***Evaluation Methodology & Baseline Study of European Commission***

***Technical Cooperation support***

Final Report

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**acronyms**

|  |  |
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| 5Cs | 5 Capabilities identified by ECDPM/Dutch Cooperation as the CD Outcomes |
| CD | Capacity Development |
| CFRD | Capacity Development Results Framework |
| DEVCO | EC Directorate General for Development Cooperation |
| EC | European Commission |
| ECDPM | European Centre for Development Policy Management |
| EF | Enabling Factors |
| EQ | Evaluation Question |
| IDN | Interim Desk Note (of the present evaluation) |
| IR | Inception Report (of the present evaluation) |
| JC | Judgement Criteria |
| JEU | EC DEVCO Joint Evaluation Unit |
| LFA | Logical Framework Analysis |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MSC | Most Significant Changes |
| MTEF | Medium Term Expenditure Framework |
| OF | Opportunity Framework |
| QC and QCa | Quality Criteria |
| QSG | EC Quality Service Group |
| RAC | Rapid CD Assessment |
| ROA | Rapid Outcome Assessment |
| ROACH | Result Oriented Approach to Capacity Change |
| TC | Technical Cooperation |
| TOR | Terms of Reference |
| WBI | World Bank Institute |

# Introduction

This evaluation is being commissioned within the framework contract for Evaluation of the EC’s main policies and strategies which was signed on 10 April 2007 between the EC and a consortium led by Particip (Germany) and composed of ADE-Aide à la Décision Économique (Belgium), DIE-Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (Germany), DRN-Development Researchers Network (Italy), ECDPM-European Centre for Development Policy Management (Belgium), and ODI-Overseas Development Institute (United Kingdom). DRN is in charge of the study.

## Objectives and scope of the exercise

This evaluation study aims to:

* develop a detailed results-orientated methodology for the assessment of capacity development in the Technical Cooperation (TC) programmes; *and*
* test it in a number of case studies reflecting a variety of EC intervention regions and modalities.

In line with what is specified in the ToR, the scope of the study covers the following four typologies of TC as defined in the EC Backbone Strategy:

* Capacity Development of organisations and individuals;
* Provision of policy and/or expert advice;
* Strengthening of implementation (of services, investments and regulatory activities); *and*
* Preparation/facilitation of EC cooperation (or broader donor cooperation).

Nevertheless, as agreed in the Reference Group meeting held on 9 March, Capacity Development (first type of TC according to the Guidelines n° 3 of March 2009) is the focus of the evaluation, although other typologies are considered when relevant to achievement of capacity development (second and third types of the Guidelines).

## Definition of CD

Capacity Development being the focus of the study, it is important to establish from the outset a clear understanding of its definition. The OECD-DAC definitions are used:

* Capacity: understood as the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully.
* Capacity development: the process by which individuals, groups and organisations, institutions and countries develop, enhance and organise their systems, resources and knowledge; all reflected in their abilities, individually and collectively, to perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives[[1]](#footnote-2).

Such DAC definitions build on the UNDP’s definition “Capacity development [is] the process by which individuals, groups, organisations, institutions and countries develop their abilities, individually and collectively, to perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives”[[2]](#footnote-3).

In this report, the world ‘capability’ is used as well, as synonymous with capacity, but it is never used when referring to the comprehensive dimension of capacity; it is rather applied to specific capacity areas. For instance, the global capacity of an institution is defined as the coherent expression of four fundamental capabilities[[3]](#footnote-4).

Describing the Intervention Logic of a capacity development process, the expressions “capacity inputs”, “capacity outputs” and “capacity outcomes” are used to simplify the distinction between the logical components of a capacity process and the standard components used in a development intervention.

## The present report

The methodology was drafted and discussed in the summer of 2011. Two modalities have been defined: a thorough evaluation, and a rapid assessment. The rapid assessment modality was tested in three countries at the end of 2011 and at the beginning of 2012, namely Ukraine, Bolivia and Chad.

The present synthesis report includes a summary of the literature review carried out at the start of the work; a presentation of the revised methodology building on experience to date; and validation of the three tests. It is structured in eight sections:

1. Section 1: Summary of the literature review on Capacity Development and key issues for evaluation
2. Section 2: Thorough evaluation methodology
3. Section 3: Rapid Assessment of Capacity Development (RAC)
4. Section 4: Annexes

Section 1: Summary of the literature on CD assessment in the last decade: key evaluation issues

# The literature review: conclusions, lessons learned and proposed courses of action

## Purpose of the review

This is an overview of the conclusions and lessons learned from a broad-scoped literature review of technical cooperation (TC). The literature review itself is a much longer analytical document with a comprehensive reference bibliography; it is annexed to the Inception Report. The present document is meant to simplify the reader’s task by conveying a structured set of conclusions and lessons gleaned from a more extensive examination of the literature review document.

### How was the review done?

While the mandate given to DRN refers to an “Evaluation Methodology and Baseline Study of European Commission Technical Cooperation Support”, the literature review focused on the models for, and the evaluation of, TC within its four purposes as defined by the EC, notably for Capacity Development (CD)[[4]](#footnote-5).

The literature review was based on a wide cross-section of socio-technical domains including development cooperation; business; health; large institutional management (e.g. hospitals and universities) and modern public sector administration. The over two hundred books, articles, reports and other products consulted were consulted in studies undertaken by or for bilateral and multilateral donors; international financial institutions; business schools and journals; institutional science managers; academics and civil society organisations. An important point to consider is that these items had to be publicly available or in the personal library of the researchers and had to be in English, French or Spanish (the vast majority were in English).

The lion’s share of the documentation was linked to evaluation or metrics in one way or another, although many texts were considered if they dealt with capacity development but did not specifically cover evaluation. No attempt was made to seek validation of our interpretations of observations, findings or conclusions with the original authors of the documents.

A meta-evaluative methodology was developed for the review, with analytical criteria that were blind-tested for consistency. The principle of rich data was applied to reduce the need to take identical observations into account beyond the point where it could be said that the observations were common to most authors. Findings were clustered and statistically analysed using multi-variate analysis software.

### Observations concerning the scope of the existing literature

Overall, there was little in the way of consistency in the quality of published research. Most documents build on or refer to a small number of publications (e.g. from DANIDA and DFID) so the same arguments are repeated. The literature is also not generally supported by empirical evidence so that unfortunately much of the documentation is conceptual and opinion-based rather than evidence–based. The vast majority of non-academic texts do not contain the arguments needed to ascertain research reliability or validity.

As noted by the UNDP and the World Bank in key documents on the issue, there is little consensus on concepts or meanings in this domain, and one important document[[5]](#footnote-6) clearly makes the case that the term “capacity development” has been overused and overextended to a point at which it has lost its analytical utility.

Of particular interest is the obvious lack of documentation published by, or from the perspective of, recipients. This is, in our opinion, a major weakness in the literature, for much of what is written is designed from a north-to-south perspective, with an obvious paradigm that includes underpinning the management and administration of donors.

## Findings concerning CD as an iterative process

### The ‘black box’ issue

Almost all documents reviewed contain CD models that are rather static, two-dimensional and linear, focusing on details of the direct “outputs” that need to be generated or the narrative description of the “outcomes” of an intervention, rather than dynamic change management models or measurement systems that include the change processes that actually takes place within the beneficiary (induced results or internalised processes). A simple analogy is the “systems” view where inputs enter a “black box” to emerge as “outputs”. In this case, the outputs enter a black box to emerge hopefully as outcomes. What happens inside the box is not relevant. This simple model was replaced long ago in management science thinking (e.g. in business, large institutions, public sector administrations) because what is important is not the input, output or outcome but the ability of the black box to evolve and change to produce what is needed on a sustainable basis, through an internalisation process that renders the capacity relevant and “owned” (this is obviously a simplified definition).

### Pull vs. push approach

Within the literature, the “typical” vision of TC is to see CD within a “functional rational” rather than “political motivational” paradigm. In practice this means that TC is generally used to generate systems, processes and structures (through various strategies including training and mentoring) as part of a CD-push strategy, rather than the organisational and institutional dynamics, motivations, political support and other factors that are seen as prerequisites for change (i.e. CD-pull). The CD concepts found in the literature are therefore relatively fixed in terms of the requisite “steps” prescribed for success. These steps create a hierarchy and a series of products. The literature analysis clearly points to a key influencing factor for this state of affairs: this is what donors need for their project cycles, contract management, and so forth. Evaluations done by major donors support this analysis and report that because of this and other vectors, the overall scorecard for the success of technical cooperation within a CD context has been very poor for decades[[6]](#footnote-7).

### Built-in flexibility and interaction with the context

Some documents refer to the need to contextualise to local conditions but this aspect is not often further developed even if practically every evaluation report will point to the absolute need to contextualise. In contrast, a relatively constant approach in the non-developmental literature is to position CD (and change generally) as a long-term iterative process, with CD end-products (in terms of capability) defined and with built-in flexibility (and empowerment) in the administrative and management processes. The development literature is instead relatively weak when it comes to describing how to implement this more flexible and adaptive model (including the use of external vectors such as TC)[[7]](#footnote-8).

Basically, this more current vision (including flexibility, adaptation, emphasis on sustainable performance, etc.) is an open field of research: while it reflects the aims of the Paris, Accra, Busan and other international agreements, the development praxis finds it very difficult to implement, in part because current practice does not take account of the accountabilities of each partner. In fact the literature is relatively silent on how to contextualise models or manage complex processes within a donor-beneficiary relationship that does not have downstream accountability consequences (the literature on governance and accountability is strong on this point).

### Capacity and performance

Whenever the literature notes that complexity is a vector that needs to be managed, the documents agree that managing CD as an iterative process is radically different from past TC or CD practice (incl. design, inputs, monitoring, relationships, evaluation etc.). The literature makes it clear that the intervention design carried out for CD interventions and (the rigid and linear) management systems of donors are not geared to the process or systems view needed for CD analysis. A logical consequence of the foregoing is that project management flexibility is, and has been, a real requirement for CD and TC, along with ongoing management of uncertainty and risk; the ability to easily engage in resource mobilisation or demobilisation, motivation, ownership and accountability on the part of recipients and a focus on managing the change process, rather than in the production of pre-defined outcomes. As noted in non-development literature, “performance is not a proxy for capacity”. In other terms, evaluation should measure capacity and not performance. These factors are cornerstones of the non-developmental literature but, according to many evaluation reports studied in this mandate, donors have not set up their procedures and systems with the eventual success of CD in mind. A case in point is that the literature clearly points to monitoring processes that are weak and disjointed, with managers having few levels of empowerment to change and adjust as needed.

### Findings concerning CD as a multi-dimensional and political concept

As noted previously, most of the literature focuses on functional “push” rather than political “pull”. Although Grindle and Hildebrand[[8]](#footnote-9) had provided a comprehensive analysis of the need to include individual, organisational and institutional analytical levels in any CD-based intervention as early as the mid-1990s, the role of motivation and political support was not re-examined in detail until fairly recently. When comparing development praxis and non-development praxis, the authors of this report found that recent publications in the non-developmental domains are more likely to recognise that CD is accelerated or enabled by political pull enhanced by perceived positive motivation, political timing and the support of external lobbies. The above-noted paper describes a substantial analytical framework for assessing capacity and capacity enhancement that is built upon a model that disaggregates capacity for each of the three levels of analysis. They state that although training individuals, transferring capacity and developing more efficient systems is important, capacity depends more on improved management that is able to ensure the integration (and internalisation) of new abilities, skills and knowledge into everyday work. Part of their work reflects Nonaka’s and Takeuchi’s[[9]](#footnote-10) model of the transfer of explicit knowledge from an individual (it could be through TC) to tacit knowledge in an organisation (group)[[10]](#footnote-11). These authors repeatedly refer to the absolute need to provide a motivating environment in which development of capacity is encouraged and new capacity is constantly used to “push the envelope”. In the specific case of CD within a development context, the literature is quite unanimous on one point: the motivational leadership is - or is not - provided from the highest levels of government. Evaluation reports indicate “mostly not”.

As noted in a UNDP research paper published in 2002[[11]](#footnote-12), most references to the underlying cause of poor results of CD in development contexts cite weak “ownership”, “poor political support” or similar terms. Nevertheless, analysis of real experiences covering the contribution of political motivation to good capacity development is rarely expanded on in the development literature, although very recent evaluations on Tunisia and other countries, where strong GBS programmes have been implemented, provide some light on this subject. In fact, there is emerging evidence that an *increased sense of ownership and support for CD* can be the result of the *political motivation* inherent in socially-important objectives negotiated with the EC (e.g. EU enlargement, EPA, trade agreements). The literature clearly shows that there are few successful examples of externally-driven and motivated CD (i.e. by the donors). An important lesson is that “motivation” needs to be internalised and supported, but the literature is weak on the strategies that should be used by donors to provide support for that motivation. The recent Tunisia experience referred to above has given the question a new dimension: how could the donors (in this case the EC) use “POLITICAL MOTIVATION” to reinforce the partnership relationship, thus providing a self-interested objective for developing partners?. This issue could be important in and of itself, but also as a backdrop for evaluation efforts aimed at learning from experience.

Unfortunately, the literature is relatively silent on how to design change (sometimes called transformation) strategies that are based on beneficiary-pull or political-pull strategies; in fact, some documents assume that this is the role of recipient institutions as part of their accountability and do not refer to it at all.

### The individual, organisational and institutional layers of CD.

As alluded to previously, few documents studied as part of the literature review treat CD as a “whole systems” or “holistic-complex” issue, or address it from the level of the societal benefits being sought. Somewhat simplistically one could conclude that most of the documents concentrate either on the linear generation of outputs (which can be produced either by the donor-supplied TC or a combination of “TC and recipient”), or on the need to clearly identify which “outcomes” need to be produced. Either way the focus is on the performance of the donor intervention, and not on the complex dynamics that result in a sustainable new capacity generated. A recent donor-generated report[[12]](#footnote-13) specifically examined the influence of the performance-framework-defining tools it used (e.g. LFA) and found that the recipients and managers in the field did not find them useful, largely because they were designed to help the donors, not the recipients. The literature review showed that not only is a significant part of the donors’ project cycle toolkit seen as benefiting the donor rather than the beneficiary, but also that the majority of indicators used in CD were performance indicators for the intervention (external reference), and not capacity-driven (internal reference).

Quantitatively speaking, the development literature (i.e. the largest number of documents) was focused on the development of the capacity of the individual, while temporally (i.e. what has been most recently written) many documents tended to expand the individual focus to the organisation. But recent publications in the management and sector-institutional domains (e.g. education, health) are now based on strategies that reflect the belief that the institutional context is as relevant. The political context, support from potential beneficiaries, ties between the motivation of the decision-maker and the changes sought, and so forth, are often key to the ability of the organisation to use the new capacity it has acquired (through empowerment and delegation). The authors of the literature review did not find any example of a text that expanded on the interplay between these three levels. Although it would have to be highly context-specific, such a treatise would be a very useful complement to the existing literature. In any case a useful lesson learned is that is it important not only to define and evaluate organisational and sector outcomes, but institutional outcomes too.

## Findings concerning the definition of the end state of CD effort and how to achieve it

While every management science text dealing with change management will go to considerable length to speak of the complexity of change and its management, creating models that are iterative, with second-order feedback loops and redundancy, the development literature is weak on this important point. The literature review found that comprehensive capacity assessment guides were only a very recent phenomenon and that they focus the assessment in the hands of external bodies (often NGOs or consultants) rather than the “recipient”. In fact, except for twinning arrangements, needs assessments and response strategies are generally guided by donors, not beneficiaries. The majority of CD-related TORs examined by the authors did not contain room for significant “joint” assessments of needs or intervention design with beneficiaries. The authors have formed hypotheses as to why this happens (including the nature of contracting for “external expertise”.

Interestingly, the intervention documents reviewed consistently assumed that the most appropriate response for a CD requirement was TC. Even capacity assessment guides did not dwell on the need to consider other options, nor did they describe how to compare options. At the limit, it would have been interesting to study a document that proposed a model for comparing different use-of-TC options, but none was found. Thus a comparison of the effectiveness of various TC options was not addressed in the literature we studied. A notable finding was that the literature generally assumed that TC would provide what is missing (most often in terms of knowledge) , rather than change what is already there.

## Findings concerning the evaluation of CD and other measuring issues

The following points are worth noting:

* A number of documents propose capacity indicators. Most are general (in the sense of being applicable to just about any CD intervention). They very much focus on the front end of CD processes and need to be contextualised to be useful in specific cases.
* Measurement models and indicators tend to be in terms of increased performance at the individual and organisational levels, not increased capacity. Yermile Mizrahi’s seminal paper for the World bank Institute[[13]](#footnote-14) *inter alia* made two points very forcefully: first, that capacity enhancement needs an environment where “recipients” are able to “use” acquired knowledge; and second, that performance indicators cannot be substituted for capacity enhancement indicators. Capacity and performance are not synonymous.
* TC is not discussed with reference to its role within the specific change strategy.
* Baselines are often mentioned as necessary; however, they are rarely described or available to evaluators.
* Monitoring and Evaluation has tended to concentrate on the accountability needs of donors; results in the literature indicate that most M&E systems are disconnected from local learning and knowledge management systems.
* Evaluation tends to be *ex ante* or *ex post*. If CD is a process, then the managers of that change or transition need to rely on ongoing evaluation.
* Evaluation models do not include the need to seek evidence of the influence of exogenous forces acting on the capacity development “system” (i.e. from political, motivation, organisation, culture, etc.).
* The evaluation literature generally does not cover the influence of “participatory” or “ownership” vectors on capacity change.
* Even if Intervention Logic diagrams clearly identify the causality relationship between capacity development and downstream impacts (specific or intermediate), the literature we examined (i.e. final reports of country-level programme evaluations) showed that most often the programme design did not include creation of databases and monitoring systems. This weakness effectively constrains the downstream measurement of CD’s “contribution” to societal-level impacts.

## Key synthetic conclusions on the literature review

To conclude this short summary of the literature review, some key points are considered particularly important for constructing the proposed approach to CD assessment:

* *Pull* *versus* *Push* approach to CD, meaning taking into account the factors that drive (*pull*) the endogenous processes and how support programmes can adjust to such factors (instead of just trying to *push* the processes).
* *Capacity versus Performance*, distinguishing assessment of capacity from a judgement on the effectiveness of a support programme and on its degree of compliance with the established performance indicators.
* *Knowledge sharing* and learning processes: for capacity development the learning process for acquiring new knowledge and skills should be considered at least as important as the knowledge and skills themselves.
* *What* to evaluate and *how*. Here there are two main issues to address: [a] how to distinguish CD evaluation from the standard support programme evaluation; and [b] how to integrate CD assessment into the current project cycle management, while limiting its burden and pervasiveness.

# Recent works on CD assessment and direct references of the proposed methodology

In recent years the main international agencies have accelerated the search for new approaches to identifying and evaluating capacity development. The present study starts from the achievements of the European Commission’s Backbone strategy for Technical Cooperation and builds on its experience. Other important references, however, include: the work of the Netherlands evaluation unit (IOB), which has tested the 5C approach to Capacity Development; and that of the World Bank, which has established the Capacity Development Results Framework and tested new evaluation tools; and that of UNDP, which has further developed its approach for capacity measuring.

