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Programme

# A Report from the Office of Evaluation



*Strategic Evaluation of the Effectiveness of  
WFP Livelihood Recovery Interventions*

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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# Acronyms

ALNAP	The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CFW	Cash for work
CHS	Community Household Surveillance
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Assessment
ESFP	Expanded School Feeding Programme
EMOP	Emergency Operation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FFA	Food for assets
FFE	Food for education
FFT	Food for training
FFR	Food for recovery
FFW	Food for work
FHH	Female-headed households
FSRP	Food Security Rehabilitation Project
GFD	General food distribution
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IP	Implementing Partner
LICUS	Low income countries under stress
MCHN	Mother and child health and nutrition
MFI	Micro-finance institutions
NFI	Non-food item
NGO	Non governmental organisation
ODOC	Other direct operational costs
OECD/DAC	Office for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Directorate
PSNP	Productive Safety Nets Programme
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
SFP	Supplementary feeding programmes
TFC	Therapeutic feeding centres
UN	United Nations
WFP	World Food Programme



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# Executive Summary

1. This evaluation examines the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of WFP's support to people's recovery of their livelihoods after disasters. The objectives of this evaluation were to assess how far WFP interventions are meeting their stated and implicit recovery and livelihoods objectives and to encourage learning for WFP to improve its recovery related programming. It considers both EMOPs and PRROs and all food assistance activities. Relief activities as well as those with explicit recovery objectives may have an impact on restoring livelihoods in recovery contexts. The intended audience for the evaluation are WFP staff, executive board members, cooperating partners who play a critical role in delivering recovery interventions and UN agencies, NGOs and governments engaged in recovery programming, with links to WFP's work.
2. The evaluation used a mixture of methods and information sources, including a document review, interviews with WFP, partner and government staff, and semi-structured individual interviews and group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Field based research was carried out for five country case studies: Colombia, Lesotho, Uganda, Nepal and Bangladesh. These were complemented by desk analysis of recovery issues in Pakistan, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia and a wider desk review of WFP documentation and the secondary literature on livelihoods and recovery. The Sustainable Livelihoods approach formed the analytical framework for the evaluation.

## Relevance

3. Under the heading of relevance criteria the evaluation examines needs assessments, the internal coherence of WFP policies and interventions and external coherence with government, partners and donors, project design and appropriateness in relation to livelihoods recovery.
4. *Needs:* Assessments in the country case studies showed several examples of good practice in utilising a livelihoods framework for examining issues around recovery. However, assessments often do not make clear recommendations about choices between different programme options or analyse the appropriateness of food assistance and particular mechanisms and modalities. Initial assessments and programme design were not always updated to reflect changing livelihoods recovery needs.
5. *External and Internal Coherence:* WFP's strategic and policy commitments to supporting livelihoods recovery are consistent with good practice. They recognise that there is a need for support to recovery to start early and often be provided at the same time and in addition to relief. Many of the donors interviewed both at a country and executive board level for the evaluation questioned the strength of the case that WFP was making for support to recovery and argued the need for a more tightly defined recovery role, with clearer exit strategies which focuses more carefully on where food assistance is most appropriate. Recovery objectives within project documents were generally in line with WFP policies and consistently refer back to the strategic objectives to which they relate.
6. *Project Design:* The evaluation team found that limited connections were made between the findings of needs assessments and the design of programmes. Log-frames were often weak reducing the likelihood of effective monitoring of livelihood outcomes. Project documents often lack clarity about the reasons for including some types of activities under recovery labels. Nutrition and food for education programmes in particular are often labelled as recovery activities with little clear logic explaining how they relate to livelihoods recovery. There has been a striking lack of outcome related corporate level indicators relating to livelihoods recovery and the indicators being used in log-frames at country level remain largely output based and focused on amounts of food delivered, numbers of assets built or training delivered.



7. *Appropriateness*: One dimension of appropriateness is whether or not the use of cash as an alternative or complement to food aid is being assessed and used. The new strategic plan contains a clear commitment to using cash where it is appropriate, assessments are starting to examine the role of cash and projects using cash are being implemented. WFP is still only considering cash as a direct alternative for food aid rather than examining ways in which cash can be used differently to support livelihoods. An alternative use that could be considered is lump sum cash grants which could enable people to invest in productive assets and kick-start processes of recovery.

## Efficiency

8. This section examines issues relating to targeting and coverage, monitoring and evaluation, channels of delivery and institutional arrangements within WFP and with partners.
9. *Targeting and Coverage*: A consistent theme from some of the country case studies and other recent evaluations is that fewer activities with explicit recovery objectives are implemented than planned, primarily due to funding shortfalls and the prioritisation of relief. In relation to targeting, a particular issue is that evidence suggests that food for assets can rarely be entirely self targeting in poor countries and that assuming it is can lead to serious issues of exclusion.
10. *Monitoring and Evaluation*: Monitoring of livelihoods recovery has largely focused on outputs and neglected outcomes and impact. WFP needs to do more to analyse the impact of food assistance in relation to its contribution to supporting processes of recovery and people's own efforts to build stronger livelihoods. There were some good practice examples in several of the case study countries where WFP had made significant efforts to generate learning around livelihoods issues. There is also a disconnection between monitoring and evaluation and programming adjustments. Monitoring data is also too often being collected but not adequately analysed or documented, inhibiting learning. To generate better understanding of recovery outcomes greater use of qualitative approaches is needed to complement quantitative monitoring.
11. *Channels of Delivery*: General food distributions are often the food assistance mechanism being implemented on the largest scale. They need fewer non-food resources and so are more suited to WFP's tonnage based funding model. General food distribution is usually presented as a relief intervention with basic life-saving objectives to alleviate immediate hunger and meet basic needs. In contexts where peoples' livelihoods are recovering general food distributions are also likely to have recovery impacts. By helping people to meet basic needs, general food distributions can free up income and enable people to make their own investments in recovery. The most efficient mechanism for supporting livelihoods recovery in some contexts, therefore, may simply be continuing to provide general food distributions.
12. A consistent finding from the country case studies was that WFP was sometimes delegating most of the responsibility for the technical adequacy, safety and sustainability of assets built through FFA onto partners and framing WFP's role purely in terms of food delivery. School feeding often has mixed educational and food security objectives. The education objectives are often stressed and there is relative neglect of the food security rationale.
13. *Internal Institutional Arrangements*: WFP's tonnage based funding system is a key constraint to the ability of WFP and its partners to effectively implement livelihood recovery related activities. The basic dilemma is that support costs are tied to food aid tonnage but that recovery activities need greater support costs due to more complex implementation at the same time as food aid tonnages are often reduced. This continues to present constraints to investing sufficiently in the capacities of staff and partners and the non-food costs needed to implement more effective recovery programmes.



14. In order to deliver effective livelihood recovery related programmes WFP staff require skills in analysing livelihoods and implementing livelihood focussed activities. In several of the case study countries, most WFP staff had little exposure to conceptual models, such as DFID's sustainable livelihoods framework, or international best practice in post-disaster livelihoods recovery or integrated relief and recovery programming approaches. The skills and resources of cooperating partners are also critical to effectiveness and the availability of strong partners able to bring complementary resources into programmes was critical to programming quality. WFP was starting in some of the case study countries to be more strategic in its selection of partners.
15. *External Institutional Arrangements:* There was generally positive feedback from country case studies of WFP's role in coordination and partnerships. Real efforts were being made by WFP to align its recovery relating programming with governments and other actors. WFP is becoming increasingly engaged in policy discussions around transitions from relief to longer term social protection approaches.
16. Food assistance alone is often insufficient to support recovery of livelihoods. In several of the country case studies a key issue in relation to recovery is that people were receiving very little livelihoods assistance other than food aid. WFP could have played a stronger catalytic role in trying to bring in other actors to provide complementary assistance. In recovery contexts WFP needs to simultaneously maintain its humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence and development principles of support to greater harmonisation, alignment and government ownership. Greater attention needs to be given to how to reconcile these principles and maintain a constructive but critical engagement with governments around issues relating to livelihoods recovery, such as relief exit strategies and transitions to safety nets.

### **Results of WFP Livelihood Recovery Interventions – Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability**

17. *Effectiveness:* WFP food assistance in the countries reviewed appears to be helping people to meet immediate food needs and mitigate negative coping strategies but is less effective at supporting processes of recovery through restoring the key productive assets needed for stronger livelihoods. For livelihoods recovery assistance to be effective it also needs to be timely. Timeframes for livelihood recovery activities are often too short and need to be implemented over a longer period. Recovery related activities also often need to be implemented earlier and simultaneously with relief.
18. *Impact:* The greatest recovery impact of WFP food assistance is sometimes the impact of continuing relief. In the case study countries and many previous evaluations, however, the volume of assistance being provided was not sufficient to have any significant effect on processes of livelihoods and asset recovery, beyond alleviating short term food insecurity. Impact is often reduced by funding shortfalls resulting in recovery focussed activities being cut back, widespread sharing of rations and individual households only being able to work for a short time on food for assets projects due to targeting difficulties.
19. *Sustainability:* A critical dimension of sustainability is how well WFP is developing and implementing exit strategies from its livelihood recovery related activities. In several of the case study countries, WFP was forced through funding constraints to abruptly cease rather than phase out activities. There is a need to undertake stronger contingency planning to avoid cutting off activities at short notice and to provide more planned and gradual transitions when faced with funding or pipeline constraints. Exit strategies need to include advocacy with development donors and government to develop policies and programmes to address needs previously covered by WFP.



## Conclusions

20. WFP's commitments to support livelihoods recovery in its strategic plan and policies are not yet translating into quality recovery programming in many contexts. Some of the constraints to this are financial, linked to both donor scepticism about WFP's recovery role and its tonnage based funding model and other constraints are linked to design and implementation issues that could be strengthened.
21. There is a rich body of international experience and developing good practice within WFP to draw on in terms of livelihoods recovery analysis and programming. The growing interest in support to early recovery, renewed attention to a 'recovery gap' in financing instruments and an emerging donor focus on support to fragile states are trends which could help WFP to address recovery funding challenges. The ability of WFP to provide cash as well as or instead of food aid where appropriate provides new opportunities for supporting the recovery of livelihoods. A growing interest in long-term safety nets as a response to chronic poverty represents an opportunity for WFP to carve out a role in making transitions from recurrent relief to support to government owned safety nets.
22. WFP needs to define more clearly what its role should be in recovery contexts and then demonstrate that it can programme recovery related activities more effectively in order to secure wider donor support for a role in recovery. To this end, it is important that HQ and senior management clearly signal a greater priority for livelihood recovery programming by investing greater resources to support the roll out of relevant corporate policies and programme guidance and to develop the skills of operational staff so that they are better equipped to understand and support processes of livelihood recovery.
23. In terms of livelihood objectives, a continuing difficulty is that WFP frames recovery objectives around the idea that food assistance will be phased out as people become more self reliant. In many least developing countries where a large majority of people live on or below the poverty line and are subject to recurring shocks this is simply unrealistic and sets projects up to fail or continue indefinitely. In contexts with high levels of chronic poverty and protracted crises, livelihood recovery objectives may need to be more modest and longer term and WFP may need to accept that an ongoing reliance on relief is necessary. WFP may also need to play a stronger role in linking beneficiaries of food assistance to other forms of livelihood support provided by other actors.
24. Finally, the tendency to view relief and recovery as two separate categories of support, each associated with distinct food assistance activities, is not helpful. Combinations of relief assistance to meet basic food needs and recovery assistance to restore key household and productive assets have proved to be effective in helping people to recover livelihoods. WFP may have important recovery impacts in some contexts by making the case for continuing humanitarian assistance which can also contribute to processes of recovery.

## Recommendations

### *Assessment*

25. Assessments need to do more to examine processes of livelihoods recovery and the possible role of food aid to support processes of recovery. Further support in developing the use of livelihoods frameworks to inform analysis of recovery needs should be provided by the Food Security Analysis Service at headquarters and regional levels to country level VAM units.
26. Initial assessments and programme design are too often not updated and WFP VAM units at Country Office level should do more to periodically re-assess recovery needs. Greater use of qualitative analysis of livelihoods to complement largely quantitative, survey based assessments is required.





27. It is recommended that needs assessments explicitly assess the levels of assistance required to support recovery and enable people to build assets and not simply meet immediate needs.

#### *Programme Design*

28. The Programme Design Service should continue to invest in the development of indicators relating to livelihoods recovery, particularly outcome and impact indicators that will permit measurement of progress towards livelihoods recovery objectives.
29. It is recommended that the Programme Design Service support country offices in developing a clearer livelihoods recovery rationale, clearer livelihood objectives and stronger exit strategies for activities that are labelled as recovery activities.

#### *Programme Implementation and Efficiency Issues*

30. The tonnage based funding model continues to be a real structural constraint to good recovery programming and continuing dialogue is needed with donors about options to tackle this.
31. Greater efforts should be made at country office level to generate additional resources for recovery activities.
32. Investment at headquarters and regional levels is required in rolling out corporate policies and programming standards around livelihood recovery to the country office level.
33. It is recommended that WFP invest more in professional development opportunities, learning and training for WFP and cooperating partner staff in order to strengthen their skills in the areas of need assessment, planning and programming and monitoring and evaluation in recovery contexts. WFP also needs to invest more in staff skills so that they can be more engaged in social protection policy debates and in analysis of the appropriate role of WFP in transitions to government owned safety nets.
34. WFP should further develop its capacity to plan and implement cash-based responses where these are appropriate.
35. Levels of assistance will often need to be increased from current levels and combined with ongoing relief to give people a chance to rebuild livelihoods.
36. WFP could do more to build on its field presence to play a catalytic role in encouraging other recovery actors to provide other forms of livelihoods support.
37. WFP should do more to review its partnership arrangements and assess the capacities and performance of cooperating partners. WFP should share responsibility for the technical adequacy, safety and sustainability of food for assets with its cooperating partners and needs to invest more in quality assurance systems.
38. Timeframes for livelihood recovery activities are often too short and recovery related activities often need to be implemented earlier and simultaneously with relief.
39. WFP needs to do more to analyse the impact of food assistance in relation to its contribution to supporting processes of recovery and people's own efforts to build stronger livelihoods. This will require closer collaboration between VAM units and monitoring and evaluation staff.
40. WFP needs to guard against premature phasing out of relief and make a strong case to donors for continued support where it is appropriate.



41. Recovery related activities are often implemented on a comparatively small scale compared to relief and WFP needs to find ways to scale-up recovery support whilst maintaining capacity to continue relief.



## **Preamble**

1. This evaluation examines the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of WFP's support to people's recovery of their livelihoods after disasters. The report is structured as follows. Section 1 examines international debates about recovery, WFP's recovery related work and the objectives, scope and methodology for the evaluation. Section 2 presents the findings of the evaluation against the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Section 3 sets out conclusions that provide an overall assessment of performance against these criteria, key issues for the future and recommendations.

## **1. Background**

### **1.A. Context**

2. Recovery is a difficult concept which has often proved controversial and difficult to pin down. This section provides a quick overview of how recovery and livelihoods have been framed within debates about international aid. WFP's particular focus on recovery of livelihoods has to be situated within debates about recovery more widely defined and the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders (Chandran et al 2008).
3. Debates about the appropriate interaction between relief and development in crises and the recovery from them have been going on for decades and there has been an array of terminology used within these debates. During the 1980s and 1990s the debate tended to be framed around the idea of linking relief and development and the premise that greater linkages between them would improve the process of recovery or rehabilitation from crises (Buchanan Smith and Maxwell 1994). It was always recognised that transitions from relief to development did not represent a simple linear progress from relief through recovery to development, that often relief and development approaches were carried out simultaneously and that processes of recovery were fragile and prone to slipping back into crisis. There were also growing calls through the 1990s for greater 'coherence' between different actors in the pursuit of recovery approaches (Harmer and Macrae 2004). The 1990s also saw a growing critique of too simplistic an approach to relief and development linkages and the argument that there were necessary distinctions that were important to maintain if humanitarian principles were to be respected. It was feared that developmental approaches might compromise neutrality and divert attention from a necessary focus on relief (Macrae ed 2002; Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2003).
4. There has also been considerable debate about the extent to which humanitarian relief activities should be designed to support people's abilities to provide for themselves, and whether relief approaches based on the provision of life-saving inputs should be complemented by approaches that takes into account the protection of livelihoods (Lautze 1997; Vaux 2006). In line with this thinking about the role of relief activities, the 2004 version of the Sphere Handbook particularly emphasizes livelihood elements and the capabilities, assets and activities that are needed for an adequate means of living to ensure immediate survival and future well-being (Sphere 2004). International experience has demonstrated that households will initiate a self-recovery process almost immediately after a disaster strikes and that the decisions made about relief and recovery support can influence whether this reinforces the use of positive or negative coping strategies, as well as the integration of disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures into responses (ALNAP/Provention Consortium 2008; Christoplos, 2005; World Bank, forthcoming).
5. A further debate centres on the appropriate balance between funding for relief and recovery. There has been a recurrent concern for the lack of funding for relief to development transitions most recently labelled as the 'recovery gap' and recent attempts to fill this gap through new funding instruments such as Multi-Donor Trust Funds (Chandran et al 2008). Vaux (2006) argues that funding for relief is often



prioritised and support for the recovery of livelihoods is neglected. Others argue the opposite, that support for basic life-saving relief is sometimes prematurely or inappropriately reduced because of a desire to focus on recovery (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2003). This has been related to donor's political interests and donor fatigue at the continuing provision of relief. Ideally, this shouldn't be an either or debate and support should be provided for both relief and recovery.

6. There have been frequent shifts in terminology and a recent review notes; 'the usage of the term early recovery is diverse and confused' (Chandran et al 2008). Recovery is the term that is increasingly being used to describe what was often previously labelled either as rehabilitation or a 'grey zone' between relief and development. There is now an 'early recovery' cluster led by UNDP and its definition of early recovery explicitly includes livelihoods (CWGER 2008).

*'a multidimensional process of recovery that begins in a humanitarian setting. It is guided by development principles that seek to build on humanitarian programmes and catalyse sustainable development opportunities. It aims to generate self sustaining, nationally owned, resilient processes for post crisis recovery. It encompasses the restoration of basic services, livelihoods, shelter, governance, security and the rule of law, environment and social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations.'*

7. Another term in increasing usage is 'fragile states' which has taken over from a focus on 'poorly performing' countries or weak and failed states as the preferred term for a shifting set of countries with particular challenges around governance and meeting the basic needs of their citizens. The World Bank is also shifting from using the term 'low income countries under stress (LICUS) to fragile and conflict affected countries (World Bank 2006). Many of the contexts where recovery is taking place or where there is a hoped for transition from relief to recovery are also countries that are labelled as fragile and where OECD donors have recently committed to principles of engagement (OECD 2007). There is also growing interest in and renewed enthusiasm for investments in social protection programmes within wider development assistance (Samson et al 2006; Devereux and Wheeler 2007).
8. There are a huge variety of contexts in which WFP is supporting processes of livelihoods recovery, covering complex emergencies, conflicts and post-conflict environments, quick and slow onset disasters and combinations of the above. In all of these it is important that recovery programming reflects context specific challenges. Box 1 highlights the contexts in which the country case studies for this evaluation were carried out.

#### **Box 1: Case Study Contexts**

Uganda presents a variety of multi-faceted recovery challenges. In the north a fragile peace process is enabling people to start resuming their previous largely agricultural livelihoods and begin a gradual process of return. In Karamoja a combination of drought, chronic poverty and conflict has left large numbers of people in need of emergency assistance. Any sustained recovery is likely to be constrained until there is greater peace, security and protection for the population and much greater attention from a wider range of development actors. In the West Nile Region there remains a large refugee population in spite of recent returns. Continued food aid is likely to be needed but there are prospects for greater refugee self reliance to be promoted.

Bangladesh faces frequent natural disasters as well as high levels of poverty. Despite progress made toward alleviating food insecurity at the national level, a relatively large group of extremely poor or 'invisible poor' rural households has been largely left out of development programming (TANGO, 2006). Within this broader context, the Category IV Super Cyclone Sidr struck the south west coast of Bangladesh on 15 November 2007. The cyclone caused an estimated 3,406 deaths and over 55,000 injuries. Around 2.3 million households were affected. Rising food prices in 2008 have further undermined livelihoods.



Nepal, with a population of 27 million people, is a food deficit country. Twenty-four percent of the population lives on less than USD 1 per day and 31 percent live below the national poverty line. The majority of people are subsistence farmers highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture. Nepal is also struggling to establish a new government and recover from an eleven-year civil war, during which 13 000 people were killed, 200 000 were internally displaced, and an estimated two million fled to India, Nepal is also prone to frequent natural disasters.

Colombia’s prolonged internal armed conflict has led to the second largest internal displacement in the world after Sudan. A recent report estimates that 279,675 people were displaced during the first half of 2008, a figure 41 per cent higher than last year’s, and the highest in 23 years (COHDES 2008). The government’s Unitary Displaced Population Registry has registered a total of 2,649,139 internally displaced people (IDPs) at the end of August 2008. Colombia is also prone to a large number of natural disasters.

Lesotho is struggling to cope with depressed employment opportunities, declining agricultural production, rising staple food prices and the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS, all which have undermined livelihoods. Lesotho has a 24% rate of HIVAIDS, currently ranked the third highest in the world. Between May 2007 and May 2008, the price of maize flour increased by 50%. Drought and floods have had devastating effects, particularly for the rural poor ( LVAC 2008).

- 9. It is also helpful to highlight some of the key contextual recovery challenges facing WFP. What is possible in terms of recovery varies hugely between these broad categories, sketched in Table 1.

**Table 1: Context Specific Recovery Challenges**

<i>Recovery Context</i>	<i>Recovery Issues</i>
Long term refugees and displaced people	Recovery is often limited by government restrictions, other constraints to livelihoods and reliance on external assistance. Support to promote greater self reliance and integration may be possible.
Post conflict recovery and return	Peace processes may enable relatively rapid recovery as improved security allows people to rebuild livelihoods and for displaced people to return to their homes.
Prolonged conflicts	Many conflicts can go on for decades making any livelihoods recovery difficult, as the impact of conflict continues to undermine livelihoods.
Quick and slow onset disasters	Recovery may be a clearly defined process of rebuilding after a specific shock.
Contexts where natural disasters overlap with high levels of chronic poverty, food insecurity, and/or HIV/AIDS	Recovery from disasters is often complicated by high levels of poverty where distinguishing between acute and chronic vulnerability is difficult
Contexts with recurrent natural disasters	Regularly occurring natural disasters may help to trap people in chronic poverty, lead to reliance on relief and make recovery of livelihoods difficult.

- 10. In a large number of contexts, WFP is providing food assistance to refugees or displaced people who have no immediate prospect of returning home and whose livelihoods in the places they have been displaced to are severely constrained by insecurity and/or government policies. In these contexts, the sense in which it is possible to support recovery is often limited as people are likely to remain heavily dependent on external assistance in the absence of what UNHCR labels durable solutions. WFP recognises this and project documents generally accept an ongoing dependence on food aid.



11. In many contexts in which WFP works it is extremely difficult to disentangle emergency and recovery needs from long term development challenges relating to chronic poverty and food insecurity (Devereux 2006). Long running conflicts and contexts where natural disasters are recurrent present similar challenges in the sense that livelihoods continue to be undermined by shocks, any recovery will be difficult and relief needs are ongoing. Here recovery objectives may need to be more modest and longer term and WFP may need to accept that an ongoing reliance on relief is necessary and appropriate. Often WFP has been working in these sort of context for decades with high levels of relief provided on a regular basis.
12. In these sorts of environments WFP is increasingly finding itself engaged in debates about the role of food assistance within wider approaches to social protection. This potentially provides a different way of conceptualising livelihoods recovery. As social protection responses to chronic poverty become more widespread there may be opportunities to expand welfare safety nets during periods of crisis and to support transitions from emergency assistance to longer term social protection and safety net programmes (Harvey 2007; Harvey et al 2007).

## 1.B. WFP's Work

### *Policy Framework*

13. WFP's approach to recovery is set out in the recent consolidated framework of policies which summarises and draws on a number of papers with implications for recovery; *From Crisis to Recovery* (1998), *Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies: Strategies for WFP* (2003), *Transition from Relief to Development* (2004), *Exiting Emergencies: Programme Options for Transition from Emergency Response* (2004), *Building Country and Regional Capacities* (2004) and *Definition of Emergencies* (2005) (WFP 2007). Together these policy papers represent a clear commitment to supporting processes of livelihoods recovery and to link emergency efforts to save lives with efforts to protect livelihoods. Livelihoods are clearly defined according to the sustainable livelihoods framework. Recovery is articulated in a variety of ways including direct support by WFP to preserve assets at household levels, capacity building and links to longer term safety nets. Lacking from any of the policy papers is any definition of recovery. For the purposes of this evaluation a working definition is therefore proposed in the next section. There may also be a need to update some of the policy guidance in the light of changing frameworks for international engagement in recovery contexts, such as the introduction of the early recovery cluster.
14. The WFP policy paper "*From Crisis to Recovery*" (1998) recognizes that traditional relief responses are often inadequate to address the needs of disaster-affected people who are trying to stabilize and secure their livelihoods. The policy states that once WFP has fulfilled its mandate of saving lives in a relief situation, the primary aim of a WFP-food-aid-assisted recovery program is to enable people to restore their livelihoods in order to assure immediate and longer-term food needs. The policy acknowledges that the transition from relief to development may resemble a swinging pendulum more than a linear continuum and that both complex and chronic emergencies tend to blur the lines between relief, recovery and development.
15. The *Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies* paper defines livelihoods following the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework and notes that in many circumstances both EMOPs and PRROs have objectives and activities aimed at supporting livelihoods and preserving assets. It describes the potential impact of food aid on livelihoods primarily in terms of preserving assets and preventing negative coping mechanisms. It notes that food aid is not always the most appropriate resource for supporting livelihoods and determining appropriateness of food aid in different contexts requires careful analysis of food availability and access and markets. It notes key programming challenges in incorporating livelihoods analysis into assessments, linking assessment to programme design, targeting, intervening early enough to preserve assets, monitoring and evaluation, supporting recovery in situations of long term displacement, linking food aid to other non-food interventions, staff capacity and funding constraints (WFP 2003). The *Definition of Emergencies* (2005) paper notes that the use of emergency resources to protect and save



livelihoods is a long standing policy and operational practice and that a factor in the establishment of the PRRO category was to have an instrument that favours transition over the use of short-term emergency responses

16. The *WFP and Food Based Safety Nets* policy paper notes the increasing prominence of safety nets on the aid agenda and a need for greater WFP engagement with this debate (WFP 2004). It traces three models of possible engagement with safety nets from assisting in developing future national systems, participating in the design and implementation of safety nets and helping to improve existing systems. It argues that greater engagement of WFP in safety net programmes would require enhanced skills and knowledge on the part of WFP staff to advise and advocate effectively for safety nets within national development and poverty reduction strategies.

The *Building Country and Regional Capacities* policy paper notes that transition situations often represent contexts where capacity building is extremely difficult but especially needed (2004). The *Exiting Emergencies* policy paper notes that institutional capacity building should be part of every exit strategy. It also notes that food aid may become a less important resource as activities shift from relief to recovery and that WFP may have to shift its role to become an advocate and catalyst for necessary non-food capacities and resources. It notes that triggers for exit strategies such as a population's recovery from shock need to have indicators defined transparently and early so that partners and beneficiaries can anticipate exits (WFP 2005). The *Humanitarian Principles* policy paper commits WFP to core humanitarian values of humanity, impartiality and neutrality and to self reliance (defined as providing assistance in ways that support livelihoods), participation and capacity building (WFP 2004).

