Mene	Desk Officer F5
Jueves 22 Ene	Bruselas	Marc Litvine	RELEX. Centroamérica
Jueves 22 Ene	Bruselas	Peter Versteeg	RELEX. Desk Officer Centroamérica
Viernes 23 Ene	Bruselas	Elena Ramón	Desk Officer ECHO

Listado de Reuniones y Entrevistados en Centroamérica

Fecha	10 LUGAR	11 NOMBRE	12 CARGO
Jueves 29 Ene	Managua	Giorgio Mamberto	Embajador, Jefe de Delegación CE
Jueves 29 Ene	Managua	J.L. Martinez Prada	Coordinador Cooperación Delegación CE
Jueves 29 Ene	Managua	Vitor Serrano	Experto Individual. SA regional
Jueves 29 Ene	Managua	Victor Valdivieso	Asistente SA Nicaragua
Viernes 30 Ene	Managua	Vitor Serrano	Experto Individual. SA regional
Viernes 30 Ene	Managua	Luis N. de Carvaho	Jefe de Sección Delegación Nic.
Viernes 30 Ene	Managua	L. Van Crowder	Representante FAO en Nicaragua
Viernes 30 Ene	Managua	Victor León	Oficial de Proyectos FAO
Lunes 2 Feb	Managua	Vitor Serrano	Experto Individual. SA regional
Lunes 2 Feb	Managua	Lola Ocón	Consultora Programa SA
Lunes 2 Feb	Managua	Victor Valdivieso	Asistente SA Nicaragua
Martes 3 Feb	Managua	Makis Oikonomou	Delegación Nicaragua
Martes 3 Feb	Managua	Marta Gallardo	Técnica Cooperación Delegación
Martes 3 Feb	Managua	Jocelyn Lance	Representante ECHO Centroamérica

Miércoles 4	Managua	Vitor Serrano	Experto Individual. SA regional
Miércoles 4	Managua	Denis Pommier	Experto individual SA Nicaragua
Miércoles 4	Managua	Helene Appleton	Funcionaria Comisión
Jueves 5 Feb	Managua	Kristina Bednarska	Representante PMA Nicaragua
Jueves 5 Feb	Managua	Christel B. Kristensen	Oficial de VAM (PMA)
Jueves 5 Feb	Managua	Luis Pardelhas	Director Programa Comercialización Delegación CE
Jueves 5 Feb	Managua	Lola Ocón	Consultora Programa SA
Viernes 6 Feb	Managua	Luis N. de Carvaho	Jefe de Sección Delegación Nic.
Viernes 6 Feb	Managua	Carmen Lahoz	Representante Euronaid
Viernes 6 Feb	Managua	Ada Isabel Gonzáles	ONG Local MUSA
Viernes 6 Feb	Managua	Leonardo García	ONG Local (Popol na)
Viernes 6 Feb	Managua	Denis Pommier	Experto individual SA Nicaragua
Sábado 7 Feb	Managua	Preparación Informe	
Domingo 8	Managua		
Lunes 9 Feb	Tegucigalpa (H)	Carlo La Fache	Coordinador SA Honduras
Lunes 9 Feb	Tegucigalpa (H)	Juan Vazquez	Coordinador Programa TIERRA
Lunes 9 Feb	Tegucigalpa (H)	Miguel A. Rodriguez	Coordinador PROACTA
Martes 10 Feb	Guatemala City	Hernan Delgado	Director General INCAP
Martes 10 Feb	Guatemala City	Patricia Palma	Políticas Públicas INCAP
Martes 10 Feb	Guatemala City	Jesús Hernando	Sistemas de Información INCAP
Martes 10 Feb	Guatemala City	Elizabeth Sagastume	Dir. Cooperación CEPREDENAC
Martes 10 Feb	Guatemala City	Verónica Spetrino	Agregada Delegación Guatemala
Martes 10 Feb	Guatemala City	Claudia Varillas	Técnico SA Delegación Guatemala
Miércoles 11	Managua	Preparación Informe	

Jueves 12 Feb	Managua	Victor Valdivieso	Asistente SA Nicaragua
Jueves 12 Feb	Managua	Vitor Serrano	Experto Individual. SA regional
Jueves 12 Feb	Managua	J.L. Martinez Prada	Coordinador Cooperación DelegaciónCE
Viernes 13 Feb	Managua	Carmen Lahoz	Representante Euronaid
Viernes 13 Feb	Managua	Daniel Chillón Olmos	ACTED
Viernes 13 Feb	Managua	Montserrat Julve	ACSUR- Las Segovias. España
Viernes 13 Feb	Managua	Ángela Pérez	MPDL España
Viernes 13 Feb	Managua	Iván Murillo	Oxfam Bélgica
Viernes 13 Feb	Managua	Pier Paolo Biagi	CHISP Italia
Viernes 13 Feb	Managua	Pastor Vilchez	Oficial Proyectos Intermon Oxfam
Sábado 14 Feb	Ometepe	Bernard Coppens	Manager ONG Belga COPIBO
Sábado 14 Feb	Ometepe	Ramon Torrente	Gerente Cooperativa CARUNA
Sábado 14 Feb	Ometepe	Bernabé Lopez	Cooperativa Productores de Café
Lunes 16 Feb	Managua	Vitor Serrano	Experto Individual. SA regional
Lunes 16 Feb	Managua	Cesar Garcia Alvarez	Primer Secretario Delegación
Lunes 16 Feb	Managua	Hans Von-Bieler	Jefe Sección Delegación
Martes 17 Feb	Managua	Preparación Informe	
Miércoles 18	Managua		
Jueves 19 Feb	Managua		
Viernes 20 Feb	Managua		

Apéndice 3 Bibliografía

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Apéndice 4: Lista de Acrónimos

AA	Asistencia Alimentaria
AMUNIC	Asociación de los Municipios de Nicaragua
AI	Apoyo Institucional
BCIE	Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica
BID	Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo
BM	Banco Mundial
CE	Comisión Europea
CEPAL	Comisión Económica para América Latina
CGIAR	Grupo Consultivo sobre Investigación Agropecuaria Internacional
AMUNIC	Asociación de los Municipios de Nicaragua
AI	Apoyo Institucional
BCIE	Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica
BID	Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo
BM	Banco Mundial
CE	Comisión Europea
CEPAL	Comisión Económica para América Latina
CGIAR	Grupo Consultivo sobre Investigación Agropecuaria Internacional
CONASAN	Comisión Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional
COTESAN	Comité Técnico de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional
CSP	Estrategia de Cooperación de la Comisión Europea (Country Strategy Paper)
ECHO	Oficina de Ayuda Humanitaria CE
ENABAS	Empresa Nacional de Alimentos Básicos
ENITEL	Empresa Nicaragüense de Telecomunicaciones
ERCERP	Estrategia Reforzada de Crecimiento Económico y Reducción de la Pobreza
EU	Unión Europea
EURONAIID	Asociación de ONGs -Holanda-
FISE	Fondo de Inversión Social de Emergencia
FMI	Fondo Monetario Internacional
FUNDE	Fundación Nicaragüense de Desarrollo (afiliado al Instituto Nicaragüenses de Desarrollo Económico INDE)
FUNICA	Fundación Nicaragüense para Tecnología Agrícola
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries / Países Pobres Altamente Endeudados
IDR	Instituto de Desarrollo Rural
INCAP	Instituto de Nutrición de Centroamérica y Panamá
INEC	Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos
INETER	Instituto Nicaragüense de Estudios Territoriales
INIFOM	Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal
MAG-FOR	Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Forestal
MHCP	Ministerio de Hacienda, Industria y Crédito Público
M&E	Monitoreo y Evaluación
ONG	Organización No Gubernamental
OPS	Organización Panamericana de la Salud
OTR	Oficina de titulación Rural

OXFAM	Organización Internacional no Gubernamental para el Desarrollo
PESA	Programa Especial de Seguridad Alimentaria
PIB	Producto Interno Bruto
PND	Plan nacional de Desarrollo
PMA	Programa Mundial de Alimentos
PNUD	Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo
PROTIERRA	Proyecto de Desarrollo de las Municipalidades Rurales
PRRAC	Programa Regional de Reconstrucción de América Central
RAAN	Región Autónoma Atlántico Norte
RAAS	Región Autónoma Atlántico Sur
RESAL	Red Europea de Seguridad Alimentaria en África y Latinoamérica (Conjunto de consultoras seleccionadas por la UE apoyar su acción en Seguridad Alimentaria)
SA	Seguridad Alimentaria
SAN	Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional
SETEC	Secretaría de la Presidencia
SICA	Secretaría de Integración Centroamericana
SISCA	Secretaría de Integración Social Centroamericana
SNPMAD	Sistema Nacional para la Prevención, Mitigación y Atención de Desastres
TDR	Términos de Referencia
UESA	Unidad de Estrategias de Seguridad Alimentaria
UNA	Universidad Nacional Agraria
UNAG	Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos
UNICAFE	Unión Nicaragüense de Cafetaleros

Apéndice 5 Plan de Trabajo. Misión Centroamérica

<i>Día</i>	<i>Miércoles 4</i>	<i>Jueves 5</i>	<i>Viernes 6</i>	<i>Sábado 7</i>	<i>Domingo 8</i>	<i>Lunes 9</i>
<i>Mañana</i>	09,00 Reunión Dennis Pommier (Técnico SA Delegación)	09,00 Reunion Victor Baldivieso	09,00 Reunión presentación Embajada Francia' Sociedad Civil	Revision de docu- mentos	Salida para Honduras	Honduras
<i>Tarde</i>	15,00 Reunión L. Pardelhas	11,00 Réunion Denis Pommier 15,00 Reunión Jefe Regional ECHO 17,00 Reunión Jefe Regional WFP (UN)	15,00 García Álvarez (Técnico Delegación) 16,00 Reunion Cecilia Olmes Genero, Direchos humanos			(<i>Reunión Delegación C. Lafache en Honduras</i>)

<i>Día</i>	<i>Martes 10</i>	<i>Miércoles 11</i>	<i>Jueves 12</i>	<i>Viernes 13</i>	<i>Sábado 14</i>	<i>Domingo 15</i>
<i>Mañana</i>	12.1.1 Salida para Guatemala	12.1.2 12.1.3 Regres 15,00 Reunión EURONAIID 16,30 Reunión Programa Comercializa- ción Nicaragua. Luis Pardelhas	09,00 Reunión Director Área Alan Rouche 11,00 Reunión Director Área Von Biller/ J. Nieto 15,00 Reunión Director Área Finanzas Otello Micucchi	9,00 Reunión Olga Villa (Técnica Delegación) 10,00 Reunión M. Antonia Zelaya (Técnica Delegación) 11,00 Reunión Vitor Serrano 15,00 Reunión Gobierno IDR/MAGFOR		
<i>Tarde</i>	(<i>Reuniones técnicos Delegación INCAP CEPRENEN AC En Guatemala</i>)				Trabajo/ discusión Pierre/ Herminio Preparación Informe	Trabajo/ discusión Pierre/Herminio Preparación Informe

<i>Día</i>	<i>Lunes 16</i>	<i>Martes 17</i>	<i>Miércoles 18</i>	<i>Jueves 19</i>	<i>Viernes 20</i>	<i>Sábado 21</i>
<i>Mañana</i>	09,00 Reuniones finales Vitor Serrano, Denis Pommier	Trabajo de compilación y redacción de Informe Final (Necesario 5 días: Sábado 14 Domingo 15	Trabajo de compilación y redacción de Informe Final (Necesario 5 días: Sábado 14 Domingo 15	Trabajo de compilación y redacción de Informe Final (Necesario 5 días: Sábado 14 Domingo 15		
<i>Tarde</i>	15,00 Debriefing en la Sede de la Delegación	Martes 17 Miércoles 18 Jueves 19	Martes 17 Miércoles 8 Jueves 19	Martes 17 Miércoles 18 Jueves 19		



**Thematic Evaluation of Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management
and Special Operations in Support of Food Security;**

FIELD REPORT PALESTINE

Final Report

prepared by

Manfred Metz
Najwa Rizkallah

June 2004

For the

Consortium composed by
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CIDEAL
ECDPM
IDC
SEPIA

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACAD	Arab Centre for Agricultural Development (NGO)
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CRIC	Centro Regionale D'Intervento per la Cooperazione (Italian NGO in Gaza)
DC, DCs	Developing Country /-ies
EC / EU	European Commission / European Union
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
FA/FS	Food Aid and Food Security
FSTA	Food Security Technical Assistance
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN
FIVIMS	Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
JC	Judgement Criteria
GoI	Government of Israel
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture, Palestinian Authority
MoP	Ministry of Planning, Palestinian Authority
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
(N)FSS	(National) Food Security Strategy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Plan (of the EU for a specific partner country)
OL	Official Letter
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories (=WB/GS within 1967 borders)
PA / PNA	Palestinian (National) Authority
PARC	Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PLDC	Palestinian Livestock Development Centre (NGO)
PLSC	Palestinian Livestock Service Centre
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PHG	Palestinian Hydrology Group (NGO)
PNGO	Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations' Network
RPSP	Regional Policy Strategy Paper
SESP	Socio-Economic Stabilization Plan
SHC	Special Hardship Case
TA	Technical Assistance
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VSF	Vétérinaires sans frontières (NGO)
WB/GS	West Bank and Gaza Strip
WFP	UN World Food Programme

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Palestine is a very special “country” case. It is **not a sovereign state** and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as political representation has only very limited authority and no effective control over its territory. This reality and the fact that the political, economic and social situation has severely deteriorated over the past years since the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada (September 2000), has far reaching implications for the EC’s and other donor’s interventions in Palestine.

Therefore, the findings of this country evaluation are much more specific to Palestine as a unique “country” case and can not be considered ideally suited for generalising conclusions for the purpose of evaluating the FS Regulation.

The main and overriding food security problem in Palestine is **insufficient access to food** due to widespread and aggravating poverty. All consulted documents of numerous organisations operating in the OPT and resource persons interviewed agree on two main findings:

1. Since the Al Aqsa Intifada, all economic and social indicators¹ of the Palestinian economy and the living conditions of the Palestinian people have deteriorated at an alarmingly growing speed.
2. The continued **Israeli occupation and its military administration** - with all its facets directly and indirectly intervening into the daily life of Palestinians - are the two paramount and most pervasive causes of drastically increased and further increasing poverty and food insecurity in Palestine.

More specifically, the following are identified to be the main factors causing spreading and aggravation of poverty:

- Closures, road blocks, checkpoints, curfews and a comprehensive, bewildering permit- and licensing system for people, vehicles, drivers and goods of varied age-groups, types, forms and origins cripple mobility;
- Loss of employment and income of Palestinian work force in Israel;
- Severe restrictions on access to and utilisation of water and land resources - further accentuated by the construction of the Separation Wall in the WB and its delineation east of the green line, i.e. the 1967 borders.

The critical deterioration of the living conditions has taken place *despite* massively stepped-up international assistance to the PNA and the Palestinian population during the past three years!

The EC is, after the League of Arab States, the second largest donor to Palestine, providing, among others, budgetary support to the PNA, humanitarian assistance through

¹ e.g. negative overall growth and sector growth in virtually all key economic sectors, dwindling tax revenues of the PA, reduced exports; dwindling household incomes, exploding unemployment rates and indebtedness; no. of people below poverty line increased; serious drop in school attendance, increased malnutrition rates, negative development of public health parameters, particularly that of vulnerable groups, general worsening of livelihood conditions, etc. See also Annex 3.

ECHO, and, since budget year 2000, assistance under the FA/FS Budget Line B7-200.

In the context of an overall evaluation of the Commission's Food Aid and Food Security Programme, based on the Council Regulation 1292/96 on *Food aid policy and food aid management and special operations in support of food security*, the evaluation in Palestine covered the EC support provided under this Budget Line.

In summary, the EC support to Palestine under the FA/FS Budget Line (B7-200/1) consists of the following measures:²

- 1) Bilateral Food Security Programme to PNA 2000 and 2002: total € 10 Million.
- 2) Food Security Projects through NGOs 2000-2003: total some € 11 Million
- 3) Food aid and food security assistance through UN Agencies:
 - UNWRA³, 2001-2003 (€ 15 Million p.a.) € 45 Million
 - WFP, Emergency Operations 2001-2003 € 20 Million
 - FAO, for food security assessment study 2003 € 0.3 Million

Thus, the largest part of FA/FS Budget Line resources (some 80%) has been allocated for emergency food aid channelled through UNWRA and WFP. The other assistance provided to the PNA and through NGOs has been for technical assistance, capacity building, and development oriented food security programmes. The technical assistance and capacity building components aimed at institutional capacity building and strengthening in fields of strategic planning, particularly the development of a food security strategy, and support to programme implementation.

According to the Terms of Reference for overall evaluation exercise, set out in twelve Evaluative Questions,⁴ the EC support to Palestine under the FA/FS Budget Line has been evaluated as to its internal and external coherence, as to the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability of the various interventions, with respect to the suitability of planning and implementation procedures applied, the extent to which phasing out concepts have been considered, as well as to the role of the Regulation No. 1292/96 in bridging the gap between relief, rehabilitation and development.

Summarising the findings, it can be stated that the prevailing circumstances in Palestine are determined by the intentions and actions of the GoI and its military occupation administration, which grossly impair both,

- the capacity of the PNA with regard to effective policy design and implementation; and
- the effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability of *all* international assistance, may it be humanitarian or developmental.

² For details, see Table A-6 in Annex 3. € 3.8 Million out of the € 5 Million provided under the bilateral Food Security Programme to the PNA 2000 have been channelled through NGOs and are also contained in the figure under 2).

³ For UNRWA's emergency programme in Palestine; UNRWA receives substantial further EU financing of its regular programme covering also Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

⁴ Of which Evaluative Questions No. 2 – 12 had to be addressed by the country case studies.

Following the EU principle to select on a priority basis such activities and instruments which have the most effective impact on alleviating poverty and food insecurity, this postulate⁵ is undoubtedly best met by working towards bringing the Israeli occupation and military administration of Palestinian territories to an end.

To summarise, a recent report of British MPs visiting Palestine shall be cited: ***"The situation in the OPT.... is not one which donor assistance can resolve"***⁶.

Conclusions

Keeping this general and overriding conclusion in mind, the following conclusions specifically refer to the EC supported Food Security Programme:

- 1) As long as the occupation persists, there will be a continuous need for further substantial and increasing emergency relief assistance.
- 2) The absence of a valid CSP adversely affects co-ordination, consistency, complementarity (particularly external) and effectiveness of both, Community aid and bilateral assistance of EU Member States.
- 3) Endeavours to establish a National Food Security Strategy, as stipulated by the Regulation and affirmed under the bilateral Food Security Programme for Palestine, have not yet reached far, in spite of substantial investments and efforts made. Although the peculiar conditions in Palestine limit the scope for effective strategic planning from the outset, and though the fundamental prerequisite for a comprehensive NFSS, namely the existence of a sovereign state and government, does not apply for the time being, there remains a small corridor for strategic planning which can and should be used.
- 4) Effective planning and implementation of the current Food Security Programmes have been constrained by a number of factors, such as:
 - Ambiguities regarding objectives, concepts and approaches, particularly between the PNA and the EC,
 - Lack of focus on strategic areas and fields of intervention and target groups,
 - Unclear responsibilities and role of actors in PCM phases, including phasing out strategies and the role of TA,
 - Deficiencies in inputs by subject matter specialist in designing and monitoring specific food security interventions (e.g. micro-credit, dairy plant management, dairy cattle production).

⁵ see EC Development Policy, COM (2000) 212, 26.April 2000, Chapter 4.1 *Integrated framework for Community activities, Strategic areas, Guiding principles*

⁶ House of Commons, International Development Committee, 2004, Development Assistance and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Second Report of Session 2003-04, Volume 1, HC 230-I

Recommendations

On strategic issues:

- 1) The EC and EU Member State Governments should overcome their foreign policy dissent with respect to policies concerning the Israel-Palestine conflict. The EC / EU Member State Governments shall redefine their role within the Near East Quartet and the Road Map and take up **own initiatives**, together with other cooperating quartet members and the Arab League of Nations. To this end, the EC and EU Member State Governments shall use the form of persuasion and necessary political and economical pressure, including economic sanctions suitably phased and adjusted according to compliance and/or non-compliance by the GoI.
- 2) The EC **and** EU Member State Governments, as represented by their respective delegates or bilateral assistance agencies, shall formulate **one common EC/EU Development Assistance Strategy (CSP)** for the OPT which deliberately confines itself to few, selected Programme components only. Such strategy shall be designed to be **explicitly complementary and consistent with efforts and objectives under 1) above**, and be based **on the actual framework conditions of crisis and emergency**.
- 3) **A lead donor country / agency approach** – as has been rather successfully practised with the PNA in connection with the Palestinian Reform Programme – shall be suitably incorporated into the recommended common EC/EU Country Development Assistance Strategy (CSP) approach (see 2) above).
- 4) To give up the idea of an ambitious and comprehensive National Food Security Strategy in favour of a **realistic strategic – though provisional - concept**, based on the conditions of the current emergency scenario and serving the following main purposes:
 - Coordination of PNA programming and donor assistance in the field of food security,
 - Identification of priorities in terms of geographical areas of interventions, sectors / specific products to be promoted, target groups, choice of technologies, etc. and corresponding allocation of resources;
 - Definition of modes of implementation (incl. role of NGOs, community based organizations, cooperatives, private sector);,
 - Identification of specific needs / fields for capacity development in matters of policy and strategic planning;
 - Identification of criteria and indicators and formulation of a concept for monitoring food security interventions, including aspects of impact monitoring.

On specific issues related to the current EC Food Security Programme:

- 1) Ensure **better coordination** of EC supported food security relevant interventions with those of other donors. See recommendation 3) above.

- 2) The EC should undertake decisive steps to increase the **transparency and the pace of decision-making processes** in all aspects (approval of projects, criteria for selection / priorities, transfer of funds etc.). Reconsider the minimum ceiling of € 500,000 for food security projects implemented by NGOs.
- 3) In order to **rationalise programme management and the approval process for NGO projects**, the entire cycle, starting with tender procedures and proposal selection, contract awards, implementation monitoring should be handled within the **exclusive competence of the EC Country Delegation** and by its FSTA Office. The same procedure shall apply for project proposals applications of INGOs and national NGOs.
- 8) **Country specific Texts of Tenders for Call for Proposals**: Without unduly limiting the scope of forthcoming NGO project proposals - texts of tender publications for any country **should be more country-specific**, rather than using a wholesale text applicable for all countries.
- 9) **Phasing out concepts** should already be outlined in the project proposals and worked out in good time during project implementation, in order to ensure sustainability.

As planned, a phasing out strategy will have to be developed for the ACAD credit project, ensuring that the credit portfolio is retained as revolving fund. Furthermore, a sustainable solution is still outstanding for the CRIC dairy project, though the project is formally already concluded.
- 10) Capacities of EC TA personnel in charge of appraising NGO proposals and monitoring implementation of NGO projects ought to allow also professional judgement in technical matters relating to respective projects. Next to others, the aspect of a food security relevant technical background should be considered with some priority at the stage of staff recruitment. – If an administrative overload and pre-occupation should unduly affect substantive appraisal and monitoring of NGO projects, such professional expertise can also be externally acquired through local contracts.
- 11) Ensure a better integration of Technical Advisors into their respective partner organizations, e.g. by placing “ex-(EC-)muros” Technical Advisers of relevant Technical Assistance components “in-muros” of the offices of the partner organizations.

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 Background to the mission

The European Commission (EC) has entrusted PARTICIP GmbH with the evaluation of the Commission's Food Aid and Food Security Programme, based on the Council Regulation 1292/96 on *food aid policy and food aid management and special operations in support of food security* (in the following called the FA/FS Regulation) and financed under Budget Line B7-200.

The FA/FS Regulation aimed to restructure, update and adapt all the legal instruments of food aid policy and management (including special operations in support of food security such as the supply of inputs and seeds, storage programmes and early warning systems) and consolidate them in one Regulation. The FA/FS Regulation took into account the main results of the FAO - World Food Summit in Rome, 1996, above all it reflected a major change away from hitherto food aid and emergency relief dominated assistance operations to a comprehensive approach of combating hunger and food insecurity by an integrated and long-term oriented strategy directed at alleviating poverty as the main determining root cause of structural food insecurity.

The (then new) underlying conceptual thinking comprised aspects of

- a) access to food (addressing the dimension of employment and sufficient purchasing power),
- b) availability of food (dimension of food production and trade),
- c) utilisation of food (dimension of health and education) and
- d) stability (dimension of reliability of access- and availability-determinants).

The FA/FS Regulation thus demands that humanity's efforts to reduce hunger and malnutrition must take note of all the above mentioned aspects of food insecurity simultaneously and in a consistent and coherent manner and deal with them on a basis of integrated economic, trade, social, environmental and fiscal policies and strategies, directed at a sustainable development process and the elimination of poverty as the overriding objective of all EC development assistance efforts. Under the same FA/FS Regulation the EC finances assistance to selected 25 Priority Developing Countries

- to overcome temporary food shortages;
- to manage post crisis rehabilitation and recovery; and
- to address problems of structural and long-term food insecurity.

The FA/FS Regulation provides support of three types:

- Food Aid, either in kind (commodity aid) or as financial aid for local / regional purchase of food commodities, for food/cash for work/training programmes or other food security-related activities and operations;
- Operations in support of food security covering a wide range of programmes and projects, incl. technical assistance, in pursuance of increased FS;
- Early Warning Systems and storage programmes.

Assistance is provided as direct aid (i.e. managed by recipient governments who may enter into implementation arrangements with NGOs or private sector) and indirect aid (i.e. contract between the EC and implementation organisations such as UN agencies, international and national NGOs).

The EC commissioned, in year 2000 a first evaluation of the FA/FS operations. Due to the short period of observation since the FA/FS Regulation had come into effect (some three years only), this evaluation, however, could generate rather general findings and recommendations only and did not result in any major alterations / modifications of the FA/FS Regulation and its provisions. Therefore, the 2000 evaluation recommended i.a., that a further evaluation shall be undertaken in 2004, when more substantive evidence on the impact and effectiveness of the FA/FS Regulation as a key EC instrument to pursue the objective of poverty reduction can be realistically expected.

In 2001, a major evaluation of the FA/FS Regulation has been undertaken by the EU Court of Auditors (CoA).⁷ The CoA made, among others, far reaching recommendations culminating in that:

- (1) *the concept of food security should be integrated in the Commission's overall development policy, and single overall strategies and programmes should be developed for and by the recipient countries;*
- (2) *consideration should be given, in the context of the new evaluation of food security support, to **discontinuing Regulation (EC)No 1292/96 in its present form** and to integrating all development actions, including those on food security, in a limited number of comprehensive regulations. Consequently, the structure of the budget headings under B7 (external actions) should be modified.*

This current evaluation has been executed in two phases: A desk study phase and the completion phase. After the desk phase report had been presented in December 2003 and approved by the Commission, the completion phase consists of 10 country case studies where EC Food Aid and Food Security Programmes are being implemented. Palestine has been selected as one of these 10 case studies.

2.2 Why Palestine?

2.2.1 Introduction

The Desk Phase Study of this evaluation identifies a number of criteria for the selection of case study countries, such as :

- the selected country should be a major recipient under the FA/FS budget line;
- both, the FS- and FA- component should be reasonably represented and within both components there should be found various implementing partners (e.g. gov-

⁷ Report of Court of Auditors : EU Food Security Regulation Evaluation, April 2003

ernment, WFP, EURONAIID, international NGOs) and different forms of assistance (direct aid / indirect aid, budget support⁸, programme aid to ministries, FS-operations supporting international organisations, FS-operations being implemented by INGOs and NGOs selected under the call for proposals);

- major geographical regions respectively their corresponding regional EC-assistance programmes (ACP, ALA, TACIS, MEDA, CARDS) should be represented;
- other special considerations, e.g. preferably countries with no evaluations of the FA/FS programme during the past 2 years.

Being one of the major recipients of EC development assistance in general, and also under the budget line B7-200, West Bank & Gaza - as the official EU documents use to refer to the occupied territories of Palestine (OTP) - does indeed qualify as a country case under the above mentioned major criteria, and has been selected as representative of the MEDA-region.

The EC has launched its Food Aid and Food Security Programme under Budget Lines B7-2000 in Palestine in the year 2000 only. By integrating also the emergency relief operations to vulnerable refugee and non-refugee beneficiaries in this programme (previously covered by other budget lines), the programme has become relatively substantive in size and comprises different instruments and types: direct and indirect aid, emergency food aid, Food security programmes and projects implemented by the Palestine National Authority (PNA) and through NGOs. Apart from a mid-term review of the UNWRA Food Aid and Cash Assistance Programme component (2002) there was no previous evaluation of the FA/FS programme in Palestine.

In summary, the EC support to Palestine under the FA/FS Budget Line (B7-200/1) consists of the following measures:⁹

- 1) Bilateral Food Security Programme to PNA 2000 and 2002: total € 10 Million.
- 2) Food Security Projects through NGOs 2000-2003: total some € 11 Million
- 3) Food aid and food security assistance through UN Agencies:

- UNWRA ¹⁰ , 2001-2003 (€ 15 Million p.a.)	€ 45 Million
- WFP, Emergency Operations 2001-2003	€ 20 Million
- FAO, for food security assessment study 2003	€ 0.3 Million

In addition, substantial emergency food aid and other forms of humanitarian assistance have also been financed by the EC Humanitarian Aid Office's (ECHO) emergency fund (e.g. for drinking water projects, hygiene condition improvement, psycho-

⁸ meant is budget support financed by the FA/FS-Budget line B/-2000/1; whereas the PA *did* receive from the EC major financial assistance as budget support, this, however, had been provided under a different budget line than the one governing food aid and operations in support of food security.

⁹ For details, see Table A-6 in Annex 3. € 3.8 Million out of the € 5 Million provided under the bilateral Food Security Programme to the PNA 2000 have been channelled through NGOs and are also contained in the figure under 2)

¹⁰ For UNRWA's emergency programme in Palestine; UNRWA, however, also receives substantial EU financing of its regular programme covering also Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. UNRWA

logical help for traumatised children, youth and others; basic primary and health care; activities in support of small-scale business and employment) and been implemented through NGOs, the ICRC and UN agencies.

Another major share of the EC's total assistance to Palestine is provided as budgetary assistance to the PNA for its political and administrative survival, payment of salaries to PNA-employed Palestinians (income and employment objective) and other purposes, especially supporting the creation of a legal and administrative framework of a governmental machinery under the so-called "Palestinian Reform Process"(PRP). This assistance, however, is financed by other EU budget lines than the FA/FS.

2.2.2 Country profile: Food aid and food security: Situation, policy, actors and programmes

2.2.2.1 Overview

The Palestinian people have been in dire straits since the beginning of the *Al Aqsa Intifada* and Israel's stringent retaliations. Israeli actions have been varied and severe, denying access to markets to buy and sell goods, preventing the free flow of goods and people throughout the occupied Palestinian territory, and placing the Palestinian workforce on lockdown. Consequently,

- jobs have been lost,
- prices of goods have risen, and
- wages have dropped.

Social networks, particularly the education system, have suffered under Israeli closures as well. The food security of the Palestinian people under these conditions has been jeopardised. Per capita caloric intakes have plummeted, literally handicapping the promise of a better future for the thousands of malnourished Palestinian children. As the coping mechanisms employed by Palestinians have become virtually exhausted, the general living conditions for Palestinians can only be described as that of an formidable humanitarian crisis.

The primary weapon of the Israeli government during this period has been extensive closures of roads, and curfews placed upon large towns and cities. Israel has imposed more than 120 checkpoints throughout the Palestinian territories, cutting the land into 220 sub-population islands.¹¹ Travelling through checkpoints is unpredictable, time-consuming, and dangerous, due to the presence of Israeli soldiers, and settlers. The imposition of curfews, forbidding Palestinians to leave their homes under threat of imprisonment or death, has been in place in some communities 90 percent of the time. In the second half of 2002, Palestinians were under curfew 70 percent of the time.¹² Finally, the Israelis have destroyed large quantities of Palestinian property, and confiscated huge tracts of land. To clear space along settler boundaries, bypass

¹¹ The Palestine Monitor. *Palestinian Intifada Fact Sheet, Sept. 2000-March 2002*.

¹² UNRWA, *Closure: Palestinian Productive Activities and Short to Medium Policy Alternatives*, in Food and Agriculture Organization for the United Nation. *Report of the Food Security Assessment – West Bank and Gaza Strip*, p. 8

roads, and checkpoints, and to make room for the Separation Barrier, the Israelis have demolished thousands of homes, often even without advanced information, and have razed buildings, irrigation infrastructure, crops, trees, and farmland, often killing cattle and other farm animals. Due to the invasive path of the Separation Barrier, almost 200,000 dunums of the most fertile farmland in the West Bank have been confiscated.¹³

The effects of these actions on the Palestinian economy have been devastating. Between 1999 and 2003, GDP per capita in the Palestinian Territories declined by over 40 percent, from \$1,496 to \$897.¹⁴ Lost income and physical damage is estimated at an value of approximately \$5.4 billion for the first two years.¹⁵ Since the Government of Israel (GoI) has denied Palestinians access to third countries for decades, the Palestinian economy became dependent upon Israel for jobs and goods (import and export), magnifying the effect of Israeli closures. Moreover, checkpoints have ballooned the costs of transportation and communication for Palestinian business, with 12 percent inflation in this sector.¹⁶ For the first quarter of 2003, unemployment, not accounting for discouraged workers, was 30.3 percent.¹⁷ While 20 percent of Palestinians were under the poverty line of \$2.1 per day before the *Intifada*, by the end of 2002, 60 percent of Palestinians failed to breach this daily income level.¹⁸

Not surprisingly, food security is a significant problem for Palestinians. Food security is roughly defined as having reliable access to 2100 kcal of food per person per day.¹⁹ According to the FAO Food Security Assessment, 40 percent of the Palestinian population is food insecure, and another 31 percent lies within a middle ground between food security and insecurity.²⁰ All but one of the districts in the West Bank have sectors in which 50 to 90 of the population suffer from food insecurity.²¹ To compensate for sizeable population growth, the food supply will need to expand by 4.7 percent before the middle of 2005, simply to maintain the current food "security" levels.²² The results of food shortages can be clearly seen in the children. Nearly one out of five children five years old and younger in Gaza, and nearly one out of 12 children in

¹³ FAO, 2003, p. 9; 1 dunum equals 1000m² or .1ha

For a detailed description of the effects of the (first) construction phase of the Separation Wall, special reference is made to the publication of the Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON): "The Wall in Palestine - Facts, Testimonies, Analysis and Call to Action", June 2003

¹⁴ IMF. Macroeconomic Developments, Outlook, and Reform in the West Bank and Gaza. AHLC Meeting: Rome, Italy. December 10-11, 2003.

¹⁵ FAO, 2003, p. 9.

¹⁶ FAO, 2003, p. 17.

¹⁷ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. *Labour Force Surveys 1995-2003*.

¹⁸ Corrado, Stefano. 2004, *Food Security Country Summary Tables: Palestinian Territories*. p. 2. For further Human Development and Food Security Indicators, see Annex 3.

¹⁹ FAO, 2003, p. i-ii

²⁰ FAO, 2003, p. 33

²¹ Corrado, S, 2004, p. 2

²² FAO, 2003, p. 18

the West Bank, suffers from stunting or chronic malnutrition.²³ More children are affected by less severe forms of malnutrition. As families exhaust their liquid and illiquid reserves of money, their ability to cope with their plight is imperilled.

2.2.2.2 National Policy and Strategy for Food Security

The type and dimension of the food security problem in the Palestinian Territories, the restrictions imposed by the GoI, and the fiscal crisis of the Palestinian Authority and municipalities have severely limited the development of a coherent and capable solution. Nevertheless, there has been some activity in policy development by the Palestinian Authority (PA), donors, NGOs and private sector actors. Most of the effort, however, could only help to ameliorate the *symptoms* of the crisis.

Several changes have developed in policy strategy since the inception of the current crisis. Whereas the PA has been able to also pursue long-term development objectives during the pre-September 2000 period, in response to the post Al Aqsa Intifada crisis, however, programming has been forced to centre around emergency relief and aid. Donor assistance has also shifted accordingly, with a renewed focus on short-term programs at the expense of medium and long-term ones. The current food security management efforts focus on food relief, cash assistance, and health services provision. Welfare programmes attempt to supplement income, and augment caloric intake for particularly needy families. Much of donor- and NGO support is focused on meeting the PA 's and its municipalities' revenue shortfall, so as to allow them to continue to serve the public.²⁴

In addition to emergency relief programmes, other strategies have been developed. Education programmes are utilised to change the eating and rearing patterns of Palestinians, so that they can better cope with the shortages of food. By encouraging Palestinians to select more nutritious foods to the extent possible, and by enabling them to better care for their young in these difficult circumstances, it is hoped that the worst effects of food insecurity can be avoided. Moreover, agricultural development has been seen as an important avenue to improve the food shortage for Palestinians. By implementing measures directed at repairing agricultural lands damaged by Israelis, encouraging farmers to more efficiently and effectively utilise their land (land reclamation and re-cultivation of fallow lands), and investing in the agricultural know-how and skills of Palestinian farmers, it is hoped that these will increase their ability to cope with the current situation.

²³ Johns Hopkins University, Al Quds University, Global Management Consulting Group, and Care International. *Preliminary Findings of the Nutritional Assessment and Sentinel Surveillance System for the West Bank and Gaza*. August 5, 2002; see also Table A-2 on Nutrition Indicators in Annex 3.

²⁴ FAO, 2003, p. 116-117

2.2.2.3 Main Actors and Programmes

The Palestinian Authority, with its ministries and municipal institutions, is one of the principal actors in tackling the food security problem. However, the Palestinian Authority has been hamstrung by the Israeli actions taken after the beginning of the *Al Aqsa Intifada*. Revenues have plummeted for a number of reasons: economic depression has shrivelled taxable income; the Government of Israel, until recently, refused to transfer tax revenues owed to the PA; finally, closures and checkpoints have hampered the ability of the PA to collect taxes from the population. Monthly revenues fell from \$91 million in late 2000, to \$18 million in late 2002.²⁵ As families are incapable of paying for utilities provided by municipalities, including water, electricity, and sewage removal, these services are also suffering. In general, activities have focused more on food relief, cash assistance, and provision of public employment, and less on the creation and revitalisation of the private sector.

The PA is working towards alleviating poverty and food insecurity, though means are limited. As the PA is the largest employer in the Palestinian Territories, its chief goal right now is to maintain the jobs and incomes of its employees. Consequently, other welfare and social safety programmes had to be scaled down. Policies supporting agricultural development have become another important approach to improve the nutritional status of Palestinians.

Through several welfare programmes, the PA does address the food security problem. The Ministry of Social Affairs directs the largest welfare programme in Palestine, comprising medical treatment, income transfers, and food distribution to needy families. Special hardship cases (especially those affected by loss of their employment in Israel and the Wall construction) are specifically addressed with aid specially pledged to UNRWA and WFP for this purpose. With the assistance of donors, the PA also provides vocational training, physical rehabilitation, and shelter for elderly and orphans. The Ministry of Health has, with donor assistance, developed a system of assessing the nutritional needs of the Palestinian people; to this end it has planned pilot programmes on nutrition.

The Ministry of Agriculture is in the process of developing a National Food Security Strategy, and establishing a Commission for Food Security to specifically address this problem. Among others, the Ministry of Agriculture funds activities such as: subsidies to small and medium sized enterprises, promotion of food production co-operatives and savings funds, the establishment of local composting centres, and job creation.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) is the second largest player in this arena. Committed to handling the needs of the approximately 1.6 million refugees in the Palestinian Territories, the UNRWA provides a great variety of services. Under its Regular Programme, it supports education, health care, and social and relief services. Though the major share of its budget is directed to education and healthcare, the UNRWA developed an Emergency Programme to handle the current crisis. The Emergency Programme finances food aid,

²⁵ IMF 2003

repairs and rehabilitation, shelter constructions, cash assistance, and emergency health provision. The UNRWA is also a major provider of temporary jobs, providing job opportunities of 1.2 million working days in 2001. Unfortunately, the UNRWA emergency activities have received far less support from the international donor community than is required under the conditions of accentuated human hardships.²⁶

The World Food Programme (WFP) is the largest provider of food to Palestinians. Working in conjunction with ministries of the PA and a number of NGOs including the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC), the WFP provides food in two different ways: direct relief food distribution, and Food for Work and Food for Training programmes. In 2002, the WFP attended to the needs of approximately 540,000 beneficiaries.²⁷ In the past, emergency food assistance has also been provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), but meanwhile (2003) the ICRC has discontinued its operations in Palestine because it considers - with reference to international law of the Geneva Convention - the GoI to be responsible for the welfare of people living under its occupation administration. By this decision the ICRC wishes to emphasise this obligation and demand the GoI's compliance with such obligation, rather than letting itself be continuously misused by the GoI as a provider of humanitarian assistance of last resort on its behalf.

International donors play an important role in handling the issue of food security. In general, assistance has been received from the League of Arab States, the European Commission, USAID, the World Bank, the UN, and a host of other countries. In 2002, over \$1 billion was disbursed to Palestinians for emergency support, and budget assistance to the PA.²⁸ The majority of funding was directed towards budget support for the PA and local municipalities, with the major share of this directed to pay salaries of its employees.

There is a large NGO community in Palestine. More than 1,000 organizations exist, with 100 constituting national NGOs. Their primary sector concerns are human rights, health, education, rural and environmental development. Among the more important NGOs are the ICRC, and the Islamic Social Welfare Organisation, including the American Near East Refugee Aid, and Al-Salah Islamic Society. ACDI-VOCA²⁹, funded by the USDA, has become one of the largest players in the field of food security. The Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) also plays an important role in solving

²⁶ FAO, 2003, p. 119. The same applies as regards the budgetary resources being made available to UNRWA to meet the expenses under its Regular Programme. According to the UNRWA General Secretary, Mr. Peter Hansen, who currently (March 2004) is on a special good-will tour through capitals of major donor countries to plead for increased financial contributions to the UNRWA budget, donations by the world community have dropped recently in dramatic proportions. "Whereas 10 years ago UNRWA had 200 USD at its disposal per year for every Palestinian refugee, today this sum has dwindled to USD 70 only. This at a time when the need for assistance has enormously increased." Berliner Zeitung, 15.3.2004

²⁷ FAO, 2003, p. 130.

²⁸ FAO, 2003, p. 116. See also Figures on donor commitments and disbursements in Tables A-3 – A-5, Annex 3.

²⁹ Agricultural Cooperative Development International-Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance

water and food security problems. There are a number of Palestinian NGOs that work to solve food security problems. MA'AN Development Center, with programmes funded by Australia, Belgium, and the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), is involved in several food security projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The NGO community benefits from several organisations designed to improve their coordination and co-operation. For this purpose, the Palestinian NGO's Network (PNGO) has been formed, serving as an apex organisation and forum of discussion for NGOs,. NGOs enable international donors to more effectively interact with the PA and the beneficiary communities. The NGOs in Palestine are generally considered to be effective in participatory project planning and implementation.

2.2.2.4 Major Challenges and Constraints

The major cause of food insecurity and/or obstacle to improvement of the food security situation is the occupation status of Palestine along with all its concomitant phenomena of Israeli administration by its Armed Forces; above all, the single most root cause for the most precarious and continuously deteriorating food insecurity and vulnerability is the blockade policy (in form of road closures, military checkpoints, a complex permit and licence system, curfews, etc.) and its high degree of arbitrariness with which it is enforced by the military personnel. There is a strong direct linkage between closures and economic growth in the Palestinian Territories. The negative impact of closures cannot be over-emphasised. Closures and curfews have an all comprehensive impact on the entire economy and livelihoods of Palestinians: they create a general situation of complete unpredictability and unreliability and fear; goods and people cannot reach markets, Palestinians cannot reach their working places in Israel or other parts of Palestine, essential goods cannot reach the needy (not at all or not in time), farmers cannot obtain necessary inputs; closures and checkpoint practices exorbitantly increase transportation and storage costs and risks of total loss of products of Palestinian origin are high, especially of perishable products, such as vegetables, fruits, meat and dairy products. Such conditions grossly impair economic competitiveness of Palestinian products and services, rendering any rational entrepreneurial decision virtually impossible. Such conditions effectively discourage investments by national private sector and interested foreign investors and - as a result - stifle economic growth. Israeli restrictions also limit the ability of the PA, donors, and NGOs to conduct relief programmes, and tremendously increase their costs and negatively affect the efficiency of programme implementation.

The donor community has been vitally important in aiding the Palestinian people, but has not done enough. Most donor activities focus on prevention of accentuated food insecurity, and limiting the symptoms of food insecurity, with not enough projects enabling job creation in the private sector. Moreover, the funding for emergency relief falls far short of the objective needs of the Palestinian people. Although some 50-75% of Palestinians receive assistance, many receive far too little and often on an irregular basis.³⁰ Donor contributions are projected to decrease in the future, despite an increasing need.

³⁰ FAO, 2003 p. 145

From :UN Humanitarian Plan of Action, CAP 2004:

The main cause of the crisis is Israel's closure policy that now involves over 600 checkpoints and roadblocks throughout the West Bank and Gaza. Blocking traffic between villages and towns, between cities or into Israel, the policy has crippled the Palestinian economy. Settlements and bypass roads, that have continued to expand, have further compounded the problem. Curfew, confining Palestinians to their homes, is a regular occurrence. A 175 km wall is being built to separate the West Bank from Israel but its path juts deeply into the West Bank directly affecting about 210,000 Palestinians.

Now moving into their fourth year of life under closure, the numbers of Palestinians unable to cope is increasing. The occupied Palestinian territory has now entered in a phase of de-development. About 60% of the population are now below the poverty line, 40% of working-age people are unemployed and have given up hope of finding jobs. This is now taking its toll on the health of the population - approximately 40% of the population are estimated to have reduced both quantity and quality food intake. Half the Palestinian population is unable to access their usual health services due to closures and curfews. Examination results show that children's school performance is declining – a fact due to disruption of school life.

Both Israeli and Palestinian civilians are paying an appalling price for the ongoing conflict. Armed Palestinian groups responsible for military attacks and suicide bombings are in breach of international humanitarian law (IHL) and are unequivocally condemned by the UN and the Palestinian Authority. However, while Israel has legitimate security concerns to stop these attacks, its response (policies that restrict the movement of people and goods as well as humanitarian access; assassinations, military operations, land confiscation and leveling, house demolition, and the construction of the wall on Palestinian land) has been disproportionate under international humanitarian law. The commitments made to Ms. Catherine Bertini, Personal Humanitarian Envoy of the Secretary General, by the GoI have been so far little respected.

Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel as the occupying power bears primary responsibility for ensuring the welfare of the Palestinian population. It has not only to yet fulfil its obligations but has hampered other organisations from doing so in its place.

In the context of Israeli occupation, the UN's impact can only be limited and short-term. If internal closure were lifted and exports facilitated, poverty and unemployment levels would fall far more than what could be achieved by donors greatly increasing their funding.

The PA, burdened by severe fiscal distress, lacks the capacity to effectively manage and monitor the strategy to eliminate food insecurity. Although the PA is in the process to formulate a National Food Security Strategy - the absence of such strategy is felt. Necessary and reliable information on the needy, what assistance they need, where they are, and their main source of income had not been collected or consolidated.³¹

³¹ Only recently a comprehensive Food Security Assessment by the FAO has been financed by the EC and USAID, cf. FAO, 2003

Without an easing of the restrictions on the movement of people and goods in the Palestinian Territories, without a dramatically increased and better coordinated donor assistance programmes, and without programmes targeted at creating private sector jobs, and enhancing the competitiveness of Palestinian enterprises, the Palestinian people will continue to undergo hardship. 70 percent of Palestinians, if not more, will remain threatened by food insecurity. One out of five young children in Gaza and one out of 12 young children in the West Bank, if not more, will continue to suffer from stunting and chronic malnutrition.

2.3 Summary of the mission

The field mission in Palestine took place from Feb. 12 – 26. The evaluation team was composed of Dr. Manfred Metz, international consultant & teamleader and Ms. Najwa Riskallah, national consultant. The team was assisted by Mr. Norbert Jost from CODEPLAN, Berlin, who participated as volunteer team member.

During the field mission, information has been collected through document reviews and interviews of:

- EC Representatives (particularly related to food security programme), ECHO
- PNA: MoA, MoP
- UN agencies: UNRWA, WFP, FAO
- Other donors: USAID
- International and national NGOs (ACAD, CRIC, PARC, PHG, VSF).

Furthermore, various food aid distribution sites and food security projects have been visited in Ramallah district, in the Tubas area of the northern West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.

A detailed chronology of the mission and list of persons interviewed is given as Annex 1 of this Country Report.

The consultants highly appreciate the open-minded discussions with the staff of the EC Technical Assistance Office and the other persons contacted, the commitment they felt throughout, and are grateful for all the support they received. Particular thanks also to Mr. Norbert Jost for his readiness to join and support the mission, and for his substantial contributions.

2.4 Constraints: Palestine, an exceptional and very special "country" case - Implications for the evaluation and the significance of the results

Palestine represents a region of decade-long conflict of outstanding geopolitical relevance. As an occupied territory, Palestine is **not a sovereign state** and the Palestinian Authority (PNA) as its political representation has only very limited authority and no

effective control over its territory, neither over its resources (land and water) nor over law and order in its territory.

It is the GoI and its military administration of the occupied territories which exerts decisive power. To which extent any legal, regulatory, administrative and executive transaction of the PNA may be effective is entirely determined by the discretion of the GoI.

In so far, the **fundamental, albeit implicit, assumption** and rationale of all EC policies³² and corresponding instruments³³ dealing with international relations, i.e. that its foreign counterpart of policy dialogue and agreements does - as a rule - represent a sovereign state with internationally recognised borders **does not apply to the PNA and Palestine**. At the very most, Palestine may be a state in-statu nascendi, however, considering the decade-long gestation period and all other circumstantial evidence even this must be considered as highly doubtful at this point of time. In substance, the PNA is left with little or no authority at all and is being degraded to something like a district-administration for the so-called "A"-areas with ministries as district departments and little effective political power. Under the prevailing occupation status in Palestine, neither the PNA nor international donor agencies nor NGOs and their staff are in the position to materially determine the quality, results and impact of their efforts. These finally remain entirely dependent on the mercy, good will (or not-so-good will) of the GoI and its military administration. Under prevalent conditions of complete arbitrariness, little or nothing can be relied upon - unless unpredictability. The above specifically applies to the situation in the WB&GS since the beginning of the Al Aqsa Intifada in September 2000.

It is in perfect conformity with such exceptional status of and conditions in Palestine, that this affects the EU's proceedings and decision making concerning its Palestine assistance programme in an all-pervasive way. The EU has to make (and does make) considerable allowance for the special status and situation on Palestine, since the EU's administrative-procedural *rules* or programming-, planning- and management *routines* have been (by and large) developed on the basis of *principles* such as inherent system-logic and consistency, functional rationality and common sense and on the fundamental assumption of dealing with governments of sovereign states - that is for the "normal" country case.

Palestine does not conform with this assumption, and the above mentioned rules, routines and principles - which invariably also apply to programme *monitoring* and *evaluation* - can apply only to a limited extent. The EU-assistance programme to Palestine is largely determined by overriding political considerations; and its efficiency and effectiveness is rather exclusively determined by the decisive political power in Palestine, i.e. the GoI. It is this overall political context and the conditions set by it which matter most and are responsible for the general framework conditions which determine the environment under which the EU assistance programme for Palestine

³² e.g. general Community policies, EC Development Policy, EC Regional Policy, EC Food Security Policy

³³ EU Treaty, Regional Agreements, specific bilateral Association Agreements, EU Country Strategy Papers, Regional and National Indicative Plans

has to be implemented. To this end, a policy dialogue concerning such structural and political dimensions of the existing WB/GS realities would have to be held with the Government of Israel - not with the PNA.

Therefore, an evaluation of the EU-Palestine food security programme financed under the budget line of the FA/FS Regulation cannot be made as an isolated assessment of evaluation criteria³⁴ on sector-, programme- and project level examining only *internal* consistencies, complementarities or matters of efficiency and effectiveness. The evaluation has to bear in mind the overall political context and the realities sur-place, and will have to emphasise issues of consistency, complementarity and coherence between the EU-Palestine assistance programme (of which the Food Security Programme is a part) on the one side and the EC's and EU Member States' Near East, Regional and Israel Policies on the other side, because *here* are the most relevant linkages to food insecurity in Palestine.

This is of relevance

- a) for the presentation of this evaluation report: It necessitates and justifies the relative political nature of its form and content.
- b) for the assessment of its findings within the larger context of the FA/FS Regulation overall performance and utility: such assessment has to bear in mind the very unique constellation of conditions in the WB/GS which a general Regulation of the EC can neither be expected to address nor have been originally formulated to provide for.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the findings of this country evaluation are much more specific to Palestine as a unique “country” case and can not be considered ideally suited for generalising conclusions for the purpose of evaluating the FS Regulation. Many lessons can however been learned from the way the FS regulation is dealing with such a specificity.

Finally, the EC Food Aid and Food Security Programme in Palestine was started in year 2000 only. It had been designed before the start of the second Intifada (September 2000), i.e. with optimistic hopes concerning the peace process and assuming normal life and working conditions - which did not materialise. The implementation of the FA/FS Programme has been negatively affected, i.a. also by delays for various reasons. For example, some projects financed under the 2000 programme have not even started yet. In so far, the situation found in Palestine had been very similar to the one found by the evaluators of the first evaluation study of the FA/FS Regulation in 2000/1, namely a fairly short period of observation, respectively of effectual programme implementation.

³⁴ Major *evaluation criteria*: consistency, complementarity between and relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact, compliance with critical cross-cutting issues (e.g. women / children / youth, human rights, environment, ownership, etc.) and coherence of EU policies of varying levels (EU Treaty, Development Policy, Regional Policy, Country Strategy) and sectors (trade, food security, agriculture, employment, etc.) and their corresponding programmes and projects.

3. ANSWERS TO EVALUATIVE QUESTIONS

3.1 Evaluative Question 1

EQ1: What is the level of coherence between the food security policies, strategies and objectives of Regulation No.1292/96 and those from other geographical instruments (EDF, ALA, MEDA, TACIS, CARDS) and budget lines (ECHO, Rehabilitation, NGO Cofinancing)?

The evaluative question 1 will be dealt with in the synthesis report.

3.2 Evaluative Question 2

What is the level of integration of the food security policy within the Commission's development strategy with the partner country concerned as laid down in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP)?

***Note:** There is no valid CSP for Palestine. The further analysis can only refer to a draft - CSP which had been prepared before the start of the Al Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, covering the period 2000-2006; this document, however, has never been submitted for approval and never reached official status.³⁵*

No valid CSP for Palestine

There is no valid / official EC Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Palestine, nor a valid National Indicative Plan - a fact which perfectly conforms with Palestine's status of a special and unique "country" case.³⁶

As a consequence, decisions on and selection criteria concerning EU assistance and fund allocation are largely made on a **yearly basis at political level** and are included in the programming exercise by DG Relex (Directorate of External Relations). In practice, most "orientations" included in draft CSP have nevertheless been reported to remain valid."³⁷

³⁵ somewhat confusing : the Website of the EC Palestine office in Jerusalem still publishes - without obvious qualification - this "CSP" under the heading "Country Strategy Paper (2000-2006) although it has no official status.

³⁶ See section 2.4 above.

³⁷ EC Technical Assistance Office, Jerusalem, personal communication 29.2.04; see also: EU Website, January 2004: Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme

General assessment of the draft Country Strategy Paper, 2000

The **draft CSP** refers to the three overarching objectives of the Barcelona Process of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership³⁸ and has been based on the assumption of *continued* future progress in the – staggering - peace process of the Oslo Accord between Israel and Palestine. This main assumption proved itself to be a "killer " assumption and rendered the draft CSP obsolete.

In its entirety, the document contradicts itself and remains inconclusive in substance. The main thrust oscillates backwards-forwards between a fairly realistic problem- and sector analysis describing the meagre results of the political Near East process and deteriorating economic performance in the recent past. Although the draft CSP identifies the "*overriding importance of political progress in the peace process for economic development (in Palestine)*", and also states at the same time "the high risks and uncertainty" concerning the political future in general - it shies away from drawing the obvious conclusion of its own analysis, i.e. to draw up a CSP on the very basis of *existing* conditions of occupation and continued non-co-operation by the GoI as well as no progress in the Near East peace process.

Therefore, the draft CSP remains caught in the dilemma that it attempts to outline a mid-term country programme, however in full realisation that neither the PNA nor the EU had any material influence on the fundamental framework conditions in the OPT - which are set by the GoI.. This amounts to planning under conditions of complete uncertainty, respectively on the basis of fairly improbable assumptions. To overcome this dilemma, the draft CSP implicitly introduced the unrealistic assumption of a continued progress of the peace process - so as to "improve" the framework conditions at least on paper! In so far, the draft CSP must appear as an excellent example for planning under conditions of purposive optimism or wishful thinking.

The contradictory and inconclusive nature of the draft CSP explains i.a. why the draft CSP could not reach official status. As the underlying root cause, however, is the lack of Near East foreign policy consensus among EU Member State Governments and the resulting wavering ambiguity of the EC as an indication of (objective and felt) foreign policy impotence.³⁹

Features of the draft Country Perspective Strategy Paper, 2000

The draft CPSP identifies "4 major objectives" (better: focal sectors) for EC interventions:

- Economic growth and employment generation - through provision of new employment emphasising the private sector;

³⁸ 1. Establishment of an area of peace and stability; 2. Progressive establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area; 3. Closer relations, improved understanding and mutual perceptions between peoples.

³⁹ regarding the issue of "EC policy ambiguity", reference is made to Annex 4 of this report.

- Revival and development of rural areas - through provision of infrastructure and social service development in the communities and villages of the WB/GS;
- Improving social conditions and human resource development - through improvement of general health and education;
- Development of institutions and policies - especially with respect to democratic institutions.

Although such objectives are also relevant for food security, **food security objectives have not been explicitly included in the draft CSP**, nor is a reference made to the forthcoming EC Food Security Programme.

Draft CSP and the MEDA Regional Policy Strategy (RPSP), 2002-2006

The draft CSP refers rather extensively to the Barcelona Process and describes its salient features. However, there is **no direct reference to food security** in the RPS Paper - which ought to be regarded as a major weakness. This contradicts and is inconsistent with numerous (policy) declarations of the EC, identifying poverty elimination as *the* main development policy objective of the EC and food security as one of its major dimension.

However, there are **very strong linkages of the RSP to fundamental conditions affecting food security with high relevance to Palestine**. This relates to the very main objective of the MEDA partnership agreement itself, i.e. promotion of regional, sub-regional⁴⁰ and cross-border trade, and to common basic understandings of the EURO-MED Partnership by Member Partners, namely:

- the importance of normal relationships between Member Partners and of co-operation as genuine partners as *prerequisites* for economic and political stability in the region;
- the commitment for the principles underpinning the Barcelona process, e.g.:
 - the respect for human rights,
 - the rule of law (incl. international law) and fundamental freedoms;
 - promotion of good neighbourly relations;
 - intensified regional and intra-regional trade, co-operation and integration.

Likewise, "*a conducive political and economic climate, including the prevention and resolution of conflicts*" has been explicitly identified as "*the main precondition for food security at the national level*".⁴¹

This is to state that obviously the GoI as the occupying power in WB/GS acts in contravention to the main policy objective of the MEDA Regional Policy and does, in practice, not share the basic understandings of the EURO-MED Partnership. At the same time, however, this observation also points to the fact that the EC and EU Member States have obviously failed to effectively establish such linkages and make

⁴⁰ i.e. trade between Mediterranean MEDA - partners

⁴¹ see EC, DG Development: "Fighting Hunger - Food security at the Heart of Poverty Reduction; The European Commission's vision and approach, September 2001, p.4

use of its policy (or "political"⁴²) dialogue with the GoI, so as to ensure compliance of the GoI with the above main MEDA objective and principles. Whatever persuasive efforts the EC may have undertaken so far, they have failed and the GoI's non-compliance remained without political and economic consequences.

Absence of a valid CSP - its effects

CSPs are generally developed (or supposed to be developed) by an extensive discussion exercise between EU Member States, the partner country as represented by its government and civil society (and sometimes even major non-EU donors). They constitute a consolidated consensus among EU Member States concerning political strategy, their primary (foreign) policy objectives, choice of appropriate instruments of co-operation and assistance, assistance priorities and financial outlay.

On the basis of an analysis of the partner country's situation, EC priorities and the activities of other major partners, CSPs are used to guide, manage and review EC assistance programmes to developing countries⁴³. This central role of the CSP for the EU assistance programme cannot be over-emphasised, and therefore CSPs figure most prominently in the EU's Development Policy which stresses the outstanding importance and decisiveness of the country strategy, especially for the issue of the division of tasks between the Community and the Member States⁴⁴.

The non-existence of a valid CSP is most unfortunate, especially when considering the overriding strategic importance of the **CSP being the pivotal tool** used for programming mid-term, multi-annual EC assistance within the internal EU programming, budgeting and budget allocation routines. The absence of such cardinal instrument *per se* adversely affects co-ordination, consistency, complementarity (particularly external) and effectiveness of both, Community aid and bilateral assistance of EU Member States.

⁴² EURO-Mediterranean association agreement with Israel (2000), see Article 1,1

⁴³ EC COM.(2001) 0153 Linking Relief, rehabilitation and development; Chapter 4.2

⁴⁴ COM (2000) 212, 26.April 2000, Chapter 4.1 (Strategic Activities) Integrated framework for Community activities, Strategic areas, Guiding principles

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 2:

There exists no valid and official CSP. This fact is in conformity with the special and unique conditions prevailing in Palestine (a not sovereign "country" without government) and is considered to be indicative for a **lack of political consensus between EU Member States** with regard to major objectives of EU-Near East Policy and key-strategic issues regarding EU Regional Policy and the EC's foreign policy dealings with the GoI.