## ROACH

The Backbone Strategy has supported the ROACH approach to the assessment of capacity development. The present study has developed a detailed analysis of the applications of the ROACH approach[[14]](#footnote-15). It has concluded that this approach highlights well the capacity development process () implicit in the intervention logic of a TC or other support intervention, which aims to transform a set of inputs into a set of development outputs, outcomes and impacts. It does not, however, provide specific instruments for identifying whether or not a capacity development process has taken place successfully, aside from the standard performance assessments. In other words, ROACH does not allow an assessment of the capacity development process with its own specific indicators *vis-à-vis* the output and outcome indicators of the standard support programme. In addition, ROACH – while considering a number of enabling factors that favour the capacity development processes, namely the Quality Criteria – does not consider any “pull” factor.

The CD evaluation methodology developed here builds on the key achievements of the ROACH system, that is to say recognition of the CD process necessary to attain sustainable results. However it integrates and revises the approach, to allow specific assessment of the CD process and to take into account the role of the context-related driving factors in the determination of the CD processes.

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| Figure - ROACH approach to evaluation (from the Backbone Strategy Toolkit) – The square is not part of the original figure |
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## 5Cs


Other recent methodological works on CD, already mentioned, respond in different ways to the need for assessing or evaluating the CD process *as such*, and not (or not only) in relation to the development results generated in the framework of a given support intervention. This implies that they seek specific capacity indicators and possible logical paths for CD assessment. The basic idea is that the CD process goes beyond the scope of a given support programme and creates capacities that change the behaviour of beneficiary institutions and are instrumental in the accomplishment of their own missions.

Consideration of the CD process *as such* is particularly important in the 5Cs approach, developed by the ECDPM and supported by the Netherlands IOB[[15]](#footnote-16). The present study, as explained in the following chapters, adopts part of the 5Cs methodology and aims at identifying a fully compatible approach.

Figure 2 indicates how the 5Cs are formulated so as to be individually and collectively linked, since it is the combination and balance of capabilities that defines the capacity of an organisation or system to create value for others. All five capabilities are therefore necessary, yet none is sufficient in itself to create capacity. The model focuses on the endogenous capacity-change processes and insists on coherence between the different capabilities, while not stressing a specific intervention logic with possible intermediate steps (i.e. outputs/outcomes/impacts). The approach is based on “behavioural adaptation to changing environments and conditions”.

It should be noted that evaluating behavioural change is never easy. The Netherlands’ recent experience in the evaluation of CD (using the 5Cs model as part of its methodology) was built around a rather lengthy and complex evaluation process that was difficult to submit to quality control: “transference”. Respondents were asked to speak about their perceptions of change without having any pre-arranged reference point or model construct to refer to. The evaluations then translated the responses into the five capabilities.

Figure : Overview of the 5Cs model



## World Bank Capacity Development Results Framework (CDRF)

Another relevant reference which deserves particular attention is the World Bank Capacity Development Results Framework (CDRF – 2009). The Framework establishes an approach to orientating the Bank’s programmes towards an improvement in their CD content, with a view to enhancing achievement of the development goals. “The central thesis of the CDRF is that through the acquisition of new knowledge and information – that is, through learning – agents of change can enhance the conduciveness of the socio-political environment, the efficiency of policy instruments, and the effectiveness of organizational arrangements and so contribute to the achievement of development goals”[[16]](#footnote-17). The three factors mentioned are regarded as the CD determining factors. An evaluation of the CD process should consider the learning process put in place with the aim of enhancing the three CD determining factors. The Framework establishes a number of detailed indicators for assessing the three factors and tailoring the learning activities of the relevant programmes.

The Framework not only provides the theoretical and methodological instruments for assessing the capacity process *as such*, but also imparts strong importance to the *pull* factors, namely the socio-political framework, and other enabling conditions.

Recently a simplified methodology for the assessment of the CD process, in accordance with CDRF, has also been proposed by the World Bank Institute[[17]](#footnote-18). The approach adopts an Intervention Logic including CD outputs - or intermediate capacity outcomes - and CD outcomes as shown in Figure 3.

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| Figure 3: CD logical process according to the CDRF |
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## UNDP: Measuring Capacity


In its Measuring Capacity of June 2010, UNDP proposes a comprehensive approach to assessing and measuring CD through the identification of specific CD outputs and outcomes that ensure the achievement of the national development goals (Figure 4). The latter are regarded as the impact of the Capacity Development process. UNDP has been particularly advanced in such matters since 1998, having supported the idea of CD as a process.

Now it proposes a very comprehensive approach based on the key assumption that the overall development process depends upon Capacity Development. Again a disaggregation of specific outcomes and outputs is proposed: the CD ***outputs*** are disaggregated by *institutional arrangement, leadership, knowledge* and *accountability,* while the ***outcomes*** are identified as *performance, stability* and *adaptability*. The theory of change is that the outputs, duly developed and integrated, will generate the outcomes in terms of comprehensive new capacities of the national institutions, which will become globally stronger and empowered to achieve the national development goals.

The UNDP model preceded the WBI model by a few months. The two are very similar, although the WBI model emphasises the distinction between demand and supply institutions and proposes a slightly different breakdown and definition of what the UNDP model defines as outputs and outcomes.

None of the assessment models examined so far gives any specific consideration to the external driving factors, although they consider that the external environment has an importance of its own, as in most evaluations

FIGURE : CD LOGICAL PROCESS, ACCORDING TO UNDP (MEASURING CAPACITY, 2010)

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## The Proposed Methodology

The proposed methodology will build on the recent evolution of the approach to CD evaluation as outlined in the paragraphs above. The key points supporting the theory of change, on which the proposed methodology relies, are highlighted below:

1. The Capacity Development process of a beneficiary institution (or institutional system) cannot be assessed through the performance indicators of a single specific support programme.
2. Capacity Development is an endogenous process of empowerment, driven by internal and external factors, which enables the institution or system involved to fulfil its own mission.
3. One main point of the proposed methodology is the emphasis on the driving role of the political and economic environment in which the beneficiary institution or system is embedded, which determines its opportunity framework.
4. Another main point of the proposed methodology is the attempt to highlight a relationship between the acquisition by the institution or system of a series of specific individual or organisational capabilities, and the transformation and mainstreaming of such capabilities into a new overall capacity to fulfil its own mission. The identification of specific indicators for both the specific capabilities and the overall capacity is essential for grasping and assessing such a relationship.
5. The opportunity framework and the quality of the learning process act as the catalysers of the Capacity Development process, including the acquisition of the specific capabilities and their transformation or mainstreaming into overall capacity.

Such points and theoretical implications are developed in the next chapters.

### Two ways of assessing a CD process

The CD process implicit in any support programme may be assessed in two ways.

* A **quick assessment** based on the methodology can be partly incorporated into the EC Quality Support Group process with minor changes and additions to the present QA and monitoring procedures that use the TC Quality Criteria. The present practices should embody a wider-scope criteria grid as well as a small number of related questions including the two new context-related enabling factors (the Opportunity Framework, as shown in the description of the IL – see also the EQs). This will entail slight changes to the QCa, which should be better focused on CD. In addition the EUDs, through specialised and specially trained consultants recruited locally, should organise a stakeholder consultation to carry out a Rapid Assessment of CD (RAC)[[18]](#footnote-19), the specifications of which have been tested in the three field assessments mentioned. The RAC should identify and map both expected and unexpected outcomes.

The RAC is a relatively short exercise that should be easily carried out on all cooperation initiatives designed to have a significant effect on CD, including actions not classified as TC (e.g. NGO grants, Budget Support, etc.). The RAC – when available – may be used as a key information source in standard programme evaluations, including country and thematic evaluations.

* A **thorough evaluation** of the CD process should be carried out for those actions expected to have a strong effect in terms of CD, where full involvement of the evaluated institution is ensured. In theory one might even suppose that some actions could have only a CD outcome, without pre-determined induced outputs, that is to say with a set of unexpected induced outputs and development outcomes. This already happens with some innovative decentralised cooperation programmes (e.g. EUROSOCIAL-1), of which the expected outcome is a strengthening of the autonomous capacities of the institutions involved without reference to specific technical or policy achievements.

Owing to the invasive dimension of this type of evaluation in relation to the institutions involved, a full commitment from the development partner is required. Such commitment will be achieved only if the institution has a specific interest in the evaluation, so as to facilitate a real joint exercise.

Indeed, a thorough evaluation should acquire and analyse the documentation relating to the internal life and the internal products of the institution, instead of limiting its investigation to interviews, group meetings or workshops with the key stakeholders. It might raise concerns and opposition unless the full commitment of internal and external decision-makers is ensured.

The time issue is also particularly important. The possibility of the results of the evaluation being available within a short time is part of the value added of a CD evaluation, which should become an instrument for further institutional debate and strengthening.

When a thorough evaluation is decided upon, ToR would be drawn up based on the EC JEU evaluation guidelines. The standard evaluation approach would be used with its various phases, field missions, Reference Groups and seminars, and the evaluation team would be instructed to use the evaluation model proposed therein.

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| --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 1 Comparison between the areas covered by the current QSG and the Rapid and Thorough Evaluations** | | |
| **QSG** | **RAC** | **Thorough Evaluation** |
| Quality Criteria Assessment | Assessment of the Quality Criteria, based on EUDs’ and other quickly obtainable documentation | Assessment, including additional studies, of the Quality Criteria |
|  | Assessment of the OF, based on EUDs’ and other quickly obtainable documentation | Assessment, including additional studies, of the OF |
| RAC consultation to assess Capacity Outputs and Outcomes, their causal links and the links with the programme inputs and the enabling factors.  The consultation uses participatory methods (including questionnaires, group-coaching, MSC techniques) to acquire and process the relevant information. | Step 1: Capacity Outputs assessment in relation to inputs and context |
| Step 2: Capacity Outcomes assessment in relation to outputs and context |
| Step 3: Causal links between inputs and Capacity Outcomes and the role of the context |

Section 2 presents the Thorough Evaluation.

Section 3 presents the Rapid Assessment of CD (RAC)

Section 2: proposed methodology

# The CD process

## The narrative

In accordance with the key issues outlined at the end of Section 2 (paragraph 3.4), the basic narrative of the theory of change, on which the proposed methodology relies, may be expressed as follows.

A significant and sustainable change in the capacity of a given institution (or institutional system), which enables that institution or system to improve its efficiency and effectiveness in the accomplishment of its own mission, is the result of a deep endogenous learning process including:

1. the acquisition of individual and organisational capabilities, *and*
2. their mainstreaming and transformation into an overall institutional capacity encompassing a coherent improvement in a number of basic features summarised below, which need to be adapted to the specific nature of the institution or system and to the characteristics of the context:
   * policy initiative and autonomy,
   * links to the results,
   * institutional networking,
   * flexibility and adaptation, *and*
   * the coherent expression of all such features.

Such change, like the endogenous process that determines it, is made possible by an enabling environment, which drives the change process through the provision of adequate opportunities, visions and resources. The political and economic opportunities that drive the change are provided by the international environment and partnerships and the domestic political leadership. The specific resources to support the change are provided by possible external and internal support programmes, which may have implicit or explicit capacity development components.

## The intervention logic

In accordance with the basic EC planning and evaluation methodologies, it has been agreed that the logical framework be used to represent the change process and structure the evaluation, involving the construction of an Intervention Logic (IL) and the identification of a chain of effects linking context, inputs, outputs, outcomes and so forth. It should be made clear that this choice does not affect the actual content of the proposed methodology and other approaches might also be used[[19]](#footnote-20).

The proposed IL shows only the crucial levels (enabling factors and inputs / outputs / outcomes), which may be complemented by other intermediate or longer-term levels (e.g. immediate effects/ induced outputs/ impacts, etc.) according to the depth of the evaluation. This basic IL is shown in Figure 5 below. It describes, in graphic format, the Intervention Logic used in conjunction with the proposed methodology. The IL can be used to support the evaluation methodology guidelines promulgated by the EC-DEVCO Joint Evaluation Unit for “evaluations at programme, project or cross-cutting levels”. It represents a model of capacity change based on a number of concepts of change dynamics that are explained in the Inception Report (including open systems, knowledge reinforcement, and the effects of ownership and leadership on motivation and behavioural dynamics at institutional levels).

Based on the detailed research carried out under the banner of this mandate, it is clear that evaluators must contextualise the diagram, including basing the logic they propose on local facts and conditions. The IL diagram and its foundational tenets are not meant to represent a generalised model, but rather a CD road-map that needs to be adapted specifically to the issue at hand.

Figure : Proposed standard IL for the evaluation of CD



The IL of a capacity development action is usually nested[[20]](#footnote-21) in the IL of a standard support programme, as suggested in the Figure below in which the implicit CD process is unpacked. The figure shows that the inputs and outputs of a support programme contribute to a capacity development process, with the latter in turn contributing to generation of the effects of the programme (namely the induced outputs and outcomes). The figure, however, also shows other features:

* the IL of the support programme describes two flows of effects: the blue one emphasises the standard sequence of the chain of effects, which does not yet explain to what extent the endogenous capacities have contributed to the determination of the effects. Especially in a short-term perspective, these might have been obtained only (or mainly) through the action of the external Technical Assistance. The brown flow emphasises the contribution of the capacity development process to the determination of effects.
* the Enabling Factors influence both chains of effects (support programme and CD process), although they are determinant for the CD chain, while – at least in theory - the operational chain could function even if they are weak or absent (when external TC is substituted for internal capacity).
* the CD process contributes to the chain of effects of the support programme, but is also affected by its results, by way of the loops shown in the figure.

Figure : Nested ILs



There now follows a brief description of the key elements of the proposed Intervention Logic Diagram (refer to Figure 5).

## Level 1of the IL: enabling factors and CD inputs

Level 1 of the proposed IL (Figure 5) contains the Enabling Factors of a CD process, which act as both preconditions for, and key inputs into, the process to take place. These include three different groups of items that affect the entire chain of effects described in the IL:

1. The Opportunity Framework (OF), which includes features of the context that in general cannot be influenced by an externally-provided support programme. To a certain extent, however, under certain conditions the OF may be affected by significant partnership arrangements, including political dialogue and the related economic and institutional opportunities. The OF includes two combined dimensions:
   1. first, the momentum of the country in a given phase of its development process. This is the real engine of growth and development, and affects the opportunities and motivations of the institution - or system - that is the subject of the CD evaluation. Within such a framework a TC support programme should be tailored to play a facilitation role. The OF/1 includes such vectors as the historical momentum[[21]](#footnote-22); the regional context and related integration[[22]](#footnote-23); and the specific comprehensive partnership agreements[[23]](#footnote-24).
   2. second, the reform commitment of the government and the political economy that affects the institution - or system - involved. The OF/2 includes the recent political records of change, and the socio-political context that supports it.

The assessment of the OF should tell if and to what extent the external conditions for the (explicitly or implicitly) intended capacity development are there and what should be done to enhance their conduciveness or to better adapt the support programmes to their actual potential.

1. The Quality Criteria (QC), that is the quality of the support provided, the way it is conceived, appropriated and implemented; *and*
2. The actual Support Inputs provided.

The IL considers the inputs that provide the resources for CD from a double point of view:

* from the point of view of the design, appropriation and delivery methods which are quality controlled by the EC through its QSG processes. The Quality Criteria scrutiny should tell if and to what extent the inputs of the support programme (including their design, quality and delivery methods) fit and support the Capacity Development process, so that their high level, in combination with a positive OF, should ensure the attainment of significant capacity outputs and outcomes. The QC now used as the basis for QSG and for part of the ROM processes constitute a strong baseline that can be used to oversee the overall implementation of TC-Reform. There are minor elements of integration into the QC that arise from this methodology. One, for example, addresses the incorporation of strategic institutional contexts into the design of TC and CD, including M&E.
* from the point of view of the specific CD inputs, when they are explicit, including: (i) the political and policy dialogue, which affects or interacts with the OF; (ii) possible knowledge-sharing initiatives, such as inter-institutional exchanges, with regional or international sister institutions, peer-to-peer approaches or twinning experiences; (iii) various types of training; (iv) different types of TA; and (v) possible financial support to ease the institution’s mission and operations.

The QC (according to the headings already adopted by the QSG) are:

* 1. Fits to the context. This includes the relevance of the programme *in relation to* the OF and the existing capacities of the beneficiary. *Difference from the present QC: more emphasis on OF.*
  2. Demands and commitment. This includes the level of policy commitment of the beneficiaries at various levels (e.g. government, specific beneficiary institutions) involved in the sector or themes addressed by the support; and the actual demand for and ownership of the content of the programme. *Difference from the present QC: more emphasis on policy commitment.*
  3. Harmonised support. This includes the establishment and consolidation of a dialogue framework on the content of the programme driven by the beneficiary and in which other donors participate. The adoption of joint mechanisms, consultation among donors, possible complementarities and other strategic design factors should also be considered. *Difference from the present QC: more emphasis on “sectoral approach”*.
  4. Link to results and expected outcomes. This includes consideration by the programme of specific CD effects in terms of both outputs and outcomes, with specific indicators. *Difference from the present QC: focus on CD results, not only on programme results*.
  5. Implementation arrangements. This includes the TC supply modality and addresses the decision-making process (who manages the programme - a PIU or the beneficiary?), and how the TC is delivered (through a peer-to-peer approach, a traditional consultant-based support approach, or another…). *Difference from the present QC: more emphasis on peer-to-peer (inter-institutional) cooperation*.

This methodology ensures that such enabling factors (both the OF and the QCa) are very well examined. Whereas they are most often relegated to the backdrop within existing evaluation models, they must be well understood in this model because they condition the success of the process affecting the motivation and opportunities for change; they also define the M&E oversight and responses that will be, or have been, applied to CD initiatives. Since this model assumes that constant or ‘developmental’ evaluation approaches will be applied throughout the life cycle of TC, understanding these vectors is not only important but critical.

## Level 2 of the IL: capacity outputs

These are the actual changes in the internal competences and skills that are found in the beneficiary institution(s); they may be directly determined, induced, facilitated or hampered by the implementation of a given support programme. Such outputs do not represent new capabilities *per se*, but identify areas where institutional competence is likely to have been increased through the contribution of the support programme or other resources available in the context.

The changes in competences may be reflected in staff, procedures, knowledge and structures of an institution or system:

* when associated with specific support actions, they appear as direct outputs (e.g. staff trained).
* when conceived as a second-order (indirect) consequence of the support’s implementation, they are considered as induced outputs (e.g. new functions that can be fulfilled by the upgraded staff without the benefit of additional CD inputs or outputs).
* finally, there may be cases where such competences are acquired through inputs not directly related to specific support actions, but available in or provided by the context. The IL also makes it possible to capture and assess such competences.

Given the need to keep this methodology within the limits of a relatively simple framework, splitting “outputs” into two parts (i.e. first and second order effects, more simply described as “direct” and “induced”) is not required as in other evaluation methodologies. In the event that an evaluation mandate covers a complex institution within a socially or politically complex environment, it is recommended that the evaluation team takes into consideration this difference by focusing on the induced outputs - which contain greater value-added than direct outputs - while addressing the direct outputs as a lower level of effects.