#### *Key Definitions and Programme Guidance*

17. WFP's existing policy papers do not include any definition of the term recovery and, as noted in the previous section, the wider literature is characterised by confusion over the term. The WFP Programme Guidance Manual, however, does define recovery as:

*'a process that occurs at various levels (individual, household, community, country) following a shock (human-made or natural disaster) when, on the basis of existing capacities and, if necessary, with externally provided assistance, there is a return to the level of food security that existed prior to the shock (livelihoods are restored).'*

An issue with this definition is that it defines recovery in terms of a return to the pre-disaster state, when this may be undesirable because pre-disaster livelihoods are often what left people vulnerable to disaster in the first place. It is also a broad definition of recovery, whereas this evaluation has a specific focus on livelihoods recovery.

18. The evaluation, therefore, uses the following working definition for the concept of livelihoods recovery:

*'livelihoods recovery is a process of moving towards sustainable and more resilient ways of making a living following a disaster.'*

This definition aims to avoid the idea that recovery is about rebuilding existing livelihoods. It recognises that it may be unrealistic to succeed in rebuilding sustainable livelihoods in the short to medium term as this is often an unfulfilled long-term development goal but that the objective is still to start a process of moving towards greater sustainability. It also encompasses the concept of resilience to emphasise the importance of aid attempting to strengthen people's ability to cope with future disasters. It also importantly defines recovery as a process which can take place independently of what aid actors do or don't do. Whether and how aid contributes to or undermines that process is a separate question.



19. The Programme Guidance Manual notes that recovery ‘generally starts as soon as people have assured their immediate survival and are able to begin thinking about rebuilding their lives and livelihoods’ and that ‘assistance programmes should endeavour to capitalize on opportunities to promote recovery from the earliest possible moment - in particular by supporting and building on people's and communities' own recovery initiatives.’ The manual also defines the term self reliance which is often seen as one of the objectives of recovery programming. It argues that self reliance "refers to the ability of an individual, household or community to meet essential needs in a sustainable manner with dignity without external assistance and without resorting to activities that irreversibly deplete the household or community resource base." Further guidance is provided on when to start recovery activities, the range of activities and there is a guide to food for work/assets (WFP 2004; WFP 2007f).
20. The evaluation uses the sustainable livelihoods framework as the theoretical basis for the evaluation (DFID 2001). The term assets will be understood according to the following DFID definition

*the assets on which livelihoods are built, and can be divided into five core categories (or types of capital). These are: human capital, natural capital, financial capital, social capital, and physical capital. People’s choice of livelihood strategies, as well as the degree of influence they have over policy, institutions and processes, depends partly upon the nature and mix of the assets they have available to them*

Livelihoods are defined using the Sphere definition, also used by WFP, “livelihoods comprise the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being. Livelihood strategies are the practical means or activities through which people access food or income to buy food, while coping strategies are temporary responses to food insecurity.’ (Sphere 2004; WFP 2003). Social protection is understood by this evaluation as referring to interventions implemented by the state, or those operating in the public interest, such as NGOs, “to respond to levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation which are deemed socially unacceptable within a given polity or society” (Norton et al. 2001).<sup>1</sup>

*Strategic Plan*

21. The WFP Strategic Plan (2006-2009) demonstrated a strong commitment to livelihoods recovery in Strategic Objective Two which aimed to ‘protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks.’ It described food distribution ‘as a means to preserve essential assets during crises and to support recovery from crises; as a means to develop physical assets or human capital to reduce vulnerability; as a means to encourage school attendance in spite of crises; and as a component of nation safety net programmes.’ The relevant corporate performance indicators for strategic objective two are presented in Table 2 below. A clear issue is that outcome indicators are related to food consumption and don’t focus on the creation or preservation of assets or avoidance of negative coping strategies, which form the core of the logic model for this evaluation and we discuss this further in the section on programme design.

**Table 2: Relevant Corporate Performance Indicators for Strategic Plan (2006-2009)**

Strategic Objective 2: Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks		
Activity Types	Outputs	Outcomes
General food distribution	Output 2.1 Timely provision of food in sufficient quantity for targeted beneficiaries in crisis	Outcome 2.1 Increased ability to meet food needs within targeted households in crisis situations or
Support to safety net		

<sup>1</sup> The policy paper *WFP and food based safety nets*’ does not include a definition of social protection





<p>programmes (includes programmes reaching HIV/AIDS affected households)</p> <p>Food for work / food for assets</p> <p>Food for training (includes life skills training and training for income generating activities)</p>	<p>and transition situations or vulnerable to shocks</p> <p>Indicator 2.1.1 Actual beneficiaries receiving WFP food assistance through each activity as a percentage of planned beneficiaries by project category, age group, sex etc.</p> <p>Indicator 2.1.2 Actual MT of food distributed through each activity as a percentage of planned distributions by project category, commodity</p> <p>Indicator 2.1.3 Actual participants in each activity as a percentage of planned participants, by project category, sex</p>	<p>vulnerable to shocks</p> <p>Indicator 2.1.1 Proportion of beneficiary household expenditures devoted to food (pilot indicator)</p> <p>Indicator 2.1.2 Dietary diversity (pilot indicator)</p> <p>Outcome 2.2 Increased ability to manage shocks within targeted households in crisis situations or vulnerable to shocks</p> <p>Indicator 2.2.1 Appropriate indicators under discussion</p>
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Source: WFP 2006-7 Indicator Compendium

22. The new WFP Strategic Plan (2008-2011) continues WFP's strong commitment to supporting livelihoods and processes of recovery. Aspects of livelihoods recovery are reflected in at least three of the five strategic objectives:

- Strategic Objective One: 'save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies';
- Strategic Objective Three: 'restore and build lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations'
- Strategic Objective Five: 'strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase.'

23. Strategic objective three has a central focus on recovery emphasising that, 'recovery situations should represent a full-fledged context of intervention that involves specific needs and calls for specific responses'. Goal two of this objective focuses specifically on support to the re-establishment of livelihoods and on approaches that help people to gain assets and build sustainable livelihoods. The tools envisaged for meeting this objective stress the growing potential importance of voucher and cash based programmes to facilitate food access. Performance indicators for the new strategic plan are still in the process of being developed (WFP 2008i).

#### Logic Model

24. The logic model for this evaluation was constructed from elements found in the WFP policy documents *From Crisis to Recovery (1998)* and *Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies: Strategies for WFP (2003)*. The 1998 policy document defines the overall goal of WFP recovery interventions as contributing to the restoration of livelihoods in order to assure immediate and longer-term food needs. The 2003 policy document defines short-term objectives or outcomes, specifically the preservation of essential assets and the reduction of negative coping mechanisms.

25. This evaluation made some small additions and changes to the logic model proposed in the terms of reference. Under types of activities, the local purchase of food aid was included as a new activity as local purchase may impact on local markets and therefore support or undermine processes of recovery. The



general food distribution activity has been amended to include cash grants and the activity of food for work (assets) amended to include cash for work. This is to recognise the potential use of cash grants or vouchers as alternatives or complements to food aid, highlighted in the latest WFP strategic plan. The objectives / outcomes have been amended from ‘preservation of assets’ to ‘preservation and/or creation of assets’. An additional objective/outcome has been added of ‘support to local traders, farmers and markets’. The reason for adding creation of assets is to highlight that assets may have been completely lost and therefore need to be built again rather than restored. The new stress on promoting the developmental impact of local purchases within the new strategic plan means that it may increasingly be an objective within country programmes.

26. The goal/impact column has been amended from ‘restoration of livelihoods’ to ‘food aid or cash, and assets built, contribute to stronger, more disaster resilient and food secure livelihoods.’ This aimed to get away from the idea that recovery is necessarily about restoring livelihoods that existed prior to an emergency. WFP may be aiming to support stronger livelihoods that are more resilient in the face of disasters. People’s own livelihood strategies may also shift following disasters. An example would be the increasing levels of urbanisation in south Sudan, as people who have lived for many years in Khartoum find themselves ill suited for a return to rural livelihoods and instead are settling in urban centres such as Juba. The objective has therefore been changed from ‘preservation of household and community assets’ to ‘preservation and/or creation ...’ and the goal has been changed from ‘restoration of livelihoods’ to ‘food aid or cash and assets built contribute to stronger, more disaster resilient and food secure livelihoods’.

**Table 3: Revised logic model**

Types of Activities	Objectives/Outcomes	Goal/Impact	Key Risks and Assumptions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General food distribution or cash grants</li> <li>• Supplementary feeding</li> <li>• Therapeutic feeding</li> <li>• Food or cash-for-work (assets)</li> <li>• Food-for-training</li> <li>• Food-for-education (school feeding)</li> <li>• Local purchase of food commodities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Preservation and/or creation of household and community assets</li> <li>➤ Reduction in the use of negative coping mechanisms at household and community level</li> <li>➤ Support to local traders, farmers and markets</li> </ul>	<p>✓ Food aid or cash, and assets built, contribute to stronger, more disaster resilient and food secure livelihoods</p>	<p>Risks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Instability &amp; recurring conflict</li> <li>• Unrealistic recovery targets</li> <li>• Unpredictable or short-term funding</li> <li>• Undermining of existing coping mechanisms</li> <li>• Food aid or cash has negative impacts on markets</li> </ul> <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adequate availability of staff capacities and non-food resources.</li> <li>• Incorporation of adequate livelihood analysis into WFP recovery interventions</li> </ul>

*Key Findings of Previous Evaluations*

27. The thematic evaluation of the PRRO Category noted that there was a general weakness in targeting, needs assessment and monitoring and evaluation; that there was little quantitative information about livelihoods available, that it was difficult to determine whether recovery activities were creating durable



assets; that country offices were often setting unrealistic or inappropriate recovery targets, especially in highly unstable contexts and that program implementation often suffered from a lack of beneficiary participation (WFP, 2004). These findings have recurred in evaluations carried out since 2004. Specific findings from previous evaluations relevant to this report are integrated into the findings section.

## 1.C. Evaluation Features

### *Objectives*

28. The objectives of this evaluation are to assess the extent to which WFP recovery related interventions are achieving their stated recovery objectives and implicit livelihood objectives and to draw lessons to help WFP to better design and implement future recovery interventions.

### *Scope*

29. The geographic scope of the evaluation is global with case studies selected to try to ensure a wide geographic spread. The WFP operations considered were those that were ongoing in 2007 and 2008. In the country case study work the primary focus was on operations from 2005.
30. The evaluation considered both EMOPs and PRROs as both categories can have recovery related objectives. In contexts where processes of livelihoods recovery are going on, any food aid that is provided, regardless of the activity it is attached to, will have some effect on people's livelihoods. A problem with labelling particular sets of activities as most suitable for recovery is that it risks neglecting the recovery impact of activities not specifically labelled as recovery and framed around recovery objectives. In particular, ongoing relief and general food distributions may continue to have a significant impact on processes of recovery, support to building and maintaining livelihood assets and avoiding negative coping strategies. The evaluation therefore considered how all WFP food assistance activities in a recovery context contributed to processes by which people rebuilt their livelihoods. To avoid giving the evaluation too broad a scope, it focussed on EMOP and PRRO operations and activities that have explicit or implicit livelihood recovery objectives.

### *Stakeholder Analysis*

31. The main stakeholders for the evaluation are WFP staff at country, regional and headquarters levels with an interest in learning lessons to improve recovery related interventions, executive board members for whom information about the effectiveness of WFP recovery interventions will help to guide future funding decisions, cooperating partners who play a critical role in delivering recovery interventions and UN agencies, NGOs and governments engaged in recovery programming which may link to WFP's work. Disaster affected populations clearly have an interest in whether or not WFP is achieving its recovery objectives since it is the restoration of their livelihoods that is at stake in the aftermath of a disaster.

### *Methodology*

32. The evaluation used a mixture of methods and different information sources, including review of both WFP and non-WFP key documents, interviews with WFP, partner and government staff, semi-structured individual interviews and group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Field based research was carried out for five country case studies: Bangladesh, Colombia, Lesotho, Nepal and Uganda. These were complemented by desk analysis of recovery issues in Ethiopia, Pakistan, Sierra Leone and Sudan



and a wider desk review of WFP documentation and the secondary literature on livelihoods and recovery<sup>2</sup>. Further telephone interviews were conducted with key donor executive board members and cooperating partners (annex 2). A matrix of key questions against each of the standard evaluation criteria was developed and used to guide the case study fieldwork (annex 3). The Sustainable Livelihoods approach formed the analytical framework for the evaluation. The evaluation team wherever possible triangulated information from various sources both by consulting a broad range of stakeholders within the country case studies and by comparing findings between countries. The evaluation team consisted of three independent consultants: Paul Harvey, Laura Wilkinson and Cynthia Burton. In each of the five case study countries the team worked with local consultants who were Ms Shawkat Ara Begum, Bangladesh, Mr Shubha Sharma, Nepal, Florence Akello and Simon Nangiro, Uganda, Juan Felipe Tsao, Colombia and Manthoto Lephoto, Lesotho.

### *Key Limitations*

33. The time available for in-depth fieldwork in the country case studies was limited and so the number of beneficiaries interviewed was not representative or randomly sampled and only a limited number of WFP activities could be visited. It was not always possible to interview the full range of WFP stakeholders.
34. Previous evaluations have highlighted major weaknesses in relation to monitoring of recovery outcomes and the quality of analysis of the impact of food aid on livelihoods by WFP. These weaknesses continue to be present and a lack of data to draw on constrained the extent to which the evaluation could make strong judgements about impact.

## **2. Main Findings**

### **2.A. Relevance**

35. The relevance criteria is concerned with assessing whether programmes are in line with beneficiary needs, country needs, organisational priorities and donor and partner policies. This will be discussed under the headings of needs, internal and external coherence, project design and appropriateness.

### *Needs*

36. Analysis of context and an adequate needs assessment are of particular importance for promoting relevant and appropriate responses (Beck 2006). In the matrix for this evaluation we asked:
  - What is the evidence base and assessment process for determining recovery needs?
  - How did WFP's activities relate to people's own livelihood strategies and investments in processes of recovery?
37. The assessments in the country case studies showed several examples of good practice in utilising the livelihoods frameworks for analysis and examining issues around recovery. A key concern was a level of disconnection between the assessment process and project design, a general weakness recognised in WFP and being addressed in current initiatives (WFP 2008k). This is discussed further in the sub-section on project design. There was also still a tendency for assessments to focus on measuring food needs and quantifying levels of food insecurity without considering how food aid could contribute to the recovery of livelihoods.
38. A consistent theme in many previous evaluations was a weak evidence base and assessment process for determining recovery needs and when and how to shift activities from relief to recovery objectives. For

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<sup>2</sup> A fifth desk analysis of recovery issues in Yemen was originally planned but dropped due to a lack of recovery relevant programming being carried out by WFP. Time constraints prevented its replacement with another country from the Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe bureau.



example in West Africa, a PRRO evaluation found no criteria for shifts from relief to recovery, no evidence of objective criteria being used to make decisions about when and where to phase out general food distributions and introduce targeted distributions and little evidence that for non-camp populations recovery activities have been introduced as a result of specific assessments (WFP 2004: 37). Young (2007) notes the need for WFP recovery activities to better incorporate security and protection concerns into strategic planning and assessment processes. She also argues in the context of Darfur that a livelihoods approach to assessments would serve to better inform programme strategies by accommodating and analysing the underlying processes, institutions and policies that are linked to the conflict and destroying livelihoods. In Uganda and Ethiopia it was noted that WFP needed to do more to improve its analysis and understanding of livelihoods in pastoral areas.

39. In several of the case studies, livelihoods recovery issues were addressed. For example, the EFSA in Bangladesh incorporated questions about livelihoods recovery, collected livelihoods data at the household and community levels, conducted market surveys and took into account rising food prices. Building on tools used for a 2006 food security survey conducted for WFP by TANGO it developed asset and coping strategy indexes. The asset index included, house and household, animal and productive assets. The coping strategy index identified a range of possible negative coping strategies adopted by households in the wake of the disaster, such as changes in food consumption or distress sales of livestock. Food consumption and food access scores were combined with a coping strategy index to assess the degree of risks to lives and livelihoods among affected households. Those determined to be the most food-insecure and shock affected (assets damage combined with the loss of primary and secondary livelihoods) were identified as a priority population for assistance. The EFSA included questions to households and communities about their three most important recovery needs, in keeping with established past good practice in Bangladesh. The EFSA survey instruments addressed land ownership in a limited way, for example, the inclusion of 'sold land' as a response option in the coping strategies section of the household questionnaire and of some information on types of farming such as: 'own farming,' 'lease farming,' and 'share-cropping.' It would be desirable to give greater and more direct attention to the land ownership status of affected people in future EFSAs (eg amount of land owned, usage, etc), both in the data collection and analysis. Also, the market assessment was limited to food markets and vendors. It did not examine changes to other types of important items that affected people might seek to replace - e.g. building materials, seeds, tools, rickshaws, etc. - nor did it look at the impact of the cyclone on local labour markets. Some information and analysis has been collected by WFP on the impacts of the disaster on the household level employment context (eg out-migration, selling labour and advance). This needs to be complemented by greater attention to broader labour market impacts and trends. Gender differences in coping strategies were also not analysed. Assessments in Nepal were framed in the sustainable livelihoods context, examined assets and gender differences in coping strategies and did some limited assessment of labour markets.
40. There were some examples of good cooperation in assessments; for example a joint ICRC/WFP assessment in Colombia of IDP living conditions in eight cities in Colombia which tried to capture the IDP experience and coping strategies using a livelihoods lens (WFP/ICRC 2007). WFP in Sudan carries out annual needs assessments for both northern and southern Sudan in collaboration with a range of other actors. These major exercises do examine key issues relating to recovery including the use of coping mechanisms, asset indexes, market analysis and community perceptions of livelihood trends and are starting to examine the implications of the assessments for programming (WFP 2006c; 2007; 2008c and d).

### *Internal Coherence*

41. This sub-section examines the internal coherence of WFP recovery related interventions with WFP corporate policies. In the matrix for this evaluation we asked:



- Are individual country approaches to recovery consistent with WFP policies and are recovery focussed activities consistent with other WFP interventions?
- How did WFP's livelihoods recovery programming relate to other WFP relief and development activities?

Recovery objectives within project documents were generally in line with WFP policies and strategic priorities and consistently refer back to the strategic objectives to which they relate. The more explicit recovery related objective three in the new strategic plan has made it clearer where livelihood recovery objectives fit.

42. There is very little evidence from the country case studies, however, of corporate policies related to recovery being used beyond this. For example, none of the countries had developed recovery strategies as called for in the 'crisis to recovery' policy paper (WFP 1998). There was little evidence of any investment at the headquarters or country level in rolling out corporate policies relating to recovery. In several of the case study countries, most WFP staff were unfamiliar with WFP's global policies on livelihoods and emergencies. A similar lack of investment in 'roll-out' was seen in relation to WFP's capacity building policies (WFP 2008c). In one country office, there was also a general perception amongst staff interviewed that recovery was a lower priority than relief, both in the sense that it was often the first to be dropped when funding constraints forced cutbacks on planned activities in project documents and that it is an area where there are few incentives in the organisation for good performance. As one Country Office staff member put it 'The WFP may have global recovery policies, but the system still reserves most of its incentives and rewards for a well-run relief operation. After all, which is more important – survival or recovery?' A finding of the evaluation team is that, if recovery relating programming is to be improved, this lack of prioritisation needs to be addressed. There is a need to find ways to be able to invest in both relief and recovery simultaneously, rather than recovery taking a back seat to relief.
43. There may be times when recovery is simply unrealistic in ongoing crises. The issue of the need to focus on relief and whether or not recovery activities are appropriate when relief is the main priority is a key concern in Sudan. In Darfur, food for recovery activities were planned in 2004 but not implemented and dropped in 2005. An EMOP evaluation found that this was appropriate given the need to focus on immediate relief and continuing displacement. The evaluation argued that 'large scale recovery would have placed further stress on limited staff and non-food resources and resulted in reduced numbers receiving life-saving support via a general food distribution' (WFP Sudan 2006).
44. One of the contexts in which WFP supports recovery is where refugees and internally displaced people are able to return. In Uganda, the Country Office is providing continuing relief assistance to people whether they are in camps or have returned to their home areas, a strategy staff describe as being based on need not location. Previously returnees had been provided with a 3 month package of food assistance but in Lira District where a three month package was provided and then food aid phased out, malnutrition rates had risen after return, causing a shift in strategy. In southern Sudan, 3 months of food aid has been the return package and recent studies have highlighted its inadequacy (Pantuliano 2008). In Colombia, newly displaced people receive 3 months of relief food aid and in Nepal, IDPs and children associated with fighting forces were receiving a two month reintegration package. In Burundi, the 2009-10 PRRO envisages a six month food package for refugees returning from Tanzania. In Angola, the Country Programme recognised that IDPs would require about 18 months of food assistance after their return home to re-establish their livelihoods and continued general distributions for this population with the aim of reducing vulnerability and ensuring adequate food resources during the period of transition (WFP 2005f). These differences in approaches and the scale of support to populations may just reflect contextual differences but the disparities in relatively similar contexts (18 months in Angola, 3 months in southern Sudan) suggest that some comparative analysis of policies and levels of support to returning populations might be useful. The evaluators could not find any guidance about levels of assistance for returnees in the Programme Guidance Manual. Largely absent in any of these contexts is a strong evidence base about the



successes and failures of people in re-establishing food secure livelihoods and the degree of reliance on food assistance to inform these discussions.

### *External Coherence*

45. This sub-section examines the external coherence of WFP's recovery related programming with governments affected by disasters, donor governments, cooperating partners and other recovery policies and interventions. In the matrix for this evaluation we asked:

- Are WFP approaches to recovery in line with those of donors, disaster affected governments and partners (globally and in specific countries)?
- What was driving a shift from relief to recovery programming (improving livelihoods and/or donor and political pressures)? Was recovery programming at the expense of a focus on relief or vice versa?
- How does WFP's livelihoods recovery programming relate to broader recovery objectives around peace and state building?
- How is WFP navigating its commitments to key humanitarian principles (independence, neutrality) and developmental ones (harmonisation, alignment, capacity and state building)?
- How did WFP's livelihood recovery programming relate to those of other actors (UN agencies, NGOs, government, MFIs, Red Cross)?

46. A key concern for the evaluation team in relation to coherence was that donors are unconvinced about the strength of the case that WFP is making for support to recovery. Many of the donors interviewed both at a country and executive board level for this study questioned the relevance of WFP's recovery related programming. There was a widespread view that, particularly given the increasing scarcity of food aid as a resource, there was a need for WFP to have a primary focus on relief. The relevance of food assistance in recovery processes was often questioned and it was felt that WFP needed to make a better case for its appropriateness. In particular there was concern about the PRRO category and a tendency to include activities that were developmental and would fit better in country programmes than under the PRRO umbrella. Several donor representatives interviewed argued the need for a more tightly defined recovery role, with clearer exit strategies which focuses more carefully on where food assistance is most appropriate. A respondent from USAID noted that it uses 'rule of thumb' criteria for distinguishing relief and recovery programs from other programs relating to whether or not the situation is one in which an emergency has recently ended, the goal is to improve food security and objectives, activities and indicators support the recovery goal, there is a specific exit strategy, end point and sustainable results and beneficiaries are vulnerable groups whose food security has been adversely impacted by an identifiable emergency.

47. There was also concern on the part of donors with a lack of documented evidence about impact and outcomes and in the absence of this impact, relevance is further questioned. For example, a review in Burundi cited one donor insisting on the need for 'simple evidence of what is the impact of their support to WFP' in order to continue funding the PRRO (WFP 2008f). There's a need to think about what this evidence might look like. 'Sharing what works' instruments might help with internal and cross-country learning but more critical, in-depth and independent analysis of outcomes and impacts is also needed. Several donors mentioned a finding of the peer review of evaluations around the failure of evaluations to ask broader questions about the role and relevance of food aid rather than focussing on the details of what was currently being implemented (WFP 2007e).

48. It is clear that, if WFP is to turn its commitments to livelihoods recovery in the new strategic plan into concrete programming at field level they will need to make a better case to donors at a global and country office level. This is recognised at a HQ level and WFP (2008f) notes that donor scepticism about the use of PRROs and WFP's prolonged presence in post-crisis settings is leading to donors sometimes earmarking relief rather than recovery activities within PRROs. It argues that 'WFP needs to respond



effectively to these concerns, pointing out the dual relief-recovery function of many of WFP's emergency activities and encouraging donors to avoid arbitrary or misleading distinctions'.

49. In recovery contexts, WFP often needs to simultaneously maintain commitments to both key humanitarian and development principles. In common with other actors, WFP has paid too little attention to the extent to which these commitments are complementary or contradictory. How WFP balances commitments to independence and exit strategies that are often framed around building state capacity is critical to the success of its livelihoods recovery programming. This tension was seen in the Karamoja Region of Uganda, where WFP is providing relief and recovery assistance to respond to a complex mix of natural shocks, chronic poverty and conflict. A particular issue in Karamoja is that the government is actively involved in the conflict which is playing a large part in the crisis and is also WFP's implementing partner in two of the three districts, partly due to the fact that there have been few cooperating partners for WFP to work with. This raises difficult questions about the extent to which WFP can continue to be perceived as neutral and independent. The need to be perceived by the local communities as independent reinforces the argument for attempting to encourage NGO cooperating partners to start operations in the region, something that WFP is already attempting to do. More generally, the evaluation team felt that whilst the strong emphasis on alignment with government priorities in Uganda was appropriate that there was a need to balance alignment with government with maintaining the ability to be constructively critical of government when appropriate. Similar dilemmas about needing to work closely with government whilst maintaining a critical distance during conflict were found in Colombia.
50. This tension was also highlighted in Ethiopia where WFP support to the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) has been an important part of an attempt to generate greater government ownership through a shift from relief to longer term support to social protection. This does, however, create issues for WFP in relation to independence and the ability to influence and be critical of government. External stakeholders interviewed felt that WFP in common with other UN agencies risked being co-opted as an arm of government and had not been vocal enough in pressing the government to declare a disaster early enough in 2008 or in pushing for humanitarian access in the conflict affected Somali Regions of the Ogaden.
51. In Nepal, the problem was the opposite where WFP appears to have limited its policy and programming relationships with the government, to avoid the politicisation of WFP assistance, especially given the conflict context. Some cooperating partners and donors also commented on the difficulties of working with the government, due to corruption, lack of adequate human and financial resources and administrative inefficiencies (ie slow and heavily bureaucratised procedures for releasing activity approvals and food supplies). These are real constraints with no easy solution, especially the need to preserve neutrality and impartiality. At the same time, a fragile new government has been in place since May 2008 that is trying to rebuild an administrative system weakened by years of conflict. A number of donors are already making this a strategic priority, and the WFP could collaborate with these agencies to identify acceptable transitional/post-conflict strategies for working with the Government of Nepal. Several WFP field staff and cooperating partners have developed experience in negotiating across political lines during the conflict and also have established good informal working relationships with local officials, a foundation on which WFP could build.
52. As we noted earlier, WFP is becoming increasingly engaged in policy discussions around transitions from relief to longer term social protection approaches. This implies interacting with a different set of organisations and institutions and the skill and capacity on the part of WFP staff to play active roles in national level policy discussions. WFP staff need to be able to sit at the table with government, the World Bank, NGOs and donors and articulate a clear role for WFP within longer term social protection programmes and strategies. For instance, a Burundi review recommended that Government and the three Rome based UN agencies lead the formulation of a food security and livelihood protection strategy (WFP Burundi 2008).