A draft CSP which had been prepared in 1999 and designed to cover the period 2000-2006 never reached official status. Its basic underlying assumption of a continued progress of the peace process has proved utterly wrong and rendered the draft CSP document obsolete for its main purposes, i.e. as the central tool for mid-term, multi-annual country programming and budgeting, assistance co-ordination, consistency and complementarity aspects.

Food security objectives were **not included** in the draft CSP; neither the Regional Strategy Paper (MEDA) makes any explicit reference to food security issues which is considered one of its major weakness. Although there are **strong linkages** of objectives and principles of the Regional Strategy Paper and of its underlying Barcelona Process with substantial relevance to the OPT and to fundamental conditions affecting food security in Palestine (namely: respect for human rights; the rule of law, incl. international law, and fundamental freedoms; promotion of good neighbourly relations; intensified regional and intra-regional trade, co-operation and integration), the EC has failed to make use of such linkage effects through a **robust policy dialogue** with the GoI.

3.3 Evaluative Question 3

EQ3: What is the level of coherence between EC food aid and food security policy and national strategies of beneficiary countries, especially the PRSP?

3.3.1: Coherence of Objectives of CSP and PRSP

N.a. - There is neither a PRSP nor a valid CSP for Palestine.⁴⁵

3.3.2: Importance of FA/FS issues in national strategies

The PNA and its "governmental" system, administrative structure and their (planning) capacities are still in an early process of evolution and development. This evolution- and capacity-building process *itself* is a core EU-sponsored assistance concern pursued under the *Palestinian Reform Programme*. Moreover, circumstances prevailing in the OPT are those of military occupation, and a permanent and aggravating emergency of a more and more cataclysmic kind. Mid-term policy- and programming efforts for development as well as food security- related objectives are generally rendered obsolete and have repeatedly been frustrated by the needs of continuous crisis management. Meeting the ever pressing demands of existential problems absorbs the working capacity and human energies to the very largest extent. These are not conducive conditions for an effective and rational national planning process by the PNA.⁴⁶

During the last years, planning, programming and policy making by the PNA have been overshadowed by the urgencies of daily emergencies and, therefore, existing nascent planning-, coordination- and management capacities necessarily focused on meeting the needs of a **permanent and aggravating emergency situation**.

Whatever national plans and strategies have been developed by the PNA⁴⁷, they were short-termed and / or short-lived, caused i.a. by major systemic changes of the PNA

⁴⁵ PRSPs are a formal condition to qualify for debt relief under the International Debt Relief Initiative for highly indebted and poor countries (HIPC). Palestine has no debt servicing problems, since assistance to the PNA and Palestinians is rather exclusively given as grant. Also other fundamental assumptions underlying the concept of PRSPs do not apply to the PNA and the WB/GS, which explains the non existence of a Palestinian PRSP.

⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the PNA has again and again invested in remarkable planning and re-planning efforts, even by including some developmental perspective into their "national" plans. From a polit-strategical point of view, such PNA persistence must be perfectly sympathised with: A "recovery plan" *with* a development dimension (rather than being exclusively oriented towards repair, emergency and humanitarian problems) also matches the promised political progress of the road map. It is **this very vision and hope** which nurtures perseverance and carries the Palestinian people and their political representatives through the dark times of occupation, destruction, closures, human suffering and a continuing emergency.

⁴⁷ 1) 2-year Palestinian Investment Programme 1996-97; 2) 3-year Palestinian Development Plan 1998-2000; 3) 5-year development Plan 2001-2005; 4) 5-year Strategic Development Plan 2001-2005; 5). 100 Days Plan of the Palestinian Authority, June, 2002; 6)a). Emergency Public Investment Plan 2003-2005; 6)b) Quick Impact Intervention Program (QIIP), July–December 2003; 7) Socio-Economic Stabilisation Plan, 2004-2005;

administration⁴⁸ and by ever deteriorating realities in the OPT - which constantly frustrated assumptions / hopes of improved framework conditions to be realised by progress of the road map process. E.g., the Emergency Public Investment Plan 2003-2005 originally envisaged a second phase for 2004-2005 which was to emphasise (mid-term) economic *recovery* objectives instead of emergency-governed objectives. It is primarily the GoI's and the Quartet's responsibility to create such conditions in the OPT which will *then* permit the PNA to develop mid-term development-oriented plans and national strategies allowing a systematic pursuit of poverty- and food security improvement programmes requiring multi-annual programming.

The revised national strategy by the PNA is laid down in its **Socio - Economic Stabilisation Plan (SESP) 2004 2005** and basically returns to planning objectives meeting the challenges of continued emergency, that is "*to mitigate the effects of the socio-economic crisis facing the Palestinian people*".⁴⁹ As its predecessors, the SESP is basically a project list for international financing; however sound project selection criteria are identified which underline the plans focus on targeting the most needy, employment and the private sector.

The ESSP gives high priority

- to humanitarian and social benefits to ensure the maintenance of a basic safety net for the most needy;
- to private and public infrastructure repair and (re-)construction so as to provide stimulus to the private sector, maintain essential public services (education, health; water), regenerate and prevent health hazards;
- to employment and income generation through the private sector, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs);
- to investment in the agricultural sector (rehabilitation and construction of green houses, olive- and fruit orchards; nurseries, water wells, small irrigation works,

⁴⁸ comprising i.a. the introduction of the Basic Law, the new post of a Prime Minister with cabinet and ministries, a short tenure of the first administration and the change of Prime Minister in September 2003, including ministerial reshuffling and continuous re-structuring and changes as driven by the quartet members under the Palestinian Reform Programme.

⁴⁹ However, even the SESP adds as a second objective "*(to) maximise the scope and pace of economic recovery in the OPT in the context of an uncertain political situation.*" In a special "*Note on the Private Sector Regeneration*" annexed to the SESP, the Ministry of National Economy and the Private Sector Coordination Council explicitly states (see page 9), that "*emergency and recovery objectives (were) not mutually exclusive and ought to be implemented in parallel.*" While the argument appears self-contradicting, it is valid more in principle and theory than in practice, i.e. under occupation conditions prevailing in WB/GS. The argument may - at best - be valid to a limited degree only as long as the international donor community will continue to finance a very substantial, albeit in the long run unsustainable foreign aid package. The above argument carries rather no weight, once foreign assistance would significantly decrease. The above argument may nurture an illusion and may contribute to blurred political priorities - probably more on the donors' side than on the PA's. Reality in the OPT cannot be reconciled with sustainable recovery- or development objectives! This is only to stress (again) the urgent need for a robust policy dialogue of Quartet members and the international donor community with the GoI to end closures and occupation of the WB/GS and so fundamentally change reality framework conditions in the OPT permitting real recovery and sustainable development.

animal sheds) so as to revitalise production and provide for (re-)employment in the agriculture sector also for those who lost their jobs in Israel; and

- to encouraging capacity building in the realm of the PNA, municipal administrations and NGOs;

Strictly speaking the SESP makes no explicit reference to poverty or food security or to defined objectives of the FS Regulation. This is perfectly in accordance with both, a rigorous interpretation of their formulation and the realities in the OPT. However, its major thrust centres around repair, preservation and selective enlargement / strengthening of *physical and productive assets* (road, water, building infrastructure; support to private sector and), *human assets* (through education - and health services, employment and training), *social assets* (family and social networks, participation of NGOs and civil society) and *institutional capacities* (capacity development). To maintain these assets is crucial to prevent implosion and collapse of the Palestinian society and economy as a whole; moreover, these assets are the very prerequisite for any sustainable development at a later stage once political framework conditions will have permitted.

With this in mind, the SESP very much conforms with the intentions of the FA/FS Regulation applying to emergency situations and matches the needs of an economy which "*exhibits classic characteristics of war-torn economies: deteriorating income, consumption and saving, declining export capacity and production shifts towards non-traded and informal goods and services*"⁵⁰ rather well. This applies to the Plan's major objectives, target group orientation and selected sectors and areas of intervention. Thus, the question of coherence can only be examined on the basis of existing realities of assistance programme implementation. Programming and planning under conditions of the OPT are ruled by the demands of a permanent and aggravating emergency. Aiming at meeting the elementary needs of a war torn society and an economy, the major thrust of the SESP centres around repair, reconstruction and preservation of physical and productive assets, human assets (education and health), social assets (family and social networks) and development of institutional capacities. To maintain these assets is crucial to prevent collapse of the Palestinian society and economy and to preserve them as the very prerequisites for any sustainable development in an eventual post-conflict scenario.

3.3.3: Role of the EC within national strategies

The SESP itself makes no explicit reference to the EC and identifies no specific role for the EC or EU. The document addresses the international (donor) community at large.

However, the PNA (and the Palestinian people) are very much aware not only of their dependence on the support of the international community, but on the specific support they receive from the EU and EU Member States. The EC has meanwhile be-

⁵⁰ see UNCTAD Secretariat report on "UNCTAD's Assistance to the Palestinian people, Geneva, July 2003

come the most important donor to the Palestinians, providing badly needed humanitarian assistance, support to refugees, development assistance and support to the Palestinian Authority. The importance of the EC donor support is fully recognised and acknowledged.

Above all material assistance and financial support, Palestinians look upon the EU as a natural, (perhaps most) important political ally and broker of good faith.⁵¹ Similar to the credit given globally to the UN and their organisations, also the EU is considered as a supporter of the Palestinian cause rather for good reasons of international solidarity and of upholding (its own) fundamental principles (i.a. human rights and international law) than egoistic or imperial motives. The same does not apply in equal measure to all EU Member State governments nor to all international donor governments and their bilateral assistance agencies.

The Parliamentary Mission of the House of Commons to the WB/GS shall be quoted in this context:

"Unusually for us, during our visit to the West Bank, no one asked us for money! Neither the PNA, nor the NGOs, nor the UN Agencies saw their problems as rooted in a shortage of funding. But they all asked for advocacy and political pressure to end the occupation."⁵²

What makes the current situation so difficult for Palestinians to tolerate is not so much the suffering from material deprivation of "Asian or African" dimensions, but permanent psychological stress caused by violence, deaths and the awareness that it is not the result of a natural calamity, but of deliberate actions on the part of the GOI. And that even influential friends (such as the EU) leave them **alone** when it comes to dealing with the core root cause of their lot, i.e. the political dimension of the Israel-Palestine conflict. No donor (technical/humanitarian/financial) assistance to Palestine of whatever magnitude can solve *this* problem.

The general Palestinian attitude towards the EU and EU-assistance can be described as one of gratitude and trust, but also one of **disappointment** due to unfulfilled expectations. Palestinians (PNA-officials and the public) feel, that EU Member State governments and the EC remain all too ambivalent and indecisive when it comes to resolutely fend for their principles in the political arena vis-à-vis the GoI. It is on this issue where Palestinians voice doubts about the real position of the EC. Such doubts are justified and raise the larger concern of the EC's and certain EU Member States' **credibility**.

3.3.4: Rationale of the EC interventions

In the absence of a Country Strategy and a National Indicative Plan, programming and fund allocation of EU assistance to the OPT are carried out on an annual basis at

⁵¹ The blue-starred Europe flag is generally respected and EU citizen heartily welcomed by Palestinians.

⁵² House of Commons, International Development Committee, 2004, Development Assistance and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Second Report of Session 2003-04, Volume 1, HC 230-I; para 146

political level at the EU HQs in Brussels and decisions made are then included in the programming exercise by DG Relex (Directorate of External Relations).

The EU assistance response during the last 4 years had to concentrate to cope with the needs of emergency, and can best be characterised as a **continuing emergency response**. Main considerations during this critical phase of an escalating crisis have been to de-escalate, to preserve, make best use of existing - though under present conditions limited - potentials, to institutionalise a western democratic parliamentary system and liberal market economy and strengthen the private sector and an active civil society.

The overriding purpose of the assistance programme had been to keep the hope of a Near East peace process alive, since 2002 by supporting the road map especially through the "Palestinian Reform Programme". Total assistance from the European Community budget in support of the reform process and in response to the worsening economic and humanitarian crisis stood at EURO 570 million for 2002-2003.⁵³

The assistance aims, in particular,

- to **maintain governance capacities of the PNA** so as to prevent its collapse, strengthen the institution as such and maintain some semblance of governmental authority. This took the form of a major **budgetary support to the PNA** to finance lead-ministries' social and essential public service programmes;
- to finance a massive humanitarian and emergency assistance programme, to ensure the maintenance of a basic safety net for the most needy mainly through ECHO funding of food aid implemented through UNRWA, WFP and NGOs;
- to maintain essential public services (education, health; water) to preserve assets and prevent health hazards;
- at private and public infrastructure repair and (re-)construction (houses, factories, public buildings including office buildings of the PNA);
- at employment and income generation in the public and private sector;
- at privatisation of public corporations and semi-governmental organisations, as well as at private sector relief and revitalisation through preferential credit, especially for small and medium enterprises (SME);
- to support political reforms (Palestinian Reform Programme) and institution building, comprising i.a. the development of a Basic Law, establishment of a western democratic parliamentary system and apparatus emphasising fiscal discipline and transparency, of a corresponding judiciary and the legal framework of a liberal market economy, preparation for elections of a possible future State of Palestine;
- at investment in the agricultural sector (rehabilitation and construction of green houses, olive- and fruit orchards; nurseries, water wells, small irrigation works,

⁵³ EU Website: The EU's relations with West Bank and Gaza Strip, January 2004

animal sheds) so as to revitalise production and provide for (re-)employment in the agriculture sector also for those who lost their jobs losses in Israel; and

- to encourage capacity development in the realm of the PNA, municipal administrations and civil society (e.g. NGOs).

The EU assistance programme as a whole matches very well the objectives and intent of the Palestinian Socio - Economic Stabilisation Plan. In addition, it reveals commendable efforts to consequently keep critical **cross-cutting themes** in mind when selecting and - albeit to a lesser degree - implementing programmes, e.g. emancipation of civil society, participatory procedures, "ownership" considerations, gender and social targeting concerns. One should add that there exists a broad acceptance and consensus with the PNA and in the Palestinian society for most of these concerns. The observance of environmental concerns is impaired by the Israeli occupation administration and a lack of public awareness among Palestinian citizen.

It is one significant characteristic of the EC's assistance programmes to Palestine that the assistance does not go without conditions⁵⁴. The EC attaches conditions to its financial assistance programme in general and to its support to the Palestinian Reform Programme in particular. To which degree these conditions are agreeable to the PNA or are donor driven shall not be examined here. It is, however, quite obvious that the assistance programme closely orients itself along the outlines of the road map's first phase and the EC consequently and effectively enforces conditions to be met by the PNA. The PNA by and large willingly complies - what else?

The EC, however, does not exhibit a similarly firm attitude and determination when it comes to dealing with the GoI which is the factual setter of the rules and conditions under which the Palestine assistance programme has to be implemented. The EC's failure to be equally resolved and effective on the other side of the road map's equation is evident.

3.3.5: Coordination of donors' and government interventions

Next to the word "situation" which figures most prominently in *every* conversation in Palestine, it is the term "coordination" which might rank second place: because it is so much needed *at all levels* (donors, PA-administration, implementing agencies) and virtually absent. This is characteristic for emergency situations in general and the prevailing conditions of a war-torn Palestine in particular.

At the same time - seemingly contradictory but essentially only underlining the objective and felt need for coordination in an environment of emergency, disorder and confusion - there is a myriad of coordination meetings of different coordination committees, liaison bodies and information exchange platforms of sorts: in short, sporadic spontaneous actions and sparks of collaboration efforts - but little effective coordination. Considering the different functions aid coordination can have (see Box below),

⁵⁴ which the EU freely admits; see EU Website: The EU's relations with West Bank and Gaza Strip, January 2004

in most cases, however, they hardly go beyond information exchange - without leading to substantive follow-up.

Different Functions of Aid Coordination

Aid coordination activities in WB/GS have, at various times, included:

- Information sharing (including, as necessary, information gathering).
- Sharing (and/or jointly conducting) analysis, monitoring and evaluation.
- Aligning with common objectives and strategy (note: even if wider and longer term goals are hard to agree, there may be consensus at sector level and over the short term).
- Prioritisation and resource allocation.
- Joint funding and/or implementation of development projects and programmes.
- Joint representation (e.g. at the level of facilitating projects).
- Wider advocacy, dissemination.

Source: Lister, Stephen and Anne Le More, 2003; Aid Management and coordination during the Intifada - Report to the LACC Co-Chairs", Mokoro Ltd

There is a wide consensus among donors themselves, ministry officials of the PNA, implementing agencies and field staff that there is little effective coordination in nearly all respects. Little is known what other donors plan and do which is typical for a fairly donor driven emergency response. The same also applies to the food security programme, even though there are few (minor) examples of joint activities - see below. *"Various donor efforts to take stock of ongoing aid have been haphazard, and do not address the PA's need for predictability of aid flows as a pre-requisite for efficient resource planning."*⁵⁵ The EC delegation plans to undertake a new effort to create a basis for improved coordination and, as a first step in this regard, the establishment of a common data base of programmes and projects of European and other donors is currently envisaged.

Many factors contribute to such unsatisfactory state of affairs as regards coordination:

- the accentuated and continuous conflict- and emergency situation;
- the preoccupation with meeting the urgencies of emergencies and the shortening of planning horizons;
- the still weak planning capacities of the Ministry of Planning, PA;
- the absence of an EU Country Strategy;
- the absence of sufficient consensus of main political actors (Quartet) on key issues of Near East policy;
- the non-cooperation of the GoI; and
- a continuing, deep running and unresolved debate among donors and aid agencies about the very nature of the international (relief) assistance to the WB/GS itself,

⁵⁵ Lister, Stephen and Anne Le More, 2003

i.e.:

- the dilemma, that donors, by mitigating the humanitarian crisis and stepping up assistance, do co-finance Israeli occupation and practically release the GoI of its obligation to take care of people's welfare in the OPT;
- the dilemma that, by supporting local level projects and operations in the WB, which is made a Bantustan-Palestine by Israeli closure policy, donors commit complicity in the cantonisation of the OPT and in by-passing and thereby weakening the role and credibility of the PA, which cannot serve Palestinian interests.

Also the new Ministry of Planning, PNA deplores unsatisfactory coordination and an increasing tendency of donors to bypass central planning efforts of the PA, stating that the "*the need for closer donor - PA - integration (needs to be addressed) and to make it consistent with stated political objectives of establishing a viable independent State of Palestine. This requires calling for greater discipline on the part of the donors and to support the integration of aid programmes into PA-structures and procedures (for example USAID programs which remain independent and are minimally coordinated with PA for political reasons) including untied procurement.... A consistent effort will be needed to be made with donors to develop longer-term predictability and transparency in aid flows (and to) try to limit insistence on donor- and project-specific planning and implementation and review procedures in favour of a comprehensive integrative approach.*"⁵⁶

The lack of coordination is certainly the result of disagreement stemming from not reconciled positions of major "players" with regard to political fundamental concerns of the Israel-Palestine conflict, respectively the destination of the "journey" along the road map. These contradictions then routinely emerge at all levels of aid assistance coordination and management **starting from the top**, especially the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC)⁵⁷, the Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC). The United Nations Special Coordinator's Office (UNSCO) is equally limited in its coordination effectiveness, so the efforts of the Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA)⁵⁸.

Ironically, one of the major coordination efforts undertaken is that by the Task Force for Project Implementation (TFPI). This forum of donors and implementing agencies attempts to channel and intensify coordinative contacts with the COGAT (Office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories) of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) with the objective to obtain special permits or facilitate movement and safety of (international) staff or goods, etc. These are at best efforts to minimise the

⁵⁶ Ministry of Planning, PA, 2003, Aid Coordination and Management in the new Ministry of Planning, by Jihad K. Alwazir, Ass. Deputy Minister, Draft 23.5.2003

⁵⁷ since September 2000 defunct because of withdrawal of the GoI from this forum;

⁵⁸ For an illustrative description of aid coordination and management in Palestine reference is made to the report by Stephen Lister and Anne Le More, Mokoro Ltd., 2003. The report also makes recommendations for improved coordination; most of these, however, must remain of little value, because they aim at "improving" an existing institutional framework in a situation of unresolved conflicting political positions of the main actors. Consequently, such controversy must re-appear when questions of coordination are dealt with: Who coordinates whom and what? What should be the future arrangements? Who has which responsibility and which competence?

very effects which the Israeli military administration produces itself. Similarly, there is some coordination between UNRWA and WFP at the operational level for common logistical concerns with regard to implementation of the humanitarian aid.

There had been times when coordination among donors had been better. This notably applies to a period during 2001 / 2002 when under the World Bank as *lead agency* a joint damage assessment of destroyed physical infrastructure had been made and donors subsequently financed repair and (re-)construction programmes. Obviously, such short-lived and relative success lies within the nature of the one-dimensional straightforwardness of the issue "destruction - reconstruction" and an age-old inclination of donors towards construction projects for reasons of technical and administrative simplicity as well as disbursement velocity. However, similar achievements seem impossible when it comes to more complex domains of cooperation and coordination.

With respect to food aid and food security there has been some coordination for the preparation of the recent food assessment study, which has been financed jointly by the EC and USAID and prepared by the FAO in collaboration with the WFP.⁵⁹ Now, that this valuable base-line study is at hand, a (one) nutrition/food monitoring system shall be established in Palestine to provide a poverty and food security relevant data and information base for more effective and better coordinated assistance in the future. At present, FAO and WFP try to reconcile their respective methodological concepts for such nutrition/food monitoring system: Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM) versus Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information Monitoring System (FIVIMS). It seems far from being assured that both UN organisations with headquarters in Rome will be able to harmonise their concepts so that one practical monitoring system will see the light in Palestine within a reasonable time period.

Exceptional and an internally consistent coordination between some donors takes place only with respect to the *Task Force on Palestinian Reform* which pursues structural and systemic objectives such as those relating to the rule of law, basic law or constitution, elections, liberal market economy, public finance and judiciary reform etc. *Seven Reform Groups* have been formed, each under a lead PA ministry and a lead donor coordinator heading so-called *Reform Coordinating Support Units (RCSU)*⁶⁰, and assistance delivered under this programme proceeds in a rather organised manner and along the lines suggested by the road map. However, the entire programme lacks vertical consistency and its relevance remains totally unclear as long as such efforts take place in a political vacuum, respectively under conditions of complete uncertainty with regard to the ultimate objective of the exercise. Structural reforms of the Palestinian Reform Programme can only become effective if and when a sovereign Palestinian state will have been established. Without constructive coopera-

⁵⁹ FAO: Report of the Food Security Assessment West Bank and Gaza Strip, Rome 2003. Such coordinated approach had been suggested earlier by the EU-Court of Auditors which recommended that the EC should give priority to supporting the development of systems aimed at providing reliable information on socio-economic household situations (including aspects of poverty and food security).

⁶⁰ The EU being in charge of areas such as "Judiciary", "Financial Accountability" together with the IMF, and "Ministerial and Civil Service" together with the WB, and "Elections" together with the US; Japan leads the area "Local Government"; The USA leads the area "Market Economy" and Norway the area "Civil Society".

tion of the GoI and with serious doubts about the will and intention of the GoI in this regard, it is and remains most uncertain whether the Palestinian Reform programme can come to any effective fruition at all.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 3:

No CSP and no PRSP exists for Palestine. There have been quite a few, though short-termed and short-lived national planning documents; neither of them makes any explicit reference to poverty or food security or to defined objectives of the FS Regulation.

Without a CSP, the EU assistance response during the last four years has been emergency response with the aim to de-escalate, to preserve assets and the PNA, to finance and manage a humanitarian crisis. As a supporter of the "peace process" and member of the Near East Quartet, the EC has been following the logic of the road map (first phase) so as to institutionalise a western democratic parliamentary system, a liberal market economy and to strengthen the private sector and an active civil society.

The EC attaches conditions to be met by the PNA - especially under its Palestinian Reform Programme - and enforces them quite effectively. However, the EC fails to be equally resolved and effective on the other side of the road map's equation, that is when it comes to dealing with the GoI which determines the rules and conditions under which the Palestine assistance programme has to be implemented. Such failure constitutes a major incoherence which - unless rectified - will gravely compromise and jeopardise the achievement of the ultimate objective and justification of its entire assistance programme to Palestine.

There is a wide consensus among donors themselves, ministry officials, implementing agencies and field staff that there is little effective coordination in nearly all respects. Little is known what other donors plan and do which is typical for emergency situations and a fairly donor driven response.

Such lack of coordination seems nearly inevitable and "natural" if one considers the gravity of prevailing life- and working conditions in Palestine. It nevertheless underlines the importance for improved coordination. The lack of coordination has to be considered as the inevitable result of substantial disagreements stemming from not reconciled positions of major political "players" with regard to fundamentals of the Israel-Palestine conflict, respectively the destination of the road map. Such lack of consensus must (and does!) routinely re-emerge at all levels of aid assistance, coordination and management. If there is disagreement with respect to the ultimate objective and the road that shall lead you there, there can be no consensus on the very purpose and mechanisms of coordination. The logic consequence is that such disagreement paralyses all efforts and motives of donor coordination.

3.4 Evaluative Question 4

EQ4: What is the added value of food aid in kind (FA) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

3.4.1: *Relevance of FA strategies and actions*

The EC channels its food aid through UNRWA (for refugees) and WFP (for non-refugees). Both organizations target, with their food assistance programmes, the poorest and chronic food insecure (“Special Hardship Cases-SHC” in UNWRA terminology) and the “new poor”, i.e. those who have lost their means of subsistence (jobs, income, houses, assets) in the wake of the conflict since September 2000.⁶¹ Furthermore, they maintain institutional and supplementary feeding programmes for pregnant and lactating mothers and their children at risk of malnutrition. Thus, by responding to the immediate needs and providing the means for sheer survival, the emergency food aid programmes are relevant and in accordance with the objectives of the EC FA/FS Regulation.

3.4.2: *Effectiveness of FA strategies and actions*

In 2002, about 1.9 million people in the WB/GS, i.e. almost 60% of the population, received food aid.

UNWRA manages two main food assistance programmes for the Palestinian refugees,⁶² the long standing Special Hardship Cases (SHC) programme, serving, at present, 115,000 chronic poor and an Emergency Food Aid programme, initiated after September 2000, which serves about 1 million of the “new poor”. Food assistance to the vulnerable non-refugee population is provided by WFP (some 530,000 targeted beneficiaries in 2003) and Islamic Social Welfare Organizations.

The SHCs include female heads of households, elderly, chronically ill, disabled and others without any other source of income or support. A set of rigorous criteria is applied to those eligible under this programme, and the status of the enrolled beneficiaries is regularly reviewed.⁶³ Apart from a full food ration, the SHCs also receive a complementary cash assistance of US\$ 40 per year.

While UNWRA manages the distribution itself, WFP works through partner organizations (MoSA, international and local NGOs). The partner organizations operate Food-for-Work (FFW) or Food-for-Training (FFT) schemes. Contrary to UNRWA

⁶¹ See definition of “New Poor” categories in FAO, 2003, p. 51.

⁶² Only registered refugees fall under UNRWA’s mandate, these are those who had acquired the refugee status during 1949-1952 and their descendants.

⁶³ An observation from a field visit to En Arique village (Ramallah district) where a food distribution by UNWRA to SHCs took place: A man, father of ten children, came to the distribution site and vigorously complained that he did not receive a ration any more. He had been removed from the beneficiary list because he had found a job as community worker. His salary was, however, lower than the value of the food ration he used to get before.

beneficiaries, the non-refugee "WFP"- beneficiaries of emergency assistance have to "earn" their food ration through participation in such schemes. The FFW approach supports targeting efficiency (self-targeting; only those participate who don't have alternative job opportunities) and gets some useful works done. The FFT schemes aim to increase the skills of the beneficiaries, thus to reduce their future dependence on food assistance.

Under the Emergency Operations, the "new poor" were supposed to receive 60% (UNWRA standard) respectively 67% (WFP) of a full ration. However, due to insufficient resources/funds, these target levels could not be achieved.⁶⁴

An EC commissioned mid-term review of the UNRWA Food Aid & Cash Assistance Programme arrived at the conclusion that, altogether, the assistance is effectively distributed to those persons and families who need it most, and that the selection and distribution system is fairly effective.⁶⁵

3.4.3: Efficiency of FA strategies and actions

The EC provides finance to UNRWA and WFP, and the food aid is procured by the organisations themselves. This leads to efficiency gains compared to deliveries in kind. The organizations can procure the food items and organise the deliveries according to the needs, taking also the logistics constraints imposed by the Israeli authorities into consideration.

Handling procedures in Israeli ports have been such that alone WFP had to pay an estimated sum of USD 800,000 during 2002 in demurrage costs only. Between September 2000 and February 2003, UNRWA incurred an extra \$1.78 million in expenses as a result of extra costs for storage and other charges on the import of basic commodities. Trucks (the names of their drivers and their possible replacements) delivering food aid have to be announced to checkpoints well ahead in time to be allowed to pass. International staff has to be employed as truck drivers because Palestinian staff were not allowed to leave their place of residence. Back-to-back reloading arrangements have been imposed at the border posts, i.e. each truck delivering a full container of food has to take back an empty one. If one border post is closed – and this happens frequently without previous notice – the trucks with relief food have to be redirected to another border post, and the empty containers waiting inside the WB/GS have to be shifted to the other border post as well.

Logistic experts have to invest a tremendous amount of effort, time and ingenuity to cope with Israeli "rules and regulations" which are subject to arbitrary change at any time.

Despite such problems in food aid logistics and the additional costs they cause, food aid has still a **cost advantage** over cash assistance. Due to high import tariffs,⁶⁶ food market prices are substantially above world market prices. While, for example, the

⁶⁴ Cf. FAO, 2003, p. 128. For example, only 70% of the target level for flour could be distributed by UNWRA in the Gaza Strip in 2002.

⁶⁵ ITALTREND, 2003, p. 63.

⁶⁶ Under the Israeli / WB/GS customs union agreed upon, the protective Israeli tariffs for agricultural products also apply to the WB/GS. Import tariffs for most agricultural products range from 100-350 %. Cf. FAO, 2003, p. iii.

import price of wheat from Israel was US\$670 per tonne, the world market price for wheat was US\$ 205 per tonne only.⁶⁷ Food aid deliveries are exempted from import tax. Thus, the food aid rations received by the beneficiaries represent a considerably higher value if compared with the costs to the organizations for import and distribution. On the other hand, a substitution of the in-kind assistance by cash would substantially reduce the management burdens and overhead cost of the organizations.

Although it has been observed at some places that beneficiaries occasionally sell part of their relief rations,⁶⁸ in order to raise some cash for other expenditures, this does not seem to be a general phenomenon in WB/GS.⁶⁹

3.4.4 Impact:

The most important and immediate impact of the food (and partly cash) assistance programmes is that they help to prevent the poor and vulnerable from further deprivation and to ensure a minimum level of subsistence. The supplementary feeding programmes have reportedly positive impacts on the nutritional status of malnourished mothers and children.

The problematic impacts often associated with food aid, namely the adverse effects on domestic markets and local production, and the risk of creating further dependence, do not apply in the case of WB/GS because:

- Most of the food aid commodities have to be imported anyway.⁷⁰ Edible oils only exception. UNWRA and WFP have included locally purchased olive oil in the food basket, thus encouraging local production and increasing the income of local farmers.
- The main determining factor causing dependence on food aid of a large and increasing number of Palestinians is the Israeli occupation with all its facets and consequences in terms of trade and mobility restrictions.

3.4.5 Sustainability:

As long as the Israeli occupation of the WB/GS and the related harassment of the Palestinian people and economy by the closure policy goes on, a big and further increasing proportion of the Palestinian population will continue to depend on even larger relief assistance from abroad, and from corresponding pledges by donors. While the relief needs have not been fully met in the past, the relief agencies (UNWRA, WFP) fear a further drop of donor pledges in future.⁷¹ Without fundamen-

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ During the same field visit to En Arique village already mentioned above, we could observe that a women who had received her monthly SHC ration sold all the wheat flour to a local baker. The price she received was substantially below the market value.

⁶⁹ Cf. ITALTREND, 2002, p. 64.

⁷⁰ Given its natural resource base, Palestine will always remain a net food importer.

⁷¹ Only 38% of the UN 2003 consolidated appeal was met by commitments see Table A-5, Annex 3.

tal change in the political scenario, and if an already grave humanitarian crisis was to be averted to reach a climax, the consequences of which might be all too serious - the EC would have to continue to increase its emergency and humanitarian assistance programmes to ever higher financial dimensions. Such assistance programme is **unsustainable**, and ultimately not justifiable, if it was not simultaneously backed up with all political and economical leverage the EC and EU Member States can muster so as to bring about a turnaround of occupation policies of the GoI.

3.4.6: Comparative advantage to other instruments dealing food aid

Apart from the food aid provided under the FA/FS budget line, the EC has also channelled food aid through ECHO. Out of a total budget of EURO 32.5 million for humanitarian assistance in 2003, about 50% has been food aid. Like food aid from the FA/FS Regulation, also ECHO channels its food aid through the UN agencies UNWRA and WFP, and through NGOs.⁷²

There are no significant conceptual differences among the food aid provisions through the different budget lines, both serve the same purpose of emergency relief and both are similarly implemented. The main justification for the approach to provide food aid through the different budget lines is to increase the total amount of EC resources for the provision of food aid, to better match the needs.

3.4.7: Coordination of the various types of operation

As to programming, coordination of the food aid programmes is done by AidCo regarding food aid provided under Regulation and ECHO in Brussels, based on the UN appeals. Coordination in the field, also between UNWRA and WFP is largely confined to solve technical, particularly logistical problems.

Little overall coordination exists among different donors and organizations concerned with relief assistance. The donors mainly deal with the implementing partner agencies on a bilateral level.

The EC relief food aid and the other food security programmes are operated quite apart from each other and there are little coordination needs and linkages, apart from internal coordination at EC Headquarters and Delegation level.

However, there seems need to improve co-ordination between UNRWA and WFP on the operational level. *"It is costly, inefficient and a waste of donor's money for UNRWA to be delivering humanitarian aid to those Palestinians who are "refugees" while WFP delivers similar aid to "non-refugee" Palestinians living nearby. It makes no sense to have two (EC and other) donor-funded UN agencies maintaining separate purchasing organisations, warehouses and distribution networks, etc.. As a first step UNRWA and WFP should reach agreement to divide the distribution of humanitarian*

⁷² An "Urban Vouchers Programme" for urban poor, supported by ECHO, had been implemented by ICRC until 2003. ICRC has phased out its assistance to Palestine because it refuses to continue to take on the burden from the GoI which, as the occupying power, is responsible to cater for the needs of the victims of the occupation. See also chapter 2.2.2: Country Profile.

aid within the OPTs geographically, with one agency supplying aid to “refugees ” and “non-refugees ” alike in some areas of the territories and the other agency in the other areas.”⁷³

To this end, the EC may take up the issue of rationalisation of UNRWA and WFP operations in Palestine.

3.4.8 Quality (effectiveness) of beneficiary targeting

While targeting of the SHCs as the most needy among the refugee population functions apparently fairly efficient and effective, there is a general impression that targeting of the “new poor” under the emergency programmes has been far from satisfactory.⁷⁴ Due to the emergency situation, the selection of and distribution to the beneficiaries has been organised in a hurry.

The completion of the Food Security Assessment⁷⁵ and the planned establishment of an Information System for Improving Nutrition and Food Security⁷⁶ should lead to improved targeting in future.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 4:

By helping the poor and food insecure Palestinian refugees and non-refugee population to survive, the relief food operations are very relevant and can be considered as satisfactory with regard to beneficiary selection and the distribution of food commodities. Under the trying living and working conditions imposed by the Israeli military administration in the WB/GS, it is no small achievement to reach the vulnerable Palestinian refugee and non-refugee population and help them to survive.

⁷³ see House of Commons, 2004 , para 108

⁷⁴ Cf. ITALTREND; p. 64.

⁷⁵ FAO, 2003

⁷⁶ Cf. Wehelie, Yassin, 2004.

3.5 Evaluative Question 5

What is the added value of the currency facility (budgetary support) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

There is no budget support component under EC's Food Aid and Food Security Programme in Palestine.

However, the EC provided **general budget support to the PNA**, which has been essential to maintain governance capacities of the PNA so as to prevent its collapse, strengthen the institution as such and maintain some semblance of governmental authority. General EC budget support helped to finance lead-ministries' social and essential public service programmes (Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education) and to pay PNA employees' salaries⁷⁷ (employment- and safety net aspects).

To this end, EC budgetary support had been of an outstanding significance, all the more during times when the GoI withheld substantial amounts of taxes collected on behalf of the PNA and the PNA's fiscal position turned precarious.⁷⁸ A collapse of the PNA has been averted by emergency budget support from the Arab League Countries (ca.75%) and the EU (ca.25%), jointly making up about half of total PNA budget outlays over the period. With the partial resumption of payments by the GoI to the PNA's Ministry of Finance during 2003, direct budgetary payments by the EU to the PNA have been adjusted downwards.

Thus, apart from the overall objective to strengthen the PNA as a political organisation, the general budget support contributed to food security objectives by way of employment and income generation and financing indirectly essential public services in the education and health sectors. By helping to preserve *productive, human and social assets* of the Palestinian society and economy, the very prerequisites for any sustainable development in a post-conflict period have been maintained.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 5:

Although there is no targeted FSBS, the general budget support provided by the EC also relevant and effective with regard to food security objectives.

⁷⁷ With 43% of all wage earners, the PA is by far the biggest employer in the OPT.

⁷⁸ Monthly revenues fell from USD 91 million in late 2000 to just USD 18 million by the end of 2002; Source: The World Bank, May 2003: "Twenty-Seven Months- Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis - An Assessment

3.6 Evaluative Question 6

What is the added value of the operations to support food security for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

Under the FA / FS Programme Budget Line the EC has awarded to the Palestinian Authority a total sum of Euro 10 million - split into two separate official letters of award of € 5 million each - to finance two Programmes "*to boost food security in Palestine*" (2000 Programme) and "*to improve the food security situation in the West Bank & Gaza Strip*" (2003 Programme). The respective Programmes envisaged the following components:

2000 Programme (OL 30.935/20227, 08-06-2000, amended 17.06.2003):

Programme Objective: "*to reduce the vulnerability of the poorest rural populations and to ensure their long-term food security*"

1. Technical Assistance for developing a food security strategy (€ 0.5 M)
2. FS-related institutional capacity building at Municipal level (€ 0.2 M.)
3. Food security programmes through local partners (€ 3.8 M)
4. TA for the implementation of components 2 and 3 (€ 0.5 M).

2002 Programme (OL 32186/2002, 31-12-2002)

Programme Purpose: "*to improve the availability and access to food for the food insecure populations in the low-potential areas of the WB & GS.*"

1. Technical Assistance (€ 1.4 M)
2. Rural Infrastructure development (€ 1.3 M)
3. Agricultural services development (€ 0.6 M)
4. Institutional Strengthening (€ 0.7 M)
5. Setting up of a Food Security Information System (€ 1.0 M).

The TA and capacity building components (items 1, 2, 4 of the 2000 Programme) will be treated under Evaluative Question 7. Since implementation of the 2002 Programme has not yet started (apart from the TA component which is a continuation of the TA input under 2000 Programme), the following analysis referring to EQ 6 is confined to item 3 of the 2000 Programme, i.e. the implementation of special operations in support of food through local partners.

3.6.1 Relevance

The measures implemented through NGOs mainly focus on the agricultural sector and aim at employment and income generation, stabilisation and increasing agricultural production and productivity, enhancing smallholder livestock and improved

water management.⁷⁹ Such measures and objectives are in accordance with the food security objectives of the Regulation.

As to the relevance of individual projects implemented by different NGOs:⁸⁰

- (1) PARC, Land reclamation: Very relevant because of: employment creation, increase of agricultural production and productivity, protection of Palestinian land ownership titles against requisition by Israeli Military land administration, water harvesting.
- (2) PHG, Food for Life Programme: very relevant because aimed at home gardening and agricultural production through improved water harvesting and management; temporary employment through rural infrastructure construction (agric. roads, cisterns, pools, terraces); sustainability and community based-oriented approach; capacity development of various rural stakeholders
- (3) ACAD, Micro-credit programme: relevant because concept-wise *originally* intended to provide micro-credits to rural poor and thus to income and employment generation.
- (4) PLSC, Improvement of livestock services: relevant with regard to employment and income generation, capacity building for local NGO
- (5) CRIC, Dairy development Khan Younis, Gaza: only theoretically relevant because the project deals with milk production and processing which is food security relevant through its employment and income generation potential. In the context of Gaza, however, milk processing and dairy development with large ruminants under the conditions described under section 3.6.2 below, can hardly be economically feasible and, therefore, runs a high to become an economic disaster for both milk producers and dairy plant operators.

Summarily, the operations to support food security are by nature development oriented interventions which do require – among others - a relatively stable environment. This critical condition, however, is not met in the OPT. Considering the actual overall conditions and the warlike situation in Palestine, these are circumstances which can only allow marginal contributions of developmental activities towards the objective of the FA/FS Regulation, i.e. of an improved food security.

Therefore relevance of (field-oriented) operations to support food security in the OPT can be generally considered as **marginal**. This statement even applies – although in smaller measure - to the TA-efforts pursuing the formulation of a PNA Food Security Strategy at this point of time when the PNA is existentially threatened and fully absorbed with managing the emergency.⁸¹

Also with reference to the main logic and thrust of argument presented in chapters 3.2 and 3.3, for the OPT the **most effective and relevant strategy to improve food se-**

⁷⁹ See Table A-6 in Annex 3 for a list of supported NGO projects.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ See also chapter EQ 7, 3.7.1.

curity is the removal of the occupation and closures by the military administration. This is the very strategy which ought to be pursued by the EC and EU Member State governments *u n i t e d l y*, consequently and vigorously by a robust policy dialogue with and pressure on the GoI – including appropriately selected economic sanctions to be stepwise increased / decreased / removed in accordance with GoI (non)-compliance.

3.6.2: Effectiveness

Because of short implementation periods of the projects, the effectiveness of the measures cannot be finally assessed yet. However, the following preliminary observations can be made:

- Some of the projects are likely to become effective in increasing employment, production and income (PARC, PLSC already partly realised; PHG likely, but not yet started).
- Unsatisfactory targeting efficiency in reaching the poorest population groups, as stipulated under the EC Council Regulation and even explicitly mentioned in the first Official Letter of award, and management drawbacks (micro credit programme) are responsible for fairly limited effectiveness in some other projects. Unsatisfactory targeting is especially an issue of concern with regard to the micro-credit programme (ACAD)⁸² and the dairy project (CRIC). This is particularly deplorable with respect to the credit programme which - at least theoretically - can yield impressive effectiveness results because of the expected multiplier effect through the instrument of revolving funds.

As regards the dairy project (CRIC), this equally suffers from serious defects right from the identification and planning stage for which conceptual weaknesses and lack of professional expertise of EC evaluators in charge of NGO project proposal selection and approval must be held responsible: Dairy development combined with the establishment of a dairy co-operative and a milk processing plant (dairy technology) explicitly belong to the *most* ambitious challenges in the entire development arena requiring i.a. a very long time to mature, all the more when all three components shall be newly introduced - as has been the case in Khan Younis. The project has been designed for an 18 months implementation period only, the area is not suited at all for milk production with large ruminants for agronomical and more so (agro-)economical reasons⁸³, the necessary dairy technology expertise was neither available, nor could the project provide the same or arrange for necessary training. Foreseeable marketing problems have been grossly underestimated and the milk producers /cooperative members seem to be a rather heterogeneous group with diverging interests. These observations do not permit much optimism that the project could have become much more

⁸² The clients of ACAD visited during the field study clearly belong to middle income groups.

⁸³ There is no local green fodder production basis available. Practically all feed (green fodder, straw and concentrates) has to be purchased - from Israel - at high costs, and this under the conditions of extremely unreliable transport conditions in Gaza.

than a waste of money, efforts and an economic disaster for the milk producers and dairy plant! Gaza as a whole is at the most suited for *small* ruminant production and less perishable livestock products (meat) or cheese and curd. - The project has been ill-designed and was destined to failure from the start.

- One of the planned projects, the establishment of “⁸⁴A localised composting network for Bethlehem district. West Bank” was cancelled because it turned out to be not feasible.
- The minimum amount of Euro 500,000 for proposals to be submitted by the NGOs is questionable. It precludes the promotion of “small but beautiful”, i.e. innovative approaches and the entry and participation of small locally-based NGOs.
- There are likely positive effects with regard to capacity development of local NGOs in planning and implementing projects (PARC, PHG and communities addressed by them; PLSC).

3.6.3: Efficiency

The efficiency of the NGO operations has been adversely affected by the difficult working conditions, particularly the restrictions on movements, but also by EC specific administrative and financial procedures and project specific deficiencies:

- Delays in decisions on project approvals and in the transfer of funds by EC have impaired efficient project implementation.
- The efficiency of the credit-programme implemented by ACAD gravely suffers from the relatively small credit volume handled and comparatively high overhead costs (staff and salaries) by the NGO. This is only *partly* explained and can only be partly justified by the impaired working conditions in Palestine under the Intifada. This project seems to have conceptual and management defects from the outset, among others indicating subject matter incompetence at the planning stage by the concerned EC department/desk⁸⁵ and unsatisfactory local follow-up and supervision of and by ACAD. The defects have been identified to some extent only and even these have been rectified only slowly and in small measure until to-date by the respective directly contracted NGO, despite a mid-term evaluation in December 2002.
- The operational efficiency of the dairy plant project in Khan Younis, Gaza, which had been set-up by CRIC (formally completed in June 2003) is severely hampered by technical constraints and management deficiencies.⁸⁶ The economic viability of the project as whole is doomed.

⁸⁴ See Table A-6 in Annex 3.

⁸⁵ The ACAD Director himself pointed out the problem of lacking professional support from the EC side, supposedly because the food security division has no credit specialists.

⁸⁶ During the site visit in Feb. 2004, the workers claimed that the dairy plant had not been operating for the last two weeks, and that they had not received their salaries since January 2004– this in spite of the

- The amounts for overhead costs for personnel and project administration, studies, and other organisational expenses appear rather high if compared to the resources actually budgeted for beneficiary related investments.

3.6.4: Impacts

The implementation period has been too short for impacts to materialise and to be assessed.

In order to facilitate impact assessment at a later stage, programme monitoring should also cover aspects of impact monitoring.

3.6.5: Sustainability

Capacity building efforts are an essential programme component and increase the probability of sustainability of intervention effects. However, sustainability of the food security interventions is endangered because it largely depends on the further political and social development in Palestine.

The **absence** of some critical technical assistance input for some NGO-projects has impaired their effectiveness and sustainability:

As to individual NGO projects:

- The sustainability of the CRIC Dairy Project is very doubtful, due to obvious management and technical constraints and economic reasons (see under 3.6.2 and 3.6.3 Effectiveness and Efficiency above).
- To ensure the sustainability of the ACAD micro-credit scheme, this will require a feasible concept for a phasing-out strategy (of EC assistance), which still needs to be elaborated. Some special effort and ingenuity ought to be invested into an intelligent phasing-out strategy which does more than sheer handing-over a substantial amount of money into the property of the benefiting NGO so as to get the project administratively "off the books". The phasing-out arrangements should safeguard the potential positive impacts which the project has not been able to produce as yet.

3.6.6 Comparative advantage with regard to other types of operations and other instruments

The specific features and comparative advantages of the food security projects implemented through NGOs can be summarised as follows:

- The projects are geared towards increasing the self-help capacities of the population, and to make them independent from other public support programmes.

fact that the NGO CRIC had subsidised the dairy plant operations by advancing the salaries of the workers for one year (July 2003-June 2004). Furthermore, there is no manager appointed for the dairy plant, management had been done so far by the board members of the cooperative.

- Implementation through local NGOs compensates for capacity constraints of the PNA, builds on available capacities among the NGOs and contributes to their further development.
- Some of the NGOs work closely with the communities, apply participatory and adapted approaches and are able to encourage own initiatives by the beneficiaries.⁸⁷

However, the specific *source* of funding (here the FA/FS budget line) has no specific advantage over any other source, e.g. NGO-cofinancing budget line.

The impact potential of NGO-implemented projects remains primarily governed by thorough planning, selection of suitable food availability and access - relevant interventions, the focus on the main target group of the FA/FS Regulation (poorest), mode of their implementation (participatory and emancipatory working methods) and - above all - by the quality of the NGOs themselves, notably their staff's genuine development commitment.

3.6.7 Coordination of the various instruments dealing with FS

Overall coordination of the different EC supported FA/FS Programme instruments rests with the EC Technical Assistance Office, Jerusalem. Here, coordination occurs through regular meetings at the EC Office and through informal meetings of the officers in charge of the different programmes. For the specific components of the Programme, the following coordination linkages and procedures exist:

- The food security projects are planned and implemented (apart from the emergency food aid programmes) with little coordination needs between these components.
- The MoA of the PNA has been involved in the process of selecting the food security projects being implemented by the NGOs; some – rather ad-hoc - coordination (information) takes place between the MoA and the individual NGOs. Stronger coordination linkages seem to exist between the NGOs and the EC Technical Assistance Office. There are two task managers assigned for the coordination, support and monitoring of the NGO programmes. While there exists a good working relationship with the NGOs, there is a lack of competence and inputs with respect to specific subject matters which the preparation and effective monitoring of the projects would require (e.g. on micro-credits, agriculture, livestock).
- There seems to be little coordination among different NGOs involved in the implementation of EC supported projects, although there exists some potential to make positive use of linkage- / linking effects. This particularly refers to financing agricultural investments and the micro-credit programme implemented by ACAD. Such potential ought to be made better use of.

⁸⁷ Particularly convincing examples in this regard are the projects implemented by the Palestinian Livestock Service Center /VSF (livestock services for small ruminant production) and the land rehabilitation project implemented by PARC.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 6:

The EC supported food security projects are largely geared towards income and employment generation, making productive use of existing agricultural potentials and enabling Palestinian farmers build a (new) basis for existence. The mode of implementation through NGOs takes advantage of available technical, planning and management capacities and contributes to their further development. Although most of the projects are still in an early stage of implementation or have not started field operations yet, which precludes a valid assessment of their effectiveness, there are indications of targeting and efficiency problems with regard to some of the projects.

3.7 Evaluative Question 7

What is the added value of the other / Technical assistance and capacity building component for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the regulation?

3.7.1 Relevance

Based on the perception of capacity constraints in strategic planning as well as programme planning and implementation at all levels, substantial provisions for TA and capacity building have been made by the 2000- and 2002 (Food Security) Programmes offered to the PNA.

The FA/FS Regulation places a considerable significance – if not that of a formal prerequisite for any support under the Regulation - to the existence of a national FS strategy as a major component of poverty reduction policies. The FS Strategy paper shall document the food security priorities of a Government (here: the PNA) and provide a national strategic planning framework into which specific food security interventions financed under EC Food Security Programmes can and shall be integrated in a consistent and complementary manner. Wherever no such national FS strategy exists, the EC initiates and supports – or even is, formally speaking, *held* to support according to the provisions of the Regulation – the elaboration and formulation of a national food security strategy by the concerned government.

The major purpose of the TA input in Palestine is the contribution to the formulation of a national food security strategy and to build up planning and implementation capacities for food security related concerns at central and municipality levels.

The TA input for the formulation of a national food security strategy is in line with the postulate set out in the 96-FA/FS Regulation. However, a comprehensive national food security strategy is of little or no relevance under prevailing conditions of occupation and unpredictability of further developments; and much less relevant than could have possibly assumed by EC-planners during 1999/2000. This is to recall that the EC itself could produce only a (draft) CSP which proved largely irrelevant and never could reach official status because their programming had been guided by "optimistic", but unrealistic assumptions of material progress of the peace process and an imminent establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

The development of a national food security strategy (NFSS) would be, respectively would have been more relevant if

- if either Palestine was an independent state in a *post-crisis environment* with an established government; or
- if there was at least the realistic perspective of an independent Palestinian state.

None of above conditions and prerequisites are met. Even a well formulated NFSS would have to remain one of paper.

The formulation of a FS Strategy for Palestine has been included as a Programme 2000 objective because the Regulation demands such a FS Strategy (a rather formal reasoning). This, *without* sound analysis of the *general* systemic preconditions for a NFSS to become a useful instrument of practical relevance for national planning and assistance coordination and whether Palestine did / could meet such preconditions. Neither the *specific* preconditions had been properly assessed necessary for the task of a FSS formulation itself (e.g. capacity analysis of the Palestinian Authority) and to which extent such preconditions could actually be realistically expected to be met by the PNA administration and local partner institutions.

It is interesting to note that the **formulation of a NFSS has actually been removed** as an objective / result of the first (FS) Programme 2000 by its amendment dated 17. June 2003. The covering letter rather cryptically refers only to an "*updated Logical Framework*" which replaces the previous one. The "updated" logical Framework, however, only defines the following result: "***A National Food Security Strategic Planning Process is launched***"! This is more than linguistic sophism, but a major revision in substance and represents a complete turn-around from the original objective which in essence has been given up because its achievement has obviously become unfeasible and unrealistic - even within an extended Programme period by 4 years!

The second 2002 (FS) Programme having started in early 2003 for a 3 year implementation period makes **no reference at all to a NFSS anymore** although € 1.4 million have been allocated for TA and the *setting "up of a long-term EC Local Food Security Team in order to insure adequate supervision and coordination to the programme"*. Expenditures under this Programme are, however, to a large (largest) extent for the *continuation* of the TA-input of the first 2000 (FS) Programme whose main task remains connected to the formulation of a NFSS.

Since the issue has been EC driven and a lot of energies and money have already been invested - it would be difficult for the EC and the Delegation alone for face saving reasons to give up the idea of an NFSS all together. This option might also have become somewhat delicate for the PNA itself which – after so much pressure from the EC and, reportedly, even hints that without a NFSS no assistance under the FS Budget Line might be approved in the future – has made the formulation of a NFSS *meanwhile* an "own" concern.

As a way out of an apparent dilemma and impasse the following is suggested:

- a) The objective / result of the formulation of a **comprehensive** NFSS for Palestine is openly abandoned because a period of permanent crisis management is simply not the "right time for such an ambitious undertaking. Moreover, it would be inappropriate under present conditions because of limited relevance. To be of practical relevance in Palestine and to become a useful instrument for orientation and coordination under current conditions, a FS Strategy should be **simple** and straight-forward.
- b) De-escalation, Downsizing and adjustment – in two ways: *Firstly*, by downscaling the *issue* itself, that is the significance of it and the importance given to it. By admitting a reduced relevance of an all comprehensive NFSS

for the time being and until a phase of post-crisis will have eventually been reached, this alone will reduce built-up tension between involved actors and institutions, and so re-establish a more conducive atmosphere permitting dialogue, partnership and Palestinian ownership.

Secondly, downscale the complexity of a NFSS for Palestine and the original expectation horizon considerably. Such re-adjustment of scope will allow to move away from the notion of a cross- and multisectoral, all-comprehensively integrated and integrating food security policy concept and facilitate the formulation of a simple, but useful food security strategy paper which can do justice to and better fit actual PNA- and Palestinian emergency and crisis realities and planning capacities as well as conditions under donor driven circumstances.

At this stage, a Food Security Strategy should be aimed at which **confines itself to targeted interventions to improve food security on the household level addressing primarily access and availability concerns** - and at the most also aspects of utilisation (health). In accordance with the argument and plea for a new (EU) CSP, such Food security strategy ought to be based on the existing situation of crisis and emergency, and not assume the conditions of any future post-crisis situation. When this eventually will have become reality – nobody knows.

- c) Such less ambitious and scaled-down approach will be more feasible and permit making good use of a principally positive attitude of the PNA administration (not only MoP, but also MoA and others) towards the subject of food security and the development of a NFSS and so increase Palestinian ownership.
- d) For the formulation of *such* FSS-Palestine the following suggestions are offered:
 1. Main Features:
 - Restrict thematic coverage (initially) to 5 - 6 priority food security sectors (ministries) relevant to household food security only;
 - identify for each of them selected priority concerns, (programmes, projects, implementation approaches);
 - identify selected priority target groups and areas;
 - identify few selected principles and cross-cutting issues applying to food security related programme implementation and budget allocations;
 - identify the main roles / functions which the main actors and their representatives (government, donors, implementing agencies) are to play in the implementation of FS related interventions;
 2. The current emergency situation does not allow a formulation process with many co-authors contributing small portions. Ownership and participation remain important – and under no circumstances should an externally recruited expert / consultant prepare a first draft of such strategy paper. However, to get the formulation process moving at all, a first draft will have to be put on a table by someone or by few members (3-4) of a small task force, so that there will be a discussion basis for participating actors / stakeholders allowing the first draft to be further

processed into a second, third and eventually final draft by incorporating improvements and relevant views and interests. This will be a stepwise process, however, with the demands on the final product being considerably scaled down and with the scope of the food strategy suitably reduced (suited PNA-practical purposes not in the first place demands of academics or numerous concept papers on food security and development!), there seems no good reason why *such* formulation exercise should not reach its less ambitious objective within a period of say 9-12 months.

3. One may also consider to re-name the final product into a National Food Security Strategy Outline / Orientation Paper concentrating on food security aspects of access and availability at household level, so as to also indicate the *transitory* nature of the document. Once the national planning process of a future Palestinian government will have matured and become increasingly more refined under fundamentally different i.e. improved conditions in Palestine, the first step Food Security Strategy Outline can be further adapted and refined into a more comprehensive and ambitious strategy fitting the then new conditions, capacities and challenges. However, this is not a concern of today.
4. The process towards a first draft and a final food security orientation paper needs a central **facilitator** and driving force⁸⁸, and it seems "natural" that the MoP should shoulder the responsibility of a **Task Force Manager** steering the direction, scope and time frame of the drafting and subsequent formulation process. After all the MoP will be one of *the* main beneficiary by reaping the principal ultimate "benefit" of a food security strategy from its value as a guideline for decision making and anchor of orientation for its planning functions. A TA- input in the form of an *integrated* consultant may be considered to be seconded to the MoP to assist its role of task force management.
5. The idea of establishing at this stage a high-powered National Food Security Commission (identified as a new EC Programme result) seems to be **inappropriate** at this point in time. Experience has amply shown that issues concerned with power and decision making within the PNA-structure are sensitive and loaded. The establishment of such Commission appears premature and ill-timed and constitutes rather an additional hindrance than being facilitating. A national Food Security Commission may eventually **evolve** from an authentic PNA institutional development process and **once** the strategic depth of a Food Security strategy can be further refined beyond the scope of household access and availability.

3.7.2 Effectiveness

The PNA adopted the concept of a national food security strategy (NFSS) and the process of preparing such strategy has been launched. The mandate to formulate the

⁸⁸ The term coordinator is purposively avoided because it is often associated with competence and power issues which have in the past – in no small measure – complicated the issue of getting a NFSS formulated.

NFSS was given to the MoA, and a TA to support the MoA in this exercise has been appointed.

Yet, a NFSS has still to be formulated (see following paragraph on efficiency).

A tangible result achieved is the Food Security Assessment, prepared by FAO and financed by EC with some co-financing from USAID. This assessment has become available in February 2004 and forms a valuable basis for future FS-related and nutrition monitoring and programming.

3.7.3 Efficiency

3 ½ years have passed since the OL 30935/2000 which specifically identifies the objective of developing a national food security strategy. A substantial amount of energy and resources have been invested since then to support this effort. Although various steps have been taken (establishment of a Steering Committee, working groups, studies on the “Facilitation of National Food Security Strategic Plan”⁸⁹, institutional capacity building and the FAO Food Security Assessment), even a first draft of the Food Security Strategy still remains to be produced.

Various factors have contributed to the slow progress in formulating the NFSS:

- The objective to elaborate a NFSS was donor (EC) imposed from the beginning and ill conceived⁹⁰, though it seems it has become a PNA’s own concern in the meantime.
- The mandate to formulate a NFSS had been shifted from the former MoPIC (now MoP) to the MoA. Taking into consideration that food security is a cross-cutting issue, and that the formulation of a NFSS requires coordination between different ministries and organizations, it is questionable whether this shift in mandate to the MoA had been an appropriate choice. Currently, the EC plans to have the mandate re-shifted from the MoA to the newly formed MoP which appears to be a more suitable PNA counterpart institution.
- There have been different perceptions /opinions between the MoA and the EC-TA on what a food security strategy actually is / should be, and on the role of the MoA and the TA in preparing / formulating the NFSS. While the MoA reportedly expected the FSTA to prepare a draft, the same considered its role rather that of a facilitator of a task for which the ownership and primary responsibility must rest with the PNA and Palestinian stakeholders. There is an obvious trade-

⁸⁹ See EURATA, December 2003

⁹⁰ The 2000 (FS) Programme's initial design had been particularly weak and its analytical depth strikingly shallow, grossly misjudging the complexity and the necessary preconditions of the task – if the process of its formulation and the resulting FS strategy itself was to satisfy all *those* expectations which the Regulation mentions and an array of guiding development principles and programming guidelines of Commission Communications and / or DG DEV papers demands (Key words: genuine partnership demands, ownership concerns and political commitment, demands of a participatory process involving various stakeholder groups, the existence of a national development- and Poverty Reduction Policy into which the FSS was to be integrated, etc.). Therefore, the attempt to formulate such a comprehensive NFSS resembles the construction of a third floor without foundation.

off between rapid and efficient strategy development on the one side and a participatory approach and ownership of strategy by the PNA on the other side.

- Communications problems between both parties (MoA and TA) have compounded by the fact that the TA's office is not integrated into the MoA.

Altogether, conceptual differences and a lack of clarity about objectives, scope, contents and responsibilities have delayed the formulation of a NFSS.

Cost-Efficiency Ratio: Taking into consideration that 24% (1.2 out of 5 million Euro) of the resources provided under the 2000 bilateral EC Food Security Programme to the PNA have been allocated for TA and capacity building, the cost-efficiency ratio is rather low.