The IL identifies four categories of output that may be categorised as:

1. Staff: new staff with new expertise, or new competences among existing staff, with a view to responding better to the institution’s mission, may have been the consequence of various actions promoted or facilitated by the programme. Such actions may have included staff recruitment, training and upgrading, exchange of experience, and so forth. The new expertise and competences acquired should enable the institution to fulfil new functions or improve the existing functions (e.g. production of legal and regulatory documents, financial reports, statistical and monitoring reports, etc.).
2. Procedures: a support programme through its CD component may have contributed to changing and standardising some strategic procedures of the institution, for instance the introduction of systematic stakeholder consultations or the introduction of an MTEF.
3. Structures: changes in institutional structures, possibly promoted or facilitated by the programme, range from the creation of new units, for example monitoring and evaluation, to the reduction of organisational overlapping, the adoption of a decentralized structure, and so on.
4. Unexpected: these outputs include other factual changes in the institutional framework (initiatives, responsibilities, competences), which were not planned by the support programme as such but occurred during its implementation and may or may not be placed in relation to such implementation.

If the evaluation team and the developing partner decide to add other categories for one reason or another, this can be accommodated within the boundaries of the methodology. The most important issue to evaluate is the extent to which the outputs, direct or induced, have created additional capabilities (see next level in the logical chain) and whether the combination of those capabilities has given rise to increased capacity in the institution. This evaluation “focus” coincides with the guidelines of the JEU in that it prioritises evaluations that focus on outcomes and impacts.

## Level 3 of the IL: Capacity Outcomes

These include the acquisition by the beneficiary institution(s) of new levels of capacity. As shown in the IL the relationship between such capacity and the development results targeted by a given support programme is complex and is not accomplished during the life of the support programme:

* On the one hand, such capacity may or may not have been translated into the expected performance (induced outputs and outcomes) of the support programme under evaluation. This is relatively clear when a programme aims at the achievement of general development indicators. For instance, a programme aims at strengthening the ministry of education and improving access to primary school in rural areas. Having a more powerful ministry and more rural children at school in a relatively short term does not mean that the education system has become stronger. The policy and financial autonomy of the institutions involved, their operational capacity, their relationship with the stakeholders and the final users, and their resilience should all be assessed so as to capture the actual strengthening of the institutional system, and so the institutional sustainability of any possible achievement.

It should be stressed that the performance indicators of a support programme may not be used to assess the capacity development process, even if they are specific CD indicators, since in most cases - as might have been the case in the example of education - they refer to the acquisition of capacity outputs (new competences, functions, structures and funds). The CD process must be assessed from within the institution and its system, through outcome indicators that are sufficiently general and flexible to allow an understanding of achievements that were not pre-determined and have occurred during the process itself.

* On the other hand, it must be noted that this capacity is, by definition, absolutely necessary for the accomplishment of the institution’s mission beyond the duration of any specific support programme, and is therefore the basis of the institution’s sustainability. There must be a fundamental distinction between the performance indicators of a support programme and the performance indicators related to the strategic institution’s mission.

To identify such capacity various alternatives have been considered[[24]](#footnote-25). In the end it was agreed to capitalise on the recent best-case experience of the Netherlands evaluation unit (IOB) and adopt a similar approach[[25]](#footnote-26). This choice integrates the 5Cs approach into the proposed evaluation model. The advantage of this choice is that the 5Cs approach has already been widely tested by the Netherlands Cooperation programme and its adoption by the EC may facilitate strong harmonisation within the EU development policy framework. The 5Cs have been incorporated into Figure 5 above (in the Outcomes column). Some minor changes in the definitions were introduced following the field tests, to make them more understandable and adaptable to the specific frameworks.

As mentioned above, the capacity of an institution or system has to be assessed through the consideration of a number of fundamental capabilities, or types of behaviour, or modalities of action, to show that the institution or system is able to fulfil its mission under different conditions on a relatively long period of time. This is why the recent attempts to establish specific approaches for the assessment of CD have converged on identification of some key features, relatively general and flexible, with content that can be adapted to the different policy and institutional contexts:

* the 5Cs methodology proposes four groups of capabilities plus a comprehensive element to establish coherence among them, such as: to survive and act; to adapt and self-renew; to generate development results; to relate;
* the WBI proposes three main capacity outcomes, such as: strengthening stakeholders ownership - that is the demand institutions; strengthening policy efficiency and organisational effectiveness - that is the supply institutions.
* several mission-based approaches, such as those in use for evaluations of institutions with a relatively competitive mission (e.g. universities[[26]](#footnote-27)), identify some basic capacities, for example: to strategize and plan; to mobilize resources; to operate and attain results; to govern human resources; and to learn by doing.

Table 2 shows the correspondence of the definitions used in the different approaches. It is relatively amazing that through a different conceptual framework and diversified priorities, the various approaches considered converge towards a comparable set of areas. This is important for an understanding that the focus should not be on the specific definitions, as they should come from a careful understanding of the contexts. The focus should rather be on the ability of the definitions adopted to identify institutional behaviour and achievements that may guarantee the accomplishment of the institution’s mission on a medium-to-long-term horizon under different conditions, including domestic crises and external shocks.

**Table 2: comparison between the key CD outcomes under different convergent approaches**



## The interaction of the key components of the IL

As explained in section 6.1 the hypothesised CD process is the result of the internal dynamics of a given institution or system, subject to two types of stimuli: a) the driving force of the opportunity framework in which the institution is situated (pulling factors); and b) the quality of the specific support programmes provided (pushing factors).

Under such stimuli the CD process occurs through the acquisition of specific competences and skills at individual or organisational level (Capacity Outputs), which may be appropriated by the institution or system, internalised or metabolised and mainstreamed, so as possibly to generate actual institutional capabilities (Capacity Outcomes).

Both the pulling and pushing factors contribute to all levels of the process (see the logical chain in Figure 6):

* The pushing factors may however be more important in the production of the Capacity Outputs. They may help create some competences and skills, even in the absence of specific opportunities and political support, although the latter are at the origin of the availability of the support programmes and are at least necessary for acquiring the related financial and human resources.
* The pulling factors are fundamental to the actual metabolism of the Capacity Outputs. If there are no genuine opportunities for the establishment of a new education policy and institutional system, for instance, the units and staff trained for sectoral PFM, MTEF, and so forth will migrate to other ministries or even abroad, or will rapidly adopt sub-optimal survival strategies to comply with political patronage. But if the opportunities are there (e.g. there is strong political support, funds are made available by the government, the country is on a growth trend, with good partnerships), the competences and skills acquired are transformed into actual initiative and generate a learning process, with a consolidation of the whole institution or system.

# The key Steps of the evaluation process

Although the thorough (standard) evaluation is unlikely to take place with any frequency, it is important to develop its methodology, so as to lay down the conceptual framework for any possible simplified or quick application. To ease understanding of the whole evaluation process, we can use the **3-Step** model[[27]](#footnote-28). The following assessments should be made:

Preliminary assessments, including:

* an assessment of the Opportunity Framework to highlight the political and economic context in which the institution or system operates and the related driving factors; *and*
* an assessment of the Quality Criteria of the possible support programme(s) included in the evaluation[[28]](#footnote-29).

The assessment of the OF will tell the evaluators to what extent the institution is embedded in a conducive environment, and will be used to better understand the causality links in the CD process, in both Steps 1 and 2.

The assessment of the QCa will highlight how the support programme fits both the OF and the internal institutional dynamics to enhance the capacity development process;

STEP 1 will assess how and to what extent the inputs and activities of the support program-me have contributed to generation of capacity outputs in the targeted institution or system, how the QC has affected that contribution, and what has been the role of the OF;

STEP 2 will assess the capacity outcomes attained by the targeted institutions in relation to the capacity outputs and other determining - or facilitating or limiting - factors, namely those relating to the OF;

STEP 3 will assess the causality links between the inputs provided by the support program-me and the capacity outcomes attained by the targeted institution(s), in relation to the Enabling Factors (the OF and the QC).

## Preliminary assessments: the OF and the QCa

This phase implies the taking stock of all enabling factors, including context-related factors (Opportunity Framework) and Quality Criteria of the support programme(s). The assessment relies on the existing documentation and, according to the depth of the evaluation, specific studies, interviews or focus groups may be used.

An understanding of the Opportunity Framework (see paragraph 6.3) helps explain the levels of ownership, the actual dynamics and the external driving or limiting factors of the institution or system which affect both the production of the capacity outputs and the generation of the capacity outcomes.

On the other hand the assessment of the QCa highlights the means put in place by the support programme to enable the targeted institutions to profit at the highest level of the existing OF throughout the capacity development process.

One of the main challenges of this phase will be the identification of the interaction between the OF and the intended mission of the institution or system, including the related support action and its QCa. This includes: (i) the extent to which the OF provides a conducive framework for the institution or system and the related support action to attain the respective objectives; and (ii) *vice versa*, the extent to which the institution or system and the related support action are enabled or tailored to respond to the OF features and facilitate its positive influence.

Table : standard EQs for the Preliminary Assessment

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **EQ relating to:** | **Statement of the EQ** |
| EQ1: Opportunity Framework./1 | To what extent do the country’s historical momentum, growth and partnership opportunities, and other existing contextual factors, affect the institutional context of the CD action? |
| EQ2: Opportunity Framework./2 | To what extent do the reform records of the government and the political environment affect the institutional context of the CD action? |
| EQ3: Quality Criteria | To what extent does the support programme under evaluation respond to the Quality Criteria established by the EC Backbone strategy for Technical Cooperation, including relevance to the context[[29]](#footnote-30), ownership of targeted institution(s), strategic focus, harmonisation and appropriate delivery modalities? |

Table 3 shows the specific EQs relating to this phase of the evaluation. These EQs, like those that will be proposed for the other phases and steps of the evaluation, are meant to be illustrative only and should be modified (added to, amended, eliminated) to reflect the specific contexts and conditions of the actual evaluations. For that reason no indicators are identified, and only an illustrative set of Judgement Criteria is provided in Annex 1.

## STEP ONE – on the production of capacity outputs

Step 1 builds on the basic input-output information gathered through monitoring or – in the EC programmes – through QSG annual processes involving the EUD, but also on specific research related to the production of expected or unexpected capacity outputs in the targeted institutions.

The inputs considered here are all those provided by the external support programme and the related activities, regardless of whether or not they have a specific CD purpose. Other internal inputs are also considered. On the other hand the capacity outputs to be considered include both the expected and unexpected capacity outputs generated during the period under evaluation.

For all such outputs, possible causality links with the inputs will be investigated[[30]](#footnote-31). The role of the OF and the importance of the QC, in the production of the outputs, has to be assessed. Some examples may better explain this relationship:

* some capacity outputs (e.g. creation of new structures and functions in a ministry) may be the direct consequence of the government reform process (OF), without any specific contribution from the inputs and activities of the support programme under evaluation;
* some training offered by a support programme may create stronger skills if accompanied by peer-to-peer exchange of experiences (QC), than it would create if based on traditional professorial teaching (QC);
* some training may produce individual skills that push the beneficiaries to migrate toward other institutions or even abroad, if the institution is not supported politically and its opportunities for growth are limited, while they may be translated into new institutional structures and procedures if the OF is conducive.

The following table contains a list of possible EQs for Step One.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Table 4: standard EQs for the Step 1 Assessment** | |
| EQ4: Outputs- staff competences | To what extent did the programme or other inputs contribute to production of objectively verifiable changes in staff competences (legal, financial, data processing, management…)? How did external factors affect such changes? |
| EQ5: Outputs- procedures and functions | To what extent did the programme or other inputs contribute to production of objectively verifiable changes in institutional procedures and functions (policy and financing, stakeholders’ involvement, accountability and supervision)? How did external factors affect such changes? |
| EQ6: Outputs- organisations | To what extent did the programme or other inputs contribute to the production of objectively verifiable changes in the organisational and internal functioning (institutional structure, decision process, internal mobility and competition)? How did external factors affect such changes? |
| EQ7: Outputs- unexpected | To what extent did the programme or other inputs contribute to the production of objectively verifiable changes in respect of individuals, organisations and initiatives that were not targeted? How did external factors affect such changes? |

## STEP TWO - on the emergence of CD outcomes

The scope of this step is to assess the actual changes in CD in the targeted institutions, according to the capacity outcomes identified in the IL: initiative, results, networking, adaptation, and coherence. During the three Rapid Assessment tests of the present methodology, the 5Cs – which remain the reference for the capacity outcomes mentioned – have been renamed so as to facilitate their unambiguous identification by the stakeholders involved in the assessments and their adaptation to the specific contexts.

In this step the assessment is also extended to the causal links between the capacity outcomes and the capacity outputs or other factors relating to the Opportunity Framework.

is meant to show the key EQs that could be applicable to the outcome level of the methodology proposed**.** The six EQs in Table 5 may present a formidable amount of research for an evaluation, but it should be recalled that the evaluators adjust them to the specific context and then choose appropriate indicators.

The wording in the EQs within the table is somewhat generic because it is proposed as a means of understanding the evaluation methodology; during an actual evaluation the wording would be adapted to the context and particular attention should be paid to the institutional and organisational environment (including the Opportunity Framework and the policy and reform realities) within which the CD objectives would be set.

Table : standard EQs for expected and unexpected outcomes

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| EQ8: Initiative | To what extent is the institution more capable of generating plans (at strategic or other levels) that reflect its stated needs, mission and various changing environments and then mobilizing its resources and management to execute them? |
| EQ9: Results | To what extent is the institution more capable of achieving and monitoring the “developmental results” stated in national and “departmental” plans in a sustainable manner? |
| EQ10: Networking | To what extent is the institution accountable and able to work in a coordinated and efficient manner as part of a wider network of interested stakeholders? |
| EQ11: Adaptation | To what extent is the institution in a position to adapt constantly in response to changing external environments and conditions? |
| EQ12: Coherence | To what extent has the institution succeeded in putting in place policy and management frameworks that build on one another and provide evidence of a clear chain of results from the strategic to the operational levels? |
| EQ13: Unexpected outcomes | How have non-planned and/or context-specific capabilities (developed as a result of Capacity Development efforts in the institution) improved or reduced the overall capacity of the institution to carry out its vision and achieve its objectives? |
| EQ14 to 17: Causality links | To what extent have the institutional capacity outputs and/or other factors related to the OF contributed to each of the above-mentioned capacity outcomes (initiative, results, networking and adaptation). |

## STEP THREE: Causality links between the CD inputs and the CD outcomes.

According to the 3-Step approach it is difficult to use a linear model to assess the direct link between the inputs provided and the outcomes generated. this is particularly true in our case, as the process that leads to the capacity outcomes is complex and implies the contribution of so many factors, namely the OF and other institutional dynamics. The causality link between the CD inputs and the CD outcomes (STEP 3) has to be assessed through a systematic comparison of the results of Steps 1 and 2. Step 2 shows how changes in competences and experience have or have not contributed to an increase in capacity outcomes, in the framework of a given context. Step 1 shows how the programme inputs have had any influence on such competences and experience, again in the framework of a given context. Step 3 highlights the transitive relationship between inputs and outcomes. Formulating specific EQs for such an assessment is unnecessary[[31]](#footnote-32).

## Link between CD evaluation and standard programme evaluation

### CD and standard evaluations are not superimposable

A clear distinction should be made, in the short term, between the evaluation of an institutional CD process and the evaluation of the performance of the same institution *vis‑à‑vis* a set of externally given objectives, as is the case when evaluating a development programme.

The CD evaluation aims at identifying the progress achieved, within the institution, in terms of skills, competences, strategic initiative, implementation capacity, and so forth, with a view to long-term fulfilment of the institution’s mission. The standard programme evaluation aims at identifying the progress achieved, during the life of the programme, towards fulfilment of a set of objectives and performance indicators that are coherent with the institution’s mission.

The CD evaluation assesses the strengthening of an institution or system, while the programme evaluation assesses the strengthening of its performance. The two approaches may not be superimposable in the short or even medium term, while they should be so in the longer term provided there is actual correspondence between institutional mission and planned performance (see also paragraph 6.5).

It may also be difficult to attempt to carry out the two evaluations in parallel; their objectives may conflict. In particular, in a standard programme evaluation it may happen that the institutions involved feel they are under examination. This may cause a defensive attitude and jeopardise their collaboration in the CD evaluation.

### The need for complementarity

The above considerations, however, should not lead to the conclusion that the two assessments should be completely separate. Indeed their complementarity appears ever more important. In particular a standard programme evaluation would benefit much from the availability of an updated CD evaluation of the main institutions involved in the programme. The CD evaluation would improve understanding of the reasons for the successes and failures of the programme, and would allow an in-depth assessment of the sustainability of its results.

The key value-added inparted by a CD evaluation to a standard evaluation concerns the assessment of the **sustainability** of the induced outputs and outcomes. Various cases may arise, viz.:

* Both the standard and the CD evaluations give compatible positive or negative results: this means that the induced policy outputs and the related outcomes of the standard programme are either both positive and institutionally sustainable, or negative and institutionally unamendable.
* The CD evaluation is positive, while the standard programme evaluation is negative: this implies a question of time. The new capacities are not yet translated into new induced outputs and development outcomes, or else they were badly formulated.
* The standard programme evaluation is positive, while the CD evaluation is negative: the induced outputs and development outcomes are not likely to be sustainable. This is for instance the case in many countries where intensive TA programmes are implemented.

To make CD evaluations available as a key complement of the evaluation process is a complex issue, if excessive organisational burden and duplication is to be avoided. It is recommended that part of the CD evaluations be integrated into the recurrent assessments carried out by the EUDs and the monitoring system - that is the preliminary steps - and that methods of rapid assessment to carry out CD evaluations be identified a few months prior to the planned programme evaluations for selected programmes.

### Conditions for carrying out a rapid CD assessment

Provided that sound quick assessment tools are available, as proposed in the following chapters of this report, the complementarity between CD evaluation and standard evaluations may be ensured on a systematic basis.

CD evaluations should be carried out on all programmes with a significant TC component, including the first three categories of TC identified by the Backbone strategy (capacity development, policy advice, support to service delivery).

How can one establish whether a TC component is significant or not? Several criteria should be used to determine whether the following apply:

* in the case of standard TC programmes, when a programme supports the establishment of a sectoral or thematic approach, including policy and institutional change, with a focus on specific partner institutions or institutional systems (e.g. at sectoral and local levels). There should also be a particular level of TC (say above €400,000 per year);
* in the case of Budget Support programmes, where financial resources are provided to specific partner institutions (or institutional systems) at country, regional, sectoral level, to strengthen their effectiveness on sustainable bases, with or without specific TC components;
* in the case of support to civil society via NGOs and other Non-State Actors, provided that the programmes have a relatively wide scope and have a well-defined partnership with specific institutional systems;
* finally it would not be advisable to carry out a rapid CD assessment of a comprehensive country or regional programme as such, as it would be difficult to identify the right institutional dimension.

Planning the rapid CD assessment could be either independent or combined with standard evaluations. The EUDs should decide each year the programmes for which a rapid CD assessment would be necessary. At the same time, when a final evaluation of an important programme (sectoral policy, budget, or civil society support) has to be carried out, it would be opportune to plan a rapid CD assessment between six and three months before the evaluation starts.

Besides such planning criteria, the rapid CD assessment should be a flexible instrument, to use on demand. For lengthy programmes (say more than four years), the CD assessment could be repeated twice (mid-term and final). For the types of programmes mentioned above (TC, BS and support to Civil Society), a form of Rapid CD assessment of the beneficiary institutions should be incorporated in the appraisal phase. In such case, the relevant inputs should be those which exist in the institution and in the specific context, before the support programme starts.