53. WFP Ethiopia claims it has taken an active role in this sort of process and that it has been engaged in the formulation and ongoing implementation of the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP). The current PRRO notes that ‘WFP contributed to policy development, advocacy and technical inputs’ in support of the strategic shift to the PSNP (WFP 2007). A mid-term PRRO evaluation found that WFP had played an important role in the PSNP policy arena and had entered into the policy debate actively. But it also found that there were ‘no examples of strong coordination between WFP and NGOs working in the PSNP and that donors considered that opportunities for synergy were being lost due to these weak relationships (WFP 2007). Other stakeholders question how well WFP is continuing to engage in policy discussions around the PSNP. An example given was a relative lack of engagement in ongoing discussions around the expanding safety nets into pastoral areas through the Pastoral Task Force. More generally it was felt that WFP required greater capacity to engage in policy debates around food security and livelihoods, safety nets and the appropriate role of food assistance. It was also felt that WFP should do more to engage with international NGOs with expertise and capacity in livelihoods issues.
54. WFP has been actively involved in emerging debates around social protection programmes in Sierra Leone. A newly introduced budget revision to the PRRO to expand support into urban areas for people affected by rising food prices has been envisaged as WFP providing a short term response which will transition to a longer term safety net. WFP has been at the heart of discussions with other actors such as the World Bank and the EU about its appropriate role and is coordinating its response closely with other actors.
55. Engaging with development actors around longer term social protection strategies may also require WFP to rethink its funding strategies – rather than largely relying on PRROs it may need to compete on a level playing field with other international agencies and private sector actors for particular contracts and projects. WFP may have comparative advantages around its field presence and ability to implement at scale but it will need to make a convincing case to donors in specific contexts for its efficiency and cost effectiveness.

### *Project Design*

56. This sub-section examines the consistency of the project design and logic of activities relating to livelihoods recovery. The evaluation matrix questions asked were:
- Does the project design make sense?
  - Has the project design evolved to reflect changing circumstances?
  - Are recovery objectives and activities realistic?
57. The evaluation team found that limited connections were made between the findings of needs assessments and the design of programmes. Even where assessments contain good analysis of the ways in which people’s livelihoods have been affected by shocks and processes of recovery, the highest priorities identified by affected people are not always included in the design of projects. For example, In Nepal, the quality of the VAM livelihoods assessments was very high, in fact, offering a potential model for future assessments. The design of the PRRO partly corresponds to the short-term food security needs identified in the CFSVA and market assessments through the provision of short-term employment opportunities and the restoration of priority communal assets. At the same time, the design does not include specific activities to address some of the key livelihoods recovery needs identified in the CFSVA/conflict impact assessment, such as the replacement of household level assets lost during the conflict.
58. Assessments and programme designs also often do not clearly explain the rationale behind the programming choices and modes of delivery selected, including other options considered to achieve the most efficient and effective results in line with existing delivery capacities. In part as a result of this project documents often contain a very standard package of interventions with little adaptation to context. Donors and other partners feel that standard responses are being labelled as recovery rather than a



recovery analysis informing design. For instance, why is the replacement of communal assets frequently selected over the replacement of individual household assets, even when the latter are a stated priority need of the affected population? How is an appropriate number of days of work decided to make an effective contribution to household livelihoods recovery? For instance, in Nepal, the estimates regarding the number of working days and resources required for conflict-affected populations and returnees to “safeguard lives and livelihoods and enhance resilience to conflict” are not based on baseline studies of the income or asset replacement threshold required by very poor and vulnerable households to recover to the situation they had prior to the conflict or their displacement.

### **Box 2: Project Design in Bangladesh**

The design of the EMOP 10715.0, a response to Cyclone Sidr, corresponds to the short-term relief and nutritional needs identified in the EFSA. It partly responds to livelihoods recovery needs by identifying vulnerable low income people with high levels of damage and losses to productive assets as the main target groups for relief and recovery assistance and aiming to restore some of their income and communal assets through FFW/CFW activities.

The design, however, makes assumptions that the provision of three months of work for one adult member of each participating household at a lower ‘self-targeting’ pay level will be sufficient to avoid negative coping strategies, such as distress sales of assets or taking out high interest loans. The design does not directly address the replacement of key lost productive household assets identified in the EFSA, nor does it base its income estimates on baseline studies or empirical evidence of what income/asset replacement threshold may be required by very poor and vulnerable households to recover to the situation they had prior to the disaster.

The rationale for starting “early recovery” activities in a second phase (February to May), rather than earlier, was not provided. International experience has demonstrated that households will initiate a self-recovery process almost immediately after a disaster strikes and that the decisions made about relief and recovery support can influence whether this reinforces the use of positive or negative coping strategies, as well as the integration of disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures into responses. This was the case following Cyclone Sidr when many households resorted to expensive private loans within the first few months of the disaster to replace fishing and farming tools/inputs and lost stock from small shops, as well as to repair their homes (FGDs/household interviews and Government of Bangladesh/World Bank et al, March 2008).

WFP’s own experience has been that food aid needs to be combined with credit, cash, training and/or other forms of support to achieve more than a temporary improvement in the situation of the most poor and vulnerable (WFP Bangladesh, 2007). Relief and recovery programming have been designed to be provided through largely separate channels and, for equity reasons, participants have not been allowed both to receive the GFD and FFW/CFW opportunities at the same time. Both forms of support potentially could have been linked and made mutually reinforcing to enhance the chances of households reaching a critical income and asset threshold to restore lost resilience.

59. There is also a tendency for programme design to be based predominantly on initial assessments, without periodic re-assessments or updating of the information, and for project designs to lack the flexibility to be adapted to changing circumstances. Most post-disaster experience is that the livelihoods context can be fluid and changeable; affected households and communities will re-assess their options and their livelihoods strategies will evolve over time (ALNAP/Provention Consortium 2008; Christoplos, 2006). For example, in Bangladesh, beneficiary needs were initially identified through a joint UN rapid assessment mission (16-19 November 2007) followed by a more in-depth Emergency Food Security Assessment or EFSA (9-15 December 2007). The EFSA focused on assessing the initial impact of the cyclone on household food security and livelihoods in order to refine the ongoing relief operations and to plan early recovery activities. It was conducted jointly with 19 partner NGOs and UN agencies. The decision to conduct a second stage of analysis, including livelihoods assessment and in coordination with other responding organisations reflects positive lessons learned from past natural disasters in Bangladesh



and international good practice. The EMOP project design, however was not adjusted to the evolving programming context over time. The EFSA was conducted in December 2007, approximately one month after Cyclone Sidr. An updated needs assessment was not conducted, either separately or through the beneficiary feedback systems established during phase 1 (the latter can be an option if there are programme funding constraints). Given the lengthy delays in commencement of the implementation of phase 2 (around eleven months after the disaster), it would have been desirable to conduct such an assessment prior to implementation of the livelihoods recovery programming (for example, during the more detailed planning processes which took place over May-June).

60. In Nepal, some important adjustments have been made to project design over time to reflect the evolving programming context. For example, the PRRO has been extended and expanded over 2008-09 to account for the additional impact of natural disasters and increasing food prices on conflict-affected areas. It would have been useful to update the conflict needs assessment and integrate it with the market and price impact assessment conducted in 2008, prior to extending and expanding the PRRO. The political situation has evolved considerably since the original 2006 analysis, and the programming context and needs have evolved with it. This was indicated by beneficiaries during focus group discussions and household interviews (eg increased mobility and productive activities).
61. The quality of programme design related to recovery in general was weak with recovery objectives rarely clearly broken down and a lack of clarity about the reasons for including some types of activities under recovery labels. Logframes were often weak reducing the likelihood of effective monitoring of livelihood outcomes. A lack of clarity about the specific objectives of recovery is sometimes leading to confusion both internally amongst staff and externally with donors. In Nepal and Bangladesh the evaluators found a weak conceptual basis for recovery that focused predominantly on meeting short-term food security needs. The emphasis was placed more on meeting shorter term income and employment needs, with less attention given to the quality and the durability of communal assets being built or to household level livelihood recovery needs.
62. It would be helpful if project documents did more to break down recovery objectives, including a clear trajectory from a shock to a desired recovery outcome. Examples might be a planned transition from:
  - Short term relief to longer term safety nets
  - Relief food assistance to development food assistance
  - Food assistance to other livelihood interventions
  - From a shock to stronger and more resilient livelihoods
63. In different contexts, the WFP recovery strategy might be aiming for one of these objectives or several of them simultaneously and each of them implies different approaches to exit strategies and capacity building. For instance, a goal to promote a transition from WFP support to other livelihood interventions would imply a focus on coordination with other livelihood actors and WFP's catalytic role in bringing in other development actors. A transition to development food assistance would imply making a strong case to donors for longer term support to development programming. Being more explicit about planned transitions and the recovery trajectory envisaged within particular activities would enable WFP to make more explicit links from recovery related activities to clear exit strategies and so help in making a more convincing case to donors to support recovery.
64. Project design has also suffered from a striking lack of indicators relating to livelihoods recovery and limited guidance at a corporate level. The indicators being used in log-frames at country level remaining largely output based and focused on amounts of food delivered and in relation to food for assets on numbers of assets built or trainings delivered. Outcome indicators in the previous strategic plan remained at a pilot level and were not effectively rolled out. Draft indicators being developed as part of the new strategic plan are attempting to move forward on this issue with suggested indicators for example tracking reductions in negative coping mechanisms through a coping strategy index (WFP 2008i). There are still



no indicators being suggested, however, that would capture improvements in livelihoods at a household level.

65. The one indicator that is currently being used in Uganda for example is ‘proportion of beneficiary household expenditures devoted to food’ and this seems problematic for several reasons. There may well be variations in the proportion that people spend on food unrelated to receipt of food assistance or to processes of recovery from disasters as recent rising global food prices amply demonstrate. Secondly the logic is unclear and largely unexplained. The indicator might be tracking the fact that receipt of food aid means that people have to spend less on purchasing food or that food aid will support the recovery of livelihoods leading to greater incomes or production and therefore a sustained need to spend less on food or more on other things. It is not clear, however, whether the indicator is tracking the immediate impact of receipt of food on household expenditure or the hoped for impact of food assistance on improved livelihoods and the indicator cannot distinguish between the two.
66. The indicators proposed in project document log-frames relating to food for assets are almost all output related. For example in the Burundi PRRO log-frame they refer to numbers and types of assets created and number and type of training sessions held. There is rarely any attempt to track and develop indicators for the usefulness, impact and sustainability of assets built or trainings conducted. Problematic indicators, the focus on outputs and neglect of outcomes and impact and a lack of analysis of data are far from confined to issues around recovery. As the recent evaluation of WFP’s gender policy notes: some of the indicators suffer from ‘construct validity’ – they are not good indicators of what is being measured and most of the indicators measure outputs rather than outcome or impacts (WFP 2008e: 21). It also notes widespread collection of data but little analysis of that data or use of it to inform programming strategies.

### *Appropriateness*

67. This sub-section on appropriateness examines the extent to which activities relating to recovery are tailored to needs. The question asked in the evaluation matrix to examine the issue was:

- Is the appropriateness of food aid being explicitly assessed, monitored and evaluated?

As noted above in the section on project design, assessments often failed to consider the appropriateness of different programming options and this often led to a standardised package of responses.

68. One dimension of appropriateness is whether or not the use of cash as an alternative or complement to food aid is being assessed and used when appropriate. The new strategic plan contains a clear commitment to considering and using cash where it is appropriate and the possible use of cash is increasingly on the agenda (WFP 2008g). There is some evidence of assessments starting to examine the role of cash and of its use in programming. In Bangladesh, cash as well as food for work was being implemented in areas where markets were seen as strong enough. In Nepal, WFP is working with three implementing partners using cash transfers, for example GTZ had provided cash and food in its public works partnership with WFP. In Lesotho, WFP and World Vision had implemented a pilot project which compared recipients receiving cash, a combination of cash and food and food aid. (Devereux 2008b). WFP (2008g) cites recent experience with vouchers and cash transfers in Bangladesh, Georgia, Malawi, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
69. Evidence from the country case studies, however, suggested that there were still some biases towards food aid in the choices being made about programming instruments. Where analysis of the potential appropriateness of cash does take place it is sometimes superficial with the traditional concerns about cash (security, corruption, food availability) being cited as reasons for continuing with food assistance without any analysis of whether these concerns are likely to be applicable in practice or any recommendation for more in depth analysis. A review in Burundi for instance cites insufficient communications and lack of safeguards for cash transfers, low purchasing power and demand, fragile security situation, lack of



significant infrastructures for the delivery of cash and a large structural production gap as reasons why food aid is likely to continue to be needed without much critical examination of whether or not these are really impediments to cash programming or comparison with the risks of insecurity and diversion facing delivery of food aid (WFP Burundi 2008). Where good analysis had been conducted, such as in Nepal, there was limited use of the outcomes – with the notable exception of the GTZ/WFP FSRP partnership.

70. In Ethiopia, the PSNP since its inception has provided a mixture of cash and food aid. Cash transfers were restricted to woredas<sup>3</sup> with the necessary administrative capacity and where markets were assessed as strong enough to respond to the additional demand pressure. The expectation was that cash transfers would increase as administrative capacity and markets strengthened (Devereux et al 2008). Rising food prices in 2008 have led to the erosion of the value of payments in cash through the PSNP. Even with a rise in the daily wage from 6 to 8 birr the cash wage received now buys significantly less food than the equivalent food transfer. Unsurprisingly this has led to strong beneficiary preferences for receiving food aid. As a recent Save the Children report argues there is a need for the programme to do more to ensure parity between food and cash wage rates and to be more flexible and responsive to changing food prices and market availability in the type of resource transfers (Save the Children 2008). External stakeholders felt that in spite of a theoretical shift to being able to consider cash as well as food WFP maintained a food first bias and was not very engaged in debates about the appropriate mix of cash and food instruments within the PSNP.
71. In Nepal, a study examining the appropriate mix of cash and food assistance found that there were a number of misperceptions among WFP and other stakeholders regarding the potential anti-social uses of cash (e.g. for smoking or drinking by men) and the interpretation of stated beneficiary preferences for food or cash (e.g. why many women and isolated mountain communities said they would prefer to receive food over cash) (Dietz 2006). There was a tendency among some WFP staff and NGO partners to view these as definitive statements of what was possible or not possible as a programming response, rather than analysing the underlying reasons for these statements. The findings of the study and various evaluations are not reflected in the balance of food/cash programming employed in the PRRO (Dietz 2006). Direct food aid continues to dominate the assistance provided, with only the FSRP providing a FFA/CFW combination and facing many challenges in administering the cash through WFP channels. The Bangladesh EMOP 10715.0, recognised that there would be situations when cash was a more appropriate response than food assistance, but only allocated a small portion of assistance to a cash-based programme against its stated criteria of functional food markets, despite reporting from the EFSA that: “nearly 95% of local markets were continuing to function at mid-December [2007] ... Food is generally available on the market and markets have, for the most part, recovered.” WFP currently has a directive that pilot cash proposals should not exceed US\$3 million which restricts the ability of country offices to significantly scale up cash based responses where appropriate.
72. In Uganda, as WFP starts to seriously examine the possible appropriateness of cash and voucher based assistance as an alternative or complement to food aid, there will be a need for stronger analysis of markets. The EFSA’s are starting to examine issues around the appropriateness of food and cash and a forthcoming CFSVA will include an extensive survey of markets and traders. There has been some attempt to track price data but little analysis of the impact of food aid on local markets. In the Acholi region, staff felt that when working with partners that had added a cash component with FFW, the activities seem to be more well received as well as an integral part of recovery.
73. WFP is still only considering cash as a direct alternative for food aid rather than examining ways in which cash can be used differently to support livelihoods. Thus far, cash has almost exclusively been considered as a possible alternative or complement to food aid in food for assets programmes. An alternative use is lump sum cash grants which could enable people to invest in productive assets and kick-start processes of

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<sup>3</sup> district



recovery. These have been successfully used by other agencies as part of support to livelihoods recovery but do not yet seem to be part of the WFP toolbox.

### **Box 3: Lump sum grants to support livelihoods recovery**

Isiolo, Kenya, suffered a severe drought in 2005 that led to livestock deaths and acute malnutrition in children. Save the Children responded in 2006, providing 750 households with a one-off cash transfer of \$435. The cash was distributed with the objective of assisting families to re-stock herds, invest in other productive uses and meet other immediate needs. The evaluation found that the cash transfers beneficiaries were able to invest in livestock and other livelihood assets and meet pressing needs without resorting to selling animals (O'Donnell, 2007). UNHCR has provided lump sum grants to assist in reintegration in Burundi, Afghanistan and other contexts (UNHCR 2008). In response to the 2005 food crisis in Niger, the International Federation of the Red Cross and British Red Cross distributed \$240 to 5,713 households with the objectives of meeting immediate needs, avoiding coping strategies and restocking herds (University of Arizona 2006).

In response to the worst drought to hit Swaziland in 15 years, Save the Children targeted 7,500 households with a monthly transfer of food rations and cash in 2007/2008. A one-time grant of \$70 was also distributed at the beginning of the project in order to allow protection and promotion of livelihoods, combining a larger grant with the smaller monthly transfers.

74. There is a lack of clarity in project documents about how other activities such as nutrition programmes and school feeding related to processes of livelihood recovery. Donors often see these activities as either ongoing relief or developmental with no clear link to processes of recovery and a lack of clear exit strategies. A review of the Burundi PRRO found that school feeding and health and nutrition components were no longer linked to an emergency response and argued that these 'components need to be placed within a more developmental framework, improved partnerships and handover perspectives'. It recommended moving them into a new country programme (WFP 2008f).
75. A broader range of activities in support of livelihoods may be appropriate (credit, restocking, seed distributions or vouchers, support to markets and many others). Whether or not food assistance can be appropriately used to support this wider range of activities needs to be analysed on a context specific basis. Often, an appropriate role for WFP is likely to be advocating for a broader range of livelihood activities to be implemented by other actors whilst it focuses on supporting food security. Local procurement may have potential to stimulate local markets and contribute to recovery processes but its feasibility will need to be carefully examined and may be particularly challenging in recovery contexts and particular care will need to be taken not to create artificial markets and negative impacts once support is withdrawn.
76. A recommendation from the Nepal and Bangladesh case studies was that WFP should consider the incorporation of household level livelihoods recovery activities and expansion of the use of modalities such as direct cash transfers for asset protection or replacement and income diversification. In Nepal, a Food Security Rehabilitation Project implemented in partnership with GTZ had included strategies to increase and diversify household income and assets. Through complementary GTZ funding, the road works programmes' beneficiaries are being provided with items like vegetable seeds and goats, together with agricultural extension support and training to improve farming techniques or other means to generate income, eg hospitality training for women. GTZ also recently commissioned a livelihoods-oriented labour market assessment to guide its work in this area.
77. The relevance of school feeding as an emergency / recovery intervention was questioned in some of the country case studies and recent evaluations. It is possible to construct a recovery rationale for school feeding, that keeping children in school builds human capital which strengthens livelihoods but this is clearly long term and therefore problematic for many donors. A shorter term recovery rationale is around the importance of schooling in restoring a sense of normalcy and community reintegration but this begs



the question of whether food aid is the most effective way of supporting the restarting of schools after disasters. Better payment of teachers' salaries, adequate equipment or waiving of school fees for example might be equally or more effective and there is rarely any analysis of alternative interventions. There is also a need to for greater consideration of issues such as exclusion of particularly vulnerable children not attending school. A third rationale for relief and recovery may be that school feeding is an effective mechanism for reaching populations with food support as in the Pakistan example. These recovery rationales, however, are rarely made explicitly in project documents. An exception was in Pakistan where a clear recovery rationale for school feeding to maintain attendance as families return and relieve short term hunger was included in the post earthquake PRRO (WFP Pakistan 2006).

78. The contribution of the Bangladesh EMOP's school feeding programme to livelihoods recovery – which was not its stated objective - was questioned by some, as compared to other possible recovery investments. From a livelihoods perspective, the programme was considered too short to achieve significant nutritional or educational outcomes. In the one community visited where the SFP was being implemented the GFD had been withdrawn earlier as part of the relief programming drawdown, and the teachers and school management committee reported that some families reduced the number of meals at home of children receiving high energy biscuits in schools, and with no nutritional surveillance.
79. A Kenya evaluation argued that 'there is considerable doubt about the advisability of the Expanded School Feeding Programme (ESFP) except as a means of supplementing relief distributions' and that there will be many problems in realistically achieving a smooth exit strategy (WFP 2007d). In other contexts, the link between school feeding and recovery and its objectives were unclear. For example the West Africa evaluation found that 'the overall purpose of school feeding in the region was unclear, and so it was not possible to determine whether the intervention was appropriate or not' (WFP 2004g; 41). By contrast in Colombia, an evaluation found that school feeding was appropriate as a recovery intervention that helped to re-integrate IDPs back into society and supported schooling as one of the first steps for children in returning to a normal life. In an EMOP to respond to rising food prices in Pakistan, food assistance is being delivered through the school feeding mechanism as this was already set up and running and represented the most robust way of quickly scaling up assistance (WFP Pakistan 2008).

## **2.B. Efficiency**

80. This section examines the outputs (quantitative and qualitative) of WFP recovery related programming in relation to inputs. The sub-sections examine targeting and coverage, monitoring and evaluation, the adequacy of resources, channels of delivery and institutional arrangements. The evaluation team was not able to adequately address questions of cost efficiency in the limited time available for country case studies.
81. The evaluation matrix asked the following questions:
- Do targeting criteria relate to recovery objectives? What proportion of recovery needs were being met (in terms of % of population and volume of assistance)?
  - Were groups/people with particular vulnerabilities included (illness, age, disability, gender)?
  - Timeliness: Did people receive timely food aid?
  - Have planned recovery related activities been implemented as planned?
  - How well are monitoring and evaluation mechanisms contributing to analysis of the contribution of food assistance to processes of recovery?
  - Were the resources of WFP and its cooperating partners (human and financial) sufficient to carry out planned activities effectively?
  - How do project costs for recovery programmes compare across different countries?
  - How do costs for WFP livelihood recovery activities compare to other forms of livelihood recovery programming?



### *Targeting and Coverage*

82. Relating to coverage, a consistent theme from some of the country case studies and other recent evaluations is that fewer recovery activities are implemented than planned. For instance in West Africa, the evaluation finds that more recovery activities were planned in 2002 and 2003 than were actually implemented. It notes the ‘generally dismal performance of other (non school feeding) types of recovery activities’ and relates this to the lack of cooperating partners with appropriate technical expertise and capacity, particularly for FFW. Food for assets activities in particular seem to be consistently small scale and with low coverage. The Somalia PRRO evaluation found that ‘although some FFW projects did occur in the Sool Plateau, project size and number of beneficiaries were very limited and the impact negligible given the area affected’ (WFP 2006 Somalia: 9). A lack of effective partners able to implement effectively at scale is a recurring theme. An exception is in Ethiopia, where the scale of public works under the PSNP is certainly impressive with 34,000 projects per year being completed (Mid-term Review 2008).
83. The 2004 PRRO thematic evaluation notes that recovery is likely to lead to a need for more rigorous targeting, but there is limited evidence of more rigorous approaches being introduced (WFP 2004). Targeting criteria in Bangladesh and Nepal were seen as clear and appropriate. In some of the country case studies partners lacked skills and experience in community-managed targeting and WFP timeframes did not allow sufficient time and flexibility for two-staged targeting with adjustment over time based on community feedback. A review of the Burundi PRRO found that ‘targeting guidelines basically do not exist’ and a need for improved targeting through all programme components. It found that targeting based on six monthly projections was resulting in continuously fluctuating caseloads and disconnecting programming from medium to longer term needs and not allowing longer term investments to assist recovery from shocks and to rebuild assets and support livelihoods (WFP 2008f). Maxwell and Burns (2008) note that targeting in southern Sudan is still more often a process of negotiation or haggling between WFP, communities, local leaders and local government than a more systematic or community based process. The study noted that there was very little in the way of post distribution monitoring, so little attempt to quantify targeting errors.
84. Many of the targeting issues raised in the country case studies cover generic concerns over inclusion and exclusion related to the familiar difficulties of targeting large scale relief and recovery resources. Few of the findings directly relate back to issues around recovery. An exception is the heated debate in Ethiopia around the issue of ‘graduation’ from the PSNP and whether or not this has led to selection of beneficiaries who are more likely to graduate and the exclusion of the poorest (Sharp et al 2006). An evaluation notes a lack of conceptual and programming clarity around graduation and fears that people will be ‘graduated’ from the programme to meet top down targets before they are sufficiently food secure (WFP Ethiopia 2007). The fundamental targeting issue in Ethiopia, however, is that resources in the PSNP are simply insufficient for it to cover all chronically food insecure households leading to significant issues of exclusion of people who are as needy as those included in the programme (Devereux et al 2008).
85. FFW in project documents is often assumed to be self targeting but in practice this rarely seems to be the case unless wages are set so low that they risk failing to meet other objectives (Barrett and Clay 2003). A Tajikistan evaluation found that ‘in food insecure areas WFP rations are too valuable to be self targeting and FFW participation tends to be monopolised by the stronger and more enterprising households (WFP Tajikistan 2006). Similarly in Afghanistan it was noted that ‘FFW is only weakly self targeting because village leaders select participants.’ An issue in Bangladesh was that the C/FFW wage was lowered from original planned amounts, so as not to conflict with a low government CFW wage rate, so that whilst it may have been self targeting wages were too low to contribute much to recovery of livelihoods and some beneficiaries stated that they found it hard to cover even immediate basic needs.
86. In Nepal, FFA/CFW have been considered by WFP to be largely self-targeting to the most poor and vulnerable, as lower wages and hard physical labour do not normally attract those in higher income





groups. This evaluation supported the findings of the 2006 country programme evaluation and the food/cash study that self-targeting is ineffective, as the marginal value of labour varies considerably between households and the short-term employment attracts less food-insecure households with a lack of other work opportunities (Dietz 2006 and 2006b). Communities often address the high demand for work opportunities by spreading the employment benefits evenly across all households and rationing the number of days each household can work. While this can be a positive feature in terms of social capital and peace-building, it can dilute the intended food security and recovery effects of the assistance.

### *Monitoring and Evaluation*

87. A consistent finding was that WFP needs to improve its ability to understand evolving recovery needs and better document the contribution of food aid to recovery processes. A stronger evidence base and documentation of learning from programmes should help to improve effectiveness and impact and might also help with the task of persuading donors to invest in support to recovery. In common with other areas of WFP's work a major issue with monitoring in relation to livelihoods recovery is a continued focus on outputs and neglect of issues around outcomes and impact. One of the key objectives of livelihoods recovery programming suggested in the various policy documents is that food aid may help to reduce the use of negative coping mechanisms. However, there is only limited evidence of attempts to track the impact of food aid on coping strategies from the country case studies or recent evaluations. There was little evidence of any analysis of possible unintended or negative impacts of food aid or the potential positive or negative impacts of food for work/assets on labour markets. A focus on fairly mechanical reporting of outputs is also leading to a disconnection between monitoring and evaluation and programming adjustments. Monitoring data is also too often being collected but not adequately analysed or documented, inhibiting learning. Lessons raised in repeated evaluations are not being reflected in changes in programme design or implementation. In Nepal, for instance, the evaluation case study noted little evidence of monitoring and evaluation reports being systematically followed up.
88. There are, however, some good examples of investments in monitoring and analysis. In Nepal, WFP has developed an impressive network of 31 field level monitoring and evaluation officers, employing a sophisticated range of tools – such as vulnerability and coping indexes - to conduct real-time comparisons of the efficiency and effectiveness of the PRRO's relief and recovery programmes across districts. The monitoring system is largely focused on capturing information on progress and results in achieving physical targets (eg quantity of food received, number of communal assets built, etc), as well as on the efficiency of food aid distribution (eg timeliness of delivery, etc). It does generate some useful information on the impact of food aid (eg average number of months that beneficiaries can feed their households, perceptions of increased food security, etc), but only indirectly captures the impact of WFP's interventions on the restoration of assets, income and positive coping strategies of affected households (eg what assets were lost and what has been replaced as a consequence of WFP support, what goods and services can be purchased such as health care, etc). The system could be usefully expanded in future crisis responses to include more quantitative and qualitative information about changes to household assets and income as a result of WFP's interventions. The baseline data already collected and reporting tools in use are capable of producing this information, building from existing strengths in the VAM's Food Security Monitoring and Analysis System for measuring changes to negative household coping strategies, the ability of families to meet their food needs and uses of cash (FSRP reporting only). Given that most WFP and IP staff have limited or no prior livelihoods recovery experience, they would need some capacity-building in this area.
89. In Lesotho, a Community Household Surveillance System (CHS) has been introduced and is carried out twice a year. The CHS household questionnaire investigates household demographics, migration, income and production, borrowing, agricultural production, access to food aid, household food stocks and sources, food consumption, coping strategies, assets and livestock ownership. The country reports describe the trends in vulnerability across various vulnerable groups, and also place emphasis on differences between



food aid beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The evaluation team felt that this represented an example of good practice in attempting to track livelihood outcomes (Owubah et al 2005; WFP Lesotho 2008).