3.7.4 Impacts

Due to the short time lapse since programme inception, and the problems mentioned above, tangible impacts have not yet materialised.

3.7.5 Sustainability

Sustainability depends on the effectiveness of human and institutional capacity building actually achieved. Notable are positive "training-by-doing"-effects of the NGOs with regard to project planning and implementation. Further capacity building effects have, so far, remained quite limited.

3.7.6 Comparative advantage

Technical assistance and capacity building are largely complementary /supportive to the other instruments, therefore comparative advantage is not an issue.

However, under the TA component, locally or regionally available professional capacities should be more explored and be made more deliberate use of. They have, compared to international experts, comparative advantages with regard to lower costs and familiarity with the local conditions, language and mentality.

3.7.7 Empowerment role of TA:

Support to strategy development capacities aims at empowering the PNA to fulfil its planning functions. These effects have been very limited so far.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 7:

The purpose of the substantial TA inputs under the EC Food Security Programmes was a contribution to the formulation of a national food security strategy and to build up the planning and implementation capacities at central and municipality levels. Due to conceptual problems arising from the special “country case” Palestine, the unclear role of the PNA, its ministries and other actors in such strategy, ambiguities regarding the objectives and a lack of clear assignments in formulating such strategy, the effectiveness has been very limited.

3.8 Evaluative Question 8

EQ8: To what extent has the design of supported actions (phasing in) facilitated progress towards the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?

Note:

As to **Judgement Criteria 3.8.1** (Quality of the overall programming of resources) and **3.8.2** (Quality of the country level of programming) see Chapter 2.4, Answers to EQ 2 and 3, and Annex 4: Policy Ambiguity and Policy Inconsistencies - Implications of EU's Near East Policy for the EC Assistance to Palestine.

The Palestinian Territories have been included in the list of countries (Group II) eligible for assistance under the Food Security regulation Budget Line. Group II contains crisis and post-crisis countries, but no criteria for this category are known, to justify the selection or explain the absence of countries in this Group. The selection of Palestine has, of course, been a political decision and is fully justified on the basis of the needs and emergency.

Main issues:

1. EC Programming for Palestine has been severely affected by the continuous and **aggravating crisis** in the OPT and constrained by the **absence of a CSP** caused by a lack of political consensus among EU Member States on major strategic issues and a lack of united foreign policy implementation vis-a-vis the Government of Israel.
2. **Many modifications in programme** design, approaches and schedules, and corresponding amendments of agreements (FS Programme and project agreements), have become necessary during programme implementation. Main reasons for such adjustments have been both, substantial **changes in fundamental assumptions** made and underlying the EC assistance to the OPT concerning the socio-economic and political environment, and **poor programme design**.
3. The Food Security Regulation is very specific with respect to the **main target group** it wishes to address. There is only one target group mentioned: the poorest and most food insecure/vulnerable. No such stringent focus in targeting can be found in all the interventions of the Food Security Programme leaving considerable room for a sharper focus for programming and actual implementation. Without such stricter focus, however, the Council Regulation foregoes its very special legitimization /justification distinguishing it from any other source of funding. Without stricter focus in terms of thematic issues, mode of intervention, target group specificity, FS programmes and operations in support of food security can too often hardly be recognised as distinctly different from other development programmes / projects (with e.g. mid- and long-term objectives of a highly aggregated, systemic, structural and institutional nature) – which tend to make FS Programmes wholesale programmes.

As an example for an under-exploited potential of a more direct targeting focus: The second public "*Call for proposals from NGOs for Projects within the Food Security Programme in the WB and Gs*" as published by EuropeAid is a general tender containing – besides necessary formalities and the overall aim the projects are to contribute to – only a general reference to the Council regulation, however without mentioning any country-specific priority areas, thematic concerns or special target group/s.⁹¹ The absence of any country-specific tender particulars is regrettable and considered indicative for a lack of country-specific priorities and programming focus. Without unduly limiting the scope of forthcoming NGO project proposals – tender publications for any country should be more country-specific, rather than using a wholesale text applicable for all countries.

3.8.3: Quality of the programme approval process

The approval process for Food Aid assistance seems to be done in a routine manner and swiftly. The EC confines its role largely to financial contributions to programmes of UNRWA and WFP. The respective contractual deeds with them are routine business for the EC and working relationships with both UN-organisations are well established.

With regard to the TA component, the EC handles the entire input at its own discretion without much reference to the PNA. TA and the contracts of experts are managed by the EC and this also includes quite liberal juggling with the original FS Programme budget allocations and between budget components. Approval issues with the PNA confine themselves to their nodding to budget revisions presented to them. Such procedure makes it quite clear that the PNA is no established state government but a dependent client and there is little partnership when it comes to budget issues. In the larger interest of the recipient – little disapproval by the PNA is voiced openly.

A "Country Technical Paper" was prepared by the EC office which serves as a guideline for NGOs for preparing their project proposals.⁹²

The approval process for NGO projects has been very lengthy and cumbersome. For example, a proposal presented by the PHG in Oct. 2001 was approved by the EC in December 2002, and a project agreement was concluded in February 2003. During such prolonged administrative gestation periods project-relevant conditions may change substantially necessitating major changes in the original project design and causing additional administrative work; such risks are particularly high in the present Palestinian context. Furthermore, NGOs have to maintain the capacities built up for project implementation over an extended time period, with substantial cost implications to them.

⁹¹ Publication reference EuropeAid/114275/C/G/WB and published in the Internet under <http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/tender/data/AOF33352.htm>; the overall aim is given as: "improving the food security conditions among the most disadvantaged Palestine groups residing in the WB&GS"

⁹² EC, Palestine Territories (PT), Food Security Programme 2000, Projects within the Food Security Programme in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Country Technical Paper, May 2002

Such problems could be considerably reduced with a two-step approach for submission of proposals, selection and contract award: The NGOs will present a concept paper first, on the basis of which a pre-selection of suitable projects is made, and only for those pre-selected (short-listed) proposals an elaborated planning document would be required in a second step.

This procedure would increase efficiency by *reducing* the work load for assessment and selection of proposals; administrative processing periods and risks mentioned above; mis-invested resources / efforts by NGO's whose elaborate proposals are rejected; corresponding frustration and de-motivation; and the work load for subsequent amendments and revisions on the NGO and EC- side.

3.8.4: Relevance of EC actions vis-à-vis beneficiary needs

The assessment of needs for emergency assistance is done by the UN Organizations in the context of the Consolidated Appeals Process.⁹³

The EC has initiated and financed the FAO Food security assessment study (with some co-financing from USAID). This study has been completed in 2003⁹⁴ and its findings are most relevant, provided they will be used as basis for defining future EC and other donors' assistance in the field of food security and FS-related and nutrition monitoring will be established on a continuing basis. The EC 2002 FS Programme has already earmarked € 1.0 million for the setting up of a Food Security Information System.

NGOs are held to base their proposals on an assessment of the needs of the beneficiaries and some Palestinian NGOs make in their areas of operation even (annual) needs assessments as a *routine* exercise. Whereas little can be said about the quality of such assessments with respect to the range, type, relevance and accuracy of information gathered and their analytical depth, elaborate needs assessments face the risk:

- that lengthy EC approval processes (see 8.3 above) jeopardise the relevance of the respective assessment and, consequently the effectiveness of the resulting project design because project- and target group critical conditions may have changed before an eventual start of project activities;
- that they – if based on participatory approaches -, raise expectations among beneficiaries which will be frustrated if the proposal will not be approved and no other source of funding the proposed activities can be found.

As for the future, laudable efforts have been undertaken to sharpen the target group focus for NGO projects and to define more precisely the focal target groups for EC supported food security programmes. To this end, two workshops were held which identified seven types of beneficiaries and geographical target areas⁹⁵:

⁹³ United Nations, *Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)*, Occupied Palestinian Territory 2004

⁹⁴ FAO, 2003 Food Security Assessment West Bank and Gaza Strip, Rome

⁹⁵ Four workshops had been planned in 2002. Because of the Israeli imposed closures, only two workshops could be conducted. The following 7 beneficiary groups have been identified : Low-income farmers; Rural women sustaining their families; Low-income women heading households; Disabled

3.8.5: Selection of adapted FA-FS components / channels

- The emphasis of the EC's FA/FS programme on emergency food aid and the choice to channel it through **UNWRA and WFP** is considered as an appropriate approach under the prevailing conditions. There is no real alternative, neither for emphasis on food aid nor to choice of channel.
- Doubts whether the **MoA** is the most appropriate institutional choice responsible for the formulation of the NFSS and for coordinating the food security programmes have already been raised before (see under JC 3.7.3). This reinforces the (wrong) perception of food security being primarily an issue of agricultural production.
- The choice of **NGOs** as implementing partners for food security projects is generally considered appropriate, taking the capacity constraints of the PNA and the comparative advantages of NGOs (professional staff, experience in working with local communities, , grass-root and innovative approaches) into account, as well as considering the importance of promoting other critical cross-cutting concerns (participation, strengthening civil society).

These general comparative advantages, however, do not apply to all local NGOs in equal measure and the selection of suitable ones will remain a critical concern – also in Palestine. Moreover, it will be necessary to remain sensitive towards a tendency of favouring few, well established local NGOs at the cost of others.

International NGOs seem to have in Palestine only one major comparative advantage: Under the given situation of occupation local NGOs enjoy some protection against military acts of complete arbitrariness. This refers to some increased personal safety when driving vehicles with the European flag and the logo of the INGO; and to increased protection against confiscation and destruction of physical property. Beyond these advantages local NGOs benefit little from their affiliation with INGOs; irrespective of their general enormous commitment, the quality of professional backstopping which they receive from INGO headquarters or their local representatives has been found wanting.

- Due to the absence of a CSP and a NFSS, there is a **lack of clear priorities** in programme design.

3.8.6: Clear planning of division of responsibilities in the various PCM phases

For the NGOs, the decision processes and structures of the EC, and the division of responsibilities between the EC country office and Brussels remained largely unclear.

and wounded; Inhabitants of isolated agricultural *areas* (living on the boundaries of Israeli settlements); Unemployed; Low-income employees (income per family below poverty line). - This classification does not fully apply to projects financed under the 2000 FS Programme. See e.g. 3.6.2.

EC tender procedures (publication per Internet only), and established EC selection criteria disqualify small NGOs and relatively low-cost projects a priori and constitute effective, but not necessarily desirable "entrance" restrictions (closed shop). Other general selection criteria, namely the minimum grant being fixed at € 500,000 or maximum project duration (36 months) seem obviously based more on administrative convenience than could be justified with sound reasoning. These criteria may even be counterproductive, promoting i.a. also cost inefficiencies, and their revision should be seriously considered.

The EC devolution process and improved budgetary and accountancy arrangements will allow a **country-specific management of the entire call-for-NGO-proposal process and project cycle management**. All competences and management responsibilities pertaining to FS NGO projects shall be given to the Delegations and / or locally contracted capacities. This is expected to reap rich benefits with respect to country-specific adjustments (focus on selected priorities, target groups, flexibility with regard to minimum / maximum grant conditions) and efficiency gains.

3.8.7: Integration of cross-cutting issues in programme / project design

Regarding gender aspects: Women headed households have been identified as one of the most vulnerable groups, catered for under the SHCs, and some "Food-for-Training" activities for women groups.

With respect to individual FS projects, the degree of women participation, respectively proportion of women as direct beneficiaries varies widely. Notably the ACAD credit project which has been far the largest recipient of EC support (€ 3.43 million), has shown a fairly poor gender record: Out of a total amount of disbursed loans (€ 2.78 million) until end 2003 only 4 (four)% have been given to female loanees, equaling 5% of all loans. Other projects (PHG, PLSC; in part PARC) have fairly strong women oriented project components or are community oriented, which in Palestine does not at all mean women-exclusive. In total, the FA/FS programmes can not be considered as gender-discriminatory.

Next to the EC FS Budget Line financed programme, EC assistance to the WB/GS as a whole appears to be fairly conscious of major cross-cutting issues, e.g.: democracy and rule of law (Palestinian Reform Programme), strengthening civil society, participation, NGOs as implementing agencies are strong points. PNA-"Ownership" is a general weak point, but this must be attributed to a large extent to the state of emergency and a donor-driven environment, as well as the political speciality of Palestine as a non-state.

One cross-cutting concern seems neglected / forgotten by the EU assistance programme and other bilateral programmes: YOUTH as a critical, and specially vulnerable, sensitive and victimised target group. Considering that youth makes up the largest age group of the Palestinian society, a much greater, specifically targeted effort is not only fully justified, but is also urgently required to rescue an almost lost generation.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 8:

The main determining and constraining factor for programme design and planning in Palestine is the continuous and aggravating crisis. This major constraint has as to be taken into account in programme formulation and planning, e.g. through setting of clear priorities, allowance for flexible approaches, and speeding up decision and preparation procedures. There is scope for improvements in this regard.

3.9 Evaluative Question 9

To what extent have implementation set-ups (i.e. suitable structures for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation), management mechanisms / tools and processes (i.e. division of work and responsibilities, coordination of actions) facilitated the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?

Note:

The issues raised under EQ 9 have largely been addressed before. In order to avoid repetition, reference is made, where appropriate, to the respective sections.

3.9.1: Complementarity with other programmes

- EC is contributing the largest share of the relief food supplies to UNWRA and WFP (EQ 4, chapter 3.4).
- An adapted NFFS, as proposed under 3.71, once completed (with EC TA support) will provide a framework for food security interventions also sponsored by other donors.
- Most of the food security projects supported under EC's Bilateral Food Security Programme and implemented by NGOs are rather additional than complementary approaches to agricultural and rural development. Other projects of similar nature are also supported by other donors.

3.9.2: Clear Division of responsibilities in the various PCM phases

- See 3.8.6

3.9.3: Empowerment role of Technical Assistance

- See 3.7.8

3.9.4: Adapted procedures for programme management

- See under the different components: 3.4.3 for food aid, 3.5 for budgetary support, 3.6.3 for the food security projects, 3.7.3 for the TA and capacity building component, as well as 3.8.3 and 3.8.5.
- Implementation and effective management of the programmes and projects is severely hampered by the restrictions on movements imposed by the GoI.
- The Task Force for Project Implementation (TFPI) can be considered to be a special international management mechanism in Palestine. The TFPI is a combined

effort of international donors and implementing agencies which attempts to channel and intensify contacts with the Office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, COGAT of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The TFPI's tries to facilitate project implementation in the OPT by launching official complaints and requesting the Israeli military administration for special transport and transit permits and for safety arrangements for (international) staff and goods. The efforts have been substantial, their efficiency marginal and can be considered at best Sisyphus-like. Nothing more can be expected if those are asked to remove obstacles who themselves systematically produce them for own reasons.

- As to coordination of the different EC programmes in Palestine: See 3.6.7

3.9.5: Adequate Resources for programme (EC) and project management

- There are four staff members of the EC Technical Cooperation Office concerned with the management of the EC food security programmes which is considered adequate in manpower terms.⁹⁶ A thorough assessment of the proposals and an effective supervision of project implementation is, however, constrained by a lack of professional inputs from subject matter specialists (e.g. regarding micro-project programmes, agriculture and livestock).
- The MoA has assigned one person, the Director of the Rural Development Department, as counterpart to the office of the FS Technical Assistance Programme in Ramallah to work on the NFSS. This is definitely no adequate arrangement and also follows a conceptually wrong logic: The TA-manpower capacity shall be integrated into PNA- structures, that is into the Ministry of Planning as the (future) counterpart institution, not the other way round. There should be representatives of other key ministries (e.g. MoP, MoSA, MoH) also involved in the preparation of the NFSS.
Detailed suggestions for a revised concept pertaining to the (process of) formulation of a FSS have been made under EQ 7, section 3.7.1 (Relevance).
- See Chapter 3.3 for the management of the relief operations, Chapter 3.6 for the management of the NGO food security programmes.

3.9.6 Adequate M & E / Information systems

Apart from project/programme monitoring which is the task of the implementing agencies (UNWRA, WFP, NGOs) and some kind of “supervisory” monitoring by the EC Office, there is no overall monitoring system for the FA/FS programmes in place, nor are aspects of impact assessment given adequate consideration. The notorious lack of reliable information about impact- and targeting efficiency ought to be dealt with already at the stage of programming and project planning, i.e. by making appro-

⁹⁶ The Head of the cooperation office had a shared responsibility for different programmes. There is the plan to assign a new section head particularly for the food security programme.

priate budget provisions for monitoring purposes whenever impact- and targeting efficiency is of critical relevance.

- UNWRA and WFP have their own internal monitoring system which covers the logistics operations up to the distribution to beneficiaries resp. delivery to the implementing NGOs. Such monitoring is restricted to activity-monitoring and monitoring proper commodity distribution.
- As to monitoring of the SHC, see 3.4.2.
- Commissioned by the EC, the Food Aid and Cash Assistance Programme of UNWRA was evaluated in 2002.⁹⁷ The evaluation arrived at the conclusion that the Programme is overall efficiently managed and reaches the most vulnerable.
- The EC and USAID had sponsored the FAO Food Security Assessment study already cited above. The findings are most relevant and provide a base line for continued FS-related and nutrition monitoring. There is the plan to establish a food security information system.⁹⁸ For this purpose, the EC 2002 FS Programme has allocated € 1.0 million.

3.9.7 Actors' participation in programme management

See chapter 3.7.3 as the role of the MoA / TA in preparing the NFSS.

Women are well represented in the management teams of UNWRA, WFP and NGOs. Also the focal point for food security in the MoA is a women. In fact women are much better represented in the Palestinian partner organizations than in the EC Representation.

UNWRA follows the strategy to primarily employ Palestinian refugees and is, in fact, their largest employer in Palestine.

⁹⁷ See ITALTREND, 2002.

⁹⁸ See Wehelie, 2004.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 9:

The implementation set-ups of the emergency food aid programmes (UNWRA, WFP) are well established and effective. Those of the local NGOs implementing food security projects are generally adequate, taking into account that an effective management of the programmes and projects is severely hampered by the restrictions on movements imposed by the Government of Israel. However, local NGOs, have received very little professional backstopping from their INGO partners and no significant added value of INGO involvement could be ascertained. Similarly, beyond EC – internal administrative demands, *technical* backstopping capacities of the EC - NGO Technical Assistance Office have not been impressive. Regarding the implementation set-up for the Food Security TA component it would be desirable if the same would be fully integrated into the respective PNA structure and located in the immediate office environment of the MoP as the relevant counterpart institution.

3.10 Evaluative Question 10

EQ10: To what extent has a phasing out of the supported actions been planned and what contribution did it have on the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?

3.10.1 Presence of a clear strategy to gradually reduce dependence on EC assistance

The first EC FS Programme 2000 has just started. Under present conditions in Palestine and in the foreseeable future, the issue of phasing down (and eventually: out) is irrelevant at this stage. Consequently, no phasing out strategy has been developed for EC assistance, neither for the FS Programme nor for the general assistance support to the PNA and Palestine.

Phasing out strategies ought to be developed, however, for individual projects implemented by NGOs because EC project support is only provided for a limited period. Absence of a suitable phasing-out strategy Problems in this regard with negative repercussions for effectiveness have developed with two projects for which no phasing-out strategy had been developed at the planning or before approval stage:

- In the case of the CRIC- dairy plant and milk producer cooperative project, serious conceptual thoughts about a phasing-out strategy and some professional expertise at the *approval stage* would have probably been beneficial in so far, so as not to approve the project in the first place. Reference is made to 3.6.2 for specific observations concerning the aspect of economic viability of milk production with large ruminants and milk processing in Gaza. Officially the project has already come to an end (€ 547,000). Following a withdrawal of the Israeli occupation of the GS, an entirely new concept might eventually become worthwhile considering, involving as an alternative small ruminant milk production with women or Bedouins as milk producers and the dairy plant producing cheese, curd (*laban*) or dry yoghurt (*lebaneh*-soft or hard), i.e products the local markets demands and of a less perishable nature.
- In the case of the ACAD credit scheme (EC contribution € 3.42 million) it must be ensured that the credit fund will continue to be *revolving* and not been eaten up by the administrative overhead cost of the "NGO"-organization.

Some special effort and ingenuity ought to be invested into an intelligent phasing-out strategy which does more than sheer handing-over of a substantial amount of money into the property of the benefiting NGO so as to get the project administratively "off the books". The performance of ACAD so far has been poor, and the accrued benefits and impacts from this project likewise. Therefore, whatever phasing-out strategy will be developed by the EC, the phasing-out arrangements should safeguard the potential positive impacts which the project has not been able to produce as yet.

The phasing-out strategy should try⁹⁹ to retain some EC "residual rights" of continued monitoring of ACAD's future operations and ensure the central original purpose being more vigorously pursued, i.e. food security relevant utilisation of credits to the central target group of the FA/FS Regulation and the development of locally administered and supervised revolving funds at community level -so as to insure the multiplier-effect of the seed money. Since local supervision of ACAD operations through the NGO-Unit of the Delegation had been rather remote, administratively very intensive (e.g. many amendments of the agreement have already been necessary), but ultimately little effective, the EC may consider a "salvage input" and second a regionally recruited agriculture / micro credit expert on a full-time basis to ACAD as an integrated expert working in ACAD's office and reporting to the Delegation. The additional overhead cost incurred may be compensated by improved efficiency and effectiveness.

In general, a fresh comprehensive look at the entire thematic issue / sector of "agricultural credit", "agricultural credit cooperatives" or "rural banking system" in Palestine seems called for. The prevailing institutional arrangements appear unsatisfactory, and the ACAD credit project with pilot character has not been able to show the way in a good direction. The EC may – to this end – capitalise on its contacts with the Ministry of Finance, PNA (Palestinian Reform Programme) to raise this concern on high level and to develop a **system solution** for improving credit services to better meet the agricultural, rural and SME sectors credit needs.

The ICRC, one of ECHO's former implementing partners, has stopped ("phased out") its engagement in Palestine ending a € 21.5 million emergency relief programme in the West Bank, which provided 300,000 Palestinians with food aid, because, with reference to the Geneva Convention, it considers the occupying power (i.e. Government of Israel) responsible for ensuring survival of the population of the occupied territories.¹⁰⁰

3.10.2 Empowerment strategies of partners - actors

It is one of the objectives of the EC Food Security Programme to contribute to human and institutional capacity development of the PNA and the municipalities, to enable them to effectively plan and implement donor supported programmes. Being able to continue with such programmes, once donor support will be phased out, is less relevant for the PNA and the municipalities at this stage. There are likely built-in positive capacity ("training by doing") effects for NGOs concerned with the implementation

⁹⁹ This might prove legally speaking not easy at all, because the EC contribution has been given as a grant and has become de iure and de facto already the property of ACAD. The chairman of ACAD is quite aware of this legal fact and did not forget to explicitly mention it, in a by-the-way-mode, of course.

¹⁰⁰ See House of Commons, 2004, p.67; along with pertinent newspaper articles and ICRC statements; quoting i.a. a ICRC spokesman: *"This was humanitarian relief designed to assist in a humanitarian emergency, not to address the longer-term problems caused by curfews, closures and the collapse of the economy that has occurred. It is not our responsibility to take care of the economic needs of the Palestinians. We have repeatedly said it is the responsibility of the occupying power"*.

of EC supported food security project as regards professional skills of their staff as well as earning a record of experience.

There are likely implicit positive capacity building (“training by doing”) effects for the NGOs concerned with the implementation of the EC supported food security project as regards the of the professional skills of their staff as well as building up a record of experience. .

3.10.3 Adequate procedures for smooth transition

Not applicable under present conditions, except for the ACAD micro-credit programme.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 10:

Under present conditions and in the foreseeable future, phasing out of EC assistance is no relevant issue. Phasing out strategies are, however, relevant for individual food security projects implemented by NGOs. In order to improve sustainability, phasing out concepts should already be developed in project proposals and worked out in necessary detail later, but in good time during project implementation.

3.11 Evaluative Question 11

How sustainable are the effects and impacts of EC supported policies and programmes in the field of food security, both at the level of target populations and at institutional and policy level in the partner country?

3.11.1: Presence of a clear strategy to gradually reduce dependence on EC assistance

Not an issue in Palestine under current conditions, see 3.10.1

3.11.2 Ability of Government (and non-government) institutions to elaborate strategies and implement programmes

The TA and capacity building components, forming a big proportion of the EC assistance under its Bilateral Food Security Programme, pursue this very objective. The effects have been limited so far, apart from the capacity building “by-doing” effects in the NGOs.

3.11.3 Ability of service providers to continue provision of services in the long run

Under the FS Programme the following 3 projects pursue specific service functions as their *core* institutional purpose:

1. the credit services provided by ACAD,
2. marketing services provided by the cooperative dairy plant in Khan Younis (CRIC), and
3. livestock (small ruminants) extension services by the PLS Centre, Tubas(VSF)

Institutional development support to service providers must enable them to reach that stage of maturity which permits a continued, economically viable provision of those services without external financial assistance. Such critical threshold of capacity development must be attained until a project's end – or the project fails. There is little in between.

To 1: As long as overhead costs eat up the principal of seed money, it is obvious, that the credit operations of ACAD have not reached that critical threshold. This despite the fact, that the interest rates charged are anything but preferential rates.

To 2: According to the information received, the dairy plant is insolvent and had stopped operations at the time of the site visit since 2 weeks. It is unlikely that the plant will be able to ever reach that critical threshold capacity. (See also 3.6.2)

To 3: The PLSC *does* continue its extension services also after the formal end of the NGO-project's support. The project's overall achievements so far, both, with respect to institutional development and service effectiveness, are impressive,

also considering the relatively short project period of 30 months only. The Centre is managed by particularly competent and committed staff and extension personnel (including women extensionists) with a solid and commendable conceptual background. Moreover, the economics of small ruminant production are sufficiently attractive and a driving force, so that there are good chances for continued service provision by the PLDC¹⁰¹ in the future.

The PLDC can be considered as an example of a rural institution providing services which are *demande*d and even paid for by its clients. Considering the outstanding economic relevance and further growth potential of small ruminant production in the service area of the 3 major districts of the WB (Jenin, Nablus, Tubas), the still young PLDC requires some continued support to consolidate its institutional achievements so far. Continued assistance by the EC or any other donor for a period of 2-3 years can be strongly recommended.

3.11.4 Ability of beneficiaries to continue accessing the benefits of the EC support after the EC grant has ended

With regard to Food Aid, by far the largest component of the FS Programme in monetary terms, once the EC would discontinue its grant assistance, beneficiaries would be thrown into direct famine conditions creating an "unthinkable" scenario

With respect to the other assistance components, the following can be said:

- Supplementary feeding programmes which help to reduce malnutrition in early childhood will have beneficial effects for the whole life of the beneficiaries.
- Most food security projects implemented by the NGOs are designed to have sustainable benefits for the beneficiaries (e.g. productive use of rehabilitated/improved land, investments in agriculture / livestock, water cisterns and better water management, homegardens).
- Effective human capacity building measures will improve the overall planning and implementation capacities of institutions such as the PNA, local authorities and the NGOs

3.11.5 Ability of women and men of different ages, ability, ethnicity, income and religion to have equal access to the benefits of the EC projects

The patriarchal structures and typical gender division of functions of the Palestinian society are also reflected in the gender composition of project beneficiaries, not however necessarily with respect to the resulting benefits. The general role of women in the Palestinian society and also to a large extent in public life compares fairly favourably with other societies of the same region. The main reason for this phenomenon is among others an express general valuation by the society of education for children. Also the war-like conditions place a heavy burden on women, and this burden

¹⁰¹ now, that is after recent approval by the concerned Ministry, PNA, the PLSC has become a registered NGO under the new name of Palestinian Livestock Development Centre, PLDC

emancipates. Women have, in principle, equal access to the project services and benefits, and in some NGO projects, deliberate efforts are made to specifically address women and encourage their participation. This particularly refers to the VSF supported Livestock Services Project for small ruminants, and also the PHG Food for Life Programme. Nothing has come to be known about any positive discrimination on religious or any other grounds. Nor that any EC supported programmes were consciously discriminated or excluded from any programme benefits. As matter of fact, and contrary to any widespread preconceived notions, evaluators have experienced a fairly open and tolerant atmosphere throughout.

Bedouins are an important minority group. They do live their traditions as best as they can and largely as a distinct community separately from others. Under "settled" living conditions many families and their youth must experience special hardships and a continuous cultural alienation and psychological stress. Bedouins have to be addressed by special projects and implementation approaches. To the best of knowledge this is also done. The PLDC plans to design a special service package for Bedouins who are excellent livestock farmers.

See also 3.8.7, on cross cutting issues – note also the remark on YOUTH who are generally neglected in assistance programmes.

3.11.6 Ability of EC delegation to manage programmes as well as to ensure coherence between different EC instruments

See 3.6.7.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 11:

Taking into account that sustainability and effectiveness of the EC supported food security programme are highly determined by the (unfavourable) political and socio-economic conditions and the course of further developments, and that, due to the short time which has lapsed since programme initiation, the question on sustainability cannot be conclusively answered, it can be stated that the operations in support of Food security are by and large geared to lead to sustainable results.

The Food Aid component, however, is not sustainable; further and increasing donor assistance will be required as long as occupation and closures continue.

3.12 Evaluative Question 12

EQ 12: What is the role of the Regulation No. 1292/96 in the on-going efforts to bridge the gap between relief, rehabilitation and development?

3.12.1 Agreement on a definition of the LRRD process

The EC Food Security Programme for Palestine was designed with the perspective to link relief, rehabilitation and development, at a time when there still existed a chance for its realisation. Both, the PNA and the EC factually tried to maintain some developmental perspective in their programming, respectively assistance. These intentions have been frustrated at large.

The EC Food Security Programme for Palestine had been designed in 2000 with the assumption of a continued progress of the peace process allowing a perspective to combine relief and rehabilitation with a development dimension. However, this fundamental underlying assumption has been proved wrong: conditions prevailing in the WB/GS since 2000 have been (are) those of continued military occupation, restricted mobility and of a permanent and aggravating emergency. Such environment in the OPT reduced the chances for development considerably, both with respect to the relevance of mid-and long-term policy-, programming and planning efforts in pursuance of development- and structural food security- oriented objectives, and with respect to implementing such programmes successfully. This would have required, above all, **a stable post-crisis environment**.

Nevertheless, the PNA has - even up to the degree of ignoring such facts - again and again tried to include some developmental perspective into its national plans. However, whatever plans and strategies have been developed, they became increasingly short-termed and remained short-lived. Planning, programming, policy making capacities – not to speak of implementation capacities - of the PNA, donors and implementing agencies have largely been exhausted by meeting the needs of a permanent and aggravating emergency situation. (See also chapter 3.3.2)

3.12.2 Clear division of role between the various instruments in this process

There is no LRRD process (see above) but a clear division of the role between the various instruments:

- 1) Food aid - for relief in an extended and aggravating emergency situation,
- 2) Financial support - for maintaining essential public services (PNA), reconstruction (private and public sector), and asset protection (Society) and some rehabilitation-cum-development (NGO projects),
- 3) TA/capacity building support - for preparing the (institutional) foundation for an uncertain future, i.e. when the emergency situation in the OPT will have

changed into a post-crisis scenario allowing a rational multi-annual planning and an untroubled implementation of genuine development programmes.

In this respect, institutional capacity development efforts have to be generally considered as an appropriate and meaningful assistance component at this stage, *provided* these efforts would also be complemented by all possible efforts on the political level to also bring about the transition from the status of occupation to independence. Improved national capacities at the time X will definitely help to **reduce potential future gaps and lead- time** necessary to manage (an uncertain) transition and to bring a national planning and implementation machinery into full operation for meeting the future demands of recovery and development.

3.12.3. Complementarities of the various instruments

The different instruments are, in the present situation, used to serve different purposes (see above 3.12.2), and their respective relative importance varies considerably in the order: 1. Food Aid – 2. NGO Projects - 3. TA (see also chapter 4.1 below on relevance). There is little (scope for) complementarity with regard to achieving synergy effects. Some linkages exist between the TA component and the support to the NGO food security projects.

3.12.4 Added value of the Regulation to fulfil its role to bridge gaps between RRD

The EC Regulation 1292/96 offers a fair range of instruments which can principally serve the **entire range of assistance needs** and so promote a continuous process from emergency relief to development. Therefore, an issue of gaps which need bridging would not arise - *provided* that the country in question would fulfil few critical pre-conditions (of which the existence of a non-emergency situation; and the existence of a sovereign state and government are two notable ones) – and *provided* these instruments could be utilised effectively for which the existence of a well coordinated and thorough country strategy (CSP) and a correspondingly defined Food Security Programme are prerequisites.

The OPT neither fulfil these conditions, nor is the issue of "bridging gaps between RRD" relevant.

The Food Security Regulation *in general* (as distinct from any role with respect to a function "bridging gaps between RRD") possesses two special "added values":

1. The FS Regulation is very specific with respect to the main target group: the poorest and most food insecure/vulnerable, and consequently places a high significance to a National Food Security Strategy (NFSS) of partner countries. EC assistance under the FS Regulation requires the formulation of such NFSS wherever no such strategy exists. And - consistent with the significance and the Regulation's requirements – the EC supports through its FS Programmes the formulation of such NFSS in countries where there is none yet.

The Regulation's **explicit postulate of a NFSS** as a framework and guideline for national programming and planning and for the integration of EC supported inter-

ventions through FS Programmes and their "special operations in support of food security, does constitute a positive "added value" of the Regulation¹⁰². However, only once NFSSs and EC FS Programmes and their "special operations" truly and effectively translate the Regulation's main intention into reality (i.e. to benefit the poorest and most food insecure/vulnerable), the above theoretical "added value" will become a real one.

Such NFSS is still to be formulated for Palestine. A comprehensive NFSS for Palestine can only then become fully relevant and effective, once an independent and sovereign state of Palestine will have been established. Nevertheless, until then a much less ambitious Food Security Strategy can serve a good, but limited purpose under continued occupation conditions.

2. The EC Regulation offers a fair range of instruments that allow to serve virtually the entire range of assistance needs. Such an enormous "flexibility" constitutes a widely acknowledged and appreciated administrative advantage for programmers and programme managers to get their respective programmes/projects and ad-hoc financial applications approved for financing with relative (!) ease. Such flexibility – advantage has also been expressively acknowledged by the EC Delegation from an aid management point of view ("nearly everything is possible").

Though flexibility appears to be an obvious asset, especially under very special and prolonged emergency and war-like situations, it cannot necessarily be regarded as a *general* asset of the Regulation. To the contrary, the impressive flexibility-capacity of the FA/FS Regulation may turn in case of "normal" countries cases with "normal" post-crisis environment conditions into an undesirable liability, rather camouflaging and possibly even promoting a lack of coordination or focus and stringency of assistance programming/planning, both of which finally breed inefficiencies and consistency problems. Of course, flexibility, administrative and managerial convenience remain to be essential properties of any financial and programme management instrument, however, these may preferably be better safeguarded by:

- the formulation of EU-coordinated Country Strategies (CSPs) which - on the basis of a thorough country-specific problem analysis - identify fitting strategies, as well as **clear and judiciously selected priority objectives and areas of interventions**, as well as a set of purposively selected principles (incl. major cross-cutting themes);
- making **relevance** for a sustainable development process and for effective poverty reduction of the main target group (poorest, most food insecure/vulnerable) within reasonable time horizons **the decisive criterion** for the identification and selection of priority objectives and areas of intervention;

¹⁰² Actually, the postulate for a NFSS should equally apply to **all** countries which face food security problems and receive EC development assistance, *irrespective* of which budget lines provide the funds for the assistance programmes.

- creating more transparent EC budget and accounting structures, with major budget lines corresponding with *few* major sectoral and/or strategic instruments of development assistance;
- establishing simple and more transparent administrative and accounting procedures minimising bureaucratic redundancies;
- continued devolution and strengthening of competencies of country Delegations with respect to country-specific programming, decision making and fund disbursement.

3.12.5 Coordination of the various instruments

As already said before, the various instruments (food aid, support to food security programmes, TA/capacity building) have been applied quite separately from each other. As long as the present situation remains, the focus will continue to be on emergency assistance, and there are little coordination linkages (and needs!) to the other food security instruments.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 12:

The Regulation provides for a variety of instruments and a flexibility in their use, which offers, in principle, the possibility to promote a process from relief to development. The prevailing conditions in Palestine, however, rule out such a process, and the focus of food security interventions here will, therefore (have to) remain on relief assistance. The linkages to the other instruments of the Regulation, applied in Palestine, remain weak.

4. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Note:

The following overall assessment of aspects of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability refers to the three components provided for under the Regulation: Emergency food aid, the food security projects implemented by the NGOs, and TA/capacity building component. With respect to all the above mentioned assessment criteria, all three types of food security interventions are substantially determined and constrained by the Israeli occupation and its direct effects on the political, economic and social framework conditions in the OPT. . See section 4.6: Internal / external coherence.

4.1 Relevance

Food aid: EC food aid channelled through UNRWA (for refugees), WFP (non refugees) as well as ECHO (humanitarian assistance) is highly relevant to mitigate the precarious food situation of a large and increasing proportion of the population. As a consequence of the Israeli occupation and the continued harassment by the occupying forces, large sections of the population have been deprived of their capacity of self-reliance and become increasingly dependent on the social safety nets provided by the international agencies and foreign donors.

NGO FS projects: The measures implemented through NGOs mainly focus on the agricultural sector and aim at employment and income generation, stabilisation and increasing agricultural production and productivity, enhancing smallholder livestock and improved water management.¹⁰³ Such measures and objectives are in accordance with the food security objectives of the Regulation.

TA/capacity building: The availability of improved national planning and implementation capacities would definitely help reduce future gaps and necessary lead-time to manage (an albeit uncertain) transition from occupation and emergency to independence, and to bring a planning and implementation machinery of an independent Palestinian State Government into full operation for meeting the future demands of recovery and development. Institutional capacity development efforts undertaken by the FS Programme (strengthening strategic planning capacities and assistance to the development of a national food security strategy) could be considered as justified and (potentially) relevant, **if** these efforts had been complemented by determined efforts on the political level to bring about the transition from occupation to independence.

However, without such efforts and under the conditions of continued occupation and given the complete uncertainty about any future independent sovereign Palestine, the actual relevance of this component is small.

¹⁰³ See Table A-6 in Annex 3 for a list of supported NGO projects.

Overall conclusion in relation to Relevance:

There is a clear ranking with regard to relevance of the different FA/FS instruments: The relief food aid is most important and relevant, the NGO FS projects are fairly relevant, while the TA / capacity building component is, under present conditions in Palestine, only of little relevance with regard to achieving food security objectives.

4.2 Effectiveness

Food aid: The emergency food aid provided through UNWRA and WFP is effective in helping a large and increasing part the Palestinian population, who lack and have lost any other means of subsistence, to survive.

The selection and distribution system is fairly effective. However, the strict separation of UNRWA, addressing only beneficiaries with official refugee status (acquired some 55 years ago), and WFP / others to address beneficiaries without refugee status is questionable. A subject matter, need- and geography- based division of labour between the agencies would be able to realise efficiency gains and also permit to do away with the application of different selection criteria.

NGO Food Security Projects: Because of short implementation period of the projects, the effectiveness of the measures cannot be finally assessed. Nevertheless, the following preliminary observations can be made:

- Most of the projects have the potential become effective in increasing employment, production and income;
- Unsatisfactory targeting efficiency in reaching the poorest population groups and management drawbacks are responsible for fairly limited effectiveness in some projects.
- There are positive effects with regard to capacity building of local NGOs in planning and implementing projects.

TA/ capacity building components have suffered from different problems. For the TA Food Security component, conceptual and communication problems figure prominently; aggravated by the doubtful relevance of a comprehensive NFSS, as also different perceptions regarding the principal role of TA, the appropriate scope of the Strategy and the principle of ownership. Insufficient technical backstopping by INGOs and their local representatives, as well as an EC TA-Office for NGO, preoccupied with administrative matters, could not add much to improve effectiveness. A National Food Security Strategy, *the* major planned TA output, could not been realised yet.

Overall conclusion in relation to Effectiveness:

While the emergency food aid has been effective in helping a large part of the Palestinian population to survive, the other programme components have been very limitedly effective so far, partly due to the short gestation period in a most trying environment, partly due to conceptual and FS Programme management shortcomings.

4.3 Efficiency

Food Aid: The efficiency of the relief food operations is severely affected by the restrictions on movement of goods and persons imposed, and arbitrary rules and regulations applied by the Israeli military forces. Given these and within such constraints, the UN agencies have established a relatively efficient system of relief logistics and distribution.

Due to the high import taxes levied by Israel on commercial food imports, local market prices for food commodities, incl. grain, are relatively high and above the import costs of food aid commodities which are exempted from import taxes. Therefore, food aid is cost-efficient in Palestine in comparison to cash-assistance.

NGO Food Security projects: The efficiency of the NGO operations has been adversely affected by the difficult working conditions, particularly the restrictions on movements, but also by EC specific administrative and financial procedures and project specific deficiencies such as:

- Delays of decisions concerning project approvals and transfer of funds;
- Conceptual and management deficiencies in some NGO projects, partly accruing from a lack of diligence and subject matter expertise invested into the assessment of proposals and monitoring the projects.

TA/capacity building: Despite a substantial amount of TA to support the formulation a National Food Security Strategy (NFSS) has been invested and various steps were taken to achieve this end (establishment of a Steering Committee, working groups, studies on the “Facilitation of National Food Security Strategic Plan”¹⁰⁴, institutional capacity building and the FAO Food Security Assessment), a first draft of a NFSS has yet to be produced.

Several factors have been responsible for this delay: Ambiguity about the objectives, role and contents of a NFSS, about the way how to get there, and a lack of clear assignment of responsibilities and tasks.

¹⁰⁴ See EUROATA, 2003

Overall conclusion in relation to Efficiency:

While the relief food system is, under existing extremely difficult conditions, operated in an overall efficient way, the efficiency of (some of) the NGO food security projects suffers from bureaucratic, conceptual and management deficiencies, and the efficiency of the TA and capacity building component has been very poor.

4.4 Sustainability

Food Aid: The sustainability of the relief programmes depends on continued commitment of donors to provide the necessary funding. There are indications that the already huge and further increasing needs for relief assistance are not adequately covered by donor funding.

NGO Food Security Projects: Some of the Food Security projects have a potential for achieving sustainable results, others not.¹⁰⁵ Overall sustainability of the food security interventions will, of course, largely depend on the further political and social development in Palestine.

TA/ Capacity building: The empowerment function of TA and capacity building measures specifically aim at creating sustainable effects in terms of augmenting human and institutional capacities for effective planning and implementation of future development actions. However, the probability whether or not such long-term capacity development effects will become relevant cannot be assessed at this time.

Overall conclusion in relation to Sustainability:

Continued and aggravating emergency conditions in Palestine preclude any admissible conclusion on the sustainability of development effects.

4.5 Impact

The implementation period has been too short for impacts to materialise and to be assessed.

The major tangible impact of the food assistance programmes is that they help to prevent the poor and vulnerable from further deprivation and to permit a minimum level of subsistence.

Nevertheless, in their totality the EC Food Aid and Food Security Programmes do have an important impact in so far, that they signal the Palestinian people interest and

¹⁰⁵ For details, see 3.6.5.

sympathy of the political Europe for their fate in the present. To help keeping hopes alive under war-like conditions is no small contribution – and this is widely appreciated by Palestinians in the OPT. However, as for hopes for the future, people in the OPT are still waiting for a determined EC and EU to take also complementary and determined political action vis-a-vis the GoI, so as to justify their hopes for a better future.

The most substantial impacts on food security would be achieved through a concerted effort of the EC and the Member States to put effective pressure on the GoI to end the occupation (see following paragraph).

Overall conclusion in relation to Impact:

Under present conditions in Palestine, the EC Food Security Programme is largely confined to the immediate and short-term impact of ensuring sheer survival.

4.6 Internal / external coherence

*".... Fresh impetus is required to speed up progress in tackling hunger, which is the first step in fighting poverty. The World Food Summit +5 (i.e. the follow-up conference in 2001) will be an important occasion to reaffirm commitment to the World Food Summit goals, and to mobilise additional donor resources. **At the same time there is a need to translate political will and donor resources into coherent actions. These actions need to be focused not only on aid delivery, but also on securing the necessary policy and institutional changes in the domestic and international arenas***"

EC, DG Development: Fighting Hunger - Food Security at the Heart of Poverty Reduction; The European Commission's vision and approach, September 2001

There exists no (valid and official) CSP. This fact is in conformity with the special and unique conditions prevailing in Palestine (no sovereign "country" and government) and is considered to be indicative for a **lack of political consensus between EU Member States** with regard to major objectives of EU-Near East Policy and key-strategic issues regarding EU Regional Policy and the EC's foreign policy dealings with the GoI.

A **draft CSP** for the period 2000-2006 never reached any official status. Its basic underlying assumption, i.e. continued progress of the peace process and a positive co-operation by the GoI, proved to be utterly wrong and rendered the document obsolete for its main purposes, i.e. as the central tool for mid-term, multi-annual country programming and budgeting, assistance co-ordination, consistency and complementarity aspects.

Food security objectives are neither included in the draft CSP nor does the Regional Strategy Paper (MEDA) make any explicit reference to food security issues which is considered one of its major weakness. Although there are strong linkages of objec-

tives and principles of the Regional Strategy Paper and of its underlying Barcelona Process with substantial relevance to the OPT and to fundamental conditions affecting food security in Palestine¹⁰⁶, the EC has failed to make use of such linkage effects through a corresponding **robust policy dialogue** with the GoI.

The absence of a consistent and resolved Regional and EU Near East policy leaves the Palestine assistance programme of the EU and its Member States rather disconnected from consequent, determined and un-ambiguous political support by the EC and EU Member States Governments as a logic and necessary complement. . The main framework conditions prevailing in WB/GS as set by the GoI and its military occupation, decisively undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of the EC's and any other donors' humanitarian and developmental assistance to Palestine, including the achievement of poverty- and food security objectives.

Overall conclusion in relation to Internal/External Coherence:

The root cause of food insecurity in Palestine can only be addressed through pressure on the GoI to do away with the practices and harassment of occupation. Precondition for such **robust policy dialogue** is a joint Near East Policy of the EC and its Member States. The absence of a consistent and resolved Regional and EU Near East policy continues to confine any assistance programme to Palestine to emergency response and damage repair, and precludes the achievement of poverty alleviation and food security objectives.

¹⁰⁶ namely: respect for human rights; the rule of law, incl. international law, and fundamental freedoms; promotion of good neighbourly relations; intensified regional and intra-regional trade, co-operation and integration

5. CONCLUSIONS

The continued **Israeli occupation and its military administration** - with all its facets directly and indirectly intervening into the daily life of Palestinians – is the pervasive cause of drastically increased and further aggravating poverty and food insecurity in Palestine. The critical deterioration of the living conditions has taken place *despite* massively stepped-up international assistance to the PNA and the Palestinian population during the past three years.

The prevailing circumstances in Palestine are determined by the intentions and actions of the GoI and its military occupation administration, which grossly impair both,

- the capacity of the PNA with regard to any effective policy implementation; and
- the effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability of *all* international assistance, may it be humanitarian or developmental.

Following the EU principle to select on a priority basis such activities and instruments which have the most effective impact on alleviating poverty and food insecurity, this postulate¹⁰⁷ is undoubtedly best met by bringing the Israeli occupation and military administration of Palestinian territories to an end.

*"The situation in the OPT... is not one which donor assistance can resolve."*¹⁰⁸ As an immediate step, political and economic pressure has to be exerted on the GoI to **remove the vexing road blockades, closures, curfews and the obnoxious permit-and licensing system**, so the Wall of Separation. These measures represent a continuous violation of the GoI obligations as the occupying power, systematic denial of human rights to the Palestinian people and harassment and crippling of the Palestinian economy. **There is no other strategy to improve poverty and food security in Palestine more effectively.**¹⁰⁹ Without such strategy, the EC's, like any other donor's support, will largely *remain* confined to help the Palestinian population to survive (though at decreasing standards), to assist the PNA to maintain some minimum public services, and to repair some of the damages caused by the Israeli occupation.

Keeping this general and overriding conclusion in mind, the following conclusions specifically refer to the EC supported Food Security Programme:

- 1) As long as the occupation persists, there will be a continuous need for further substantial and increasing emergency relief assistance.
- 2) The absence of a valid CSP adversely affects co-ordination, consistency, complementarity (particularly external) and effectiveness of both, Community aid and bilateral assistance of EU Member States.

¹⁰⁷ see EC Development Policy, COM (2000) 212, 26.April 2000, Chapter 4.1 *Integrated framework for Community activities, Strategic areas, Guiding principles*

¹⁰⁸ House of Commons, International Development Committee, 2004, Development Assistance and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Second Report of Session 2003-04, Volume 1, HC 230-I

¹⁰⁹ "...removing the "access controls" imposed by the Israelis would have increased real GDP by 21%, whereas a doubling of development assistance —without easing closure —would only reduce the number of people living in poverty by 7% by the end of 2004.- House of Commons, 2004.

- 3) Endeavours to establish a National Food Security Strategy, as stipulated by the Regulation and affirmed under the bilateral Food Security Programme for Palestine, have not yet reached far, in spite of substantial investments and efforts made. Although the peculiar conditions in Palestine limit the scope for effective strategic planning from the outset, and though the fundamental prerequisite for a comprehensive NFSS, namely the existence of a sovereign state and government, does not apply for the time being, there remains a small corridor for strategic planning which can and should be used. Even under prevailing conditions of occupation, a food security strategy for the OPT would be beneficial for the following major purposes:
- Coordination of PNA programming and donor assistance in the field of food security,
 - Identification of priorities in terms of geographical areas of interventions, sectors / specific products to be promoted, target groups, choice of technologies, etc. and corresponding allocation of resources;
 - Definition of modes of implementation (incl. role of NGOs, community based organizations, cooperatives, private sector);,
 - Identification of specific needs / fields for capacity development in matters of policy and strategic planning;
 - Identification of criteria and indicators and formulation of a concept for monitoring food security interventions, including aspects of impact monitoring.
- 4) A clarification of these issues would also help to solve a good deal of the problems encountered in planning and implementation of the current Food Security Programmes, such as:
- Ambiguities regarding objectives, concepts and approaches,
 - Lack of focus on strategic areas and fields of intervention and target groups,
 - Unclear responsibilities and role of actors in PCM phases, including phasing out strategies and the role of TA.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

On strategic issues:

- 1) The EC and EU Member State Governments should overcome their foreign policy dissent with respect to policies concerning the Israel-Palestine conflict. The EC / EU Member State Governments shall redefine their role within the Near East Quartet and the Road Map and take up **own initiatives**, together with other cooperating quartet members and the Arab League of Nations. The EC / EU Member States should shed earlier political ambiguities, should develop a common European political platform for vigorously promoting a genuine peace process, speak with one voice, act unitedly and enter collectively into a **robust policy dialogue** with the GoI - with the objective to bring about, within an acceptable time horizon, the end of the Israeli military occupation administration in the WB/GS, the establishment of a sovereign and independent Palestinian state, a halt of the construction and removal of the Wall of Separation and an immediate stop of policies of harassment and closures in the OPT.

To this end, the EC and EU Member State Governments shall use the form of persuasion and necessary political and economical pressure, including economic sanctions suitably phased and adjusted according to compliance and/or non-compliance by the GoI.

- 2) The EC and EU Member State Governments, as represented by their respective delegates or bilateral assistance agencies, shall formulate **one common EC/EU Development Assistance Strategy (CSP)** for the OPT which deliberately confines itself to few, selected Programme components only. Such strategy shall be designed to be **explicitly complementary and consistent with efforts and objectives under 1) above**, and be based **on the actual framework conditions of crisis and emergency**. This strategy shall be revised once occupation will have ceased and the actual framework conditions in the OPT will have fundamentally changed into a stabile post-crisis situation and therefore allow a systematic development process in Palestine.

Such new common EC/EU Palestine assistance strategy shall comprise the following Programme components:

- markedly reduced and most selective continuation of the Palestinian Reform Programme;
- concentration of budgetary support to the PNA for selected purposes, especially support to basic social services, i.e. education and health;
- continued humanitarian assistance and support to UNRWA and WFP for their emergency programme and SHC-programme and the new poor; With respect to the OPT, the strict separation of UNRWA addressing only beneficiaries with official refugee status and WFP / others addressing beneficiaries without refugee status shall be given up. A subject matter-, need- and geography-based division of labour will realise enormous efficiency gains and also permit to do away with a varied application of beneficiary selection criteria.

- direct employment programmes and selected physical infrastructure projects for essential public services only, e.g. water, sanitation, electricity, communication;
 - continued emergency rehabilitation (e.g. reconstruction of private homes);
 - institutional and capacity development for selected concerns of the civil society and for NGOs, village and district administrations;
 - selected priority measures for rural development : e.g. land reclamation, water resources, livestock- and range land improvement, horticulture and vegetable production, especially targeting women and youth (!);
- 5) **A lead donor country / agency approach** – as has been rather successfully practised with the PNA in connection with the Palestinian Reform Programme – shall be suitably incorporated into the recommended common EC/EU Country Development Assistance Strategy (CSP) approach (see 2) above). The EC or individual EU Member Governments, as represented by their bilateral aid agencies, assume an official lead role as "**Task Manager**" for (a) selected sector/s or thematic concern/s of their preference – according to their individual interests, special competences and own resources. Programming of Bilateral Assistance Profiles shall be made consistent with and be complementary to the common EC/EU strategic foundation of the CSP. A lead donor country / agency (Task Manager) shall itself assume a major financing function and be assigned the central coordination function for the respective sectors/ thematic concern and also undertake the delegated function of heading the respective (ministerial) policy dialogue with the partner government, here the PNA.
- 6) To give up the idea of an ambitious and comprehensive National Food Security Strategy in favour of a realistic strategic – though provisional - concept, based on the conditions of the current emergency scenario and serving the purposes as outlined under conclusion 3) above.

On specific issues related to the current EC Food Security Programme:

- 7) Ensure **better coordination** of EC supported food security relevant interventions with those of other donors. See recommendation 3) above.
- 8) The EC should undertake decisive steps to increase the **transparency and the pace of decision-making processes** in all aspects (approval of projects, criteria for selection / priorities, transfer of funds etc.). Reconsider the minimum ceiling of € 500,000 for food security projects implemented by NGOs.
- 9) In order to **rationalise programme management and the approval process for NGO projects**, the entire cycle, starting with tender procedures and proposal selection, contract awards, implementation monitoring should be handled within the **exclusive competence of the EC Country Delegation** and by its FSTA Office. The same procedure shall apply for project proposals applications of INGOs and national NGOs.

Moreover, a two-step approach for the submission and selection of NGO project proposals should be considered: As a first step, a brief concept paper shall be presented by the NGOs for preselection (short-list); and, as a second step, more elaborate proposals shall be requested only from a limited number of short-listed proposals. Such approach will speed-up decision making, increase work efficiency by reducing wasted energies for project formulation of later rejected applications on the NGO side, and for the assessment of an inflated number of detailed proposals on the EC side. Proposals and agreements should provide for sufficient flexibility, providing sufficient room for participatory planning approaches (interventions identified with community participation). Such revised approach may also reduce the need for frequent amendments of agreements.

- 10) **Country specific Texts of Tenders for Call for Proposals:** Without unduly limiting the scope of forthcoming NGO project proposals - texts of tender publications for any country **should be more country-specific**, rather than using a wholesale text applicable for all countries. This allows a more distinct focus for country-specific priority areas, thematic concerns, special target group/s or geographic areas and improves compliance (consistency, complementarity) with identified Food Security Programme priorities.
- 11) **Phasing out concepts** should already be outlined in the project proposals and worked out in good time during project implementation, in order to ensure sustainability.

A phasing out strategy has to be developed for the ACAD credit project, and might be developed for the CRIC dairy project:

a) The ACAD-micro credit project:

The phasing out concept should safeguard the multiplier-potential of the seed money which the project has not been able to generate as yet. The EC should retain "residual" rights of continued monitoring of ACAD's future operations and ensure the central original purpose being more vigorously pursued, i.e. food security relevant utilisation of credits to the central target group of the FA/FS Regulation and the development of locally administered and supervised revolving funds at community level. -. Since effective supervision of ACAD operations through the NGO-Unit of the Delegation has been (made) particularly difficult, the EC may consider a "salvage input" and second a regionally recruited micro credit expert to ACAD as an integrated expert working in the NGOs office and reporting to the Delegation. The additional overhead cost incurred may well be compensated by improved efficiency and effectiveness.

b) CRIC dairy project:

The project has already come to an end recently, and the risks of total failure are high, due to grave organizational, economical, technical and management problems. An attempt of a limited rescue input (e.g. by seconding for few months a dairy expert with experience in cheese-and curd-making and familiar with management of a small dairy plant – as they can be recruited from a "Senior Expert Service") may be considered to help overcome at least technical problems with milk processing and give some advice on plant management.

- 12) Capacities of EC TA personnel in charge of appraising NGO proposals and monitoring implementation of NGO projects ought to allow also professional judgement in technical matters relating to respective projects. Next to others, the aspect of a food security relevant technical background should be considered with some priority at the stage of staff recruitment. – If an administrative overload and pre-occupation should unduly affect substantive appraisal and monitoring of NGO projects, such professional expertise can also be externally acquired through local contracts.
- 13) Ensure a better integration of Technical Advisors into their respective partner organizations, e.g. by placing “ex-(EC-)muros” Technical Advisors of relevant Technical Assistance components “in-muros” of the offices of the partner organizations.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: Itinerary, Institutions and People Contacted

Date	Activities / Persons met
11-02	Flight Berlin--Tel Aviv of teamleader Manfred Metz and Norbert Jost. Evening: First Team meeting (National Consultant Ms. Najwa Rizkallah and Norbert Jost, CODEPLAN).
12-02	Team meeting Briefing session at EC Representation with: Mr. Philippe Jacques, First Secretary Mr. Frédéric Compeyrot, Task Manager Food Security Mr. Michael Mansour, Task Manager Food Security Mr. Olivier Boudart, Team Leader, Food Security TA Programme
13-02	Meetings at: FAO: Mr. David Parker, FAO Programme Coordinator WFP: Mr. Jean-Luc Siblot, Country Director Ms. Mirjana Kavelj, Head of Logistics Mr. John McHarris, VAM Officer UNRWA: Mr. Anders Fänge, Director of UNRWA Operations, West Bank Mr. Sean Purcell, Field Procurement and Logistics Officer, Mr. Mahmoud Abdel Hadi, Officer of Operations Dr. Husam E. Siam, Chief Field Health Programme
14-02	Trip to Ramallah, there meetings with: PARC: Mr. Abdellatif Mohammed, Director of Projects Department Palestinian Hydrology Group: Dr. Abdel Rahman Tamimi, Director General Ms. Samar Michael husary, Engineering Hydrology Specialist
15-02	All meetings cancelled, offices closed due to heavy snowfall Move to Ramallah, team meeting there.
16-02	Meeting at EC Food Security Office, Ramallah Mr. Olivier Boudart, Team Leader Mr. Nidal Jayousi, Facilitation Expert Ms. Sawsan Baghadi, Programme Assistant Ms. Fatina Wathaefi, MoA, Head Rural Development Department, MoA, and Coordinator Food Security Programme.
17-02	Field visit: Visit to a project site of the PHG in Ein Kinya Village, Ramallah district, together with Samar Michael Husary, PHG, Meeting with members of the "Marketing Committee", the "Agricultural Marketing Cooperative" and the "Farmers Union". Visit to a land reclamation project site of PARC at Khobar village, Ramallah district, Meeting with Dr. Akel Takes, member of the "Agricultural Marketing Committee" and three farmers/beneficiaries of the PARC project. Meetings in Ramallah: Mr. Samir Barghouthi, Director ACAD,, and Mr. Ashraf Dr. Jihad K. Alwazir, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning Mr. Olivier Boudart, Teamleader, EC Food Security Programme
18-02	Meeting at UNRWA office, Ramallah with Ms. Diana Edkall, Area relief and social services officer for Jerusalem, Ramallah, Jericho. Field visit to two distribution sites of UNRWA assistance to Special Hardship Cases in

Date	Activities / Persons met
	Ain Kenia and En Arique villages, Ramallah district. UNRWA social workers and beneficiaries & non-beneficiaries interviews. Meetings in Ramallah with: Mr. Saed Nasser, Consultant to PHG and former staff member for capacity building of the EC Food Security Programme (2001-02). Mr. Shaker S. Jodeh, Director of Planning, MoA
19-02	Trip to Palestinian Livestock Service Center (PLSC) Project in Zebabdeh, Jenin District, with: Mr. Sabri Patrick Giroud, VSF Country Representative, Visit of PLSC Field office, Zebabdeh, meeting with: Mr. Midal Said Mhmoud Sinjilawi, General Manager, Mr. Rahed Seifan, Adm. and Technical Manager, Mr. Medeiv, Coordinator, and Field workers. Visit of two PLSC supported farmers in Al Jaladeh village, Interview with head of village council.
20-02	Trip to Jerusalem, there meetings at EC Representation with: Mr. Frédéric Compeyrot and Michael Mansour, Task Managers Food Security ECHO: Mr. Bart Witteveen, ECHO Expert, Palestine Territories, and Ms. Maria José Pallares Paredes, Middle East, ECHO 2
21-02	Trip to Gaza In Gaza: Meeting with Michela Bonsignorio, CRIC, trip to Dairy Project in Khan Yuni, South Gaza, Visit of dairy plant, Interview with Dairy Cooperative Board Chairman, members and dairy plant workers, Visit of a dairy farm, farmer's interview. Return to Gaza Town via Rafah
22-02	Visit of WFP supported projects in northern and middle Gaza: Community Health and Nutrition Centre (supplementary feeding, mother and child health care), interview with Ms. Iti Dal, Executive Director of AEI (Ard el Insan) Visit of Bedouin Food-for-Work/Food for Training Project, implemented by CRIC, visit of Bedouin settlement Visit of Bedouin FFW project (men); Visit of Bedouin Women's Association at Mughraga, middle Gaza, Interview of Chairwomen and members. Return to Gaza town, there: Visit of area office of ACAD, short meeting with Mohsan Abu Ramadan, Branch Manager; Visit of two ACAD-clients (loanees of ACAD micro finance programme), 1 frame /picture maker, 1 women-farmer, together with Mr. Aladdin Saga, ACAD loan officer.
23-02	Jerusalem: Drafting of Aide Memoire
24-02	Meeting at EC Food Security Office, Ramallah with staff of the EC Office for Palestine (see 12-02), the EC Food Security Office, Ramallah (see 15-02) and Ms Fatina Wathaeft, Coordinator Food Security Programme, MoA.
25-02	Telephone interview with Ms. Sherry Carlin, Humanitarian Aid Officer, USAID Drafting of Aide Memoire Continued Departure Mr. Jost
26-02	Debriefing at EC office Jerusalem Departure of international consultant Metz.