Section 3: Rapid Assessment of Capacity Development (RAC)

# Presentation of the RAC

## The challenge

The challenge is to find a non-invasive approach that allows an evaluation of CD outcomes responsive to sound methodological criteria, but at the same time still achievable with relatively accessible means and capable of being combined with other project management activities such as standard programme evaluations, high-quality instruction and monitoring. According to the Backbone strategy and the TC reform, the EC needs to increase the CD outcomes of most of its cooperation interventions and not merely test advanced CD assessments in a few programmes. This is why establishing and testing a suitable RAC approach is a key objective of the present evaluation study.

## The Rapid CD Assessment

### Different components

As emphasized above the RAC is not a special methodology. It is only a simplified application of the comprehensive methodology discussed so far. This is why the proposed RAC procedure is based on standard EQs and JCs and follows the criteria of the 3-Step methodology described above.

The assessments relating to EQs 1, 2 and 3 (see paragraph 7.1) should, according to the QSG, be included in the current instruction and monitoring procedure; and they should be available for each programme. This is the standard approach considered for the RAC. In the event that they are not available, a specific quick exercise may be undertaken to address these questions, using the available documents and the informed opinion of the EUD and the national counterparts.

The assessments relating to EQs 4 to 17 (see paragraphs 7.2 and 7.3) and the analyses relating to STEP 3 (see paragraph 7.4) will be addressed through a specific exercise in two parts: (i) a questionnaire, (ii) a workshop.

### The administration of the Questionnaire

The questionnaire should be administered through guided interviews by a duly instructed local consultant, as follows:

* + The interviewees should be selected from among a few relevant persons (or groups of persons) within and outside the targeted institution. Within the institution the interviews should involve the heads or key staff of the few departments involved in the targeted areas of the support programme, plus other staff with more general responsibilities. Outside the institution, representatives of civil society (users) and the political world (parliamentary commissions) who have opportunities for interaction with the institution, should be interviewed.
  + The number of interviews for a standard support programme (say a €M 1-5 project) may vary from 4 to 8 internal staff and from 3 to 6 external persons, that is a total of between 7 and 14 interviews.
  + The duration of the interview should range between one and two hours so as to allow one interviewer to complete the whole task within between three and five days, aside from preparation and processing.
  + The modality of the interview should be *adapted* to the situation. In those situations where expression of opinions is supposed to be relatively free, the interviewees may be grouped - after a short individual briefing - so as to extend their number and to apply group-coaching techniques to facilitate stimulation and cross-checking of answers. Where there are counterparts who are particularly reserved or even reluctant, individual interviews to reassure the reluctant partners will be prefeable, and interviews with new counterparts (e.g. civil society) should be increased.

### The contents of the Questionnaire

The standard version of the Questionnaire, as presented below, needs rapid adaptation to the specific countries and programmes, and includes two parts: one on the CD outputs and another on the CD outcomes. The questionnaire uses the standard EQs in a simplified version.

**Questionnaire on capacity outputs:**

1. STAFF: during the last X years, has the institution shown any significant change in terms of staff competences?
   * more and/or better trained staff (provide details)
   * new sectoral/ thematic competences (provide details)
   * knowledge of and links with the experience of similar institutions in other countries (provide details)
   * better career opportunities (provide details)
2. ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONS: during the last X years, has the institution shown any significant change in terms of organisation, procedures and responsibilities?
   * new or strengthened units or functions for data processing, policy and financing (provide details)
   * improved consultation of stakeholders: surveys, consultation with civil society organisation, dialogue with political representatives and parliament (provide details)
   * other significant changes in organisation, procedures, functions (provide details)
   * any change in the decision-making process, such as improved evidence-based decisions (provide details)
3. UNEXPECTED: during the last X years has the institution shown any other significant change in terms of competences and capabilities acquired? (provide details)
4. CAUSALITY: do you think that any of the changes mentioned above is related to the Support Programme YYY? If so, please specify:
   * what change (just mention one of the changes mentioned above)?
   * why (synthesised description of the contribution provided)?
   * do you think that external factors, such as the political support (specify), internal leadership (specify), other external support programmes (specify) have contributed to or limited such changes and how?

**Questionnaire on CD outcomes:**

1. INITIATIVE: do you think that, compared to X years ago, the institution is:
   * capable of producing more initiatives (plans, laws, operations)? (Y/N and examples)
   * capable of creating and managing more financial, technological and technical means? (Y/N and examples)
   * appearing socially and institutionally stronger? (Y/N)
2. RESULTS: do you think that the institution, compared to X years ago, is capable of:
   * better monitoring of development results? (Y/N and examples)
   * better maintenance of performance records? (Y/N and examples)
   * playing a stronger leadership in policy development, buttressed by its effectiveness? (Y/N and examples)
3. NETWORKING: do you think that the institution, compared to X years ago, is capable of:
   * being better recognised and trusted by stakeholders and relying on decentralised participatory networks? (Y/N and examples)
   * having regular relationships with political counterparts (especially the Parliament)? (Y/N and examples)
   * establishing better relations and networking links inside (other institutions, e.g. universities, other ministries) and outside (sister institutions abroad – excluding donors) the country? (Y/N and examples)
4. ADAPTATION: do you think that the institution, compared to X years ago, is capable of:
   * better learning from the experience (feed-back mechanisms: results are analysed and discussed and decisions are taken accordingly? (Y/N and examples)
   * better negotiating, selecting and managing donors’ inputs? (Y/N and examples)
   * more efficiently identifying changes in the context and proposing ‘innovations’ (reports, policy proposals, raising awareness) to address them? (Y/N and examples)
5. COHERENCE: do you think that the institution, compared to X years ago, is capable of:
   * better adapting the management structure to the policy mission and tasks, by increasing staff dynamics, results-based careers, decentralisation, etc.? (Y/N and examples)
   * better governance, in terms of accountability, transparency of decisions, coordination, human resources management? (Y/N and examples)
   * a better systematised and transparent strategic, regulatory and operational framework? (Y/N and examples)
6. UNEXPECTED: do you think that the institution, compared to X years ago, has acquired other new capacities apart from those you have mentioned above?
   * Can you briefly mention and explain the most significant changes that you would like to stress, apart from those mentioned above?
   * Apart from the mention of any additional change, can you briefly express an overall opinion on capacity change responding to the following question: can you mention one, two or more important things that the institution can now do that it could not do X years ago?
7. CAUSALITY: can you cite the key internal or external factors that have most contributed to the main changes identified so far? (if necessary the interviewer may facilitate the reply by citing factors relating to the capacity outputs and to the OF – provide details). The interview should highlight whether a cause is referred to one specific change or to the overall improvement of the capacity. The causality link should be discussed and justified and examples should be provided.

The Questionnaire will include space for mentioning the required examples and possible stories relating to such examples, which may be annexed by the interviewers or interviewees when needed.

### Preparation and processing

The Questionnaire should be adapted by the consultants to the specific context, and the questions should be better tailored to the specific institutions. In some cases, the emphasis on predefinition of the outputs and outcomes may be reduced and the interviewees may be helped to identify changes in a freer way (especially when coaching is possible). The adaptation of the Questionnaire should take no more than one day of work following examination of the relevant documentation and preparatory meetings.

The interviews have to be organised in collaboration with the EUD. To identify and brief the interviewees and fix the appointments, not less than one week will be necessary, with two working days for the interviews themselves.

Following the interviews the findings will be analysed and classified in accordance with the various capacity outputs and outcomes. For each group of outputs and outcomes, findings will be presented in a tabular form and ranked according to the strength of the evidence (strong, medium, weak). Examples will be highlighted as a complement to the tabular presentation. The findings will be presented in an anonymous manner, although the distinction between findings inside and outside the institution will be maintained.

The processing of the Questionnaire and the preparation of the material for the workshop will require about five working days, as the consultant may need to check with the relevant interviewees the information collected through the Questionnaires.

In some cases the Questionnaires may be processed during one or more coaching sessions, with the participants contributing to validation and ranking. Such sessions may or may not be limited to people from the same institution.

### Restitution

The consultant will present the results in a half-day workshop, with extended participation by the targeted institution (5-10 persons), its external interlocutors (2-5 persons), and the EUD.

The workshop will discuss the main findings (first part), and the causal links (second part). The latter include and expand the assessment as per point 1(d) of the Questionnaire (STEP 1) and point 2(g) (STEP 2), including the role of the factors linked to the OF and the facilitating or limiting influence of the quality of the support programme (QC).

The workshop will not draw out consolidated conclusions (STEP 3), but will discuss and verify the STEP 1 and STEP 2 assessments, so as to draw out substantial hypotheses in the context of STEP 3. The latter will be systematised by the consultants after drawing together the conclusions of the workshops. This will require another five working days, including the drafting of the RAC report.

### Summary of the inputs and times necessary for a standard RAC

Based on the experience carried out by the evaluation team the three selected countries, an average RAC exercise should require the following operations and the related inputs (at least until broad practice has been consolidated):

Once the local consultants have been trained, the support from the external consultants would be reduced, if not terminated. Therefore the time needed for the whole exercise could be reduced to an average of thirty working days for each RAC.

|  |
| --- |
| Table : Technical inputs for a standard RAC |
|  |

# The three tests

The standard RAC procedure, as already illustrated, should be adapted as much as possible to the characteristics and opportunities of the different situations. The three tests have shown that the procedure works in very different contexts.

**The Ukraine case study**

In Ukraine a relatively difficult institutional environment was characterised by poor motivation and significant disorientation of both institution and staff. This situation was the consequence of contradictory political guidance, a destabilising administrative set-up and general institutional marginalisation. The institutional stakeholders were shy and reluctant to comment on the situation beyond a few concerns about the actual individual and organisational dysfunctions. The work emphasised the individual discussions and search for facts and causal connections during the recent history of the institution. The validation was done again at individual level, sometimes through a second short meeting. The workshop focused on presentation and discussion of the conclusions, with the aim of finding a common understanding and possible grounds for action.

**Brief presentation of the Project and the RAC**

***Objectives and expected results***

The Project was financed within the Tacis Action Program 2006 for Ukraine. It aims at supporting the application of a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) in Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) within the context of WTO accession and the ENP Action Plan. The strategy supported by the project focused on a strong Europeanization of the agriculture and rural development policies, on the basis of the models applied in the pre-accession countries, and in accordance with the strong pro-European political orientations of the government since 2005.

The Project started in October 2009 and ended in December 2011, when an extension until September 2012 was approved. Apart from the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food (MAPF), its counterparts are the State Committee for Veterinary Medicine and the Ministry of Health which are responsible for the implementation of the food safety component, other ministries and the farmers, wholesalers and consumers organisations. In the food safety area it is complemented by a twinning project covering the legal and technical aspects of the system, and by a separate EU supply contract for delivery of laboratory equipment.

***Project Objectives and results expected***[[32]](#footnote-33)

**Objective**

The objective of the Project, as set out in the Terms of Reference, is to support the application of a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) for agriculture and rural development within the context of WTO accession and the ENP Action Plan.

**Results expected**

The Project is structured in four components, the expected results of which are stated in the TOR:

**Component 1: Institutional Development:**

* Improved policy capacity and professional skills in MAP
* EU-Ukraine agriculture and rural development policy dialogue promoted
* Enhanced MAP donor co-ordination in the agricultural sector
* MARS crop yield forecasting system made operational
* Improved visibility and public image of MAP

**Component 2: Food Safety**

* Harmonized food and veterinary Ukrainian legislation in place
* Food safety institutional framework analysed, recommendations for improvement made
* Animal Identification & Registration System and movement control system improved and staff of the Agency for Animal Identification & Registration trained
* Tender dossier provided for the establishment of key operational and efficient laboratories in pilot regions according to international standards, to ensure that any trade restrictions based on residue concerns be removed for meat, milk and honey and related products.
* Laboratory staff, inspectors and vets trained on food safety issues.
* Access to veterinary databases ensured and DG SANCO newsletters translated and disseminated three food standards validated.

**Component 3: Market Infrastructure Development**

* Implementation of the National Programme for Wholesale Markets Development supported.
* Improved framework for agricultural professional organisations.
* At least one wholesale market assisted with preparation of the feasibility study in a pilot region.
* At least six assembly markets are assisted with preparation of pre-feasibility studies and action plans in pilot regions.
* At least six producer organisations supported in pilot regions.
* At least ten storage/packing facilities supported to service farmers in pilot regions.

**Component 4: Rural Development**

* Rural Development Strategy drafted and publicly discussed.
* Two operational programmes drafted and prepared for approval.
* Medium term expenditure programme agreed with stakeholders and Project Partner.
* Lessons learnt from EU LEADER+ programme.
* Rural development website/portal developed on the Internet.
* Training in rural development provided to MAP and to pilot oblasts.

**Project Team**

* Key Expert 1 and Team Leader – Senior Expert in Institutional Development
* Key Expert 2 – Senior Expert in Food Safety
* Key Expert 3 – Senior Expert in Market Development
* Key Expert 4 – Senior Expert in Rural Development

**Project Budget: 2 M Euros**

**The execution of the RAC**

All components of the project have strong and largely explicit capacity development implications. The RAC has been carried out in accordance with the standard procedure, and with engagement of fifteen days (split between two missions) of an international consultant and thirty days of an Ukrainian consultant. The consultants have carried out the assessment of the enabling factors, the structured interviews, and the restitution workshop. Close collaboration with the EUD has been maintained throughout the work. The individual structured interviews were preferred to the group meetings, coaching sessions and workshops. This mainly reflects the low level of institutional mobilisation and specific interest (including the institutional segmentation). Eleven interviews have been carried out, in the following categories: four of the responsible persons of the key departments in the MAPF, three of key staff of the food safety service, three of decentralised “demand institutions” including a wholesalers’ association and two NGOs involved in rural development programmes, and two of high-level independent resource persons.

**Assessment**

**Enabling factors**

The RAC started with an assessment of the enabling factors, which included meetings with EUD staff and with informed persons, and general meetings with ministry staff; and study of the country strategies, NIPs and project documents. As a result of such analyses the following preliminary conclusions have been formulated.

**Opportunity framework**

Europeanization of the agricultural policies. This had a strong political support in the country (government and citizens) at the conception of the project, which correctly influenced the project design, but during execution the political backcloth was radically reversed.

The new government had very different priorities: at international level the new focus was on the partnership with Russia, while Europeanization (of policies and institutions) was no longer an objective; in the domestic market the weight of the large grain producers weakened any attempt to support small and medium enterprises, and agricultural and non-agricultural diversification in the rural areas.

The new government maintained the establishment of a free trade area (including agriculture) as a priority, given its interest for the EU market. The related institutional and technical activities were supported. The lack of interest in the MAPF as a policy development institution, however, also undermined the creation of new structures, functions and capacities in this sector.

The need to restore political control of the administration impelled the government to a politically-driven, long and chaotic administrative restructuring which also affected the MAPF, creating uncertainties and volatility among staff, instability of structures and inadequate resourcing.

Faced with such a situation, the parties had no tool for adjusting the objectives and work plans with a view to reorientation, radical change or cancellation of the programme. In particular the political and sectoral policy dialogue excluded agriculture and rural development from its agenda from the outset, as was generally the case in the ENP countries. Only the phytosanitary standards, in view of the FTA, were and are the subject of dialogue and negotiation.

**Quality criteria**

Fits to context, demand and commitment. These two criteria were fulfilled at the time of the design. When the project started both the context and demand had changed and the project had no built-in mechanism for adjusting to the new conditions. The low priority given to the agricultural sector in the ENP strategy is another weakness in the project strategy.

Link to results. The results targeted by the project design were realistic, clear and easy to monitor at both institutional and policy levels. They became unrealistic when the conditions changed.

Harmonisation. The strong prospect of integration into the EU in the early stages, which was not discussed, also facilitated cooperation with non-EU partners. Later, when such a prospect was no longer supported by the government, even other donors (especially the US) pursued different priorities.

Implementation arrangements. The transfer of knowhow within the Project has mostly followed classical methods. Peer-to-peer and learning-by-doing methods were not prioritized, although they were partially applied through intensive programs of study tours to sister institutions, allowing trainees to learn from peers abroad.

**Capacity outputs**

***Capacities of staff***. The project provided much ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ training at both national and local levels within the public services involved and their external partners. ‘Horizontal’ training was provided in policy analysis, strategic planning, project management, presentations, negotiations, English, and so on. ‘Vertical’ training focused on food safety, rural development, marketing policies and institution-building. Most interviewees noted that training contributed to the personal career advancement of the participants, but the weak policy initiative of the MAPF in the relevant areas and the organisational destabilisation of the MAPF hampered any significant evolution of such training into new institutional strength.

***New procedures and approaches.*** The project made substantial efforts to introduce new procedures and approaches and to highlight several new policy issues in the Ministry. The relevant achievements and their limits, as perceived in the interviews, are presented below for each project component:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Capacity outputs (new procedures and approaches) | | | |
| Institutional Development | Food Safety | Market Infrastructure | Rural Development |
| Database of donors (no more in use) | Approach ‘from the field to the table’ (approved, but far from application) | Approach to market infrastructure development (included in some new laws) | Dissemination of the European RD concept (included in law, but then cancelled by the new govt) |
| Regular donor consultations (no longer effective) | Support to animal registration (effective) | Model for business-plans in wholesale marketing (there is no strategy yet) | Decentralised pilot experiences with local communities (effective, albeit marginally) |
| Functioning of some laboratories (effective) |
| General comment: important outputs, but which partially evaporated | General comment: significant technical progress | The US Aid has taken the lead in the sector and in working at the strategy | General comment: the project has responded well but the room for manoeuvre is limited |

***New organisations/ structures/ functions***. The project has operated in a context of instability, cut of staff and other resources, due to the politically driven administrative reform. The relevant changes, as from the interviews, are shown in the table below.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Capacity outputs (new structures and functions) | | | |
| Institutional Development | Food Safety | Market Infrastructure | Rural Development |
| Unit for WTO cooperation (standard) | Contribution to the creation of the new State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service (very important achievement, but remains to be implemented at decentralised level and start to operate) | The administrative reform has weakened this sector (cuts in staff and functions) | The administrative reform has merged the Dpt of Rural Development with the Dpt of Science. Even in pilot regions, there is no institutional change |
| Unit for cooperation with EU on FTA (effective negotiations) |
| Unit for International Coordination (see above) | General comment: here the institutional reform has been implemented, it being a govt priority. The resources and the policy framework to operate it are still lacking | General comment: a competitive domestic market in agriculture does not seem a priority for the govt | General comment: in this area the govt has backed away from previous achievements |
| General comment: these are mostly standard administrative / technical units |

**Conclusion on capacity outputs.** As a partial conclusion, the interviewees tended to say that the project has produced significant capacity outputs in accordance with its intervention logic and its different components, but the response of the beneficiaries has been weakened by either a lack of political motivation and support, or by general institutional instability. This is true also in the areas prioritised by the government, such as Food Safety.

**Capacity outcomes**

For each of the standard CD outcomes identified by the methodology, the interviewees – helped by the evaluators – have tended to concentrate their attention on one (in one case two) main indicator(s) fitting the specific context. The indicators considered are specified when addressing the following five expected general CD outcomes.

***Initiative of the institution***

Key indicator: autonomous policy development capacity (e.g.: proposals for strategies and laws, resistance to policy (and political) marginalisation, etc.). In the case of the Ministry and its partner institutions, there is clear evidence of the low level of this capacity. The declared goal of the administrative reform in the sector was to introduce an institutional separation of the policy development functions concentrated in the ministries from the policy implementation functions (administration, control, regulation, etc.) which were to be transferred to other executive bodies (agencies, inspections, commissions, etc.). However in reality the reform has led to the centralization of power within the Presidential cabinet, where key policy decisions are formulated (as for instance the dropping of RD from the policy priorities, the practical suppression of the RD Dpt, and the low priority given to the marketing policies). Under such political conditions the Ministry and its partners do not find themselves in an appropriate position to promote, elaborate, propose and monitor policies.