90. WFP in several of the countries reviewed had made significant efforts to generate learning around livelihoods issues. For examples the Sudan country office has made important investments in bringing in outside expertise to analyse livelihoods and the role of food aid. A Food Aid Forum in June 2006 brought together a broad range of opinion on the use of food aid and the potential roles and activities of WFP in Sudan and this led to a special issue of the Disasters Journal on food aid in Sudan (Gelsdorf et al 2007; Young 2007; Buchanan Smith and Jaspars 2007; Pantuliano 2007; Sharp 2007). The Forum was notable for the willingness of WFP to engage with critical analysis of the role of food aid. WFP also commissioned a study which aimed to enhance understanding of the effects of food aid and how the conflict in Darfur has affected livelihoods and markets (Buchanan Smith and Jaspars 2007). WFP in Uganda has recently established an evaluation and lessons learned unit, with the aim to get a greater understanding of the impact of WFP's interventions and has commissioned a series of recent evaluations which have attempted to analyse outcomes and impacts relating to recovery (Abola et al 2008; Das and Nkutu 2008; WFP Uganda 2007c; 2008).
91. An example of an attempt to gather more systematic evidence of impact was provided in a Tajikistan evaluation which noted that 'To assess the effectiveness of WFP for livelihood recovery, a household consumption survey was carried out among VGF beneficiaries in Khatlon in 2005. The survey concluded that as a result of access to WFP food assistance, beneficiaries were able to reduce their cash expenditure on food. In the absence of food assistance, they spent 74 percent of total income on food, whereas during the period of WFP assistance they spent less than half (49 percent) of their income on food. However, the food purchase displacement effect lasted no longer than a couple of months. As soon as the food assistance ended, food expenditure increased to the previous level. With the exception of some women in a remote mountain village (Farob *jamoat*, Penjikent District, Sughd Province) who reported to the evaluation team that VGF was responsible for saving their children's lives, no one else reported that it had any lasting effects on livelihoods.' (WFP Tajikistan 2006).
92. The weakness of WFP corporate level indicators (previously discussed in paragraphs 64-66) was widely noted by WFP staff who felt the need for greater guidance. In Sierra Leone, for instance, WFP struggled with the lack of corporate indicators relating to recovery and Strategic Objective Two. The country office described 'searching everywhere' for indicators that might be appropriate. The logframe for the PRRO has two indicators relating to livelihoods recovery. They are the 'proportion of beneficiaries whose food deficit reduced by at least 2 months' and the 'percentage of households with increased income by gender of head of household.' However, there is little evidence of achievements against these indicators actually being measured (WFP Sierra Leone 2007). The tendency to have indicators relating to livelihoods recovery in project document logframes but not to be collecting or analysing data against them was also found in other contexts (although not in Bangladesh and Nepal). In Ethiopia, the logframe for PRRO 10665.0 includes three indicators particularly relevant for recovery (increased ability of PSNP beneficiaries to manage shocks and invest in activities that enhance their resilience; % of households reporting reductions in food deficit of at least two months and proportion of beneficiaries with access to and/or benefiting from created assets) but there is, however, no evidence of WFP collecting, analysing or reporting on these indicators (WFP Ethiopia 2007b). A recent WFP review of the PSNP notes that there is no database for public works projects and no tracking of standards, performance and effectiveness other than intermittent monitoring through public works reviews (Mid-term review 2008). In several of the country case studies, NGO cooperating partners noted that they were only asked to report on food delivery outputs and expressed a need for more quantitative and qualitative performance indicators to assess livelihoods recovery progress and results.
93. The country case studies, in common with recent evaluations, noted limitations with the evidence base for attributing impact. For example in Afghanistan an evaluation concluded that 'livelihood outcome monitoring tools are urgently needed to enable WFP to assess the realism of its livelihood protection and



recovery objectives and the means and resources employed to realise them' and that 'it is uncertain whether FFW helped poor households to cope with crisis or to retain assets because systematically collected data on results at the outcome level was lacking' (WFP Afghanistan 2005). A review in Burundi (WFP 2008f) found an 'almost complete lack of data on impact of the various components'. A PRRO evaluation in Ethiopia found that the impact of the PSNP is unclear and 'there is no robust evidence to demonstrate an improved consumption smoothing impact compared to previous relief interventions'. (WFP Ethiopia 2006). A recurring theme from previous evaluations is also limited capacity for analysis of what monitoring data is being collected. A Kenya evaluation found that there was no data on the extent to which assets were protected or negative coping assets avoided. Vastly over-complicated post distribution monitoring forms were being used with the result that data wasn't being collected properly, analysed or used (WFP Kenya 2007).

94. In Uganda, there is a heavy reliance on surveys and quantitative monitoring data in the information being collected. There is a real need to consider a wider range of analysis tools and to complement surveys with a broader range of qualitative as well as quantitative tools. The over-reliance on surveys has inhibited analysis of recovery issues that do not lend themselves to understanding through surveys and quantitative analysis. This over-reliance on quantitative survey methods and relative neglect of qualitative tools was also seen in other country case studies.
95. Particular weaknesses in relation to monitoring of food for assets programmes were seen in several contexts. In Uganda for example, there was little analysis of possible effects on labour markets and whether participating in food for assets takes people away from key livelihood activities. In Acholi Region labour availability within the household appears to be a critical determinant of the success of recovery and households with labour constraints are recovering more slowly. In this context, the appropriateness of work requirements needs to be carefully analysed and consideration given to the particular needs of labour poor households especially as general food distributions are phased out. In Karamoja region there is a need to analyse the impact of a work requirement on the mobility needs of pastoral and agro-pastoral households. Studies of the PSNP in Ethiopia show the importance of monitoring the impact of food for work participation on labour demands in households. Concerns were raised that poor households with limited labour capacity were having to work full time for six months or more in order to meet the public works obligations (Sharp et al 2006). In theory this has been addressed by putting a cap on the number of days that households can work but a recent review found that finding evidence that the cap is being implemented in practice is very difficult and found that the PSNP system is 'still very tough on households with limited labour capacity' (Devereux et al 2008). There has also been little analysis of the sustainability and maintenance of assets created. Revisiting assets some time after they have been built to examine whether they are still being used and maintained ought to be a standard part of WFP and partner monitoring of food for assets programmes.

#### *Adequacy of Resources*

96. A fundamental issue is the impact of WFP's funding system on the ability of WFP and its partners to effectively implement livelihood recovery related activities. The basic dilemma is that support costs are tied to food aid tonnage but that recovery activities need greater support costs due to more complex implementation at the same time as food aid tonnages are often reduced. This has been noted repeatedly in previous evaluations and was raised as a constraint in the country case studies for this evaluation.
97. In Southern Africa, the evaluation noted that 'funding and programming mechanisms that base cash for staffing and other operating costs on food tonnages rather than on programming needs limit WFP's capacity to implement sustainable recovery strategies.' When large scale relief distributions cease so do funds for staff and operating costs and sub-offices reduce operations and may close (WFP 2007). Similarly in West Africa, an evaluation highlighted that 'partners who are responsible for smaller quantities of food are likely to receive smaller funds, irrespective of the actual implementation costs' which are often greater for recovery interventions (WFP 2004f). In Ethiopia, a recommendation of the



evaluation was that additional funding was needed to enable WFP to undertake its capacity building functions based on need rather than on the basis of available ODOC budgets (WFP Ethiopia 2007). In Indonesia the evaluation noted that ‘the degree to which WFP is able to move beyond simple delivery of food items depends on the quantities that such deliveries entail (WFP Indonesia 2006).’

98. WFP also frequently has to cope with funding shortfalls in operations, particularly among some donors that have rigid divisions between relief and development programming which do not adequately recognise and support important post-crisis transitional periods. Strategic level dialogue by WFP headquarters with a range of donors is still required on an appropriate balance between and focus for relief and early recovery activities and the flexible use of resources provided to try to improve support to recovery activities. In Nepal, for instance, the July 2007 to June 2009 PRRO’s coverage has been affected by donor funding shortfalls, including insufficient funding and late confirmation of contributions; for instance, the shortfall in December 2008 was around 44.7%. These resource constraints have contributed to delays in programming and food aid deliveries and changes to the coverage and timing of the PRRO’s recovery programmes without much advance notice. WFP, despite a challenging donor environment, could have put in place a stronger contingency plan to deal with funding shortfalls, identify critical minimum coverage requirements for the PRRO or to ensure that programming was not extended beyond likely available resources. In Bangladesh, financial resources for the Bangladesh EMOP’s recovery programmes could not be secured until April/May 2008, leading to project delays. Funding shortfalls in other case study contexts also led to abrupt halts in recovery activities with limited communication with partners and beneficiaries.
99. Another aspect of adequacy of resources are the human resources skills of WFP and its cooperating partners in relation to livelihoods recovery. In order to deliver effective livelihood recovery related programmes WFP staff require skills in analysing livelihoods and implementing livelihood focussed activities. In several of the case study countries, most WFP staff had little exposure to conceptual models, such as DFID’s sustainable livelihoods framework, or international best practice in post-disaster livelihoods recovery or integrated relief and recovery programming approaches. The same was true of WFP’s cooperating partners. There was much uncertainty regarding appropriate timeframes, activities and priorities for undertaking livelihoods recovery activities.
100. WFP staff interviewed in the case study countries felt that there were a lack of learning opportunities for staff in relation to livelihoods and there was a clear desire for more guidance, training and tools. In several of the country case studies, WFP should invest more in professional development opportunities, learning and training for WFP and implementing partner staff to strengthen their livelihoods recovery needs assessment, planning and M&E skills. In some contexts, there are specific new skills and capacities that are needed such as the ability to play a more active role in policy discussions around the introduction of longer term safety nets. Limitations in terms of staff capacity were a critical recurring theme in many previous evaluations. In Southern Africa, a conclusion was that ‘the staff profile for emergencies may be inappropriate for recovery activities, which require staff with strategic planning and related skills’ and ‘technical expertise in food security analysis and livelihood programming is often limited.’ (WFP 2007c).

### *Channels of Delivery*

101. There was little evidence of WFP undertaking regular and rigorous analysis or review of cost efficiency and effectiveness of different food assistance modalities or comparison with trends in modalities of other donors, agencies and governments. For example in Uganda, there was no analysis comparing efficiency of partners, of cost effectiveness analysis of particular activities or of benchmarking efficiency against other food aid providers in Uganda or other countries in the region. Part of the analysis process for making decisions about the appropriate mix of cash and food instruments should be cost efficiency analysis.



102. In Nepal, the budget breakdown for the expanded and extended PRRO shows that the value of the commodities represents around 35.5% of total WFP costs, including transport and other direct and indirect operational and support costs. By comparison, the value of commodities for Bangladesh's Cyclone Sidr EMOP is around 69% of total costs. The extreme difficulty of the transport conditions in Nepal account for much of this large additional cost, and the WFP Country Office management held the view that most feasible logistical efficiency gains had already been made. This raises a question regarding both the efficiency and the effectiveness of food-based assistance, as compared with cash transfers, as the primary mode of programme delivery in Nepal.

#### *Food for Assets*

103. Food for assets is the activity most directly associated with livelihoods recovery in WFP project documents. The activity is usually framed as having dual objectives or providing immediate support to livelihoods through cash or food wages and longer term impact on livelihoods through the building of community assets. The country case studies, however, highlighted a number of concerns with the efficiency of food for assets programming. A consistent theme was a lack of adequate non-food resources, WFP staff and implementing partner technical capacities and skills to ensure that good quality and sustainable assets were being built.

104. There are some positive findings about the effectiveness and potential of food for work. In Indonesia an evaluation found that FFW projects were largely 'well conceived and implemented' with self targeting to the poorest and clear benefits to the local economy. WFP Country office staff and a recent evaluation in Pakistan saw FFW activities as particularly appropriate in the post 2005 earthquake context because there were a range of immediate needs for short term infrastructure repair which lent themselves to labour intensive public works such as repair of walking tracks, clearance of rubble from housing and repairs to damaged terraces and irrigation channels. This small scale infrastructure repair was very simple, did not need technical assistance and benefited from the incentive food assistance provided and the mobilisation provided by WFP and its partners (Umm e Zia 2008). In Ethiopia, the MERET programme (managing environmental resources to enable transitions to more sustainable livelihoods) works with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and communities to invest in sustainable land management through food for assets activities. The project supports the building of stronger livelihoods for those participating, has also been used as a model for developing food for assets activities in the PSNP and is often cited as an example of good practice (WFP Ethiopia 2008). The evaluation team in Lesotho felt that the support to conservation agriculture through food for assets was particularly effective.

105. The lack of adequate budgets for the non-food costs of food for assets programmes is a recurring theme. A Kenya evaluation noted a lack of tools for soil excavation in a dam construction project (WFP Kenya 2007). A 2005 Angola PRRO evaluation noted that 'few IPs had sufficient budgets for NFIs or appropriate technical capacity' in FFW projects' (WFP Angola 2005: 34). Similar concerns were raised in several of the country case studies. In Sierra Leone, non-food resources for FFW such as limited availability of tools are noted as a constraint (WFP Sierra Leone 2008). WFP project documents often assume that partners will provide complementary technical skills and non-food resources but there is a need to look more critically at contexts where these assumptions are not likely to be met.

#### **Box 4: FFW in Pastoralist Areas**

In Eastern Sudan 'in 2004, WFP introduced Food for Recovery, a less structured form of FFW aimed at supporting community recovery, where the receipt of food aid is linked to community projects, chosen and implemented by the community itself. Timeframes for FFW and FFR were often inadequate and local conflicts over land reduced cooperation between villages and delayed the progress of projects. Implementing agencies and WFP staff found FFR projects much more time consuming and most had not been adequately trained to make the transition from distributing free food to promoting recovery. Promoting the creation of



assets in areas where communities are scattered, mobile and/or too far away from the project location has clearly limited the efficacy of FFW and Food for Recovery initiatives. Furthermore the project outputs chosen have often been of little interest to communities. The majority of the households targeted by such projects are labour scarce and they are not prepared to sacrifice labour that is strategic to their livelihoods activities unless they think that the project will have an immediate and beneficial effect on the household economy... This would mean focussing activities on livestock support, soil and water conservation, and education or skills training.’ (Pantuliano 2007: 582 and 585).

An evaluation in Kenya (WFP Kenya 2007: 34) also noted difficulties with implementing FFW within pastoral economies and concluded that ‘FFW is neither viable or relevant as an EMOP activity without the support of a technical agency (government or NGO), tools and other non-food materials and a development strategy for community participation and maintenance. Without these elements FFW can do more harm than good.’ These findings reinforced those of an earlier study which also questioned the viability of FFW as implemented by WFP in Kenya (Anderson 2001).

106. Some of the country case studies note that WFP supports a very wide range of FFA activities for which it is difficult develop the technical skills and capacity to adequately support and monitor. For example in Uganda the current list of activities supported under FFA is enormously broad (training in brick-laying, carpentry, improved farming skills, adult literacy, nutrition, and HIV/AIDS prevention and care and community projects relating to environmental protection, reforestation, establishment of tree and fruit nurseries and woodlots, road repair and rehabilitation, rehabilitation of schools, health and community centres, protection and rehabilitation of drinking water sources, fish farming and watershed development). This makes it difficult for WFP to provide adequate technical oversight and supervision with limited staff resources and demands maintaining relationships with a very broad range of partners as noted both by the evaluation team and previous evaluations. Similarly, in Colombia, a WFP evaluation found that the country office does not have staff capacity to evaluate the technical quality of proposals and needed to link better with other actors (WFP Colombia 2007). A 2005 evaluation of Angola’s PRRO found that ‘in many instances neither WFP or its partners possessed the required technical skills for FFW projects’ (WFP Angola 2005: 36). There is an argument, therefore, for focussing on a narrower range of activities but this raises its own issues around respecting community priorities and designing projects according to context specific needs. There is a delicate balance to be struck between a narrower range of activities for which WFP and its partners can provide adequate technical supervision and enabling projects to reflect local contexts and priorities.
107. The Somalia Country Office was dealing with this issue by ‘transitioning from large numbers of small community-level projects to small numbers of larger, livelihood systems projects (the number of projects in 2005 is 25 percent of that in 2003)’. An evaluation saw this as advantageous both from a programme management viewpoint and for maximising impact on livelihoods (WFP Somalia 2006: 21). A Kenya evaluation noted that ‘WFP staff were far too busy trying to manage a complex, life-saving relief operation to make any practical contribution to the FFW activities envisaged in the project document (WFP Kenya 2007: 34). In its new PRRO Kenya is proposing a narrower focus for FFA with activities restricted to watershed management.
108. A consistent finding from the country case studies was that WFP was sometimes delegating most or all responsibility for the technical adequacy, safety and sustainability of assets built through FFA onto partners and framing WFP’s role purely in terms of food delivery. This should not be acceptable practice, given the cost, given the importance of these assets to many communities’ livelihoods, the cost of building them and safety considerations. The response of staff to quality concerns of FFA was sometimes that projects were intended to be short-term and quick impact and that therefore quality was less of a priority – an attitude that the evaluation team felt needs to be critically examined and challenged. There is a need for better support and monitoring of the quality of programming and assets being built. WFP either needs to have this capacity in-house or needs to explore sub-contracting other actors to provide a stronger quality assurance system.



109. In Nepal, food for assets activities suffered from a lack of funding for construction tools and materials to complement the unskilled labour inputs paid through WFP food aid. In spite of selection criteria that require activities to be identified with minimum requirements for such items, most communal infrastructure building does require a basic amount of tools and materials to be built to a minimum acceptable quality standard. As a result, some of the communities' priority activities cannot be selected for implementation (eg permanent concretised small-scale irrigation systems), some communal assets are being built to lower standards and some cannot be completed. There are also instances where the number of days (40) allocated for the construction work is insufficient, such as for upgrading schools. This situation is compromising quality standards in construction, combined with possible shortcomings in engineering skills among some of the cooperating partners (a few partners explained that the short and uncertain timeframes surrounding PRRO extensions had adversely impacted their ability to attract and retain good personnel to work in remote sites). WFP also has not set minimum quality standards for safe and durable construction, nor does it have the technical capacity to conduct spot checks on building quality. In all three FFA asset sites visited in Jumla, Nepal the communal assets visited by the evaluation team were sub-standard. A bridge and foot/mule trails had been built below the flood line in a steep watershed gully and without proper bracing that will likely be washed away within one or two years and a school had been built with weak walls that have a substantial chance of collapsing one day – this is an ethical safety issue as much as it is an issue about cost-efficiency and assets durability.
110. Another ethical and safety issue raised in Nepal, but also relevant in other contexts, is that WFP's cooperating partners have raised further concerns about the safety of workers employed under FFW/FFA schemes, citing examples of various accidents that had occurred on food for asset projects, causing either death or permanent disability. This is a serious occupational health and safety issue, which also negatively impacts on the livelihoods of affected workers and should be viewed as a shared responsibility of both the cooperating partners and WFP. The FSRP has developed a successful worker insurance scheme which may possibly be replicable in other future FFA/CFW schemes and there have been suggestions from some partners regarding creation of a pooled insurance fund. Both ideas merit further exploration. WFP and cooperating partners also should take a pro-active and preventive approach to this issue by systematically investigating and recording the causes and consequences of site accidents to identify accident safety measures and monitor whether partners have acceptable occupational health and safety practices and track records.
111. The food for assets guide in the Programme Guidance Manual was not widely used and could usefully be revised and expanded. In southern Africa, WFP has developed a Food for Assets Handbook with funding from GTZ that is more user friendly (not least by virtue of being printed in hard copy) but itself needs to be updated to take into account issues such as how to make informed choices about whether to make payments in cash, food or a combination of both (WFP 2007g). Updated guidance would also be useful to clear up widespread confusion over terminology. Food for assets appears to be the preferred term although the Programme Guidance Manual uses food for work and food for assets interchangeably and it also remains unclear whether food for training is included under the food for assets heading or is a separate category.

#### *Food for Training*

112. The evaluation has limited findings in relation to food for training both because FFT activities were not a main focus in some of the case study countries and where FFT activities were being implemented they were not a main focus of the fieldwork and interviews with beneficiaries. In several of the country case studies there was little evidence of WFP or its partners assessing the impact or usefulness of food for training activities. In Lesotho, the evaluation team felt that training provided to beneficiaries in conservation agriculture techniques was successful and had the potential to be expanded.



### *General Food Distribution*

113. General food distributions are often the most successful mechanism at being implemented on a large scale. They need fewer non-food resources and so are more suited to WFP's tonnage based funding model. General food distribution is usually presented as a relief intervention with basic life-saving objectives to alleviate immediate hunger and meet basic needs. In contexts where people's livelihoods are recovering, however, general food distributions are also likely to have recovery impacts. By helping people to meet basic needs, general food distributions can free up income and enable people to make their own investments in recovery. This aspect of general food distributions was, for instance, important in Uganda and is discussed further below (paragraph 116). The most efficient mechanism for supporting livelihoods recovery in some contexts, therefore, may simply be continuing to provide general food distributions, where appropriate.

### *Food for Education*

114. School feeding often has mixed objectives around maintaining school enrolment, attendance and the quality of learning and providing nutritional support. The education objectives are often stressed and there is relative neglect of the food security rationale. There is a need for greater attention to the impact that receipt of food aid provided through school feeding has on household food security and hence recovery of livelihoods. For example, in the Karamoja region of Uganda school feeding was playing a critical role for vulnerable households in maintaining a precarious degree of food security, especially as pipeline breaks had made general food distributions irregular. One man interviewed was collecting firewood with his wife and selling it in town. This produced just enough to feed him and his wife but only because his seven children were receiving food aid at school. These sort of food security impacts were, however, not being captured by WFP's existing monitoring tools.

115. There is also a need for greater critical analysis of whether or not the educational objectives of school feeding are being met and whether or not food aid is the most appropriate way of meeting these objectives, within the context of overall support to education. School feeding on its own may not be sufficient to meet recovery objectives to restore access to education after disasters. For example, a mid-term review of the post 2005 earthquake PRRO in Pakistan noted that 'in many of the districts visited, the willingness of people to educate their children in response to WFP's support to education is hindered by general lack of schools. This lack of infrastructure would pose problems for WFP interventions in order to accomplish its objectives related to education and would require the involvement of other partners such as the government, UN, and donor agencies. Other, equally important obstacles are lack of female teachers and difficulties with transportation/storage in remote locations.' (WFP Pakistan 2007).

### *Nutrition*

116. An issue for maternal and child health services, where WFP in many contexts is providing nutritional support to pregnant and lactating women and children under two, is whether or not the provision of food through health centres is an efficient delivery mechanism. A recent review of supplementary feeding programmes by Valid and WFP in Uganda noted that 'though integrating the delivery of the supplement into the health system was meant to make its use more effective, considering the current state of the health services in Moroto and Nakapiripirit districts (and most of other districts), whereby ordinary MCH services are not provided/utilized as they should be; delivering the nutrition supplement this way appears not to be the best-suited modality. Indeed, if from WFP's perspective, the overriding objective of the MCHN programme is to provide a food supplement to prevent malnutrition, this can be achieved through other distribution modalities e.g. direct food distribution (alongside GFD or as a separate distribution) to the identified vulnerable groups (WFP and Valid 2008).





### *HIV/AIDS*

117. WFP in several contexts is providing food assistance to people living with HIV/AIDS to support their adherence to treatment and nutritional recovery. The link between HIV/AIDS related activities and recovery of livelihoods from a particular shock was often unclear in project documents and this was another area of activity that donors often felt should be more appropriately supported as part of a development programme.
118. In Uganda, the food support provided by WFP to vulnerable people living with HIV/AIDS was widely perceived as having played an important role in terms of immediate assistance to people with very constrained livelihoods and in encouraging adherence to treatment. In some areas, partner NGOs had been able to develop strong livelihoods components to the project and phase food aid out after one year. Beneficiaries interviewed in the Acholi region felt that the livelihood support had been effective. The HIV/AIDS strategic evaluation's aide memoire from a Uganda case study noted that the Uganda Country Office had performed well in phasing out people from food aid and developing other forms of livelihood support (WFP Uganda 2007b). This, however, was noted in the thematic evaluation as the exception rather than the norm and that there was a generally low consideration being given to graduation of beneficiaries from food aid to other forms of livelihoods and income generating support. It also notes the need to develop linkages with safety net programmes (WFP 2008j). There is a need, however, for better analysis of how lasting and sustained the benefits were from the livelihoods support provided in Uganda. In some areas, the phase out strategy for the project was less clear and it appeared that food aid was just providing a useful but temporary support to livelihoods. HIV/AIDS is clearly a long-term development challenge and the question of how to integrate nutritional support for people affected by HIV/AIDS who are malnourished or food insecure into national policies and programmes is probably best tackled from a development perspective.

### *Other Activities*

119. Various other activities have been highlighted as having a potential contribution to livelihoods recovery. Local purchase, to the extent that procurement can be made in areas recovering from disasters, might have the potential to stimulate markets and boost the incomes of participating farmers, so contributing to recovery. In northern Uganda, purchase for progress has not yet become operational but there are plans to expand support to smallholders to participate in local procurement, particularly in the highly fertile Acholi Region. In DRC, between 2001 and 2006, WFP purchased 16,078 MT of commodities in ways that may have helped to encourage production and local traders' activities in food growing areas (WFP 2008f). In a review of food aid in Sudan Frankenberger et al (2007) found that 'there is a great deal of scope for food assistance in the medium term to help people recover their livelihoods.' They argued that there was scope for greater innovation in livelihood supporting activities suggesting, for example, using food to establish female run fodder nurseries for small ruminants which provide milk to mothers and children when the rest of the family migrates to cattle camps.
120. The Country Office in Sudan highlighted the positive impact on livelihoods of a Special Operation to build roads. This was primarily framed around the need for better roads to enable WFP to move food around more efficiently but appears to have had major impacts on early recovery, for instance, through increased trading volumes for communities where road access was improved. The project was implemented entirely separately from FFW using contractors, heavy machinery and cash wages and had significant government support.