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Annex 3: Tables:

Tables A-1: Economic and Human Development Indicators for Palestine 2000 and 2001, and Regional Indicators for West Bank and Gaza Strip

A-1a) Economic Indicators

A-1b) Human poverty indicators

A-1c) Health Indicators

A-1d) Development Indicators West Bank & Gaza Strip

A-1e) Employment and poverty indicators West Bank & Gaza Strip

Table A-2: Malnutrition in the West Bank and Gaza

Table A-3: Donor Commitments and Disbursements, 1998-2002 (US\$ millions)

Table A-4: Commitments and Disbursement by Donors, 2002 (US\$ millions)

Table A-5: UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for occupied Palestinian Territory (HPA) 2003

Table A-6: EC Food Aid / Food Security Programmes Palestine, Portfolio Overview

Annex 3: Tables

Tables A-1: Economic and Human Development Indicators for Palestine¹¹⁰
2000 and 2001, and Regional Indicators for West Bank and Gaza Strip

Table A-1a) Economic Indicators

		2000	2001
Total GNP	(million \$)***	5089.00	4609.00
Total GDP	(million \$)***	4360.00	4093.00
GNP growth annual rate*	1999-2000	-9.00	
GDP growth annual rate*	1999-2000	-7.60	
Per capita GNP	\$*	1771.50	
Per capita GDP	\$*	1484.50	
Per capita GDP growth annual rate***		-10.30	-15.70
Per capita GDP growth annual rate***		-11.70	-18.70
Imports of goods & services growth annual rate ***		-10.90	-19.40
Exports of goods & services growth annual rate ***		-7.40	-7.60
Imports of goods & services from Israel	(million) \$ *** (first quarter)	454.00	222.00
Exports of goods & services to Israel	(million) \$ *** (first quarter)	111.00	64.00
Number of closure days per year ***		52.00	210.00
Trade balance	(million) \$ *	-2933.40	
Percentage share of economic sectors in GDP 1999			
Agriculture		7.00	
Industry		18.00	
Building and construction		12.00	
Services ³		63.00	
Commitments by donor countries	(million \$)****	4847.00	
Disbursements by donor countries	(million \$)****	3314.00	
Gross capital formation	(million \$) 1999	1971.60	
Final consumption	(million \$) 1999	5748.20	
Total liabilities and assets in the banks	(million \$) *	4594.20	
Public expenditures	(million \$) **		1679.00
Public revenues	(million \$)**		1308.00
Budget deficit	(million \$)**		-371.00
Tax revenues	(million \$)**		509.00
Private consumption	(million \$)*	4870.50	
Private consumption (growth annual rate)*		-6.70	-14.00
Governmental consumption	(million \$)*	1222.60	
Governmental consumption (growth annual rate)*		15.50	-5.00
Proportion of people living on less than two dollars per day***			47.50

2. Source of data indicated by * is the Palestinian Monetary Authority. Source of data indicated by ** is the Ministry of finance. Source of data indicated by *** is the World Bank. Source of data indicated by **** is MOPIC.

3. Services include wholesale, retail trade, transport, financial intermediation, other services, public administration, and defense.

¹¹⁰ Source: UNDP, Palestine Human Development Report 2002

Table A-1b: Human poverty indicators

	2000	2001
People not expected to survive to age 40 (%)	6.10	6.00
Adult illiteracy rate	10.80	
Population without access <i>to safe water</i> ⁵	3.80	
<i>to sanitation</i>	56.10	
Unemployment rate	14.10	
Poverty rate 1998	20.30	60.80
Absolute poverty 1998	12.50	
Poverty severity 1998	3.00	
Poverty gap rate 1998	5.50	

Table A-1c) Health Indicators

	2000	2001
Life expectancy at birth (years)	71.50	71.50
Proportion of coverage of vaccination	98.00	98.00
Children vaccinated against :		
Measles	92.90	
BCG	74.70	
HBV	89.40	
Polio	96.80	
MMR	64.10	
DPT	88.50	
Women who have received some form of health care during pregnancy (%)	95.60	80.40
Births under some form of health supervision (%)	97.40	
Percentage of mothers received tetanus toxoid	27.50	
Average maternal mortality per 100,000 1995	80 - 70	
Fertility rate among women (15-19) (%) of total 1999	6.50	
Infant mortality per 1000 live births 1995-1999	25.50	
Child mortality below the age of 5 per 1000 births 1995-1999	28.70	
Percentage of children under five years of age wasting weight-for-age	2.50	
Percentage of children under five years of age wasting height-for-age	7.50	
Percentage of children under five years of age wasting weight-for-height	1.40	
Tuberculosis cases per 100,000 people	2.1 (68 Cases)	

Table A-1d) Development Indicators for West Bank & Gaza Strip

Indicators	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Palestine
Population distribution (%)	63.90	36.10	100.00
Life expectancy at birth (years)	72.00	71.10	71.82
Sex ratio	102.30	101.80	102.10
Adult literacy ratio 2000	89.20	89.20	89.20
Enrollment rates in the stages of education 2000			
Basic education	94.10	101.2	96.80
Secondary education	54.30	63.20	57.50
Higher education	20.00	28.60	23.10
Basic and secondary and higher education	70.10	79.70	73.70
Natural rate of population growth	3.40	3.90	3.60
Population (million) 1997	1.90	1.00	2.90
Population (million) 2001	2.10	1.190	3.29
Percentage distribution of the population according to age (%) 2001			
0-14	44.80	49.90	46.70
15-29	27.00	26.10	26.60
30-49	19.20	16.50	18.20
Over 50	9.00	7.50	8.50
Refugees as a proportion of the population 2000	27.90	67.00	43.00
Average family size (persons) 2000	5.70	6.90	6.10
Percentage of women who have used contraceptives 2000	54.30	46.10	51.40
Female headed households 2000	9.70	7.00	8.80
Infant mortality per 1000 live births 1995-1999	24.40	27.30	25.50
Child mortality below the age of 5 per 1000 births 1995-1999	27.20	31.20	28.70
Average crude births per 1000 (%) 2001	37.80	44.20	40.10
Average crude death rates per 1000 (%) 2001	4.30	4.20	4.30
Total fertility rate (%) 1999	5.52	6.81	5.93
Proportion of home owners 2001	85.10	95.30	88.40
Households with TV sets (%) 2001	95.90	90.70	94.20

**Table A-1e: Employment and poverty indicators for
West Bank & Gaza Strip**

Table (2): Employment and poverty indicators

Indicators	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Palestine
Per capita GDP (\$) 1999	1850.90	1338.60	1640.60
Per capita GNP (\$) 1999	2213.30	1576.70	2028.30
Share of agriculture sector to GDP (%)			
Participation rate in the labor force (15 & above)	43.60	37.50	41.50
Unemployment rates (%)	12.10	18.70	14.10
Share of women in the labor force	13.80	10.60	12.70
Distribution of workers according to the economic activity: (%)			
Agriculture and fishing	12.50	16.50	13.70
Mining, stone crushing	15.40	11.50	14.30
Building and construction	22.20	13.50	19.70
Services	49.90	58.50	52.30
Distribution of workers according to the employment status (%)			
Employers	5.10	3.30	4.60
Self employed	20.60	17.20	19.60
Wage employee	64.70	69.50	66.10
Family members without wages	9.60	10.00	9.70
Poverty rate 2001	50.50	81.50	60.80
Poverty rate 1998	14.50	33.00	20.30

Annex 3: Tables**Table A-2: Malnutrition in the West Bank and Gaza**

	Survey	Acute malnutrition ¹⁾	Chronic malnutrition ¹⁾
West Bank	PCBS ²⁾ 1996	2.2	6.7
	PCBS 2000	1.5	7.0
	PCBS 2002	2.3	7.7
	JHQ ³⁾ 2002	4.3	7.9
Gaza	PCBS 1996	3.7	8.2
	PCBS 2000	1.4	8.3
	PCBS 2002	2.0	10.6
	JHQ 2002	13.3	17.5

1) Percent of children aged 6-59 months

2) Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics Surveys

3) John Hopkins / Al Quds Universities Survey, see Abdeen, 2002.

Source: World Bank, 2003, based on FAFO (Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science - Norwegian acronym), 2003

Annex 3: Tables

Donor Commitments and Disbursements

Table A-3: Donor Commitments and Disbursements, 1998-2002 (US\$ millions)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Commitments:					
Regular (Development) Sup-	667	692	852	473	261
Emergency and Budgetary 0	0	0	121	755	1266
Total Commitments	667	692	973	1228	1527
Total Disbursements	419	482	549	929	1026

Source: World Bank, 2003.

Table A-4: Commitments and Disbursement by Donors, 2002 (US\$ millions)

Donor Countries	Commitments	Percentage	Disbursements	Percentage
League of Arab States	630	41.3%	316	30.8%
European Commission	269	17.6%	217	21.1%
United States (USAID)	201	13.2%	194	18.9%
World Bank	75	4.9%	37	3.7%
Italy	60	3.9%	32	3.1%
Norway	49	3.2%	44	4.3%
Germany	45	2.9%	21	2.3%
Sweden	31	2.0%	16	1.5%
Switzerland	17	1.1%	12	1.1%
Denmark	16	1.0%	18	1.8%
Canada	14	0.9%	14	1.3%
France	13	0.8%	11	1.0%
United Kingdom	13	0.8%	12	1.1%
Japan	13	0.8%	12	1.1%
Others	82	5.6%	71	7.0%
Total	1,527	160.0%	1,026	100.0%

Figures do not include donor support to UNRWA's regular budget.

Source: World Bank, 2003.

Annex 3: Tables

**Table A-5: UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal
for occupied Palestinian Territory (HPA) 2003**

Summary of Requirements and Contributions by Appealing Organization

Compiled by OCHA on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing organisation.

Appealing Organisation	Original Requirements	Revised Requirements	Contributions	Pledges	Carryover	Total Resources Available	Unmet Requirements	% Covered
FAO	9,300,000	5,637,000	1,941,891	292,581	0	2,234,472	3,402,528	39.64%
OCHA	1,900,000	2,079,092	2,136,684	0	0	2,136,684	(57,592)	100.00%
UNDP	15,750,000	15,750,000	0	0	0	0	15,750,000	0.00%
UNESCO	600,000	600,000	0	0	0	0	600,000	0.00%
UNFPA	4,185,000	4,185,000	542,299	0	0	542,299	3,642,701	12.96%
UNICEF	16,200,000	16,200,000	0	3,579,253	0	3,579,253	12,620,747	22.09%
UNRWA	202,727,762	202,727,762	40,537,615	1,410,437	24,668,460	66,616,512	136,111,250	32.86%
UNSECOORD	847,000	847,000	0	0	0	0	847,000	0.00%
WFP	39,789,000	42,649,000	35,140,281	0	0	35,140,281	7,508,719	82.39%
WHO	2,500,000	3,100,000	2,021,391	0	0	2,021,391	1,078,609	65.21%
GRAND TOTAL	293,798,762	293,774,854	82,320,161	5,282,271	24,668,460	112,270,892	181,503,962	38.22%

Source: United Nations, *Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)*, Occupied Palestinian Territory 2004,

Annex 3: Tables

Table A-6: EC Food Aid / Food Security Programmes Palestine

Portfolio Overview

GOVERNMENT					
YEAR	ORGANISATION	PROGRAMME TITLE	DURATION	EC CONTRIBUTION	
2000	Palestinian Authority	Bilateral Food Security Programme	24 months	€ 5,000,000	100%
2002	Palestinian Authority	Bilateral Food Security Programme	24 months	€ 5,000,000	100%

NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS					
YEAR ^{1,2}	ORGANISATION	PROJECT TITLE	DURATION	EC CONTRIBUTION	
2000	Arab Centre for Agricultural Development	Support for small & medium sized agricultural enterprises in the WB & GS	59 months	€ 2,974,500	' 100%
2001	Oxfam Belgium with Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees	Enhancing food security conditions and creating new job opportunities in Palestine	36 months	€ 2,262,026	57%
2002	Arab Centre for Agricultural Development	Enhancing productive cooperatives among farmers and creating cooperative saving & credit funds	24 months	€ 451,380	33%
2002	Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem ³⁾	A localised composting network for Bethlehem district. West Bank	24 months	€ 468,463	90%
2002	Centro Regionale d'Intervento per la Cooperazione	Production of fresh and pasteurised milk in Khan Younis municipality, Gaza Strip	19 months	€ 547,000	90%
2002	Vétérinaires Sans Frontières	Provision of livestock services for sustainable small ruminants production in northern W. Bank	30 months	€ 650,000	73%
2003	Palestinian Hydrology Group	The Palestine Food for Life Programme	36 months	€ 1,249,856	79%
2003	Care International UK	Sustainable Access to Food and Economic Security in Jenin (SAFES Jenin)	36 months	€ 1,250,000	84%
2003	Movimondo	Enhancing Food Security Levels in the Jenin District through the Support of Income Generating Agriculture Activities, Training, and Technical Assistance.	24 months	€ 918,225	90%

¹ Projects signed in 2002 were financed under the 2000 Global NGO Food Security Call for Proposals,

² Projects signed in 2003 were financed under the 2002 NGO Food Security Call for Proposals within the framework of OL1 (No. 30.935).

³ Project cancelled

Table A-6: EC Food Aid / Food Security Programmes Palestine
Portfolio Overview
continued

UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES					
YEAR	ORGANISATION	PROGRAMME TITLE	DURATION	EC CONTRIBUTION	
2001	UNRWA	Food aid & cash assistance ²	12months	€ 15,000,000	100%
2002	UNRWA	Food aid & cash assistance ²	12 months	€ 15,000,000	100%
2003	UNRWA	Food aid & cash assistance ²	12months	€ 15,000,000	100%
2001	WFP	Contribution to EMOP 10072	6 months	€ 5,000,000	39% ¹
2002	WFP	Contribution to EMOP10190	8 months	€ 10,000,000	53% ¹
2003	WFP	Contribution to EMOP 10190.1	12months	€ 5,000,000	23% ³
2003	FAO	Food security assessment	2 months	€ 300,000	55%

¹ The figure represents the EC share of confirmed contributions and not of the total budget of the appeal,

² Regional Programme covering Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza Strip,

³ On January 5,2004.

Source: European Commission Technical Assistance Office West Bank & Gaza Strip

Annex 4

POLICY AMBIGUITY AND POLICY INCONSISTENCIES

Implications of EU's Near East Policy for the EC Assistance to Palestine

by

Norbert Jost

The EC and EU member state governments will have to give up an apparent policy-ambiguity regarding its / their commitment to the objective of the establishment of an independent and sovereign State of Palestine.

Neither the respective EURO-Mediterranean association agreement with Israel (2000) nor the *interim* association agreement with the PNA on trade and co-operation (1997) make any reference or commitment to an objective related to the establishment of a sovereign state of Palestine:

- a) The agreement with Israel rather only refers to general objectives e.g. *"to provide a .. framework for political dialogue"* (not policy dialogue!) and of *"encouraging regional co-operation with a view to the consolidation of peaceful coexistence and economic and political stability"*; the respect for human rights and democratic principles is mentioned, strictly speaking, however, only as a base governing the *"relations between the Parties"* (EC and the GoI!)
- b) The agreement with the PNA declares the desire of *"strengthening the framework of...regional economic integration of the Middle Eastern countries as an objective ..."* and the wish... *"to establish lasting relations* (between the Community and the PLO)", *"the need to intensify existing efforts to promote economic and social development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip"*, and *"... normalisation of relations between the Parties"*.

The observation concerning ambiguity on such central policy issue of the EC Near East policy is shared by most interview partners in Palestine; even EC Office personnel felt themselves rather left guessing which policy the EC was actually pursuing. The absence of a valid EU Country Strategy and a National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Palestine equally fits the apprehension of ambiguity and may be indicative for a lack of political consensus between EU Member States.

As a member of the Near East Quartet, the EU officially supports the **road map**.¹¹¹ A critical analysis of the circumstances surrounding the final release, the nature and very text of the document called road map as well as the very "progress" made on that

¹¹¹ "A performance-based road map to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict", published by the US Government 30.4.2003. The road map is essentially a document of reference, however with no signatories to it.

road since then, supports not only the perception of ambiguity, but justifies serious doubts whether the provisions of the "road map" can indeed lead to an independent sovereign State of Palestine, respectively to an end of the Israeli-Arab conflict. It has to be noted that any real progress towards conflict resolution, remains essentially dependent on the political willingness and readiness of the GoI with whom rests the military power and power of definition, whether or not it is satisfied with the fulfilment of a series of conditions set by the road map, the onus of which has been one-sidedly laid upon the Palestinian side. This, without corresponding obligations on the Israeli side to *simultaneously* create such conditions which would enable the PNA to materially contribute its part.

The design of the road map is such, that one is held to assume, its purpose was to maintain a situation of a political impasse which then permits to pursue other and undeclared objectives. The provisions of the road map leaves the GoI in the "comfortable" position to define itself what it is willing to contribute to the process of conflict resolution. On the other hand, the GoI is in the position to manipulate at any time and stage of the 3-phase road map the political and living conditions within the occupied WB and Gaza in such a way, as to fend off any possible demands stemming from the provisions of the road map. That is why the GoI - at the very most - is willing to comply in form of "unilateral concessions". In short, if the GoI does not want a sovereign Palestinian state because it harbours plans of quite a different nature, there will never be one, unless it can be brought to the conviction that a negotiated resolution of the conflict is its own larger long-term interest.

To this end, however, sufficient political and economic power of "persuasion" will be required, which at best can only be mustered jointly, by the US Government and the EU supported by a constructive role of neighbouring Arab governments. Next to a massive humanitarian and emergency assistance programme, the EU and its member states finance an assistance programme of political reforms (comprising i.a. a constitution, a western democratic parliamentary apparatus, a corresponding judiciary, the framework of a liberal market economy of a possible future State of Palestine) which basically orients itself on the outlines of the road maps *first phase*. At the same time, however, the EU does little in concrete terms to effectively impress upon the GoI on the political and economic level, and therefore is not in the position to materially promote substantive progress on the road to conflict resolution, neither to contribute to a co-operative compliance by the GoI to fulfil its obligations of the road map's first phase, nor to influence any subsequent steps pertaining to phases 2 and 3 of the road map.

By removing ambiguity of its Near East policy, the EU would remove a glaring inconsistency between major Treaty principles, objectives and principles of its external and development policy, regional policy and policies on poverty reduction and food security on the one hand, and the main thrust of its assistance and co-operation with both, the GoI and the PNA on the other. The inconsistency and incoherence problem manifests itself in form of a **missing link** between the implementation of *one* Near East policy by the EU *and* its member states vis-à-vis the GoI on the one side, and their financial, technical, emergency and humanitarian assistance of a formidable cumulative size to Palestine on the other. This missing link, i.e. a robust EU policy dialogue with the GoI concerning its role as the occupying power in the WBG and its

responsibility to actively contribute to a genuine conflict solution, is also of particular relevance for the drastically aggravating poverty- and food security situation in Palestine.

In its Development Policy, the EC emphasises this particular link when highlighting the interdependence of poverty, food security and sustainable rural development strategies with the regional dimension: *Food security also has an **important regional element** in that it can often only be ensured through a regional rather than a national framework of production and distribution.*¹¹² For Palestine, the regional dimension (and this means for all practical purposes a good neighbourly and co-operative relationship with Israel!) is and always will be of special critical importance for its economic welfare and development of trade and tourism, since its own agricultural resource base will remain incommensurate with its food needs.

When criticising the above EU policy inconsistency - this is not to ignore the dire predicament in which the EU finds itself with regard to its hereto meagre influence on Near East politics, respectively on the GoI. The EU's dilemma most likely stems from an **insufficient consensus** among member states with regard to Near East foreign policy objectives and strategy.¹¹³ This would explain the observed inconsistencies, but highlight the necessity to deal with them internally as a priority issue. As long as a lack of consensus on the main thrust of EU's Near East Policy prevails, it will prove rather impossible to iron out such inconsistencies.

Yet, the EC deserves fair recognition for its perseverance with which it has in the past tolerated the above dilemma and - despite of it - continued to support the Palestinian cause, diplomatically and with a substantial assistance programme to the Palestinian people and the PNA. This even against the odds of hitherto non-co-operative politics of most Israeli governments and US governments which have not been willing and/or able to muster effective political and economic leverage on Israeli governments so that political progress could have been achieved.

However, it has to be realised that, *ceteris paribus* (!), the EU would have to continue to increase its basically emergency and humanitarian assistance programmes to ever higher financial dimensions. Such assistance programme is unsustainable, in parts grotesque¹¹⁴ and there is no end in sight. It could only be justified either on purely

¹¹² EC Development Policy, Chapter 4.3 COM(2000) 212, 26 April 2000:

¹¹³ one obvious symptom for such lack of consensus is the conspicuous absence of an EU country perspective strategy for Palestine which requires consent by member states. See also chapter

¹¹⁴ Grotesque in so far that the EC finances rehabilitation and reconstruction of physical infrastructure which has been destroyed by the Israeli army. The EU-financed airport in Gaza is only an example. Despite the EC's announcement that it reserves the right to demand compensation from the GoI for such damages to EU-financed infrastructure, little is known about whether such claims have been seriously pursued and processed. Furthermore, the EU has stepped in with budgetary assistance of Mio Euro, only to make up for the loss of revenue to the PA caused by the withholding of due taxes by the GoI. The implementation of even humanitarian assistance by UN-agencies is seriously hindered by Israeli authorities or military administration causing inefficiencies in terms of additional costs. The demands / recommendations of Mrs. Bertini's (Special Envoy of the UN General Secretary) report have been virtually ignored by the GoI as regards measures to improve the humanitarian conditions,

humanitarian grounds or if it was backed with **consistent and complementary efforts** on the political level vis-à-vis the GoI. An EU Near East policy *without* such complementary political efforts is **substantially inconsistent** with most of EU's lofty objectives and principles enshrined in the UN Charter, Community Treaty and policies dealing with external relations, development, MEDA regional co-operation, poverty and food security, (see also Box below). An EU Near East policy *without* such complementary political efforts would condemn the ongoing co-operation and assistance programme to Palestine to remain a rather permanent emergency exercise - without justified hope for any substantive improvement of the living conditions of people living there.

On Coherence of EC Policies - selected Quotations:

*"...The Commission's development co-operation policy is based on support and policy dialogue covering numerous areas including trade policy, macro-economic management, regional integration, key economic and social sectors,..... Finally the European Commission is **taking active measures to strengthen the coherence between Community policies, on the one hand and its development policy, on the other....**"*

*".... Fresh impetus is required to speed up progress in tackling hunger, which is the first step in fighting poverty. The World Food Summit +5 (i.e. the follow-up conference in 2001) will be an important occasion to reaffirm commitment to the World Food Summit goals, and to mobilise additional donor resources. **At the same time there is a need to translate political will and donor resources into coherent actions. These actions need to be focused not only on aid delivery, but also on securing the necessary policy and institutional changes in the domestic and international arenas**"*

from: EC, DG Development: Fighting Hunger - Food Security at the Heart of Poverty Reduction; The European Commission's vision and approach, September 2001

removal of restrictions on movement of persons and goods and unfettered mobility of international and humanitarian personnel - as they are demanded even by the road map document.

Handling procedures in Israeli ports have been such that alone WFP had to pay an estimated sum of USD 800,000 during 2003 in demurrage costs only. Between September 2000 and February 2003, UNRWA incurred an extra \$1.78 million in expenses as a result of extra costs for storage and other charges on the import of basic commodities. Trucks (the names of their drivers and their possible replacements) delivering food aid have to be announced to checkpoints well ahead in time to be allowed to pass. National and international logistic experts have to invest a tremendous amount of effort, time and a formidable amount of ingenuity to satisfy Israeli "rules and regulations" which are subject to change at any time. The scenario increases the need for co-ordination into bizarre dimensions for even the most prosaic matters - all of them having of course a serious "security" relevance. "Security" has become the justification also for the absurd - which hardly a most creative fantasy can imagine. - If it was not stark and, more often than not, tragic reality, one would have to consider the conditions in the occupied territories as a masterpiece of an absurd theatre.

A **paradigm change** will be required with regard to attitude of and policies pursued by the GoI. With an imminent escalation of the permanent crisis in the occupied territories of WB/G at hand - and also considering the far reaching ramifications of the Israel - Palestine conflict in general -, it seems that time has come that the Quartet and the international community at large does not tolerate any longer to be held hostage of policies of the GoI which have proven for too long a time already to be the most critical obstacle to regional and world peace.

Without decisive efforts on the political and economical planes, **including economic sanctions**, no effective political pressure can be exerted on the GoI to bring about the needed paradigm change in the Israel-Palestine relations and a much needed turn-around of an ever escalating scenario of violence and human suffering on all sides, especially on the side of Palestinians who have been the main victims of the conflict since 1967. Israel 's restrictions on the movement of Palestinian goods, its destruction of Palestinian infrastructure and its total control of the OPTs and their borders are denying Palestinian exporters access to EU markets.

E.g. it is entirely **unacceptable and in contradiction to text and spirit of the EU - Israel Association Agreement** that Israel on the one hand prevents Palestinians to take advantage of their trade agreements with the European Union (and other Arabic neighbours), whilst simultaneously benefiting from its own preferential European trade terms¹¹⁵. Moreover, the EU continues to subsidise Israeli occupation of the WB/G by financing an enormous, unsustainable emergency and humanitarian assistance to the OPT - which on top of it is even grossly obstructed by the closure policy -, and even contributes in no small proportion to additional revenues to the Israeli Finance Ministry and economy by e.g. increased demurrage payments to port authorities or Israeli transport and trading companies. It is equally unacceptable that the EU continues to ignore its policy inconsistencies - without making a convincing effort to undo them.

Therefore, the EU and its Member States will have to step up its commitment to a conflict solution in the Near East and enter into a **robust policy dialogue** with the GoI which holds the key for the future development of the Near East region. Israel's future depends on a conducive climate with its Arabic citizen and neighbours and , very much so, on strong political and economic links with *Europe*. Therefore, the EU has no reason to underestimate its potential influence, provided it is able and prepared to throw it into the scales.

From the GoI, genuine peace-oriented political actions must be expected and demanded - no vague or only verbal commitments, not to speak of a further militarisation of the region. **As a first step**, a removal all forms of road blocks and other forms of hindrances to mobility for people and goods *within* the occupied territories plus a halt to any further construction of the Wall of Separation shall be demanded from the

¹¹⁵ i.a. reference is made to Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement; in addition, under the trade agreement even products from Israeli settlements have been exported using false product labels to the EU though this is not admissible under the agreement.

GoI. To this end, the concerned EU Council of Ministers of Economy/Trade should suspend Israel's preferential terms of trade with the EU until it lifts the movement restrictions which it has placed on Palestinians and Palestinian trade. It is likely, that EU exports to Israel which are greater in value than EU imports from Israel, will suffer retaliatory action. But such short-term economic considerations should not guide the EU Council and Commission in its Near East as well as regional Mediterranean policy, because this would amount to a serious challenge to its credibility if they effectively hindered the EU to live up to its own fundamental policies and trade policy principles without any determined action to defend them effectively.

Secondly, the EU and its Member States should seriously re-examine their role and commitment to the road map and develop a **new common Near East policy** so as to eliminate EU policy inconsistencies and ambiguity and (probably) strategic dissent among Member States. As a more promising alternative, the approach chosen for the Geneva Accord, i.e. **one, uninterrupted process of continued negotiations** between both concerned parties until an all comprehensive solution is reached.

Annex 5: Map of Palestine





Evaluación Temática de la Política de ayuda alimentaria y de las Operaciones Especiales en Apoyo de la Seguridad Alimentaria;

PARTICIP GmbH

**INFORME DE TERRENO
PERU**

**Pierre Van Roosbroeck
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Junio 2004

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PARTICIP GmbH ha preparado este informe para la Comisión de la Comunidad Europea. Los autores aceptan por si solos la responsabilidad por este informe. El Informe no refleja necesariamente la opinión de la Comisión.

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1. RESUMEN EJECUTIVO

1.1. Objetivos

El presente informe es el resultado del análisis correspondiente a la fase de terreno en Perú, en el marco de la Evaluación de las acciones financiadas a través de la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria de la Comisión Europea en los países ACP/ALA/MED/TACIS. Dicha Evaluación tiene como objetivo principal, situar el Reglamento 1292/96 en su contexto siete años después de su entrada en vigor y de la implementación, en los países objeto del Reglamento, de su contenido, estrategia y política.

1.2. Metodología

A través de 12 preguntas evaluativas generales para las diez países seleccionados, se analizó el valor añadido del Instrumento Seguridad Alimentaria y de los mecanismos que lo componen, en aras de analizar y visualizar el futuro de esta Línea presupuestaria. Estas preguntas evaluativas marcaron sobre el terreno el desarrollo de la evaluación y son, junto con los 5 parámetros generales de medición (Pertinencia, Eficiencia, Eficacia, Impacto y Coherencia) el cuerpo principal del presente informe. Las técnicas aplicadas incluyeron entrevistas, talleres, revisión documentaria y visitas de campo. Se conversó con personal de la Delegación, de la UTSA, funcionarios y ex funcionarios de los niveles local, regional y nacional de los sectores involucrados.

1.3. Rankings

obtenidos para las preguntas evaluativas y para la evaluación global según criterios de evaluación

Respecto a las preguntas evaluativas: 70% Satisfactorio, 20% Regular y 10% Pobre (sobre un total de 10 preguntas, sin considerar las preguntas 1 y 4)

Respecto a la evaluación global: 33% Muy satisfactorio, 33% Satisfactorio y 33% Regular (sobre un total de 6 criterios)

Las preguntas evaluativas 1 y 4 no aplican para el caso Perú.

En cuanto a la pregunta Evaluativa 2, se constata que el PASA está integrado a la estrategia de país de la CE, complementa otras intervenciones y finalmente existe coherencia entre los objetivos de la Política de SA (ayuda directa e indirecta) y el CSP. La temática de SA es importante para la estrategia de país.

Respecto a la pregunta Evaluativa 3, las estrategias de SA del PASA están implementadas a través programas orientados a la lucha contra la pobreza consistente con el conjunto de las orientaciones políticas establecidas en los sucesivos Gobiernos en relación a SA y lucha contra la pobreza

En cuanto a la pregunta Evaluativa 5, el uso del AP ha contribuido a disminuir la vulnerabilidad en SA de los beneficiarios a través la dinamización del contexto socio-económico local, favoreciendo un mecanismo de subsidiaridad que favorece la toma de decisiones a nivel local y ha orientado en gran parte el proceso de descentralización del Estado en marcha, sin haber sido este objetivo explícito del programa

Respecto a la pregunta Evaluativa 6 el valor añadido se centra en trabajo en zonas de difícil acceso, conocimientos actualizados y adaptados sobre mejora tecnológica y estudios que

pueden ser base para un futuro mejoramiento productivo incorporando la transformación agroindustrial a pequeña escala, contacto con profesionales que abren el abanico de alternativas de desarrollo rural y en particular trabajar temas que otras líneas de cofinanciación no desarrollan.

En cuanto a la pregunta evaluativa siete, la AT asegura el acompañamiento de las intervenciones de SA en curso. La UTSA tiene un nivel alto de coordinación con la Delegación que garantiza una mejor coherencia con las políticas y acciones de los donantes y del estado.

Respecto a la pregunta Evaluativa ocho, el diseño del PASA permitió fortalecer el rol del Estado (articulando participativamente los niveles central, regional y local) en la reducción de la pobreza como eje de la reducción de la inseguridad alimentaria (más aún considerando el desinterés del Estado por asumir una política de SA). Se identificó correctamente a la población objetivo y se busco que haya una articulación en las intervenciones en recursos humanos (directamente a familias e individuos) y la inversión social que se orientaba a las condiciones colectivas a los bienes públicos. Finalmente se debe destacar que el mecanismo de AP fue una innovación en la gestión pública: fondos de donación que se entregan al Estado contra reembolso, transferencia de fondos de cooperación desde el MEF hasta los gobiernos locales en el marco normativo de la gestión pública, mecanismos de gestión en cada nivel, capacitación de gobiernos locales pequeños de zonas pobres en el manejo de montos significativamente mayores a los que manejaban con el consecuente empoderamiento.

En cuanto a la pregunta Evaluativa nueve, la preparación del PASA y la ayuda indirecta han sido apropiados para lograr los objetivos de SA: la opción por centrarse en la reducción de la pobreza bajo un enfoque descentralizado centrado en el nivel local, aunque por motivos más allá del PASA no siempre se ha podido llegar suficientemente en forma efectiva a las familias más pobres.

En relación a la pregunta Evaluativa 10, se ha planificado positivamente una fase de entrega de las obras en los casos del componente de inversión social y productiva y ayuda indirecta. En los componentes de salud y educación no se cuenta con mecanismos explícitos de sostenibilidad ni se tuvo acceso a información que evalúe la viabilidad de la continuación de las acciones sin el AP de PASA.

Respecto a la pregunta 11, se espera una sostenibilidad a través del mecanismo de descentralización del Estado iniciado en 2002. El PASA como instrumento ha demostrado su capacidad adaptarse en las situaciones más desfavorables del país mediante su mecanismo de participación activa de los beneficiarios, insertándose efectivamente en los mecanismos locales del Estado para llegar a sus objetivos.

Finalmente, en cuanto a la pregunta Evaluativa doce, el PASA y la ayuda indirecta están orientados básicamente a intervenciones de desarrollo, salvo excepciones y no se han previsto vínculos entre acciones de emergencia o de rehabilitación con las intervenciones del mecanismo en el Perú.

1.4. Conclusiones

Generales

El PASA ha podido contribuir a mejorar la SA en el marco de las políticas sectoriales relativas a la lucha contra la pobreza y con un enfoque descentralista que beneficia a los más pobres, precursor en el país. El PASA pudo implementar una estrategia que ha permitido un acercamiento de la institución gubernamental de primer nivel (la municipalidad) y la sociedad civil (la comunidad local y/o nativa).

El PASA ha desarrollado un mecanismo de AP diferenciado del mecanismo clásico de la UE. El PASA ha sido un interlocutor positivo en la formulación de políticas públicas para la población en pobreza extrema, acompañando críticamente la ejecución de estas políticas, mejorando así las capacidades de análisis de la gestión de los propios sectores y asumiendo conjuntamente riesgos

El PASA ha podido mantenerse sin cambios significativos en sus líneas estratégicas durante siete años y tres gobiernos sucesivos porque se enmarcó en una política global de descentralización: inversiones focalizadas a los municipios, apoyo a estrategias de salud y educación centradas en ofrecer mejores servicios a las poblaciones pobres y dispersas. Ha buscado preservar la coherencia de las estrategias públicas, en función de las políticas públicas de los Gobiernos

Su contribución a la reducción de la pobreza presenta grados de eficiencia, efectividad e impacto variables debido a limitaciones de la gestión de fondos, los procesos de gestión pública y la intervención fragmentada territorialmente entre los sectores apoyados.

Inversión social

El AP focalizado en resultados específicos (en gobiernos locales vía MIMDES y beneficiarios directos-Gobiernos locales vía CONACS) tiene logros más sostenibles y visibles que el AP a líneas sectoriales (salud y educación), lo que se explica porque hubo que considerar las estrategias existentes y la realidad institucional en cada sector.

Los beneficiarios, tanto en la sierra como en la selva, demandan obras físicas (fundamentalmente caminos y puentes) con la finalidad de mejorar el acceso a mercados locales, tanto para vender sus productos como para comprar bienes. Se busca mejorar el acceso a mecanismos de adquisición de alimentos vía mejores ingresos, pero sin mejorar el capital productivo a través de otros mecanismos como mejora tecnológica o acceso a microcrédito.

El hecho que en los planes apoyados por el PASA, este financie y ejecuta menos de 10 % de las obras que han sido identificadas en los talleres participativos de planificación local supone riesgos en la estrategia de inversión social adoptada. En las zonas de intervención existe una cultura de frustración, moldeada por años de marginación que requerirá muchos años para poder ser superada.

Diversas instituciones públicas y privadas –como el Fondo contravalor Perú-Alemania- están canalizando presupuestos a distritos con planes apoyados por el PASA lo que refuerza positivamente la contribución del PASA más allá de su aporte directo.

Recursos humanos (Salud y educación)

El PASA no financió planes locales en los sectores de salud y educación porque se apoyan estrategias orientadas a capas sociales amplias.

El apoyo PASA a Salud y Educación ha sido a nivel de todo el sector, sin pasar por un mecanismo descentralizado (aunque se financian iniciativas descentralizadas porque estos sectores son muy complejos para descentralizar y se requiere primero asegurar la coherencia interna de estos ministerios).

Gestión pública y AP

Los retrasos de los desembolsos por diversos aspectos del proceso a nivel del Estado peruano, así como en menor medida de la CE (por ejemplo por retrasos en la firma de convenios por más de un año) ponen en riesgo la efectividad del PASA

El alto nivel de recambio del personal a todo nivel que genera la ausencia, en el Estado en general, de una gestión estratégica con intervenciones priorizadas (entre ellas las financiadas por PASA) tiene como consecuencia que el respaldo de los Ministerios de Salud y de Educación, en especial en las regiones, a las líneas con PASA es muy frágil.

En el caso del MIMDES una mayor valoración del aporte del PASA ha permitido mantener al personal de apoyo en cada región al Convenio CE-MIMDES para el PASA.

Ayuda indirecta

La ayuda indirecta ha tenido la posibilidad de generar mecanismos alternativos de relacionamiento para ONGs europeas en los que un Gobierno regional las contrata directamente por la calidad del trabajo desarrollado en su trabajo financiado por PASA.

1.5. Recomendaciones

Generales

El AP es un mecanismo con valor añadido cuando está orientado a objetivos con indicadores claros a nivel sectorial, pero también debe demostrar un valor añadido en los resultados esperados. El acompañamiento que contribuya al mejoramiento de la gestión pública es un componente fundamental del AP aunque las políticas son en última instancia decisiones del país, como se demuestra en el Perú.

Apoyar el desarrollo de Planes Operativos Municipales, Provinciales y Regionales anuales basados en recursos efectivos, plazos y responsables y con una mayor información a los beneficiarios respecto al monto presupuestal disponible, en el marco de los Presupuestos participativos en ejecución.

Promover las acciones de la sociedad civil de los ámbitos de intervención a través de los planes de larga plazo. Los planes –con participación activa de la sociedad civil- no tienen que orientarse únicamente a planificar las inversiones estatales. Deben ser también guías de orientación y de potencialidad para el sector privado y otros actores. El PASA podría también proponer mecanismos para promover el desarrollo de actividades productivas (incluyendo más proyectos productivos, de micro-crédito, etc.), partiendo de la experiencia del CONACS.

Las intervenciones deberían mantener su enfoque descentralizado, priorizando un apoyo directo a los beneficiarios antes que el apoyo indirecto desde el nivel central (salud y educación)

Inversión social

Se deberían desarrollar planes específicos para las comunidades nativas (en la selva), al interior de los planes distritales y provinciales, buscando coordinar las prioridades de los varios grupos étnicos y basados en sus propias cosmovisiones y valores.

Recursos humanos (salud y educación)

Acompañar la descentralización de los sectores de salud y educación, desde el rol precursor del PASA en el tema. Se deberían plantear pro activamente nuevos mecanismos de descentralización con Gobiernos locales, en el marco legal vigente, pero aportando al proceso.

Gestión pública y AP

La CE debería mantener un valor añadido específico a su AP que asegure que las intervenciones que financie sean innovativas, sostenibles y con impacto directo en los más pobres, teniendo además para ello un acompañamiento cercano del PASA durante su ejecución.

Promover la realización de planes municipales a largo plazo (10-15 años) para visualizar el desarrollo local (distrital/provincial) y regional con mayor perspectiva, articulando provincia y distrito. Dentro de este marco se pueden realizar planes multianuales (articulados al marco multianual del Estado) y planes operativos anuales. Esta identificación a largo plazo permitirá facilitar las prioridades, integrar más consideraciones socio-económicas en los planes (cultura local, medio ambiente, manejo sostenible de recursos naturales, viabilización de inversiones agro-industriales, etc.) y no atenuar la frustración potencial en la satisfacción de una gran parte de la población que se ve excluida en la ejecución anual o tri-anual debido al presupuesto insuficiente para cubrir sus prioridades.

2. INTRODUCCION

2.1. Antecedentes y justificación

En la “*desk phase*” anterior a la fase de terreno, se determinó la metodología general de la evaluación: A través de 12 preguntas evaluativas generales para las diez muestras de terreno, se analizaría el valor añadido del Instrumento Seguridad Alimentaria y de los mecanismos que lo componen, en aras de analizar y visualizar el futuro de esta Línea presupuestaria. Estas preguntas evaluativas marcaron sobre el terreno el desarrollo de la evaluación y son, junto con los 5 parámetros generales de medición (Pertinencia, Eficiencia, Eficacia, Impacto y Coherencia) el cuerpo principal del presente informe.

2.2. Por qué Perú

El presente informe es el resultado del análisis correspondiente a la fase de terreno en Perú, en el marco de la Evaluación de las acciones financiadas a través de la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria de la Comisión Europea en los países ACP/ALA/MED/TACIS. Dicha Evaluación tiene como objetivo principal, situar el Reglamento 1292/96 en su contexto siete años después de su entrada en vigor y de la implementación, en los países objeto del Reglamento, de su contenido, estrategia y política y realizar un estudio comparativo con los otros instrumentos CE de SA .

La Línea de Seguridad alimentaria se implementa en el Perú desde 1997 bajo las modalidades de Ayuda directa (Apoyo presupuestal mediante el PASA) y Ayuda indirecta. La ayuda directa tiene previsto continuar hasta el año 2006 y la ayuda indirecta está culminando en este año (2004). El antecedente previo a este Programa en el Perú fue el Fondo de contravalor Perú-Unión Europea que desarrolló acciones diversas en apoyo a comunidades a nivel nacional.

El Perú es un caso particularmente relevante por la modalidad de AP desarrollada, única en el país en el campo de la cooperación internacional, y diferente de otros modelos ejecutados por la CE en diversos países. Se espera por lo tanto que este documento alimente la discusión sobre el valor y limitaciones de este instrumento para la cooperación al desarrollo en el marco de la Línea de SA así como de otras líneas de trabajo en este campo en el Perú y en otras Delegaciones.

Objetivos:

El presente informe es el resultado del análisis correspondiente a la fase de terreno en Perú, en el marco de la Evaluación de las acciones financiadas a través de la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria de la Comisión Europea en los países ACP/ALA/MED/TACIS. Dicha Evaluación tiene como objetivo principal, situar el Reglamento 1292/96 en su contexto siete años después de su entrada en vigor y de la implementación, en los países objeto del Reglamento, de su contenido, estrategia y política.

Metodología :

A través de 12 preguntas evaluativas generales para las diez países seleccionados, se analizó el valor añadido del Instrumento Seguridad Alimentaria y de los mecanismos que lo componen, en aras de analizar y visualizar el futuro de esta Línea presupuestaria. Estas preguntas evaluativas marcaron sobre el terreno el desarrollo de la evaluación y son, junto con los 5 parámetros generales de medición (Pertinencia, Eficiencia, Eficacia, Impacto y Coherencia) el cuerpo principal del presente informe.

Las técnicas aplicadas incluyeron entrevistas, talleres, revisión documentaria y visitas de campo. Se conversó con personal de la Delegación, de la UTSA, funcionarios y ex funcionarios de los niveles local, regional y nacional de los sectores involucrados así como autoridades de gobiernos locales y beneficiarios.

2.2.1. Perfil de País

2.2.1.1. Consideraciones previas

El Perú cuenta con una población total de 27,250,000 habitantes¹ en 1.28 millones de Km² distribuida en tres regiones geográficas (costa, sierra y selva) y casi un tercio viviendo en la capital. En la última década ha habido mejora de algunos indicadores importantes en salud. Así la mortalidad infantil bajo de 54 a 32 x 1000 fallecidos (1990-2000) y la mortalidad materna decreció de 265 a 185 por 100.000 (1993-2000). La asistencia escolar también ha mejorado en todo el país. Pero, pese a estas mejoras y a un torno macroeconómico estable, existe una desigualdad que se expresa en el hecho que el 54.8%² vive en pobreza y 24.4%³ en pobreza extrema, concentrados en la sierra y selva rurales (70% de personas en pobreza y 35.6% en pobreza extrema en estas regiones).

El Gobierno peruano ha definido la seguridad alimentaria como una situación en la cual se logra al “acceso material y económico a alimentos suficientes, inocuos y nutritivos para todos los individuos, de manera que puedan ser utilizados adecuadamente para satisfacer sus necesidades nutricionales y llevar una vida sana, sin correr riesgos indebidos de perder dicho acceso. Esta definición incorpora los conceptos de disponibilidad, acceso, uso y estabilidad en el suministro de alimentos” (Decreto Supremo No 118-2002-PCM).

Este capítulo se centra en el período 1997-2002, en el marco del período en evaluación. Durante este período se tuvieron tres gobiernos que marcaron dos grandes períodos políticos en relación a la pobreza y seguridad alimentaria. El primero desde 1990 al 2001 (Gobierno de Ing. Alberto Fujimori); y el segundo con dos Gobiernos, el Gobierno de transición del Dr. Alberto Panigua de octubre 2001 a Julio 2002 y el Gobierno del Dr. Alejandro Toledo de Julio 2002 a la fecha (culminando en Julio 2006).

2.2.1.2. Situación general en términos de seguridad alimentaria

La FAO en su Informe sobre inseguridad alimentaria del 2001 señala que el Perú ha reducido la tasa de prevalencia de subnutrición⁴ de 41% a 13% en el período 1990/92 a 1997/99, siendo por lo tanto un caso altamente exitoso en reducir el nivel de inseguridad alimentaria. Este resultado debe ser relativizado, considerando los indicadores de pobreza ya señalados y otro indicador clave en sintetizar el estado de la seguridad alimentaria, la tasa de desnutrición crónica en menores de cinco años⁵.

La ENDES (DHS a nivel mundial), conducida por el INEI, presenta una tasa de desnutrición crónica para menores de 5 años para el año 2000 de 25.4% (alrededor de 700,000 niños y niñas). Luego de un descenso significativo para el período 1991-1996 de 36.5% a 25.8%, se habría generado un estancamiento para el año 2000 con una tasa de 25.4%.

¹ Proyección INEI 2003

² INEI 2002

³ INEI 2002

⁴ Subnutrición: Ingestión de alimentos continuamente insuficiente para satisfacer las necesidades de energía alimentaria. Este indicador se calcula en base a las Hojas de balance de alimentos que se continuaron haciendo en el Perú solamente hasta 1998.

⁵ Relación Talla/Edad

Los Censos de talla escolar de 1993 y 1999, señala que la tasa de desnutrición crónica a nivel nacional en escolares se redujo de 40 a 30%.

Más allá de estos valores nacionales, existen grandes diferencias entre las situaciones a nivel urbano (21%) y rural (56%) e incluso al interior de las ciudades (diferencias según estratos económicos en ciudades de entre 2.5 a 9 veces)⁶.

Veamos la situación en términos de las tres dimensiones básicas de seguridad alimentaria.

Disponibilidad

La disponibilidad de alimentos combina la oferta nacional, la importación y en menor medida las donaciones. En términos agregados el país es importador neto de productos agrícolas.

Respecto a las fuentes nacionales se puede afirmar que en la última década la producción agropecuaria ha tenido un crecimiento importante (tasa anual promedio de 5% del 1996 al 2001), pero con variaciones debidas a factores climáticos y de rentabilidad. Existen diversos factores que generan una situación de altos costos (desde caminos en mal estado hasta bajo nivel educativo del productor).

En cuanto a las importaciones, la tendencia a partir de 1997 ha sido a mantener un balance con períodos de ligero superávit comercial. Los principales productos de importación en términos de volumen son trigo, maíz amarillo duro, torta de soya, azúcar, aceite de soya y arroz.

Las donaciones de alimentos en la última década han promediado un valor de US\$ 80 millones que es menos del 1% de la oferta total de alimentos en el Perú. Se estima que aún este monto ira descendiendo más hasta ser totalmente prescindible.

En este contexto la producción nacional agropecuaria es la fuente principal de disponibilidad de alimentos. En valores de 1994 se ha estimado que la dependencia externa de la demanda total de alimentos es de 9.4%. Excepciones importantes son el trigo con alrededor del 90% de importación y maíz y aceites con una tasa de dependencia externa de 50%.

La disponibilidad en el período 1980-1998 ha sufrido variaciones. Los tubérculos y maíz amiláceo sufrieron caídas de hasta 50% con posteriores recuperaciones. Arroz, menestras y frutas mostraron una tendencia neta hacia el crecimiento, al igual que los productos pecuarios (a excepción de los lácteos). Pan y fideos mostraron una tendencia que condujo hacia el final del período a una reducción en la disponibilidad de 20-30% por debajo de 1980. Finalmente el pescado presenta un decrecimiento constante y significativo.

Acceso

Estando la disponibilidad de alimentos cubierta, el acceso a ingresos es considerado el factor clave para lograr la seguridad alimentaria de los hogares. El Perú en términos de ingresos es considerado un país de ingreso medio bajo con un ingreso per capita de US\$2,100 al año 2000. Sin embargo, este valor esconde la relación de un país con una distribución altamente inequitativa de los ingresos, Para el año 2001, el quintil más rico tenga ingresos 50 veces más altos que el quintil más pobre y que la diferencia entre los quintiles cuarto y quinto tengan una diferencia de 4.4 veces.

⁶ MINAG 2002

Una muestra de ello es que, en relación al gasto en alimentos, la situación ha venido empeorando a finales de la década última. Así, el gasto real en alimentos de las familias se redujo entre 1997 y el 2000 en 16.4%, pese al abaratamiento del costo de la canasta de alimentos entre -6.5% a -14.6%, según las regiones geográficas.

Los hogares en el área rural tienen un gasto en alimentos que corresponde al 73% de los ingresos y en el área urbana, por ejemplo, los hogares cuyo jefe es obrero de construcción, corresponde al 66% de sus ingresos.

Este hecho recuerda que el efecto de la estabilidad macroeconómica, en particular el control de la inflación, no ha podido lograr mejoras significativas en la economía familiar por la reducción de la actividad económica en su conjunto.

Empleo:

La situación del empleo en el Perú es preocupante. La tasa de empleo se ha mantenido en alrededor de 50% y una tasa de desempleo de 7% que se explica por la categoría intermedia de “subempleo”, 43%, que implica básicamente trabajo informal, sin contrato ni beneficios sociales.

Otra razón que explica la relativa baja tasa de subempleo es la movilidad en el empleo temporal. En promedio sólo 39.7% de las personas empleadas mantienen su empleo todo el año.

La participación de mujeres en el mercado laboral urbano llega al 43%. Esta participación es en condiciones más precarias de empleo que los hombres.

Uso de alimentos

Los problemas nutricionales que han sido discutidos en la sección superior en el acápite sobre disponibilidad tiene un claro soporte en la ingesta inadecuada de alimentos y su inadecuada utilización por el estado de salud y problemas infecciosos especialmente de los menores de dos años y sus madres. El círculo vicioso desnutrición-infección es el cuello de botella que se debe atacar. Prácticas inadecuadas de lactancia materna y alimentación complementaria en el primer año de vida, condicionadas por el bajo nivel educativo de la madre y servicios de información insuficientes o de mala calidad son asuntos claves en este tema. Existen para ello barreras geográficas, culturales y económicas que considerar.

En general en términos de cantidad, las familias urbanas consumen más que las rurales, probablemente debido a su mayor ingreso. En cuanto a tipos de alimentos, si bien el mayor gasto monetario se realiza en vegetales, su consumo es limitado y concentrado en los estratos más altos.

En cuanto a recursos hidrobiológicos el consumo es bajo. Para el año 2000 se limitó a 16.2 Kg. por persona/año, una cifra muy reducida para la potencialidad existente. Esto se explica más por actitudes de tipo cultural antes que razones lógicas.

Adicionalmente, los niveles de pobreza dificultan el acceso a los alimentos en condiciones óptimas de higiene lo que genera la presencia de enfermedades de transmisión alimentaria (ETAs) y enfermedades diarreicas agudas (EDAs).



Una mirada global/de síntesis

• Evolución de la pobreza

La desnutrición crónica está asociada en el Perú a la pobreza. El 35% de los niños menores de 5 años de hogares en extrema pobreza versus el 24% de hogares en pobreza no extrema y 13% de hogares no pobres sufren retardo en el crecimiento.

La pobreza se ha venido incrementando en el período 1997-2001 tanto en términos absolutos como relativos y tanto en las zonas urbana como rural. A nivel nacional pasó de 43% a 55% y en el ámbito rural de 68% a 77%. Esto implica en valores absolutos en cinco años más de dos millones de “nuevos pobres”, básicamente en áreas urbanas. Pese a este incremento de la pobreza urbana la tasa rural sigue siendo estructuralmente más alta (70% versus 36.9%).

El Estado ha buscado responder a esta situación con ayuda alimentaria que sin embargo se ha desarrollado con serias limitaciones de focalización y como paliativo temporal.



Fuente CIAS/PCM 2002 Bases

- **Pobreza según necesidades básicas insatisfechas (NBI)**

Considerando este enfoque el 35.2% de hogares a nivel nacional cuenta con al menos una NBI. A nivel rural el total de hogares bajo esta categoría se incrementa a 63%. Por áreas geográficas más del 50% de la población de la sierra y la selva se encuentran en esta situación (zonas además de mayor concentración de población indígena).

La educación traducida como asistencia a la escuela es una NBI con amplia cobertura con valores nacionales y regionales menores a 4%. Sin embargo diversos estudios señalan la mala calidad de la educación pública que limita sería los efectos reales de la asistencia escolar.

2.2.1.3. Principales actores y Programas

En el marco de la lucha contra la pobreza se desarrollan diversos programas y proyectos que cubren diversos temas del campo de la seguridad alimentaria. Una reciente consultoria de Maria Inés Sánchez-Griñan para la Comisión de Seguridad Alimentaria coordinada por el CIAS, con apoyo de la FAO, identificó alrededor de 100 programas y proyectos del sector público en ejecución.

Esta sección considera los de mayor envergadura y carácter nacional. No se trata de proyectos que estén definidos, necesariamente como de seguridad alimentaria, peor se relacionan directamente con alguna dimensión de la seguridad alimentaria.

Estado (y donantes)

En el Anexo 5 se detallan los tipos de programas sociales, componentes temáticos, instituciones ejecutoras y principales fuentes cooperantes y donantes en cada caso.


La mayoría de los programas sociales relacionados con la temática de seguridad alimentaria han recibido apoyo técnico y financiero de entidades multilaterales y donaciones de países europeos, Estados Unidos y Japón principalmente. Los apoyos se han expresado en donaciones en dinero para ejecución de programas públicos y en el desarrollo de Fondos de contravalor para lucha contra la pobreza (por ejemplo en vigencia durante el período de evaluación Alemania, Suiza y Canada).

El donante más significativo en términos de seguridad alimentaria es USAID a través del Programa derivado de la “Public Law 480” y que se describe en la siguiente sección por ser ejecutado directamente por ONGs.

Durante el Gobierno del Ing. Fujimori estos proyectos y programas trabajaron con poca coordinación y distribuidos en diversos ministerios. A modo de ejemplo los Ministerios de Salud, Educación y la Promoción de la Mujer y Desarrollo humano (ex PROMUDEH actual MIMDES) tenían proyectos de donación de alimentos; no había articulación entre los responsables de obras de infraestructura en salud y educación (Ministerio de la Presidencia) y los responsables de proveer el personal necesario para laborar en estas instalaciones (CTARes y Ministerios sectoriales). Estos puntos vienen siendo trabajados reubicando los proyectos en las áreas técnicas sectoriales respectivas, pero ello supone un costo importante en términos de recursos humanos formados e ineficiencias varias.

Además se mantienen debilidades estructurales: ausencia de una instancia supraministerial de coordinación efectiva que evite superposición, desarrollo de instrumentos y decisión política efectiva para una focalización en extrema pobreza.

A modo de ejemplo, el Programa del Vaso de leche presenta una sub cobertura (personas que deberían ser beneficiarios y no lo son) de 71%, un 42% de infiltrados (personas que reciben el beneficio sin ser parte del grupo objetivo) (Vasquez y Winkelried 10-12:2003).



Fuente CIAS/PCM 2002 Bases

ONGs

Las ONGs (internacionales y locales) con fondos de la cooperación internacional canalizan alrededor de 300 millones de dólares al año según Valderrama citado en Vásquez (163:2002)⁷. Los fondos principales provienen de Estados Unidos y Europa.

El 27% de las ONGs realizan sus actividades en Lima y el 64% en la sierra sur, lo cual puede explicarse por ser éstas, zonas de pobreza extrema (sierra sur) y de mayor número absoluto de población en pobreza (Lima).

Muchos de los proyectos que ejecutan las diversas ONGs internacionales y locales abordan alguna dimensión de la seguridad alimentaria ya que, en general, están orientadas al desarrollo de capacidades en recursos humanos (educación y capacitación).

En términos específicos de seguridad alimentaria, en el campo de las ONGs se cuenta con el Programa de seguridad alimentaria de USAID con fondos de la Public Law 480 de los Estados Unidos (ayuda alimentaria directa y monetización). El Programa en el período 1998-2001 fue ejecutado por seis instituciones: ADRA-Ofasa, CARE, Caritas, CRS, Prisma y Technoserve con un presupuesto total de 179.87 millones de dólares. La fase actual se ha iniciado en el año 2002 y tiene previsto culminar el 2008 es desarrollada por ADRA-Ofasa, CARE, Caritas y Prisma. El presupuesto total para los 7 años es de alrededor de 114 millones de dólares (16.27 millones anuales).

Otro programa importante de USAID es el desarrollo de los centros regionales de desarrollo económico que buscan potenciar el desarrollo de “corredores económicos” y a través de cadenas productivas incrementar el empleo del ámbito de intervención.

Aunque los montos mencionados son significativos en términos absolutos, Vásquez y Mendizabal señalan que en el campo de alimentación y nutrición el 92% del gasto de proyectos corre a cargo el Estado. Evidentemente el aporte de las ONGs pasa por desarrollar

⁷ Tomando como referencia el año 1999.

experiencias innovativas en ámbitos menores y contribuir en la incidencia en las temáticas que trabaja antes que asumir las responsabilidades del Estado.

Sector privado

En cuanto al sector privado, existen experiencias de empresas que desarrollan acciones focalizadas en su entorno bajo un enfoque de responsabilidad social empresarial en el campo de la seguridad alimentaria.

Predominan las experiencias de empresas mineras. Las principales ejecutan los siguientes programas: Programa de incremento del empleo en el circuito turístico nororiental – Cajamarca (Minera Yanacocha), Programa de Desarrollo Agrícola -San Marcos, Ancash (Antamina) y Desarrollo de empresas comunales rurales –Huaraz (Barrick Misquichilka). Otros ejemplos diversos ramos son: Exportación de cerámica de pequeños artesanos de Chulucana – Piura (Allpa S.A.C), el Programa de reciclaje para la mejora de la producción láctea – Trujillo (Damper S.A.) y el Programa de fomento de microempresas textiles – Arequipa (Inca Tops).

Mecanismos de coordinación y articulación

Si bien durante el período estudiado se formaron múltiples comisiones de trabajo multisectoriales y con representantes de la cooperación y ONGs, éstas no han tenido un funcionamiento efectivo. En la actualidad existe una nueva instancia que ha estado trabajando con cierta continuidad luego de la última Cumbre mundial de la alimentación (Octubre 2002).

El Estado peruano ha conformado en noviembre del 2002 la Comisión multisectorial de seguridad alimentaria como ente orientador de la política en este tema en articulación con la estrategia de superación de la pobreza (DS No 118-2002-PCM).

Esta Comisión es presidida por la Secretaria técnica del CIAS de la Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros. La secretaria técnica está a cargo del Ministerio de agricultura. La Comisión está integrada por los Ministerios de Comercio exterior y turismo, Educación, Mujer y desarrollo social, Producción, Relaciones exteriores, Salud y Trabajo y promoción del empleo; además del Presidente de la Mesa de concertación de lucha contra la pobreza.

Esta Comisión a su vez ha conformado un Comité técnico integrado por instancias operativas (Direcciones generales y Organismos públicos desconcentrados de los Ministerios integrantes), ONGs, Sociedad Nacional de Industria y otros participantes de la sociedad civil.