Link with the capacity outputs***.*** The link between the institutional initiative and the capacity outputs is now broken and the new skills, procedures andorganisations created are not transforming themselves into new institutional strength. Indeed, the institutions involved seem weaker, in comparison with the beginning of the project, in terms of autonomous policy initiative.

***Results based decision making***

Key indicator: the institutions’ capacity to monitor the performance of the sector and sub-sectors and develop strategic thinking and decision-making processes in response to the actual results. Indeed the capacity of the institutions involved (namely the MAPF and the Food Safety Service) to establish monitoring systems and data collection in the various subsectors is very low, as it is hampered by the organisational uncertainty and instability, the bureaucratic overload of the staff, the low level of interest of the government, and the difficulty of identifying strategic indicators for monitoring and analysis.

Link with the capacity outputs. The linkage between such a capacity outcome and the training provided by the project in this area has not been established, as the latter had no adequate institutional appropriation. In addition the evidence indicates that most policy decisions made by the Government are politically-driven rather than evidence-based. In such a situation the role of the Ministry and other institutions shifts from monitoring the results to complying with government priorities. As an example, the decision of the Government to introduce quotas on the export of grains in the autumn of 2011 has been implemented, albeit widely criticized and in contradiction with the declared strategies of trade liberalization and Ukrainian commitments to WTO.

***Institutional networking***

Key indicator: coordination with te other relevant government institutions and the participation of the various non-government actors has been identified as a key indicator.

Considering the inter-institutional coordination, during the most recent years quite a variety of networking and consultation tools has been established in the Ministry. They include inter-departmental and inter-institutional working groups and five councils under the Ministry. Such a range of inter-institutional networking tools, however, seems rather ritual and highly inefficient owing to the fact that any given issue can be discussed in all such councils and committees by the same people several times over, with no practical benefits.

The same applies to the attempts to establish regular stakeholders consultations. Significant relationships with non-state actors instead occur at decentralised level, but they are at a pilot stage and need to be consolidated prior to any generalisation. Positive initial examples have been mentioned in the areas of community development and wholesale promotion.

With respect to international relationships with sister institutions, they are still at the level of project outputs and have not been appropriated by the institution(s). Indeed in the ENP area there are no opportunities for inter-institutional exchange beyond support for single projects.

Link with the capacity outputs. The experience (capacity output) to which the project has contributed in terms of promoting decentralised pilot experience in Rural Development and Agricultural Marketing is the basis of the new local cooperation between MAPF and various non-government actors, although it is too early to see any real transformation of such experience into institutional capacity. On the other hand the project has actively promoted a more inclusive approach with stronger involvement of stakeholders. However according to the evidence it has not succeeded in reducing duplication and overlapping (e.g. the Civic Council promoted by the project under the Ministry is a duplication of a coordination council created in 2000 and still operational). The project has invested in developing connections between the Ministry and sister institutions abroad: while these activities were useful in terms of awareness-raising and capacity outputs, the sustainability of such links is rather low owing to a number of factors: the lack of resources to maintain and update such relationships, the poor local grasp of English, and above all the very low autonomy of the Ministry in deciding its policy priorities.

***Adaptation to the context***

Key indicators. Two indicators have been considered: adjustment of the relevant institutions to the administrative reform, and donor coordination. The second indicators has been included under this capacity outcome to emphasise the fact that donors are partners which may help or condition the beneficiary institutions, which need to develop specific strategies for optimising their support for shared priorities.

On the first indicator the Ministry did not make any reaction to the reduction of staff and resources and the suppression (or limitation) of several functions. There was no attempt to try to optimise the means available or concentrate efforts on some of the priorities confirmed by the new government (e.g.: veterinary and phytosanitary controls, and trade related issues). The reaction was instead inspired by an attempt to minimise the shocks and put in place a survival strategy.

On the second indicator, the MAPF has made some efforts. Better coordination and management of donor inputs has been an objective of the Ministry and some improvements (with the help of the project) have been achieved in terms of procedures and tools. Donor support however has not been used to integrate or compensate for the scarce resources provided by the government in key sectors. At a time of heavy cuts donor support could have alleviated the policy and operational consequences. Instead the position of Deputy Minister in charge of the international cooperation has been suppressed and the coordination meetings have been suspended. In general the international partners have been downgraded as policy partners.

Link with the capacity outputs. In terms of adaptation to the political and organisational shocks, the project could not help, since it did not adapt to the changed situation beyond the positive individual initiatives of its staff. Even. In terms of donor coordination, the capacity outputs produced (or promoted with others) by the project have so far been frozen – if not thwarted – by the political and administrative changes.

***Institutional coherence***

According to the responses of the interviewees, a synthesised indicator has been considered in this area. Assessment of the indicator is based on the combination of the responses given in relation to the four outcomes assessed so far.

The conclusion of the interviewees is that there has been no significant progress in terms of institutional coherence and that the Ministry and the other institutional bodies involved have if anything gone backwards in terms of institutional coherence and strength, given that they are in the middle of an institutional transition, the outcome of which is not yet identifiable.

It is relatively clear that institutional improvements have been attained, but so far they have been either frozen or dispersed, as they did not find a conducive environment or a sustainable response in the targeted institutions. The latter have not yet been able to translate the single improvements (capacity outputs) into autonomous institutional orientation and action in any of the specific fields considered (policy; results; networking; adaptation to the context), so as to ensure progress in terms of global coherence and institutional strength.

**General conclusion**

The opportunity framework, namely the radical change in the political priorities of the government, has strongly affected the capacity development process in the area of agricultural and rural development. The EC cooperation did not have adequate political and policy instruments to facilitate re-discussion and re-negotiation of the policy framework of the project. The ENP does not consider agriculture and rural development as a priority area and does not envisage any political and policy dialogue on sectoral issues, apart from those relating to trade and food standards. On the other hand, the project – as conceived and managed – did not include any mechanism for adjusting or even stopping its plans and operations in the context of a modified context.

The project has put in place significant skills for capacity development and has created a number of impressive capacity outputs in the different areas involved. Most of such outputs, however, have been frozen and sometimes dispersed or even thwarted; and in many cases they are being used at a merely individual level (for career purposes), often in other institutions. In most cases they have not evolved into institutional capacities.

**The Bolivia case study**

In Bolivia a completely different picture characterised the RAC. The institution is young, freshly created around a strong political agenda at the core of the government’s political priorities. People were committed and eager to profit from any opportunity to improve their personal and collective performance. They found that the RAC was instrumental to a process of institutional learning and consolidation. The process was much more collective than in Ukraine, different systems and techniques of coaching and joint learning were put in place, and some improvements to procedures and methods were also suggested.

**Brief presentation of the programme**

The PAPS program comes at a time of change in the government’s policy towards the coca sector. The shift from an approach based on alternative development via crop substitution, to one based on integral development with coca led to a rift with some partners, particularly USAID, and facilitated greater presence of EC cooperation. This fact, coupled with the development of the new sectoral approach by the government of Bolivia (with plans and strategies for the medium term), cleared the way for the new mode of EC aid: budget support.

The overall objective of the PAPS program is to support the Government of Bolivia in its fight against drug trafficking within a framework of dialogue and social peace. The specific objective of the program is to support the design and implementation of certain components of the sectoral policy of integral development, defining the latter’s scope, limits, and interaction with other sectors and sub-national levels in order to achieve a shared political vision. The program’s specific areas of intervention are coca-producing areas, migrant areas, and sensitive areas (protected areas).

The expected results of the PAPS are:

A comprehensive sectoral policy for integral development that is firmly defined, interrelated with related sectors, socially shared by stakeholders and institutions in the context of the problems of coca cultivation, and in concert with the international community on the basis of the principles of sovereignty and national dignity.

Acceptance and support by the international community of a shared vision for integral development that fits within the wider framework of a common responsibility, particularly in the context of established international policies that aim to combat drug trafficking;

An institutional framework within the Bolivian state that is consolidated, dynamic and flexible, and able to generate institutional and sectoral synergies to promote implementation of sectoral policy for integral development. in areas touched by the problems of coca cultivation (production, forced migration, and sensitive natural environments), the framework runs, manages, monitors, and evaluates sectoral policy.

Pressure from sectors and stakeholders concerned with the problem of coca for actions and initiatives to be carried out in a manner that is sustained, coherent, and consistent with technical and administrative capacity.

Social investments and productivity investments by public and private stakeholders in the areas of intervention, based on project portfolios that line up with the objectives of integral development and conflict mitigation.

For implementation of the PAPS program, provision by the EC of external professional advice for the institutional and programmatic strengthening of the Vice-Ministry of Integral Development with Coca (VCDI) and other governmental agencies involved in combating drug trafficking.

PAPS’ design Quality criteria

The quality of the PAPS design is reflected by the following features:

Suitable design for the sectoral context as based on the sectoral policy of the Government (and supports development of that policy) and contributing to its effective implementation.

Sufficient demand and high buy-in by the Government. The design also addresses the strategy in place to achieve greater national sovereignty.

Good harmonization of proposals and clear definition of administrative mechanisms, *via* the Program’s TA component, through promoting greater inter-institutional coordination between the different actors of the program. The design also aims to strengthen the technical and administrative capacities of stakeholders so as to improve the calibre of future project proposals seeking funding.

Dialogue and coordination. At the inception of PAPS, the government’s leadership in respect of donor coordination was limited. However the very design of PAPS called for greater coordination with the international community as an output. In addition the design included acceptance by the international community of integral development with coca.

Peer relationships. Through the aid it provides, the EC can hold dialogue with the Government and target its assistance, focusing support on defining and implementing the government’s sectoral policy (with the specific exception of the industrialization and value assessment of coca).

This positive picture of the design of the program is further improved and supported by a number of contextual elements that create a very favourable window of opportunity.

**Assessment of the opportunity framework**

The preliminary question that must be posed in order to assess the window of opportunity is:

**To what extent was the context already fertile for the development of capacities at the time the program was launched?**

The second question is:

**What are the contextual factors that have facilitated or limited the actions of the PAPS in the development of the capacities of the partners**?

The main enabling factors are:

• The high priority of the Desarrollo Integral con coca in the government strategy and the very important role of the EU-Bolivia partnership in supporting such a policy

• The high degree of organization and the bargaining power of the institutions, partners and beneficiaries

• The independence and autonomy of dialogue, both between the government and donors, and between the government and the end-beneficiaries. Furthermore, the quality of the leadership displayed by the Government’s counterparts is improving

• The promotion of values of equity and inclusion in the State apparatus

• The existence of a concerted sector strategy among the stakeholders, along with heightened inter-sectoral coordination

• Continued support from the EC which tends to generate the necessary tools and results that facilitate implementation of PAPS.

The main limiting factors are:

• The beneficiaries’ lack of a comprehensive vision (macro) in project proposals to PAPS. It is believed that this challenge is currently being addressed but has not yet been fully resolved

• Lack of sufficient policy coordination between the policy against drug trafficking and the policy for integral development with coca

• Negative impact of the conflicting individual interests of territorial and political stakeholders, both on the distribution and definition of competences, and on the role of sectoral institutions.

• Incipient development of civil service careers and recognition of their merit

• The lack of coordination at regional level

• Prevalence of international cooperation in financing the sector.

**assessment of the capacity-outputs**

The underlying initial question is:

**What have you learned through your interaction with PAPS?**

This list of capacity outputs has been subdivided into individual and organizational items. Those presented below are the most important to the process of learning to interact with PAPS, according to the various stakeholders.

***Individual Capacities***

Personal and Relational:

• Greater realization and appreciation of personal career development and its impact on making one more competitive

• Dialogue, cooperation between the State and civil society organizations

• Increased capacity to develop sectoral and regional agreements

Organizational and Managerial:

• Increased knowledge of resource management, planning, monitoring and evaluation

• Results-based management

• Management of indicators

• Process visioning (from conception to final customer)

• Knowledge of the region: production potential, future prospects, difficulties

***Organizational Capacities***

Relational:

• Negotiation and coordination with international cooperation bodies, the government, etc.

• Capacity to interact with stakeholders in the formulation of strategies (ownership and participation)

• Consultation

• Teamwork

Organizational and Managerial:

• Capacity for organizational restructuring and for improving the definition of responsibilities for each department or unit

• Increased capacity to acquire local funding through plans that are well publicized and understood by the general public

• Transparency

• Planning capacity and strategic capacity

• Increased use of national norms and processes

• Capacity to track administrative processes

**assessment of the capacity-outcomes**

The five categories into which the capacities are grouped do not represent independent blocks. Rather, they are interrelated, together forming a unique capacity-learning process. It is also important to recognize that, in addition to the actions undertaken via the PAPS, other institutional initiatives are also involved in this field.

Synthesized observations by category of capacity:

Ability to Survive and Act appears to be more individual and acts as an organizational impetus to the same end. Furthermore it is recognized that the ultimate beneficiaries (associations of municipalities) have a great capacity for initiative that contributes to rapprochement and interaction.

However, the Ability to Achieve Results is more organizational and includes factors such as risk prevention, use of indicators, and setting of targets - and the presence of good staff skilled at executing projects without conditions; also increased autonomy of beneficiaries in presenting and formulating proposals and in their technical execution.

Ability to Relate capacities are simultaneously developed at individual and organizational levels. In terms of valuing the community network the use of the “community liaison” is an approach that has recently become institutionalized throughout the rest of the State apparatus.

Ability to Self-Renew is seen as a predominantly individual category. The importance of evaluations or assessments prior to decision-making stands out as a key factor. Finally, the importance of the capacity of beneficiaries to correct and reorient the allocation of resources must also be stressed.

Ability to Link Strategic and Operational Levels is a more organizational category of capacity and consists of a capacity for greater transparency and accountability, coherence between national and sectoral policies, and synergies and organizational learning through experiential learning

**Correlation between capacity-outputs and capacity-outcomes**

Studying the correlation between capacity-outputs and capacity-outcomes helps complete an understanding of the learning process in capacity development to which PAPS has contributed. The paths followed by the various capacity outputs and their combined significance as components of a capacity outcome make it possible to measure quantitatively the impact of the program.

The statistical results of the correlation analysis seek to outline the impact of PAPS on capacity development as a set of general trends within a complex and varied phenomenon. Indeed the learning processes are not necessarily sequential and cannot be boiled down to a simple statistic. Rather, it is important to remember that each individual participant in the PAPS is distinct, possessing a particular set of characteristics and traits that contribute to a complex overall system that is itself unique and difficult to replicate. However despite this complexity we believe that this statistical exercise helps to define and prioritize the flow from outputs to outcomes. This analysis is accomplished by identifying the most significant correlations within the capacity categories.

The capacity output of consultation, considered to be a capacity of organizational nature, has been selected as having the most significant influence on the development of capacity outcomes. It is interesting to note that the second most important capacity is that of dialogue, identified as a capacity pertaining to the area of individual learning

These two capacities are of different scope, yet both are relational in nature. These abilities, in addition to being complementary, are also necessary for the application and development of the government’s overall strategy in general, and in the sector in particular. We can therefore say **that the PAPS has contributed largely to the development of relational capacities of a strategic nature for the implementation of government policies.**

The statement above is reinforced by the fact that administrative and managerial capacities occupy third and fourth places in order of importance.

The capacity outcome most developed by the variety of capacity outputs is “rapprochement to the beneficiary.” It belongs to the first of the five categories of outcome: Ability to Survive and Act. This lines up with what we have seen previously (the relational capacity outputs are those most strongly correlating with the development of outcomes). This impact of the PAPS is underlined not only as a logical continuation of the learning process, but also for having facilitated a **qualitative professional leap forward by generating an increased capacity for autonomy when interacting with the beneficiaries**. Furthermore, the capacity to “build awareness and generate confidence” among the beneficiaries ranks fourth in importance and belongs to the Ability to Relate category.

The PAPS contributes to development of capacity outcomes at the Ability to Achieve Results level, but also goes beyond them, affecting all the other categories with the exception of Ability to Self-Renew. The latter, albeit mentioned, is not significant.

**Conclusions**

The activities and interactions generated by the PAPSbetween the different stakeholders have had a significant impact on capacity development, at both individual and organizational levels. The main factors behind this positive impact are:

Proper design of the program which, through its Technical Assistance component and the outputs and induced outputs that it planned to generate, aimed to encourage improvement of capacities, particularly those pertaining to the realm of greater inter-agency and inter-sectoral consultation and coordination. This is coupled with the fact that capacity development is seen as an ongoing learning process and, in the light of this, the PAPS further encourages a process of institutional support and capacity building that was launched many years ago by the EC in Bolivia through various programs aimed at supporting the sector.

The context in which the PAPS exists is highly conducive to its further growth and development. First, it ties in with the Government’s evolving development strategy in the coca sector. The latter strategy grants the government greater autonomy from donors, and increased leadership in defining and implementing the strategy. Second, it feeds on the actions of those individuals and structures that are highly motivated to implement the sectoral strategy. Third, it can be said that the PAPS has favoured a qualitative leap in professional capacity, facilitating increased professional autonomy in interactions between multiple stakeholders (institutions or beneficiaries). This is doubly important as these types of relational, consultation, and dialogue capacity are precisely those which can, and indeed do, influence implementation of government policies. Finally, administrative and managerial capacities have also been strengthened by the program and these, organizational in nature, also have a direct impact on achieving strategic objectives.

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| **Lessons learnt from the Bolivia case study**  The Bolivian case study introduced a number of innovations in the RAC procedure, although probably not all can be generalized and assumed as standard. As mentioned, the Bolivian counterparts’ willingness to participate and commit since the first mission has been particularly strong.  Moreover the introduction of specific participatory tools for information gathering and analysis has elicited the interest of the Bolivian counterparts, since the exercise appeared particularly useful to the participants for increasing their awareness of the effects the project has had on their individual and organizational capacity development paths.   * 1. **Simplification of the terminology**.   The Bolivia case has shown that the distinction between competences and capacities is difficult to grasp during the exercise. The team has suggested suppressing the use of the word “competences” and referring instead to “capacity outputs” and “capacity outcomes”. This change has been incorporated into the standard version of the RAC.  To explain the transition through different stages, the term “learning” has been introduced to explain the open individual and organizational processes – with a past, a present, and a future – within which the program operates, strengthening and valuing acquired knowledge or introducing new knowledge. Capacity development is nourished by the learning process and, as such, the flow from capacity outputs to capacity outcomes is likewise a process that takes time.   * 1. **Coaching sessions**.   The capacity outputs and capacity outcomes were identified by the stakeholders themselves during individual interviews, group interviews and group-coaching sessions.  Collective coaching was addressed to a group of people within the same institution that is part of or collaborates with the activities of the programme.  The coaching sessions were carried out after an individual interview with the person in charge of the relevant institution. The terms of the coaching were agreed with him.   * 1. **Workshop**.   Organisation of an in-depth half-day working session with all stakeholders (governmental counterparts, technical assistance team, EU Delegation staff) for analysis of the opportunity framework and of the capacity outputs and capacity outcomes. The workshop was therefore less a dissemination exercise than a joint exercise for analysis of individual and organisational capacity development experiences gained through interaction with the PAPS.  The workshop allowed confirmation, updating and ranking of the list of individual and organisational capacity outputs and capacity outcomes identified during the coaching sessions.  The workshop concluded with identification, by the same stakeholders, of the main correlations between capacity outputs and capacity outcomes. |

**The Chad case study**

Chad was an intermediate case, with a relatively dynamic OF and strong government sectoral priority, but with a confused and uncoordinated institutional framework, and low institutional and individual capacities. The proposed procedure was applied step-by-step and also produced satisfactory results.