### *Institutional Arrangements*

121. This sub-section examines institutional arrangements both within WFP and externally in terms of how WFP relates to its partners. The evaluation matrix asked:



- How did WFP's livelihood recovery programming relate to those of other actors (UN agencies, NGOs, government, MFIs, Red Cross)?
  - How did WFP's activities relate to people's own livelihood strategies and investments in processes of recovery?
  - How did WFP's livelihoods recovery programming relate to other WFP relief and development activities?
122. There was generally positive feedback from country case studies of WFP's role in coordination and partnerships. Real efforts were being made by WFP to align its recovery relating programming with governments and other actors. In Uganda for instance, WFP has been actively contributing to the forthcoming UN peace-building and recovery strategy which should help to situate WFP's programming within broader recovery objectives. The new country strategy being developed has placed particular stress on aligning WFP activities with government policies and priorities.
123. Findings from previous evaluations highlight the need for WFP to do more to coordinate with other actors involved in livelihoods recovery related work. For example, in Kenya, cooperating partners felt that 'WFP concentrated too much on food aid and neglected opportunities for complementary development activities that could lift populations from dependency on external assistance' (WFP Kenya 2007). In Indonesia the evaluation notes the need for a balance between field projects that revitalise services and evidence based advocacy at national and sub-national levels to influence key stakeholders that have substantially greater resources than WFP. It concludes that, 'the efficacy of WFP programmes can only be increased through greater convergence with other government, bilateral and multilateral programmes (WFP Indonesia 2006).
124. WFP relies importantly on its cooperating partners for effective delivery of programmes. The strengths and weaknesses of its partnerships in relation to recovery are therefore a critical component of effectiveness. Where strong partners were available and able to bring complementary resources into programmes this can significantly increase efficiency and effectiveness. In Pakistan a mid term review of the post 2005 earthquake PRRO observed that 'non-WFP provided NFIs such as construction material and tools, etc. play a critical role in the implementation of livelihood activities. Additionally, partner organisations combined Cash for Work incentives through non WFP sources with WFP FFW incentives, thereby contributing significantly to the success of the livelihood activities' (WFP Pakistan 2007). An impact analysis notes that complementary funding provided by World Vision as part of their partnership with WFP in FFW implementation was important in providing costly construction materials. Roads were built by WVI using a combination of FFW and USAID funded CFW allowing better quality construction (Umm e Zia 2008). In Tajikistan, an evaluation noted that 'assets created appear to be of good quality – partly because WFP is working almost exclusively with partners who have sufficient financial resources to pay for adequate non-food inputs as well as human resources for supervision of the engineering aspects (WFP Tajikistan 2006).
125. In other contexts, a lack of strong cooperating partners is a key constraint. In Sudan, there is a desire in sub-offices to move from food for recovery (a relatively light modality) to food for work which has more of a focus on building lasting assets but partners with the capacity to implement are often just not available. The current EMOP notes the constraints to implementation capacity: 'food for recovery is intended to serve as an alternative to general food distribution where food for work is not a viable option due to a lack of implementation capacity or other factors' (WFP 2008). In Sierra Leone, the Country Office perceives the need to develop stronger technical and collaborative partnerships with cooperating partners as a key challenge in improving its recovery programming.
126. The WFP evaluation of the Colombia PRRO noted an extraordinary number of partners (1,700) and asked 'whether WFP is geared up to handle this number is an open question' (WFP Colombia 2007). WFP staff are clearly very stretched in attempting to keep track of this huge number of partners. For example in Bogota sub-office they have 5 staff and over 321 cooperating partners and in the Cali office



they have 6 staff and 278 partners. WFP staff stressed a lack of adequate staffing resources to work with so many partners as a key constraint to monitoring programmes and analysing outcomes. The evaluation team for the Colombia case study concluded that WFP needs to look more at the performance of partners and their efficiency and effectiveness in program implementation. One way would be to build the capacity of cooperating partners, particularly at the municipal level. Many staff comments were that they had no control over programs and that they were highly dependent on the cooperating partners for outcomes. They also commented that this was particularly a problem in at the municipal level. It is evident that much of this is an affect of having so many cooperating partners and a large area to cover. Somehow WFP must overcome the issue of “program outcomes being out of its hands”. Similarly, in both West Africa and Somalia, concerns were raised in previous evaluations over the sheer number of partners that WFP was trying to manage (WFP 2004; WFP Somalia 2006).

127. WFP could do more to review its partnership arrangements, more systematically assess the capacities and performance of cooperating partners and attempt to draw in stronger cooperating partners where capacities are weak. In Lesotho, WFP has recently gone through a very deliberate process to more strategically select cooperating partners for a new PRRO. In eliminating and choosing partners, WFP analyzed who could provide what as well as which organizations had the best complementary activities and inputs. A 2005 Angola PRRO evaluation noted that ‘no IP capacity assessment has taken place, and IP performance evaluations or assessments were irregular or non-existent’. It argued that fewer partnerships with larger IPs would have been desirable but such partners were simply not available (WFP 2005f). A review in Burundi (2008f) found that ‘there are no instruments to assess partners’ capacity before WFP engages in a partnership with them’. It also noted a serious lack of standard procedures for the review and approval of project proposals submitted by partners.
128. In Nepal, there was a desire on the part of NGO cooperating partners to receive training and professional development from WFP on livelihoods recovery. WFP, however, had only limited capacity to provide such support. The process of VAM monitoring and evaluation training (available also to local government) and spot checking on partners recently introduced is a good initiative by WFP that is contributing toward building a shared understanding of programme objectives and implementation parameters, a capacity-building approach that could be extended and deepened to further build livelihoods recovery capacity among partners. WFP may need to consider whether a pre-qualification system also should be established to identify partners with the critical basic skills required for livelihoods recovery programming and to provide appropriate forms of professional development support where capacity gaps are identified; ideally, this could be done in partnership with other UN agencies, with whom many of the same NGOs also work, to achieve economies of scale and synergies between programming.
129. Food assistance alone is often insufficient to support recovery of livelihoods. WFP’s ‘Exiting Emergencies’ policy paper notes that WFP may have to shift its role in recovery from direct implementation to become an advocate and catalyst for necessary non-food capacities and resources. In several of the country case studies a key issue in relation to recovery is that people were receiving very little livelihoods assistance other than food aid. In these contexts, WFP could do more to build on its field presence to play a catalytic role in encouraging other recovery actors to provide other forms of livelihoods support. For example in Uganda, an Oxfam report notes that recovery actors have not been able to keep up with the pace of return, meaning that conditions in return areas are often worse than in the camps. According to an internal UN document, recent mapping assessments ‘show an appalling lack of basic services in transit sites and return areas’. In the Lango sub-region, where almost all former IDPs had completed their return by the end of 2007, the returnee population suffered an increase in malnutrition and mortality as a result of insufficient food and reduced access to basic services (Oxfam 2008).



## 2.C. Effectiveness

130. This section examines the extent to which livelihood recovery objectives are achieved and if outputs have led to expected outcomes. The evaluation matrix asked:
- Have food aid activities with objectives related to livelihoods recovery preserved or created livelihood assets, reduced negative coping and met stated objectives?
  - Did people build useful assets, and receive useful training?
  - Were project objectives and activities designed in such a way that activities were able to meet objectives around livelihoods recovery?
131. The PRRO thematic evaluation noted that recovery objectives were often unrealistic and unclear and this theme has continued to recur. An evaluation in West Africa concluded that ‘in the case of West Africa coastal region the major weakness of recovery activities has been the lack of clarity as to the specific objectives of the recovery interventions.’ (WFP 2004d and g). WFP needs to work with cooperating partners, other actors in supporting recovery processes and donors to look more realistically at the levels of support that people would need to successfully rebuild assets and move towards stronger and more resilient livelihoods. Too often at the moment, WFP assistance may be contributing to meeting basic needs but is doing very little to kick start recovery processes.
132. Several of the country case studies concluded that WFP assistance was simply not sufficient to do more than contribute to alleviating short term food insecurity and reducing reliance on negative coping strategies. Food assistance would need to be more generous, longer term and linked more strongly to other livelihood interventions to enable people to build assets and contribute to stronger and more resilient livelihoods. For example in Nepal, feedback received from FFA beneficiaries indicates that WFP’s food aid assistance has contributed to improving the short-term food security of conflict- affected beneficiaries, and that for the duration of the assistance provided, negative coping mechanisms also appear to have decreased. However, many of these gains are unlikely to contribute significantly to ‘future protection’ and assistance was not sufficient to enable people to replace key lost assets. Where the Food Security Rehabilitation Project was operating, and where households had secured a higher number of days work, or seeds and livestock or other productive inputs, the building up of assets and income was noticeably higher, though this may not be a representative sample.
133. The WFP Ethiopia Country Office felt that the effectiveness of public works in the PSNP depended on the type of activity and a host of other variables. A recent evaluation noted promising results from soil and water conservation activities, with a high number of soil and water conservation activities achieving a high quality rating and smaller percentages of roads and water projects (MA consulting 2008). The review notes that technical standards of roads and water projects are frequently unsatisfactory and in some cases are causing environmental problems of soil erosion (Mid-term review 2008).
134. In Bangladesh, the third objective of the EMOP (10715.0) was “to restore livelihoods and rural community infrastructures in the affected areas.” Some rehabilitation of priority community infrastructure is taking place through FFW/CFW, albeit in a very limited number of locations compared to broader relief targeting. However, some cooperating partners voiced their concern to the evaluation team that the works being constructed may not last, as they are being built during the rainy season. Construction in very wet sites and during rainstorms may affect the quality of earthworks for activities to raise platforms raise/repair access roads and strengthen embankments. Some beneficiaries also observed that they could not undertake certain priority infrastructure projects, due to the cooperating partner having a lack of available or affordable construction materials. The operation is likely to meet the objective of restoring livelihoods among more poor families only to a limited extent, although there are no real outcome level performance indicators that directly relate to this aspect of livelihoods recovery



(output indicators focus on numbers of participants and amount of food and cash distributed). This is due to:

- The combined impact of asset losses, reduced employment opportunities and the price hike on families' purchasing power – most income is going to food at present from these schemes;
- The low daily wage rate set (BDT 100 or three kg of rice), compared to normal market prices for casual day labour (around BDT 200/day)<sup>4</sup>;
- The late start (September/October 2008) and short duration (three months) of the programmes.

135. The combination of natural disaster and economic shocks (food and fuel price hikes) appears to have seriously eroded the coping capacities of the chronic and ultra-poor, an observation confirmed in the WFP/FAO food security/price hike study released during the mission. Virtually all families interviewed were eating one meal a day or less (subject to days when male family members could find work) on top of post-cyclone distress sales of livestock or loans to rebuild/repair houses, where this was possible. As a result, little or no savings are possible nor replacement of key assets for many from the income earned. Some of those participating in the GFD reported that they had sold some of the items received, such as the cooking oil, to buy other items the family needed (mostly food or school supplies for children) or to make repayments of existing loans. While this indicates that families are able to convert the assistance received to forms that meet their important short-term priority needs, it may also indicate only a very limited contribution to the longer-term livelihoods recovery of cyclone-affected households. A small number advised that they were able to focus on earning income to meet other family needs and to replace a modest amount of lost household assets while they received the GFD. Almost all stakeholders expressed the view that a minimum of 6-12 months of support is required for families to be able to save enough to replace key lost assets and that the provision of such support needs to be commenced earlier in the disaster response. Otherwise, the survivors resort to micro-finance institutions (MFI) or private loans to repair or rebuild houses and/or to replace other lost productive assets, such as rickshaws, as was reported by several WFP beneficiaries to the evaluation team. This may indicate the potential of WFP's relief GFDs to make a greater contribution to the livelihoods recovery of affected households by sustaining the assistance for a sufficient time period, when resources are available to do so, and to make the case to donors for increased levels of support for GFDs.

### *Timeliness*

136. A key question related to effectiveness is whether or not the food assistance received was timely. Did people receive support at the right time to support processes of livelihood rebuilding? Timeliness should be seen in the sense of both relief and recovery related activities starting early enough to preserve assets and as carrying on for long enough to support people as they start a process of recovery following disasters. The best way to support livelihoods recovery may be to intervene early to protect assets before they are eroded and people have to undertake negative coping strategies. It is important, therefore, not just to view recovery in relation to post disaster contexts but to consider the role of early interventions and disaster prevention in supporting recovery. In Somalia, for instance, a slow response to 2001/2003 drought in Puntland was seen as a 'missed opportunity to protect livelihoods' which had 'long lasting repercussions in terms of livelihood recovery' (WFP 2006: 9 Somalia).

137. In contexts where there is an ongoing emergency, recovery in the grand sense of the majority of a population rebuilding their livelihoods is clearly unrealistic. As the Somalia PRRO notes 'the likelihood of a final shift to recovery does not apply to Somalia for the foreseeable future (WFP 2006 – Somalia:

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<sup>4</sup> Originally, WFP planned to set the daily rate at BDT 150/day or its daily rice equivalent (designed to be self-targeting of poorer households by being set below the current normal day labourer rate). However, in order not to take beneficiaries away from the GOB's 100 days work programme, a decision was taken to reduce the amount to the same as that provided in the 100 days scheme: BDT 100/day.



29). There may, however, be opportunities within particular areas and at particular moments in time for food assistance to support building stronger and more resilient livelihoods. Recovery in these contexts may mean thinking less in terms of transitions and more in terms of taking advantage of windows of opportunity to engage in recovery related activities in addition to relief.

138. In Tajikistan an evaluation found that the unpredictability of vulnerable group feeding was one of its main shortcomings as an instrument for livelihood protection. ‘Beneficiaries who are on the VGF lists at one time of year never know when the next distribution is likely to take place. Nor do they know whether or not they are likely to be included on the list a second time’. In Ethiopia, delays in distribution for the PSNP are negating hoped for benefits accruing from predictability and early transfer of resources. A similar lack of adequate communication with beneficiaries about timings of distributions was found in Lesotho and Colombia.

139. The length of time for which recovery assistance is likely to be needed is also an issue. There is often pressure on WFP from donors to phase out relief and recovery assistance as quickly as possible. However, recovery processes sometimes take much longer than artificial donor timeframes and support continues to be needed. Buchanan Smith (2007) argues that ‘the time it may take to rebuild after such wholesale destruction of livelihoods should not be underestimated.’ She cites the example of a village in Nyala attacked in the late 1980s where the herd sizes of villagers had reached 50% of their previous herd sizes nine years after their return. In Bangladesh, the evaluation team found that FFW/CFW started several months late and was too short to meet short-term asset protection/replacement and income stabilisation needs. In Nepal, the number of days people could work on food for assets activities was too short to enable asset recovery. Similar issues were found in Colombia and Uganda. A concern in several of the case study countries was that repeated short term extensions to EMOPs and PRROs was not allowing for a smooth flow of programming with adequate time to carry out more sustainable asset replacement strategies.

## **2.D. Impact**

140. This section examines the wider effects of WFP’s recovery related food assistance. The questions asked in the evaluation matrix are

- What contribution did WFP activities make to processes of recovery (both in terms of food aid received and assets created or training undertaken)?
- Were there any unintended positive or negative impacts? Were potential negative impacts of food aid on markets or of work requirements on livelihoods considered?
- How were impacts different according to gender, age and disability?

141. An overarching question in the terms of reference for the evaluation relates to the impact of WFP interventions on the protection and restoration of livelihoods at household and community levels. The country case studies and recent evaluations note the usual difficulties with measuring, analyzing and attributing impact that are shared across the humanitarian system (Hofmann et al 2006). Limitations in WFP’s monitoring and evaluation of impact have been discussed previously (paragraphs 87 to 95).

142. Relief and recovery are often seen as two separate categories of support and with distinct food assistance activities. However, in many contexts it is timely relief that is likely to have the greatest livelihood recovery impact. An evaluation of emergency operations in Kenya, for example, noted that general food distribution and the creation of thousands of distribution points helped to prevent the negative consequences of migration to relief centres and served to prevent further loss of rural assets (WFP 2007d).

143. In Uganda, in terms of scale, relief distributions continue to dominate the portfolio of WFP activities. In 2007, there were over 2 million general food distribution beneficiaries and under 100,000 beneficiaries



of food for training and food for work (WFP Uganda 2007). Continuing relief in Acholi Region has helped people to be able to return and to start the process of opening up land, restarting farming, building houses and slowly building up sufficient assets to create more food secure livelihoods. Relief, therefore, has had by far the greatest recovery impact. Premature phase out from general food distributions could risk undermining these impacts. An NRC evaluation documented various negative coping strategies utilised because IDPs are not yet able to meet net food gaps following ration reductions (Das and Nkutu 2008). WFP (2008f) argues that, in southern Sudan, continued general food distribution following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement served a dual function of meeting immediate basic needs and contributing to building up the trust and confidence necessary for communities' recovery. This paper notes that a clear role for WFP in transition and recovery contexts is 'advocating for a realistic understanding of continued humanitarian needs and explaining how continued humanitarian assistance and/or transition safety nets contribute to meaningful recovery and future development' (WFP 2008f: 4).

144. There were examples of positive impacts arising from WFP food assistance found in the case study countries. Beneficiaries interviewed during the case studies expressed appreciation for the immediate impact on food security of WFP assistance. For example, in Nepal, impacts described by the beneficiaries themselves were focused on meeting short-term food security needs, with some mentioning that "nobody else came to help us except for WFP." A small number also described being able to make some modest savings and to purchase a few household assets. Communal assets, such as small-scale irrigation and water supply systems, mule trails and schools, are being well used and likely to bring physical and social capital benefits to those communities such as increased farm outputs, better health and access to education where they have been well built. Where the FSRP is operating, and where households have secured a higher number of work days or other productive inputs (eg seeds, livestock), the building up of assets and income was noticeably higher.
145. An impact of the FFW/CFW noted in Bangladesh was that several households advised of using some of their income to make payments against large debts incurred to micro-finance institutions (MFIs) before and/or after the cyclone. This can be seen as a positive impact, if their credit-worthiness and access to new credit has improved. On the other hand, there were anecdotal reports from WFP staff of beneficiaries being pressured by IPs with MFI programmes or other MFIs to prioritise loan repayments with their income, even in situations where the household was struggling to meet basic food needs. The Country Office was planning to investigate this issue at the time of the evaluation.
146. In Pakistan, an impact assessment of the post 2005 earthquake PRRO livelihoods component was carried out in early 2008. It found that repairs to roads and paths carried out with FFW had positive economic impacts. It cites one example where house reconstruction costs were reduced by 60%. Irrigation repairs enabled farmers to grow higher value vegetable crops, field terracing work helped to preserve physical assets and provided economic benefits from fruit trees provided by the project and livestock sheds were valuable physical and economic assets. It found that on average, households participating in FFW supported debris removal saved up to Rs 5,000 (\$83) on labour charges (Umm e Zia 2008). Many of the activities impacted on the wider community as well as those participating. The 2006 SPR for the post earthquake project cites a rapid assessment of 100 families which found that WFP food assistance helped to save 38% of household expenditure on food and improved access in remote areas from infrastructure repair had reduced the costs of commodities by 20 to 30% (WFP 2006b).
147. In Ethiopia, the PSNP has been the subject of a series of reviews which have attempted to track impact. Most recently, both a recent Save the Children study and Devereux et al review note that the PSNP has been delivering real benefits to those taking part. Save the Children find that PSNP participants report that food consumption has improved, fewer assets are sold and, prior to the start of 2008, household livestock holdings were improved. However, they also note that these gains are fragile and in 2008 were often wiped out by rising food prices, crop failures and livestock losses (Save the Children 2008). Devereux et al (2008: 72) conclude that 'overall the PSNP is stabilising livelihoods and improving the food security of beneficiary households'. It also notes that the inability of the PSNP to extend to all



chronically food insecure continues to create a large inherent exclusion rate from the programme. It finds that the poverty of households excluded from the PSNP has deepened. The country office noted that there was evidence that PSNP beneficiaries were better able to cope with this year's drought showing PSNP recipients' livelihoods had become more resilient. There were particular concerns in Ethiopia about the impact of food aid on pastoralists and the effectiveness of programming in pastoralist areas. An IDS study found that large volumes of food aid were being delivered but that the 'amount received per beneficiary has been trivial and there has been much misappropriation and an unhealthy impact on markets reducing incentives for traders and producers' (Devereux et al 2006).

148. The Bangladesh case study concluded that whilst the EMOP is likely to fully or partially meet most of its stated objectives, only a limited contribution is likely to be made to the meaningful livelihoods recovery of affected households and communities due to: the lower coverage of recovery-focused FFW/CFW programmes compared to relief programmes; the late start and short duration of these programmes; the negative impact of food price hikes on the ability of participating households to generate savings or to replace lost productive assets through FFW/CFW; the lack of inclusion of specific household level activities to replace lost assets and improve or diversify incomes; and possible quality and sustainability issues for communal assets being created. Overall, the approach taken to livelihoods recovery in the EMOP (10715.0) appears to have been narrowly defined and developed to focus predominantly on public assets replacement and short-term food security through food/cash transfers, without adequately considering the range of actions and activities required to restore community and household resilience to pre-disaster levels (or to improve them).
149. A particular issue is over the volume of food assistance being provided and whether or not it is enough to have any significant effect on livelihoods and processes of asset recovery. In south Sudan, for instance, the sufficiency of the ration provided to returnee households has been questioned: 'assistance provided to a typical returnee household (three month food ration, seed for one feddan) appears to underestimate need'. In Upper Nile and Jonglei 'currently the food ration and other inputs provided to returnees are not enough to enable them to effectively re-establish their livelihoods' (Frankenberger 2007). A recent review of returns in Blue Nile State concluded that 'the minimal difference in food security situation between those who arrived in 2006, 2007 and 2008 indicate that three months ration given at arrival coupled with lean season support is not sufficient to re-establish livelihoods and it is recommended that food assistance is extended for a full year (WFP 2008d: 5). In Afghanistan an evaluation also concluded that FFW didn't contribute significantly to meeting the food gap for the most vulnerable. Weak targeting further reduced its effectiveness in meeting relief objectives. 'An average transfer of 24kg per family member through FFW ... cannot be expected to make much difference in terms of food needs, let alone livelihood resilience or IDP reintegration.' An evaluation in Tajikistan also noted limitations in terms of sustained impact. In a vulnerable group feeding project the money saved on food was spent on other short-term consumer items like clothing. VGF is therefore largely ineffective for livelihood recovery because the assistance is thinly spread, the livelihood effects are ephemeral and targeting is weak in spite of household to household verification by WFP.' (WFP Tajikistan 2006: 22).
150. Similarly in Uganda, FFA beneficiaries received very small amounts of food aid as a result of funding shortfalls and decisions made at community level to share work and rations: 'the result is that food is spread too thinly to contribute significantly to household incomes and is not sufficient to cover periodic shortfalls in consumption.' (WFP Uganda 2005). Impact is sometimes diluted impact by the widespread sharing of rations between households in contexts where local perceptions are that 'we are all vulnerable'. For example, in Karamoja region in Uganda, general food distribution is being provided to the majority of the population and is contributing to protecting livelihoods and decreasing the frequency of which people are forced to engage in negative coping strategies. In practice, however, general food distributions in Karamoja have sometimes been spread very thinly with erratic distributions (due to pipeline breaks) and issues with registration and diversion meaning that rations are being shared between several households. Maxwell and Burns (2008) note that sharing of food rations remains widespread in





southern Sudan and argue that it needs to be better understood and taken into account in the way targeting strategies are designed.

151. This is certainly not a new dilemma nor is it peculiar to recovery related programming. Sharing potentially dilutes the impact of both relief and recovery programming for individual households. Where sharing of rations is widespread, WFP should consider:

- Monitoring the degree of sharing to show the actual amounts of food assistance that individual households are utilising and the likely impact on coping strategies and preserving or rebuilding assets.
- Monitoring whether or not there are elements of coercion to sharing and therefore negative impacts on households forced to share.

#### **Box 5: Rations Spread thinly**

In Karamoja, general food distribution is being provided to the majority of the population and is contributing to protecting livelihoods and decreasing the frequency of which people are forced to engage in negative coping strategies. In practice, however, general food distributions in Karamoja have sometimes been spread very thinly with erratic distributions (due to pipeline breaks) and issues with registration and diversion meaning that rations are being shared between several households.

Adele Okono is a food aid recipient in Arecek Village near Moroto town. She is a widow with 7 children (3 of whom are adults and now married). She is on the food aid register and received general food distributions 4 times in 2008 but each time had to share her rations with 3 other households. She wasn't sure about the reason for this but there were concerns that the volunteers managing the distributions might be diverting some of the food aid. The household had harvested very little due to poor rains and were coping largely through sales of firewood and charcoal and casual labour in the nearby town.

This means that she had received only about 68kg of maize in 9 months – better than nothing but a relatively small contribution to her food security and livelihood needs.

152. A particular issue for the impact FFW in several contexts was late payment of food wages. In Uganda, there was surprisingly little attention paid in monitoring and by staff to the nutritional or livelihoods value of the food aid provided to participants. Pipeline breaks resulted in some participants either not being paid or receiving food very late. The attitude was that, as these were useful community projects, people should be willing to provide labour for free if needed. This is worrying given that food for assets projects have dual objectives of building assets and supporting food security through food assistance. A 2005 PRRO Angola evaluation noted that reductions in rations received on FFW projects due to late deliveries and insufficient resources delayed completion of several projects and led to some being abandoned. An Angola evaluation also highlighted a particular issue relating to land rights for assets created through food for work programmes, an issue also of importance in other contexts (WFP Angola 2005). FFW in Tajikistan was seen as ineffective in protecting livelihoods during the lean season as payments tended to slide well into the post-harvest season (WFP Tajikistan 2006). Late payment of wages also a concern in Nepal. In the Pakistan post 2005 earthquake a mid-term review noted that communities, 'felt that some FFW activities required intensive labour and are not commensurate with the ration sizes provided for the man days planned. This forced some partners like Save the Children to add Rs. 60 per man day to complement the inadequate food rations.' (WFP Pakistan 2007).

153. Findings about the impact of food for education and nutrition programmes on livelihoods recovery noted concerns about unintended impacts. In Bangladesh the school feeding programme, in the school visited, had improved attendance so much that it now well exceeded the school's official capacity, raising a question of ensuring manageable class sizes while assistance is ongoing. The teachers and school management committee met also raised several questions about the intervention saying there would be



little meaningful result, if students only stayed in school for four to six months. They expressed concern about the potential negative impact on students and their families if the support is suddenly withdrawn in December 2008 and about the exclusion of children attending pre-school from the SFP. Additionally, seven households in the SFP community visited anecdotally reported that they are giving the children receiving the HEBs less or no food during the family's one daily meal and sharing that child's portion with their other children who are not eligible to participate (ie those not currently enrolled in forms 1-5).

154. A concern raised by government officials interviewed in Uganda about both school feeding and mother and child health activities was that teachers and health workers were being over-burdened with the demands of running feeding programmes and that this was taking scarce capacities away from their core duties. The risk that school feeding may disrupt learning and create risks of "schools as feeding centers" was also raised in an IFPRI impact evaluation (Adelman et al 2008b). A recent review in Uganda noted that the food provided through the mother and child health (MCH) programme was affecting MCH services due to the unprecedented numbers of women and children that are currently seen at the centres (when food is available); for centres already constrained in terms of staff levels, staff morale, drugs and equipment, adding an incentive to use the services, without a concurrent improvement in other aspects can only reduce efficiency (WFP and Valid 2008).
155. There was some concern in several of the case studies and in previous evaluations that prolonged food aid could create 'dependency.' In many contexts there is a strong dependency narrative and anti food aid discourse, particularly among government officials but also more widely. Harvey and Lind (2005) argue that dependency is a problematic concept with little evidence to support it and that underpinning dependency narratives are often pejorative elite attitudes towards poor people. Concerns around dependency, however, still seem to be an important factor in policy shifts from general to more targeted food distributions but what is meant by dependency is rarely well defined. In Somalia, for instance, the rationale for FFW was presented as 'reducing dependency.'
156. Maxwell and Burns (2008) note that there is a widespread sense among policy makers (both within WFP and in the government of southern Sudan) that it is time to move away from past ways of dealing with food assistance and to make a break from what is often labelled the 'OLS mentality'. This assumption that food aid has made people dependent needs to be critically examined as there is little evidence for it in practice. As Maxwell and Burns (2008) argue 'there are other valid reasons for wanting to move beyond the modalities of the OLS period, but care should be taken to keep the focus of food assistance on the issue of vulnerability, rather than on the assumed problem of dependency'. Savage and Petty (2008) in a recent study of livelihoods in Pader District find that there is little evidence that food aid is serving as a disincentive for people to work hard and invest in recovery. The influence of dependency narratives on policy and the extent to which it is supported by any evidence could usefully be examined by WFP.