La Comisión cuenta con una estrategia de seguridad alimentaria (en versión preliminar), elaborada por el Comité técnico, que comprende cuatro ejes estratégicos:

- Protección social de los grupos vulnerables
- Competitividad de la oferta alimentaria nacional
- Fortalecimiento de capacidades para el manejo de riesgos en seguridad alimentaria a nivel local, regional y nacional
- Marco institucional a nivel local, regional y nacional para modernizar la gestión en seguridad alimentaria

2.2.1.4. Política nacional y estrategia para la SA

Formulación de políticas

La seguridad alimentaria ha sido estrechamente relacionada en el Perú con la pobreza tanto en sus dimensiones de acceso (generación de ingresos) como de uso de alimentos (especialmente acceso a servicios de salud de calidad, servicios básicos como agua potable/segura y educación en especial de las madres). En este sentido, para el período de análisis se identifican dos enfoques respecto a la política de seguridad alimentaria: uno específico al tema, y un segundo articulado a la pobreza como eje de la política social.

En el primer caso se pueden señalar como hitos los siguientes documentos:

- “Informe nacional Seguridad alimentaria en el Perú para la Cumbre mundial sobre la alimentación de 1996”, producido por la Comisión multisectorial de seguridad alimentaria Cumbre mundial sobre la alimentación en Noviembre de 1996, presidida por el Ministerio de Agricultura (Gobierno del Ing. Fujimori)
- “Plan Nacional de nutrición y alimentación Nutrición al alcance de todos 1998-2000” producido por la Comisión Multisectorial de Política nutricional, liderada por la Presidencia, en Junio de 1998 (Gobierno del Ing. Fujimori)
- “Propuesta Lineamientos de política y estrategia nacional de alimentación y nutrición” producido por la Comisión multisectorial de alimentación y nutrición que presidió el Ministerio de salud, en Julio 2001 (Gobierno de transición del Dr Paniagua 2001/02)
- “Acuerdo nacional” dedica el acuerdo decimoquinto a la Seguridad alimentaria.
- “Informe nacional sobre la seguridad alimentaria en el Perú, hacia una estrategia nacional concertada contra el hambre” producida por el Grupo de trabajo multisectorial de seguridad alimentaria en Octubre del 2002, liderado por el Ministerio de Agricultura (Gobierno del Dr. Toledo 2002-2006)
- “Estrategia nacional de seguridad alimentaria 2004-2015” (versión preliminar) producida por el Comité técnico de la Comisión multisectorial de seguridad alimentaria en Enero 2004, presidida por el CIAS/PCM (Gobierno del Dr. Toledo 2002-2006)

Cada uno de estos documentos fue formulado con propuestas de acción, pero en la práctica no presentan continuidad, en tanto en la agenda social del Estado prevaleció una preocupación por la reducción de la pobreza como eje de trabajo.

En la actualidad se cuenta con una nueva oportunidad de que la estrategia señalada como documento quinto se lleve a la práctica.

En el segundo enfoque se cuenta con tres documentos hito:

- La “Estrategia focalizada de lucha contra la pobreza” (1996-2000) durante el gobierno de Alberto Fujimori
- La Carta social (Noviembre 2001)
- La “Estrategia de superación de la pobreza y oportunidades económicas para los pobres” (Mayo 2002) en aplicación por el Gobierno actual.
- Adicionalmente durante el Gobierno de transición del Dr. Paniagua, con participación de la Iglesia católica, se crean las Mesas de lucha contra la pobreza (de nivel nacional,

regional y en menor medida provincial y distrital) que contribuyen a delinear la política social del Estado con participación de la sociedad civil.

A nivel internacional, el gobierno ha asumido compromisos en la Conferencia Internacional de Nutrición (1991), Cumbre Mundial sobre la Alimentación (FAO, 1996 y 2002), la Declaración del Milenio (NNUU, 2002) y la Declaración de Quirama (Junio 2003) del Consejo Presidencial Andino. Esta última señala que el Consejo Andino de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores debe establecer los lineamientos de una Política de Seguridad Alimentaria Sub Regional.

Implementación de la política en el período 1996-2001

Durante el segundo gobierno del Ing. Fujimori la política de seguridad alimentaria se formuló a través de dos programas (uno de carácter universalista y el otro focalizado):

El “Programa de Mejora del Gasto social básico”:

Este Programa se inicia en 1994 y tiene por objetivo la promoción de la igualdad de oportunidad para todos mediante el aumento y mejora en el acceso a los bienes y servicios esenciales de calidad adecuada.

Los campos de acción comprendían: promoción del empleo temporal, salud, educación, seguridad, servicios públicos e infraestructura y se ejecutarían a través de los ministerios.

La “Estrategia focalizada de lucha contra la pobreza extrema”

Este programa se trazó como meta reducir para el año 2000 la pobreza extrema a la mitad. La focalización combino los criterios geográfico y demográfico, partiendo del Censo nacional de población y vivienda 1993, el Censo nacional de talla escolar y la Encuesta nacional de niveles de vida 1994.

Se seleccionaron 212 distritos con un índice alto de Necesidades básicas insatisfechas (y que a su vez tenían menos de 5,000 habitantes) y 182 distritos con más de 5,000 habitantes en pobreza extrema. Se incluyeron además 25 distritos que cumplían ambos criterios. Se contaba entonces con 419 distritos que incluían al 60% de los pobres extremos del país.

La estrategia comprendía tres líneas de acción:

- Asistencia social: nutrición a niños en edad escolar y otros grupos vulnerables y planificación familiar
- Infraestructura social: salud pública (postas médicas), sistemas de agua potable y desagüe y educación básica (construcción y equipamiento de escuelas)
- Infraestructura económica: caminos (para acercar los distritos al mercado) pequeñas obras de irrigación y electrificación

Pero el análisis de las acciones ejecutadas muestra que, si bien hubo avances en diversos aspectos, no hubo mucha correlación entre la propuesta de política y su ejecución. Si bien mejoró el acceso a servicios básicos en las zonas rurales, la mayor proporción de los nuevos beneficiarios vivía en zonas urbanas. El quintil 1 (el más pobre) no fue el más beneficiado, sino el quintil 2. El quintil más rico, el 5to, recibió en porcentaje prácticamente lo mismo que el quintil más pobre. En la práctica no se focalizaron los gastos ni los impactos en los más pobres.

Si bien el gasto social se incremento significativamente, de doce programas principales, solamente FONCODES (Fondo de inversión social) orientó más de 50% (el 68%) de su gasto

a las zonas rurales. (Parodi 431/32:2001). En muchos casos además el gasto tuvo un comportamiento temporal electoral (obras inmedatistas no sostenibles).

Implementación de la política a partir de Julio 2002

El enfoque del Gobierno del Dr. Toledo se sustenta en cinco principios básicos:

- La universalización de los servicios básicos y una mejora sustantiva de su calidad;
- La generación de oportunidades económicas para las personas en situación de pobreza a partir de un crecimiento económico con orientación redistributiva;
- Un proceso de descentralización y manejo eficiente del gasto y la inversión social;
- El involucramiento y acceso de las personas en situación de pobreza a canales de participación para que sus demandas sean atendidas y tengan la capacidad para salir de la pobreza por sus propios medios; y,
- Un soporte institucional que permita la integralidad de las acciones en un marco de coordinación y concertación, local, regional y nacional.

Estos principios implican un proceso en marcha que se traduce actualmente en:

1. Una profunda racionalización e integración de programas y proyectos:

- Unificación de programas alimentarios en una entidad, integración de proyectos de infraestructura con los sectores respectivos
- Construcción de una plataforma común de los programas sociales en un ministerio (MIMDES)
- Creación del Seguro integral de salud con los más pobres como público prioritario.

Este proceso está aún en construcción y no está exento de contradicciones y balances de intereses en pugna (Gobiernos locales, regionales y central y grupos con intereses políticos). La Unión europea está desarrollando proyectos de apoyo a este proceso de descentralización;



2. Instituir una gerencia social para lograr resultados eficaces y costo efectivos:

Reforzar el rol de la PCM a través del CIAS como conductor del Plan nacional de lucha contra la pobreza.

3. Descentralizar y entregar capacidades de gestión y decisión: descentralización de programas sociales a gobiernos locales en forma gradual según cumplimiento de competencias, creación del Sistema nacional descentralizado de salud (con participación de la sociedad civil), desarrollo de presupuestos regionales participativos.

Los principales cuellos de botella del conjunto de estos programas son el alto nivel de filtración, que representa con cifras que superan más del 50% de población no objetivo beneficiada, la subcobertura y la presencia de débiles sistemas de planificación, monitoreo y evaluación que permitan conocer la eficiencia y efectividad de las intervenciones para su inmediata reorientación cuando proceda o validación.

2.2.1.5. Principales retos e inconvenientes para lograr la seguridad alimentaria del país

La inseguridad alimentaria es un problema que en términos nacionales se ubica principalmente en la población pobre que en mayor medida corresponden e a las áreas rurales del país (con énfasis en la sierra y selva y en la población de raíz indígena). El reto entonces es reducir la pobreza.

En el marco de un enfoque de seguridad alimentaria, el mejoramiento de ingresos de los hogares y las condiciones de salud y educación, en especial de los grupos más vulnerables (mujeres en edad fértil y niños menores de dos años), son los aspectos claves en los que se debe incidir.

El liderazgo del Estado (a nivel nacional, regional y local) es fundamental y aquí el reto principal pasa por mejorar significativamente la gestión pública de los programas sociales en articulación con la sociedad civil (ONGs y organizaciones sociales). En este marco entre las intervenciones estratégicas que permitan superar las limitaciones actuales en reducir los niveles de inseguridad alimentaria se deben considerar las siguientes:

1. Racionalización de la intervención pública en la lucha contra la pobreza (“de los lineamientos a su implementación”):

- a. Coordinación intersectorial con un liderazgo supraministerial de la PCM a través del CIAS y un enfoque territorial local (distrital-provincial) y regional (“corredores económicos”)
- b. Mecanismos de planificación (especialmente identificación de beneficiarios), monitoreo y evaluación integrados y multisectoriales de intervenciones en seguridad alimentaria
- c. Fortalecer la creación de personal técnico estable en los sectores públicos de salud, educación y demás sectores sociales para la implementación de las políticas (en especial a nivel local y regional)
- d. Asegurar en el proceso de descentralización en marcha una participación de los hogares más pobres en la gestión pública y una focalización del gasto social en este grupo.

- e. Participación efectiva de la sociedad civil en la priorización de intervenciones: vigilancia social de la gestión para verificar el cumplimiento de los lineamientos de política
- 2. Focalizar la ayuda alimentaria con carácter temporal, limitado y orientado hacia situaciones de emergencia y extrema vulnerabilidad
- 3. Incorporar la seguridad alimentaria como una dimensión específica de la lucha contra la pobreza –en términos operativos- comprendiendo sus tres facetas básicas: disponibilidad, acceso y uso de alimentos
- 4. Aprovechar el “bono demográfico”: El Perú tiene una oportunidad histórica para el desarrollo de sus recursos humanos por el momento de transición demográfica e que se encontraría hasta el año 2030 con una tasa de dependencia de tercera edad que se mantiene y un descenso significativo de dependencia juvenil por el descenso de la tasa de fecundidad.

2.2.1.6. Conclusiones

El Perú mantiene una situación de inseguridad alimentaria estructural que se centra en las dimensiones de acceso y uso de alimentos, en particular la población rural y de raíz indígena en la sierra y selva son las más afectadas (77% de la población rural en pobreza). El Estado ha respondido con múltiples programas con escasa coordinación y débil conocimiento de su impacto. El apoyo de las ONGs y el sector privado es limitado en montos y cobertura por su propia naturaleza subsidiaria del Estado.

El ingreso de la población pobre es sumamente bajo. Con un ingreso anual per capita de US\$2,100, el quintil más rico tiene ingresos 50 veces más altos que el quintil más pobre. Sólo el 50% de la población está adecuadamente empleada.

En cuanto al uso de alimentos, factores que requieren atención son prácticas inadecuadas de lactancia materna, alimentación complementaria en el primer año de vida (estrechamente relacionados con el bajo nivel educativo de la madre y servicios de información nulos o de mala calidad), y bajo acceso a agua potable y saneamiento básico.

El Estado peruano pese a múltiples planes, no ha asumido la seguridad alimentaria como un enfoque de desarrollo. Sin embargo, a través de una preocupación por la pobreza como prioridad en la agenda social, responde a muchos retos de la seguridad alimentaria.

En el Gobierno actual existen propuestas valiosas en términos de desarrollar programas no asistencialistas, con mecanismos de participación ciudadana y vigilancia social; pero que están aún en proceso de implementación inicial. En términos de capacidad institucional pública se debe tener en cuenta el contexto social adverso producto de la débil institucionalidad política luego de los 10 años del Gobierno del Ing. Fujimori.

Se puede finalmente señalar cuatro medidas recomendables para reducir el grado de inseguridad alimentaria en la población en pobreza: racionalización de la intervención pública en la lucha contra la pobreza (en el marco de los diagnósticos ya disponibles), focalizar la ayuda alimentaria a lo estrictamente necesario, incorporar explícitamente la seguridad alimentaria como una dimensión específica de la lucha contra la pobreza y aprovechar el “bono demográfico” del país en términos de mayor número de personas como población económicamente activa por un período de no más de 25 años.

2.3. Resumen de la Misión

La Misión en Perú fue llevada a cabo por Pierre Van Roosbroeck consultor europeo como team leader y Ricardo Furman, consultor peruano durante los días 23 de Febrero y 15 de marzo. Previamente ambos consultores participaron en la Comisión en Bruselas de un Seminario de cinco días con los restantes consultores que desarrollan las muestras en los otros nueve países y con los técnicos de la CE para la preparación de la Evaluación en su fase de terreno.

Se efectuó una visita de terreno a dos regiones del ámbito del PASA, Huancavlica y Junín. Un detalle cronológico de la Misión (Plan de Trabajo) y la Lista general de las personas entrevistadas se incluyen como anexos en este Informe de País.

Siguiendo la propuesta realizada en el Informe de la Primera Fase, la metodología ha sido muy variada, incluyendo los siguientes aspectos en la recolección de información:

- Análisis documental: se han revisado informes del PASA, consultorías de evaluación y sistematización, así como bibliografía de la políticas públicas de reducción y superación de la pobreza
- Entrevistas: Se han realizado diversos tipos de entrevistas con los diversos implicados en la materia, tanto responsables o gestores, como representantes de organismos, ONG participantes a diversos niveles.
- Talleres de trabajo: Con la UTSA se tuvieron dos talleres de presentación y análisis del Programa y dos reuniones de discusión de los resultados.
- Visitas al terreno: Se visitaron intervenciones de las tres líneas de intervención de ayuda directa. Además de las entrevistas con los responsables se pudo tener contactos con beneficiarios directos y funcionarios participantes de distinto nivel y responsabilidad.

2.4. Limitaciones

En general, pese a lo corto de la misión para una temática de tanta envergadura, hemos tenido un acceso suficiente a fuentes directas a través de las entrevistas y a fuentes documentales. La colaboración de la UTSA y la Delegación en proveer información, contactos y permitir una discusión abierta ha sido muy buena. De igual manera la actitud de las contrapartes del Estado ha asido abierta en expresar sus puntos de vista francos y críticos. De esta manera se ha logrado conocer de primera mano los logros y limitaciones del Programa.

Sin embargo, creemos necesario hacer algunas consideraciones que deben permitir poner en su contexto el presente informe:

- No se trató de elaborar una evaluación la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria, sino mas bien de estudiar y analizar las estrategias y las políticas que se desprenden de la aplicación del Reglamento 13292/96. .
- El factor tiempo: el tiempo de dos semanas para el trabajo de campo en Lima y regiones fue reducido considerando las distancias en el Perú, en particular tratandose de distritos en extrema pobreza y por tanto con mayores dificultades para llegar. En este sentido la interacción con la población beneficiaria y autoridades locales fue relativamente limitada.
- No se pudieron visitar proyectos de ONGs en función del tiempo disponible y la lejanía de estos respecto a los distritos seleccionados.

- Finalmente no se tuvo interacción con otras fuentes cooperantes e instituciones que trabajen la temática de seguridad alimentaria desde ONGs o proyectos bilaterales

2.5. Agradecimientos

Los consultores agradecen la colaboración prestada por todo el personal técnico y administrativo de la UTSA y de Delegación de la Comisión europea en Lima, así como al personal del Convenio con el MIMDES en Huancavelica y Junín, así como las personas entrevistadas del Gobierno central, Gobiernos regionales de Huancavelica y Junín, Gobiernos locales, la ONG DESCO en Huancavelica y varios consultores y ex funcionarios públicos que compartieron su tiempo y valiosa experiencia con el PASA.

3. RESPUESTAS A LAS CUESTIONES EVALUATIVAS

3.1. Cuestión evaluativa 1

No aplica a evaluaciones de país

3.2. Cuestión Evaluativa 2

¿Cual es el nivel de integración de las políticas de SA en la estrategia de desarrollo de la Comisión definida en el CSPs?

La ayuda directa en SA (el PASA) está incluida en el CSP como una línea de la CE orientada hacia la lucha contra la pobreza (objetivo principal de desarrollo de la cooperación de la CE). El PASA es consistente en términos de “Principios de cooperación⁸”: se concentra en un sector clave para el desarrollo social del país (población en pobreza) y busca una mejor relación de la CE con los Ministerios (mediante la modalidad de aporte presupuestal a las políticas sociales del Estado).

Temas transversales que la CE considera actualmente que deben incorporarse en sus distintos programas no están explícitamente incluidos, lo cual se explica en el hecho que el diseño del PASA es bastante anterior a la definición de estos temas como transversales. Medio ambiente que es parte de la estrategia de país, está ausente. Un segundo tema importante es la prevención de desastres que se ejecutó solamente a través de la ayuda indirecta. Finalmente el enfoque de género sólo fue incorporado en una línea de intervención, los “Núcleos ejecutores mixtos”.

Por otro lado, el PASA es consistente en cuatro de los ocho criterios que el CSP establece para definir “Ámbitos de intervención prioritaria⁹”: importancia de la reducción de la pobreza (tema central del PASA), coherencia con las prioridades del Gobierno (trabaja en base a políticas públicas), lecciones aprendidas de la experiencia pasada (mecanismo generado y mejorado durante su ejecución) y capacidad de la CE para gestionar y supervisar los programas (operativamente a cargo de la UTSA bajo supervisión de la Delegación).

Finalmente, el área geográfica del programa (zonas de extrema pobreza) complementa otras intervenciones de la CE en zonas de pobreza urbana y otras zonas rurales¹⁰, además de articularse estrechamente con proyectos sectoriales como Amares en salud y de apoyo a Gobiernos regionales como AGORAH. Sin embargo, el PASA es un complemento antes que un programa articulado a los demás intervenciones (a excepción de AGORAH¹¹). En general, no se han establecido criterios geográficos para priorización de áreas entre los proyectos de lucha contra la pobreza.

Respecto a la línea de ayuda indirecta (B7-2010), está explícitamente incorporada como un mecanismo de cooperación (cofinanciación de las ONGs) que incluye como uno de sus temas la SA. En 1998 se articularon proyectos iniciados por ECHO en relación al “Fenómeno del Niño” (relación emergencia-rehabilitación) y se continuó con diversos proyectos hasta completar 11 proyectos. Los proyectos son coherentes y complementarios con la ayuda

⁸ Sección 5.2. en el CSP

⁹ Sección 5.3 en el CSP

¹⁰ Por ejemplo Cordillera negra y Desarrollo integral la Libertad-Cajamarca

¹¹ Este es un proyecto de reciente formulación, que utiliza explícitamente lecciones de la experiencia de trabajo con Municipalidades apoyadas financieramente por el PASA.

directa y desarrollan mecanismo innovativos en diversos temas. Son un aporte a la Delegación en términos de posibles modelos.

Se puede afirmar que existe coherencia entre los objetivos de la Política de SA (ayuda directa e indirecta) y el CSP. La temática de SA es importante para la estrategia de país en el marco de la reducción de la pobreza y complementar las acciones del Gobierno.

Es importante precisar que el CSP que se toma como referencia corresponde al período 2002-06 (cinco años luego de iniciado el PASA).

Respuesta general a la cuestión evaluativa 2:

El PASA está integrado a la estrategia de país de la CE: se concentra en la población en pobreza que es un sector clave para el desarrollo social del país, busca una mejor relación de la CE con los Ministerios trabajando desde las políticas públicas, trabaja con un enfoque de aprendizaje de la experiencia pasada y fortalece la capacidad de la CE para gestionar y supervisar los programas.

Además, complementa otras intervenciones de la CE en zonas de pobreza urbana y otras zonas rurales y se articula con proyectos en marcha en zonas comunes. Sin embargo, el PASA es un complemento antes que un programa articulado con los otros proyectos de lucha contra la pobreza.

La ayuda indirecta en SA (uno de los campos de la cofinanciación de las ONGs) es también una línea incluida en la cooperación en curso de la CE en el Perú hasta el año actual (2004), según el acuerdo de Bruselas.

Se puede afirmar que, existe coherencia entre los objetivos de la Política de SA (ayuda directa e indirecta) y el CSP. La temática de SA es importante para la estrategia de país, en el marco de la reducción de la pobreza y complementar las acciones del Gobierno.

Se debe precisar que el CSP corresponde al período 2002-06, es decir cinco años luego de iniciado el PASA. Durante el período previo al CSP, en el que el marco orientador de la Delegación fue el Programa indicativo, el PASA fue un Programa orientador central.

3.3. Cuestión Evaluativa 3

¿Cuál es la coherencia entre las políticas y estrategias en Seguridad Alimentaria de la Comisión con las estrategias nacionales, específicamente en la PRSP?

En la vida del PASA el Estado peruano establece dos marcos de política en relación a la pobreza¹² En el año 2003 el Gobierno del Perú, mediante el CIAS en su rol de coordinador supra-ministerial, establece como marco orientador oficial de la lucha contra la pobreza. el documento “Bases para la estrategia nacional de superación de la pobreza y oportunidades económicas para los pobres” enmarcada por el crecimiento económico, el manejo eficiente y descentralizado del gasto social y la participación ciudadana. La estrategia cuenta con un sistema de monitoreo con 20 indicadores que incluye como único indicador síntesis del conjunto de la SA, la desnutrición de niños de menos de 5 años. El Comité Técnico del CIAS esta encargado de coordinar esta estrategia en base a un plan de trabajo de 7 años.

Previamente en 1996 el documento orientador del Estado respecto a la pobreza había sido “Elementos de la estrategia focalizada de lucha contra la pobreza extrema 1996-2000”, en cuya formulación el PASA estuvo muy cercano. Se planteaba la necesidad de focalizarse en los distritos más pobres y actuar mediante la inversión social como “palanca de oportunidades” de los más pobres. Esta estrategia considera también la desnutrición crónica en menores de cinco años como un indicador clave de selección de ámbitos.

Por otro lado, el CIAS ha producido en Enero del 2004 una estrategia de SA (no oficial aún). Es un documento orientativo, pero sin compromisos de Gobierno a seguir. Presenta una serie de vacíos importantes para implementar una política. No describe cómo implementar las metas necesarias para lograr a los objetivos. No se establece un sistema de monitoreo inter-ministerial de la estrategia. Tampoco existe un marco lógico de la estrategia propuesta, ni una priorización de las orientaciones definidas. Finalmente, no precisa una estrategia para llegar a atender la pobreza extrema (15 % de la población del país) que se caracteriza por una vulnerabilidad constante de SA.

El PASA desarrolla estos marcos institucionales a nivel local, mediante el desarrollo de planes municipales con un enfoque de seguridad alimentaria, a través de la priorización de obras para el acceso a productos alimentarios y mercados locales y; a niveles regionales y nacionales, en los campos de salud y educación al focalizar sus fondos en la población más excluida.

Un nuevo proyecto de la CE que parte y complementa la acción del PASA, el proyecto denominado AGORAH, profundiza y expande el PASA mediante el apoyo a la realización de planes de desarrollo provincial y regional en las regiones de Ayacucho y Huancavelica (las regiones más pobres del área de intervención del PASA). No se ha incluido la Región de Junín donde PASA apoya los planes municipales en la zona de selva alta (Chanchamayo-Satipo) por tener un nivel relativo menor de pobreza.

El PASA cumple también con la Estrategia nacional de lucha contra la pobreza en los temas culturales (educación bilingüe), salud (atención a la mortalidad infantil y a madres gestantes y atención a la población excluida), participación ciudadana y descentralización. La dimensión de acceso en SA se establece como una prioridad nacional mediante el incremento de los ingresos de los pobres por la creación de empleos.

¹² El Perú no está en la lista de países que debe contar con un ERCEP

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 3: (Perú no cuenta con un PRSP)

En el año 2003 el Gobierno del Perú establece como marco orientador oficial de la lucha contra la pobreza el documento “Bases para la estrategia nacional de superación de la pobreza y oportunidades económicas para los pobres” enmarcada por el crecimiento económico, el manejo eficiente y descentralizado del gasto social y la participación ciudadana. La estrategia cuenta con un sistema de monitoreo con 20 indicadores que incluye como único indicador síntesis del conjunto de la SA, la desnutrición de niños de menos de 5 años. El Comité Técnico del CIAS esta encargado de coordinar esta estrategia en base a un plan de trabajo de 7 años.

Previamente, en 1996, el documento orientador del Estado respecto a la pobreza había sido “Elementos de la estrategia focalizada de lucha contra la pobreza extrema 1996-2000” en cuya formulación el PASA estuvo muy cercano. Se planteaba la necesidad de focalizarse en los distritos más pobres y actuar mediante la inversión social como “palanca de oportunidades” de los más pobres. Esta estrategia considera también la desnutrición crónica en menores de cinco años como un indicador clave de selección de ámbitos.

En el año 2002 el MINAG publica el “Informe nacional sobre seguridad alimentaria en el Perú” que se articula al documento de “Bases de...” mencionado y pone la pobreza como un tema clave.

El Comité Técnico del CIAS ha preparado participativamente un documento (no oficial aún) de Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria 2004-2015 para la orientación general de la política de SA con varias metas específicas para lograr a los resultados esperados pero sin compromiso específicos.

Las estrategias de SA del PASA están implementadas a través programas orientados a la lucha contra la pobreza consistente con el conjunto de las orientaciones políticas mencionadas.

3.4. Cuestión Evaluativa 4

¿Cual es el valor añadido de la Ayuda en Especie en aras de contribuir a que se consigan los objetivos generales marcados en la Regulación para Seguridad alimentaria?

El Perú fue clasificado en base al Reglamento No 1292/96 –de junio de 1996- como un país con inseguridad alimentaria estructural. Por ello se le asigna, en el marco de la política de seguridad alimentaria, programas de asistencia técnica y financiera y se descarta el apoyo alimentario en especie.

3.5. Cuestión Evaluativa 5

¿Cual es el valor añadido del mecanismo “Apoyo al presupuestario (AP)” de la Regulación con relación a los objetivos de SA que la propia regulación plantea?

Pertinencia:

Las precondiciones del uso del AP han sido favorecidas por la existencia de estructuras estatales disponibles hasta el nivel municipal. En el nivel más cercano al beneficiario, la comunidad local o nativa, no llega directamente el esquema institucional del estado. La posibilidad de asegurar que las comunidades más pobres de una municipalidad distrital sean beneficiadas en los planes está considerada en la estrategia pero se requiere asegurar mecanismos en la formulación y ejecución de los planes para que así suceda siempre.

El PASA ha sido pionero en trabajar bajo un enfoque de descentralización y fortalecimiento de gobiernos locales, asignando fondos directamente a estos, y trabajando bajo las normas de administrativas regulares del Estado (a diferencia de otros organismos internacionales como el BM que establece su propia normatividad sin fortalecer así capacidades locales).

En este aspecto, el componente de fortalecimiento institucional jugó un papel importante, mayor al esperado inicialmente. La capacitación de funcionarios de nivel local y regional fue un factor clave en lograr proyectos con los estándares mínimos de calidad requeridos¹³.

Pero, este enfoque ha estado orientado solamente al sector de inversión social, mas no en cuanto a los sectores salud y educación, en los que ha prevalecido un trabajo vertical y centralizado, en especial por la voluntad de los sectores.

Efectividad:

Existe ahora un mecanismo casi irreversible de desarrollo descentralizado que se ajusta más a las necesidades de los beneficiarios. Los planes locales de los distritos financiados por el PASA han generado expectativas altas a nivel local que no se pueden satisfacer con los presupuestos disponibles (del PASA y del Estado).

El PASA ha apoyado financieramente principalmente el acceso al mercado, y en menor medida la disponibilidad local, de acuerdo a lo establecido en los planes locales desarrollados por la población. La prioridad en los planes ha sido la realización de obras (carreteras y puentes) para mejorar el acceso a los bienes alimentarios.

¹³ El Perú cuenta con un exigente Sistema de Administración Pública que debe aprobar todo expediente técnico de proyectos desde el nivel local hasta el nacional.

El Ministerio de la Presidencia, y el MIMDES luego¹⁴, prestó asesoría técnica a las poblaciones que elaboraron los planes mediante el personal que actuó como soporte técnico del nivel central y regional del Gobierno del Convenio PASA del MIPRE/MIMDES-CE.

Cabe indicar que la continuidad de este personal fue un factor importante en la calidad de la asesoría. Esta continuidad, poco común en la dinámica pública, es en parte atribuible al valor que los Gobiernos peruanos le han otorgado al PASA.

En cuanto a salud, se podría haber tenido mayores avances, teniendo en cuenta a nivel regional la presencia de instancias más organizadas (las DIRESAs). El apoyo del PASA al sector educativo favorecerá también el acceso a la SA, pero a más largo plazo. En el sector educación se hubiese requerido Direcciones regionales más consolidadas para logros más inmediatos y de mejor calidad.

En ambos sectores se presentan limitaciones para un trabajo a nivel local si se quiere desarrollar intervenciones desde el sector, considerando el bajo monto relativo que invierte el PASA frente al presupuesto global de ambos sectores¹⁵. Cabe reflexionar sobre una estrategia de fortalecimiento del rol de los gobiernos locales a través de planes de desarrollo que incorporasen estas dimensiones de la seguridad alimentaria para intervenciones más sostenibles. El apoyo a CLAS es una situación intermedia, por su carácter de instancias de gestión local en salud¹⁶.

Aquí se abre la pregunta “ex post” sobre el nivel de injerencia que la CE debe tener en delinear el Programa bajo un enfoque de AP para el logro de sus objetivos: ¿mayor cumplimiento riguroso del instrumento en términos de definición de políticas desde el Estado o definición más propia de las decisiones de inversión en la Comisión? ¿Cómo entender el acompañamiento? El PASA optó por la estrategia balanceada (inversión social con gobiernos locales y salud y educación con las reglas de los sectores) en el marco de los límites que el propio Acuerdo establece.

Eficiencia:

El AP ha favorecido la subsidiaridad de las tomas de decisiones, lo que da más fluidez al mecanismo de apoyo a la SA. El modelo es flexible desde su concepción porque se adapta a las prioridades de los beneficiarios. Tiene una rapidez de adaptación porque los niveles de decisión son adecuados a los niveles de ejecución. Los logros alcanzados son numerosos: descentralización de los sectores de apoyo socio-económico, de la salud y en menor medida de la educación. El mecanismo demorará más tiempo para los dos últimos sectores, que son también los más complejos por cobertura, personal y tipo de impactos que deben alcanzar. El mecanismo requerirá un mayor tiempo para agilizarse y poder responder de manera adecuada a las numerosas demandas locales.

Los convenios –en su gran mayoría anuales- se han firmado tardíamente, generando demoras en su implementación. Los atrasos llegan hasta once meses de desfase. La negociación del Convenio con la contraparte técnica de cada Ministerio, la firma del o la Ministro y luego, a partir del 2002, el requisito de que se debe firmar en Bruselas, han promovido retrasos percibidos con desánimo por los ejecutores, especialmente en el componente de inversión

¹⁴ El Estado ha re-estructurado varias veces la ubicación de los Programas de desarrollo social entre los que se ubica el componente de inversión social del PASA. De allí el paso por dos ministerios.

¹⁵ Los Ministerios de salud y educación son los de mayor cobertura y personal en el Estado.

¹⁶ En los últimos años se viene concluyendo que el CLAS no es un modelo efectivo para las zonas de pobreza. Pero este es un resultado de la experiencia por lo que no quita relevancia a haber apostado por este modelo.

social. La Misión encontró el caso de Yauli, Huancavelica en el que la obra estuvo suspendida más de un año.

Igualmente hay casos de retrasos en las rendiciones y cambios constantes en las regulaciones de la administración pública. Todos estos obstáculos a la gestión requieren ser asumidos en parte como hechos de la realidad y no como situaciones inesperadas ya que es habitual que no se supere el 60% de ejecución del gasto presupuestado en el año.

Es importante reconocer que el PASA ha tenido la flexibilidad para adaptarse a estas situaciones y plantear mejoras como la firma de los convenios trianuales y fortalecer la capacitación del personal de Gobiernos locales y regionales. Por ejemplo, se han apoyado cursos para funcionarios referidos al sistema de inversión pública.

Por otro lado, se nos ha manifestado reiteradamente que el modelo de AP exige mayores tiempos de gasto y reembolso, toda vez que debe recorrer el proceso administrativo del Estado que es complejo y largo.

La relación costo/beneficio es más baja que a través un mecanismo centralizado: el costo de la identificación y preparación es mayor porque requiere la participación de los beneficiarios que implica tiempos, pero el costo de la ejecución es más bajo porque el nivel de participación de los beneficiarios en la realización de las acciones es más alto. El beneficio cualitativo y cuantitativo es más alto porque cada acción ha sido identificada por los beneficiarios, lo que garantiza un mayor nivel de apropiación para lograr a una mayor sostenibilidad. También es un proceso orientado sobre la demanda de servicios y de apoyo, y no sobre la oferta que es más asistencialista/paternalista. Esto garantiza un mejor grado de utilización del apoyo proporcionado y un mayor beneficio por el usuario, cada vez más satisfecho que se ha podido responder de manera adecuada a sus necesidades.

Impacto:

Existe una dinamización del tejido socio-económico local, provincial y regional con una población que logra concertar e involucrarse en su propio destino.

La población entrevistada remarcó la pertinencia de las obras seleccionadas (caminos y puentes) y las autoridades locales (comunales y municipales) así como las regionales y nacionales señalan el esfuerzo por desarrollar mecanismos de sostenibilidad de las intervenciones de inversión social. Esto se expresa en la formación de instancias sociales de mantenimiento de las obras. Se han desarrollado los instrumentos para que operen estas instancias. Sin embargo, por limitaciones de tiempo, la Misión no pudo verificar si estos vienen operando. De hecho se nos manifestó que, en algunos casos, había aún problemas de convocatoria para que estos operen.

Todavía el sistema de manejo de fondos a nivel del Estado es lento porque los fondos corren a través del sistema administrativo del Estado (con múltiples controles y personal sin capacitación para manejarlo). El impacto del sector de inversión social puede ser negativo por dos razones:

1. El proceso participativo permite financiar una parte menor de las necesidades identificadas por los beneficiarios por falta de disponibilidad presupuestal. Sin una intensiva información a los beneficiarios –que podría no haber sido suficiente- de los alcances del plan como instrumento de gestión, las expectativas de los beneficiarios pueden transformarse en frustración al no ver implementados sus trabajos participativos de identificación de necesidades.

2. Existen retrasos en las transferencias de fondos que resultan en la paralización por meses o años de obras a realizar o en curso de ejecución, con la consecuencia social adicional del no pago de la mano de obra.

En el sector educación la contribución ha sido más dispersa y puntual debido a que la opción asumida por el Ministerio ha sido la no focalización geográfica, con lo que la dispersión se mantuvo hasta la actualidad (en el caso de Salud se logro pasar de 11 a 6 regiones¹⁷). En este contexto el impacto más significativo ha sido la contribución a la formulación del proyecto de Educación rural del Ministerio de educación financiado por el Banco Mundial.

En general, en los diversos sectores en el nivel central, en los Gobiernos regionales, y en los locales, se ha podido comprobar que el PASA ha generado cambios en actitudes y prácticas de los funcionarios para el desarrollo de mecanismos de elaboración y revisión de expedientes técnicos, manejo de fondos y en general gestión pública bajo las normas de operación del Estado peruano.

Sostenibilidad:

La participación alta de los beneficiarios y de los protagonistas locales ha reforzado la viabilidad de las acciones. Existe una mayor responsabilidad de los protagonistas para el manejo sostenible de los capitales/recursos humanos, culturales y naturales a nivel local. La sostenibilidad de la estrategia apoyada por el PASA para la inversión social está garantizada por la modernización de la administración pública a nivel municipal, con servicios que responden a las necesidades de la población.

En el sector salud las principales líneas en las que en los últimos años se ha focalizado la inversión han sido: Hogares maternos, Brigadas médicas, CLAS y, desde el año 2003, el SIS en Ayacucho. Los dos primeros tienen dificultades para ser sostenibles por ausencia de fondos suficientes y el CLAS no sería un instrumento adecuado para poblaciones en pobreza por problemas de autosostenibilidad financiera. Cabe remarcar que el PASA ha apoyado financieramente la posibilidad de experimentar estas intervenciones para llegar a los resultados señalados, lo que es positivo en última instancia como aprendizaje institucional.

El SIS es una política de Estado basada en un enfoque de derechos y como tal es una contribución efectiva al Estado en términos financieros. Se requiere precisar cuál es el valor añadido de esta asignación financiera, pues se trata de una estrategia ya validada del Estado. El enfoque en el acompañamiento para ello es aquí importante.

Ventaja comparativa con otros instrumentos:

Un mecanismo de AP presenta ventajas frente a un enfoque de proyectos en el que las estrategias y objetivos específicos están pre-establecidos. Acompaña procesos y permite rápidamente reorientarse según las políticas públicas se reorienten. No requiere de decisiones de instancias superiores.

Para asegurar que esta ventaja no se convierta en una ineficiencia, se requiere interlocutores claros con estrategias definidas y una contraparte de la CE igualmente con una visión clara y especializada con un acompañamiento en campo (además de durante la negociación). El proceso desarrollado ha sido de aprendizaje, y los resultados en términos de tener un mecanismo más afinando, son positivos.

¹⁷ El PASA actualmente prioriza Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurímac, Junín-Selva y Alto Amazonas-Loreto

Pero la ventaja comparativa del AP tiene que estar definida por el valor añadido al sector apoyado. No es muy pertinente financiar líneas presupuestarias y sectoriales de gobierno con mecanismos demasiado complejos y aún débiles, salvo que se prevea una contribución efectiva vía el AP.

Valor añadido del mecanismo

El PASA provee fondos frescos que permiten plantear propuestas innovativas, así como cubrir vacíos en el presupuesto público. Pero además de esto, existen valores añadidos: la mejora en la capacidad de administrar fondos a nivel de Gobiernos locales (en particular en distritos pobres sin experiencia previa en manejo de montos significativos), la prueba de modelos de gestión del Estado con ONGs como es el caso de Proalpaca, proyecto ejecutado por 4 ONGs operadoras (europeas y locales) con el Estado bajo el rol de seguimiento y acompañamiento, y en general mejoras en el proceso de gestión de gastos de inversión social en el sector público.

La experiencia de asignación de fondos ha planteado también un nuevo mecanismo de gestionar fondos de la CE a nivel del Perú en el marco de legal del Estado (sin caer en paralelismos administrativos como otras agencias internacionales). Este mecanismo ha sido creado por el PASA y el MEF a través de un proceso de prueba y error que ha costado varios años.

Valor añadido en la relación con otros donantes

Los donantes más significativos en el Perú en el campo de la SA, junto con la CE, son USAID y el PMA. El BM y el BID, que por montos junto con USAID son los de mayor peso, están orientados a programas más sectoriales (salud, educación, etc.). Las cooperaciones bilaterales europeas, de Japón y Corea del sur abarcan otros temas con diversos intereses focalizados en temas particulares. La FAO trabaja el tema en apoyo al MINAG con un enfoque más de formulación de políticas así como de asistencia técnica en temas de producción.

La relación con el PMA ha sido reducida en tanto los enfoques son muy divergentes (donación de alimentos para grupos focalizados versus AP). Con USAID se tienen dos interlocutores: la línea de SA y la de Descentralización. Con esta segunda ha habido un mayor acercamiento. Con los demás cooperaciones técnicas la relación ha sido débil.

A nivel de la cooperación con países de la Unión europea se ha trabajado con la Cooperación alemana (GTZ) en el período 1997-99 en la implementación de la EFLCPE, con la Cooperación inglesa (DFID) se han compartido modalidades de financiamiento en distritos focalizados y finalmente se ha coordinado con el Fondo de contravalor Perú-Alemania para que éste oriente su financiamiento a distritos que cuentan con planes de desarrollo participativos y expedientes técnicos

No existe en el país una Mesa de donantes que trabaje la temática de SA. Se pierde una oportunidad de crear sinergias en términos de retroalimentación y complementación de esfuerzos.

Un espacio de intercambio se generó en la Comisión multisectorial producto de la preparación del Informe nacional de SA para la Cumbre mundial del 2002, pero esta Comisión fue orientada a consolidar la estrategia del Estado y el rol de los donantes fue limitado.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 5

El uso del AP ha sido pertinente en relación al contexto local y nacional. Las estrategias desarrolladas son validas para el mejoramiento de la SA : intervenciones priorizadas, participación de los beneficiarios en las etapas del ciclo del proyecto y reforzamiento de capacidades mediante fortalecimiento institucional.

Las acciones han sido orientadas para desarrollar las prioridades de los beneficiarios: acceso a alimentos y a mercados locales. El AP ha contribuido a disminuir la vulnerabilidad en SA de los beneficiarios a través la dinamización del contexto socio-económico local, aunque en menor medida a nivel de educación y salud. El AP ha favorecido un mecanismo de subsidiaridad que favorece la toma de decisiones a nivel local. El AP ha centrado su estrategia en el mecanismo de descentralización del Estado, visibilizando un mecanismo de desarrollo y de SA a través del apoyo descentralizado a los pobres y más pobres.

El fortalecimiento institucional ha sido un componente necesario para preparar a funcionarios de los niveles local y regional en el manejo del sistémico y complejo proceso de gestión pública de fondos.

Finalmente, el mecanismo ha orientado en gran parte el proceso de descentralización en marcha, sin haber sido este objetivo explicito del programa.

3.6. Cuestión Evaluativa 6

¿Cual es el valor añadido de las operaciones de apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria (Títulos II y III del Reglamento 1292/96) para lograr los objetivos generales marcados en el mismo?

El análisis referido a esta pregunta se centra en revisión de documentación y entrevistas a personal de la Delegación. Debido a la corta duración, logística y objetivos amplios de la misión no se pudieron visitar proyectos ejecutados por ONGs (ni culminados ni en marcha) o entrevistar a personal de instituciones directamente relacionadas. Cabe precisar que sólo el 15% del presupuesto del mecanismo en el Perú se ha destinado a ONGs y el 85% al PASA.

En este marco, el análisis parte, en términos de casos, principalmente, de las experiencias de PROESA (ejecutado en Ayacucho y Apurímac por OXFAM y una red de ONGs locales y organizaciones base incluyendo gobiernos locales) y FORTISA (ejecutado por CICDA, cuatro ONGs locales y la Universidad de Huancavelica en esta última región).

Ambos proyectos presentan el reto complementario a las actividades del PASA de incluir componentes productivos con familias, incorporando incluso el crédito. Además ambos incluyen un componente de fortalecimiento de la institucionalidad local y constataron dificultades en desarrollo de las capacidades locales. Sin embargo, no se puede negar que la presencia de estos proyectos dinamizaron las zonas de intervención con propuestas alternativas.

La misión no tiene elementos suficientes para opinar sobre los impactos logrados ni la sostenibilidad de los cambios logrados. Pero, se puede señalar que las dificultades encontradas en términos de falta de capacidad local humana y técnica (como ausencia de electricidad para funcionamiento de una planta de transformación de granos) muestran la necesidad de un uso más eficiente de los recursos en las ONGs mediante una planificación más sistemática que consideré el análisis de viabilidad.

Un impacto indirecto ha sido, sin duda, el acceso a conocimientos sobre mejora tecnológica y estudios que pueden ser base para un futuro mejoramiento productivo incorporando la transformación agroindustrial a pequeña escala.

Algunas ventajas de la modalidad que vale la pena destacar son las siguientes: posibilidad de participación de ONGs locales y no exclusivamente europeas, orientar a ONGs para que se enmarquen en un tema específico como es SA y en zonas alejadas y a su vez una mayor flexibilidad en el marco de SA para trabajar y, finalmente, la posibilidad de desarrollar proyectos innovativos (esto fue un criterio de selección de las propuestas).

También es importante recoger la experiencia inicial de vincular proyectos de emergencia con rehabilitación. Los primeros cuatro proyectos de ONGs de Seguridad alimentaria en el período analizado fueron continuación de acciones de ECHO en la costa peruana post Fenómeno del Niño.

Un valor añadido ha sido la interacción entre ONGs europeas y Gobiernos regionales. De esta manera se tiene el caso del Gobierno regional que prevé contratar a CICDA para desarrollar un proyecto en articulación a redes locales. De esta manera, se fortalece la integración entre ONGs europeas, locales y el Estado en el camino de buscar alianzas efectivas.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 6:

El valor añadido de las operaciones de apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria (Títulos II y III del Reglamento 1292/96) para lograr los objetivos generales se centran en: trabajo en zonas de difícil acceso, conocimientos actualizados y adaptados sobre mejora tecnológica y estudios que pueden ser base para un futuro mejoramiento productivo incorporando la transformación agroindustrial a pequeña escala, contacto con profesionales que abren el abanico de alternativas de desarrollo rural y en particular trabajar temas que otras líneas de cofinanciación no desarrollan.

Esto queda legitimado con el caso de la relación directa de contratación del CICDA por el Gobierno regional de Huancavelica.

3.7. Cuestión Evaluativa 7

¿Cuál es el valor añadido del componente « Otros/ asistencia técnica y Apoyo institucional » para lograr a los objetivos de SA en el Reglamento?

El papel de la UTSA es asegurar el fortalecimiento institucional y el acompañamiento de los convenios a los Ministerios para la aprobación y ejecución según lo previsto de las Cartas. El costo de la UTSA no es alto, sólo el 5% del presupuesto del PASA.

El desarrollo de la UTSA como una unidad de trabajo no integrada a la Delegación le ha permitido ser ágil en su relación con las contrapartes facilitando su eficiencia y eficacia. Las contrapartes refieren que ha sido un interlocutor para la definición conjunta de las políticas a apoyar. En su relación con la Delegación trabaja en coordinación con el Experto a cargo de la línea de cofinanciación permitiendo un conocimiento mutuo de ambas líneas.

Para los aspectos de asistencia técnica, que la UTSA pueda requerir para los procesos de negociación, es importante la posibilidad de relación que se mantiene con los proyectos sectoriales como es el caso de salud. El Proyecto AMARES viene jugando un rol positivo en la orientación de la negociación al trabajar directamente este proyecto con el MINSA en las mismas regiones.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 7: AT en la UTSA y Delegación

La AT asegura el acompañamiento de las intervenciones de SA en curso. No se precisa una coordinación operacional respecto al apoyo indirecto (ONGs) y el apoyo directo (AP). La coordinación del trabajo con ONGs estuvo en la UTSA hasta el año 2003 cuando, como parte del proceso de desconcentración, es transferido a la Delegación adquiriendo un mayor peso administrativo que técnico y mayor número de funciones y por tanto menor efectividad. Se mantienen como procesos paralelos pero coordinados.

La UTSA tiene un nivel alto de coordinación con la Delegación en el sentido que cada negociación relacionada al PASA se hace a través de la delegación. De hecho la UTSA facilita la coordinación del PASA a través la Delegación para garantizar una mejor coherencia con las políticas y acciones de los donantes y del estado.

3.8. Cuestión Evaluativa 8

¿Hasta que punto el diseño en su fase de identificación de las acciones en Ayuda Alimentaria y Seguridad Alimentaria han facilitado el logro de los objetivos marcados? Esto incluye la identificación de prioridades, la selección de países, de beneficiarios, de los componentes, de las operaciones a financiar, la identificación y valoración de los procesos, la programación multianual, etc.?

La Regulación se desarrolla a través de la ayuda directa e indirecta. La primera mediante el PASA como Programa de apoyo presupuestal (aproximadamente 85% de los fondos), y el segundo a través de la selección de programas ejecutados por ONGs europeas y peruanas (alrededor de 15% de los fondos).

La ayuda directa

La propuesta de apoyo presupuestario y los objetivos

Siendo el PASA un instrumento de apoyo presupuestario, antes que un Programa o Proyecto, sus objetivos se orientan a fortalecer el rol del Estado en la reducción de la pobreza¹⁸. En el marco de los ajustes de la política de cooperación de la CE, se opta por el modelo de AP. Este enfoque fortalece al Estado en sus diversas instituciones involucradas, dejando a su vez una relativa discrecionalidad al Estado para desarrollar un programa. Sus dos objetivos –de proceso antes que efecto o impacto en los beneficiarios finales- eran:

- Mejora de capital humano: Incrementar el gasto público en los sectores más pobres en el marco de programas sectoriales establecidos (gasto social básico focalizado en salud y educación¹⁹).
- Inversión social y productiva para los más pobres: Facilitar y apoyar la implementación de una nueva estrategia de ataque a la pobreza extrema (Estrategia focalizada de lucha contra la pobreza extrema)

Estos dos objetivos implicaron, por la decisión de los ministerios involucrados, dos enfoques distintos: el primero de carácter vertical y centralista refuerza el “Programa de gasto social básico²⁰” y el segundo horizontal y descentralista ejecutado por el MIMDES, Gobiernos regionales (ex CTARes) y Gobiernos locales²¹ y en un sub-componente el apoyo a la población alpaquera ejecutado por CONACS/MINAG mediante operadores. El primero se orientó a fortalecer procesos en marcha en los sectores y el segundo a generar una nueva dinámica que fortalezca la institucionalidad local en las comunidades distritos y provincias identificados en extrema pobreza.

Ambos objetivos tienen como soporte un valioso componente de apoyo institucional orientado a reforzar las capacidades institucionales del sector público para poder lograr los dos objetivos mencionados.

Respecto al primero, sectores de Educación y Salud, la débil planificación y dispersión de acciones, en número y ámbito, diluyó la significancia de las intervenciones, aunque no deja de

¹⁸ Para la razón de considerar como eje del PASA la pobreza y no la SA véase más abajo “Contexto”

¹⁹ Programas nacionales focalizados de “Salud y Educación básicas para todos”

²⁰ Salud básica para todos y Educación básica para todos

²¹ Inicialmente PROFINES.

ser valioso que se apoye una política de atención a poblaciones excluidas e indígenas, que comprende la población más pobre.

En cuanto a la EFLCPE, en sus inicios hubo una planificación intersectorial y participativa. Se convoca a ONGs prestigiosas (como CARE, ADRA-Ofasa y OXFAM UK) para que colaboren en un contexto estatal poco acostumbrado a interactuar con estas instituciones. Luego estos planes evolucionaron en calidad, como parte de un aprendizaje, partiendo de ser precursores y base para los Planes locales de desarrollo de implementación mandatoria en el Perú de acuerdo a la Ley de Municipalidades del Enero del 2003.

En términos temáticos, se asoció adecuadamente inseguridad alimentaria con pobreza, por lo que la población identificada como población objetivo fue aquella en extrema pobreza (ubicada en la sierra y selva –incluyendo en selva indígenas y colonos). Sin embargo, por razones ajenas al diseño del programa, poco tiempo después de su inicio debido a decisiones políticas del Estado (en especial la preocupación por la re-elección del Presidente Fujimori) el Proyecto a cargo de la EFLCPE se debilita, centrando su accionar en los fondos del PASA.

El propio diseño del mecanismo de AP fue una innovación en la gestión pública: fondos de donación que se entregan al Estado contra reembolso, transferencia de fondos de cooperación desde el MEF hasta los gobiernos locales en el marco normativo de la gestión pública, mecanismos de gestión en cada nivel, capacitación de gobiernos locales pequeños de zonas pobres en el manejo de montos significativamente mayores a los que manejaban con el consecuente empoderamiento.

El esquema de trabajo (el AP) es el no ser un Programa sino un mecanismo de asignación presupuestal. De esta manera sus metas e impactos no son específicos al PASA. El Programa expresa sus resultados e impactos en las políticas públicas del Estado. Es el Estado el que define los cambios que quiere lograr. El PASA otorga un “plus” a través de la asignación de un monto adicional para apoyar determinadas intervenciones y acompañar la ejecución para sugerir y obtener aprendizajes.

En este sentido, no se cuenta con un instrumento de gestión propio del PASA como, por ejemplo, el marco lógico. Más bien se trabaja en el contexto de los Planes operativos anuales de cada institución pública, que tiene sus particularidades. El rol de la CE –a través de la UTSA- es de asegurar la pertinencia del AP en llegar directamente a la población en pobreza.

Se optó por combinar el trabajo a un nivel territorial explícito desde el diseño en la EFLCPE y uno de nivel nacional/regional flexible en el campo de los recursos humanos (Educación y Salud). En términos de diseño inicial, en ambos casos se trataba de gastos focalizados (selección de distritos y asignación al Programa focalizado de gasto social básico). En la práctica los programas de gastos sociales de Salud y Educación fueron dispersos y difíciles de rastrear en cuanto a una identificación de beneficiarios en extrema pobreza.

Si bien estas dos estrategias tienen cada una sus implicancias en cuanto a sostenibilidad, visibilidad del impacto, fortalecimiento de capacidades, etc.; es evidente que el carácter no focalizado en un espacio y en una población específica dificulta establecer una relación costo/beneficio de la inversión del PASA en términos de población beneficiaria directa.

La no articulación de los dos componentes fue una debilidad de la implementación que diluyó los resultados que en la práctica convirtieron al PASA en tres mecanismos paralelos: intervenciones, en salud, en educación y finalmente en gobiernos locales (y sector alpaquero).

En términos conceptuales si era posible identificar una articulación en el esfuerzo en recursos humanos que iba directamente a familias e individuos y la inversión social que se orientaba a

las condiciones colectivas a los bienes públicos que se deben desarrollar para generar desarrollo económico, pero siempre que hubiese plena coincidencia geográfica.

Contexto político-institucional:

La comprensión del contexto en el que se diseña el Programa permite explicar la forma en que se orientaron los esfuerzos (contexto que cambio significativamente poco después de iniciado el PASA). Los principales supuestos en la fase de diseño fueron: 1) la EFLCPE iba a ser una política de Estado intersectorial coordinada por un nivel supra ministerial (el CIAS), 2) La política social no iba a profundizar su carácter asistencialista marcado por la campaña re-eleccionista del entonces Presidente Fujimori. 3) El PASA iba a ser un fondo “palanca” para planificar una estrategia general del Estado de lucha contra la pobreza (más sistemática e integral que la promovida por el BM y el BID a través de FONCODES y PRONAMACHCS)

La relación entre seguridad alimentaria y pobreza es también conceptual y pragmática. En primer término, la discusión global, ya en la Cumbre de la alimentación de 1986, remarcó la importancia de la dimensión del acceso frente a la disponibilidad, tradicionalmente priorizada. Este enfoque estaba empezando a prevalecer fuera de condiciones de emergencia. En términos pragmáticos, pese a los múltiples documentos producidos²², no existía un interés por asumir la SA como un enfoque de desarrollo. En este marco la opción asumida de centrar los esfuerzos en la propuesta en reducir la pobreza extrema ha sido una opción adecuada. Aquí cabe resaltar el rol de la Delegación de la CE en Perú.

Finalmente cabe señalar el rol precursor de la propuesta en el campo de la descentralización, teniendo en cuenta que muchos elementos se reflejan en las leyes de descentralización, municipalidades y transferencias de Programas sociales. En el futuro inmediato el rol precursor del PASA se podría desarrollar en trabajar una estrategia integrada de los sectores con los Gobiernos locales en el nuevo entorno positivo hacia la descentralización.

La ayuda indirecta

En términos de diseño, la Regulación se presenta como un mecanismo más flexible que otros esquemas de la cooperación al desarrollo de la CE (esto está cambiando con los nuevos reglamentos financieros).

El proceso de selección de proyectos a ser ejecutados por ONGs ha tenido tres fases: proyectos formulados en discusión entre la CE y la ONG. Una segunda fase en la que se convoca a concursos, y luego, en una tercera fase mixta se abren los fondos disponibles a concurso, pero estableciendo un diálogo para mejorar las propuestas seleccionadas. En total se aprobaron 11 proyectos.

Los cuatro primeros proyectos fueron ejecutados en la costa como continuación de acciones de ayuda humanitaria (ECHO) luego del Fenómeno de El Niño. Los siguientes siete proyectos se ubicaron principalmente en las zonas de intervención de la ayuda directa.

Los proyectos fueron ejecutados por consorcios de ONGs que en total sumaron 48 (6 europeas y 42 peruanas). Los proyectos fueron complementarios y coherentes con la ayuda directa teniendo como temas innovativos pequeña agroindustria rural, financiamiento agrícola, psicultura con especies nativas, gestión social de riesgo y otros.

²² Véase la situación de la SA en el Perú (sección X)

Temas transversales

En cuanto a los temas transversales actualmente priorizados por la CE: medio ambiente, prevención de desastres, derechos humanos y género; la ayuda directa (el PASA) no incorpora estas dimensiones explícitamente, salvo en el modelo del “Núcleo ejecutor” de FONCODES en el que se exige que uno de los cuatro miembros sea mujer.

Nuevamente teniendo en cuenta que se trata de un apoyo al Estado, de no incorporarlo el Estado, la UTSA no lo planteaba como una condición para otorgar el financiamiento que se consideren estas dimensiones en las intervenciones. Esto no corresponde al modelo de AP en ejecución ni era mandatario en la CE

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 8

La ayuda directa (PASA) fortalece el rol del Estado (articulando participativamente los niveles central, regional y local) en la reducción de la pobreza como eje de la reducción de la inseguridad alimentaria. La modalidad de planificación del AP anual es positiva por su flexibilidad, deja una relativa discrecionalidad al Estado para desarrollar un programa. Los dos objetivos identificados (Mejora de capital humano e Inversión social y productiva para los más pobres) implicaron por decisión de los ministerios respectivos dos enfoques distintos: el primero de carácter vertical y centralista y de amplia cobertura y el segundo horizontal y descentralista focalizado en localidades específicas. No se estableció una complementariedad territorial específica entre ambos objetivos.

En términos temáticos se asoció adecuadamente inseguridad alimentaria con pobreza por lo que la población identificada como población objetivo fue aquella en extrema pobreza (ubicada en la sierra y selva –incluyendo en selva indígenas y colonos).

En términos conceptuales si era posible identificar una articulación en el esfuerzo en recursos humanos iba directamente a familias e individuos y la inversión social se orientaba a las condiciones colectivas a los bienes públicos que se deben desarrollar para generar desarrollo económico, pero siempre que hubiese plena coincidencia geográfica.

La no articulación de los dos componentes desde su planificación en los sectores, es una debilidad de la estrategia de implementación que diluyó los resultados que, en la práctica, convierten al PASA en tres mecanismos paralelos: intervenciones, en salud, en educación y finalmente en gobiernos locales (y sector alpaquero).

Considerando el desinterés del Estado por asumir una política de SA, la opción asumida de centrar los esfuerzos del PASA en reducir la pobreza extrema ha sido una opción adecuada que coincide además con marcos conceptuales internacionales sobre el tema. Aquí cabe resaltar el rol de la Delegación de la CE en Perú.

El mecanismo de AP fue una innovación en la gestión pública: fondos de donación que se entregan al Estado contra reembolso, transferencia de fondos de cooperación desde el MEF hasta los gobiernos locales en el marco normativo de la gestión pública, mecanismos de gestión en cada nivel, capacitación de gobiernos locales pequeños de zonas pobres en el manejo de montos significativamente mayores a los que manejaban con el consecuente empoderamiento.

Finalmente, cabe señalar el rol precursor de la propuesta en el campo de la descentralización, teniendo en cuenta que muchos elementos se reflejan en las leyes de descentralización, municipalidades y transferencias de Programas sociales emitidas a partir del año 2002 (casi cinco años luego de iniciado el PASA).

La ayuda indirecta se centró en proyectos complementarios y coherentes con la ayuda directa, teniendo como temas innovativos pequeña agroindustria rural, financiamiento agrícola, piscicultura con especies nativas, gestión social de riesgo y otros.

En cuanto a los temas transversales priorizados por la CE recientemente (medio ambiente, prevención de desastres, derechos humanos y género) no se han incorporado explícitamente, salvo género en el modelo del “Núcleo ejecutor” de FONCODES. Esto no ha sido mandatorio; pero además, siendo un mecanismo presupuestal de apoyo al Estado, de no incorporarlo el Estado, la UTSA no le corresponde exigirlo.

3.9. Cuestión Evaluativa 9

¿Hasta que punto la preparación para la implementación de los proyectos y programas (mecanismos de manejo/ mecanismos y procedimientos, p.e. repartición del trabajo y responsabilidades, coordinación de acciones) han facilitado el camino para lograr a los objetivos de SA marcados por el Reglamento 1292/96?

Se puede afirmar de las entrevistas y documentos revisados, que no ha existido coordinación con otras líneas de la CE, particularmente con proyectos de desarrollo rural en zonas pobres. Por ejemplo, los Proyectos Pampa Puno y Pampa 2 de desarrollo rural han sido también precursores para el desarrollo del enfoque de corredores económicos y para la valoración de recursos naturales con comunidades andinas (transformación y acondicionamiento de la carne y fibra de alpaca, y de la quinua), así como para el mejoramiento del acceso en SA (construcción de carreteras, mejoramiento de los ingresos vía artesanía).

La UTSA apoya a la implementación del PASA con un staff adecuado a sus funciones. El apoyo a las ONGs es ejecutado por una AT en la Delegación. Las funciones parecen bien definidas entre la gestión del PASA a cargo de la UTSA, el manejo de las ONGs por la AT específica en la Delegación y el dialogo político promovido por la delegación.