**presentation of the PASET programme**

Starting in 2007-8, the EC has put in place a comprehensive institutional development intervention based largely on a paradigm of counterpart-based (mentoring) TA. The project aims at strengthening the domestic transport network so as to satisfy demand for transport in the country in a durable way. It supports the government strategy for the sustainable development of the Chadian economy and the reduction of poverty.

Four results are expected:

i) The domestic network is maintained annually and periodically, with levels of satisfactory service

ii) Local SMEs take part in road maintenance

iii) The economic axis of the South of Chad (Moundou road - Doba - Sahr) is usable all year round

iv) The layout of an axis to opening the access to the East Chad (Sahr - Abéché), preserving the park of Zakouma, is adopted.

**Enabling factors**

**Paset’s Quality criteria**

Suitable design for the sectoral context. The EC’s intervention reflected the evolving economic requirements and strategic plans for the country. A more effective road network was needed to enable the country to exploit its natural resources, to ensure its geopolitical security in times of conflict, and to enable its far-flung villages and cities to gain access to markets.

Sufficient demand and high buy-in by the Government. Chad also committed to road improvements in regional fora, in line with its strategy of reducing consumer prices through reductions in transport costs. These vectors were recognised but the relatively hazardous hypothesis was made that the country’s leaders would adopt a champion role in the sector, particularly with respect to its institutional capability, in a sustainable manner. Indeed, studies done in 2004 and 2008 confirmed that the sector agencies were weak in almost every aspect.

Harmonization. The EC plays the major role in the transport sector in the country. The World Bank and the African Development Bank follow, while other donors do not participate, or provide only marginal contributions. Donor programs in the infrastructure sector entail expenditure of several tens of millions of euros, but there is as yet no coordination mechanism for enhancing policy dialogue with the government on institutional and policy reform.

Link to results. The explicit strategies of the interventions financed under the PASET do not contain institutional targets, for example indicators related to new institutional capabilities and responsibilities (including management standards and risks), and linked to achievement of the project’s results. Most indicators were exclusively focused on the project’s inputs and activities (technical, financial, operational).

Peer relationships. Two large contracts were put into place that provided for a significant number of traditional short- and long-term TAs assigned to the Secretary-General(s) who was (were) ultimately responsible for the results of the interventions. The EC also provided “devis-programme” (programme estimates) funding and provided monitoring and quality control services, among others. The priority given to implementation of the project activities compared to the institutional results favoured a ‘replacement’ approach in the implementation of the TA.

**Assessment of the opportunity framework**

Historical momentum. Chad opened the 21st Century with dramatic economic growth boosted by oil exports. Big investments in infrastructure were planned and partly implemented using the oil surpluses. In the meantime two major crisis factors have characterised the country: corruption supported by the oil economy, which has hampered establishment of a coherent development strategy and weakened any State-building process; and the political destabilisation of the region, which has plunged the country into a deep civil war between the north and the south.

Institutional development. The State-building process is complicated and weakened by this mix of resource boom, corruption and high political instability. Public service standards and hiring policies in the public sector are very poor, salary levels are so low as to force individuals to work on two or three jobs (often simultaneously), an absence of professional motivation on the part of most technical staff in the public sector, and a decision-making culture that relies on the political head (the minister) not only for decisions but also for direction.

Sectoral policy. A first sector reform plan took shape in 1989 and a National Transport Strategy was proposed for the 2000-2010 period, responsibility for the sector being vested in one ministry that was split in two in August 2011, creating in essence one focus for public works and another for transport policy. Indeed, the strategic plans of the transport sector show very few links to other strategic plans. During those many years the EC has supported the capacity development of the ministry(ies), of the private sector, and of key road maintenance-related agencies (mainly AGER). Transport was perceived as a key element in development by both the government and its partners.

**Volatile and unappropriated capacity outputs**

Despite record-setting levels of public works, institutional development was clearly not a priority. Institutional and capability objectives and standards were not clearly identified by the GoC, and the TA focused on ensuring implementation of the project’s operational outputs.

The capacity outputs produced by the TA were many: creation of a database and improvement of data collection; instructions for staff functions and sub-sector guidelines; contribution to the design and assistance to the implementation of new structures (FER, AGER, CER); improvement of systems (technical maintenance, rural transport,…) etc. Such outputs however were not appropriated by the beneficiaries and did not generate effective functions or skills in the institutions. Despite their actual use in the operational process, such outputs had little effects in terms of institutional development: they were often ignored and were mostly non-sustainable owing to transfers and abandonment. An important apparent exception is AGER which, at the time of the present assignment, was institutionally structured to accomplish its maintenance mission but had never been tested in practice, and the programme of work of which was not yet approved by the very ministry from which it was designed to be independent.

Sector ministries remain very weak in most areas, except contract management and supervision. Most of the engineering, construction and supervision functions, however, are carried out by contractors who, in turn, are monitored – but not necessarily controlled – by the ministries. It is recognised that the country was able to construct an important number of kilometres of primary and secondary roads as well as an impressive quantity of urban infrastructure. These results are based on a contracting-out strategy that did not feature in the Sector Strategic Plans and are heavily risk-laden. Key functions such as strategic planning, costing and quality control have only been mastered by a small number of senior managers who will soon retire. Adequate management knowledge, skills and aptitudes, and the systems needed to support them, are not in place. In general the ministries have not, over the years, actually defined the kind and levels of performance they require or the priorities needed for institutional development.

Basically the TA has concentrated its efforts on mentoring Chadian homologues. The mentoring process has not been as effective as planned. Many that were mentored have left the public service or are not doing the job for which they were trained. Much of the TA has gone toward substitution of employees instead of co-development with them, and some of the training was for systems that the ministries still have not mastered or for which alternative systems are still not in place.

A partial exception is represented by the capacity support provided to private enterprises, mainly in the area of administrative and technical improvement related to maintenance works. Here the motivation of the enterprises has allowed an internalisation of the support which has not occurred in the public administration.

**Assessment of the capacity outcomes**

Poor initiative and autonomy, with the exception of the private sector. Over the years covered by this evaluation, the office of the Presidency has controlled most decision-making and contract negotiation in respect of construction projects and has left only the mechanical tasks associated with construction and progress control (for progress payments) in the hands of sector officials. Sector ministries mostly do not push forward sector strategies or monitor and control their institutional development efforts. Indeed, this was known at the time of the design of the program. An exception is represented by private sector operators who seem to have strengthened their capacity for participation.

No accountability for the strategic results. The sector ministries and agencies are not accountable for the implementation of the sectoral strategies, in part because they did not develop them. Systems are not supportive of strategic learning and decision-making, but are compliance- and monitoring-oriented. They respond to the contracts managed and works done, not to the strategic soundness, effectiveness or efficiency of the results achieved. The ministries do not seek to be seen to be accountable, nor are they held accountable.

Poor feedback and adaptation mechanisms. The lack of strategic accountability and the limited or absent institutional development objectives minimise any feedback and learning process within the public institutions involved.

Weak networking. There is no evidence of strategic networking, with other government institutions to enhance synergies, or public bodies such as the parliament. A certain functional (not strategic) networking may be seen in the relationship with the private sector, although this is based on operational reasons (information and services).

Low general level of governance. By and large, at the level of the public institutions involved, no significant improvement in systems design or use, or in the general level of governance (including transparency, coordination, human resource management), was perceived by the stakeholders interviewed. Most systems now in place are either legacy or are the result of initiatives in other ministries (such as PFM reform). Even in the private sector institutions this level of improved systemic coherence does not seem to have been achieved in terms of increased competitiveness and transparency of the enterprises.

**Links between capacity-outputs and capacity-outcomes**

The evaluation concluded that only in the case of the increased administrative and technical capacity of the private enterprises has there been a positive correlation with the capacity outputs generated by the project. In the other cases, such outputs have not contributed to strengthening the capacity of the institutions involved, although they have been instrumental in the implementation of their operational outputs (construction works).

**Conclusions**

The important level of financial and technical support provided by the EC did not significantly improve the level of capacity of the ministries, which remain seriously handicapped in terms of delivering on the National Transport Strategy. The political and institutional conditions for the construction of such capacities were not there. GoC did not own the process and therefore did not take action to improve the quality of the CD.

The design of the EC’s intervention was based on CD hypotheses that were known to be erroneous or risky, even at the time. The entire « program » should have been based on performance standards for each function and strong monitoring systems should have supported active management. Or else alternative options could have been adopted, instead of building such a relatively complex system of public institutions.

Section 4: Annexes

annex 1: EQs and Judgement Criteria

The EQs mentioned herewith at meant to show a standard set of areas that the thorough evaluation should cover and a standard set of Judgement Criteria to explain and identify each question. In reality, EQs may be merged/ disaggregated as considered opportune, and the JCs may be decreased, increased, refocused, according to the specific contexts.

**Table 7 : STEP 1: Standard EQs and Judgement Criteria**

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| **EQ and Judgement Criteria** | **Statement of the EQ** |
| EQ1: Enabling factors - Opportunity framework/1 | To what extent do the country historical momentum, growth and partnership opportunities, and other existing contextual factors affect the institutional context of the CD action?[[33]](#footnote-34) |
| Judgement Criteria | Growth and trade opportunities of the country create a positive context for the target institution(s) to strengthen their strategic responsibility and financial capacity  The regional partnerships subscribed by the country provide adequate stimuli in terms of improved governance and empowerment for the targeted institution(s)  EC participation in the regional partnerships and trade agreements with the country is based on a dialogue framework allowing specific leverage on the targeted institution(s) |
| EQ2: Enabling factors - Opportunity framework/2 | To what extent do the reform records of the government and the sectoral political economy affect the institutional context of the CD action? |
| Judgement Criteria | The reform records and the general reform orientation of the government provide a favourable policy and financial environment for the target institution(s)  The ongoing sectoral reform processes focus on the targeted institution(s) as key actors and provide them with the necessary means to respond to their mission  There is an effective framework of political dialogue allowing EC to participate in joint monitoring of the development results and actual discussions on the reform implementation? |
| EQ3: Enabling factors - Quality Criteria | To what extent does the support programme under evaluation responds to the Quality Criteria established by the EC Backbone strategy for Technical Cooperation, including relevance to the context, ownership of targeted institution(s), strategic focus, harmonisation and appropriate delivery modalities?[[34]](#footnote-35) |
| Judgement Criteria | The programme’s design - including the quantity and quality of inputs provided and the type of activities planned – is appropriate to the specific political, institutional and managerial contexts within which the capacity objectives were required |
| The local partners are effectively engaged in the relevant sector reforms and have a leadership position in the planning and management of the programme  The programme design and implementation explicitly focus on CD effects and provide means and indicators to ensure their achievement  The programme is carried out in a framework of dialogue and coordination led by the beneficiary, including harmonized / joint practices among donors  The programme responds to ‘peer-to-peer’ modalities, to emphasize the learning and CD processes, and to reduce as much as possible the external management of TC (PIU)? |

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| EQ4: Outputs- staff competences | To what extent did the programme contribute to the production of objectively verifiable changes in staff competences (legal, financial, data processing, management…)? How did external factors affect such changes? |
| Judgement Criteria | Staff competences toward the strategic objectives of the institution have been increased: new competences have been created and existing competences have been strengthened  Specific inputs and activities of the programme have contributed to the determination of such changes in the staff competences  Staff competences have been an indirect consequence of the staff involvement in the programme activities  Other inputs and external factors have contributed -and have interacted (or not) with the programme- to change staff competences |
| EQ5: Outputs- procedures and functions | To what extent did the programme contribute to the production of objectively verifiable changes in institutional procedures and functions (policy and financing, stakeholders’ involvement, accountability and supervision)? How did external factors affect such changes? |
| Judgement Criteria | Procedures and functions related to the strategic objectives of the institution have been created/ strengthened in various areas  Specific inputs and activities of the programme have contributed to the determination of such changes in the procedures and functions  Changes in procedures and functions have been an indirect consequence of the institutional involvement in the programme activities  Other inputs and external factors have contributed -and have interacted (or not) with the programme- to change procedures and functions |
| EQ6: Outputs- organisations | To what extent did the programme contribute to the production of objectively verifiable changes in the organisational and internal functioning (institutional structure, decision process, internal mobility and competition)? How did external factors affect such changes? |
| Judgement Criteria | The executive structure and the internal management have changed toward increased effectiveness and efficiency, better decision processes and career  Specific inputs and activities of the programme have contributed to the determination of such changes in the internal structures and functioning  Changes in the internal structures and functioning have been an indirect consequence of the institutional involvement in the programme activities  Other inputs and external factors have contributed -and have interacted (or not) with the programme- to change internal structures and functions |
| EQ7: Outputs- unexpected | To what extent did the programme contribute to the production of objectively verifiable changes on individuals, institutions and initiatives, which were not targeted? How did external factors affect such changes? |
| Judgement Criteria | Any significant and objectively verifiable change occurred, which was not an expected effect of the programme.  Specific inputs and activities of the programme have contributed to the determination of such unplanned changes  The unexpected changes have been an indirect consequence of the institutional involvement in the programme activities  Other inputs and external factors have contributed -and have interacted (or not) with the programme- to the unexpected changes |

**Table 8: STEP 2: Standard EQs and Judgement Criteria**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **EC and Judgement Criteria** | **Statement of EQs and Judgement Criteria** |
| EQ8: Initiative | To what extent is the institution more capable to generate the plans (strategic or other levels) that reflect its stated needs, mission and various changing environments and to then mobilize its resources and management to execute them? |
| Judgement criteria | JC1: Plans are generated by the institution, which reflect its vision and the needs of the society it serves as expressed in targeted, clear objectives as well as pragmatic and integrated operational strategies.  JC2: The institution has designed and built into its plans and systems the necessary feedback and monitoring mechanisms that will ensure self-renewal (adaptation) in order to achieve objectives  JC3: The institution has designed and put into place the knowledge, systems and databases necessary to ensure that resource allocation reflects the strategic directions and operational needs expressed in plans.  JC4: Mechanisms and modalities that serve to monitor and control resource allocation have been designed by the institution and then put in place and used. |
| EQ9: Link to Results | To what extent is the institution more capable to achieve and monitor the “developmental results” stated in national and “departmental” plans in a sustainable manner? |
| Judgement criteria | JC1: The institution has been able to define what it requires to (sustainably) reach targeted service levels within appropriate quality standards.  JC2: Strategies and mechanisms to engage non-governmental resources in the achievement of objectives related to the institution’s vision (including those related to coordination and complementarity) have been developed by the institution.  JC3: The institution has a record of meeting its performance targets in relation to national developmental results. |
| EQ10: Networking | To what extent is the institution accountable and able to work in a coordinated and efficient manner as part of a larger network of interested stakeholders? |
| Judgement criteria | JC1: Stakeholders assign legitimacy to the institution through an awareness of, and agreement with, the relationship between the mission, the objectives and the plans.  JC2: The institution is the primary source of advice to politicians and decision-makers within (the fields and activities related to) its mandate.  JC3: The institution has designed and put into place mechanisms to ensure that the application of the institution’s regulatory and control frameworks takes place in a transparent manner  JC4: Managers, employees and key stakeholders are motivated to execute the mission of the institution and achieve its objectives for the sake of the common good. |
| EQ11: Adaptation | To what extent is the institution in a position to constantly adapt in response to changing external environments and conditions? |
| Judgement criteria | JC1: The institution has designed and built into its plans and systems the necessary feedback and monitoring mechanisms that will ensure self-renewal (adaptation) in order to achieve objectives  JC2: The institution has the means (including the knowledge, skills and systems) to ensure that planning reflects the knowledge and experience of the institution, its networks and its stakeholders as well as the shifting trends inherent to its environments.  JC3: The institution has developed systems and means to identify where it needs to innovate or promote innovation (transformational innovation in support of strategies and objectives)  JC4: The institution has put into place the systems and means to assess the extent to which its management and task/responsibility structure reflects its needs for resiliency, diversity (capital and process advantage-seeking through integration and learning[[35]](#footnote-36)), openness (complexity and network management) and systems/policy coherency.  JC5: Policies are analysed and assessed on a timely basis and adjustments are made, based on knowledge management mechanisms including feedback, assessment, and evaluation.  JC6: The institution has designed and put into place mechanisms to ensure that positions are filled on a merit basis |
| EQ12: Coherence | To what extent has the institution succeeded in putting in place policy and management frameworks that build upon one another and provide evidence of a clear chain of results from the strategic to the operational levels? |
| Judgement criteria | JC1: The institution has developed plans and operating principles that are comprehensive and evidence-based, and where conclusions/recommendations flow from explicit chains of reasoning.  JC2: The institution has determined the nature and composition of a comprehensive set of all framework documents required for the execution of its mission, including laws, regulations, directives and interpretations, and has put in place mechanisms to ensure their application.  JC3: The institution has developed accountability frameworks (including those related to collective action) and is consistently monitoring against them.  JC4: The institution has analysed alternatives and implemented a decision concerning the most appropriate hierarchical structure and decentralisation strategy consistent with the institution’s mission and objectives.  JC5: The institution has designed and put into place a comprehensive set of control frameworks and ensures compliance.  JC6: Policies are analysed and assessed on a timely basis and adjustments are made, based on knowledge management mechanisms including feedback, assessment and evaluation.  JC7: The institution has put into place mechanisms to ensure that human resource management strategies, policies and systems reflect ongoing and future strategic and operational needs and are executed in a transparent, equitable and unbiased manner. |
| EQ13: Unexpected outcomes dealing with capabilities | How have non-planned capabilities (that have been developed as a result of Capacity Development efforts in the institution) improved or reduced the overall capacity of the institution to execute its vision and achieve its objectives? |
| Judgement criteria | JC1: Ownership of the programme on the part of the partner country was a factor in bringing about the CD outcomes.  JC2: The institution has developed the mechanisms to identify and assess the influence (effects) of un-planned CD to its institutional capacity  JC3: The institution has the means in place to quickly build upon positive non-planned effects and mitigate the influence of non-useful effects |
| EQs 14 to 17: Causality links | To what extent the institutional capacity outputs and/or other factors related to the OF have contributed to each of the above mentioned capacity outcomes (initiative, results, networking and adaptation). |
| Judgement criteria | JC1: Evidence (examples, stories, etc.) clearly indicates that the advances mentioned in terms of Initiative [then, Results, Networking and Adaptation] have a significant causal correlation with the consolidation and mainstreaming of specific capacity outputs.  JC2: Evidence (examples, stories, etc.) clearly indicates that the advances mentioned in terms of institutional Initiative [then, Results, Networking and Adaptation] have a significant causal correlation with other factors related to the Opportunity Framework.  JC3: Evidence (examples, stories, etc.) clearly indicates that the advances mentioned in terms of institutional Initiative [then, Results, Networking and Adaptation] have a significant causal correlation with the interaction between specific capacity outputs and other factors related to the Opportunity Framework. |

ANNEX 2 - RAC TOR

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

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1. **Introduction**

In recent years there has been a major push to improve the quality and effectiveness of Technical cooperation (TC). The Paris Declarations (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (2011) have marked the path of a process which places Capacity Development at the centre of the development partnership as a key outcome of Technical Cooperation.