## **2.E. Sustainability and Connectedness**

157. This section is concerned with the probability of long-term benefits from WFP assistance and the extent to which short term relief activities are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account. The evaluation matrix asked:
- What links are there between relief, recovery and development programming?
  - Has WFP assistance increased resilience to new shocks?
  - What was the exit / long term strategy for the recovery programme?
  - How sustained was the impact of food aid on livelihoods?
  - Are assets built through food for work being maintained?
  - What approach is WFP taking to the building of national capacities?



158. Concerns over the sustainability of assets built with food for assets were a recurring theme in the country case studies. In Bangladesh, WFP signed an agreement with the Government under which the community assets created through C/FFW activities would be maintained by local government under the overall guidance of Local Government Engineering Department. At the time of the evaluation, no specific operation and maintenance plans or training were being provided to the existing village maintenance committees and it was unclear how poor communities and their local governments were going to be able to afford regular repair and upkeep programmes, especially when building materials were hard to come by for initial construction works. WFP did not have a quality assurance system in place to inspect or spot check the works being constructed through its IPs to ensure that they met basic requirements for soundness of the structure, so their durability and hazard-proofing features are unknown (eg embankment walls sufficiently strong and well drained to withstand regular flooding and tidal surge levels).
159. In Nepal there were serious concerns over the sustainability of assets built with food for work. For example, a bridge and foot/mule trails had been built below the flood line in a steep watershed gully and without proper bracing that will likely be washed away within one or two years. In Uganda, a recent FFA evaluation found that there was a need to do more to study maintenance and sustainability of created assets and come up with better strategies to address the gaps. It noted many examples of problems with maintenance and sustainability (Abola et al 2008). WFP in Nepal has included systematic attention to operations and maintenance in its project design and performance monitoring system, a good practice. The Nepal Country Office is monitoring whether operation and maintenance committees are being established with a basic budget. In particular, the Food Security Rehabilitation Project has developed a full operations and maintenance strategy, including both community contributions and advocacy with local government to contribute matching funds. Further efforts to incorporate adequate time to train beneficiaries in asset maintenance may also be required in future.
160. Sustainability in food for training activities depends on peoples' ability to retain and utilise the skills learnt to improve livelihoods. In the country case studies there were few attempts to monitor or evaluate the usefulness of training provided and hence whether or not it was having an impact on livelihoods. There was also little evidence of the sort of labour market analysis needed to design and implement training that would enable people to find better jobs or increase incomes. Vocational training provided through food for training in Tajikistan was found to be effective, with half of the women trained gainfully employed. But there were question marks over who benefited from the enterprises supported (WFP Tajikistan 2006). In Colombia where FFT efforts focus on adult literacy and support to vocational training of IDPs in order to support their integration into urban environments, there was little evidence of analysis of the usefulness of training and sustained impact was unlikely given that most of the projects were very short-lived, four months at most. In Nepal, as part of WFP's FFW/FFA assistance package, recipients are given the opportunity to attend training focussed on human rights issues. Indicative findings, at the time of the evaluation, were that participation appeared to be lower than anticipated, possibly partly due to the cooperating partners prioritising the limited total number of work days available for each construction project to completion of the physical assets themselves, as advised by one NGO partner.
161. In Ethiopia, part of the debate around sustainability is whether or not the overall objective to 'graduate' people from chronic food insecurity through a combination of PSNP transfers and other food security interventions is achievable. Graduation and what constitutes it is still being debated with the benchmarks needing to be adjusted (Devereux et al 2008). Of central importance to this is the presence or absence of complementary programming. Food assistance on its own is recognised as being inadequate but generating enough complementary programming to allow graduation continues to be a challenge. Few people have thus far graduated (18,538 from a total of over 7 million) and the Government of Ethiopia and donors have embarked on a process to design another five year phase of the programme (Mid Term Review 2008).



162. A critical dimension of sustainability is how well WFP is developing and implementing exit strategies from its recovery related activities. Having an exit strategy and aiming to phase out operations which are usually the stated objectives in project documents implies a gradual process of winding down operations and attempting to put in place mechanisms to address the needs previously being addressed through food assistance. In practice in several countries, WFP was forced through funding constraints to abruptly cease rather than phase out activities. For instance, in Uganda HIV/AIDS, MCHN and food for assets projects had stopped with little warning. In Karamoja, where school feeding had not resumed with the new school term because of pipeline constraints, the lack of food assistance was causing major problems with attendance, particularly in boarding schools, which without food assistance are struggling to function at all, as in the absence of food assistance, children cannot return home for meals. Government and NGO partners felt the need for greater communication around exit strategies. There is a need to at least attempt to find the resources to provide more planned and gradual transitions. WFP has also started a process of engaging with development donors and the government in attempting to advocate for policies and programmes at a national level that will address some of the needs previously being covered by these programmes and this needs to continue.
163. At a broader level, if WFP food assistance is to make a sustainable impact on the recovery of livelihoods, this will partly depend on how it frames exit strategies and related capacity building. If WFP is to support recovery in the sense of governments being better equipped to support the livelihood needs of their own citizens it will need to invest more in developing its capacity building policies and capabilities (WFP 2008c). This is something that donors really want to see both better articulated and put into practice. Exit strategies are starting to be framed more clearly in project documents but donor perceptions were that aspirations in project documents were not being strongly followed through in practice. A problem with exit strategies as currently defined is that they are just very unlikely to be met. For example, in Sierra Leone, the PRRO's exit strategy is that 'phasing out is envisaged when increased agricultural productivity results in improved livelihoods' but there is little evidence of this being monitored or of, 'an enhanced ability to overcome hunger as measured by a decline in the number of months of food deficit' being likely given rising food prices, slow recovery and high levels of chronic poverty (WFP Sierra Leone 2007). WFP's engagement in evolving debates about social protection may provide a different model for envisaging a transition from WFP support to government owned safety nets for the most vulnerable

## 2.F. Cross Cutting Issues

164. This section examines key cross cutting issues relating to participation of beneficiaries, gender, HIV/AIDS and protection. The evaluation matrix asked:
- Are local stakeholders – disaster affected populations, local authorities and civil society - being adequately consulted in determining needs and programme strategy? Were both men and women consulted?
  - How were impacts different according to gender, age and disability?

The participation of local communities in the process of selecting food for assets projects was seen as insufficient in several contexts. In Nepal, communities were only given the option of communal public works recovery activities. Most WFP beneficiaries met expressed a desire for more household level activities to restore or improve their agricultural productivity and income earning capacity (along the lines of the farming and livestock raising livelihoods activities being carried out through the GTZ as complementary programming to the FSRP). A lack of beneficiary participation in project selection and management of food for assets programmes was also noted in Colombia and Lesotho. A PRRO evaluation in Ethiopia found that the PSNP had low levels of participatory planning with most villagers acknowledging that natural resource management plans were largely formulated by experts and District Agencies. There remains little or no sense of community ownership and in many areas public works



remain unpopular with beneficiaries who complain of competing labour demands and late payments (WFP Ethiopia 2007).

#### **Box 6: Taking beneficiary views into account**

In Nepal, when asked what would be the most effective assistance to communities and households to assist them to recover, the most common responses the evaluation team received from beneficiaries were:

- Help us to improve our ability to produce more from the land – eg vegetables, cereal crops, fruit, livestock rearing;
- For women specifically: Introduce technology such as smokeless stoves and grain-grinding mills;
- Provide us with some skills training or other means to get longer-term employment;
- Make the project timeframes longer to have a lasting impact; and
- Continue supporting the development of small scale irrigation and water supply systems, schools, etc.

In Colombia, few beneficiaries had been asked about what training they would like to receive or been involved in the selection of food for asset projects. This is a large limiting factor in the success or impact of the projects. There was no step by step process in beneficiary participation.

In Bangladesh WFP assistance is meeting a priority need among poorer, food-insecure households facing income downturns as a result of both the cyclone and food price hikes. Numerous households described both the GFD and FFW/CFW assistance as ‘keeping them alive’ and/or providing an income for many who were having difficulty finding sufficient work. Beneficiaries described the selection process for the rehabilitation of community infrastructure assets as inclusive and transparent, with most saying the activities selected were community priorities. At the same time, most beneficiaries expressed a desire for more community and/or household level activities to restore or improve their income earning capacity, including home-based FFW/CFW employment opportunities for women, as some faced social criticism for working outside of the home. Eleven months after the cyclone, when asked what would assist communities and households to recover most quickly from a disaster, the most common responses the evaluation team received from beneficiaries were:

- Start livelihoods recovery activities earlier and do them for longer (including SFP);
- Provide both food aid and cash grants, cash only (eg a grant of BDT 10,000-15,000) or FFW/CFW so we have enough to eat and can afford to replace the things we lost at the same time; cash is also less easy for officials to manipulate: “We can better ourselves – we would rather not have to take relief or take out another loan;” and
- Provide us with some skills training or other means to get longer-term employment.

165. In Nepal and Bangladesh, attention has been given to beneficiary feedback and accountability systems in the PRRO, in line with international good practice, such as: the incorporation of question lines on food aid distribution and the impact of food aid on livelihoods into the monitoring and evaluation system and efforts made to follow up on complaints made by individuals. For example, in Nepal’s food for assets projects, under the facilitation of cooperating partners, local user committees are responsible for conducting a public audit for each project activity; this is done after the distribution of the first instalment of rice and transportation of cash in the presence of more than 50% of the user group members. At the same time, the effectiveness of, or planned follow up to these audits is not clear. For example, the June-July 2008 *RCIW Programme Monitoring Report* advised that only 27% of beneficiaries had attended the last audit and only 30% thought that the issues raised had been addressed afterward, although it should be noted that the public audit process had only recently commenced and the results of any follow up may become more evident over time. In Nepal, WFP identified the importance of social inclusiveness for disadvantaged and marginalised groups in the PRRO objectives, outputs and performance indicators. This constitutes very good practice in programme design for a country that has



experienced conflict rooted in social exclusion issues. The FSRP took this a step further, developing a useful *Social Inclusion Strategy*.

166. Beneficiary accountability systems could be further developed and strengthened by WFP and its cooperating partners through the use of tools like community scorecards and/or impartial mobile grievance teams that are “gender, minority and illiteracy-friendly.” The INGO, Tearfund, the World Bank social funds and community-driven development operations, the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP International) and others have developed a range of tools and processes from which WFP could draw to enhance its responsiveness to beneficiary views and priorities. In other country case studies there was less evidence of attention being given to downwards accountability measures.
167. In line with its enhanced commitments to women, WFP in the case study countries had made real efforts to encourage the participation of women in food assistance programmes and in management committees (WFP 2008e). For example in Nepal, WFP appears to have systematically and effectively targeted the participation of women in PRRO programmes, particularly vulnerable female-headed households (FHH). Those met advised that, without WFP support, they would have had very few work opportunities and would be paid less for their labour. There was, however, little evidence of going beyond quantitative performance indicators to examine the degree and quality of participation of women and socially excluded groups in decision-making. Increased understanding of this issue can help with refining positive influencing strategies with more powerful community leaders to improve the position of these groups; for example, the NGO, BRAC, in Bangladesh has found the co-option of such groups a critical success factor in poverty reduction activities with the marginalised and chronically poor (Hulmes and Moore, 2007).
168. There were some issues with exclusion of vulnerable groups from FFA activities. In Nepal many of those lacking mobility – the elderly, handicapped and women with young children – were reported by beneficiaries to have been unable to participate in FFA/CFW activities, apparently without the compensatory measures being put in place by cooperating partners that were stipulated in the 2003 PRRO *Activity Guidelines*. WFP Nepal subsequently advised that cooperating partner reports indicated that considerations were given to vulnerable groups by either asking them to assume the responsibility for tasks that were not labour intensive (record keeping) or not working at all. They further advised that, although a few cases of exclusion may exist, exclusion had not been reported as a widespread concern. There were gaps in several of the case studies in areas such as the provision of childcare facilities for women to enable participation in food for assets, the quality of women’s participation in selection of projects and gender sensitive analysis of the distribution of benefits from assets built. In Colombia, the focus of almost all projects was on women, and this was a trend that most cooperating partners seem to agree on. But a few partners felt that there was a need to focus on projects for men too, particularly those in the urban areas who left the rural areas to get away from the conflict. In Pakistan, an effort was made to find appropriate FFW activities for women where cultural norms did not permit women to leave the house. Support was provided for kitchen gardening activities through the provision of vegetable seed and tools.
169. It was not possible in the time available for the country case studies to have a major focus on protection issues. The fragile security situation and risk of a return to conflict in many recovery contexts makes attention to protection issues of particular importance. In the Karamoja region in Uganda, there is a tendency amongst stakeholders to present the crisis as a natural disaster and downplay the impact of the conflict which is clearly of central importance in undermining livelihoods (Stites et al 2007). Recent instances of people being attacked at night immediately after food distributions and when transporting food home underlines the need for WFP to have a much stronger analysis of and focus on protection issues in programming (WFP 2008h). In Acholi region, northern Uganda, an Oxfam report highlights that many of the protection mechanisms that existed in camps, where NGO-trained community groups were active, are being disrupted as returns intensify and in both camp and return sites, women and children heads of households are often at the greatest risk of exploitation and face big challenges in



building sustainable livelihoods. To survive, some women are breaking with traditional roles and seeking alternative ways to make money, notably widespread beer brewing. There is also a need for gender sensitive attention to issues around land ownership as people return (Oxfam 2008). In Colombia, although it was mentioned, in practice it seems that WFP is paying limited attention to protection issues. Some see WFP assistance as a source of protection but there is also a need for a stronger focus and look at programming and how it can increase protection (Sanchez-Garzoli 2008). Young (2007) notes the need for WFP recovery activities to better incorporate security and protection concerns into strategic planning and assessment processes.

### **3. Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **3.A. Overall Assessment**

##### *Relevance*

170. Assessments are often utilising livelihoods frameworks to examine recovery needs but need to more explicitly assess the levels of assistance required to enable people to build assets and move beyond alleviation of short term food insecurity. WFP's strategic and policy commitments to support recovery are consistent with good practice outside WFP, and WFP is making real efforts to align its recovery programming with that of governments and other actors. Yet there is also donor concern that WFP needs to more tightly define its recovery role and avoid a tendency to include activities that may be more developmental in nature. Although WFP project objectives are generally in line with the corporate policies and strategic objectives, these project objectives need to be better framed and articulated in particular contexts to allow for appropriate strategies for livelihood recovery, transition and exit. Assessments need to feed more strongly in the design of livelihoods recovery related projects. WFP has made huge strides in recent years in assessing and implementing cash based approaches where appropriate but needs to continue to guard against a bias towards food aid and develop the capacity to scale up cash responses.

##### *Efficiency*

171. In addressing efficiency in terms of resource adequacy, WFP faces key financial constraints from its tonnage based funding model and donor scepticism about the quality of WFP's recovery related programming. Funding shortfalls often leave fewer recovery activities implemented than planned. It is clear that, if WFP is to turn its commitments to livelihoods recovery in the new strategic plan into concrete programming at field level, they will need to make a better case to donors at a global and country office level.

172. A particular concern in relation to targeting is that food for assets activities can rarely be self-targeting in poor countries and reliance on self-targeting mechanisms may lead to serious errors of exclusion. WFP monitoring of livelihoods has largely focused on outputs at the expense of outcomes and links between monitoring and adjustments in programming are often weak. To generate better understanding of recovery outcomes greater use of qualitative approaches is needed to complement quantitative monitoring.

173. In terms of channels of delivery, the most efficient mechanism for supporting livelihood recovery in some contexts may be continuing general food distributions which is often implemented on the largest scale and requires fewer non-food resources making it more suited to WFP's current funding model. The quality of food for assets programming could be strengthened in several specific ways, including analysis of labour markets, greater attention to maintenance issues and the strengthening of quality assurance systems. There is a need for greater attention to the impact that receipt of food aid provided through school feeding has on household food security and hence recovery of livelihoods.



174. Greater levels of investments are needed in WFP staff skills and capacities to implement livelihood recovery activities. Recovery programming is strongest where cooperating partners have significant complementary resources. Food assistance alone is unlikely to enable people to recover livelihoods but other forms of livelihood support are often limited. WFP may need to play a stronger catalytic role in trying to bring in other actors to provide complementary non-food assistance.

#### *Effectiveness*

175. In general it is difficult to assess the progress achieved against stated project outcomes related to livelihood recovery because of a lack of appropriate indicators and the tendency of monitoring efforts to focus on outputs rather than outcomes. In the countries reviewed, WFP food assistance appears to be helping people to meet immediate food needs and mitigate negative coping strategies. However, it seems to be less effective at restoring the key productive assets needed for stronger livelihoods. Volumes of assistance are sometimes simply not sufficient to support recovery and timeframes for livelihood recovery activities are often too short.

#### *Impact*

176. Large scale general food distributions which support basic needs and enable people to make their own investments in recovery often have the greatest impact on processes of livelihoods recovery. The impact of other recovery focused activities such as food for assets is often reduced by being implemented on a relatively small scale and benefits being spread thinly amongst many people.

#### *Sustainability*

177. Food assistance would need to be more generous, longer term and linked more strongly to other livelihood interventions to enable people to sustainably build assets and develop stronger and more resilient livelihoods. There is a need to undertake stronger contingency planning to avoid cutting off activities at short notice and to provide more planned and gradual transitions when faced with funding or pipeline constraints. Exit strategies need to include advocacy with development donors and government to develop policies and programmes to address needs previously covered by WFP.

### **3.B. Key Issues for the future**

178. WFP's commitments to support livelihoods recovery in its strategic plan and policies are not yet translating into quality recovery programming in many contexts. Some of the constraints to this are financial, linked to both donor scepticism about WFP's recovery role and its tonnage based funding model, and other constraints are linked to design and implementation issues that could be strengthened.

179. There is a rich body of international experience and developing good practice within WFP to draw on in terms of livelihoods recovery analysis and programming. The growing interest in support to early recovery, renewed attention to a 'recovery gap' in financing instruments and an emerging donor focus on support to fragile states are trends which could help WFP to address recovery funding challenges. The ability of WFP to provide cash as well as or instead of food aid where appropriate provides new opportunities for supporting the recovery of livelihoods.

180. WFP needs to define more clearly what its role should be in recovery contexts and then demonstrate that it can programme recovery related activities more effectively in order to secure wider donor support for a role in recovery. To this end, it is important that HQ and senior management clearly signal a greater priority for livelihood recovery programming by investing greater resources to support the roll out of relevant corporate policies and programme guidance and to develop the skills of operational staff so that they are better equipped to understand and support processes of livelihood recovery.





181. WFP could also do more to articulate specific objectives in particular contexts in ways that would help it to frame clearer strategies for recovery of livelihoods, transition and exit. A growing interest in long-term safety nets as a response to chronic poverty represents an opportunity for WFP to carve out a role in making transitions from recurrent relief to support to government owned safety nets.
182. In terms of livelihood objectives, a continuing difficulty is that WFP frames recovery objectives around the idea that food assistance will be phased out as people become more self reliant. In many least developing countries where a large majority of people live on or below the poverty line and are subject to recurring shocks this is simply unrealistic and sets projects up to fail or continue indefinitely. In contexts with high levels of chronic poverty and protracted crises, livelihood recovery objectives may need to be more modest and longer term and WFP may need to accept that an ongoing reliance on relief is necessary. WFP may also need to play a stronger role in linking beneficiaries of food assistance to other forms of livelihood support provided by other actors.
183. Finally, the tendency to view relief and recovery as two separate categories of support, each associated with distinct food assistance activities, is not helpful. Combinations of relief assistance to meet basic food needs and recovery assistance to restore key household and productive assets have proved to be effective in helping people to recover livelihoods. WFP may have important recovery impacts in some contexts by making the case for continuing humanitarian assistance which can also contribute to processes of recovery.

### **3.C. Recommendations**

#### *Assessment*

184. Assessments need to do more to examine processes of livelihoods recovery and the possible role of food aid to support processes of recovery. Further support in developing the use of livelihoods frameworks to inform analysis of recovery needs should be provided by the Food Security Analysis Service (OXMF) at headquarters and regional levels to country office level VAM units.
185. Initial assessments and programme design are too often not updated and WFP VAM units at country office level should do more to periodically re-assess recovery needs. Greater use of qualitative analysis of livelihoods to complement largely quantitative, survey based assessments is required.
186. It is recommended that needs assessments explicitly assess the levels of assistance required to support recovery and enable people to build assets and not simply meet immediate needs.

#### *Programme Design*

187. The Programme Design Service should continue to invest in the development of indicators relating to livelihoods recovery, particularly outcome and impact indicators that will permit measurement of progress towards livelihoods recovery objectives.
188. It is recommended that the Programme Design Service support country offices in developing a clearer livelihoods recovery rationale, clearer livelihood objectives and stronger exit strategies for activities that are labelled as recovery activities.

#### *Programme Implementation and Efficiency Issues*

189. The tonnage based funding model continues to be a real structural constraint to good recovery programming and continuing dialogue is needed with donors about options to tackle this.



190. Greater efforts should be made at country office level to generate additional resources for recovery activities.
191. Investment at headquarters and regional levels is required in rolling out corporate policies and programming standards around livelihood recovery to the country office level.
192. It is recommended that WFP invest more in professional development opportunities, learning and training for WFP and cooperating partner staff in order to strengthen their skills in the areas of need assessment, planning and programming and monitoring and evaluation in recovery contexts. WFP also needs to invest more in staff skills so that they can be more engaged in social protection policy debates and in analysis of the appropriate role of WFP in transitions to government owned safety nets.
193. WFP should further develop its capacity to plan and implement cash-based responses where these are appropriate.
194. Levels of assistance will often need to be increased from current levels and combined with ongoing relief to give people a chance to rebuild livelihoods.
195. WFP could do more to build on its field presence to play a catalytic role in encouraging other recovery actors to provide other forms of livelihoods support.
196. WFP should do more to review its partnership arrangements and assess the capacities and performance of cooperating partners. WFP should share responsibility for the technical adequacy, safety and sustainability of food for assets with its cooperating partners and needs to invest more in quality assurance systems.
197. Timeframes for livelihood recovery activities are often too short and recovery related activities often need to be implemented earlier and simultaneously with relief.
198. WFP needs to do more to analyse the impact of food assistance in relation to its contribution to supporting processes of recovery and people's own efforts to build stronger livelihoods. This will require closer collaboration between VAM units and monitoring and evaluation staff.
199. WFP needs to guard against premature phasing out of relief and make a strong case to donors for continued support where it is appropriate.
200. Recovery related activities are often implemented on a comparatively small scale compared to relief and WFP needs to find ways to scale-up recovery support whilst maintaining capacity to continue relief.



# Annexes



## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

### Terms of Reference

#### Strategic Evaluation of the Effectiveness of WFP Livelihood Recovery Interventions

##### I. BACKGROUND

###### A. Recovery in the Context of Transition from Relief to Development in the Humanitarian Sector as a Whole

1. As early as 2001 there has been discussion of the so-called “grey-zone” between relief and development (*ALNAP Annual Review, 2001*) and the difficulties associated with linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) are well documented in the evaluation of humanitarian action (EHA) literature.
2. Since 2005 there has also been considerable debate about the extent to which humanitarian relief activities should be designed to support people’s abilities to provide for themselves, and whether traditional relief approaches based on the provision of life-saving inputs should give way to a new approach that takes into account the protection of livelihoods (*ALNAP, 2005*). In line with this newer thinking about the role of relief activities, the 2004 version of the Sphere Handbook particularly emphasizes livelihood elements and the capabilities, assets and activities that are needed for an adequate means of living to ensure immediate survival and future well-being. In some contexts, it has been suggested that the protection of livelihoods may have more impact than specific sectoral interventions that address, for example, chronic problems related to lack of water or healthcare.
3. In examining the structural divisions that exist among relief, recovery and reconstruction, it is also possible to note that the humanitarian system as a whole tends to allocate a disproportionate share of funds to relief and reconstruction rather than to recovery and generally neglects the importance of livelihoods (Tony Vaux, *ALNAP, 2006*). There is a tendency for donors to focus on livelihood recovery only when sufficient funds happen to carry over from relief operations, and once the relief phase is over, there is a tendency to focus immediately on the reconstruction of infrastructure and to omit the recovery stage. Vaux suggests that this lack of attention to recovery probably reflects a lack of representation of primary stakeholders or beneficiaries, since studies indicate that when beneficiaries are able to express an opinion, they emphasise the importance of livelihood recovery rather than relief or reconstruction. Vaux also notes that one of the reasons that donors focus so heavily on relief and reconstruction at the expense of livelihoods and recovery activities is the existence of an institutional divide between the “humanitarian” and “development” sections of agencies and the availability of different budgets.

###### B. Livelihood Recovery in the Context of WFP Recovery Policy and Guidance

4. The WFP policy paper “*From Crisis to Recovery*” (1998)<sup>5</sup> presents recovery from natural and man-made crises as a major humanitarian challenge in the coming decades and explicitly recognizes that traditional relief responses are often inadequate to address the needs of disaster-affected people who are trying to stabilize and secure their livelihoods. The policy explicitly states that once WFP has fulfilled its mandate of saving lives in a relief situation, the primary aim of a WFP-food-aid-assisted recovery program is to enable people to restore their livelihoods in order to assure immediate and longer-term food needs.
5. The policy acknowledges that the transition from relief to development may resemble a swinging pendulum more than a [linear] continuum and that both complex and chronic emergencies tend to blur the

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<sup>5</sup> Subsequent WFP policy papers related to recovery (or with implications for recovery policy and operations) include *Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies: Strategies for WFP* (2003), *Transition from Relief to Development* (2004), *Exiting Emergencies: Programme Options for Transition from Emergency Response* (2004) and *Definition of Emergencies* (2005)



lines between relief, recovery and development. The policy also notes that recovery approaches are most successful when they are situation-specific, tailored to meet the immediate and longer-term needs of targeted men and women (gender aware/sensitive) and flexible. The policy specifically highlights the value of consultation with local people about their perceptions and needs and the importance of community participation in planning, implementation and monitoring. The policy also notes that WFP may contribute to the process of transforming insecure, fragile conditions into durable, stable situations through a variety of activities, including *inter alia* activities that rebuild self-reliance and restore positive coping mechanisms.