Respecto a la línea de inversión social y económica, el MIMDES cuenta con dos personas a nivel de cada región. Su perfil profesional es adecuado a sus funciones, aunque tiene limitaciones de llegada por la dispersión y lejanía de las zonas de intervención y no siempre contar con vehículo asignado. Se puede requerir más de 12 horas de viaje en la misma región para llegar a localidades que reciben apoyo financiero del PASA. El seguimiento regular se realiza a través del promotor social y del supervisor ubicado en cada municipalidad.

El PASA no ha incorporado un enfoque de género en sus intervenciones (a excepción del Núcleo ejecutor mixto de FONCODES) pero tampoco tenía la responsabilidad de realizarlo. Todavía los temas transversales (género, minorías, etnia, medio ambiente) no habían sido priorizados en los PDM.

Durante el período de inicio del programa, el PASA no podía implementarse con el Ministerio de Agricultura debido a que éste no tenía una estrategia específica de SA. Caso contrario, el MIMDES, el Ministerio de la Salud y el Ministerio de la Educación si tenían estrategias propias. Con el MINAG se inicia la relación luego que se formula la estrategia de SA, a propósito de la Cumbre mundial de la alimentación en Octubre del 2002. Se ha realizado un proyecto específico para productores alpaqueros a través del CONACS (ejecutado a través de ONGs como operadores).

El AP del PASA en inversión social a través de municipalidades ha sido implementado en tres regiones de las más pobres del país, y dentro estas regiones, en provincias y municipalidades entre las más pobres. Además, la Ley de Municipalidades, aprobada en el año 2003, retoma elementos de la estrategia apoyada por el PASA como la exigencia de contar con un plan de desarrollo distrital/provincial.

Los convenios con los sectores, al inicio de carácter anual, son ahora trianuales, lo que es mucho más adecuado a una planificación de desarrollo, porque en muchos casos un año no es tiempo suficiente para realizar un proyecto completo. La ejecución de muchas obras requiere más que un año, y varios proyectos tuvieron que suspenderse temporalmente por razones administrativas del convenio. Especialmente porque una vez aprobado, quedaban solamente algunos meses para ejecución dentro el marco temporal del convenio.

Los procedimientos de la CE no parecen demasiado adaptados para el manejo coherente del PASA. Existe una demanda excesiva de documentación por parte de la CE. Una vez que el Estado peruano firma un convenio anual la CE ha requerido hasta 4 meses para firmarlo. En estas condiciones se puede ejecutar no más del 50 % del presupuesto acordado en el convenio. El mecanismo para responder a esta situación ha sido proponer un último convenio de 3 años 2004-2006.

No existen mecanismos internos de análisis de la implementación de proyectos pero existe una sistematización del monitoreo a través los informes del PASA y del gobierno. Todavía no hay un monitoreo interno que incluya una evaluación del impacto alcanzado.

La estrategia de inversión social apoyada por el PASA parte de la participación de los actores desde la fase de identificación, siguiendo con la ejecución y la viabilidad/mantenimiento. Existen Comités de Desarrollo Local (CDL) no formalizados a nivel de cada cuenca u otra modalidad de área geográfica, con un solo representante a nivel del Comité de Desarrollo del Plan Municipal. Hasta 2002 se realizaba con la participación de los beneficiarios los Planes de Acciones Priorizadas (PAP) y desde el 2003, Planes de Desarrollo Municipal. La participación de los grupos nativos de la selva (región de Junín) es deficitaria. En el caso de las zonas andinas del PASA como Huancavelica, Apurímac y la zona andina de Ayacucho no existen la división entre colonos y nativos por lo que no está presente esta realidad de forma similar.

En la región de Junín (selva) existen un promedio de 40 comunidades nativas por Municipalidad y la constitución de un PDM requiere un esfuerzo de coordinación demasiado alto para satisfacer a cada comunidad, más aún cuando el PDM puede responder a un porcentaje limitado de las demandas. Una dificultad frente a esta situación es que el ordenamiento del aparato estatal trabaja más directamente hasta el nivel municipal, y no a un nivel de la comunidad local o nativa (aunque hay dinámicas de municipalidades delegadas y centros poblados menores, son todavía niveles discrecionales al gobierno municipal). Las comunidades nativas son invitadas a participar a los varios talleres de preparación de PDM. Muchas de ellas tienen un representante permanente bien capacitado pero ello no implica suficiente representatividad.

El AP del PASA permite la contratación de ONGs como operadores. Se requiere articular mejor la participación de las ONGs, quizás a través de un Plan Regional de desarrollo del sector alpacero para dar una proyección más regional al apoyo técnico.

Desde 1992 hasta 1996 operó el Fondo de Contravalor de la UE para el desarrollo rural. En 1996 el Fondo fue reemplazado por el AP. Aunque orientado hacia la SA y la lucha contra la pobreza, el Fondo de Contravalor fue considerado muy asistencialista y sin suficiente valor añadido a la SA.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 9

El objetivo de reducción de pobreza mediante la utilización del reglamento 1292/96, es claramente pertinente si atendemos a los indicadores que expresan que las capas mas desfavorecidas del Perú: más de 50 % de la población vive en situación de pobreza y 15 % en extrema pobreza.

La propia implementación de la Regulación 1292/96 ha sido implementada desde su inicio en 1997 con el Programa de Apoyo Presupuestario y las convocatorias a ONGs. El PASA está cada vez mas integrado en la política de descentralización del gobierno para lograr una intervención mejor insertada en los niveles locales, que es la única manera de atender a los grupos sociales más vulnerables, que son al mismo tiempo, los más difíciles de atender a través de proyectos tanto de SA como de desarrollo rural.

El gobierno ha construido su política de descentralización en gran parte partiendo de la experiencia del modelo PASA. El PASA ha permitido una mejor definición e intervención de las políticas de SA del gobierno a través su mecanismo de descentralización. Los mecanismos del Estado para descentralizarse, facilitan un apoyo más eficiente, sostenible y con mayor impacto en las poblaciones metas.

Siendo el PASA un programa de lucha contra la pobreza, no siempre se ha podido llegar suficientemente en forma efectiva a las familias más pobres porque el nivel institucional último del Estado es la Municipalidad, y no la comunidad o centro poblado (en la zona andina o en la zona de selva) y existieron problemas de violencia y mecanismos de autoexclusión que las estrategias apoyadas por el PASA no han podido manejar plenamente.

El manejo de los Proyectos ONGs fue desarrollado desde la UTSA y recientemente desde la Delegación.

3.10.Cuestión Evaluativa 10

¿Hasta que punto la Fase de Entrega de las acciones apoyadas ha sido planeada y que contribución tuvo en el cumplimiento de los objetivos generales marcados?

La planificación de la entrega de las acciones y obras que el Programa apoyo ha estado explícitamente presente en el componente de inversión social y productiva a través del fortalecimiento de capacidades del sector público, en particular de los niveles regional y local. Se han elaborado manuales al respecto a cargo del MIMDES y los Gobiernos regionales. En cada obra se reservó el 3% del costo para capacitación y sostenibilidad. Para ello se contó con un promotor social durante la ejecución de cada obra y se formaron Comités de mantenimiento de obra.

Todo el procedimiento de entrega de obras es el proceso regular de entrega de obras en el Estado peruano, sea al sector respectivo o al gobierno local. Para el PASA se trata de una obra ejecutada por el Estado con financiamiento del PASA pero en los conductos regulares del Estado.

Sin embargo, no siempre estarían funcionando de acuerdo a lo previsto y en varias visitas se expuso a los consultores de parte de los beneficiarios la necesidad que la CE continúe el apoyo en el mantenimiento. En este sentido, es importante reforzar el apoyo a la previsión presupuestal para que los Comités puedan seguir operando con fondos públicos.

En el Proyecto Proalpaca también se han diseñado estrategias de sostenibilidad, en particular se visitó al operador en Huancavelica, la ONG DESCO²³. La estrategia de entrega de reproductores y capacitación con promotores campesinos se presenta como sostenible. Sin embargo, en el aspecto tecnológico del proceso productivo y de aprovechamiento de los animales, existe necesidad de procesar aspectos gestión como, por ejemplo, pastos y provisión de cercas, así como aprovechamiento masivo de las infraestructuras generadas (camales)

En los componentes de salud y educación la situación es distinta. Las actividades son intervenciones regulares de los Ministerios salvo algunas excepciones. Por lo tanto, para que continúen sin el apoyo de PASA se requeriría un incremento presupuestal para cubrir estas actividades regulares. Este incremento no está comprometido por el MEF. Además no todas las actividades deberían continuarse.

Por ejemplo, los hogares maternos son una intervención altamente polémica al interior del MINSA en términos de sostenibilidad técnica y financiera en la realidad campesina de la sierra peruana. Otras acciones como la producción local de materiales de Educación bilingüe intercultural pasa por lograr presupuestos aún para la distribución de los libros.

En general se puede afirmar que, ni en el sector Salud ni en el sector Educación, se han establecido mecanismos explícitos de sostenibilidad para las actividades con AP del PASA, ni se tuvo acceso a información que evalúe sistemáticamente la viabilidad de la continuación de las acciones apoyadas sin el AP de PASA.

Para los proyectos de ONGs se procede a levantar actas detalladas de entrega de las obras a los beneficiarios, auditoría, informe técnico según los reglamentos precisos que existen al respecto en la CE.

²³ El trabajo con esta ONG está enmarcado en la línea de ayuda directa toda vez que se trata de un operador de un programa del CONACS/MINAG y no de un proyecto financiado directamente por la CE.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 10

Ayuda directa (PASA): Se ha planificado una fase de entrega de las obras en los casos del componente de inversión social y productiva. Las acciones tomadas deberían permitir la sostenibilidad de los resultados logrados en términos de mejora de la seguridad alimentaria.

Sin embargo, el cumplimiento de los compromisos asumidos debería ser verificado por lo menos al año siguiente de culminada cada obra para evaluar el nivel de cumplimiento de los acuerdos o identificar medias a tomar. Estos compromisos se enmarcan los procedimientos del Estado en relación al sector o gobierno local que establece las normas regulares. En este contexto de gestión se insertan las obras desarrolladas con financiamiento del PASA.

En los componentes de salud y educación la situación es distinta por requerir un incremento presupuestal para cubrir estas actividades regulares. Ni en salud, ni en educación, se cuenta con mecanismos explícitos de sostenibilidad ni se tuvo acceso a información que evalúe la viabilidad de la continuación de las acciones sin el AP de PASA.

Ayuda indirecta (ONGs): se procede a levantar actas detalladas de entrega de las obras a los beneficiarios, auditoria e informe técnico según los reglamentos precisos que existen al respecto en la CE.

3.11. Cuestión Evaluativa 11

¿Cuál es la sostenibilidad de los efectos y de los impactos de las políticas y los programas de la CE en SA, a nivel de la población, a nivel institucional y de la política propia en el país beneficiario?

La sostenibilidad de las inversiones económico-sociales apoyadas por el PASA es factible y tiene bases sólidas. Sin embargo, puede verse limitada por:

- La población puede sentirse frustrada por el bajo porcentaje del cumplimiento del plan municipal en el que participaron activamente y del cual no reciban beneficios directos (determinadas áreas del distrito). El financiamiento del PASA es para obras puntuales y el plan no es formulado bajo un modelo de “plan financiado”. Existe la necesidad de profundizar la capacitación masiva sobre el objetivo del Plan como instrumento de gestión de largo plazo.
- El sistema de manejo de fondos público es tan lento que se realiza no más de 60 % de lo que está previsto en un convenio (el convenio se efectiviza con 6 a 10 meses de retraso), lo que pone en riesgo la credibilidad del sistema de manejo de fondos por la CE, y de la estrategia porque los fondos tiene que tramitarse a través del esquema gubernamental todavía centralizado. Los convenios trianuales deberían minimizar este riesgo.
- La estrategia de inversión social no siempre llega a atender a los grupos más pobres de la población porque la municipalidad abarca, en algunas zonas, numerosos poblados o comunidades y puede no priorizar al conjunto de los más pobres (o requerir varios años para cubrir necesidades mínimas de todos ellos). La comunidad²⁴ o centro poblado puede no tener suficiente representatividad y/o peso político propio a nivel distrital. Se puede tener que viajar hasta 2 días desde una comunidad hasta la cabecera municipal correspondiente.
- Existen municipalidades, (como la de Satipo) que han descentralizado parte de su presupuesto a nivel de las comunidades de su ámbito.
- No se trata de un desinterés del PASA sino de una limitación estructural por el tamaño del distrito. Los núcleos mixtos de PASA-FONCODES han sido una buena opción. Soluciones creativas de este tipo podrían profundizarse.
- El PASA ha optado adecuadamente por apoyar políticas de inclusión de poblaciones dispersas e indígenas en los sectores de salud y educación, en particular aquellas estrategias más sostenibles y coherentes (educación rural en primaria; educación intercultural; servicios de salud para poblaciones pobres y dispersas). Debido a la complejidad de los ministerios de Salud y de Educación, las estrategias seleccionadas no han demostrado en muchos casos su viabilidad a un nivel descentralizado. En Salud, las actividades financiadas no han demostradas su sostenibilidad: las brigadas rurales son efectivas pero ineficientes (llegan a los más pobres pero el costo de operación limita su implementación), los hogares maternos no están adaptados al contexto socio-económico porque la mujer embarazada no puede abandonar su casa por días y los CLAS no son sostenibles financieramente en localidades pobres. En

²⁴ No hace referencia a un modelo organizativo en particular como comunidad campesina o nativa, sino en general todo grupo humano organizado por debajo del distrito y con una base territorial.

Educación, las capacidades regionales son todavía muy débiles pero se pudo apoyar exitosamente, aunque con retrasos, la capacitación de profesores bilingües, la publicación de manuales escolares en idiomas locales y las capacidades de escuelas de frontera.

- El AP del PASA focalizado a los Ministerios de Salud y de Educación ha permitido experimentar estrategias innovativas, pero que en la mayoría de los casos no han sido sostenibles. El acompañamiento a los sectores sociales más complejos del aparato público debe contribuir a obtener las lecciones y plantear o ajustar las estrategias, considerando siempre esa complejidad y debilidad institucional de ambos ministerios.

Conclusion: el PASA, a través de su apoyo presupuestario focalizado, ha podido viabilizarse sobretodo a través su modelo de inversión social y económica con el MIMDES para la realización de PDM. La sostenibilidad financiera está demostrada con el mecanismo de reembolso de las inversiones de las municipalidades en obras identificadas en los PDM. Todavía la sostenibilidad debe demostrarse a través de una participación integral del Estado en el financiamiento de los PDM.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 11

El AP del PASA ha llegado a viabilizarse políticamente a través del mecanismo de descentralización del Estado iniciado en 2002. Desde su inicio en 1998, el PASA ha priorizado su apoyo para el mejoramiento del acceso a la SA al nivel municipal, el nivel más descentralizado del Estado. Además se han elegido las zonas de más difícil desarrollo por ser las más aisladas o de difícil acceso debido a su geografía, situación socio-política (violencia) y socio-económica (pobreza rural). El instrumento ha demostrado su capacidad adaptarse en las situaciones más desfavorables del país. Los resultados pueden viabilizarse a través de una participación efectiva de los beneficiarios individuales, comunitarios e institucionales en las varias etapas de la identificación, implementación y mantenimiento de cada proyecto. El PASA, mediante su mecanismo de participación activa (talleres) de los beneficiarios, ha podido priorizar las necesidades para invertir en relación al presupuesto determinado. Sobretodo el PASA se ha insertado efectivamente en los mecanismos locales del Estado para llegar a sus objetivos.

3.12.Cuestión Evaluativa 12

¿Cual es el rol de la Regulación 1292/96 en los esfuerzos de ser un puente en la lógica emergencia – rehabilitación – desarrollo?

El PASA y la ayuda indirecta están orientados a intervenciones de desarrollo. Se debe destacar que, al inicio del Programa, los primeros cuatro proyectos ejecutados por ONGs en la costa peruano fueron continuidad de proyectos financiados por ECHO. Aquí se logró el vínculo emergencia-rehabilitación.

Si bien el Perú es un país sujeto a inundaciones y sequías periódicas, además de ser gran parte del mismo, zona sísmica, la Regulación no ha contemplado acciones o fondos específicos para emergencias, salvo lo mencionado vía ayuda indirecta. Sin embargo, la flexibilidad actual de programación anual permite reaccionar rápidamente. En el proyecto PROALPACA (del CONACS) el fondo de contingencias fue utilizado para atender a animales atacados por un “friaje” (en esa situación no hubo demandas de atención respecto a personas). La atención consistió en construir cobertizos para los animales. Se debe destacar que el dinero fue movilizado por el Estado en 24 horas.

La línea de imprevistos (entre 12-15% del presupuesto total) debería estar presente en todo presupuesto para responder a estas contingencias. Se debe tener en cuenta sin embargo que se prevé que los siguientes convenios sean tri-anales. Por lo tanto la Delegación debería revisar este punto y considerar como incorporar especialmente la relación rehabilitación-desarrollo en el caso de familias afectadas por desastres en los ámbitos de intervención ya definidos.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 12:

El PASA y la ayuda indirecta están orientados básicamente a intervenciones de desarrollo, salvo excepciones y no se han previsto vínculos entre acciones de emergencia o de rehabilitación con las intervenciones del mecanismo en el Perú

El punto podría ser revisado para disponer de fondos para atenciones de emergencia o rehabilitación en las comunidades directamente cubiertas con fondos del mecanismo.

4. EVALUACIÓN GLOBAL

4.1. Relevancia

El PASA se ajustó a las políticas sectoriales pudiendo así trabajar con objetivos específicos con cada Ministerio y Gobiernos regionales co-participantes.

Dentro del marco nacional frente a los altos índices de pobreza en la sierra y selva rural, el Gobierno ha priorizado un desarrollo descentralizado centrado en algunas de las regiones más pobres del país con un alto grado de participación de las municipalidades distritales de la población objetivo. En este contexto, el PASA ha contribuido con el Estado en la definición e implementación de una política válida desarrollo rural.

Los programas ejecutados por las ONGs han tenido un perfil piloto para desarrollar nuevas intervenciones en el marco de la mejora de la SA de los grupos más pobres y alejados.

La Regulación se adaptó para desarrollar programas de SA en el marco nacional de la estrategia de superación de la pobreza. Ha demostrado su flexibilidad para adaptarse a los cambios en la situación política del país.

4.2. Efectividad

El PASA, a través del AP, ha facilitado la conceptualización del esquema descentralizado del Estado. El modelo de apoyo con participación de los protagonistas de todo nivel durante las distintas etapas del ciclo del proyecto permite resultados más adaptados a las necesidades de la población en pobreza. Pero todavía sigue siendo más difícil, y no siempre posible, llegar a los más pobres y vulnerables en términos de SA.

El proceso actual de planeación de la inversión social (a través de Planes de desarrollo) deja insatisfechos a una parte importante de la población del distrito porque a través del presupuesto disponible (PASA y Estado) se puede asistir a alrededor del 10 % de las necesidades identificadas por los beneficiarios.

Por otro lado, debido al carácter anual de los convenios de la CE con los Ministerios, las obras financiadas por el Estado y la demora en el proceso de tramitación estatal y también de la CE tienden a no poder culminarse en el año planificado, porque los fondos otorgados llegan muy tardíamente. En consecuencia los planes son ejecutados a un 60 % o menos y las obras tienen que pararse por hasta más de un año, en espera del convenio siguiente. Los convenios en negociación actualmente tienen una duración de tres años (2004-2006).

Los programas ejecutados por las ONGs han generado resultados específicos y puntuales y por su propia modalidad en un ámbito reducido. Al menos se ha identificado un caso que la efectividad ha ido más allá (el CICDA en Huancavelica) al continuar la presencia del CICDA con fondos del Gobierno regional.

El AP ha podido responder a las necesidades de una parte de las poblaciones objetivo especialmente en inversión social. El modelo del AP podrá dar buenos resultados para la superación de la pobreza y de la inseguridad alimentaria buscando mecanismos para focalizar mejor en salud y educación y afinar la participación de los grupos más excluidos en los distritos atendidos.

4.3. Eficiencia

En relación al PASA, los procesos administrativos de aprobación de los convenios han sido muy lentos. El mecanismo por lo tanto no ha sido el mejor en términos de procedimientos. Los nuevos convenios son de tres años (2004-2006) pero el PASA ha demorado demasiado tiempo para desarrollar nuevos tipos de convenios, mejor adaptados a los procesos de intervención del PASA.

Si bien ha sido un proceso de aprendizaje con avances, a la fecha, en términos generales, ni el PASA ni el Gobierno han logrado en tiempo oportuno anticiparse y resolver los problemas de gestión del proceso de AP. Las modificaciones de manejo han sido muy lentas con un costo alto para la población en términos de retrasos significativos en la ejecución de obras priorizadas.

Las actividades de ayuda indirecta han enfrentado algunas veces dificultades de la capacidad local (de contrapartes) para cumplir sus compromisos, pero estos han podido ser superados.

El AP ha facilitado la subsidiaridad de las instituciones estatales. La complejidad de los procesos de firma de convenios no ha contribuido a un manejo oportuno de los fondos para la población beneficiaria.

El modelo requiere más tiempo para perfeccionarse, especialmente considerando los procesos de descentralización inicial vigentes en el país (particularmente en salud y educación y en general en la gestión pública).

4.4. Sostenibilidad

En cuanto al PASA, se han hecho los esfuerzos para que las obras entregadas puedan continuar operando con referentes institucionales que puedan responsabilizarse de su mantenimiento. En términos de obras realizadas la situación es muy satisfactoria.

En cuanto al proceso mayor en que se insertan estas actividades, la metodología de firma de convenios y el reducido presupuesto para financiar las expectativas de la población identificadas en los procesos de planificación ponen a riesgo la viabilidad del proceso participativo. Cuanto hay mucho beneficiarios potenciales que participan a talleres y comités de desarrollo local con expectativas importantes y que luego no pueden ser implementadas, se puede generar un desinterés en este tipo de procesos.

El nivel de mayor descentralización con competencia para el manejo de fondos del Estado es la municipalidad distrital que –en algunas áreas visitadas– no necesariamente representa los intereses de los más pobres en los distritos atendidos con financiamiento del PASA. Las comunidades nativas en la selva y, posiblemente, grupos como mujeres y pobladores sin tierras o con menor nivel educativo en la sierra podrían tener una participación menor en el proceso de planificación en su propio distrito porque sus intereses no están explícitamente especificados en los planes municipales, aún cuando la metodología promovida lo plantea como un paso exigido.

En la zona de la sierra la municipalidad es generalmente representativa de su población en términos étnicos. Pero esto no anula la existencia de desigualdades al interior del territorio. La metodología de priorización debe asegurar la representatividad de los grupos más vulnerables para su atención equitativa.

En la selva si hay una clara división en objetivos de calidad de vida y necesidades entre colonos y nativos, siendo los nativos alrededor del 30 a 50% en promedio, pero con una débil representación en la municipalidad (aunque existen buenas perspectivas en algunos municipios visitados).

El “Núcleo ejecutor mixto” desarrollado en el modelo de intervención PASA-FONCODES es una estrategia válida que podría generalizarse para trabajo directo con comunidades y participación municipal, pero no resuelve el problema de representatividad de todos en la priorización cronológica de las acciones.

El desarrollo de convenios anuales no responde adecuadamente a la necesidad de una planificación de desarrollo a largo plazo. El desarrollo rural es un esfuerzo que debe conceptualizarse como de largo plazo (15 años), más aún teniendo como perspectiva la intención de reducir la pobreza a la mitad para el año 2015. Aunque escapa a la responsabilidad el PASA, y se relaciona con el marco legal vigente respecto a la formulación de planes de desarrollo municipales.

Respecto a la ayuda indirecta la misión no tiene suficientes elementos para emitir opinión. Se requeriría haber visitado una muestra mínima de proyectos, lo que no se hizo por limitaciones operativas y prioridades establecidas.

La participación de los beneficiarios en el ciclo del proyecto garantiza una mayor apropiación del proceso de superación de la pobreza y de seguridad alimentaria. Esto se ha presentado en las obras entregadas. Pero los procesos de planificación pueden ser muy puntuales y frustrantes para sectores de la población de los distritos -en especial nativos en la selva- sin trabajar en una visión de mayores plazos.

4.5. Impacto

En cuanto al PASA, el mecanismo de AP permite que, al ejecutarse a través de los canales regulares del Estado, se llegue a una población objetivo mayor que si hubiese sido gestionado como un Proyecto de desarrollo. A su vez, se debe reconocer que el impacto está condicionado por la capacidad institucional y lógicas de los sectores públicos implicados, restringiendo el valor añadido del PASA.

El AP permite además reforzar efectivamente las capacidades institucionales del Estado, aún en los distritos más alejados y pobres, articulando estrategias más sostenibles de gestión de recursos para contribuir a la superación de la pobreza rural.

Se refuerza el logro de estrategias sectoriales, que han venido sido débilmente implementadas, al recibir recursos frescos para ejecutarlas. Pero la planificación sectorial no siempre considera los impactos no sectoriales (a veces negativos) sobre el medio ambiente, la sociedad civil u otros.

Los planes municipales incluyen la identificación de las inversiones públicas físicas (educación, salud, etc.) pero en forma muy limitada el potencial existente y futuro de los municipios (inversiones privadas en relación a micro y pequeña empresa, capital productivo como el microcrédito y capital humano requerido a medio plazo)

Respecto a la ayuda indirecta, se han podido experimentar mecanismos innovativos para aportar al desarrollo rural.

El impacto ha sido favorable para la orientación de la política del Estado de definir su estrategia nacional de funcionamiento descentralizado enfocado a la superación de la pobreza

4.6. Coherencia interna / externa

Respecto al PASA, el AP no propuso cambios significativos en las políticas públicas radicales sino impulsar las políticas formuladas ya existentes (aunque no siempre aplicadas) en cuatro sectores relacionados a la SA: agricultura, educación, inversión social y salud. Puso énfasis en que todas las políticas fueran coherentes con las estrategias de los sectores. En este contexto se trabajo con el MINAG solamente cuando tuvo una estrategia de seguridad alimentaria, reforzado un sector no atendido: la población altoandina alpaquera.

El AP ha sido coherente internamente porque siempre ha podido llegar a objetivos de SA, adaptándose desde su inicio a las políticas sectoriales y nacionales de reducción de la pobreza. Pero la programación basada en convenios anuales, no ha sido coherente con el sistema administrativa de la CE que requiere un tiempo significativo para aprobar un convenio anual. La programación a través convenios anuales no ha sido muy coherente con los objetivos a largo plazo de la lucha contra la pobreza, la seguridad alimentaria y el desarrollo rural de zonas alejadas y de economías frágiles y poco desarrolladas.

Sin embargo, se debe remarcar que, en este contexto, mantiene una coherencia externa porque implementa o fortalece estrategias sectoriales.

La ayuda indirecta se desarrolló de acuerdo al marco regulatorio establecido, buscando complementar temas y áreas geográficas con la ayuda directa, guardando plena coherencia al interior de la línea y con la política de cofinanciación de la CE en el país.

Existe una incoherencia con la Regulacion porque las propuestas recientes de proyectos ONGs en SA son financiados por la línea B7-6000 para el co-financiamiento de ONGs.

Desde su inicio el programa la Regulación se adapto al marco estratégico y operativo de los sectores y del Estado en su conjunto y con política de la CE en el país.

5. CONCLUSIONES

5.1. Conclusiones generales

- El PASA ha podido contribuir a mejorar la SA en el marco de las políticas sectoriales relativas a la lucha contra la pobreza.
- En el marco de las estrategias sectoriales el PASA ha, apoyado directamente, desde su generación, un proceso masivo de planificación participativa local que permitió la ejecución de planes de inversión social y desarrollo en centenares de municipalidades distritales en las regiones de intervención del PASA: entre ellas Ayacucho, Huancavelica y Junín. Dentro las modalidades del apoyo descentralizado a iniciativas comunales o locales y después a los planes municipales. Así, el PASA apoyo activamente la generación de mecanismos e instrumentos para la política de descentralización del país.
- La Regulación 1292/96 adoptó desde el inicio de su aplicación un enfoque de apoyo descentralizado en inversión social a través del apoyo financiero (y acompañamiento crítico) a políticas públicas para comunidades locales. Ha sido desarrollada en forma pragmática y flexible. Se adaptó progresivamente a los cambios de las políticas públicas, transfiriendo el apoyo a comunidades hacia las municipalidades (incorporando a las comunidades al interior de éstas en la gestión de los planes), siendo precursor en esta modalidad de gestión pública. En este sentido, el PASA pudo implementar una estrategia que ha permitido un acercamiento de la institución gubernamental de primer nivel (la municipalidad) y la sociedad civil (la comunidad local y/o nativa)
- El PASA ha desarrollado un mecanismo de AP diferenciado del mecanismo clásico de la UE. No ha habido una aprobación previa de las cuentas públicas ni se establecieron indicadores predefinidos de monitoreo y ha habido un control detallado de los gastos del AP por el mismo PASA.
- El PASA ha contribuido a mejorar la credibilidad del Estado en zonas de pobreza extrema, en particular en zonas que han tenido fuerte presencia de violencia social y política. Ha reforzado los niveles de ciudadanía al promover su participación directa en la gestión pública de su propio desarrollo bajo un enfoque altamente descentralizado en la planificación y gestión de fondos.
- El PASA ha sido un interlocutor positivo en la formulación de políticas públicas para la población en pobreza extrema, acompañando críticamente la ejecución de estas políticas, mejorando así las capacidades de análisis de la gestión de los propios sectores y asumiendo conjuntamente riesgos. Para asegurar el carácter participativo y democrático de la planificación local, el PASA no prioriza las obras. Los planes distritales contienen una priorización hecha participativamente por los beneficiarios junto con sus autoridades municipales.
- La modalidad de gestión del PASA –el AP– asegura que las estrategias de intervención apoyadas sean propias del Estado y el PASA pueda contribuir a la superación de las limitaciones existentes en los sectores “desde dentro” de estos. En este sentido, la UTSA desarrolla una actitud de diálogo constante con los funcionarios públicos para mejorar las estrategias apoyadas. La UTSA ha podido, en este diálogo, promover que se prioricen estrategias como los Núcleos Mixtos con FONCODES, el modelo de la Municipalidad ejecutora con el MIMDES, el apoyo al SIS con el MINSA, el apoyo al

proyecto Proalpaca con el MINAG, la discusión sobre escuelas de frontera y educación bilingüe con el MINEDU. La UTSA como instancia de acompañamiento del sector público en la ejecución del PASA, ha podido corregir, aunque no siempre a tiempo, las estrategias implementadas. El compartir los costos de las intervenciones – asumiendo conjuntamente los riesgos – permite un diálogo constante y un acompañamiento a la definición de las estrategias más pertinentes, eficientes, eficaces, sostenibles y coherentes.

- Las inversiones socio-económicas en obras públicas identificadas en los planes municipales (Municipalidad Ejecutora) y en el marco del Nucleo Mixto PASA-FONCODES otorgan ingresos directos a los más pobres mediante el pago de mano de obra no calificada, mientras que las obras entregadas apoyan de manera directa a los pobres y más pobres en su acceso a mercados locales. El trabajo con CONACS y la formulación de proyectos productivos avanza también positivamente en esta línea de apoyo directo a los más pobres.
- El PASA ha podido mantenerse sin cambios significativos en sus líneas estratégicas durante siete años y tres gobiernos sucesivos porque se enmarcó en una política global de descentralización: inversiones focalizadas a los municipios, apoyo a estrategias de salud y educación centradas en ofrecer mejores servicios a las poblaciones pobres y dispersas. Desde el Acuerdo Marco Perú-CE del año 1996, el PASA no se ha propuesto desarrollar un modelo propio de intervención, más bien ha buscado preservar la coherencia de las estrategias públicas, en función de las políticas públicas de los Gobiernos.
- El PASA tiene una presencia en los sectores de salud, educación, agricultura y desarrollo social desde el nivel central así como en Gobiernos regionales y Gobiernos locales en cuanto a desarrollo social y agricultura (alpaqueros). Su AP es identificado por los actores estatales con diverso grado de precisión.
- Su contribución a la reducción de la pobreza presenta grados de eficiencia, efectividad e impacto variables debido a limitaciones de la gestión de fondos, los procesos de gestión pública y la intervención fragmentada territorialmente entre los sectores apoyados.

5.2. Conclusiones específicas

Inversión social

- Existe un esfuerzo positivo por fortalecer la institucionalidad local en un marco de precursor en el proceso de descentralización iniciado en el año 2002 en el país.
- Los beneficiarios, tanto en la sierra como en la selva, demandan obras físicas (fundamentalmente caminos y puentes) con la finalidad de mejorar el acceso a mercados locales, tanto para vender sus productos como para comprar bienes. Se busca mejorar el acceso a mecanismos de adquisición de alimentos vía mejores ingresos, pero sin mejorar el capital productivo a través de otros mecanismos como mejora tecnológica o acceso a microcrédito.
- El AP focalizado en resultados específicos (en gobiernos locales vía MIMDES y beneficiarios directos-Gobiernos locales vía CONACS) tiene logros más sostenibles y visibles que el AP a líneas sectoriales (salud y educación). Esta ha sido una opción consciente asumida por el PASA porque hubo que considerar las estrategias existentes y la realidad institucional en cada sector.

- El AP del PASA ha financiado estrategias estatales que han sido un valioso espacio de aprendizaje –sobretudo en salud- pero de menor impacto y sostenibilidad financiera que las de inversión económico-social. En estos sectores el PASA apoya la ejecución de políticas nacionales, que por tanto no tienen efectos aislables en los ámbitos locales, a menos que se trabaje con la lógica de proyectos. Aquí, evidentemente la “visibilidad” del apoyo del PASA se diluye. La UTSA es consiente de ello y acompaña a los sectores en mejorar la coherencia de las estrategias para los más pobres.
- Existen diferencias en la selva entre la población nativa y los colonos (valores culturales distintos, formas de organización, etc.). Los planes formulados con apoyo de PASA responden más a las necesidades de los colonos. Las aspiraciones de las comunidades nativas de la selva (para el caso de Junín) no se recogen necesariamente siempre en estos planes. Esta situación no es necesariamente generalizable a todo el ámbito de intervención del PASA, ni atribuible a la voluntad del MIMDES, peor si debe tomarse en cuenta.
- Los problemas de violencia social en las zonas alejadas de los distritos de la selva han explicado parcialmente su ausencia en los planes municipales. La situación de pacificación actual abre espacios para un trabajo inclusivo en la actualidad.
- El hecho que en los planes apoyados por el PASA, este financie y ejecuta menos de 10 % de las obras que han sido identificadas en los talleres participativos de planificación local supone riesgos en la estrategia de inversión social adoptada. Si bien no es responsabilidad del PASA financiar el plan, la priorización de las obras con una temporalidad anual es un ejercicio que genera una gran frustración en las comunidades no beneficiadas en distritos grandes al no percibir el plan como una herramienta de gestión de mayor plazo sino de gestión anual. En las zonas de intervención existe una cultura de frustración, moldeada por años de marginación que requerirá muchos años para poder ser superada.
- Diversas instituciones públicas y privadas –como el Fondo contravalor Perú-Alemania- están canalizando presupuestos a distritos con planes apoyados por el PASA lo que refuerza positivamente la contribución del PASA más allá de su aporte directo.
- Recursos humanos (salud y educación)
- Existe una evolución positiva en la calidad y significancia en los Planes locales que no es consistente con el avance en los sectores salud y educación por trabajar en estos casos con enfoques nacionales.
- El PASA no financió planes locales en los sectores de salud y educación porque se apoyan estrategias orientadas a capas sociales amplias. Esto ha dificultado la visibilidad del PASA y en parte la posibilidad de una influencia más directa y significativa del Programa en su gestión, toda vez que el AP es muy reducido frente al presupuesto total de los sectores.

Gestión pública y AP

- El alto nivel de recambio del personal a todo nivel que genera la ausencia, en el Estado en general, de una gestión estratégica con intervenciones priorizadas (entre ellas las financiadas por PASA) tiene como consecuencia que el respaldo de los Ministerios de Salud y de Educación, en especial en las regiones, a las líneas con PASA es muy frágil.
- En el caso del MIMDES una mayor valoración del aporte del PASA ha permitido mantener al personal de apoyo en cada región al Convenio CE-MIMDES para el PASA. El mejoramiento de la salud y de la educación de los pobres es fundamental para mejorar la SA de la población más pobre y excluida.
- Los retrasos de los desembolsos por diversos aspectos del proceso a nivel del Estado peruano, así como en menor medida de la CE (por ejemplo por retrasos en la firma de convenios por más de un año) ponen en riesgo la efectividad del PASA (aún más que los del propio Estado peruano). A través del proceso de descentralización y de concertación local, los beneficiarios identifican sus prioridades, en el marco de opciones de inversión del PASA. Luego, partiendo de las obras priorizadas localmente, el Convenio PASA-MIMDES prioriza las inversiones (alrededor del 10% de lo que se ha identificado), y entonces los beneficiarios esperan se lleve a cabo su ejecución, pero el no inicio o la suspensión de la obra ha llegado a superar más de un año de retraso. Esto genera, en los casos que sucede el retraso, además implica riesgos de desconfianza de los beneficiarios de sus instituciones locales y regionales, no contribuyendo a su fortalecimiento institucional.

Ayuda indirecta

- La ayuda indirecta ha tenido la posibilidad de generar mecanismos alternativos de relacionamiento para ONGs europeas en los que un Gobierno regional las contrata directamente por la calidad del trabajo desarrollado en su trabajo financiado por PASA.

6. RECOMENDACIONES

6.1. Recomendaciones estratégicas

- El mecanismo de SA ha demostrado ser flexible para responder a contextos locales diversos. Se adaptó a una política pública centrada en pobreza sin perder el sentido de SA. Es una herramienta que permite a la CE responder a demandas que fortalecen políticas públicas sin alterar el sentido del mecanismo, por lo que debería mantenerse disponible
- La experiencia de gestión pública del AP (particular frente al mecanismo global) como fue enfocado en Peru ha sido exitosa y debería sistematizarse para proponerla en otros países

6.2. Recomendaciones generales

- Financiar planes de desarrollo distrital y provincial con una perspectiva de mediano plazo (2015) para mejorar la coordinación del gobierno y los donadores que tienen un enfoque de reducir la pobreza a la mitad para el 2015. El PASA puede ser pionero en promover horizontes mayores de tiempo para los planes.
- Apoyar el desarrollo de Planes Operativos Municipales, Provinciales y Regionales anuales basados en recursos efectivos, plazos y responsables y con una mayor información a los beneficiarios respecto al monto presupuestal disponible, en el marco de los Presupuestos participativos en ejecución.
- Promover las acciones de la sociedad civil de los ámbitos de intervención a través de los planes de larga plazo. Los planes –con participación activa de la sociedad civil- no tienen que orientarse únicamente a planificar las inversiones estatales. Deben ser también guías de orientación y de potencialidad para el sector privado y otros actores. El PASA podría también proponer mecanismos para promover el desarrollo de actividades productivas (incluyendo más proyectos productivos, de micro-crédito, etc.), partiendo de la experiencia del CONACS.
- Acompañar la descentralización de los sectores de salud y educación, desde el rol precursor del PASA en el tema. Se deberían plantear pro activamente nuevos mecanismos de descentralización con Gobiernos locales, en el marco legal vigente, pero aportando al proceso.
- Mantener el acompañamiento crítico a los sectores para asegurar cada vez estrategias más coherentes y sostenibles
- El AP es un mecanismo con valor añadido cuando está orientado a objetivos con indicadores claros a nivel sectorial, pero también debe demostrar un valor añadido en los resultados esperados. El acompañamiento que contribuya el mejoramiento de la gestión pública es un componente fundamental del AP aunque las políticas son en última instancia decisiones del país, como se demuestra en el Perú.
- La CE debería mantener un valor añadido específico a su AP que asegure que las intervenciones que financie sean innovativas, sostenibles y con impacto directo en los más pobres, teniendo además para ello un acompañamiento cercano del PASA durante su ejecución.

6.3. Recomendaciones específicas:

Inversión social

- Se debería promover el análisis del potencial de cada municipalidad para poder promover inversiones privadas y el desarrollo de pequeñas empresas que creen empleos locales (como el caso de los alpaqueros). El gobierno local puede ser considerado como un promotor de inversiones.
- Se debería establecer modalidades competitivas como concursos de proyectos a nivel distrital, provincial y regional para movilizar y dinamizar las iniciativas locales de desarrollo socio-económico.

Recursos humanos (Salud y educación)

- En los casos de los sectores salud y educación esta situación requeriría un acompañamiento más intenso. Las intervenciones deberían incorporar desde la planificación a los Gobiernos locales, bajo un enfoque de planificación por demanda, vigilancia social y articulación con la inversión social y productiva, en el marco del proceso de descentralización y el rol pionero que PASA puede continuar teniendo.
- Las intervenciones deberían mantener su enfoque descentralizado, priorizando un apoyo directo a los beneficiarios antes que el apoyo indirecto desde el nivel central (salud y educación).

Gestión pública y AP

- Se deberían desarrollar planes específicos para las comunidades nativas (en la selva), al interior de los planes distritales y provinciales, buscando coordinar las prioridades de los varios grupos étnicos y basados en sus propias cosmovisiones y valores.
- En las zonas de selva alta se deberían promover la instalación de oficinas específicas en cada municipalidad que recojan y atiendan las demandas propias de las comunidades nativas, teniendo en cuenta la alta proporción de población indígena de la zona y la preeminencia de colonos en los gobiernos locales (como el caso de la Municipalidad de Río Negro en la provincia de Satipo, Región de Junín).
- Promover la realización de planes municipales a largo plazo (10-15 años) para visualizar el desarrollo local (distrital/provincial) y regional con mayor perspectiva, articulando provincia y distrito. Dentro de este marco se pueden realizar planes multianuales (articulados al marco multianual del Estado) y planes operativos anuales. Esta identificación a largo plazo permitirá facilitar las prioridades, integrar más consideraciones socio-económicas en los planes (cultura local, medio ambiente, manejo sostenible de recursos naturales, viabilización de inversiones agro-industriales, etc.) y no atenuar la frustración potencial en la satisfacción de una gran parte de la población que se ve excluida en la ejecución anual o tri-anual debido al presupuesto insuficiente para cubrir sus prioridades.
- Es necesario promover un mayor compromiso del Estado en financiar los ejes temáticos detallados en los planes locales para evitar que se pueda generar frustración en los participantes. Se requiere un esfuerzo del Estado para explicar a la población sobre las limitaciones presupuestarias existentes y la proyección positiva de crear a

nivel municipal y regional (en el marco del Sistema Nacional de Inversión Pública) un banco de proyectos para inversiones futuras.

- Se debe agilizar el manejo del presupuesto de la CE en coordinación con el Estado peruano para responder oportunamente a los compromisos que el PASA asume con los beneficiarios.

ANEXOS

ANEXO 1: Lista de personas entrevistadas

Nombre	Cargo	Institución	Lugar	Fecha
Mendel Goldstein	Jefe	Delegación de la CE en el Perú	Lima	24 feb. y 8 mar.
Milton Monje	Especialista	MIMDES/Foncodes/Convenio PASA	Lima	25 feb.
Julio Hernández	Coordinador	CONACS/Proalpacas	Lima	25 feb.
Daniel Arestegui	Director de planificación y presupuesto	CONACS	Lima	25 feb.
Ricardo Vergara	Consultor	Ex PASA/Resal	Lima	26 feb.
Javier Abugatas	Ex Secretario técnico y ex Vice-ministro	CIAS y MEF	Lima	26 feb
Julio Pedroza	Director (e)	MINSA/Cooperación técnica	Lima	26 feb.
Milagro Nuñez	Asesora	PCM	Lima	27 de febrero
Patricia Bulnes	Consultora	PCM	Lima	27 de febrero
Fredy Arroyo	Consultor	PCM	Lima	27 de febrero
Marcelino Cardenas	Director de Tesoro público	MEF	Lima	27 de febrero
María Pastor	Especialista Tesoro público	MEF	Lima	27 de febrero
Amalia Quispe	Especialista Tesoro público	MEF	Lima	27 de febrero
Cesar Acurio	Coordinador	MIMDES/Foncodes/Convenio PASA	Lima	27 feb.
David Roldan	Especialista fortalecimiento institucional	MIMDES/Foncodes/Convenio PASA	Lima	27 feb.
Luís Tejada	Viceministro	MIMDES	Lima	27 feb.
Hilario Aquino	Coordinador Proalpaca	DESCO Huancavelica	Huancavelica	29 feb. y 1 de marzo
	Alcalde	Municipalidad distrital de Pilpichaca	Huancavelica	29 de febrero
	Gerente del camal	Municipalidad distrital de Pilpichaca	Huancavelica	29 de febrero
	Presidente	Asociación de alpaceros de Pilpichaca	Huancavelica	29 de febrero

Nombre	Cargo	Institución	Lugar	Fecha
Máximo Fuentes	Gerente general	Gobierno regional de Huancavelica	Huancavelica	1ro de marzo
Ulises Panez	Jefe regional	CONACS	Huancavelica	1ro de marzo
Erick Rojas	Especialista	CONACS	Huancavelica	1ro de marzo
Ezequiel Pomachahua	Coord. Interno Proalpaca	DESCO Huancavelica	Huancavelica	1ro de marzo
Gisela Otone		DESCO Huancavelica	Huancavelica	1ro de marzo
Francisco Saldaña	Gerente de desarrollo económico	Gobierno regional de Huancavelica	Huancavelica	1ro de marzo
Augusto Olivares	Gerente de recursos naturales y medio ambiente	Gobierno regional de Huancavelica	Huancavelica	1ro de marzo
Ninfa Guerrero	Subgerencia de medio ambiente	Gobierno regional de Huancavelica	Huancavelica	1ro de marzo
	Alcalde	Distrito de Yauli	Huancavelica	1ro de marzo
Jorge Canazas	Director regional	Dirección de salud de Huancavelica	Huancavelica	2 de marzo
Vladimir Guerrero	Coord. enlace PAAG	Dirección de salud de Huancavelica	Huancavelica	2 de marzo
Marco Bartola	Dir. Ejecutivo de Salud de las personas	Dirección de salud de Huancavelica	Huancavelica	2 de marzo
Arturo Carhuallanqui	Subgerente de gestión y desarrollo	Gobierno regional de Huancavelica	Huancavelica	2 de marzo
Alfredo Villanueva	Subgerente de gestión educativa	Gobierno regional de Huancavelica	Huancavelica	2 de marzo
Ruben Peñaloza	Responsable de Relaciones públicas	Dirección Regional de Educación e Junín	Huancayo	3 de marzo
Irma Mauricio	Especialista de Gerencia de desarrollo social	Gobierno regional de Junín	Huancayo	3 de marzo
Walter Urrunaca	Gerente de infraestructura	Gobierno regional de Junín	Huancayo	3 de marzo
Carlos Mayta	Subgerente de infraestructura	Gobierno regional de Junín	Huancayo	3 de marzo

Nombre	Cargo	Institución	Lugar	Fecha
Gerson de La Cruz	Subgerente de proyectos de cooperación técnica	Gobierno regional de Junín	Huan-cayo	3 de marzo
Rosa Camborra	Esp. de gerencia de proyectos de cooperación técnica	Gobierno regional de Junín	Huan-cayo	3 de marzo
Pedro Ripalda	Director adjunto	Dirección de salud de Junín	Huan-cayo	3 de marzo
Cesar Reyes	Especialista	Dirección de salud de Junín	Huan-cayo	3 de marzo
David Castillo	Promotor Convenio PASA	MIMDES-Junín	Huan-cayo	3 de marzo
Juan Carrasco	Especialista en infraestructura Convenio PASA	MIMDES-Junín	Huan-cayo	3 de marzo
Jorge Alvarez	Asesor de gerencia general	Gobierno regional de Junín	Huan-cayo	3 de marzo
Nancy Gamarra	Subgerencia de supervisión de obras	Gobierno regional de Junín	Huan-cayo	3 de marzo
Maria Quevedo	Alcaldesa	Municipio provincial	Satipo	4 de marzo
Edgardo Chipana	Gerente municipal	Municipio provincial	Satipo	4 de marzo
Mariela Basurto	Regidora	Municipio provincial	Satipo	4 de marzo
Angel Saldaña	Alcalde	Municipio distrital	Perene	4 de marzo
Clemente Vianderas	Agente municipal	Municipio distrital	Perene	4 de marzo
Alejandro Goday	Presidente de Comité de desarrollo	Municipio distrital	Perene	4 de marzo
Hipólito Mercedes	Presidente de Comité de obra	Municipio distrital	Perene	4 de marzo
Regulo Medina	División de desarrollo urbano	Municipio distrital	Perene	4 de marzo
Jorge Jauregui	Regidor	Municipio distrital	Perene	4 de marzo
Fian Hurtado	Depart. de planeamiento y catastro	Municipio distrital	Perene	4 de marzo
Guillermo Chumpitas	Alcalde	Municipio distrital	Río Negro	4 de marzo
Malaquias Condor	Alcalde	Municipio distrital	Pichanaqui	4 de marzo

Nombre	Cargo	Institución	Lugar	Fecha
David Inga	Director municipal	Municipio distrital	Pichanaqui	4 de marzo
Alejandro Herrera	Supervisor de obra	Municipio distrital	Pichanaqui	4 de marzo
Rolando Palacios	Residente de obra	Municipio distrital	Pichanaqui	4 de marzo
Leoncio Figueroa	Supervisor de obra	Municipio distrital	Pichanaqui	4 de marzo
Enrique Fetta	Residente de obra	Municipio distrital	Pichanaqui	4 de marzo
Ricardo Ríos	Jefe de Dirección de desarrollo urbano	Municipio distrital	Pichanaqui	4 de marzo
	Representantes de Comités de obra	Municipio distrital	Pichanaqui	4 de marzo
Modesto Galvez	Director general de EBI	MINEDU	Lima	8 de marzo
Wilton Revilla	Especialista EBI	MINEDU	Lima	8 de marzo
Juan Fernando Vega	Ex Jefe de Planeamiento	MINEDU	Lima	9 de marzo
Ignacio Sobrino	Sección cooperación	Delegación de la CE en el Perú	Lima	Varias
Patrick Reboud	Sección cooperación	Delegación de la CE en el Perú	Lima	Varias
Roberto Cogno	Coordinador	CE/UTSA	Lima	Varias
Franz Ibañez	Administrador	CE/UTSA	Lima	Varias
Giovanni Bonfilio	Equipo Lima	CE/UTSA	Lima	Varias
Alejandro Vasquez	Equipo Lima	CE/UTSA	Lima	Varias

ANEXO 2: Bibliografía

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ANEXO 3: Cronograma de trabajo

Fecha	Actividad	Lugar
16 a 20 de febrero	Preparación de perfil de situación de seguridad alimentaria en el Perú	Lima
17 de febrero	Reunión preparatoria de consultor nacional con Coord. PASA y funcionarios de la Delegación de la CE	Lima
23 de febrero	Llegada de consultor internacional	Lima
24 de febrero	Reunión en la Delegación de la CE y en la UTSA	Lima
	Ajustes Plan de trabajo	Lima
25 a 27 de febrero	Entrevistas con funcionarios de CONACS, MINSA, MIMDES, ex RESAL, MEF y PCM-CIAS (actuales y previos en la vida del Programa)	Lima
29 de febrero	Viaje y visita a comunidad de Proyecto Pro-alpaca alpaquera (DESCO-CONACS)	Lima-Pilpichaca-Huancavelica
1ro de marzo	Reuniones con DESCO, CONACS y Gobierno regional	Huancavelica
	Visita a municipalidad de Yauli: reunión con autoridades, staff de obra y beneficiarios	Yauli
2 de marzo	Reunión con DISA Huancavelica y Gerencia de desarrollo social del Gob. regional	Huancavelica
	Viaje	Huancavelica-Huancayo
	Reunión de coordinación con personal Convenio PASA-MIMDES del Gobierno regional	Huancayo
3 de marzo	Reunión con Gobierno regional y DISA Junín	Huancayo
	Reunión con Director regional de educación	Huancayo
4 de marzo	Reuniones en las municipalidades de Satipo, Rio Negro, Perené y Pichanaqui	Huancayo-Satipo-La Merced
5 de marzo	Viaje de retorno a Lima	La Merced-Lima
8 de marzo	De-briefing en la Delegación de la CE	Lima
	Entrevista en Ministerio de educación	Lima
9 de marzo	Entrevista con ex Jefe de planeamiento del MINEDU	Lima
10 de marzo	Reunión con equipo PASA para discusión de hallazgos	Lima
9 a 16 de marzo	Preparación de informe de evaluación	Lima
15 de marzo	Reunión final de discusión de informe final en la Delegación de la CE	Lima

ANEXO 4: Abreviaturas

AGORAH	Proyecto de apoyo a los gobiernos regionales de Ayacucho y Huancavelica
AP	Apoyo presupuestario
BID	Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo
BM	Banco mundial
CE	Comunidad europea
CIAS	Comité interministerial de asuntos sociales
CLAS	Comité local de administración de salud
CONACS	Concejo nacional de camélidos sudamericanos
CSP	Country Strategic Paper
CTAR	Concejo transitorio de administración regional
DIRESA	Dirección regional de salud
EDA	Enfermedad diarreica aguda
EFLCPE	Estrategia focalizada de lucha contra la pobreza extrema
ENDES	Encuesta nacional de salud
ERA	Enfermedades respiratorias agudas
FAO	Organización de Naciones Unidas para la agricultura y la alimentación
FIDA	Fondo internacional de desarrollo agrícola
FONCODES	Fondo de compensación y desarrollo social
INEI	Instituto nacional de estadística e informática
INFES	Instituto nacional de infraestructura educativa y social
MEF	Ministerio de economía y finanzas
MIMDES	Ministerio de la mujer y desarrollo social
MINEDU	Ministerio de educación
MINAG	Ministerio de agricultura
MINSA	Ministerio de salud
MTC	Ministerio de transportes y comunicaciones
MVCS	Ministerio de vivienda, construcción y saneamiento
NBI	Necesidades básicas insatisfechas
ONG	Organización no gubernamental
PASA	Programa de apoyo a la seguridad alimentaria
PCM	Presidencia del Concejo de Ministros
PDM	Plan de desarrollo municipal

PETT	Programa especial de titulación de tierras
PMA	Programa Mundial de Alimentos
PROMUDEH	Ministerio de promoción de la mujeres y desarrollo humano
PRONAA	Programa nacional de apoyo alimentario
PRONAMACHCS	Programa nacional de manejo de cuencas hidrográficas y obras de conservación de suelos
PRONASAR	Programa nacional de agua y saneamiento rural
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
UE	Unión europea
UNICEF	Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la infancia
USAID	Agencia internacional para el desarrollo (de los Estados Unidos)
UTSA	Unidad técnica de seguridad alimentaria
SA	Seguridad alimentaria
SIS	Seguro Integral de Salud

ANEXO 5: Informaciones complementarias de seguridad alimentaria en el Perú

Disponibilidad alimentaria-nutricional

a. Disponibilidad calórica

En esta dimensión sólo a partir de 1996 se logra alcanzar el mínimo identificado por el Ministerio de salud para el país que es de 2,400 calorías/día. Es importante señalar que la composición de estas calorías se concentra en cereales y azúcares. Otros productos de elevado valor nutricional como productos de carnes, pescados y caza corresponden a menos del 10% del conjunto.

b. Disponibilidad proteica

La disponibilidad proteica el Perú se encuentra para 1998 por encima del mínimo de 56 gramos. Las fuentes principales son vegetales (principalmente granos) con un ligero incremento de las proteínas de origen animal (carne y huevos básicamente).

c. Deficiencias calóricas

Partiendo del gasto en alimentos de canastas regionales, se ha establecido que el 32% de la población del país se encuentra en estado de desnutrición calórica. Por subgrupos: 50% de la población rural y 21% de la población urbana; 47% de la población de la sierra, 36% de la selva, 20% de la costa y 17% de Lima metropolitana y finalmente el 82% de los pobres extremos.

d. Deficiencias de micronutrientes (hierro, vitamina A y yodo)

La anemia por deficiencia de hierro en niños menores de 5 años para el año 2000 presenta una prevalencia de 50% (53% a nivel rural), y en menores de dos años supera el 70%. En el caso de mujeres en edad fértil la tasa nacional es de 31.6% y en áreas rurales 37%.

Respecto a la deficiencia en Vitamina A ha habido avances significativos A nivel nacional la deficiencia en menores de cinco años se redujo de 1996 a 1999 de 55.3 a 11.1%, así como en mujeres en edad fértil pasó de 19.9% a 1.5%

Las campañas de yodación de la sal han sido efectivas en eliminar la brecha entre oferta y demanda de yodo.

e. Sobrepeso

En el Perú se combina, en especial en áreas urbanas, condiciones de deficiencia nutricional junto con sobrepeso y obesidad. Para el año 2000 se encuentra una prevalencia de sobrepeso en mujeres en edad fértil en 46.6% de éstas.

Además algunos estudios señalan la coexistencia de anemias por deficiencias de hierro junto con problemas de obesidad en distritos pobres urbanos.

Uso de alimentación: subtemas

a. Lactancia materna y ablactancia

La lactancia materna exclusiva y ablactancia oportuna son factores que incidirán en la calidad de la salud y la posibilidad de reducir el riesgo de enfermedades y tener un buen uso de los alimentos por parte de los niños y niñas. En el Perú según ENDES 2000 el 97.9% de los recién nacidos reciben lactancia materna exclusiva, pero la duración del período de lactancia materna exclusiva es menor al recomendado. La prevalencia hasta los seis meses es de 67.2%, siendo menor el período de lactancia exclusiva en áreas urbanas.

Dos aspectos claves que requieren capacitación para el cambio de hábito es el número de comidas (pasar de tres a cinco o seis comidas y más sólidos que líquidos) y el inicio del período de ablactancia. Se trata no solo de conocimientos sino de actitudes (incluyendo barreras culturales) y de aspectos organizativos de la vida familiar que requieren ajustarse.

b. Educación formal de la madre de familia

Un factor clave en lograr cambios en la salud de los niños y niñas y en general en el desarrollo de la familia es el nivel de educación formal de la madre. Los años de estudio están correlacionados con prácticas de higiene y alimentación así como aspectos de planificación familiar.

En el Perú 51.6% de las mujeres sin instrucción tienen un niño con desnutrición crónica. En el área rural para el año 2000 (ENDES) 13% de las mujeres no tenían ningún grado de instrucción, 54.7% habían terminado primaria y 26% secundaria. En áreas urbanas estas cifras eran 1.7%, 17% y 52.2% respectivamente.

c. Atención en centros de salud

La atención oportuna especialmente del binomio madre-niño/a y de las mujeres en edad fértil, gestantes y lactantes con carácter preventivo ha mostrado ser un medio para mejorar la seguridad alimentaria de la familia.

Los controles prenatales y el parto institucional, así como posteriormente la vigilancia del crecimiento, son elementos claves para el desarrollo de niños saludables y evitar muertes maternas.

Existen sin embargo múltiples barreras culturales, geográficas (por distancia) y económicas para lograr que las madres asistan a los centros de salud. En este tema es necesario trabajar desde la oferta y desde la demanda fuertemente para poder reducir las altas cifras de mortalidad materna y prevenir los casos de EDAs, Enfermedades respiratorias agudas (ERAs) y desnutrición (aguda, global y/o crónica).

d. Condiciones de salud y saneamiento

El caso de ERAs notificados por el Ministerio de salud ha sido para el año 2001 de 54 brotes con 10 fallecidos que indica el nivel de riesgo que significa la presencia de esta enfermedad. En cuanto a EDAs en niños menores de cinco años la tasa de prevalencia para el año 2000 fue de 13.6% y 17.6% en ámbitos urbano y rural respectivamente, siendo mayor el número de casos en niños y niñas de entre uno y dos años.

Para ambos casos se requiere trabajar intensivamente en dotar a los hogares de infraestructura de agua y saneamiento, organización de mantenimiento de los servicios con estándares de calidad y educación sanitaria y de higiene.

En cuanto a infraestructura de agua y sanitaria, se trata de una condición necesaria para disminuir significativamente las tasas de EDA y romper el círculo vicioso de enfermedad y mala alimentación. Para el año 2000 solamente el 66% de la población tenía alguna forma de abastecimiento de agua potable. A nivel rural esta cifra desciende a sólo un 36%. Más aún, estas cifras no indican la calidad del agua a la que se accede. En este contexto la educación sanitaria y de higiene adquiere aún más relevancia.