The EC is in the front line of such a process. To improve performance in this area the EC developed a Backbone Strategy in July 2008 on 'Reforming Technical Cooperation and Project Implementation Units for External Aid provided by the European Commission'[[36]](#footnote-37). This was based on a number of preparatory reports and a comprehensive internal consultation process.

The Backbone Strategy identifies four purposes of TC:

* Capacity Development of organisations and individuals;
* Provision of policy and/or expert advice;
* Strengthening implementation (of services, investments and regulatory activities); and
* Preparation/facilitation of EC cooperation (or broader donor cooperation).

Implementation of the Backbone Strategy is now under way, as set out within an agreed work plan published in July 2008[[37]](#footnote-38) and October 2009, and according to a set of guidelines published in March 2009 entitled 'Making Technical Cooperation More Effective'[[38]](#footnote-39).

In all the categories identified above, directly or indirectly, Capacity Development is the main outcome of Technical Cooperation and is the basis of its sustainability. This is why a specific methodology to evaluate Capacity Development in the programmes with a significant TC component has been established by the EC (2012)[[39]](#footnote-40). Based on such methodology, a Rapid Assessment tool for Capacity Development (RAC) has been defined and tested[[40]](#footnote-41). The present evaluation is an application of the RAC.

The RAC uses a terminology that needs to be unambiguously defined to facilitate the task of the evaluators. A glossary of the most common terms and concepts used is provided below.

|  |
| --- |
| **GLOSSARY**  **Capacity:** according to DAC-OECD definition, it refers to the ability of people, organizations, and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully  *Capacity development* is the process by which people, organizations and society as a whole create, strengthen and maintain their capacity over time.  **Process:** It is the learning path for the acquisition of certain capacities. It is a mix of individual and organisational achievements, including formal knowledge, practice and interaction among individuals, among organisations and between individuals and organisations.  **Capacity outputs:** These are the changes in the internal competences of the beneficiary institution (or system of institutions); they are determined and/or induced directly by a specific support programme or by internal inputs and are facilitated/limited by external factors. These changes do not represent new capacities by themselves, but they identify areas where institutional / individual competence is likely to have been increased. They may include: new staff capacities acquired through training, stages, etc.; new methods of work, approaches and policies, through specific TC; new institutional responsibilities and structures, through institutional review and design; other not specified and/or unexpected.  **Capacity outcomes:** These include acquisition and development from the beneficiary institution of new levels of capacity. While capacity outputs refer to specific competences and skills, capacity outcomes refer to new behaviours and strengths of the institution(s) applicable in different fields. The capacity outcomes may be the result of a *process* of appropriation and mainstreaming of the capacity outputs, and or may be determined by external factors. In general both internal and external factors contribute to their determination. To facilitate the identification of the capacity outcomes, they have been classified into broad categories as follows:    ***INITIATIVE:*** Capacity of an institution to generate plans that reflect its needs and its mission, and to consider the changing contexts; and its capacity to mobilize financial and managerial resources to execute them.  ***LINK TO RESULTS:*** Capacity of an institution to achieve and monitor the “developmental results” stated in national and “departmental” plans in a sustainable manner.  ***NETWORKING:*** Capacity of an institution to work in a coordinated and efficient manner as part of a larger network of interested stakeholders.  ***ADAPTATION:*** Capacity of an institution to constantly adapt in response to changing external environments and conditions.  ***COHERENCE (between the four previous categories; linking the strategic and operational levels):*** Capacity of an institution to put in place policy and management frameworks that build on one another and provide evidence of a clear chain of results from the strategic level to the operational level.  **Opportunity Framework:** Refers to the opportunities for growth and strengthening of an institution or system in a given context. It includes the historical political and economic momentum, the regional and international partnerships, and the sectoral political economy within the related reform process. The OF may drive or limit the change in the institution(s).  **Quality criteria** of the support programme: These refer to the ability of the support programme, or other specific inputs, to generate capacity outputs and enhance a learning process within institutions to enable them to transform such outputs into capacity outcomes. The QCa are included in the EC monitoring programme (QSG). They refer to: relevance to the context, ownership, strategic focus, harmonisation, appropriate delivery modalities. |

1. **Background on the programme for which a rac is required**

The present study will assess the role of TC in generating capacity development in the institution(s) involved in the execution of the PROGRAMME XXXXXX**.**

**ADD background on the EC intervention to be assessed**

**Specify the rationale of the intervention and the institutions involved**

1. **Scope and objectives of the evaluation**
   1. **Scope**

The evaluation will assess the capacity development process in the institution(s) involved, in relation to the support programme mentioned above. The evaluation will not assess the effects of the support programme as such, but will focus on the CD process as explained in the methodology for CD evaluation.

The Figure below shows the distinction as well as the links between the standard chain of effects and the CD chain of effects.

**Figure 7: Standard and CD chains of effects**



* 1. **Objectives**

The evaluation will provide a rapid, but rigorous, assessment of the capacity development process in the beneficiary institution(s), in relation to the support programme and other internal and external factors. This will provide lessons for improving the effectiveness of EC technical cooperation and increasing the ownership of the aid framework.

1. **The evaluation tasks, according to the RAC method**
   1. **The Intervention Logic**

The evaluation will apply the Intervention Logic as shown in the Figure below. The RAC is not a special methodology. It is a simplified application of the full methodology adopted by the EC for evaluating the Capacity Development effects of TC interventions[[41]](#footnote-42). The RAC procedure refers to the standard steps and EQs formulated in the full methodology. Its simplification consists of systematic use of existing documentation to acquire the preliminary information, adoption of participatory methods for data collection on outputs and outcomes, and validation of the related causality links.

The evaluation will be structured in accordance with:

* one preliminary assessment covering the Enabling Factors and the Inputs, as shown in the first column of the IL;
* a Step 1, to assess the capacity outputs, as in the second column of the IL, and their causal links with the quality and implementation of the inputs and the external factors (opportunity framework);
* a Step 2, to assess the capacity outcomes, as in the third column of the IL, and their causal links with the capacity outputs and the external factors (opportunity framework);
* a Step 3, covering causal relationships between inputs (first column of the IL) and capacity outcomes (third column of the IL) and the role of external factors (opportunity framework).

**Figure 8: proposed standard IL for the evaluation of capacity development support**



* 1. **Preliminary assessment**
     1. **Content of the preliminary assessment**

This phase includes:

* an assessment of the Opportunity Framework with a view to highlighting the political and economic context in which the beneficiary institution or system operates and the related driving factors; *and*
* an assessment of the Quality Criteria of the support programme(s) included in the evaluation[[42]](#footnote-43).

The assessment of the OF will tell the evaluators to what extent the institution is embedded in a conducive environment, and will be used to facilitate better understanding of the causality links in the CD process, in both Steps 1 and 2.

The assessment of the QCa will highlight how the support programme(s) fits both the OF and the internal institutional dynamics so as to enhance the capacity development process.

The standard EQs to be asked in this assessment are shown in the table below.

**Table 9: Standard EQs for the preliminary assessment**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **EQ relating to:** | **Statement of the EQ** |
| EQ1: Opportunity Framework./1 | To what extent do the country’s historical momentum, growth and partnership opportunities, and other existing contextual factors, affect the institutional context of the CD action? |
| EQ2: Opportunity Framework./2 | To what extent do the reform records of the government and the political environment affect the institutional context of the CD action? |
| EQ3: Quality Criteria | To what extent does the support programme under evaluation respond to the Quality Criteria established by the EC Backbone strategy for Technical Cooperation, including relevance to the context[[43]](#footnote-44), ownership of targeted institution(s), strategic focus, harmonisation and appropriate delivery modalities? |

An identification of the inputs of the support programme is carried out in this preliminary phase, taking account of their implicit and explicit CD content.

* + 1. **RAC modality of the preliminary assessment**

In the RAC modality, such assessments should be available before the exercise starts:

* the general and sectoral OF should be highlighted in the basic programming documents at country [or regional] level. However rapid supplementation of the analysis may be necessary, through specific and easily accessible documents and interviews.
* the QCa should be addressed and assessed in the regular monitoring documentation. It is possible however that either the relevant assessments do not have a sufficient focus on CD, or the programme has not yet been covered by the monitoring mission, and in such a case a short supplementary analysis may again be necessary.
  1. **Step 1: assessment of capacity outputs and their causes**
     1. **Content of Step 1**

The standard EQs to be asked in this assessment are shown in the table below.

**Table 10: Standard EQs for STEP 1**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| EQ4: Outputs - staff competences | To what extent did the programme or other inputs contribute to production of objectively verifiable changes in staff competences (legal, financial, data processing, management…)? How did external factors affect such changes? |
| EQ5: Outputs - procedures and functions | To what extent did the programme or other inputs contribute to production of objectively verifiable changes in institutional procedures and functions (policy and financing, stakeholders’ involvement, accountability and supervision)? How did external factors affect such changes? |
| EQ6: Outputs - organisations | To what extent did the programme or other inputs contribute to the production of objectively verifiable changes in the organisational and internal functioning (institutional structure, decision process, internal mobility and competition)? How did external factors affect such changes? |
| EQ7: Outputs - unexpected | To what extent did the programme or other inputs contribute to the production of objectively verifiable changes in respect of individuals, organisations or initiatives that were not targeted? How did external factors affect such changes? |

* + 1. **RAC modality for Step 1**

In the RAC modality such assessments should be addressed through the administration of a Questionnaire (see annex). The Questionnaire has to be adapted to the specific context, and the modality of administration of the Questionnaire may also vary according to the context (see the Box on “Stakeholders’ participation modalities”). During the preliminary phase, in parallel with the preliminary assessment, the evaluation team has to undertake the adaptation of the Questionnaire and identify the most suitable methods of enhancing stakeholder participation.

* 1. **STEP 2: assessment of capacity outcomes and their determinants**
     1. **Content of Step 2**

The standard EQs to be asked in this assessment are shown in the table below.

**Table 11: Standard EQs for STEP 2**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| EQ8: Initiative | To what extent is the institution more capable of generating plans (at strategic or other levels) that reflect its stated needs, mission and various changing environments and then mobilizing its resources and management to execute them? |
| EQ9: Results | To what extent is the institution more capable of achieving and monitoring the “developmental results” stated in national and departmental plans in a sustainable manner? |
| EQ10: Networking | To what extent is the institution accountable and capable of working in a coordinated and efficient manner as part of a wider network of interested stakeholders? |
| EQ11: Adaptation | To what extent is the institution in a position to adapt constantly in response to changing external environments and conditions? |
| EQ12: Coherence | To what extent has the institution succeeded in putting in place policy and management frameworks that build on one another and provide evidence of a clear chain of results from the strategic level to the operational level? |
| EQ13: Unexpected outcomes | How have non-planned and/or context-specific capabilities (developed as a result of Capacity Development efforts in the institution) improved or reduced the overall capacity of the institution to carry out its vision and achieve its objectives? |
| EQ14 to 17: Causality links | To what extent have the institutional capacity outputs and/or other factors related to the OF contributed to each of the above-mentioned capacity outcomes (initiative, results, networking and adaptation). |

* + 1. **RAC modality for Step 2**

In the RAC modality, such assessments should be addressed through the administration of a Questionnaire (see annex). The Questionnaire has to be adapted to the specific context and the modality of administration of the Questionnaire may also vary according to the context (see the Box on “Stakeholders’ participation modalities”). During the preliminary phase, in parallel with the preliminary assessment, the evaluation team has to undertake the adaptation of the Questionnaire and identify the most suitable methods of enhancing stakeholders’ participation.

* 1. **STEP 3: assessment of the links between inputs and capacity outcomes**
     1. **Content of Step 3**

The 3-Step method stresses that it is difficult to find a linear causality link between inputs and outcomes of a complex action. This is why the evaluation process is split in two parts (Step 1 and Step 2) while a third, synthesis, part (Step 3) allows identification of the causality link between CD inputs and CD outcomes. Step 3 consists of a systematic comparison of the results of Steps 1 and 2. Step 2 shows how changes in competences and other experiences have contributed (or not) to an increase in capacity outcomes, in the framework of a given context. Step 1 shows how the programme inputs have had any influence on such competences and experiences, again in the framework of a given context. Step 3 highlights the transitive relationship between inputs and outcomes. Formulating specific EQs for such an assessment is unnecessary.

* + 1. **RAC modality for Step 3**

In the RAC modality, the Step 3 assessment includes, as in the full approach, a phase of validation of the assessments of both Steps 1 and 2. In the RAC modality, such validation will be done with the same stakeholders who have replied to the Questionnaires, possibly through group sessions (institutionally homogeneous), with the application of coaching techniques (see Box).

During the validation, clear hypotheses will be formulated on the contribution of the inputs and other factors to the capacity outcomes, but such hypotheses will consolidated through further analytical work.

If possible, a final workshop with the participation of all stakeholders will complete the validation process and the discussion of the hypotheses. If this is not possible, a final meeting of presentation and possible discussion of the preliminary conclusions of the assessment may be carried out. Following the validation meetings the evaluation team will go through the Questionnaires, the stories attached to the Questionnaires, and the records of the group sessions, and will then draft the RAC final report, thereby drawing Step 3 to its conclusion.

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| --- |
| **Enhancing stakeholders’ participation**  The RAC is a participatory method and needs specific efforts and techniques to enhance the participation of the stakeholders. Although the Questionnaire is the basic tool for involving the participants, its administration must be adapted to the specific contexts.  The evaluated stakeholders should be put in a position to become an active part of the exercise, avoiding the dichotomy between the evaluator and the subject of the evaluation. The evaluated stakeholder, individual or institution should clearly identify a direct interest in faithful participation in the process and have immediate feedback to generate greater awareness of the learning process. At the end of the exercise each participant will have the means to respond to two questions:   * what knowledge and capacities have I acquired as an individual and as part of my institutional system? * what is still missing in relation to the requirements of the institution’s mission, and –as a consequence – for individual professional careers?   Such conditions motivate the evaluated stakeholder to participate actively in the evaluation exercises, including the individual interviews and the group work. To create such conditions in the short time available is not an easy task and requires adaptation to the contexts. For instance, an ‘extreme’ situation or a mix of situations may apply: for example the institutions involved are relatively frustrated and demotivated because of a difficult environment and negative experiences; or they are particularly varied with very different levels of motivation and contradictory pressure from the external environment; or they are significantly motivated thank to a conducive environment and positive recent experiences. It is likely to happen that the stronger the motivation, the greater the opportunity to organize the work in a collective manner. Anyway the team should plan to combine individual and collective work as appropriate to obtain the strongest possible participation.  **Adapting the Questionnaire**   1. The opportunity framework   The standard Questionnaire – for considerations relating to both time and opportunity – does not include a specific section on the OF, as this is directly addressed by the team in the preliminary phase and then is reconsidered in the Questionnaire through the questions on the role of external factors, in both the *outputs* and the *outcomes* sections.  In any particular framework, however, the Questionnaire may be used to integrate the preliminary assessment of the OF through the introduction of some initial questions such as: “what was the degree of fertilization for the development of capacities at the beginning of the evaluated programme?” and “what are the contextual factors that have facilitated or negatively affected the Programme actions in respect of stakeholders’ capacity development?”   1. The capacity outputs   The standard Questionnaire introduces a number of questions according to the basic categories of capacity outputs. The team may prefer, however, to start from an open question, such as: “what have the individuals and the institution learned since the programme started, in terms of specific skills, new operations and organisation?” Then the other questions on the individual categories of capacity outputs may be introduced and explained.   1. The capacity outcomes   Addressing this section of the standard Questionnaire may require some explanation of the concept of capacity outcome. To clarify the concept, the team may ask a general question, such as: “which of the new acquirements (capacity outputs) is currently mainstreamed and used in the institutional work, so as to highlight a possible change in institutional behaviour?” and “what is the level of consolidation and generalisation of such institutional behaviour?”  Here again it is possible to start from an open question and then regroup the answers according to the basic categories of capacity outcomes.   1. The causality links   The standard Questionnaire has specific questions on the causality links in both the *outputs* and *outcomes* sections. Here the interviewees are requested to provide examples and stories that may justify their opinions on the causality links. In some cases the interviewee may be requested to write down a short story to be annexed to the Questionnaire. Such justification will be submitted to further validation through collective and analytical methods.   1. Planning **the administration of the Questionnaire**   The ideal would be: (i) to administer the Questionnaire on an individual basis, so as to have the concentration and ease of addressing in detail all the basic questions, according to the knowledge and the interest of the interviewee; and (ii) to organise significant group work to integrate and validate the Questionnaire. In particular the group work should be done at two different levels, including both stakeholders of the same institution and stakeholders of different institutions; the first will be mainly used to validate and integrate the individual questionnaires, the second in the phase of processing the Questionnaires to validate the main conclusions of the evaluation.  Such ideal organisation should fulfil a number of conditions linked to two basic issues:   1. The issue of time. An individual interview will last between one and two hours. A group session in the same institution may last not less than a couple of hours. A final workshop with the different institutions involved may last half a day. An average exercise must be planned in order to carry out 10-15 individual interviews, two or more institutional working groups, and one final inter-institutional workshop. 2. The issue of opportunity (in many cases). The stakeholders may be not fully available to express their views and may be reluctant to share them with colleagues and partners. In such cases the individual interviews will be cross-checked among individuals of the same institution and among different institutions belonging to the same system. The final workshop may be organised as a detailed presentation with discussion between stakeholders. One should not infer that in this case there would be poor participation thagt would affect the quality of the results; there are different techniques for acquiring information and cross-checking its content.   The group sessions may be organised using group-coaching techniques. A minimum of expertise in this area would be required, ideally for local experts. |

1. **Outputs of the evaluation**

Inception note. At the end of the Preliminary assessment, the team will prepare a short inception note (maximum five pages), where the enabling factors are summarised, as from the preliminary information acquired, the adapted Questionnaire is attached and a plan for the interviews, possible validation groups and the final workshop is established. The inception note is presented to the Delegation and the partner institution, discussed and finalised during a single meeting at the end of the preliminary phase.

RAC report. At the end of the RAC exercise, the evaluation team will prepare a RAC report, as per the standard format provided in Annex.