6. The policy paper proceeds to outline the essential components of a WFP recovery response, including a WFP recovery strategy, and the essential elements of this WFP recovery strategy. The key elements of the recovery strategy are a situation analysis, a risk assessment, the identification of a suitable program response and the identification of factors or indicators that could influence the success of the strategy. The following areas related to WFP recovery responses are specifically highlighted:
  - a. WFP's commitment to inter-agency coordination on recovery initiatives;
  - b. the importance of targeting methodologies that can distinguish differences in vulnerability;
  - c. WFP's recognition of capacity-building at all levels including *inter alia* beneficiary communities and beneficiaries themselves as an essential component of recovery programs;
  - d. the importance of beneficiary participation to the successful and effective implementation of recovery activities;
  - e. the crucial importance of understanding "the often subtle but effective coping mechanisms of affected communities" in order not to undermine these coping mechanisms, together with the need to link capacity-building and support to coping mechanisms as an essential part of a recovery strategy;
  - f. the need for WFP to assign recovery planning staff with adequate experience and skills early in the emergency stage in order to develop a proactive, coherent and strategic approach to recovery programming;
  - g. the need to assure appropriate program quality, for example, by recognizing the need for simple, small-scale, low-input, low-risk activities and developing appropriate context-specific standards;
  - h. the need to consider some aspects of sustainability, in particular, the main emphasis on restoring self-reliance of affected groups and helping women and men to rebuild their livelihoods with more independence and resilience to future crisis and
  - i. the shifting focus of monitoring and evaluation during the process of recovery from data on direct nutritional effects to include information on coping strategies and the effects of assistance on household food security.
7. The WFP policy proceeds to identify a variety of activities that are most likely to be suitable for recovery situations. These include *inter alia* food-for-work activities; activities closely associated with the reactivation of positive coping mechanisms and income generation; supplemental nutritional programs; market support through local purchases, private sector involvement in food transport and delivery, social-market outlets and community-based initiatives such as small enterprises for men and women and education and skills training.
8. The thematic evaluation of the PRRO Category (*WFP, 2004*) noted a lack of systematic data on beneficiary outcomes which made it difficult to assess whether PRROs were actually meeting their stated recovery objectives.<sup>6</sup> Specifically, the evaluation noted that there was a general weakness in targeting, needs assessment and monitoring and evaluation; that there was little quantitative information about livelihoods available (amongst the 17 case studies); that it was difficult to determine whether recovery

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<sup>6</sup> The focus of the present strategic evaluation is the effectiveness of recovery interventions, which do not necessarily always fall under the PRRO program category. In fact, an earlier review of EMOPs and PRROs noted that about one-third of EMOPs and two-thirds of PRROs include objectives related to the preservation of assets and the restoration of livelihoods (*Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies: Strategies for WFP, 2003*).



activities were creating durable assets; that country offices were often setting unrealistic or inappropriate recovery targets, especially in highly unstable contexts and that program implementation often suffered from a lack of beneficiary needs assessment and participation.

9. Of particular relevance to the present strategic evaluation and its focus on outcomes and impact at the community and household level, the abovementioned thematic evaluation recommended *inter alia* the development of a system for better capturing recovery lessons from successful PRROs and enhanced monitoring of recovery-related outcomes, including improved nutrition, livelihoods and durable solutions. The desk analysis of this evaluation will therefore include a review and synthesis of previous operational evaluations of selected PRROs.
10. Although WFP has articulated the main elements of a recovery strategy, highlighted key aspects of a recovery response and identified a variety of activities suitable for recovery situation, there is no single logic model or logical framework that exists to provide a comprehensive results framework to guide recovery interventions. A logic model is therefore proposed to guide this evaluation (refer to paragraph 28).

### C. Preliminary Stakeholder Analysis

11. A preliminary stakeholder analysis is presented in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Preliminary Stakeholder Analysis

Key stakeholder group	Interest in the evaluation
<b>Internal</b>	
WFP CO & RB managers and program staff	Managers and program staff have a direct stake in assessing whether WFP is achieving its recovery objectives at the field level in order to be accountable downwards to beneficiaries and upwards to WFP HQ and donors and to incorporate potential lessons into future program design and implementation.
Senior WFP HQ managers	Senior WFP managers have a direct stake in assessing whether WFP is achieving its recovery objectives in order to be properly accountable to WFP donors for funds received and to improve corporate performance, if and where necessary, in order to be able to attract continued adequate funding in a difficult funding environment.
WFP HQ program managers & staff & policy-makers	The Program Design and Support Division (OMX), including those staff dealing specifically with recovery issues, has a vital interest in ensuring that lessons learned from successful (and less than successful) recovery interventions are timely reflected and incorporated into the design of next generation or phase of recovery programs. The Policy, Planning & Strategy Division (OEDP) has an interest in ensuring that findings and recommendations are reflected in any future review of WFP livelihood recovery policies.
WFP Executive Board	EB members have a direct interest in better understanding the effectiveness of WFP recovery interventions in order to be able to assess overall corporate performance and to use as a basis or guide for future funding decisions.
<b>External</b>	
Beneficiaries	Beneficiaries arguably have the greatest stake in WFP determining whether or not it is achieving its recovery objectives since it is the restoration of their livelihoods that is at stake in the aftermath of a disaster. For this reason, it will be crucial for the present evaluation to gather and analyze the input and perspectives of beneficiaries and affected communities using a variety of participatory and gender-aware consultation mechanisms.



International NGO partners	I-NGO partners have a particular interest in whether or not WFP is achieving its recovery objectives in order to be able to plan and implement effective exit strategies and hand-overs of recovery activities to local partners.
Local NGO partners	Local NGO partners have a particular interest in whether or not WFP is achieving its recovery objectives since these NGOs often have a longer-term presence in the affected communities and are often best suited to assume some of the planned recovery activities, especially as I-NGOs phase out or reduce their involvement after the initial relief phase of a disaster response.
National & sub-national government partners	National and sub-national government partners have an interest in whether or not WFP is achieving its recovery objectives in order to ensure that overall goals and objectives are consistent with national priorities, especially those related to poverty reduction and longer-term development.
Other UN agencies	Other UN agencies, including UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP and FAO, have an interest in whether or not WFP is achieving its recovery objectives because strong, sustainable livelihoods will help to reduce the need for specific sectoral interventions that may be less sustainable.

## II. REASON FOR THE EVALUATION

### A. Rationale for the Evaluation

12. There are a number of reasons for undertaking the present evaluation. First and foremost is the fact that there is a strategic objective three under the new WFP Strategic Plan (2008-2011), which is stated as follows: *To restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations*. This strategic objective is therefore at the core of WFP's recovery interventions and it highlights the continued and critical importance that WFP accords its portfolio of recovery interventions. Furthermore, strategic objective one includes as one of its goals *the protection of livelihoods and enhancing of self-reliance in emergencies*. This strategic evaluation is therefore intended to generate insights into WFP operations and activities with a recovery component in order to inform and improve, where necessary, the design and implementation of future recovery interventions.
13. Further justifications for undertaking the present evaluation are as follows:
- a. Ten years after the introduction of the *WFP From Crisis to Recovery* policy there is a need to review the effectiveness of WFP recovery interventions with a special focus on
    - i) understanding why interventions were effective (or not);
    - ii) whether these interventions were carried out in a fashion that adequately supported the affected population at the crucial moments between relief and development phases of a disaster response and
    - iii) understanding, analysing and comparing the perspectives and experiences of beneficiaries with those of other stakeholders, such as WFP field staff.
  - b. The thematic evaluation of the PRRO category in 2004 highlighted a number of issues that are relevant to the present evaluation and merit further consideration<sup>7</sup> (refer to paragraph 8).
  - c. The lack of attention to livelihood recovery in the humanitarian sector as a whole (refer to paragraph 3) mean that the present evaluation is a good opportunity to situate WFP recovery

<sup>7</sup> Once again, the focus of the present evaluation is not the PRRO category but rather recovery interventions in general, and specifically the recovery components of both EMOPs and PRROs. Recovery interventions that may possibly be found in Development or Country Programs do not fall within the scope of this evaluation unless these DEV or CP operations are ongoing in countries that have been selected as country case studies or case studies.



interventions in the overall context of recovery and to identify and highlight lessons from the WFP food assistance perspective.

- d. In the context of increasingly scarce donor resources, and the expressed reluctance of some donors to continue funding WFP recovery interventions, it is imperative that WFP assess its corporate performance by identifying and addressing any weaknesses and highlighting any strengths in its recovery interventions.

14. The expected users of this evaluation include the various internal stakeholders identified in the preliminary stakeholder analysis and to a somewhat lesser extent the various external partners also identified in the preliminary stakeholder analysis. It is also understood that evaluation results will be used to benefit primary stakeholders or beneficiaries to the maximum extent possible.

#### B. Objective of the Evaluation

15. The purpose of this evaluation is two-fold. Firstly there is an accountability aspect that attempts to assess the relative success or failure of WFP recovery interventions in achieving both their stated recovery objectives and implicit livelihood objectives; there is both downward accountability to beneficiaries and upward accountability to other stakeholders, including *inter alia* donors and the tax payers of those donor countries.

16. Secondly there is a learning aspect that seeks to determine whether or not, and under what circumstances, WFP recovery interventions are achieving their stated and implicit objectives and then to incorporate these lessons into the design and implementation of future recovery interventions. Specifically, WFP is interested to identify areas that may need improvement and also to identify possible areas of strength or comparative advantage for WFP in humanitarian recovery work.

17. The inherent tension between the accountability and learning aspects of evaluation is recognized and to some extent the learning aspect may be prioritized, especially at field level, in order to better encourage and optimize stakeholder involvement in the evaluation process.

### III. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

#### A. Scope of the Evaluation

18. The starting point for this evaluation is the fact that, in the wider humanitarian context, the term “recovery” is generally understood to refer to “livelihood recovery” and that this interpretation is consistent with WFP’s own recovery policy documents, which highlight the need to help people restore their livelihoods as quickly as possible after an emergency, life-saving intervention.

19. Secondly, it is recognized that depending on the operational context and stated project objectives, virtually all types of WFP program activities (from general food distribution to supplementary and therapeutic feeding to food-for-work to food-for-training to food-for-education or school feeding) may be considered as contributing, either directly or indirectly, to livelihood recovery objectives. The focus of this evaluation on livelihood recovery therefore does not automatically exclude any type of program activity from the scope of this evaluation.

20. The focus of this evaluation will be on EMOP and PRRO operations that have an explicit livelihood recovery component or objective and the various types of WFP food assistance activities for which an explicit recovery or livelihood recovery objective are identified. This evaluation will focus on broad types of program activities, including general food distribution, supplementary feeding, therapeutic feeding, food-for-work or food-for-assets, food-for-training and food-for-education or school feeding. To the extent possible, various other activities, which may be loosely or vaguely defined, will be placed or





identified in one of the broader categories noted above; for example, if “school rehabilitation” is carried out using food as a daily wage, this would be considered a FFW or FFA activity.

21. The evaluation will focus on the relative contribution or effectiveness of these various types of WFP food assistance activities, as perceived by internal and external stakeholders, including WFP beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, to i) the preservation of livelihood assets and the reduction of negative coping mechanisms at the household and community level (implicit objectives) and ii) the protection and/or restoration of livelihoods (implicit goal).
22. The focus of this evaluation is the effectiveness and impact of WFP livelihood recovery interventions rather than the quality of WFP recovery policy or program guidance on recovery. The evaluation will consider, only to the extent necessary to understand and contextualize WFP recovery operations and activities, the following issues:
  - a. the clarity and consistency of WFP policy documents related to recovery from 1998 onwards and
  - b. the clarity and usefulness of existing WFP HQ guidance on the design and implementation of recovery interventions and their coherence with existing recovery policy documents.
23. Possible target groups for evaluation focus include rural, disaster or conflict-affected communities in their villages (not displaced); internally displaced populations and refugees in camp situations. The selection of target groups will depend to some extent on the results of an operations and activity mapping exercise and will be finalised during the inception phase (see paragraph 37).
24. The universe of operations will be limited to operations in the EMOP and PRRO category that were ongoing in 2008 and 2007 and will also include earlier phases of these operations dating as far back as 2005. Specifically, the operations and activity mapping exercise will be based on projects that were ongoing in 2008 and 2007 and once operations are selected as case studies and/or country case studies, earlier phases of these operations will be reviewed and included, as necessary.
25. The precise geographic focus of this evaluation will depend to some extent on the results of the operations and activity mapping exercise. To the extent possible, the case studies and country case studies (involving field work) undertaken will reflect different contexts, such as natural disaster or conflict/complex situations and the presence or absence of underlying chronic vulnerability and chronic food insecurity. The final selection of case studies and country case studies will be determined during the inception phase when the results of the mapping exercise are available and selection criteria have been agreed by the evaluation team.

## B. Evaluability Assessment

26. The challenges to evaluating the effectiveness of WFP livelihood recovery interventions include the need for:
  - a. a logic model or logical framework suitable for all livelihood recovery interventions;
  - b. a clear description or understanding of the situation of the affected populations immediately before and after a natural disaster or conflict has occurred;
  - c. a clear statement of the intended outcomes of WFP recovery interventions;
  - d. a set of clearly defined indicators with which to measure change related to livelihoods and
  - e. a defined timeframe by which to measure the occurrence of intended outcomes and impact
27. In order to address the potential limitations to evaluability, the evaluation
  - a. Proposes a logic model to situate livelihood recovery interventions in an overall framework (refer to paragraph 28).
  - b. Will reconstruct baseline information on the status of livelihoods at the outset of a recovery intervention based on existing documentation, secondary data and recall of key stakeholders, as required.



- c. Use the relevant WFP policy documents, including the Strategic Plan 2006-2009, to identify generic intended outcomes of livelihood recovery interventions and compare with those stated in specific project documents.
- d. Determine whether there are appropriate indicators to measure change (outcome and impact) and, if necessary, develop appropriate indicators to do so.
- e. Determine a possible timeframe against which to measure the achievement of livelihood outcomes, with particular attention to the timely initiation of recovery interventions and the appropriate and timely phasing out of recovery interventions.

28. The proposed logic model for this evaluation has been constructed from elements found in the WFP policy documents *From Crisis to Recovery (1998)* and *Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies: Strategies for WFP (2003)*. Specifically, the 1998 policy document defines the overall goal of WFP recovery interventions to contribute to the restoration of livelihoods in order to assure immediate and longer-term food needs, and it also identifies the various types of activities that are most suitable for recovery situations. The 2003 policy document defines short-term objectives or outcomes, specifically the preservation of essential assets and the reduction of negative coping mechanisms. The 2003 policy document also affirms that the full range of WFP activities has been used to support asset preservation and the restoration of livelihoods. The proposed logic model excludes an explicit evaluation of the outputs of different types of so-called recovery activities in favour of evaluating or focusing on the link and contribution of various types of activities to the achievement of key outcomes that contribute to the restoration of livelihoods (refer to Table 2).

Table 2. Proposed logic model for the evaluation<sup>8</sup>

Types of Activities <sup>9</sup>	Objectives/Outcomes	Goal/Impact	Some Key Risks & Assumptions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General food distribution</li> <li>• Supplementary feeding</li> <li>• Therapeutic feeding</li> <li>• Food-for-work (assets)</li> <li>• Food-for-training</li> <li>• Food-for-education (school feeding)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Preservation of household and community assets<sup>10</sup></li> <li>➤ Reduction in the use of negative coping mechanisms at household and community level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Restoration of livelihoods<sup>11</sup> (and food security)</li> </ul>	<p>Risks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Instability &amp; recurring conflict</li> <li>• Unrealistic recovery targets</li> <li>• Unpredictable or short-term funding</li> <li>• Undermining of existing coping mechanisms</li> </ul> <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adequate availability of WFP recovery planning staff shortly after the onset of an emergency</li> <li>• Incorporation of adequate livelihood</li> </ul>

<sup>8</sup> An underlying assumption for this evaluation is that food assistance may have a positive role to play in the protection and/or restoration of livelihoods in certain post-conflict and post-disaster situations, and that careful livelihood analysis is needed in order to determine when and where food assistance (as opposed to cash or vouchers, for example) may be the most appropriate resource to support livelihoods (*Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies: Strategies for WFP (2003)*)

<sup>9</sup> In terms of the specific activities highlighted in the logic model for this evaluation, the focus is on general and well-known categories of program activities rather than less well-defined or other activities such as “support to coping strategies”, “market support” and “agriculture-based activities”. This is necessary to limit the scope of the evaluation to reasonable and manageable proportions.



			analysis into WFP recovery interventions
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#### Assessment of Data Availability & Reliability

29. The principal source of data with respect to the stated (and implicit) objectives of WFP recovery interventions will be the various approved project documents, and to a lesser extent the minutes of Project Review Committee (PRC) meetings, for each operation. It is possible that in some cases these objectives may be vague or not clearly stated in which case the evaluators may have to carefully interpret or reconstruct project logical frameworks, as required.
30. The principal source of data with respect to the achievement of livelihood recovery objectives and goals (effectiveness and impact) will be individual interviews and group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, WFP staff (especially at field office level), national and international NGO partners and national government partners. Depending on the duration of the specific ongoing recovery intervention, and when the disaster or conflict first affected the population, evaluators will have to deal with potentially faulty recall on the part of all concerned stakeholders, including the beneficiaries themselves. This issue may be particularly problematic when it comes to assessing the timeliness of recovery interventions.
31. A source of secondary data with respect to the achievement of livelihood recovery objectives and goals will be the completed standard project reports (SPRs) for earlier phases of the operation and additional monitoring and evaluation data that may be available at country office and field office level. It is anticipated that standard project reports may have gaps and weaknesses in terms of adequate measurable data on outcomes and impact and that additional information available at the field level may not be adequately compiled and/or analysed systematically; hence, there is a heavy emphasis on collection of primary data at the field level. Another possible source of secondary data will be the findings and reports of any self-assessments or after-action reviews that may have been carried out by the country offices.

#### IV. KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

32. The **overarching question** to be addressed by this evaluation is whether or not, and to what extent, WFP recovery interventions are actually contributing to the protection and/or restoration of livelihoods at the household and community level. The specific questions to be addressed by this evaluation will focus on the higher outcome and impact levels rather than the lower output level. A **second key question** that is linked to relevance is to what extent WFP recovery interventions reflect the expressed needs and priorities of local populations. A **third key question** that is linked to impact is what are some of the intended and unintended impacts, as well as positive and negative impacts, for WFP recovery interventions.
33. The structure of this evaluation will follow the standard OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, with a particular emphasis on the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact of WFP recovery interventions in terms of their contribution to the protection and/or restoration of livelihoods. Issues related to coherence and coverage will also be considered, as appropriate. The evaluation will also explicitly consider the following cross-cutting themes when applying the DAC criteria: national and local context, human resources and management, protection, participation of primary stakeholders, coping strategies and resilience, gender equality and the environment. A detailed matrix of evaluation questions that will guide the evaluation will be developed and agreed by the evaluation team during the inception phase and included as part of the inception report.

<sup>10</sup> The term “assets” will be broadly interpreted as livelihood capital assets including human, natural, financial, physical and social in accordance with The Sustainable (Rural) Livelihoods framework originating with the work of Chambers and Conway (1992) and adopted with minor differences by DFID as their official or dominant livelihoods framework.

<sup>11</sup> For the purposes of this evaluation, livelihoods are defined as “the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living” (R.Chambers & G. Conway, 1992. Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts for the 21<sup>st</sup> century).



34. In short, this evaluation will examine the extent to which WFP projects with an explicit recovery component are achieving their implicit objectives (and not only their various stated objectives in the project documents) i) to help preserve household and community livelihood assets and ii) to help minimize negative coping mechanisms at the household and community level and the extent to which these WFP projects are actually achieving their implicit goal to timely protect and/or restore livelihoods at the household and community level. The focus will be on how this achievement or non-achievement of livelihood goals and objectives is perceived by various stakeholders, especially male and female beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in conflict or disaster-affected communities.

## V. EVALUATION APPROACH

### A. Methodology

35. The overall approach for the evaluation will be a conventional mixed method approach based on the use of different information sources, including review of both WFP and non-WFP key documents, interviews with WFP, partner and government staff, semi-structured individual interviews and group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries<sup>12</sup> and to the extent possible, mini-surveys carried out for at least some of the country case studies. The approach will be largely inductive, attempting to draw conclusions by working up from material gathered at the field level and to verify the logic model that underpins this evaluation.
36. A key element of the evaluation methodology will be the triangulation or cross-checking of information from various sources. This process of triangulation will be conducted at the country-level (for example, by consulting an adequate cross-section of different stakeholders in the same operational context) and also at a broader inter-country level (whereby findings from one country case study may be compared to those of another country case study).
37. As an input to the inception phase, all of the project documents for ongoing EMOPs and PRROs will be reviewed in order to identify all those operations for which an explicit recovery component or objective is included. For those operations with an explicit recovery component or objective noted in the project document, a sub-set of operations that explicitly refer to “livelihood” recovery objectives will be identified. For this sub-set of operations with an explicit livelihood recovery component, the various types of program activities for which either a general recovery objective or specific livelihood recovery objective is stated will be identified and mapped.
38. Based on the results of the operations and activity mapping exercise, and the choice of selection criteria by the evaluation team during the inception phase, the selection of case studies and country case studies will be impartial and follow purposive sampling techniques in order to ensure an adequate cross-section of operations according to geographic and operational criteria. The selection of these case studies and country case studies, which will be detailed in the final inception report, will determine the direction and scope of the desk analysis and the field work.
39. The evaluation team will interview beneficiaries about their views on the contribution of various types of WFP program activities to livelihood recovery, the extent of beneficiary participation in the selection, design and implementation of recovery activities and whether WFP recovery assistance has had unintended or negative impacts, as well as intended (positive) impacts, always ensuring that the dignity and potential time constraints of interviewees are respected. Interviews with individual beneficiaries will be supplemented by focus group discussions with groups of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

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<sup>12</sup> For the purposes of this evaluation, non-beneficiaries in an affected community will be considered to comprise a natural control group against which to evaluate the outcome and impact of WFP recovery interventions for beneficiary groups. Such control groups usually arise naturally since not all affected communities, and not all households within an assisted community, are necessarily recipients of WFP food assistance



Beneficiary interviews will be conducted to the extent possible without the presence of WFP personnel and the evaluation team will be expected to use gender-aware and participatory approaches. The evaluation team will ensure that an adequate number of beneficiaries are consulted and will clearly note the details of the method used for consultations in the inception report and the final evaluation report. It is further expected that the evaluation team will adhere to standards of good evaluation practice, for example, by ensuring adequate consultation with beneficiaries and triangulating information to the extent possible.

#### Data Collection Strategy

40. Data collection is based on the following:

- a. Preparatory desk review of all relevant EMOP and PRRO project documents using a structured format to ensure consistent extraction of key data (operation and activity mapping exercise)
- b. Synthesis of existing evaluations relevant to WFP recovery interventions
- c. A review of key WFP and non-WFP literature and documentation related to recovery and livelihood recovery
- d. A desk review of selected background information on the selected case studies and country case studies
- e. Interviews with key WFP staff involved in the design and implementation of recovery interventions
- f. Fieldwork involving visits to selected countries, involving semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with key internal and external stakeholders, including WFP beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

#### B. Evaluation Quality Assurance System

41. The evaluation team is required to adhere to generally accepted standards of good evaluation practice in terms of both process and final products and in particular it is required to follow the WFP evaluation quality assurance standards (EQAS) in the preparation of all final products and reports. Specifically, the evaluation team must be transparent with respect to methodologies used (providing, for example, management questionnaires, community questionnaires, beneficiary interview guidelines and NGO questionnaires, type of sampling techniques used for beneficiary consultation), triangulate information sources and ensure adequate consultation with the affected populations.
42. WFP will try to ensure sufficient time for the evaluators to carry out necessary field work effectively and WFP field offices will try to ensure adequate time for proper consultation with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, as per the schedules to be agreed in advance with the evaluation manager.
43. In the final evaluation report and evaluation summary report, the evaluation team will be required to ensure a logical flow from findings to conclusions and from conclusions to recommendations, and to prioritize (arranging in order of urgency) and target recommendations to the various users of the evaluation report. Final reports must include a list of acronyms used, use paragraph numbering and be clear and concise.

#### C. Phases and Deliverables

Activities	Output(s)	Proposed Timeline
<b>Phase 0: Preparation</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Launching of the evaluation process</li> <li>• Preliminary consultations with internal stakeholders;</li> <li>• Preparation &amp; circulation of</li> </ul>	Final Term of Reference	15 Apr – 30 Jun 2008



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>draft terms of reference</li> <li>Mapping of recovery operations &amp; activities</li> <li>Identification &amp; recruitment of evaluation team</li> </ul>	Recruitment of evaluation team	
<b>Phase One: Inception</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of selected key documents</li> <li>Inception meeting &amp; meeting Note for the Record</li> <li>Consultation with stakeholders</li> <li>Selection of case studies &amp; country case studies</li> <li>Preparation of the inception report</li> </ul>	Inception meeting NFR  Final Inception Report	01 Jul – 15 Sep 2008
<b>Phase Two: Desk Analysis</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Comprehensive review &amp; analysis of key background documents</li> <li>Preparation of preliminary country case study papers to facilitate/complement planned fieldwork</li> </ul>	Various preliminary case study and country case study papers (as internal working documents)	15 Sep 2008 – 15 Oct 2008
<b>Phase Three: Country Case Studies / Field work</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Field work in selected countries</li> <li>De-briefing workshop at HQ</li> </ul>	Various case study working papers (as internal working documents)	15-Oct – 15-Nov 2008
<b>Phase Four: Reporting</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Preparation, sharing &amp; revision of evaluation report</li> <li>Consolidation of comments matrix</li> <li>Preparation of summary evaluation report</li> <li>Preparation &amp; circulation of recommendation matrix</li> <li>Editing of EB summary report</li> </ul>	Evaluation report  Completed comments matrix Evaluation summary report  Management response to recommendation matrix Final edited report	15-Nov 2008 – 28 Feb 2009 15 Feb 2009 01-31 Mar 2009 31 Mar 2009 31 Mar 2009 31 Mar 2009
<b>Phase Six: Presentation to the Executive Board</b>		
Presentation of final evaluation summary report to the EB		Jun 2009

## VI. ORGANIZATION OF THE EVALUATION

### A. Expertise Required

44. The composition of the core evaluation team will follow the conventional pattern with the recruitment of international external consultants. The value of having mixed evaluation teams comprising international and national consultants is recognized, and once the core team of consultants has been identified and the selection of country case studies (involving field work) has been agreed, WFP will attempt to recruit national consultants for specific field work in order to complement the local knowledge and skills of the



core consultants. The various consultants will be selected through a process involving the systematic review of curriculum vitae, review of previously published evaluation reports and telephone and/or personal interviews. The identification and recruitment of the national consultants may also involve the assistance and feedback of the concerned regional or country offices, as required. *The specific tasks for each evaluation team member will be agreed and finalized during the inception phase.*

45. **Team Leader:** The team leader will require significant experience in the evaluation of humanitarian assistance, combined with both a proven expertise in humanitarian aid policy and a sound knowledge of food security and/or livelihood recovery issues. He or she must also have the ability to mainstream gender issues in all aspects of the evaluation work. He or she will require strong interpersonal skills in order to manage the required inputs of various team members and in order to manage the team's program of activities at the field level. He or she will also require very strong analytical and drafting skills in order to draft the required written inputs (in English) and pull together the various written inputs of team members, ensuring the quality, clarity and coherence of the final written reports.
46. **Team Members 1 & 2:** The team members or technical experts will also require significant experience in the evaluation of humanitarian assistance (preferably including food assistance programs in a post-disaster or post-conflict context) and/or sound knowledge of food security and/or livelihood analysis, combined with solid experience of using participatory and gender-aware methods, especially for beneficiary consultations. He or she will also require good interpersonal skills, the ability to work effectively as part of a team and good drafting skills and the ability to work in French or Spanish (and English). The various team members require a similar profile in terms of knowledge and experience due to the fact that team members will be travelling independently to carry out the field work. *The second international team member may only be identified and recruited during the inception phase once the team leader and evaluation team have agreed on how to proceed with possible national consultancies;* in other words, there will be a choice between recruiting a third international consultant and/or recruiting a certain number of national consultants.
47. National consultants will require some sectoral and/or technical experience in one or more sectors of humanitarian action, preferably with some exposure to vulnerability and/or food security issues and some experience as an evaluator. They will require good interpersonal skills and the ability to engage with beneficiaries using participatory and gender-aware techniques. They may also require experience with carrying out small household or community surveys, specifically, identifying, training and supervising enumerators to collect data, overseeing data entry and analyzing and presenting findings in an analytical.