Principales programas sociales relacionados con seguridad alimentaria en el Perú

Tipo de Programas	Componentes	Institución pública responsable a la fecha²⁵	Cooperac. Internacional principales
Asistencia alimentaria	Vaso de leche (niños)	Gobiernos locales	
	Desayuno escolar	PRONAA	PMA
	Comedores populares	PRONAA *	
	Alimentos para enfermos y ancianos	PRONAA	
	Familias en alto riesgo nutricional	PRONAA	
	Hogares y albergues	PRONAA *	
	Alimentos por trabajo	PRONAA *	PMA
Asistencia educativa	Uniformes. Calzados, textos y útiles	MINEDU	
	Educación rural y bilingüe intercultural	MINEDU	BM UE
Salud	Seguro integral de salud (incluye los ex Seguros escolares y de salud materno-infantil)	MINSA	BM-BID-UE
	Control de crecimiento del niño	MINSA	UNICEF-UE
	Vacunación	MINSA	UNICEF-UE
	Atención a poblaciones excluidas		Holanda UE
Infraestructura social ...Continúa	Obras nuevas y rehabilitación de agua y saneamiento (incluye desagüe y letrinas)	PRONASAR/MVCS, Gobiernos regionales y locales	Suiza BM
	Construcción y mejoramiento de centros educativos	INFES/MVCS, FONCODES/MIMDES, Gobiernos locales	BM BID
	Equipamiento de centros educativos	MINEDU, FONCODES/MIMDES	BM BID
	Construcción y mejoramiento de establecimientos de salud	MINSA/MVCS, FONCODES/MIMDES, Gobiernos locales	BM BID
	Equipamiento de establecimientos de salud	MINSA	BM BID

²⁵ En los casos con asterisco el programa se encuentra en proceso de descentralización hacia gobiernos locales o regionales

Tipo de Programas	Componentes	Institución pública responsable a la fecha²⁶	Cooperac. Internacional principales
Infraestructura económica	Construcción de caminos y carreteras: PROVIAS	MTC y Gobiernos locales	BM
	Electrificación rural	Ministerio de Energía y Minas	
	Obras de producción agropecuaria (sistemas de riego, obras de conservación de suelos, reforestación, etc.)	PRONAMACHCS, MINAG, FONCODES	BM BID Japón Holanda FIDA
	Titulación de tierras y lotes	PETT	BM BID
Empleo temporal	A trabajar	FONCODES / MIMDES	BM BID UE
Consumo de alimentos	Promoción del consumo de pescado	Instituto de tecnología pesquera (ITP)	
Producción y comercialización de alimentos	Agencias agrarias	MINAG	BID
	Sanidad agrícola	MINAG	BID FAO
	Tecnología pesquera	ITP	
	Mejoramiento de producción de camélidos	CONACS/MINAG	UE

Fuente: Elaboración propia en base a Chacaltana 2001 y otros

²⁶ En los casos con asterisco el programa se encuentra en proceso de descentralización hacia gobiernos locales o regionales

ANEXO 6: Criterios de juicios de las cuestiones evaluativas

1. CUESTIÓN EVALUATIVA 1

No esta a considerar en la parte de la mision de terreno

2. CUESTIÓN EVALUATIVA 2

Cual es el nivel de integración de las políticas de SA en la estrategia de desarrollo de la Comisión definidas en el RSP de la Región y en cada uno de los CSPs ?

Primer Criterio de Juicio

Coherencia entre los objetivos generales de la Política de SA y el CSP.

Indicadores:

- Existencia de similares Objetivos Generales
- Calidad de referencias cruzadas en relación con Seguridad Alimentaria y Ayuda alimentaria

Segundo Criterio de Juicio

Importancia del tema de la Seguridad alimentaria y de la Ayuda Alimentaria en el CSP

Indicador:

-Calidad de las referencias cruzadas en el CSP en relación con Seguridad Alimentaria

Tercer Criterio de Juicio

Definición clara del rol de la Regulación 1292/96 en el CSP

Indicador:

- Calidad de las referencias cruzadas en el CSP en relación con Seguridad Alimentaria

Cuarto Criterio de Juicio

Complementariedad de los diferentes Instrumentos de la Comisión en el CSP

Indicadores:

- Complementariedad de objetivos
- Calidad de la Cooperación propuesta y operacional y coordinación de las intervenciones de la Comisión.

Quinto Criterio de Juicio

Coordinación de las intervenciones de la Comisión.

Indicadores:

- Existencia de mecanismos de coordinación

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 2:

Análisis General de la Cuestión evaluativa 2:

3. CUESTIÓN EVALUATIVA 3

Cuál es la coherencia entre las políticas y estrategias en Seguridad Alimentaria de la Comisión con las estrategias nacionales, específicamente en la ERCEP?

Primer Criterio de Juicio

Coherencia de los objetivos generales entre el CSP y la ERCEP

Indicadores:

- Similaridad de los objetivos generales
- Calidad de las referencias cruzadas entre la ERCEP y las políticas nacionales

Segundo Criterio de Juicio

Importancia de SA en el ERCEP y estrategias nacionales

Indicador:

- Calidad de las referencias de SA en el ERCEP

Tercer Criterio de Juicio

Definición clara del papel de la CE en el ERCEP y estrategias nacionales

Indicador:

- Calidad de las referencias SA en el ERCEP

Cuarto Criterio de Juicio

Racionalidad de la intervención de la CE

Indicadores:

- Intervenciones específicas de la CE

Quinto Criterio de Juicio

Coordinación donantes/gobierno

Indicadores:

- Existencia de mecanismos de cooperación y de coordinación con el gobierno y otros donantes
- Calidad de la coordinación entre los donadores.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 3:

Análisis General de la Cuestión evaluativa 3:

4. CUESTIÓN EVALUATIVA 4

Cual es el valor añadido de la Ayuda en Especie en aras de contribuir a que se consigan los objetivos generales marcados en la Regulación para Seguridad alimentaria ?

Primer Criterio de Juicio

Pertinencia de las acciones y estrategias en Ayuda alimentaria en especie.

Indicador:

- Precondiciones del uso de Ayuda Alimentaria

Segundo Criterio de Juicio

Eficiencia de las acciones y estrategias en Ayuda Alimentaria

Indicador:

- Grado de cumplimiento de objetivos

Tercer Criterio de Juicio

Eficacia de las acciones y estrategias en Ayuda Alimentaria

Indicadores:

- Modalidades de implementación de los programas
- Flexibilidad y rapidez de la Ayuda Alimentaria para responder a las necesidades
- Relación Costo-beneficio en Ayuda Alimentaria

Cuarto Criterio de Juicio

Impacto de las acciones y estrategias en Ayuda Alimentaria

Indicadores:

- Cambios en estadísticas de desnutrición, comportamiento de los beneficiarios, producción de comida, precios...
- Grado de satisfacción de los socios implementadores y de los beneficiarios.

Quinto Criterio de Juicio

Sostenibilidad de las acciones y estrategias en Ayuda Alimentaria

Indicadores:

- Grado de empoderamiento de los beneficiarios en las acciones de AA.

Sexto Criterio de Juicio

Ventaja comparativa de las operaciones de ayuda alimentaria en relación a otros instrumentos fuera de la Regulación.

Indicadores:

- Similares indicadores de otros Instrumentos (ECHO)

Séptimo Criterio de Juicio

Coordinación de los distintos tipos de operaciones dentro de la Regulación y con otros instrumentos de AA.

Indicadores:

- Calidad de la coordinación con otras operaciones de dentro y de fuera de la Regulación.

Octavo Criterio de Juicio

Calidad (efectividad) de la identificación de beneficiarios

Indicadores:

- Eficacia en la distribución.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 4:

Análisis General de la Cuestión evaluativa 4:

5. CUESTIÓN EVALUATIVA 5

Cual es el valor añadido del mecanismo “Apoyo al presupuestario (AP)” de la Regulación con relación a los objetivos de SA que la propia regulación plantea?

Primer Criterio de Juicio

Pertinencia del uso de estrategias y acciones de AP

Indicadores:

- Precondiciones para el uso AP

Segundo Criterio de Juicio

Efectividad de estrategias y acciones de AP

Indicador:

- Grado de terminación de los objetivos

Tercer Criterio de Juicio

Eficiencia de estrategias y acciones de AP

Indicador:

- Modalidades de implementación adecuadas
- Flexibilidad y rapidez de adaptación de AP a un nuevo contexto
- Progresos realizados en los sectores apoyados
- Ratio Costo/beneficio de la intervención AP

Cuarto Criterio de Juicio

Impacto de estrategias y acciones de AP

Indicadores:

- Cambios en el estatuto nutricional, precios, producción alimentaria, comportamiento de los beneficiarios
- Grado de satisfacción de los partners y beneficiarios (p.e. en relación a las pre-condiciones de utilización de AP, las modalidades de implementación,...)

Quinto Criterio de Juicio

Sostenibilidad de estrategias y acciones de AP

Indicadores:

- Grado de apropiación de AP

Sexto Criterio de Juicio

Ventajas comparativas de AP con relación a los otros tipos de operación de la Regulación y de las operaciones de los otros instrumentos utilizando AP

Indicadores:

- Indicadores similares (eficiencia.) para los otros instrumentos

Séptimo Criterio de Juicio

Coordinación de los instrumentos de AP

Indicador:

- Calidad de la cooperación operacional y de los mecanismos de coordinación entre los diferentes instrumentos

Octavo Criterio de Juicio

Coherencia entre AP y la nueva regulación y EC guía de AP

Indicador:

- Fase desk

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 5:

Análisis General de la Cuestión evaluativa 5:

6. CUESTIÓN EVALUATIVA 6

Cual es el valor añadido de las operaciones de apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria (Títulos II y III del Reglamento 1292/96) para lograr los objetivos generales marcados en el mismo?

Primer Criterio de Juicio

Pertinencia de las acciones y estrategias en Seguridad Alimentaria.

Indicador:

- Precondiciones del uso de Seguridad Alimentaria (llamadas a ONGs, apoyo a Organismos Internacionales, project aid)

Segundo Criterio de Juicio

Eficiencia de las acciones y estrategias en Seguridad Alimentaria

Indicador:

- Grado de cumplimiento de objetivos

Tercer Criterio de Juicio

Eficacia de las acciones y estrategias en Seguridad Alimentaria

Indicadores:

- Modalidades de implementación de los programas
- Flexibilidad y rapidez de la Seguridad Alimentaria para responder a las necesidades

- Relación Costo-beneficio en Seguridad Alimentaria

Cuarto Criterio de Juicio

Impacto de las acciones y estrategias en Seguridad Alimentaria

Indicadores:

- Cambios en estadísticas de desnutrición, comportamiento de los beneficiarios, producción de comida, precios...
- Grado de satisfacción de los socios implementadores y de los beneficiarios. (en la selección del proceso, en la implementación, etc)

Quinto Criterio de Juicio

Sostenibilidad de las acciones y estrategias en Seguridad Alimentaria

Indicadores:

- Grado de empoderamiento de los beneficiarios en las acciones de SA.

Sexto Criterio de Juicio

Ventaja comparativa de las operaciones de Seguridad Alimentaria en relación a otros instrumentos fuera de la Regulación.

Indicadores:

- Similares indicadores de otros Instrumentos (ECHO)

Séptimo Criterio de Juicio

Coordinación de los distintos tipos de operaciones dentro de la Regulación y con otros instrumentos de SA.

Indicadores:

- Calidad de la coordinación con otras operaciones de dentro y de fuera de la Regulación.

<p>Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 6:</p>
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Análisis General de la Cuestión evaluativa 6:

7. CUESTIÓN EVALUATIVA 7

Cual es el valor añadido del componente « Otros/ asistencia técnica y Apoyo institucional » para lograr a los objetivos de SA en el Reglamento

Primer Criterio de Juicio

Pertinencia del uso de estrategias y acciones de “Otros”

Indicador:

- Precondiciones para el uso de “Otros”

Segundo Criterio de Juicio

Efectividad de estrategias y acciones de “Otros”

Indicador:

- Grado de terminación de los objetivos

Tercer Criterio de Juicio

Eficiencia de estrategias y acciones de “Otros”

Indicadores:

- Apropiación de las modalidades de implementación de los programas
- Flexibilidad y rapidez de adaptación de “otros” para responder a las necesidades
- Ratio Costo / beneficio de la intervención “Otros”

Cuarto Criterio de Juicio

Impacto de estrategias y acciones de Otros

Indicadores:

- Cambios en el estatuto nutricional, precios, producción alimentaria, comportamiento de los beneficiarios
- Grado de satisfacción de los partners y beneficiarios (p.e. en relación a las pre-condiciones de utilización de “Otros”, las modalidades de implementación,...)

Quinto Criterio de Juicio

Sostenibilidad de estrategias y acciones de “Otros”

Indicador:

- Grado de apropiación de “Otros”

Sexto Criterio de Juicio

Ventajas comparativas de “Otros” en relación a los otros tipos de operación de la Regulación y de las operaciones de los otros instrumentos utilizando “Otros”

Indicador:

- Indicadores similares (eficiencia.) para los otros instrumentos (instrumentos geográficos y Echo)

Séptimo Criterio de Juicio

Coordinación de los instrumentos de AP

Indicadores:

- Calidad de la cooperación operacional y de los mecanismos de coordinación entre los diferentes instrumentos

Octavo Criterio de Juicio

Papel de la AT

Indicadores:

- TDRs de la AT
- Performancia de la AT

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 7:
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Análisis General de la Cuestión evaluativa 7:

8. CUESTIÓN EVALUATIVA 8

Hasta que punto el diseño en su fase de identificación de las acciones en Ayuda Alimentaria y Seguridad Alimentaria han facilitado el logro de los objetivos marcados? Esto incluye la identificación de prioridades, la selección de países, de beneficiarios, de los componentes, de las operaciones a financiar, la identificación y valoración de los procesos, la programación multianual, etc?

Primer Criterio de Juicio

Calidad de la programación general de recursos (identificación de países, criterios de elegibilidad)

Indicador:

- Criterios practicados.
- Características de los grupos de beneficiarios.

Segundo Criterio de Juicio

Calidad del nivel de programación del país (vínculo con el CSP y el PRSP)

Indicador:

- Estrategia anterior a la intervención.
- Mecanismos de coordinación para programar recursos y planes de trabajo.
- Número de reuniones y seminarios de indentificación.

Tercer Criterio de Juicio

Calidad del proceso para la aprobación del Programa

Indicadores:

- Existencia de comités AA/SA
- Flexibilidad y rapidez de la Línea de Seguridad Alimentaria para responder a las necesidades

Cuarto Criterio de Juicio

Pertinencia de las acciones de la Comisión versus necesidades de los beneficiarios

Indicadores:

- Calidad del informe sobre necesidades beneficiarios, producción de comida, precios...
- Características de los grupos de beneficiarios.

Quinto Criterio de Juicio

Selección de los componentes del Proyecto.

Indicadores:

- Calidad del diseño del Programa

Sexto Criterio de Juicio

Planes claros de división de responsabilidades.

Indicadores:

- Marco Lógico.

- Proceso de selección de proyectos.

Séptimo Criterio de Juicio

Integración de los temas transversales en el diseño de proyectos.

Indicadores:

- Uso específico de Check List para el diseño de Proyectos. (en temas de Género)

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 8:

Análisis General de la Cuestión evaluativa 8:

9. CUESTIÓN EVALUATIVA 9

Hasta que punto la preparación para la implementación de los proyectos y programas (mecanismos de manejo/ mecanismos y procedimientos, p.e. repartición del trabajo y responsabilidades, coordinación de acciones) han facilitado el camino para lograr a los objetivos de SA marcados por el Reglamento 1292/96 ?

Primer Criterio de Juicio :

Complementariedad con otros programas

Indicador:

- Referencias dentro de otros programas existentes y estrategias de coordinación.

Segundo Criterio de Juicio

División clara de las responsabilidades en las varios fases PCM ? (implementación y evaluación)

Indicador:

- Documento de decisiones dentro las unidades e instituciones

Tercer Criterio de Juicio

papel de la AT

Indicador:

- TDRs y preformancia de la AT

Cuarto Criterio de Juicio

Procedimientos adaptados para el manejo de programa (mecanismos de delivery a tiempo)

Indicadores:

- Procedimientos y sistema de monitoreo
- Existente mecanismos para analizar y adaptar la implementación de proyectos

Quinto Criterio de Juicio

Medios adecuados para manejar los programas (nivel CE) y proyecto (nivel país)

Indicador:

- Staff para manejar programas y proyectos

Sexto Criterio de Juicio

M&E adecuado que incluye un sistema de apreciación del impacto (.....)

Indicadores:

- Calidad del sistema de monitoreo
- Lista de las evaluaciones
- Lista de la recomendaciones efectivas

Séptimo Criterio de Juicio

Participación de los actores en el manejo de los programas

Indicadores:

- Capacidad de integrar las discusiones en la implementación del proyecto
- Existencia de géneros en el grupo de manejo y pertenencia a varios grupos (ectnic, minoridad,...)

Octavo Criterio de Juicio

Integración de temas transversales en la implementación de los proyectos/ programas

Indicador:

- Uso de lista para chequear la implementación (género)

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 9:

Analysis de la Cuestión evaluativa 9:

10. CUESTIÓN EVALUATIVA 10

Hasta que punto la Fase de entrega/cierre de las acciones apoyadas ha sido planeada y que contribución tuvo en el cumplimiento de los objetivos generales marcados?

Primer Criterio de Juicio

Presencia de una clara estrategia para reducir progresivamente la dependencia de la Comisión y su efectividad.

Indicador:

- Existencia de un documento de estrategia de Entrega de Proyecto y empoderamiento.

Segundo Criterio de Juicio

Estrategias de empoderamiento y capacity building

Indicador:

- Seminarios, talleres, etc.

Tercer Criterio de Juicio

Adecuados procedimientos para la entrega y transición del proyecto

Indicador:

- Procedimientos flexibles.

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 10:

Análisis General de la Cuestión evaluativa 10:

11. CUESTIÓN EVALUATIVA 11

Cual es la sostenibilidad de los efectos y de los impactos de las políticas y los programas de la CE en SA, a nivel de la población, a nivel institucional y de la política propia en el país beneficiario?

Primer Criterio de Juicio

Presencia de una estrategia clara para reducir gradualmente la dependencia de la asistencia y su efectividad

Indicadores:

- Documento de estrategia para asegurar la sostenibilidad financiera y el acceso a los servicios

Segundo Criterio de Juicio

Habilidad de las instituciones del gobierno (y NGOs) para elaborar estrategias e implementar programas y también contribuir a lograr los objetivos del programa dentro todas las áreas cuando la asistencia CE acabe.

Indicadores:

- Balance financiero (costos y recursos)
- Disponibilidad y posibilidad de encontrar fondos cuando el proyecto acabe
- Gobierno y otras agencias tienen planos financieros a largo plazo
- Adopción de un plan nacional de SA
- Datos de SA y análisis a disposición al tiempo adecuado para lograr a definir políticas y decisiones

Tercer Criterio de Juicio

Habilidad de las agencias de servicios de continuar la provisión de servicios a largo plazo

Indicador:

- Staff adecuado a varios nivel para dar los servicios necesarios en áreas claves, staff mantenido y alargado cuando sea necesario, y mecanismos de formación existente.

Cuarto Criterio de Juicio

Habilidad de los beneficiarios para tener el acceso a los beneficios del proyecto CE cuando la donación CE se acabe.

Quinto Criterio de Juicio

Habilidad de la mujer y hombre de varios edad, habilidad, etnia, ingresos y religión a tener un acceso igual a los beneficios del proyecto.

Sexto Criterio de Juicio

Habilidad de la delegación CE de manejar proyectos y también asegurar la coherencia dentro los varios instrumentos CE

Indicadores:

- Numero de EC staff en la delegación trabajando en SA
- Relaciones dentro las varias unidades trabajando en SA

Séptimo Criterio de Juicio

Habilidad de la sede CE a definir estrategias y asegurar la coherencia dentro la estrategia CE y la estrategia internacional de SA

Indicadores:

Numero de EC staff en la sede trabajando en SA

Relaciones dentro las varias unidades trabajando en SA

Adecuación de los instrumentos geográficos para financiar la AT financiada actualmente para la línea SA

Numero de línea financiera con referencia a SA

Relaciones dentro los varios instrumentos

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 11:
--

Análisis General de la Cuestión evaluativa 11:

12. CUESTIÓN EVALUATIVA 12

Cual es el rol de la Regulación 1292/96 en los esfuerzos de ser un puente en la lógica emergencia – rehabilitación – desarrollo?

Primer Criterio de Juicio

Acuerdo en la definición del proceso emergencia-rehabilitación-desarrollo.

Indicador:

Existe similar definición del concepto emergencia-rehabilitación- desarrollo.

Segundo Criterio de Juicio

Clara división del rol entre los varios instrumentos de la Comisión involucrados en este proceso

Indicador:

- Modalidades específicas del uso de cada instrumento en relación a la LRRD.

Tercer Criterio de Juicio

Complementariedad de los varios instrumentos de la Comisión involucrados en este proceso.

Indicador:

- Análisis Comparativos de los distintos documentos

Cuarto Criterio de Juicio

Valor añadido de la Regulación para cumplir el rol (por ejemplo, si hay capacidad en la línea de SA de cubrir rápidamente crisis alimentarias, si los programas son flexibles para adaptarse a las crisis....)

Indicador:

- Criterios de transmisión de un paso a otro claramente definidos

Quinto Criterio de Juicio

Coordinación de los instrumentos.

Indicador:

- Calidad de los mecanismos de coordinación propuestos entre los instrumentos

Respuesta General a la Cuestión evaluativa 12:

Análisis General de la Cuestión evaluativa 12:



European Commission



**Thematic Evaluation of Food Aid Policy and Food Aid
Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security**

FIELD REPORT FOR ZIMBABWE

Final report

Annemarie Hoogendoorn

Munhamo Chisvo

June 2004

For the

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIDCO	Agency for International Development Cooperation (EC)
ARDA	Agricultural Rural Development Agency
AREX	Agricultural Extension Services
CAP	Consolidated Appeal
COMESA	Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, COMESA
CSB	Corn Soy Blend
CSO	Country Support Office (Euronaid)
CSP	Country Strategy Paper (EC)
DDRC	District Drought Relief Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DG-DEV	Directorate-General for Development (EC)
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EDF	European Development Fund
EMOP	Emergency Operation (WFP term)
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EQ	Evaluative Question
FA/FS	Food Aid / Food Security
FANR	Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN)
FIF	Food Import Facility
FSBL	Food Security Budget Line
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GBP	British Pounds (£)
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HBC	Home Based Care
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome

IMF	International Monetary Fund
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MT	Metric Tons
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RIACSO	Regional Inter-Agency Cooperation Support Office
RIV	Regional Incident Verification team
RRU	Relief and Recovery Unit (within UNDP)
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SGR	Strategic Grain Reserve
STABEX	Stabilisation of Export Earnings (EC programme)
TA	Technical Assistance
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
ZIMVAC	Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee
ZWD	Zimbabwe Dollar

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background and objectives of the study

This country case study forms part of the EC evaluation on 'Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security' that was executed by Particip GmbH in 2003/04. The study reviews the food aid and food security programmes in Zimbabwe that have been funded by the EC since 1997, with special emphasis on the period from 2000 onwards. The main objective of the study is to analyse the added value of the EC Food Security Budget Line (FSBL) that was established by EC Regulation No. 1292/96 in comparison with other EC instruments and budget lines, focussing on coherence and complementarity of the EC strategies, and the efficiency and quality management with regard to programming, targeting and handling of food aid actions and operations in support of food security. The study in Zimbabwe was carried out by Mrs. Annemarie Hoogendoorn as the international expert and Mr. Munhamo Chisvo as the national expert. The visit to Zimbabwe took place between the 10th and 25th of February 2004.

Use of EC Regulation 1292//96 funds in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has received significant amounts of funds from the FSBL, with a total budget of € 123.3 million only for the years 2002/03 and 2003/04. Within the global framework contracts with WFP and Euronaid, the FSBL has supported food aid programmes and some distribution of agricultural inputs. The FSBL currently employs one ALAT and one individual expert within the EC Delegation, and also supplied one technical assistant to the Relief and Rehabilitation Unit of UNDP in 2002/03 to participate in the relief coordination. ECHO has provided considerable funds in the wake of the Zimbabwe crisis as well, with a total of € 40.5 million for the past two years.

Answers to the evaluative questions

The methodology for all country case studies within this EC evaluation has been based upon a set of evaluative questions that was developed during the desk phase. The main conclusions of this exercise for the Zimbabwe country case study are listed here:

- EQ 1: To be answered by the synthesis phase.
- EQ 2: Within the limitations present in Zimbabwe, there is a fair level of complementarity between the FSBL programmes and the current Commission's development support that is focussed on direct population support only. There is no 9th EDF and also no Country Strategy Paper.
- EQ 3: Despite the absence of a PRSP in Zimbabwe, there is a fair level of coherence between the national Poverty Alleviation Plan and the free food aid provided by the FSBL as a safety net for vulnerable population groups.
- EQ 4: The 'food aid in-kind' instrument of the FSBL has had a fair added value in Zimbabwe to achieve the overall objectives set in Regulation No. 1292/96. The Budget Line has functioned as a flexible funding instrument that was able to quickly mobilise huge amounts of funding for food aid programmes, which would not have been possible with EDF funds. The focus so far has been on large food aid programmes, which might lead to some degree of aid dependency negatively affecting self-reliance. So far, there has been little emphasis on phasing over to other types of programmes to stimulate food security.

- EQ 5: The 'Budgetary Support / Foreign Currency Facility' instrument of the FSBL is not implemented in Zimbabwe.
- EQ 6: The 'operations in support of support food security operations' instrument of the FSBL has had a fair added value in Zimbabwe for achieving the food security objectives, but up to now, they are relatively small in size and limited to the provision of agricultural inputs only.
- EQ 7: The 'technical assistance and capacity building' instrument of the FSBL so far has had limited added value in Zimbabwe to achieve food security objectives. The two FSBL staff members within the Delegation have mainly focused on very global monitoring (there is no system in place for structured project monitoring, and no indicators are being used¹) and liaison issues. The effectiveness of the monitoring role has been constrained by a lack of clarity about the allocation of responsibilities between F-5 Brussels and the Delegation in Zimbabwe, leading to gaps in communication and reporting mechanisms. Thus far, no capacity building has been funded by the FS Budget Line apart from an unsuccessful SADC regional hub project that was discontinued in June 2003.
- EQ 8: The design of the FSBL actions in Zimbabwe facilitates the achievement of the set objectives. The Budget Line has supported relevant and timely food aid programmes as a swift response to urgent humanitarian needs. There are transparent targeting procedures with full participation of the local community. However, because of rather broad targeting criteria, there is a very high coverage which might lead to unnecessary dependence on food aid. Both WFP and Euronaid have shown to be operationally capable to procure and transport large amounts of food aid. The gender sensitivity levels of the food aid operations of WFP and Euronaid are satisfactory. The mission did not avail of sufficient information to be able to compare the costs per beneficiary of the WFP and Euronaid operations.
- EQ 9: The implementation set-up of the FSBL actions in Zimbabwe has been fair. The funded food aid programmes generally have been well executed, but the multi-level character of the framework contractual agreements with WFP and Euronaid is complicated and the chain of authorisation is not always clear. The two FA/FS experts within the Delegation are involved in general monitoring only, without a monitoring system, but with regular sharing of information with F-5 in Brussels. The Delegation only recently received a copy of the framework contracts, and up to now has not received any copies of financial and narrative final reports for the programmes funded by the FSBL. The coordination of the food aid programmes has been satisfactory but the seeds distribution programmes have been less well coordinated, especially in the first year 2002/03. Nutrition data of February 2003 show that the food crisis at that time was well under control.
- EQ 10: The planning for the FSBL-funds up to now has been done on an annual and also ad-hoc basis in response to relief needs appeals only, with no attention for phasing out of the support.
- EQ 11: The programmes in Zimbabwe currently funded by the FSBL are not sustainable and of a short-term nature only. Although the impact of the food aid

¹ WFP in Zimbabwe has a comprehensive monitoring system in place, which provides ready-to-use input for a FSBL monitoring system which should cover all FSBL projects and programmes in Zimbabwe.

might be sustainable within favourable context conditions, these currently are not present in Zimbabwe.

- EQ 12: The prime focus within the FSBL programme in Zimbabwe is still on food aid interventions, with hardly any attention for LRRD matters. The EC Delegation, ECHO and DFID were found to be more pro-active in the planning of protracted relief programmes as a step towards LRRD. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the FSBL in principle is very relevant within the current Zimbabwean context and can play a useful role to bridge the gap from relief food aid to rehabilitation and further development of the agricultural sector.

Overall assessment

In addition to the evaluation questions, the regular evaluation criteria were also used for the assessment of the use of the FSBL funds in Zimbabwe. While the problem of food insecurity in Zimbabwe is primarily caused by the land reforms, the FSBL up to now has only addressed transitory nutritional risks caused by the sudden countrywide collapse in food production. The FSBL in the past two years has provided rather high amounts of funds for very broadly targeted food aid programmes. The coverage and scope of the agricultural inputs programmes that were funded by the FSBL however were rather small with limited coverage and a restricted scope of activities. The programmes effectively averted widespread malnutrition, and avoided the threats of indiscriminate disposal of productive assets and of social unrest. Both WFP and Euronaid have shown their capability to efficiently procure and transport substantial amounts of food, and in general the food distributions seemed to be well co-ordinated. The local purchase operations have effectively promoted natural complementarity within the SADC region, and have strengthened the capacities of food commodity traders, food processors and transport companies in the neighbouring countries and in Zimbabwe itself. A proper assessment of the costs levels of the funded operations has not been possible within the limitations of this short evaluation mission. The food aid programmes are not sustainable and might lead to aid dependency eroding existing capacities for self-sufficiency in food production at the local level. The use of food aid as a safety net measure is in line with the current use of EDF funds in Zimbabwe for 'direct population support'. There is limited coherence with GoZ national policies, as the FSBL food aid operations, due to the prevailing political circumstances, thus far could not be integrated within a national food security policy.

Main recommendations

- The FSBL should continue to flexibly provide funding for humanitarian and recovery programmes in Zimbabwe as a complement to the programmes funded by remaining 8th EDF funds. Because of the prevailing conditions in Zimbabwe, it should be accepted that well-targeted food aid programmes, although unsustainable, are necessary safety net interventions and that they should be continued for some more years for humanitarian purposes only.
- The effectiveness of the agricultural inputs programme that is currently funded by the FSBL in Zimbabwe should be enhanced through a more integrated approach including agricultural extension services, provision of fertiliser and more varied packages of seeds, micro-irrigation projects, and market development. The scale of these programmes could be enlarged to achieve a larger coverage, and the programmes need to be accompanied by systematic impact assessments through monitoring of yields.

- Real solutions to the food crisis in Zimbabwe must be broader and of a more long-term nature than just the provision of food aid. The FSBL should take up phasing-over or pre-recovery programmes to fill the gap caused by the reduction of the number of beneficiaries due to better targeting of food aid from 2004/05 onwards. These programmes can also serve to maintain preparedness for more full-scale recovery programmes. Possibilities are e.g. establishment of a food security monitoring system, establishment of a Food Import Facility (FIF) with FSBL funds, TA and capacity building that will contribute to the recovery and rehabilitation after the current crisis, execution of quick impact QIP projects primarily focussing on the communal areas that are directly targeted at beneficiaries, for instance micro-irrigation projects, seeds multiplication schemes and conservation farming projects.
- For the food aid programmes in Zimbabwe, the FSBL should continue to work through WFP and Euronaid, as both have shown to be capable of procuring and transporting substantial amounts of food. However, the multi-level contractual framework agreements with WFP and Euronaid should be simplified, and the chain of authorisation should be made clearer. Next to their institutional and liaison role, and involvement in the planning and implementation of FSBL funded programmes and projects, the FA/FS experts within the EC Delegation in Zimbabwe should also take up a capacity building role in the field of food aid and food security.
- It is recommended to commission a study to compare the cost levels of the WFP and Euronaid food aid operations that are funded by the FSBL in Zimbabwe. This information will provide leverage for cost allocation discussions with WFP and the budget discussions with Euronaid. If similar assessments were also done for FSBL-funded operations of Euronaid and WFP in some other countries, the comparative analyses would provide the EC relevant units for FSBL with better insight in the efficiency levels of the use of the significant funds that are made available through the global framework contracts with the two organisations.
- The FSBL should quickly start to plan for 'protracted relief programmes' as a step towards LRRD. These efforts should be coordinated with the small-scale agricultural recovery activities that currently are being planned by the EC Delegation within the framework of the rural development programmes funded by the 8th EDF.

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 Background to the mission

This country case study is a review of the food aid and food security programmes in Zimbabwe that since 1997 have been funded by the EC, with special emphasis on the period from 2000 onwards. The study forms part of the evaluation of “Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security” that was launched in September 2003².

This 2003/04 thematic evaluation of EC food aid and food security programmes is a follow-up of the evaluation of the Food Security Budget Line (FSBL) that was established in 1996 (Regulation No. 1292/96), and the review of the functioning of the FSBL by the Court of Auditors presented in 2003, with the main objective of analysing the added value of this budget line compared to other EC instruments and budget lines. The results should provide an assessment of the coherence and complementarity of the EC strategy for food aid and food security, and an assessment of the steps taken by the Commission to improve the efficiency and quality management with regard to programming, targeting and handling of its food aid actions and operations in support of food security.

2.2 Why Zimbabwe?

2.2.1 Introduction

Zimbabwe has been the worst hit country in the current food security crisis in Southern Africa, with the most important food deficit in the region. In Zimbabwe, both the ‘*food availability*’ and ‘*access to food*’ have considerably worsened during the recent period. In response to the critical humanitarian needs, the EC has provided very significant funds for relief operations in Zimbabwe since 2002, both through the FSBL and ECHO, and through reprogramming of 8th EDF funds for projects that directly benefit the people of Zimbabwe. The FSBL and ECHO were previously not present in Zimbabwe, and were only phased in during the year 2002. Using the framework contracts with WFP and Euronaid, the FSBL has provided major assistance for food aid programmes and some funds for distribution of agricultural inputs. The FSBL also supplied one year of technical assistance to the Relief and Recovery Unit (RRU) of UNDP in 2002/03. ECHO has provided funds to a range of organisations: to WFP for logistical support to the food aid operations, to UNDP for RRU coordination activities, to UNICEF, WFP and some NGO’s for targeted feeding programmes, to FAO and various NGO’s for agricultural inputs distribution through, to NGO’s for water & sanitation projects, and to WHO for cholera preparedness activities.

In total, in the past years the following humanitarian funds were provided by the EC to Zimbabwe:

Year	FSBL	ECHO	Total
2002/03	€ 63.3 million	€ 15.5 million	€ 78.8 million

² As part of the 2004 evaluation of the food aid policy and food aid management and special operations in support of food security, ten country field studies were carried out: in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gaza, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru and Zimbabwe.

2003/04	€ 60.0 million	€ 25.0 million	€ 85.0 million
Total	€ 123.3 million	€ 40.5 million	€ 163.8 million

2.2.2. Country profile: Food aid and food security: Situation, policy, actors and programmes

2.2.2.1 General situation in terms of food security

Compared to other countries in Southern Africa like Angola, Tanzania and Mauritius where cereals provide about half of the energy intake, Zimbabwe's food basket is less diversified. Maize and to a lesser extent small grains like sorghum and millet account for 78-85% of the total quantity of food consumed in Zimbabwe. Cereals in total provide 62% of the total calorie intake. Because of the current macro-economic conditions, as a result of the fast track land reform and the political circumstances in Zimbabwe (see underneath), the high maize consumption levels predispose the country to food insecurity. Logically, this is especially the case in years when one of the major crops fails.

Zimbabwe's food security situation has been deteriorating since 1998 and has deteriorated faster during the recent period of land reforms. Whilst the food crisis caused by the drop in maize production to some extent can be attributed to consecutive droughts for two years, the hastily undertaken and politically motivated land reform programme is the main cause of the decline in food self-sufficiency. The deterioration of the food security situation and the rising poverty levels have been compounded by the general macro-economic collapse in Zimbabwe. A new phenomenon of vulnerability has emerged in urban and rural areas, where cereal shortage on the local market has affected even those with the income to buy. During the past three harvests from 2001 onwards, the import gap for maize has remained more or less unchanged at 1,000,000 MT. The share of the food balance gap is increasingly met with food aid provided by donors (see Annex 4). The capacity of the GoZ to import basic foods has declined, and there is a rather worrisome trend of increasing dependency on food aid. Global malnutrition trends up to now do not yet indicate a worsening of the nutritional status. This is probably an indicator of the success of the pro-active food aid interventions in Zimbabwe.

The ZIMVAC vulnerability assessments executed by the GoZ indicate that large numbers of people in rural areas and also more and more in urban areas require humanitarian assistance. This highlights the urgency of switching back to both quick impact and more sustainable agricultural recovery-type interventions, while attention also should be paid to the social needs and labour opportunities in the urban areas.

2.2.2.2 National policy and strategy for food security

Together with the introduction of the land reforms in 2000, GoZ reversed its former policy of liberalising the agricultural markets (consistent with the structural adjustment policy orientation). The GoZ mainly intervened in the market for maize and agricultural inputs. The food security strategy of the government in the past three seasons has favoured the re-application of controls on the marketing and pricing of the staple commodities maize and wheat. Through the GMB (Grain Marketing Board), the Government has maintained producer prices below export parity and consumer prices below import parity. Yet, because of the high import component of fertilisers and recently also of seeds, fuel and spares for farm machinery, the real production costs

have been equivalent to that experienced elsewhere in the Southern Africa region. Coupled with the high transaction costs for marketing, these developments are very taxing for agricultural producers, and actually discourage surplus production. GMB operations are not at all viable and take up a major share of GoZ's expenditures. The capacity of the GMB to provide loans to farmers for their farm inputs has been seriously reduced.

The second major limitation to agricultural production is a lack of clarity on tenure for newly resettled land. Especially in the A2 Model schemes, insecurity of tenure is a major constraint to resource mobilisation for farming and requires an urgent redress. Prospects of sustainable recovery of staple food production in Zimbabwe thus rest squarely on the implementation of sound agricultural policies in the first instance, and availability of capital and technical expertise in the second.

2.2.2.3 Main actors and programmes

- **Government programmes**

In the last three years, the MoA (Ministry of Agriculture) has focused on irrigation development, input provision, tillage assistance and livestock development for the newly resettled as well as for old communal farmers. The irrigation fund administered by ARDA (Agricultural Rural Development Agency) in collaboration with AREX (Agricultural Extension Services) was a quick disbursing instrument with excessive leakage. Farmers tended to invest the funds on the money market rather than for farming activities. The supply of inputs through the GMB and ARDA was characterised by delivery delays and a general shortage of inputs due to the price controls and the lack of foreign exchange to import the required amounts of fertilisers and pesticides. The Land Bank extended over ZWD 15 billion input credit to farmers in the current agricultural season 2003/04. The high inflation, however, reduced the purchasing power of the fund below the level of the previous season. The capacity of the Government to continue disbursing input credits is obviously being compromised by hyperinflation (at over 500%) and the operational losses incurred by Government departments administering the input credit schemes.

As part of a National Poverty Alleviation Action Plan, the GoZ undertakes Public Works programmes. Instead of free hand-out programmes, the GoZ's preferred strategy is to assist the needy through cash-for-work programmes. For the current food crisis, the GoZ response is co-ordinated by a Task Force, especially in regard to the import of grains.

- **Donors**

The EC, USAID and DFID are the main donors for food aid and, to a lesser extent, food security operations in Zimbabwe. Due to the prevailing conditions, all donors have recently restructured their programmes to focus on humanitarian assistance delivery. This means in practice that they mainly fund food aid and specific HIV/AIDS related activities. From the start of the food crisis in 2002, the EC has been the major cash donor to WFP operations in Zimbabwe, while USAID is the major donor in-kind. All donors see the need to move into agricultural recovery. Some visions are currently being developed, especially by DFID, on what types of operations are feasible in the political environment in Zimbabwe. USAID has started a pilot programme to monetise food aid in Bulawayo using 10,000 MT of sorghum. The EC is currently discussing with GoZ the possibility of implementing a € 12 million monetisation programme for wheat, aimed at alleviating food insecurity in urban areas. DFID has set aside GBP 7 million

for agricultural recovery and will target marginalized groups in communal areas and former commercial farm workers.

- **The United Nations Organisations**

The United Nations Organisations have played a pivotal role in coordination of donor and NGO programmes. Regular sector working groups meetings serve to exchange information and to facilitate the coordination of interventions in different sectors of humanitarian assistance. These working groups have been led generally by the UN agency specialising in that sector. Hence, the Nutrition Working Group, for instance, has been led by UNICEF; the Agriculture Working Group by FAO; the Health Working Group by WHO; the Food Aid Working Group by WFP, etc. The United Nations Coordinator has also been facilitating dialogue between Government and the donors, and between Government and other implementing agencies (NGO's, etc). The Relief and Recovery Unit (RRU) of the UNDP has been the centre for information compilation and dissemination to the various parties involved in the humanitarian effort in Zimbabwe. It has recently undergone restructuring and still is in need of more capacity building. RRU coordinates the preparation of the Consolidated Appeal (CAP) for the country. The third Appeal is currently being prepared. It will be geared towards agricultural recovery more than had been the case in the previous two years. Occasionally, the RRU has investigated issues of concern with respect to the delivery and distribution process of humanitarian aid, in particular when accusations of *politicisation* were levied.

Apart from their coordination roles, several UN agencies have also been carrying out humanitarian assistance programmes. For instance, WFP was the main player in food aid programmes in Zimbabwe, FAO was the implementing partner of ECHO for a seed and fertiliser distribution programme, and UNICEF received ECHO funding for supplementary feeding programmes.

- **Non Governmental Organisations**

Most of the existing NGOs have scaled up their relief interventions to meet the needs of the current emergency. In addition, new international NGO's have established offices in Harare since 2002 to respond to the emergency. The main food aid programmes by NGO's are general food rations distribution, school feeding, therapeutic feeding of malnourished children, home-based care feeding for HIV/AIDS patients, and blanket wet feeding for children under five. In addition, ECHO has supported NGO operations in the fields of water and sanitation, public health and other health related interventions. Two NGOs have recently been funded to pilot general food distribution in the politically sensitive newly resettled areas.

The main challenge of NGOs at present is to smoothly switch from relief to recovery type of interventions, also because there are signs that GoZ control may impede the switch to recovery projects. Some agencies have started with strategic planning in this direction. Obviously, the switch will be easier for those who already have on-going long-term development, food security and livelihood programmes they can scale up. In this respect, the new international NGOs that opened their offices only in 2002 are really at a par with one another. Some NGOs already receive support to expand their development interventions or to adapt their current relief operations towards sustainable long-term recovery. A priority for NGOs is the re-registration, as it is a precondition for the continued presence in the country.

- **The Private Sector**

Over the past three years, the demand for Corn Soya Blend (CSB) for general food distribution and targeted supplementary feeding purposes has grown significantly. The

private sector has responded with an increased throughput capacity. Four new manufacturers of CSB have “mushroomed” in Harare, and also the number of CSB manufacturers in Zambia has grown. The private sector has actively participated in the tenders to supply food and other basic commodities required by humanitarian organisations. In addition, the private sector has also supported NGO food aid efforts. The Coca Cola Foundation has supported World Vision International in 2003 to feed 6,500 beneficiaries for three months in peri-urban informal settlements of Harare.

In the area of long-term food security, private sector participation has been characterised by investments in agriculture through forward contracts with farmers. Unfortunately, the full impact of contract farming arrangements currently will not be realised because of the frequent interference of the State, especially at marketing stage. The private sector suffers from the repressive price control legislation for staple and food products. At the same time, foreign direct investments into agriculture through private sector initiatives remain elusive to Zimbabwe. This will remain to be the case until a favourable investment climate is created through a clearly defined land tenure system and political stability.

2.2.2.4 Major challenges/constraints for achieving food security

There are several challenges and constraints for a real and sustainable improvement of the food security situation in Zimbabwe:

a) Move to more sustainable and better targeted food relief interventions

Given the focus of the past three years on general food aid, there is a real threat that donor dependency will destroy traditional coping mechanisms at household and local market levels. This will lead to a vicious cycle of inadequate food production and unnecessary reliance on food aid. The question is whether donors will be able to reduce free food aid interventions, while maintaining the targeted support to the needy vulnerable groups in Zimbabwe. For the others, the move away from general rations requires the identification of small and less politically sensitive projects that can promote quick recovery.

b) Encouraging agricultural recovery through favourable policies and programmes

The current role of the Grain Marketing Board is not encouraging production, and neither is it satisfactorily supplying the quantities of food required by consumers. Clearly, maintaining the *status quo* will only serve to perpetuate the country's dependency on food aid. The challenge remains in restoring viability to the maize sector. This will require sharp increases in producer prices to near import parity levels, even though it might mean certain sacrifices on the part of the consumer. A repeal of the price/market control legislation in this respect is pre-requisite. The recovery of the agricultural sector requires a revival of the agricultural extension system and a well-functioning agro-industry sector for milling and processing of the maize produce.

c) Increasing security of investments in agriculture through guaranteed land tenure

The most productive land is to be found in the newly resettled former large-scale commercial farming areas. The absence of tenure security has led to low uptake of allocated land and also to random eviction and frequent disputes over land. The tenure insecurity attached to the absence of legally binding ownership or user rights is one of the biggest obstacles for resource mobilisation to farming operations.

d) Creating an enabling macro-economic policy environment

The country's agricultural sector relies on imported inputs such as fertiliser, fuel, electricity and spares for farm machinery. Macro-economic stability is the key to realisation of any real improvements in food production and availability. The challenges for the country will be to find means/measures to increase foreign currency receipts and to reduce inflation at a time of increased international isolation.

e) Promoting regional integration of food markets

With Zimbabwe needing an average import of 1,000,000 MT per consumption season in the past three years, and possibly another 800,000 MT in the next season (2004/5 consumption season) in order to meet its national consumption needs, it is obvious that this gap cannot be filled by food aid on a perpetual basis. A more sustainable strategy has therefore to ensure that the market is sufficiently developed to redistribute the available food surpluses and to take care of production shortfalls in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in the region. Such market developments should be of a regional nature and the challenge will be to convince regional Governments that current policies and interventions in the food market have to be reformed to address food security on a more sustainable basis. Another challenge will be to promote additional/ alternative crops to broaden the variety of the foods available and to promote alternative crops to maize as one potential strategy for risk reduction.

2.3 Summary of the mission

The evaluation study in Zimbabwe was carried out by Ms Annemarie Hoogendoorn as the international expert and Mr Munhamo Chisvo as the national expert. The visit to Zimbabwe took place between the 10th and 25th of February 2004. A detailed chronology of the mission and a list of persons interviewed are given as Annex 1 of this Country Report, a listing of the documents that were consulted is provided in Annex 2, and the work plan is included as Annex 3.

The evaluation team was well equipped to carry out the evaluation: the international expert has an extensive background in food aid and food security projects and the national expert has done several earlier evaluations of EC assistance programmes for rural development in Zimbabwe. The EC Delegation in Harare has been very supportive to this evaluation and the two EC Food Security Experts each joined in during a field visit during the mission.

The methodology adopted for this evaluation consisted of:

- a) A meeting with the AIDCO/F-5 Desk Officer for Zimbabwe (Brussels),
- b) A meeting with the ECHO Desk Officer for Zimbabwe (Brussels),
- c) Some meetings with the EC Delegation in Harare,
- d) A meeting with the ECHO correspondent in Harare, and informal discussions with the ECHO evaluation team also present in Zimbabwe at the time of this mission,
- e) A review of background information on the humanitarian assistance programmes in Zimbabwe and basic documentation on the EC programmes in Zimbabwe,
- f) Meetings with various stakeholders in Zimbabwe (GoZ ministry officials, the main donors, UN organisations, some implementing partners; all in Harare),
- g) Meetings with each of the FSBL implementing partners (WFP, Euronaid and UNDP),

- h) A field visit to a food distribution by GOAL in Hurungwe District,
- i) Travels to Zambia to meet WFP and some suppliers in Lusaka (information on local procurement procedures for the Zimbabwe programme), to the clearing agents and the customs office at the border crossing between Zambia and Zimbabwe at Chirundu (information on the logistics process), to WFP RIACSO and one supplier in Johannesburg (general information on the logistics process for the regional Southern Africa operation), and to the Louis Dreyfus silo's in Pietersburg in South Africa (maize logistics process towards Zimbabwe).
- j) The preparation of a stakeholder analysis sheet (attached as Annex 5),
- k) A debriefing with staff and the Head of the EC Delegation in Harare.

2.4 Constraints

Zimbabwe is a rather new country for the FSBL, with funding starting only in 2002. The funds so far have been channelled exclusively through the framework contracts with WFP and Euronaid that both work through a range of partner NGOs to implement the distribution programmes. The main constraint for this case-study has been the relatively short time allocated to the country visit, together with the fact that the evaluation team consisted of only two people. Nevertheless, the team managed to meet most stakeholders present in Harare, although the planned meetings with the NAO office, the MoA, and representatives of the milling industry in Zimbabwe did not take place. Because of the time constraint, there have been only few site visits. Regrettably, no financial reports were available at the EC Delegation on the expenditures by Euronaid and WFP out of the budgets provided by the FSBL. The information obtained by the evaluation team, including the additional files that were emailed by Euronaid, The Hague after the mission, have not been sufficient for a comparative analysis of costing levels between WFP and Euronaid.

3. EVALUATIVE QUESTIONS

3.1 Evaluative Question 1

‘What is the level of coherence between the food security policies, strategies and objectives of Regulation No.1292/96 and those from other geographical instruments (EDF, ALA, MEDA, TACIS, CARDS) and budget lines (ECHO, Rehabilitation, NGO Co-financing)?’

The evaluative question 1 will be dealt with in the synthesis report.

3.2 Evaluative Question 2

‘What is the level of integration of the food security policy within the Commission’s development strategy with the partner country concerned as laid down in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP)?’

Because of the prevailing political situation in Zimbabwe, there is presently no 9th EDF available, and there is also no CSP. Therefore, a proper integration of the support of the FSBL into the Commission’s development strategy for Zimbabwe is not possible. The EC Regulation 1292/96 and the corresponding budget line has until now provided funds for food and agricultural relief operations with a duration of only one year or less. The 18.02.02 EC General Affairs Council Decision suspends financial support for all projects under the 8th EDF in Zimbabwe except those in direct support of the population. The restructuring note of the EC aid portfolio issued by the EC Delegation (30.06.03) states that health, education, micro-projects and decentralised cooperation programmes will be maintained and re-oriented to direct population support. Some of these programmes include food security interventions. A mapping study will soon be undertaken to identify options to start recovery activities within the development projects of the restructured 8th EDF. It is planned to use € 12 million available under STABEX-95 for a food import facility (FIF) for the private sector to import wheat, in order to improve the access to food for the urban population. The regional indicative programme for Southern Africa will continue to fund the SADC Food Security Training Programme, the SADC Remote Sensing Unit, the SADC FMD control programme (foot and mouth disease; total commitment of 16.5 million Euros) and the PRINT programme (animal disease control).

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 2:

Within the limitations present in Zimbabwe, a proper integration of the support of the FSBL into the Commission’s development strategy for Zimbabwe has not been possible. There is no 9th EDF and also no Country Strategy Paper. The EC Regulation 1292/96-budget line up to now has provided funds for food and agricultural relief operations with a duration of one year or less. The EC aid portfolio funded by the remaining budget out of the 8th EDF is focussed on direct population support only, including some small-scale food security interventions. It is being considered to start-up some agricultural recovery activities within the current direct-support programmes. Also, there are plans for the establishment of a food import facility with remaining STABEX-95 funds. The EC provides funds for several regional programmes in Southern Africa, which touch upon the subject of food security with an outreach into Zimbabwe.

3.3 Evaluative Question 3

‘What is the coherence between EC food aid and food security policy and national strategies of beneficiary countries, especially the PRSP?’

Due to the blocked re-engagement of the WB and IMF in Zimbabwe, as a result of the failures to meet its loan repayments, there is currently no PRSP in Zimbabwe. The GoZ is in the process of updating its National Poverty Alleviation Action Plan, and has just commissioned a poverty assessment study. As a follow-up to ESAP (Economic Structural Adjustment Programme), the GoZ together with the World Bank developed an Enhanced Social Protection Programme in 2000. Due to the sanctions, only a few components of this programme are currently under implementation (basic assistance education module, public works programme on a cash-for-work basis). The GoZ welcomes relief operations funded by international donors. The programmes implemented by the FSBL are in support of the GoZ’s efforts to provide safety nets for vulnerable population groups. However, although the GoZ’s preferred strategy to assist the needy is through cash-for-work programmes, the FSBL has so far funded free handout programmes only.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 3:

Due to the WB/IMF sanctions, there is no PRSP in Zimbabwe. The GoZ is currently updating its national Poverty Alleviation Plan. The FSBL supports GoZ’s efforts to provide a safety net for vulnerable population groups. Although the Government prefers cash-for-work interventions like the Public Works Programme, the FSBL budget line and other donors like DFID and USAID have until now been involved primarily in programmes for free food aid and some agricultural inputs.

3.4 Evaluative Question 4

‘What is the added value of Food Aid in-kind (FA) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

In response to the humanitarian situation, Zimbabwe is receiving large amounts of food aid. At its peak in February 2004 the total number of beneficiaries for general food aid in February 2004 exceeded 5 million people out of a total population of about 11 million. It should be noted that nearly all of this food aid is distributed in the communal areas, while the people living in the former commercial areas and the urban population do not receive food aid. In addition to the free food aid programmes, there are many school-feeding programmes and a big blanket wet-feeding programme for under-fives.

The FSBL provides the largest single amount of food aid to Zimbabwe. The food aid is channelled through WFP and Euronaid. The other main donors USAID and DFID channel their assistance through WFP, C-safe and directly to implementing NGOs. In 2002, ECHO provided € 5 million to WFP for logistical support and capacity building of the NGO implementing partners. While the funding of general food aid programmes was left to the FSBL, ECHO has provided funding for several school-feeding and supplementary feeding programmes (blanket wet-feeding) that are implemented by NGOs and UNICEF. Echo has also funded several hospital-based therapeutic feeding programmes.

The contributions of the FSBL to food aid operations in the Zimbabwean food crisis have been taken out of the annual global envelopes with WFP and Euronaid, both

managed at Brussels level. These envelopes facilitate quick decision-making since allocations can simply be made by the Head of the Food Security Unit in Brussels. Logically, the FA/FS experts within the Delegations play an important role as advisors towards Brussels. There is no involvement of the FA/FS Steering Committee in country and programme allocation for the use of the globally allocated funds (the decision on the global allocation normally requires about 4 to 6 months).

The allocations to WFP have ensured a swift and timely response to two regional appeals (EMOP 10200 and 10290) for Southern Africa, with an added value to the regional procurement process. The quick EC budget allocations to WFP were only possible through the use of the FSBL. EDF funds for instance could only have been released with the consent of the GoZ, which would have seriously hampered quick decision-making. Moreover, the amount of funds made available by the EC for humanitarian operations would not have been available out of EDF funds for Zimbabwe. For the period July 2003 – June 2004, the FSBL will have allocated a total of € 52 million to WFP, of which almost 160,000 MT was for food aid. It was acknowledged by the Food Security Unit in Brussels that, for this year, the contribution to the WFP EMOP for Zimbabwe has been rather high. The EC pledged 40% of the total Zimbabwe commitments to EMOP 10290, while the FSBL usually tends to provide no more than 20 to 25% of the WFP EMOP budgets. The high EC contribution is the result of three pledges by the FSBL during the twelve-month period, of which the final one of € 20 million was done to avoid any serious disruption in WFP operations (pipeline gaps) in the first quarter of 2004. This would have otherwise occurred because of delays in the receipt of products from other donors (of whom USAID is by far the biggest).

In the case of Euronaid, the FSBL allocations were made in response to two annual Euronaid joint proposals for Zimbabwe. The regular procedure for Euronaid funds allocation involves a joint decision taken by Euronaid, The Hague and the Food Security Unit in Brussels on the division of the global envelope among the various beneficiary countries. For the period July 2003 – June 2004, the FSBL has allocated to Euronaid a budget of € 6.91 million for feeding programmes (20,554 MT of food aid) and a budget of € 1.06 million for agricultural inputs programmes in Zimbabwe.

Due to the high coverage with general food aid rations as a result of very broad targeting criteria (roughly 80% of the rural population in the communal lands of Zimbabwe are currently covered by food aid), a certain dependence on food aid has inevitably started to develop in Zimbabwe. It is not known what proportion of the funds provided by the FSBL is used for targeted supplementary feeding programmes like school-feeding and the under-fives feeding. It was noted that for both types of supplementary feeding programmes, the relevance and specificity of targeting is questionable. The current practice of blanket wet feeding of under-fives is not in line with the Sphere Guidelines. School-feeding programmes might play an important role in the increase of school enrolment and attendance rates, especially in the light of the high HIV/AIDS prevalence. However, a more integrated package of support to schools for registering orphans, as currently promoted by UNICEF, seems a more viable and longer-term answer to the current needs of Zimbabwe.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 4:

In Zimbabwe, the FSBL has functioned as a flexible funding instrument able to quickly mobilise huge amounts of funding for humanitarian programmes, which would not have been possible with EDF funds. The focus of the support for food aid programmes by WFP and Euronaid so far has been of a short-term nature only, with little emphasis on a phasing-over to other types of programmes to stimulate food security. The size of the general food ration programmes has increased every year and the programmes have reached very high coverage rates. This is not in line with the Regulation's objective to reduce dependence on food aid. In this context, it is remarkable that the FSBL has been used to provide about 40% of the last WFP EMOP for Zimbabwe, while a contribution of 20% to 25% is normally the maximum. The relevance and specificity of targeting of the blanket wet feeding programmes for under-fives and the school-feeding programmes is questionable.

3.5 Evaluative Question 5

‘What is the added value of the currency facility (CF) / Budgetary Support (BS) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

Because of the prevailing political situation, the EC aid portfolio of the 8th EDF was re-oriented to direct population support only. During the past two years, the FSBL has not provided any funds to the GoZ.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 5:

No CF/BS operations being implemented.

3.6 Evaluative Question 6

‘What is the added value of the operations to support food security (FS) for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

In Zimbabwe, the FSBL so far has mainly been used for food aid in-kind programmes. Similar to Euronaid programmes in other countries, and in addition to food aid, there has also been an element of agricultural inputs distribution, which could be marked as an ‘operation to support food security’. Up to now, this element has been much smaller in size (both budget-wise and in tonnage) than the food aid component. For the planting season 2003/04, the Budget Line provided funds to Euronaid for 555 MT of seeds (maize, sorghum, millet, cow peas) and 1,353 MT of fertiliser. These inputs have been distributed to about 110,000 farmer households, all in the communal areas. This implies a coverage of about 10% of the farmers in these communal areas. The FSBL support has been matched by ECHO funds for agricultural inputs programmes through FAO and a range of NGOs. With 8th EDF funds, the EC is also involved in the micro-projects programme and the decentralised cooperation programme that covers some small-scale integrated food security interventions in Zimbabwe.

In relation to the agricultural inputs programmes, the following issues came up during this country study:

- A need to diversify the types of seeds that are distributed. The main focus up to now has been on maize seeds, whereas small seeds can play an important additional role to improve the food security situation.
- A need for fertiliser inputs. Fertiliser is very expensive nowadays in Zimbabwe and is not affordable anymore for small farmers.
- A need to support farmers with agricultural extension services.
- A need to start micro-irrigation projects to boost agricultural production in the communal areas.

The Delegation has recently been working on a plan for a food import facility (FIF). The idea is to use the € 12 million available under STABEX-95 as a capital injection to stimulate the import of wheat through the private sector. The funds would not be routed through GoZ but would be paid directly to (international) grain traders contracted by tender, to supply wheat for production of bread that would be sold in urban areas at a reduced price. The bread would be produced by the main milling companies in Zimbabwe. These companies would buy the wheat from the grain traders with payments in local currency equivalent to the wheat real market value. Through a special local currency account, the ZWD (Zimbabwe Dollar) would be reconverted (“*re-dollarised*”) using the FOREX auction recently introduced. This would supply the funds for the next round of wheat imports. The FIF is subject to GoZ agreement on fundamental issues: The GMB will not be involved in FIF proceedings, no price controls will be in effect at raw material and finished product stage, and The Delegation expects to be able to do five import rounds in one year, for a total import of about 300,000 MT of wheat. This would meet the total national consumption requirements for wheat.

The projected amount of wheat imports is rather optimistic. It is to be expected that the import rounds will need more time than only two months per cycle. Additionally, a quick reduction of the fund is foreseen because of sub-optimal levels of repayment. Nevertheless, some sort of FIF might be an appropriate answer to the needs of the urban population that so far has not benefited from free food aid. It should be examined how an import facility could (negatively) affect the currently existing trade patterns. Because of the trade barriers in Zimbabwe for the import and export of the main cereals, a food import facility would only be possible with the consent of the GoZ. The dialogue on this issue between the EC Delegation and the GoZ (MoF) is ongoing but up to now without clear results.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 6:

The food security operations currently funded by the FSBL are relatively small in size and limited to the provision of agricultural inputs through implementing partners for Euronaid. In this way, about 10% of the farmers in the communal areas are reached. The seeds distributions effectively reduce dependence on food aid, and certainly help to improve the food security situation. The effects could be bigger if projects were scaled-up to a larger coverage. Additionally, a more integrated approach with an inclusion of programme components like agricultural extension services, provision of fertiliser, vegetable seeds and micro-irrigation projects is required.

A plan for the establishment of a food import facility (FIF) is currently being discussed between the EC Delegation and GoZ. A capital injection of € 12 million (remaining STABEX-95 funds) would be used to facilitate the import of wheat through the private sector in order to improve the access to bread in urban areas.

However, the FIF would require GoZ agreement on politically sensitive trade issues, and it remains to be seen how effective and efficient this mechanism would be.

3.7 Evaluative Question 7

‘What is the added value of the ‘other / technical assistance and capacity building’ component for achieving the overall food security objectives set in the Regulation?’

Both the WFP and Euronaid operations are covered by framework contractual agreements signed at F-5 level in Brussels. The effectiveness of the FA/FS experts in the Delegation to monitor and control the Regulation No. 1292/96 funded programmes has been constrained by gaps in reporting mechanisms due to a lack of clarity about the allocation of responsibilities between F-5 Brussels level and the Delegation level in Zimbabwe. For example, the EC Delegation in Zimbabwe only recently received a copy of the framework contracts, and has not yet received any copies of the financial and narrative final reports (neither directly from WFP and Euronaid, nor indirectly through F-5 in Brussels).