1. **Timing and organisation of the work**

The RAC is implemented in five stages:

1. **Preparatory work** (international expert - team leader with the support of the local expert for the agenda) – 2-3 days
   * Reading of basic programme documents (financing proposal, monitoring and/or evaluation reports).
   * Preliminary drafting of the programme’s Intervention Logic
   * Agenda prepared in collaboration with the EUD and programme staff and updated, if needed, *in situ.*
2. **Inception phase** (all team in situ) – approx. one week
   * Briefing of the EUD and the key counterparts on the objectives and the method of the evaluation. The team should have short meetings with as many of the potential interviewees, to understand their concerns and attitudes to the evaluation. During such meetings the distinction between standard programme evaluation and CD evaluation should be made clear, as well as that between capacity outputs and outcomes. If possible, short group meetings should be organised during this phase, to start and demonstrate the evaluation process. This will provide data for adaptation and increase the attractiveness of the exercise.
   * Training of the staff (namely the national expert) on the methodology.
   * Enabling factors: the existing assessments should be checked and completed:
     + Opportunity framework (using documentation and interviews)
     + Quality criteria (idem)
   * Adaptation and planning of the Questionnaire, interviews and validation meetings.
   * Inception note: drafting, submission, discussion and approval
3. **Administration of the questionnaire** (national expert(s) in situ) – approx. two weeks
   * The standard questionnaire (see Annex) is adapted, according to the findings of the inception phase. It has to be tailored to the specific context and institution(s).
   * The questionnaire is used as a guide for interviews and aims at detailed assessment of the capacity development process while providing specific examples on the capacity outputs and capacity outcomes generated.
   * The interviewees should be selected from a few relevant persons (or groups of persons) within and outside the targeted institution: within the institution, the interviews should involve the heads and/or key staff of the few departments involved in the targeted areas, along with other staff with more general responsibilities. Outside the institution, representatives of the civil society (users) and the political world (Parliament commissions, etc.) should be involved.
   * The average number of interviews may range from 5 to 9 internal staff and from 4 to 6 external people, with a total of 9-15 key interviews.
   * The duration of the interview should range from one to two hours, so as to allow the national expert to complete the whole task in a maximum of ten days, apart from preparation and processing. In situations where expression of opinions is believed to be relatively free, the questionnaire may be given to the interviewees a few days or hours before the interview, to facilitate replies.
   * After the interviews findings will be analysed and classified according to the various CD outputs and outcomes. For each group of outputs and outcomes, findings will be presented in tabular form, and will be ranked according to the strength of their evidence (strong, medium, weak). Examples will be highlighted as a complement to the tabular presentation. Findings will be presented in an anonymous way, although the distinction between inside/outside the institution will be maintained.
4. **Synthesis phase** (all team in situ) – approx. one week
   * Cross-checking and validation of the data of the Questionnaire, including group meetings by institution.
   * Preparation of the final workshop (material to be presented and disseminated).
   * Workshop. The workshop is intended as an in-depth and joint analysis (involving all key stakeholders: EUD, national institutions, beneficiaries) of the enabling factors and of the capacity outputs and capacity outcomes and their determining factors (STEP 1 and STEP 2 of the methodology). It also involves discussion of the key hypotheses on the correlation between programme inputs and capacity outcomes, and the role of the OF (STEP 3 of the methodology).
5. **Final report** (all team) – approx. one week
   * Elaboration of the RAC report as per standard format.
   * The RAC report presents the findings of the different stages of the RAC and uses the results of the workshop to complete the assessment. It will provide evidence to check and justify the Step 3 assessments on the respective contribution to the capacity outcomes and the related interaction of the programme’s inputs and the Opportunity Framework.
6. **Summary of the necessary inputs and time**



The RAC exercise will require the following operations and the related inputs:

1. **Responsibility for the Management and the Monitoring of the RAC**

The RAC is carried out under the operational responsibility of the EUD, JEU being responsible for the technical inputs (provision of standard ToR, identification of international experts) and methodological supervision (quality control of the final report).

1. **the** **Evaluation Team**

The average exercise requires a basic Evaluation Team composed of one international expert and one national expert, with advanced knowledge and experience of:

* capacity development and institutional strengthening issues, preferably with experience in individual and organisational coaching;
* evaluation of capacity cooperation and capacity development;
* sector and thematic expertise (**to be adapted**); *and*
* data collection and analysis (especially qualitative).

In several cases the number of experts may be increased. An additional international expert may be needed if group work is particularly important and it is difficult to find local experts with coaching expertise. More than one national expert may be necessary in the case of regional programmes and/or where the necessary expertise is available.

The team should have a good mix of experts in order to complete the different tasks. The team will need to work in **XXXXX**, and possess excellent drafting skills.

The team leader must have sound understanding of EC evaluation methodology and possess considerable experience of managing evaluations of a similar size and character.

Evaluators must not have any direct involvement with the programme under consideration.

**ANNEXES TO THE TOR**

**Annex A to the TOR: Standard RAC questionnaire**

The standard version of the RAC Questionnaire, as presented below, needs quick adaptation to the specific countries and programmes, and includes two parts: one on the CD outputs and another on the CD outcomes. The questionnaire uses the standard EQs, in a simplified version.

1. **Questionnaire on Capacity Outputs**

**[the interviewees should be briefed on the fact that the capacity outputs include new knowledge and abilities acquired by groups of staff or by institutional units, and that are expected to be mainstreamed into normal institutional life, although not necessarily mainstreamed and consolidated as new sustainable institutional behaviour]:**

1. STAFF: during the last X years, has the institution shown any significant change in terms of staff competences?
   * more and/or better trained staff (provide details)
   * new sectoral/ thematic competences (provide details)
   * knowledge of and links with the experience of similar institutions in other countries (provide details)
   * better career opportunities (provide details)
2. ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONS: during the last X years, has the institution shown any significant change in terms of organisation, procedures and responsibilities?
   * new or strengthened units or functions for data processing, policy and financing (provide details, e.g.: donor coordination, MTEF procedures, control and inspectorate capacities, sectoral policy units, decentralised structure, etc.)
   * improved consultation of stakeholders, e.g. surveys, consultation with civil society organisation, dialogue with political representatives and parliament (provide details)
   * other significant changes in organisation, procedures, functions (provide details)
   * any change in the decision-making process, such as improved evidence-based decisions (provide details)
3. UNEXPECTED: during the last X years has the institution shown any other significant change in terms of competences and capabilities acquired? (provide details)
4. CAUSALITY: Do you think that any of the major changes mentioned above is related to Support Programme YYY? On the other hand, what has been the contribution to such major changes in other factors (internal and/or external). For each major change mentioned above, please specify:
   * how the programme contributed (synthesised description of the contribution provided)
   * what other factors affected the change and how (internal factors, factors linked to the context).
5. **Questionnaire on CD outcomes**

**[the interviewees should be briefed on the fact that the CD outcomes include changes that have shown continuity over time and have become a characteristic of the institution applicable in different fields]:**

1. INITIATIVE: do you think that, compared to X years ago, the institution is
   * capable of producing more initiatives (plans, laws, operations)? (Y/N and examples)
   * capable of creating and managing more financial, technological and technical means? (Y/N and examples)
   * appearing socially and institutionally stronger? (Y/N)
2. RESULTS: do you think that the institution, compared to X years ago, is capable of
   * better monitoring of development results? (Y/N and examples)
   * better maintenance of performance records? (Y/N and examples)
   * exercising stronger leadership in policy development, reflecting its effectiveness? (Y/N and examples)
3. NETWORKING: do you think that the institution, compared to X years ago, is capable of
   * being better recognised and trusted by stakeholders and counterparts (social and political)? (Y/N and examples)
   * being more listened to by politicians when addressing relevant policy issues? (Y/N and examples)
   * establishing better relations and networking links inside (other institutions, e.g. universities, other ministries) and outside (sister institutions abroad – excluding donors) the country? (Y/N and examples)
4. ADAPTATION: do you think that the institution, compared to X years ago, is capable of
   * better learning from the experience (feed-back mechanisms: results are analysed and discussed and decisions are taken accordingly? (Y/N and examples)
   * better negotiation, selection and management of donor inputs? (Y/N and examples)[[44]](#footnote-45)
   * more efficiently identifying changes in the context and proposing ‘innovations’ (reports, policy proposals, raising awareness) for addressing them? (Y/N and examples)
5. COHERENCE: do you think that the institution, compared to X years ago, is capable of
   * better adapting the management structure to the policy mission and tasks, by increasing staff dynamics, results-based careers, decentralisation, etc.? (Y/N and examples)
   * better governance, in terms of accountability, transparency of decisions, coordination, human resources management? (Y/N and examples)
   * a better systematised and transparent strategic, regulatory and operational framework, including recognised internal leadership? (Y/N and examples)
6. UNEXPECTED: do you think that the institution, compared to X years ago, has acquired other new capacities apart from those you have mentioned above?
   * Can you briefly mention and explain the most significant changes that you would like to stress, apart from those mentioned above?
   * Apart from the mention of any additional change, can you briefly express an overall opinion on capacity change in response to the following question: can you mention one, two or more important things that the institution can now do that it could not do X years ago?
7. CAUSALITY: can you cite the key internal or external factors that have most contributed to the main changes in Capacity Outcomes identified so far? [the interviewer may facilitate the reply by citing factors relating to the capacity outputs and to the OF]. (Provide details)

The Questionnaire will include space for mentioning the required examples and possible stories relating to such examples, which may be annexed by the interviewees when needed.

**Annex B to the TOR: RAC report - standard index**

**(max 20 pages + annexes)**

**1. Introduction**

1.1 Objectives and scope of the RAC exercise

1.2 Purpose of the RAC Note

**Section 1: Intervention logic of the programme and opportunity framework in which it intervenes**

**2. Brief presentation of the programme**

2.1 Objectives and expected results

2.2 Capacity Development component(s) of the programme

2.3 Intervention logic

**3. Assessment of the opportunity framework affecting the beneficiary institution(s)**

3.1 Political and economic momentum at country level, regional context, international partnerships

3.2 Sectoral political economy and related reform process

**4. Quality Criteria of the programme**

4.1 Fit to the context (including political and policy dialogue)

4.2 Ownership

4.3 Link to the CD results

4.4 Harmonisation

4.5 TC delivery methods

**Section 2: effects of the programme in the development of capacity-outputs and capacity-outcomes**

**5. Assessment of the capacity outputs**

5.1 Identification and prioritisation of the acquired capacity-outputs, both expected and unexpected

5.2 Identification of the causality links between the capacity outputs, the programme inputs, other inputs, and the factors related to the OF

**6. Assessment of the capacity outcomes**

6.1 Institutional capacities (capacity outcomes) acquired, in accordance with the basic categories

6.2 Correlations and causality links between capacity outcomes, capacity outputs acquired, other factors and the external factors related to the OF

**7. Correlation between the inputs provided and the capacity-outcomes**

Identification of the specific and combined contribution to the capacity outcomes provided by the support programme, other factors and the external factors related to the OF

**8. Conclusions and recommendations**

**Section 3: Annexes**

9. Annex 1: methodological overview

9.1 Organisation of the mission

9.2 Adaptation of the RAC methodology to the specific case study

10. Annex 2: list of people met

11. Annex 3: sources of information

12. Annex 4: correlation fiches

13. Annex 5: list of capacity outcomes

14. Annex 6: summary and tabular syntheses of the Questionnaires

**ANNEX 3: BACKGROUND key DOCUMENTATION**

XXXXXXXXX

1. OECD-DAC - Guidelines and Reference Series Applying Strategic Environmental Assessment: Good Practice Guidance for Development Co-operation, OECD, Paris, 2006 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. UNDP - Governance for sustainable human development - A UNDP policy document - Glossary of key terms - 1997 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. See the 5Cs approach and the Intervention Logic discussed in Sections 2 and 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. This focus was agreed to with the EC on March 8, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. A DFID-sponsored evaluation of TC notes that “there is a lack of common approach and terminology to CD”. See Oxford Policy Management, “DFID Synthesis Report EV 667- Developing Capacity? An evaluation of DFID-funded Technical Cooperation for Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa”, 2006. See also Mizrahi, Y., “Capacity Enhancement Indicators-Review of the Literature”, World Bank Institute Working Paper, Stock number 37232, 2004 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Many references support this conclusion. These can be found in the longer text of this literature review. While almost all experiences with CD are identified as being inefficient in these texts, the reader is advised to remember that CD is contextual and there are a great many published cases where the CD has been successful and sustainable. The World Bank’s “guidance Note for Project Management –Strengthening Institutional capacity during Project Implementation” October 2005, clearly and unambiguously notes that Project Implementation Units have “failed dismally” in terms of any long-term impact on capacity building”. PIU’s and TC in traditional forms of CD have been identified as a serious problem by the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. For a more comprehensive comparison between the development and the business sector approaches to CD, refer to the proceedings of the EC’s July 4 Conference on CD held in Brussels in 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Grindle, M.S. and Hildebrand, M.E., “ Building Sustainable Capacity in the public sector: what can be done?” Journal of Public Administration and Development, Vol 15, 1995. This publication forms a key pillar of the World Bank Institute’s 2004 paper on capacity denhancement indicators. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Nonaka, I. and Takeuchi, H. (1995) The Knowledge-Creating Company, New York: Oxford University Press [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. The Takeuchi model has, of course, been modified and criticised over time, particularly the concept of “transfer”. The Knowledge Management literature makes a clear distinction between “transfer” (i.e. on the part of the owner of knowledge, and “learning” (i.e. on the part of the recipient. A good overview of these conflicting views and the effect of motivation on learning at an organisational level can be found in Tsoukas, H., “Do We Really Understand Knowledge?” in Easterly-Smith, M. A. et al, “ Organisational Learning and Knowledge”, Blackwell Publishers, 2003 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Fukoda-Parr, S., Lopes, C. and Malik, K., “ Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems”, UNDP-Earthscan Publications, 2002 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Sida [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Mizrahi, Y., “Capacity Enhancement Indicators-Review of the Literature”, World bank institute Papers , 2004 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. For an in-depth assessment of the ROACH, see the Inception Report of this Study, 08/2010, pages 48-52. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Engel, P., Keijzer, N., Land, T. 2007. “A balanced approach to monitoring and evaluating capacity and performance: A proposal for a framework” (ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 58E). Maastricht: ECDPM. See also: ECDPM, 2011, “Bringing the invisible into perspective”: reference document for using the 5Cs framework to plan, monitor and evaluate capacity and results of capacity development processes. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. Samuel Otoo, Natalia Agapitova and Joy Behrens, The Capacity Development Results Framework: A strategic and results-oriented approach to learning for capacity development, World Bank, June 2009, page 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. World Bank Institute, Reviewing Project Results Retrospectively Using a Results-Focused Approach to Capacity Development. WBI June 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. A rapid assessment tool has been proposed by Harry Jones, Simon Hearn in an ODI paper (2009) *Rapid Outcome Assessment (ROA)*, which provides a rapid application of the outcome mapping approach, to assess policy changes. Our proposal is focused on CD and is based on a rapid application of the evaluation methodology proposed in the previous section, through the use of participatory techniques, including Most Significant Changes (MSC), as the main research tool. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Using other instruments, one could emphasise the analysis of the nature and depth of the changes, and give less importance to the causality links, but the assessment of the change processes and its steps would remain the same. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. The nesting concept is common in the evaluation literature. In our particular case, it is implicit in the ROACH and WBI approaches, while the need to unpack the CD process and identify specific CD outputs and outcomes (within a nesting concept) is explained and developed in the Inception Report of the present study. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. E.g.: Rwanda experiences a new political unity and determination emerging from a deep crisis (rebound effect); Ghana experienced a consolidated history of good governance and growth; Zambia combined a long period of high export prices with an important trade and cooperation partnership with China; Ukraine planned support for Europeanization of agricultural policies in 2007, but when the programme started (in 2010) the country developed opposing policy priorities; Bolivia policies to support coca producers reflected strong political commitment on the part of the new government, where the best energies are invested; etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. e.g. the country is included in a fast-growing regional context, the outcomes of which are maximized through specific free trade agreements (e.g.: Vietnam). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. e.g. the case with some ENPI countries, such as Tunisia and Morocco, which have tailored most of their reform processes in the last fifteen years to the integration process with the EU. The impact that has resulted from the expectations of some African countries concerning the establishment of an EPA with the EU is another example. The same applies to different models of partnership (e.g. delivery of commodities against provision of investment), such as those promoted by China with some developing countries. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. These capacities may be identified in different ways, according to the emphasis of the evaluators, either using or maintaining a strong reference to the institution’s mission and functions, or else emphasizing the key behaviour of an institution to fit different missions and specialisations. In a first phase, the present study adopted the first approach, i.e. a mission-based approach. To that end, four key capacities were proposed: capacity to strategize and plan; to mobilize resources; to operate and learn by doing; to manage HR and govern. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. See above, the reference to the 5C approach. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. See EUA, ‘10 year anniversary: Institutional Evaluation Programme’, 2004 and ACCJC ‘Guide to Evaluating Institutions’, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. See the 3-Step approach adopted by the JEU (DEVCO) for the evaluation of Budget Support. According to this approach the causality link between Inputs and Outcomes should be assessed in two different steps: Inputs → Outputs (Step 1), and Outcomes → Outputs (Step 2). In both steps the approach emphasises the role of the contextual factors intervening in the causal relationships as catalyser or independent causes of the effects assessed. This approach should allow the evaluator to overcome the traps of a linear and deterministic relationship between Inputs and Outcomes, which does not exist in reality. The linear approach tends to overlook the complexity of the process and the participation of multiple factors in the determination of the outcomes. In the 3-Step approach the last Step compares the results of the first and second Steps to find out “how and how much” Inputs have – or have not - actually contributed to the determination of Outcomes. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. It should be clear that one can decide to evaluate the CD process in an institution (or system) with or without the presence of specific external support programmes. When there are no external support programmes, only the internal actions directly or indirectly aimed at capacity building will be considered as possible inputs into the process. In such a case there is no assessment of the QCa. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. The enlargement of the idea of context to the notion of OF implies an adaptation of the standard QCa. Of particular importance are the political and policy dialogue associated to the support programme, to enable a close interaction with the OF, namely with respect to sectoral policies and/or comprehensive partnerships. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. This evaluation methodology uses the same methods as most evaluation methodologies to assess and validate the causality links: i.e. building simple counterfactuals in the Step 1 (including before/after and with/without comparisons, based on informed advices), and also using different quantitative methods in Step 2, according to the complexity of the evaluation. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. The three-Step approach has been positively tested in several multi-donor Budget Support evaluations led by the EC DEVCO Evaluation Unit (Tunisia, Mali and Zambia). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. This synoptic table is taken from the Progress report of April 2011, the terminology used has been reviewed [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. Here the OF has been addressed through two specific questions (OF/1 and OF/2). According to the context, it could be addressed with one EQ, using the JCs to treat the specificities of the various features contributing to the OF. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Here the QCa have been merged into one EQ, but disaggregated in five JCs. Different approaches could be justified by the context. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. One of the 5Cs proposed by ECDPM, based on the management principles outlined in Konrad, A.M. et al, “Human Resource Management Practices For Achieving Diversity Advantage: Determinants And Outcomes Of The Configuration Of Diversity Management Structures”, ASAC conference paper, 2006 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. EC Backbone Strategy on 'Reforming Technical Cooperation and Project Implementation Units for External Aid provided by the European Commission': <http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/backbone_strategy_technical_cooperation_en.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. Backbone Strategy Work Plan: <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/backbone-strategy-core-documents> [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. EC Tools and Methods Series, Guidelines No. 3, Making Technical Cooperation More Effective: <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/backbone-strategy-core-documents> [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. AidCo - Evaluation Methodology and Baseline Study of European Commission Technical Cooperation Support (Final Report) - 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. Ibidem [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. Iidem [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. It should be clear that one can decide to evaluate the CD process in an institution (or system) with or without the presence of specific external support programmes. When there are no external support programmes, only the internal actions directly or indirectly aimed at capacity building will be considered as possible inputs of the process. In such case, there is no assessment of the QCa. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. The enlargement of the idea of context to the notion of OF implies an adaptation of the standard QCa. Of particular importance is the political and policy dialogue associated with the support programme, to facilitate close interaction with the OF, namely with respect to sectoral policies and/or comprehensive partnerships. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. This issue could be addressed either here or under Networking. It is only a matter of classification. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)