The two Food Security experts attached to the EC Delegation in Zimbabwe have so far concentrated their work mainly on very general monitoring of WFP and Euronaid operations supported by the FSBL. The monitoring is not based on any monitoring system, and detailed reporting to F-5 in Brussels is missing. The experts so far did not take up a role to comment upon the financial and narrative final reports for the WFP and Euronaid programmes. The Food Security experts have focused on participation in coordination meetings, regular contacts with WFP and Euronaid, review of the operational planning documents and the regular status reports received by the Delegation, and some visits to the programmes of the implementing NGOs. Since January 2004, one coordination meeting has been held between the EC and Euronaid partners. Regular trips were undertaken by the Food Security expert to the WFP Regional Office in Johannesburg to discuss programming and regional purchasing issues. Most recently, the expert visited WFP Johannesburg in February 2004 to participate in the evaluation committee for the procurement tender for the latest EC pledge of € 20 million and to verify the expenditure of overall 2003/04 EC pledges. This led to a serious discussion on the justification for the cost allocation model applied by WFP. The mission report for this trip was sent to F-5 and led to immediate action at HQ level, with a meeting between F-5 Brussels and WFP Rome.

The Delegation has recently started some meetings with senior GoZ officials in which the Food Security experts are also involved. Issues at stake are the use of the Government food reserves kept by the Grain Marketing Board and the possibility of the above-mentioned EC Food Import Facility for wheat. The FIF proposal is based on the earlier experience of one of the Food Security experts with FSBL programmes in the Newly Independent States.

A technical assistant was seconded to the UNDP/RRU Unit in 2002/2003. He served as a good communication link between the EC Delegation and the RRU. His contribution to the coordination of the food aid operations in Zimbabwe was somewhat hampered by the management problems present within the RRU.

From May 2000 onwards, the SADC hub has received financial support from a regional F-5 budget administered at Brussels level. The programme was aimed to add value to the SADC FANR (Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources) regional food security training efforts funded by regional EDF funds. However, the project proved to be unsuccessful and was abandoned in June 2003. So far, the FSBL at Zimbabwe level has

not been used for capacity building programmes. At the onset of the crisis response in 2002, ECHO provided funds to WFP for logistical support to the implementing NGOs which included some capacity building on food aid operations. Within the planning process for the assistance for 2004/05, DFID held a three-day seminar during this mission visit (17 – 19 February) on food aid and agricultural recovery in Zimbabwe. Although the agenda seemed very interesting, the seminar was not attended by the EC Food Security experts.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 7:

The technical assistance in Zimbabwe provided by the FSBL mainly focused on very global monitoring and liaison issues. The monitoring is not based on any monitoring system with regular reports information from attended meetings and missions is shared with F-5 in Brussels. The effectiveness of the monitoring role of the FA/FS experts in the Delegation has been constrained by gaps in reporting mechanisms due to a lack of clarity about the allocation of responsibilities between F-5 Brussels level and the Delegation level in Zimbabwe. E.g., the Food Security experts at the EC Delegation have not been involved in assessment of the financial and narrative final reports for the WFP and Euronaid programmes. Recently, some meetings were held with the GoZ on the possibility of the establishment of a food import facility for wheat. Thus, no capacity building has been funded by the budget line apart from an unsuccessful SADC regional hub which was discontinued in June 2003.

3.8 Evaluative Question 8

‘To what extent has the design of supported action (phasing in) facilitated progress towards the achievement of food aid and food security objectives? This includes the identification of priorities, the selection of countries, the targeting of beneficiaries / vulnerable groups, the funding operations – components, the identification and appraisal process, the multi-annual programming, etc.?’

The phasing-in of the food aid operations has been appropriate and timely as a swift response to urgent humanitarian needs. However, the FA/FS experts at the EC Delegation acknowledged that the supported actions so far have been oriented towards short-term relief, which is not completely in line with the objectives of the budget line. Up to now, the funds are primarily used for food aid operations and are provided on an annual basis only.

The targeting procedures of the WFP and the Euronaid operations are transparent with full participation of the local community in local Food Committees and Complaints Committees. At district level, the humanitarian aid is co-ordinated by the District Drought Relief Committee (DDRC). The food distribution mechanism is gender-sensitive, with women participating in the DDRC, women receiving the food aid as representative for their household and specific targeting of vulnerable women. Admittedly, the targeting levels have become very high, easily leading to dependence on food aid. This is to be corrected in the near future. The recent adoption of a division of the general ration beneficiaries in two categories (A for farmer families with low produce/income, and B for vulnerable households headed by chronically ill, children, elderly, and households with orphans or malnourished children) is seen as a first step towards more refined targeting mechanisms.

Although a detailed picture of the real costs of the funded operations was not available at the time of the mission, the cost per beneficiary within the WFP food aid programme is probably somewhat higher than for the Euronaid programmes. This might be related to the current discussion between the FSBL and WFP on the applied cost allocation model to donors (see 3.7), but probably also results from cost level differences between UN- and NGO-organisations. It is to be noted that WFP offers a large and solid operational framework with very experienced staff on board who effectively handles the complicated food aid procurement and distribution chain. WFP is considered to add value as a main player in the overall coordination of the food aid operations in Zimbabwe (including the food aid monitoring system). Euronaid has been held back by a slow release of funds from Brussels because of the current framework contract discussion at Brussels level on the pros and cons of the framework contractual agreement set-up with Euronaid.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 8:

The FSBL has supported relevant and timely food aid programmes in Zimbabwe, as a swift response to urgent humanitarian needs that would not have been possible with EDF funds. Up to now, the funds are primarily used for food aid operations and are provided on an annual basis only. The targeting procedures of the WFP and the Euronaid operations are transparent with full participation of the local community through the District Drought Relief Committee (DDRC). It was noted that the targeting in the 2003/04 cycle is very broad, which might lead to unnecessary dependence on food aid. Both WFP and Euronaid have shown to be operationally capable to procure and transport large amounts of food aid. The gender sensitivity levels of the food aid operations of WFP and Euronaid are satisfactory. The mission did not avail of sufficient information to be able to compare the costs per beneficiary of the WFP and Euronaid operations.

3.9 Evaluative Question 9

‘To what extent have implementation set-ups (i.e. suitable structures for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation), management mechanisms / tools and processes (i.e. division of work and responsibilities, coordination of actions) facilitated the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?’

The RRU, as a co-ordinating body between UN agencies, donors and NGO's, has taken up investigation and reporting on delivery and distribution process issues. This however was hampered by the refusal of the GoZ to authorise the establishment of field offices for RIV's (regional incident verification teams). Since the start in 2002, the food aid operations in Zimbabwe have been managed and coordinated at district/ward level. This set-up requires the involvement of various stakeholders: WFP field offices, a range of implementing partner NGOs, District Drought Relief Committees (DDRC's) etc. Although some duplication and some coverage gaps still exist, the coordination between the various actors has gradually improved to satisfactory levels.

The food aid programmes funded by the FSBL have a multi-level implementation set-up. For the WFP operations, the communication flows between Brussels (F-5 and DG-DEV), Rome (HQ WFP), Johannesburg (Regional WFP Office Southern Africa) and

Harare (WFP country office, EC Delegation) are complicated. The chain of authorisation is not always clear. The current discussion on the applied costing mechanisms (see above), and also some delays in the processing of tenders etc. should be seen within this context of a multi-level operational and administrative set-up. For the FSBL support to the food aid part of the Euronaid programmes, it was noted that the framework contract does not require any real field monitoring by the Euronaid CSO.

The EC-funded food aid programmes in Zimbabwe are solely based on regional procurement. Both WFP and Euronaid have executed several regional tenders. The two organisations are both satisfied with the achieved tender performance as per timing, quality and pricing issues. The maize was mainly procured in South Africa, and to a lesser extent in Zambia. Beans were mainly procured in Kenya. Effects of the regional purchases on the local markets are discussed in Chapter 4.

The impact of the general food aid programmes in Zimbabwe can only be assessed through nutrition surveys. UNICEF coordinated the nation-wide collection of nutrition data in February 2003. Although the publication of the report has been blocked by GoZ, various sources have confirmed that the acute malnutrition level (GAM) in Zimbabwe is about 5%, with outliers up to 10% in some remote districts. These results show that the food crisis is well under control.

Unlike the high level of coordination for the food distributions, the distribution of seeds has been less well coordinated up to now, although 2003 showed already a great improvement when compared with 2002. However, even in 2003 there was a great variety of seed packs (both in content and in quantities), and substantial differences in coverage figures including some duplication. FAO is currently filling this gap through the seeds suppliers meeting and the database on seeds distribution down to ward level. The slow release of FSBL funds to Euronaid in 2003/04 in relation to ongoing policy discussions on the outlines of the framework contract, has seriously constrained the timeliness of procurement and final distribution of seeds and fertiliser to the beneficiaries. While for the harvest of 2003 there was no impact assessment of the agricultural inputs programmes, the agricultural research institute ICRISAT has been contracted by FAO to obtain yield estimates for the 2004 harvest for a sample of beneficiary households. The implementing partners themselves are not involved in data collection on yields.

Whereas the ECHO staff in Zimbabwe does a lot of monitoring itself, and is in the field for 1-2 days per week, the FA/FS experts within the Delegation visit the implementing partners for the budget line less regularly and do not have a clear understanding of the monitoring role that is expected from them. Considering the differences in budget size for Zimbabwe between ECHO and the FSBL, it is fair to say that the Delegation currently has rather low staffing levels which prevents proper monitoring. On the other hand, two staff members still should be enough to develop some sort of monitoring system, and to regularly send field reports to F-5 in Brussels.

In case of the global envelopes for WFP and Euronaid, the financial reporting is done by the headquarters of WFP and Euronaid directly to Brussels. Although it seems logical that these reports are based on country-level reports, which are shared with the EC at Delegation level, the FA/FS experts in Zimbabwe are not receiving any copies of Euronaid's financial reports, except for a compilation of the narrative distribution reports prepared by Euronaid's implementing partners. There appeared to be somewhat more contacts with WFP on these matters, as the FA/FS experts had received various cost overviews for the regional EMOP's prepared by Regional WFP office in

Johannesburg (see also 3.7). Auditing of the expenditures within the FSBL is in principle done by the Financial Unit in Brussels (F-6) and sometimes by the Court of Auditors. It was noted by the evaluation team that EC auditing is limited to direct partners only. In the case of the global framework contracts for the FA/FS Budget Line, this means that only WFP and Euronaid are audited. The implementing partners who receive transport, storage, handling and general overhead fees are not included in the EC auditing procedures.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 9:

The multi-level implementation set-up of the framework contractual agreements with WFP and Euronaid is complicated and the chain of authorisation is not always clear. The EC Delegation in Zimbabwe received only recently a copy of the framework contracts, and up to now has not received any copies of the financial and narrative final reports. The two FA/FS experts within the Delegation are involved in general monitoring only, without a clear monitoring system in place but with regular sharing of information with F-5 in Brussels. The coordination of the food aid programmes has been satisfactory but the seeds distribution programmes have been less well coordinated, especially in the first year 2002/03. Nutrition data of February 2003 show that the food crisis at that time was well under control.

3.10 Evaluative Question 10

‘To what extent has a phasing-out of the supported actions been planned and what contribution did it have on the achievement of food aid and food security objectives?’

The FA/FS experts in the Delegation are not yet considering to phase-out the EC supported actions. The planning for the use of the FSBL funds in Zimbabwe has been done until present on an annual and also ad-hoc basis in response to WFP appeals and Euronaid project proposals. The planning of the new 2004/05 programme is still in its very first stages. The outcome of the WFP/FAO Crop Needs Assessment in February/April is being awaited for estimates of the required amounts of food aid. Some reduction of the level of food aid and more specific targeting is foreseen, and some phasing-over into food security operations (e.g. an Euronaid seed multiplication scheme) is being considered by the EC Delegation. The Food Import Facility with remaining STABEX-95 funds that is being discussed between the EC Delegation and the GoZ (subject to fundamental trade and pricing issues that need to be agreed upon) could serve to phase over into less dependence on free food aid. But the FIF would still be a stopgap measure with short- to medium-term effects only. Important longer-term effects could be reached however if trade/marketing liberalisation were achieved. However, this is not likely to happen in the near future.

The current debate in Zimbabwe on future food aid levels and the need to move to agricultural recovery is led by DFID. USAID is piloting with a market stabilisation project based on the import of sorghum for urban markets and has plans to continue with food aid as a component in home-based care (HBC) projects for HIV/AIDS affected households. FAO has recently started to identify appropriate agricultural interventions to boost production in the communal lands, e.g. through promotion of drip irrigation and conservation farming. ECHO focuses on a gradual phasing-out and has plans to withdraw its support to the WFP school-feeding programmes from July 2004 onwards.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 10:

The planning for the use of the funds from the FSBL has been done until present on an annual and ad-hoc basis in response to relief needs appeals by WFP and Euronaid, with no attention for phasing-out of the support. The planning of the 2004/05 programme is in its very first stages and awaits the outcome of the WFP/FAO Crop Needs Assessment. A Food Import Facility for wheat is currently being discussed between the Delegation and GoZ. The start of a few small-scale recovery projects within EDF-programmes is being considered by the EC Delegation.

3.11 Evaluative Question 11

‘How sustainable are the effects and impacts of EC-supported policies and programmes in the field of food security, both at the level of target populations and at institutional and policy level in the partner countries?’

Food aid is not seen by the EC Delegation as a sustainable intervention. In the opinion of the evaluators, the Food Import Facility would also only have short-term effects. Although the impact of the food aid might be sustainable within favourable context conditions, these are currently not present in Zimbabwe. Most households continue to have difficulties to produce their own food because of persistent lack of affordable farm inputs. In its present form, the food aid is not sufficiently targeted and lacks market compatibility and might even destroy the remaining agricultural production systems. The prevailing political situation does not allow joint planning with the Government on sustainable policies and programmes. The only viable channels for more sustainable interventions are NGOs and the UN-system, provided that they continue to receive donor funding.

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 11:

The Zimbabwe programmes of the FSBL are short-term and not sustainable. Although the impact of the food aid might be sustainable within favourable context conditions, these are currently not present in Zimbabwe.

3.12 Evaluative Question 12

‘What is the role of the Regulation No. 1292/96 in the ongoing efforts to bridge the gap between relief, rehabilitation and development?’

Potentially, the FSBL is a very useful instrument to bridge the gap from relief food aid to rehabilitation, and to further development of the agricultural sector. The budget line is in principle very relevant within the current Zimbabwean context where a big gap exists after the relief operations, and where limited development efforts are being undertaken. However, planning of the use of the FSBL in Zimbabwe as a measure to move into rehabilitation (and further on to development) appeared to be at its very first stages only. The Food Security Unit in Brussels plans to soon commission some pre-research for food security programming in Zimbabwe. The FA/FS experts in the Delegation have up to now focused primarily on the food aid operations. For further planning for the coming 2004/05 FSBL budget cycle, the FAO/WFP Crop Needs Assessment outcome is currently being awaited. It should be understood that WFP,

Euronaid and the current implementing partners in Zimbabwe for the budget line have so far shown limited intention to move to real rehabilitation-oriented programmes. DFID, also a main donor of food aid to Zimbabwe, has appeared to be more pro-active, and has started the planning of protracted relief programmes. This is an important step on the LRRD track. Exactly during the execution of this mission, DFID held a three-day conference with various facilitators from outside the country, about appropriate food security and HIV/AIDS programmes that shift away from general food distribution.

ECHO came to Zimbabwe in 2001 as a response to the drought and food crisis. It has funded a range of activities including supplementary feeding, school-feeding and provision of agricultural inputs. ECHO has not funded any general food aid programmes in Zimbabwe as the FSBL was already funding these. As a complement to the support to WFP of the FSBL, ECHO provided a fund of € 5 million to WFP at the start of the emergency, for logistical support (provision of cars) and capacity building activities, both aimed at the implementing NGOs and at WFP staff. Currently, ECHO is reducing and re-orienting its project portfolio in Zimbabwe. An evaluation of ECHO's performance in Zimbabwe in the past years was being undertaken at the same time as this evaluation of the Regulation No. 1292/96.

AIDCO's involvement in Zimbabwe is limited to projects with direct benefit to the population only. Due to the political sanctions against Zimbabwe, the EC can presently not proceed to the joint formulation of the 9th EDF plan. As mentioned above, the Delegation aims to use remaining funds out of the 7th and 8th EDF for small-scale agricultural recovery activities with direct benefit to the population, as an add-on to still existing rural development programmes (Micro-Projects Programme and the Zimbabwe Decentralised Cooperation Programme).

Overall answer to Evaluative Question 12:

At the time of this mission, the planning for the 2004/2005 assistance by the FSBL in Zimbabwe was at its very first stages only, as the FAO/WFP Crop Needs Assessment was being awaited first. The prime focus is still on food aid interventions, with limited attention for LRRD matters. The EC Delegation, ECHO and DFID were found to be more pro-active in the planning of protracted relief activities, as an important step on the LRRD track. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the FSBL is in principle very relevant within the current Zimbabwean context and can play a useful role to bridge the gap from relief food aid to rehabilitation and further development of the agricultural sector.

4. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

4.1 Relevance

The problem of food insecurity in Zimbabwe is primarily caused by the land reforms that have permanently altered the structure of the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe, at a time when also the capacity of the State to fill the food deficit has declined due to the economic recession. Given the limitations of the current political situation prevailing in Zimbabwe, with EC assistance being restricted to ‘direct population support’ only, the use of the FSBL has been confined to short-term food aid and some agricultural inputs operations by UN-agencies and NGOs. The FS Budget Line has not been used for strengthening of existing Government systems and programmes, and the leverage potential of the food aid resources to stimulate policy reforms towards more sustainable food security has not been used. Admittedly, this would have been very difficult under the current political conditions. The FSBL support has only been used for prevention of transitory nutritional risks caused by the sudden countrywide collapse of food production. However, without attacking food insecurity from a production perspective, the current strategy adopted by the EC in Zimbabwe will not lead to the achievement of the Regulation’s ultimate goal of “making food aid superfluous”. Forced by the political circumstances, the current FSBL operations in Zimbabwe tend to contradict the general development policy orientation of the EC towards long-term measures for poverty reduction and food security.

Whilst a food import facility (FIF) would be one of the more relevant instruments for supporting the transition from food aid to food security in Zimbabwe, discussions between the EC and the Government of Zimbabwe on the potential use of the facility using the STABEX instrument have encountered obstacles related to the necessary conditionalities of the facility. Another stumbling block has been the State’s socially oriented but economically unviable agricultural marketing and pricing policy that has virtually eroded incentives for surplus food production.

It is difficult to really obtain insight in the needs of the population in Zimbabwe. There are various sets of needs assessments data: the FAO/WFP Crop Needs Assessment, the GoZ crop assessments, GoZ ZIMVAC (Zimbabwe vulnerability assessment) figures, and the FEWSNET information of USAID. However, these systems do not match each other as they are based on different criteria for needs assessment and do not always cover the same population groups (e.g. with or without inclusion of the urban population, with or without the former commercial farming areas). Hardly any information is available on prevailing coping mechanisms. The results of the UNICEF-coordinated nutrition survey in February 2003 have not been officially released yet due to pressure from the GoZ to withhold publication. However, it is generally known that the malnutrition rates were not found to be alarmingly high, with an average GAM of about 5%. This shows that the food crisis at least at the time of the survey was well under control.

The relevance of the food aid operations in Zimbabwe funded out of the Regulation No. 1292/96 should be evaluated against this background of limited insight in real needs. Based on the food balance sheets prepared by the GoZ (see Annex 4), the 2003/04 maize deficit after harvest, including carry-over stocks, was estimated at 980,000 MT. In their EMOP 12900, WFP aimed at the provision of food aid in 2003/04 amounting to 346,000 MT, of which 277,676 MT will have been realised at the closure of the EMOP period in June 2004. This food aid is mainly used for general free food rations (targeted at households in the communal areas only, and reaching rather high coverage figures in

the peak months January - February), and to a lesser extent for school-feeding programmes. The FSBL has provided cash donations to WFP out of the global WFP framework envelope amounting to 135,391 MT to WFP, equalling 40% of the total pledges towards Zimbabwe in the regional EMOP 12900. Other main donors are USAID (102,550 MT to WFP, and 105,000 MT through C-safe) and DFID (13,284 MT to WFP, £ 15 million for NGO food aid programmes). A recent issue of debate between the main donor organizations and the GoZ has been the height of the stocks that are kept in the SGR (Strategic Grain Reserve). At the time of the evaluation, they were estimated to amount to 260,000 MT of maize grain, with minimal releases to the population.

The relevance of the FSBL funded provision of agricultural inputs through Euronaid's implementing partners is in principle high, as it effectively reduces dependence on food aid and helps to improve food security. The Euronaid coverage in 2003/04 was about 10% of the farmers in the communal areas. This was alongside the ECHO support for agricultural inputs programmes directly to NGO's and through FAO.

Overall conclusion in relation to Relevance:

While the problem of food insecurity in Zimbabwe is primarily caused by the land reforms, the FSBL has until now mainly provided food aid to address transitory nutritional risks caused by the sudden countrywide collapse in food production. Despite the existence of various needs assessment data systems, real insight in the size of the food gap is lacking, which seriously hampers an assessment of the relevance of the food aid operations. Nevertheless, the FSBL has provided rather high amounts of funds for very broadly targeted food aid programmes in the past two years. The coverage and scope of the agricultural inputs programmes that were funded by the FSBL however were rather small.

4.2 Effectiveness

The FSBL funds for Zimbabwe have so far only served short-term humanitarian purposes. While the bulk of the funds (over 99%) has been used for food aid, less than one percent of the resources made available from the FSBL were oriented towards agricultural rehabilitation and recovery interventions (distribution of seed, fertiliser and tools). This pattern of resource allocation reflects an emphasis on food aid at the expense of long-term food security, which contradicts the objective of the Regulation to support long-term development and reduce dependency on food aid.

It can be argued that the food aid delivered to Zimbabwe has been effective in averting widespread malnutrition, and in avoiding the threats of indiscriminate disposal of productive assets and of social unrest. However, both the magnitude of the delivered food aid and the relatively large leakage because of very broad targeting have a high propensity for having created a dependency syndrome. This could lead to the erosion of existing capacities for self-sufficiency in food production at the local level. This trend is mirrored at the national level where a growing share of the food imports is being met through food aid donations rather than commercial food import operations financed by the state and the private sector.

The targeted support to communal farmers for agricultural recovery could have been more effective if it had been better funded and more integrated with the promotion of appropriate farming technology and market development. An integrated package of

agricultural recovery interventions could encourage significant additional farmer investment leading to assured local surplus production.

The respect for regional approaches to food security enshrined in the Regulation, especially the promotion of local purchasing operations, has been effective in promoting natural complementarity between countries belonging to the SADC region. The regional procurement of food from Zambia, Malawi and South Africa to supply the Zimbabwe programme has been effective in building the capacities of local food commodity traders and processors in the neighbouring countries (especially Zambia and Malawi) for export trade. At the same time, the food aid operations have effectively generated business for both local and regional transport companies that otherwise were facing lean business in a contracting Zimbabwean economy.

Overall conclusion in relation to Effectiveness:

The FSBL funds for Zimbabwe have so far only served short-term humanitarian purposes with a very strong emphasis on food aid. This has been effective to avert widespread malnutrition and to reduce the threats of indiscriminate disposal of productive assets and social unrest. The local purchase operations have promoted natural complementarity within the SADC region effectively and have strengthened the capacities of food commodity traders, food processors and transport companies in the neighbouring countries and in Zimbabwe itself. However, the very broad targeting of the food aid could easily lead to a dependency syndrome that would erode existing capacities for self-sufficiency in food production at the local level. The FSBL support for agricultural recovery could have been more effective if it had been better funded and more integrated with the promotion of appropriate farming technology and market development.

4.3 Efficiency

Both WFP and Euronaid have shown their capability to procure and transport substantial amounts of food. Despite some delays in the awarding of tenders etc. that were related to the complicated multi-level implementation set-up³, the regional procurements generally have been executed in an efficient way. Both WFP and Euronaid have expressed satisfaction with the achieved tender performance as per timing, quality and pricing levels.

With regard to the distribution phase through the implementing partners, there are large differences between WFP and Euronaid in the reporting that is available. For WFP, the pledge is made to a countrywide EMOP appeal. WFP Zimbabwe produces regular distribution updates that specify the amounts made available at district level (a NGO takes care of one or more districts). In this approach, it cannot be specified what part of the funds provided by the FSBL are used for general food distribution and how much for targeted supplementary feeding programmes like school feeding and the under-fives feeding programmes⁴. For Euronaid, the FSBL allocation is made to a specific set of

³ Due to discussions on the outlines of the framework contract, the disbursement of funds towards Euronaid was so much delayed in 2003 that it seriously constrained the timeliness of the procurement and final distribution of seeds and fertiliser for the agricultural season 2003/04.

⁴ WFP provided us with the overall planned distribution figures for February 2004: 3,779,835 beneficiaries for the general food distributions and 513,200 for targeted programmes (not specified).

NGO- projects. While the Euronaid CSO is not involved in any real field monitoring, it does play an important co-ordinating role to collect and collate the detailed distribution reports of the implementing partners. The resulting report is sent by the CSO to Euronaid, The Hague, which will share it with F-5 in Brussels. Additionally, the Euronaid CSO has a major co-ordinating role in the preparation of the proposal for next year's programme.

Both for the allocations to WFP and Euronaid, the mission team has encountered difficulties to assess the financial efficiency of the funded operations. At the EC Delegation in Harare there was limited information on the way the budgets have been spent (especially for Euronaid), and the FA/FS experts have so far been only globally involved in the monitoring of expenditures made. Recently, some discussions were initiated by one of the experts on the costing mechanism that is applied by WFP for EMOP 12900. As both allocations were made out of global framework envelopes of the FSBL, the final reports are in principle sent by WFP-Rome and Euronaid, The Hague to the AIDCO/F-5 Food Security Unit in Brussels. Within the limitations of this short evaluation mission, financial overviews for the 2002/03 and 2004/05 cycles could not be obtained. A proper assessment of the costs levels of the funded operations has therefore not been possible.

Overall conclusion in relation to Efficiency:

Both WFP and Euronaid have shown their capability to procure and transport substantial amounts of food. The tender performance as per timing, quality and pricing levels has been satisfactory. Although detailed information for the distribution by WFP implementing partners is lacking, in general the food aid operation in Zimbabwe seems to be well coordinated. The distributions by the Euronaid partners are done according to specific project proposals; it is up to the NGOs to coordinate their programmes with other stakeholders, including WFP. A proper assessment of the costs levels of the funded operations has not been possible within the limitations of this short evaluation mission.

4.4 Sustainability

Because the Regulation funds in Zimbabwe have been confined to food aid with a minor component of agricultural inputs, the interventions by their very nature are not sustainable. Although the impact of the food aid might be sustainable within favourable context conditions, these are currently not present in Zimbabwe. Even if food aid was to be sustained, the propensity to destroy self-reliance mechanisms of households is high. In its present form, the food aid is not sufficiently targeted and lacks market compatibility. The conditions of hyperinflation and shortage of foreign currency to import critical farm inputs continue to erode the capacity of most households to produce their own food. The prevailing political situation does not allow joint planning with the Government on sustainable policies and programmes. The only viable channels for more sustainable interventions are NGOs and the UN-system, provided that they continue to receive donor funding and continue with their traditional nutrition programmes after the phasing out of food aid.

Overall conclusion in relation to Sustainability:

The food aid operations in Zimbabwe, which are funded by the FSBL, are not sustainable. The impact of the food aid on the nutrition situation in Zimbabwe could in principle be sustainable within favourable context conditions. However, these are currently not present in Zimbabwe because of the limited access of most households to critical farm inputs.

4.5 Impact

The low levels of malnutrition that have prevailed across the country at a time of both severe food shortages and HIV/AIDS prevalence are a sign for the positive impact of food aid in Zimbabwe. The presence of food aid in Zimbabwe has enabled vulnerable communities to access a balanced diet. This has thereby reduced the pressure on them to dispose of productive assets to cope with two consecutive years of drought and food shortages. In some cases, the food aid has been intensified in districts where high levels of malnutrition were found during the 2002/3 Nutrition Survey, e.g. in Binga.

The substantial regional purchases, made especially by WFP especially, have led to heightened demand and have firmed producer prices for white maize in the neighbouring countries Zambia and South Africa. This has had a positive impact on the viability of maize production in both countries. During a field visit to Zambia, it was found by this mission⁵ that, in 2003, the WFP purchasers in Zambia experienced rises in white maize producer prices by at least 50% (from US\$80/MT to US\$125/MT). This was accompanied by a significant rise in consumer prices, from the USD 100-160/MT range towards the import parity level of USD 190/MT. This price rise is in line with a normal FCA maize price evolution between June and December. It could be said that the substantial food aid procurements in Zambia have improved the integration into the regional market, and have benefited the producers in Zambia. The opening up of the Zimbabwean market through the food aid operation has enabled the surplus countries to participate in regional trade, thus building the necessary experience and capacities for future integration of the food market in the context of the future implementation of free trade area (FTA) agreements of COMESA and SADC.

The business and employment opportunities created by the food aid operations in Zimbabwe are short-term in nature and will expire with the withdrawal of food aid. However, the skills and experience that were gained in the exercise will be part of the institutional memory of the involved organisations if they can retain the staff that participated in the relief effort. In the commercial sector, for example the transport companies and the milling industry, it is possible that the gained skills will be retained and applied to other business activities. In the NGO sector, the received training and capacity building can benefit long-term development programmes after the food aid operations.

⁵ Information on Zambia maize prices was provided by the manager of the FRA warehouse in Lusaka.

Overall conclusion in relation to Impact:

The food aid programmes in Zimbabwe that were funded by the Regulation have a mixed impact. On the positive side, there has been a suppression of both malnutrition and undesirable coping mechanisms like the disposal of productive assets. The food aid operations have promoted regional market integration in Southern Africa and have benefited the producers in the neighbouring surplus countries. On the negative side, there is the possibility of the aid dependency syndrome within Zimbabwe. Although business and employment opportunities within the emergency food aid operations are short-term only, the gained skills and experience might be retained and be used in other sectors.

4.6 Internal / external coherence

The EC's general policy and strategy for food security is to pursue broad-based measures for sustainable development and poverty reduction at the national level. Given the limitations of the current political situation prevailing in Zimbabwe, a proper integration of the support of the FSBL into the Commission's development strategy for Zimbabwe has not been possible. There is no 9th EDF and also no Country Strategy Paper. The EC Regulation 1292/96-Budget Line has until now provided funds for food aid operations and some agricultural relief projects with a duration of one year or less, while the EC aid portfolio of the 8th EDF is focussed on direct population support only, including some small-scale food security interventions.

The coherence of the food aid operations with national food security operations has been limited. The FSBL, on one hand, has supported efforts by the Government to provide safety nets for vulnerable populations at a time when drought and land reforms have reduced household food security. However, integration of food aid into the country's food security policies has not been feasible, as the political environment in Zimbabwe has necessitated the EC to implement parallel food aid operations through UN- and NGO-channels. Given the current suspension of aid from the IMF and the World Bank, Zimbabwe has not adopted the PRSP approach. As a result, there has been limited coordination between donor programmes (including EC food aid operations) and national programmes for poverty alleviation.

Overall conclusion in relation to Internal/External Coherence:

The application of Regulation 1292/96 has been confined to short-term food aid operations that tend to contradict the general policy orientation of the EC towards poverty reduction, and is also not in line with the food security oriented objectives for the FSBL. Integration of the FSBL support into the Commission's development strategy for Zimbabwe has not been possible as there is no 9th EDF and no Country Strategy Paper. However, the use of food aid as a safety net measure is in line with the use of the remaining EDF funds for 'direct population support'. There is limited coherence with GoZ national policies, as the food aid operations are not integrated within a national food security policy for Zimbabwe.

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Food security situation in Zimbabwe

The nature of the food crisis in Zimbabwe is multi-faceted with links to hastily implementation of land reforms, flawed agricultural marketing policies, consecutive droughts, and an overall deterioration of the macro-economic environment within the country.

The current political environment within Zimbabwe constrains the use of EDF and also FSBL funds. Longer-term collaboration with the GoZ for policy development and/or operational programmes in the field of food security currently is not possible, and other channels need to be used.

5.2 Coherence and complementarity of the EC Regulation 1292/96 FA/FS policy

Within the restriction to provide direct population support only, the EC currently finances various small-scale food security interventions with the balance of the 8th EDF and also intends to take up recovery activities within the remaining programmes to bridge the gap from relief to development. In terms of food aid, the EC Delegation considers to use remaining STABEX-95 funds for a food import facility focussing on wheat. The planning of other food aid operations awaits the FAO/WFP Crops Needs Assessment.

The FSBL is currently used as a support to GoZ's efforts to provide a safety net for vulnerable population groups, and is in line with the use of remaining EDF fund for 'direct population support'. Although the Government prefers cash-for-work interventions like the Public Works Programme, the budget line FS Budget Line up to now has only been used for free food aid.

5.3 Added value of the instruments available under Regulation No. 1292/96

In Zimbabwe, the FSBL has functioned as a flexible funding instrument that was able to quickly mobilise huge amounts of funding for humanitarian programmes, which would not have been possible with EDF funds.

The focus of the support for food aid programmes by WFP and Euronaid has so far been of a short-term nature only, with little emphasis on a phasing-over to other types of programmes, in order to stimulate food security.

While nutrition data of February 2003 show that the situation in Zimbabwe was well under control, the food aid coverage in 2003/04 has still been rather broad. The general food ration programmes have seen increasing coverage rates up to very high levels. The specificity of the targeting of the blanket wet feeding programmes for under-fives and the school-feeding programmes is questionable. The current free food aid distributions do not contribute to the final objectives of the FSBL to reduce the dependency on food aid and to improve the food security situation.

Related to the current conditions in Zimbabwe, including the Government intervention in the agricultural markets, there are no possibilities within the FSBL to start with a currency facility / budgetary support to the GoZ.

The food security operations currently funded by the FA/FS Budget Line consist of NGO projects for provision of agricultural inputs that cover about 10% of the farmer households in the communal areas in Zimbabwe.

Apart from the funds for the SADC regional hub project, no capacity building has been funded in Zimbabwe by the Regulation 1292/96 Budget Line.

Up to now, the technical assistance provided by the Budget Line to the EC Delegation has mainly served global monitoring and liaison purposes. No monitoring system is in place. There is regular (day-to-day) information sharing with F-5 in Brussels. The effectiveness of the monitoring role of the FA/FS experts in the Delegation has been constrained by gaps in reporting mechanisms due to a lack of clarity about the allocation of responsibilities between F-5 Brussels level and the Delegation level in Zimbabwe.

5.4 Project cycle management

The FSBL has supported relevant and timely food aid programmes in Zimbabwe, as a swift response to urgent humanitarian needs. So far, the FSBL in Zimbabwe has primarily been used for gender-sensitive and well-coordinated food aid programmes. Both WFP and Euronaid have shown their capability to procure and transport substantial amounts of food.

The multi-level implementation set-up of the framework contractual agreement with WFP and Euronaid is complicated and the chain of authorisation is not always clear. The EC delegation in Zimbabwe only recently received a copy of the framework contracts, and up to now has not received any copies of financial and narrative final reports. The two FA/FS experts within the Delegation are involved in global monitoring only, without a monitoring system and no detailed reporting stream to F-5 in Brussels.

As the EC Delegation appeared to avail of limited information on the way the budgets have been spent, the mission could not properly assess the financial efficiency of the allocations to WFP and Euronaid.

Up to now, the planning for the use of the funds from the FSBL has been done on an annual and ad-hoc basis in response to relief needs appeals by WFP and Euronaid, with no attention for phasing-out of the support. The first ideas for a phasing-over of the FSBL aid into new types of food aid and food security projects have only recently started to emerge.

The agricultural inputs programmes in Zimbabwe have so far not been very well coordinated. The first impact assessments for the agricultural cycle 2003/04 is currently being undertaken. Efforts are being made by FAO to improve the coordination of the next 2004/2005 cycle.

5.5 Sustainability and LRRD

The Zimbabwe programmes of the FSBL are short-term and not sustainable. Although the impact of the food aid might be sustainable within favourable context conditions, these currently are not present in Zimbabwe.

It is acknowledged that the FSBL in principle is very relevant within the current Zimbabwean context as it can play a useful role to bridge the gap from relief food aid to rehabilitation and further development of the agricultural sector. However, the prime focus still appears to be on food aid interventions, with hardly any attention for LRRD matters. Both the EC Delegation, ECHO and DFID were found to be more pro-active in the planning of LRRD activities.

5.6 Overall assessment

While the problem of food insecurity in Zimbabwe is primarily caused by the land reforms, the FSBL has up to now provided food aid mainly to address the transitory nutritional risks caused by the sudden countrywide collapse in food production.

The food aid programmes in Zimbabwe have been effective to avert widespread malnutrition, and to avoid the threats of indiscriminate disposal of productive assets and of social unrest.

The food aid programmes in Zimbabwe are not sustainable. Although the impact of the food aid on the nutrition situation in Zimbabwe could in principle be sustainable within favourable context conditions, these conditions are currently not in place in Zimbabwe because of the limited access of most households to critical farm inputs.

Despite the existence of various needs assessment systems, real insight in the size of the food gap is lacking which seriously hampers an assessment of the relevance of the food aid operations. In the past two years, the FSBL has provided rather high amounts of funds for very broadly targeted food aid programmes. This could easily result in a dependency syndrome eroding existing capacities for self-sufficiency in food production at the local level.

The local purchase operations have effectively promoted natural complementarity within the SADC region and have strengthened the capacities of food commodity traders, food processors and transport companies in the neighbouring countries and in Zimbabwe itself. Although the business and employment opportunities within the emergency food aid operations are short-term only, the gained skills and experience might be retained and used in other sectors.

The coverage and scope of the Euronaid agricultural inputs programmes that were funded by the FSBL were rather small. The supply of inputs has not been integrated within agricultural recovery projects.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Food security situation in Zimbabwe

Real solutions to the food crisis in Zimbabwe must be broader and of a more long-term nature than just the provision of food aid. Phasing-over or pre-recovery programmes should fill the gap because of the reduction of the number of beneficiaries due to better targeting of food aid from 2004/05 onwards. These programmes can also serve to maintain preparedness for more full-scale recovery programmes.

Within the current political conditions that constrain the use of EDF and FSBL funds, there are still possibilities for operations in support of food security, like the establishment of a food security monitoring system, the implementation of quick impact QIP projects directly targeted at beneficiaries, micro-irrigation projects, seeds multiplication schemes and conservation farming primarily focussing on the communal areas.

6.2 Coherence and complementarity of the EC Regulation 1292/96 FA/FS policy

Alongside the efforts to use remaining EDF and STABEX-95 funds for smaller-scale recovery activities, the various instruments available within the FSBL should be used to provide relevant and suitable assistance in order to improve the food security situation in Zimbabwe and to reduce the dependence on food aid. Specifically, this means that there should be less focus on food aid in-kind, and more funding for operations in support of food security and for technical assistance/capacity building.

The FSBL should be used for a range of safety net interventions for vulnerable population groups in Zimbabwe, and not only remain limited to free food aid distributions.

6.3 Added value of the instruments available under Regulation No. 1292/96

The FSBL should continue to flexibly provide funding for humanitarian and recovery programmes in Zimbabwe as a complement to the programmes funded by remaining 8th EDF funds.

The food aid distributions should be continued for humanitarian purposes only and should be more specifically targeted to vulnerable groups in Zimbabwe.

As the necessary preconditions within the current political context of Zimbabwe do not exist, the FSBL currently should not start with a currency facility / budgetary support to the GoZ. The possibility for the establishment of a Food Import Facility (FIF) with FSBL funds could be investigated.

The FSBL should consider becoming involved in capacity building efforts in the field of food security that could contribute to recovery and rehabilitation of Zimbabwe after the current crisis. For instance, with the help of staff of the SADC regional training programme on food security based in Harare, a training programme could be elaborated for the staff of the international NGOs on appropriate QIP-projects to promote food security at household level.

6.4 Project cycle management

For the food aid programmes in Zimbabwe, the FSBL should continue to work through WFP and Euronaid, as both have shown to be capable to procure and transport substantial amounts of food.

The multi-level contractual framework agreements with WFP and Euronaid should be simplified and the chain of authorisation should be made clearer.

It is recommended to commission a comparison of the incurred costs levels of the WFP and Euronaid food aid operations funded by the FSBL in Zimbabwe. This information will provide leverage for cost allocation discussions with WFP and the budget discussions with Euronaid. If similar assessments would also be done for FSBL-funded operations of Euronaid and WFP in some other countries, the comparative analyses would provide the EC relevant units managing FSBL with a better insight in the efficiency levels of the use of the significant funds made available through the global framework contracts with the two organisations.

More clarity is needed on what sort of monitoring is expected from the FA/FS experts within the EC Delegation in Zimbabwe. In addition, a proper monitoring system and a system of regular communication with F-5 should be developed. Next to their institutional and liaison role and their involvement during the planning and implementation of FSBL funded programmes and projects, the FA/FS experts within the EC Delegation in Zimbabwe should also take up a role in capacity building in the field of food aid and food security.

Time has come in Zimbabwe to phase over from general food rations with a broad coverage to more refined food aid programmes (as social safety net interventions strictly targeted to the most vulnerable only) and to food security programmes.

The FSBL should continue to fund agricultural inputs programmes in Zimbabwe. The effectiveness of these programmes should be enhanced through a more integrated approach including agricultural extension services, provision of fertiliser and more varied packages of seeds, and micro-irrigation programmes. The scale of these programmes could be enlarged to achieve a larger coverage. The support to the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe needs to be properly coordinated, e.g. by the FAO, and should be accompanied by systematic impact assessments through monitoring of yields.

6.5 Sustainability and LRRD

Because of the prevailing context conditions in Zimbabwe, it should be accepted that well-targeted food aid programmes are necessary as a form of safety net intervention are needed at least for some more years, despite their unsustainability.

The FSBL should quickly start to plan for LRRD projects. These efforts should be coordinated with the agricultural recovery activities that are currently being planned by the EC Delegation within the framework of the rural development programmes funded by the 8th EDF.

Within the current Zimbabwean context, the evaluation team sees realistic options for the use of the FSBL to bridge the gap after relief operations. A sound possibility would be a Zimbabwe-level NGO Call for Proposals for agricultural recovery interventions in the communal lands (Food Security QIP's - Quick Impact Projects), and maybe also for rural Food-for-Work or Cash-for-Work projects. Another possibility would be the support for establishing a food security information system.

6.6 Overall recommendations

The FSBL in Zimbabwe should be used for properly targeted food aid and food security programmes that strengthen the existing Government systems and programmes, and that have leverage to stimulate policy reforms towards a more sustainable food security situation.

The FSBL support for agricultural recovery in Zimbabwe should be of a larger scale than it is at present and should follow an integrated approach of both agricultural inputs supply and the promotion of appropriate farming technology and market development.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

EC AIDCO F-5 Unit, Brussels

Xavier Guillou	Zimbabwe Desk Officer
Michel Gauche	Desk Officer Euronaid

ECHO, Brussels

Paul Koulen	Zimbabwe Desk Officer
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EC Delegation Zimbabwe

Ms. Francesca Mosca	Head of Delegation
Achim Tillessen	Head of Programming and Productive Sectors
Patrick Phipps	Regional Food Aid / Food Security Coordinator
Pierre-Luc Vanhaeverbeke	Food Aid / Food Security Expert
Sanne Jaegersborg	Economic Attaché
Clodagh O'Brien	Coordinator Micro-Projects Programme

ECHO Zimbabwe

Aadrian Sullivan	ECHO, correspondent
John Wilding	ECHO, evaluator / CD Resources
Dr. Alois Dörlemann	ECHO, evaluator / Health Focus GmbH.
Dr. Veronika Scherbaum	ECHO, evaluator / University of Hohenheim

Other donors Zimbabwe

Tracy Atwood	USAID, Team Leader Economic Development
Barbara Reed	USAID, Food for Peace Officer
Dr. Rachel Yates	DFID, Social Development Adviser
Alexis Ferrand	DFID, Economist
Shaun Hughes	DFID, Humanitarian Adviser

UN-agencies Zimbabwe

Victor Angelo	UNDP, Resident Representative
George Olesh	UNDP, RRU Deputy Co-ordinator
Ruth Butao Ayoade	UNDP, RRU Recovery Programme Officer

Mike Sackett	WFP, Regional Director Southern Africa
Kevin Farrell	WFP, Representative
Simon Cammelbeeck	WFP, Emergency Co-ordinator
Alberto Correia Mendes	WFP, Programme Officer
Dr. Festo Kavishe	UNICEF, Representative
Nikolina Kobali-Drysdale	UNICEF, Nutritionist
Fred Ogwal-Oyee	UNICEF, Programme Co-ordinator
Roderick Charters	FAO, Emergency Co-ordinator for Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe Government Institutions

Lancaster Museka	Secretary for Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare
Various members	Ministry of Finance and other GoZ bodies

NGO's Zimbabwe

Aad Driessen	Euronaid, Southern Africa Representative
Derick Brock	World Vision, C-Safe Coordinator
Peter Pichler	World Vision, Programme Manager Water / Sanitation
Neil	Goal, country director
Godfrey Magaramombe	Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe, Director
Edward Chisala	SADC Regional Food Security Training Programme, Programme Director
Pauline Paledi-Mokou	SADC Regional Food Security Training Programme, Training and Information Officer
Clipa Sylvano	SADC Regional Food Security Training Programme, Operations Manager

Visit to Zambia

Jorge Fanlo-Martin	WFP Deputy Country Director
Isabelle Mballa	WFP Logistics Officer
Arayaprayoon Piyamon	WFP Pipeline Officer
Beena Patel	Amanita Zambia Contracts Manager
Charles Chitembo	SOCOTEC Local Agent Zambia
Richard Lisimba	Food Reserve Agency, Stock & Standards Coordinator

Visit to South Africa

Joop Menkveld	WFP RIACSO Senior Procurement Officer
Blessed Chirimusta	WFP RIACSO Procurement Officer
Joyce Luma	WFP RIACSO Regional VAM Adviser
Bruce Muwera	Louis Dreyfus Africa

ANNEX 2: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

AIDCO - Annex I of WFP Contract: EC Food Aid Programme, 2003

EC Guidelines for Food Distribution in Zimbabwe, EC Brussels, 2004

ECHO, Indicative Budgetary Programming: ECHO Strategy 2003, Zimbabwe.

EC/F-5, The Main Evolution of the Food Security Budget Line, PowerPoint Presentation Notes by AIDCO-Brussels, 2004.

EC Brussels - Communication from the Commission of the Council and the European Parliament – Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An Assessment

European Court of Auditors – Special Report No 2/2003

EC Brussels - BI- Annual Report 2000-2001, European Commission Food Aid and Food Security Programme

EC Food Aid Evaluation (2000)

EC Delegation Zimbabwe, Information note to the EDF Committee

EC, Fighting Hunger: Food Security at the Heart of Poverty Reduction, the European Commission's vision and approach September 2001.

Government of Zimbabwe Appeal to UN Humanitarian Assistance, July 2003.

Particip GmbH - Logical Diagram – Regulation 1292/96 and Food Security operations, January 2004.

Particip GmbH, Thematic Evaluation of EC Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operations in Food Security: New Revised Desk Phase Report II, 2004

United Nations – Zimbabwe Food Security Brief, 31 January 2004

United Nations, Final Report of the Joint OCHA/UNDP Review Mission to Zimbabwe Strategic Review of the Relief and Recovery Unit (RRU), 24-29 November 2003

UNDP - Food Aid and Nutrition Sector Plan, a draft chapter for CAP, 2004.

United Nations Relief and Recovery Unit, Annual Review of the UN Relief and Recovery Unit, 2003.

United Nations Relief and Recovery Unit: Mapping of Selected Humanitarian Information in Zimbabwe, 2004

WFP Zimbabwe- Post-distribution monitoring: Monthly Statistical Reports (2003/4).

WFP Zimbabwe- Food Distribution Monitoring: Monthly Statistical Reports (2003/4).

WFP Zimbabwe – Monitoring Guidelines, EMOP 10200.

ANNEX 3: WORKPLAN

Date	Time	Institution/Dept.	Person(s) met
Th 12th Febr	8:00–10:30	Briefing EC Delegation	Achim Tillessen, Patrick Phipps, Pierre-Luc Vanhaeverbeke, Sanne Jaegersborg
	12:00–13:00	DFID	Rachel Yates, Alexis Ferrand, Shaun Hughes
	13:30-15:00	USAID	Tracy Atwood, Barbara Reed
	16:00-17:00	Briefing EC Head of Delegation	Francesca Mosca
Fr 13 th Febr	8:30-10:00	ECHO	Aadrian Sullivan
	10:30-12:00	Euronaïd	Aad Driessen
	12:30-14:30	FAO	Roderick Charters
	15:00-16:30	FCTZ	Godfrey Magaramombe
Sat 14 th Febr		(Literature review)	
Mo 16th Febr	15:00-16:30	SADC-FANR	Edward Chisala, Pauline Paledi-Mokou, Clipo Sylvano, Mr. Mugwara
Tu 17 th Febr	8:00-9:30	WFP	Kevin Farrell, Michael Sackett, Simon Cammelbeeck, Alberto Mendez
	11:00-12:30	Ministry of Public Services, Labour and Social Welfare	Lancaster Museka
	16:00-17:30	UNDP RRU	Victor Angelo, George Olesh, Ruth Butao
We 18 th Febr	8:30-10:00	World Vision	Dereck Brock, Peter Pichler, Jacques Birugi
	10:30-13:30	Workshop at EC Delegation	Achim Tillessen, Patrick Phipps, Pierre-Luc Vanhaeverbeke, Sanne Jaegersborg, Clodagh O'Brien, Lighton
	16:00-17:30	UNICEF	Festo Kavishe, Nikoline Drysdale, Fred Ogwal-Oyee
Th 19 th Febr	10:00-13:30	Flight Harare–Lusaka	
	14:00-15:00	WFP Lusaka	Isabelle Mballa and others
	15:00-17:30	Visit to Amanita and FRA, Lusaka	Several
Fr 20th Febr	9:00-11:00	Drive Lusaka-Chirundu	
	11:00-13:30	Delamain Clearing Agent and customs, Chirundu	Several
	14:00-17:00	WFP, Chirundu–Karoï	Several
Sat 21st Febr	8:00-14:00	Site visit distribution at Dunga ward, Goal	Several

Date	Time	Institution/Dept.	Person(s) met
Mo 23rd Febr	10:30-11:30	NAO	Several
	14:00-15:00	Debriefing EC Delegation	Francesca Mosca, Patrick Phipps, Pierre-Luc Vanhaeverbeke, Clodagh O'Brien, Achim Tillessen
Tu 24 th Febr	6:00-9:00	Flight Harare-Johannesburg	
	9:30-15:00	WFP RIACSO office, Johannesburg	Joop Menkveld, Joyce Luma and others
	15:00-17:00	Louis Dreyfus, Johannesburg	Several
We 25 th Febr	8:00-14:00	Site visit to Louis Dreyfus silo's at Maritsburg	Several

ANNEX 4: Zimbabwe Cereal Balance Sheet 01/04/2003 – 31/03/2004

		MAIZE (MT)	CEREALS (maize, wheat, rice, CSB; MT)
	Total Domestic Availability (production + carry over stocks) 1	891,000	1,095,000
	Total Domestic Requirements 2	1,871,000	2,382,000
A	Deficit after harvest and carry over stock	-980,000	-1,287,000
	GMB - commercial imports received to date 3	265,000	320,000
	Private/ informal imports estimated to date 4	50,000	50,000
	WFP food aid imports received to date	176,000	190,000
	C - SAFE and other NGO imports received to date	59,000	70,000
B	Total imports received from 1st April 03 to 31st January 04	550,000	630,000
	GMB additional imports planned 5	32,000	172,699
	WFP confirmed pledges still to be received (exclude CSB)	93,000	93,300
	C-SAFE and other NGO pipelines	40,000	40,000
C	Total confirmed planned imports 01/02/2004 –31/03/2004 6)	165,000	305,999
D	Total received and confirmed imports (B+C)	715,000	935,999
E	Unfilled cereal gap 7) (A - D)	-265,000	-351,001

Source: This cereal balance sheet is based on the FAO/ WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) report of 19 June 03, updated 31/01/2004.

1. CFSAM report (19 June 2003) considers 803,000 MT (production) and 52,000 MT (GMB), 30,000 MT (WFP) stock and 6,000 MT (NGO) stock.
2. Taken from CFSAM report. Based on population figure of 11.7 million. Includes livestock feed.
3. Information received from GMB 23/01/03.
4. Estimates in consultation with other sources of information.
5. GMB official information to WFP on bilateral consultation (10/12/03)
6. Stocks and pipeline. Includes C-SAFE data and other NGO's
7. EC maize donation to WFP scheduled for February 2004 not included

ANNEX 5: Stakeholder analysis FA/FS Budget Line Zimbabwe

Type of org.	Stake-holder	Characteristics	Formal objectives	Strengths	Weaknesses	Interest in this evaluation	Interface FA/FS sector	Interface with other sectors and instruments
EU	F-5 Brussels	a) € 500 mio/yr, b) 20 staff, short contracts	a) Less dependence on food aid, b) better food security, c) balanced ec/soc devt.	a) Flexible budget line (FA/FS), b) stable budget size so possibility for longer-term planning, c) clear sectoral focus - relation MDG, d)	a) Restricted by EC Council policies, could trap into FA, b) lack of continuity, c) loose policy framework (FA vs long-term FS), d) weak framework contracts with partners (WFP, Euronaid), e) weak coordination structures (ECHO, DG-DEV), f) no long-term planning, g) limited capacity for monitoring & control	a) Maintain the budget line and its size with further policy evolution, b) document performance, c) draw lessons for improvement	FA and seeds distribution only	Some with ECHO and EDF. Limited with health, education, some with agriculture.
	FSU at Delegation in Harare	a) Start 2002, variable yearly budget allocation only out of framework envelopes, b) deconcentration, but still thinly	-same-	a) Friendly management of only two contract partners, b) good potential for coordination with other EC instruments	a) Restricted by EC Del policies, b) lack of FA/FS strategy and uncertain FA/FS country budget, c) insufficient monitoring & control	-Same-	FA and seeds distribution only, no longer-term FS	Variable with EDF (some with STABEX, little with MPP, ZDCP, Health Sector, Education), hardly any with

Type of org.	Stake-holder	Characteristics	Formal objectives	Strengths	Weaknesses	Interest in this evaluation	Interface FA/FS sector	Interface with other sectors and instruments
		staffed with short contracts only						ECHO.
	ECHO Harare	a) € 38 mio 06/02- 06/04, b) two staff	Funding for coordinated humanitarian assistance and protection through IP's (NGO's, UN), with focus on phasing out/ LRRD	a) Quick budget allocation process, b) various FS-related Interventions, clearly focused / targeted, politicisation avoided, c) capacity building and good relations with implementing partners, d) bring in other technical partners if needed, e) aware of need for exit strategy and LRRD, f) forward yearly planning	a) Max. 1 year funds	a) FS Harare to take up longer-term FS interventions	FA complementary to general rations, seeds distribution, other mid-term FS interventions	Good with education, agriculture and health/watsan sectors. Pro-active with FSU and EDF.
Other donors	DFID	a) £ 35 mio / yr Food aid, £ 7 mio / yr agricultural recovery, £ 6 mio/ yr	a) Rural livelihood strategy, b) strong (Br) implementing partners, c) good in coordination with	a) Not yet explicit FS strategy in Zimbabwe	Promotion of focus on longer-term urban/rural FS, with reduction of free	a) Funding of national nutrition survey and ZIMVAC, b)	With health (HIV/AIDS) and agriculture.

Type of org.	Stake-holder	Characteristics	Formal objectives	Strengths	Weaknesses	Interest in this evaluation	Interface FA/FS sector	Interface with other sectors and instruments
		HIV/AIDS, b) small but professional staff in Harare		other donors, d) sound forward thinking (e.g. monetisation-issue) e) DFID monitoring team		FA (urban safety nets, communal lands agricultural recovery,	funding food aid / seeds distribution interventions, c) Stress need for common criteria and conditionalities	
	USAID	a) 210,000 MT / yr, b) small staff in Harare	a) PL 480: discharge of excess food production, b) food for peace, c) liberalisation of the grain market	a) Innovative approaches: pilot market compatible FS interventions, pilot HIV/AIDS related FA projects (FFW for youth, HBC and PMTCT),	a) Dumping of bulghur wheat	a) Raise interest for monetisation, b) Innovative FA/FS interventions	Providing FA, QIP FS projects including tools for ex-farmer workers	Market development, health.
UN	UNDP/RRU	a) Good funding position (funded by FA/FS Budget Line, ECHO, DFID, USAID), b) 9 sector working groups	a) Coordination through sector working groups, b) Protection, c) information services	a) Coordination of donor, UN and NGO interventions, b) promoting dialogue between donors and government,	OCHA/UNDP review mission (11/2003) concluded: a) donor driven, b) insufficient management structures, c) delay of key information products, d) no permanent field	Focus on: a) food aid and agricultural recovery, b) combating HIV/AIDS, c) critical underpinning of	100% on FA, currently moving into FS	In principle 100%

Type of org.	Stake-holder	Characteristics	Formal objectives	Strengths	Weaknesses	Interest in this evaluation	Interface FA/FS sector	Interface with other sectors and instruments
					presence due to GoZ - forced closure of field offices, e) main focus on relief, need to focus more on recovery issues	essential social services.		
	FAO Harare	a) Emergency unit US\$ 5 mio / yr and small staff, b) country office etc. boosting agricultural production ...	a) Coordination agr. inputs, b) strong focus on capacity building, c) innovative longer-term FS projects, d) participation in FAO/WFP Crop Assessment Missions	a) New unit, b)	Advocacy for sustainable longer-term FS policies and approaches	a) Coordination seeds distribution, b) publication of monthly Zimbabwe FS Brief, c) planning/execution/funding of FS projects	Mainly agriculture, some with education, none with health.
	UNICEF							
	WFP (reg + Harare)	a) Regional EMOPs 10200 (07/2002-06/03) and 10290 (07/2003-06/04) ,	EMOP 10290: a) prevent severe shortages, b) safeguard	a) Quick pro-active response to humanitarian crisis in Southern Africa, b) experienced staff,	a) Occasional pipeline breaks, b) mechanism for cost allocation by WFP Regional Office questioned by EC	a) Continuation of food aid for next EMOPs to support pre-recovery stage, b)	100% interface: EMOP 10290 40% funded by	Some interface with health (nutrition needs of vulnerable groups) and

Type of org.	Stake-holder	Characteristics	Formal objectives	Strengths	Weaknesses	Interest in this evaluation	Interface FA/FS sector	Interface with other sectors and instruments
		b) EMOP 10290 Total contribution for WFP Zimbabwe (05/02/04) US\$ 160.7 mio (80% of appeal), c) Local procurement in RSA and Zambia plus USAID in-kind donations.	nutritional well-being, c) preserve/restore social structures, human and productive assets, and safety nets.	c) efficient regional procurement, with capital injection in Zambia and RSA as side-effect, d) whole grain maize increases throughput of local milling industry, e) food aid contributed to low malnutrition rates	Zimbabwe, c) relatively high overhead costs, d) general ration beneficiary selection criteria too broad, leading to unnecessary dependency on food aid and distortion of local markets, e) blanket wet feeding U5's not targeted to needy children	start to cover non-contested farms in new resettlement areas, c) expand food-for-education programme, d) reaching vulnerable urban beneficiaries with FA.	FA/FS Budget Line	education sector (avoid high school drop-outs), limited interface with long-term food security (food aid helps to maintain asset base)
NGO's	Euronaïd Zimbabwe	Start in 2002, € 10 mio/yr, very small staff in the CSO,	Support to partner NGO's: a) procurement and logistics of FA and agr. inputs, b) policy and networking, c) provision of information and training. Partners NGOs	a) Partner driven, b) efficient and reliable procurement and logistics, c) cost-efficient impl. Partners overhead, d) Strong focus on capacity building of partners, e) ability to combine FA and agricultural inputs programmes, f) independence of WFP vulnerability	a) Delays in final payments of PMS, b) Weak coordination of final delivery with implementing partner, c) uncertain budget depending on global envelope division decision, d) no independent monitoring and control,	a) Maintain the Budget Line with the envelope for Euronaïd, b) Improve quality of FA/FS projects of impl. partners (not only distribution, more complete interventions)	100% interface: a) Food aid (2002/03 general ration, 2004 school feeding), b) agr. seeds (started in 2003, more in 2004)	Depends on type of NGO programmes

Type of org.	Stake-holder	Characteristics	Formal objectives	Strengths	Weaknesses	Interest in this evaluation	Interface FA/FS sector	Interface with other sectors and instruments
				figures.				
	Int. NGO's	About 20, variable size	Mainly humanitarian relief, few development				Implementin g partners for FA and seeds	Variable, ...
	Nat. NGO's	Variable	Mainly development, some relief				-Same-	Variable, etc.
Zimb. Context	Gov- Nutr (MoH)							
	Gov- Food aid (Social Welfare)							
	Gov- Agr (MoA)							
	Private sector		a) Profit; b) sustainability of the business					
Research & training inst.	SADC, universities, ICRISAT		a) Capacity building, b) execute research					
Benefi-	Rural	Affected by	Sustainable			a) Continued	Recipients of	Attending

Type of org.	Stake-holder	Characteristics	Formal objectives	Strengths	Weaknesses	Interest in this evaluation	Interface FA/FS sector	Interface with other sectors and instruments
ciaries		HIV/AIDS, land reforms, drought, inflation/price controls.	livelihood: a) enhancing productive capacity, b) better access to markets for supplies and production			food aid (general ration and supplementary feeding), b) stepping up longer-term FS interventions, c) better nutrition/FS situation	food aid and seeds and sometimes tools	schools and clinics
	Urban	Affected by HIV/AIDS, unemployment, inflation.	Sustainable livelihood: a) more employment opportunities, b) better availability and accessibility of basic goods			a) FIF monetisation programme for wheat imports, b) possible start cash-for-work programmes	a) No direct benefit, b) some price stabilisation by trading of excess food aid from rural areas, c) remittances from relatives in rural areas	-Same-