## B. Roles and responsibilities of WFP stakeholders

48. The roles and responsibilities of the various internal stakeholders, especially those at the field level where country case studies will be undertaken, will be clarified in detail during the inception stage of the evaluation.
49. The evaluation manager is responsible to develop the terms of reference for the evaluation; to provide adequate guidance and support to the evaluation team throughout the evaluation exercise, to ensure adequate discussion and planning with various HQ staff and regional and country offices in order to facilitate the actual evaluation work, including the field work and to provide a first level of quality feedback and assurance for the final evaluation products.
50. WFP stakeholders at HQ, regional bureaux and country offices will need to support this evaluation in the following areas: participation in individual and/or group discussions with the evaluation team, as required; provision of key background information and documents, as required; provision of comments and feedback on the evaluation products, specifically the terms of reference, inception report and evaluation report and provision of management responses to the evaluation recommendations, as appropriate.



51. In general country office managers and WFP field staff will need to provide assistance to the evaluation team in the following areas: adequate logistics support, the provision of available project data and information and the scheduling of required interviews and consultations with WFP staff, NGO and government partners and beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In the event that national consultants cannot be specifically recruited to support field work in each country, WFP field managers and staff may also be required to provide suitable persons to act as interpreters for the various field interviews.

#### C. Communication

52. The evaluation manager will try to ensure openness and transparency in the evaluation process by ensuring regular communication with internal WFP stakeholders, especially those located in the regional bureaux, country offices and field offices. There have been preliminary consultations with a variety of key internal stakeholders (through email, telephone and/or personal meetings) even before the finalization of the first draft of these terms of reference, and the draft terms of reference will be widely circulated for comments as part of the evaluation process. To some extent, the evaluation manager will also rely on the timely sharing of information by managers in the regional bureaux, country offices and field offices in order to ensure that key program staff, especially at the sub-office level, receive timely information on the evaluation.

53. An internal reference group comprising a cross-section of key WFP stakeholders (at HQ, regional bureaux and country office level) will be created and the draft inception report and final evaluation report will be circulated among this group in order to receive regular feedback during the evaluation process.

54. The dissemination and follow-up strategy for the evaluation includes a de-briefing on preliminary findings by the evaluation team for each country office at the conclusion of the field work; a half-day de-briefing workshop to be held at HQ for key internal stakeholders with the participation of the team leader; the sharing of key evaluation findings by WFP field office managers with external stakeholders and at least some of the beneficiary communities (to the extent feasible); presentation of the final summary report to the WFP Executive Board in June 2009 and the posting of the final evaluation and summary evaluation report on the external WFP website.

#### D. Resources/Budget

55. The overall budget for the evaluation is USD 190,000. Funds will be provided from the OEDE non-staff PSA budget, as per the approved biennium work plan





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### **Annex 3: List of People Interviewed**

#### **Nepal**

##### **WFP Staff**

Ms Chiya Bhandari, Senior Programme Assistant, Nepalgunj Sub-Office  
Mr Siemon Hollema, Head, Food Security Monitoring and Analysis Unit  
Ms Dominique Hyde, Deputy Country Director  
Dr Krishna Paharai, GIS Adviser  
Ms Meenu Hada, Senior Programme Assistant  
Mr Richard Ragan, WFP Representative  
Mr Nigel Sanders, Logistics Officer & Procurement Head  
Mr Moti Prasad Thapa, Head of Sub-Office, Nepalgunj  
Mr Leela Raj Upadhyay, PRRO Coordinator  
Mr Vishna, Field Monitor (Sulichour)  
Ms Karina, Field Monitor, (Jumla)  
Mr Mohan, Programme Assistant (Nepalgunj)

##### **NGO Implementing Partners**

Mr Ghan Shyam Awarth, vice Chairman, ECARDS Nepal  
Mr P P Acharya, Executive Director, DEPROSC  
Mr Mohanraj Adhikan, Deputy Head, Social Department, DEPROSC  
Mr Mohan Lal Chaudhary, Project Manager, SCF (US) - regional  
Mr Dhurba Devkota, Project Manager, SCF (US) - national  
Mr Rudra Devkola, Executive Director, ECARDS Nepal  
Dr H Martin Dietz, International Programme Advisor, Helvetas Nepal Swiss, Association for International Cooperation  
Mr Sher Bdr Karke, Protection Coordinator, Nepal Red Cross Society - regional  
Mr Ashok Kumar Jha, Regional Manager, DEPROSC Nepal  
Mr Kapil Joshi, Reporting Officer, SAPPROS Nepal - regional  
Mr P Raj Joshi, Program Officer, ECARDS Nepal - national  
Mr Rambhakta Mali, Social Mobilising Officer, WUPAP (Jumla District)  
Mr Man Bir Nepali, LTSH Officer, SCF - regional  
Mr Narendra, Director, SAPPROS  
Mr Binod Paudel, Engineer-PRRO, DEPROSC Nepal (Jumla District)  
Mr Anchal Prakash Rai, Programme Officer, SAPPROS Nepal - national  
Mr Kailash Rijal, Deputy Director, DEPROSC Nepal  
Mr Ram Risal, Country Director, Helvetas Nepal, Swiss Association for International Cooperation  
Mr Ang Rita Sherpa, Senior Program Manager, The Mountain Institute  
Ms Krishna Shahi, Social Mobilising Officer, WUPAP (Jumla District)  
Mr Khop Narayan Shretha, Coordinator (Makawanpur), The Mountain Institute

(+ a male and a female agricultural extensions officer working for GTZ met in the field in Rolpa-names unknown)

##### **Government of Nepal**

Dr Hari Dahal, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives  
Mr Kedar Neupone, Under Secretary, Ministry of Local Development





Mr Punya Neupone, Secretary for Shreemahal, Pulchowk & Lalitpur, Ministry of Local Development  
Mr Janak Raj Rezmi, Chief District Officer, Jumla District  
Mr Krishna Sandergini, Local District Officer, Jumla District

#### **Other UN agencies**

Mr Lakshman Gautam, Assistant Representative (Programme), FAO  
Ms Gillian Mellsope, Country Representative, UNICEF  
Mr Shengjie Li, Director, ILO  
Mr Robert Piper, Country Representative, UNDP & UN Resident Coordinator

#### **Donors + GTZ Project Staff**

Mr Giap Dang, Adviser/Cooperation Coordinator, European Union  
Mr Dietrich Fezer, Programme Manager, Food Security and Rehabilitation Project, GTZ  
Mr Frieder Konold, Team Leader, Food Security and Rehabilitation Project, GTZ  
Mr Simon Lucas, Growth & Infrastructure Adviser, DFID Nepal  
Mr Raj Rai, Sulichour Office, Food Security and Rehabilitation Project, GTZ  
Mr Ramesh Shrestha, Programme Coordinator, Slayan & Jajarkot, Food Security and Rehabilitation Project, GTZ  
Mr Nepal Surya, Head of Sulichour Office, Food Security and Rehabilitation Project, GTZ

#### **Bangladesh**

##### **WFP Staff**

Ms Masuma Akhter, MNP Consultant (in M&E field officers meeting)  
Mr John Aylieff, WFP Country Representative  
Mr Md Al-Mamum Azad, Programme Assistant (M&E), Barisol Field Office + 7 M&E field staff (6 men; 1 woman)  
Mr Charles Inwani, Field Coordinator, EMOP SIDR, Barisol Field Office  
Mr John McHarris, Programme Adviser, Dhaka  
Mr Sk Abubaker Siddique, Programme Officer/Recovery Programme, Programme Implementation Section, Dhaka  
Mr Ezaz Nabi, Programme Officer (M&E), Dhaka  
Mr Nasirullah, Assistant Emergency Coordinator, Barisol Field Office

##### **NGO Implementing Partners (where staff/volunteers are female, this is indicated)**

Mr Q K Alam, Director, Natural Resources & Disaster Management Program, Proshika+ Pirojpur field office team (5 + 1 female)  
Mr Nurul Amin Bagmer, Head of Programmes, Islamic Relief; Jhalokhati field office team (5)  
Mr Md Sakhawat Hossain, District Coordinator, CFW Project, Barisol, Eco-Social Development Organisation + field office team (8)  
Mr Mostafa Nuruzzaman, Director, Shushilan; Barguna field team (4)  
Mr Monzur Ul-Alam, MCHN Coordinator, SCF, Barisal + 2 field office staff (1 female) + 4 volunteers (female)  
District Coordinator, Barisol, Rural Reconstruction Foundation + 3 field monitors

##### **Government of Bangladesh**

Mr Shamsul Alam, Relief and Rehabilitation Officer, Patuakhali District, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management



Mr Amirul Islam, Chairman, Khatalia Upazilla, Jhalokathi District + 5 council members  
Mr Md. Shafiqul Islam, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Food & Disaster Management  
Mr Khalilur Rahman, Primary Education Officer, Patuakhali District, Ministry of Education  
Mr Ian Rector, Chief Technical Adviser & Team Leader, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management

#### **Other UN agencies**

Mr Lakshman Gautam, Assistant Representative (Programme), FAO  
Ms Gillian Mellsopp, Country Representative, UNICEF  
Mr Shengjie Li, Director, ILO  
Mr Robert Piper, Country Representative, UNDP & UN Resident Coordinator

#### **Donors**

Mr Peter Duncan-Jones, First Secretary (Development Cooperation), AusAID  
Mr David Hill, head of Office, ECHO, European Commission  
Ms Leda Tyrrel, Second Secretary (Development Cooperation), AusAID  
Ms Shahnaz Zakaria, Senior Food and Disaster Management Specialist, Office of Food, Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID

#### **Colombia**

##### **WFP Staff**

Praveen Agrawal, Country Director, World Food Programme Colombia  
Judith Imke, Deputy Country Director, World Food Programme Colombia  
Jackie Flentge, M&E, World Food Programme Colombia  
Manuela Angel, Head of Programs, World Food Programme Colombia  
Luis Fernando Amaya, WFP Programs Assistant, World Food Programme Colombia  
Maria Lucia, Coordinator of Sub-office Bogota, World Food Programme Colombia  
Luis Fernando Amaya, WFP Assistant Programs, World Food Programme Colombia  
Yolonda Benavides, Coordinator of Sub-office, World Food Programme Colombia  
Claudia Milena Vinasco Piedrahita, Field monitor, World Food Programme Colombia  
Krishna Ricardo Osono Duran, Assistant M&E, World Food Programme Colombia  
Carlos Andres Buenano, Field Officer, World Food Programme Colombia  
Liana Maryan, Coordinator of Sub office, World Food Programme Colombia  
Andres Cadena, M&E, World Food Programme Colombia  
Carolina Beydoya, Field monitor, World Food Programme Colombia  
Ramon Gutierrez, Field monitor, World Food Programme Colombia

##### **Government of Colombia**

Leonardo Villodor Perez, Program Coordinator, CISP  
Janet Bedolla, ICBF Coordinator, Medellin  
Javier Aguilar Gomez, IDP Coordinator, Accion Social Medellin  
Jaime Hinesfueza, Ministry of Education in Buena Ventura  
Carlos M. Gonzalez Rios, Representative, MANA (Colombia Government)  
Olga Lucía Velasco Acción Social  
Clara Hernandez, ICBF

##### **Other UN Agencies**

Eduardo Gallardo, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF



Juan Manuel Reina, IDP Program Coordinator, International Organizations for Migration  
Beatriz Henríquez, PAHDES Program Coordinator, International Organizations for Migration  
Vanessa Jimenea, USAID Income Generating Projects, International Organizations for Migration  
Jorge Arevalo, PAHDES, International Organizations for Migration  
Oscar Costilla, Program Manager, International Organizations for Migration

### **Donors**

Lynn Vega, IDP Coordinator, USAID Mission in Colombia  
Juanita Arango Program Assistant, CONSUDE, Swiss Development Organization,

### **NGOs and Red Cross Movement**

Jose Luis Barreiro, Protection Manager Oxfam GB  
Cristina Oberli – Economic Security Section of the ICRC  
Luis Gomez, Program Coordinator, CHF  
Gloria Nelly Acosta Mora, Program Director IDPs, FUPAD  
Maelaly Paredes Moya, Helper School Kitchen, Buena Ventura  
P. Jhon A. Vargas, Fundacion Manos  
Dario Castillo Mentille, Fundacion Manos  
Tito Fabray Montoya, H. T. Funceualle Manatial  
Juliana Mejia Garrido, Fundacion empresa  
Angela M Cadenas, Fundacion empresa  
Julien Velasquez, CEDCUR  
Luis Achievo Perez, Programs, CAH  
Luz Mery Londono Molina, Program Representative, Actuar Famiempicas  
Ana Olga Hernandez Nino, Program Coordinator, Fundacion Mundo Mejor  
Catalina Henera Gonzalez, Program Coordinator, Fundacion Solidaridad en Colombia  
Juan Carlos Alvarez, Women Programs, Pastoral Social

### **Lesotho**

#### **WFP**

Bhim Udas – Country Director, World Food Programme Maseru Lesotho  
Prabhakar Addala – Head of Programme & Logistics, World Food Programme Maseru Lesotho  
Hassan Abdi – Program Officer, World Food Programme Maseru Lesotho  
Janice Lachhman – HIV Focal, World Food Programme, Maseru Lesotho  
Kekelesto Mabeleng – Senior Programme Assistant, World Food Programme, Maseru Lesotho  
Napo Ntlou – Programme Officer, School Feeding Programme, World Food Programme, Maseru Lesotho  
Matsepe Nkopo – Senior Programme Assistant WFP Maseru, Lesotho  
Wahito Easter Kabaire – M & E, World Food Programme, Maseru Lesotho  
Likeleli Makhotla – VAM, World Food Programme, Maseru Lesotho  
Tsepiso Anna Moreboli – Field Officer, World Food Programme, Maseru Lesotho  
Makhauta Seeko – Senior Programme Assistant, World Food Programme, Leribe Lesotho  
Lineo Sehloho – Senior Programme Assistant, World Food Programme, Mohale's Hoek Lesotho  
Chabeli Monyake – Field Monitor, Qacha's Nek, Lesotho

#### **Government Offices**

Nchemo Maile – Deputy Principal Secretary, Lesotho Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation  
Moshoeshe Seeiso – Senior Forestry Officer, Lesotho Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation  
Matseliso Mojaki – Deputy Chief Executive, Disaster Management Authority, Lesotho Prime Minister's Office  
Pulane Makitle – Senior Field Officer, Disaster Management Authority, Lesotho Prime Minister's Office



Retselisitsoe Molefi – Senior Logistics Officer, Disaster Management Authority, Lesotho Prime Minister’s Office

Tebellong Clinic Representative, Qacha’s Nek

Ministry of Agriculture Representative, Qacha’s Nek

P. Mosenene – District Supervisor Ministry of Forestry & Land Reclamation, Qacha’s Nek

Marou Ramarou – Store Keeper Ministry of Forestry & Land Reclamation, Qacha’s Nek

Sekhantso Ntoana – Conservation Officer Ministry of Forestry & Land Reclamation, Qacha’s Nek

Lineo Baasi – Forestry Officer – Ministry of Forestry, Qacha’s Nek

Koili Moliko, Lesotho Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation, Qacha’s Nek

## **UN**

Mokitinyane Nthimo – Assistant FAO Representative, Maseru Lesotho

Farayi Zimudzi – FAO Emergency Coordinator, Maseru Lesotho

Charu Bist – Policy Development Officer UNDP, Maseru Lesotho

## **Cooperating Partners**

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Paul Mokoai, Emergency Coordinator, World Vision, Maseru Lesotho

Reverend August Basson, Growing Nations, Qacha’s Nek and Mohale’s Hoek

Graham Duffield, GTZ, Field Program Coordinator, Maseru Lesotho

## **Uganda**

### **WFP Staff**

Els Kocken, Head of Learning and Evaluation Unit, WFP Uganda

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### **Other UN Agencies**

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Lawrence Tijoy, Programmes Director, World Vision Uganda  
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Steven Odong, Programme Manager, Save the Children, Moroto  
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## **Donors**

Charles Drazu, Senior Policy Officer, Adviser Local Governance, Netherlands Embassy  
Steve Ainsworth, Conflict and Humanitarian Adviser, DFID  
Veronique Lorenzo, Head Rural Development, EC Delegation Uganda

## **Government of Uganda**

John Lodungkol, Moroto District Agricultural Officer  
Simon Apolo Lowot Nangiro, Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Development Programme  
Robert L Khauka, Principal Quality Assurance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture  
Deus Muhwezi, Assistant Commissioner, Agri-Business, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries  
Rose Adero, Moroto District, Vice Chairperson on District Council  
Moses Opello, Assistant Chief Administrative Officer, Moroto District  
Dr James Elima, Medical Superintendent, Moroto District Hospital  
Patrick Ekomera, Senior Hospital Administrator  
Paul Abul, Moroto District Education Officer  
Mr Sakwa Program Director, NUSAF  
James Ebitu, Program Officer, NUSAF  
Dr John Mbabzi, Director of Education, Ministry of Education and Sport  
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### **WFP Staff**

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Paul Turnbull, Senior Program Coordinator, Project Cycle, Programme Design Service, Programme Design and Support Division (OMX)  
Ute Meir, Chief, School Feeding, Programme Design Service, Programme Design and Support Division (OMX)



Volli Carrucci, Program Adviser, Prevention/Recovery, Programme Design Service, Programme Design and Support Division (OMX)  
Rebecca Lamade, Program Officer, Monitoring and Evaluation, Programme Design Service, Programme Design and Support Division (OMX)  
Edith Heines, Program Adviser, MCH, Programme Design Service, Programme Design and Support Division (OMX)  
Pushpa Acharya, Program Adviser, Nutrition, Programme Design Service, Programme Design and Support Division (OMX)  
Wolfgang Herbinger, Country Director, WFP Pakistan  
Sonali Wickrema, Head, Programme Unit, WFP Ethiopia  
Arega Yirga, WFP Ethiopia  
Miyuke Koga, WFP Ethiopia  
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William Nall, WFP Sudan  
Paul Buffard, WFP Sudan  
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## **FAO**

Neil Marsland, Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Policies Unit (TCER), Food and Agriculture Organisation  
Richard China, Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Policies Unit (TCER), Food and Agriculture Organisation

## **Donor Governments**

Jonathan Dworken, Deputy Director, Office of Food for Peace, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance  
Ms. Leigh Stubblefield, Livelihoods Adviser, DFID Kenya  
Jim Harvey, UK Ambassador to the UN Food and Agriculture Agencies in Rome  
Simon Mansfield, Regional humanitarian adviser central and east Africa, DFID  
James Melanson, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the Food and Agriculture Agencies of the U.N., Canadian Embassy, Rome  
Theo van Banning, Netherlands Permanent Mission, Rome  
Nick Weatherill - Food Assistance Policy and Programme Advisor - DG ECHO A4  
Matthias Lange - Food Assistance Policy and Programme Advisor - DG ECHO A4  
Nick Maunder - Food Assistance Policy and Technical Advisor - DG ECHO Sector Support Team (SST)

## **NGOs**

Thabani Maphosa, Director, FPMG, Program Development & New Products, World Vision International  
Don Rogers, Catholic Relief Services, Public Resource Representative for Africa  
Matthew Hobson, Head of Hunger Reduction, Save the Children UK, Ethiopia Programme  
Miles Murray, Senior Advisor for Emergency Programming, CARE USA.



## Annex 4: Evaluation Matrix

Issue	Indicator	Information source
<b>Relevance / Appropriateness</b>		
<p><b>Needs:</b> What is the evidence base and assessment process for determining recovery needs?</p> <p>Are local stakeholders – disaster affected populations, local authorities and civil society being adequately consulted in determining needs and programme strategy? Were both men and women consulted?</p> <p><b>Internal Coherence:</b> Are individual country approaches to recovery consistent with WFP policies?</p> <p>Are recovery focussed activities consistent with other WFP interventions?</p> <p><b>External Coherence:</b> Are WFP approaches to recovery in line with those of donors, disaster affected governments and partners (globally and in specific countries)?</p> <p>What was driving a shift from relief to recovery programming (improving livelihoods and/or donor and political pressures)?</p> <p>Was recovery programming at the expense of a focus on relief?</p> <p>How does WFP's livelihoods recovery programming relate to broader recovery objectives around peace and state building?</p> <p>How is WFP navigating its commitments to key humanitarian principles (independence,</p>	<p>Assessment document that explicitly addresses recovery needs</p> <p>Project documents include description of a consultation process for beneficiaries and other stakeholders</p> <p>Beneficiaries feel they were consulted and can explain their input into a process</p> <p>Women and men consulted.</p> <p>Extent to which project documents reflect relevant WFP policies.</p> <p>Levels of donor support for WFP country programmes.</p> <p>Support from government and key partners for WFP approach</p> <p>Assessment and project documents describe needs based rationale for reductions in food aid levels and greater targeting</p> <p>Evidence of participation in high level strategic discussions around recovery.</p> <p>Consideration of role of support to livelihoods in relation to other recovery objectives in strategy and policy documents.</p> <p>Evidence of consideration of key principles in the relationship</p>	<p>Review of project documents – particularly assessments and monitoring and evaluation data.</p> <p>Interviews with project staff involved in managing recovery projects.</p> <p>Interviews and focus group discussions with disaster affected populations and other key stakeholders in national governments and civil society.</p> <p>Interviews with staff from other aid agencies</p> <p>Donor, government and NGO partner interviews</p> <p>Review of project documents, WFP Country Office discussions and interviews with WFP staff.</p>



<p>neutrality) and developmental ones (harmonisation, alignment, capacity and state building)?</p> <p><b>Project Design:</b> Does the project design make sense? Has it evolved to reflect changing circumstances? Are recovery objectives and activities realistic?</p> <p><b>Appropriateness:</b> Was the appropriateness of food aid explicitly assessed, monitored and evaluated?</p>	<p>between WFP and governments in disaster affected countries</p> <p>Extent to which PRRO and EMOP documents reflect key recovery challenges and propose realistic objectives for food assistance</p> <p>Assessment, project documents and monitoring reports include analysis of appropriateness</p>	
<p><b>Sustainability</b></p>		
<p>What links are there between relief, recovery and development programming?</p> <p>Has WFP assistance increased resilience to new shocks?</p> <p>What was the exit / long term strategy for the recovery programme?</p> <p>How sustained was the impact of food aid on livelihoods?</p> <p>Are assets built through food for work being maintained?</p> <p>What approach is WFP taking to building of national capacities?</p>	<p>Evidence of strategic linkages between relief, development and recovery in project documents and implementation.</p> <p>Evidence of links within country programmes being different programming modalities</p> <p>Evidence of consideration of issues around exit, handover and sustainability in programme design</p> <p>Evidence of improvements in livelihoods being attributed to food aid being sustained.</p> <p>Evidence of plans and capacities in place for ongoing maintenance of community assets</p> <p>Project documents include consideration of national capacities</p>	<p>Review of project documents – particularly proposals, monitoring data and interim and final reports.</p> <p>Interviews with project staff.</p> <p>Interviews and focus group discussions with disaster affected populations and other key stakeholders in national governments and civil society.</p> <p>Interviews with staff from other aid agencies</p>
<p><b>Impact</b></p>		
<p>What contribution did WFP activities make to processes of recovery (both in terms of food aid received and assets created or training undertaken)?</p> <p>Were there any unintended positive or negative impacts? Were potential negative impacts of food aid on markets or of work</p>	<p>Monitoring and evaluation documents attempt to analyse impact</p> <p>Evidence of a logic model that links food aid to livelihoods outcomes</p> <p>Analysis in monitoring reports of possible unintended and negative impacts. Assessment and monitoring reports analyse impact</p>	<p>Review of project documents – particularly proposals, monitoring data and interim and final reports.</p> <p>Interviews with project staff.</p> <p>Interviews and focus group discussions with disaster affected populations and other key stakeholders in national governments and civil society.</p>





<p>requirements on livelihoods considered?</p> <p>How were impacts different according to gender, age and disability?</p>	<p>of food aid on food and labour markets</p> <p>Beneficiary perceptions of impact in field work interviews and focus group discussions in case study countries</p> <p>Monitoring and analysis differentiated by gender.</p> <p>Issues of gender, age and disability taken into account in programme design</p>	<p>Interviews with staff from other aid agencies</p>
<p><b>Effectiveness</b></p>		
<p>Have food aid activities with objectives related to livelihoods recovery preserved or created livelihood assets, reduced negative coping and met stated objectives?</p> <p>Did people build useful assets, and receive useful training?</p> <p>Were project objectives and activities designed in such a way that activities were able to meet objectives around livelihoods recovery?</p>	<p>Objectives realistically framed</p> <p>Analysis of achievement of outcomes for recovery related activities stated in project document objectives and logframes.</p>	<p>Review of project documents – particularly proposals, monitoring data and interim and final reports.</p> <p>Interviews with project staff.</p> <p>Interviews and focus group discussions with disaster affected populations and other key stakeholders in national governments and civil society.</p> <p>Interviews with staff from other aid agencies</p>
<p><b>Efficiency</b></p>		
<p><b>Level of Outputs:</b> Have planned recovery related activities been implemented as planned?</p> <p><b>Timeliness:</b> Did people receive timely food aid?</p> <p><b>Resources Adequacy:</b> Were the resources of WFP and its cooperating partners (human and financial) sufficient to carry out planned activities effectively?</p> <p><b>Targeting:</b> Do targeting criteria relate to recovery objectives? What proportion of recovery needs were being met (in terms of % of population and volume of assistance)?</p> <p>Were groups/people with particular vulnerabilities included (illness,</p>	<p>% of activities with explicit recovery objective funded and implemented</p> <p>Timeliness and predictability of receipt of food aid by beneficiaries</p> <p>Staff with skills relating to livelihoods analysis, technical skills to manage FFW/A.</p> <p>Those most in need of support to recover livelihoods targeted. % of population in need being supported</p> <p>Quality of recovery related analysis in monitoring and evaluation</p>	<p>Review of project documents – particularly budgets attached to project documents and for partner agencies.</p> <p>Interviews with project staff.</p> <p>Interviews with staff from other aid agencies</p> <p>Review of monitoring and evaluation documents. Interviews with WFP staff and partners.</p>



<p>age, disability, gender)?</p> <p><b>Monitoring and Evaluation:</b> How well are monitoring and evaluation mechanisms contributing to analysis of the contribution of food assistance to processes of recovery?</p> <p><b>Coordination:</b> How did WFP's livelihood recovery programming relate to those of other actors (UN agencies, NGOs, government, MFIs, Red Cross)?</p> <p>How did WFP's activities relate to people's own livelihood strategies and investments in processes of recovery?</p> <p>How did WFP's livelihoods recovery programming relate to other WFP relief and development activities?</p> <p><b>Cost Efficiency:</b> How do project costs for recovery programmes compare across different countries?</p> <p>How do costs for WFP livelihood recovery activities compare to other forms of livelihood recovery programming?</p>	<p>reports</p> <p>Evidence of active coordination with other key actors involved in livelihood recovery</p> <p>Levels of participation in key coordination forums</p> <p>Evidence of analysis of shifts in people coping and livelihood strategies in assessment, monitoring and programme design</p> <p>For projects with explicit recovery objectives % of ODOC costs compared to food aid tonnage.</p> <p>Overhead costs for partners to implement recovery projects compared to relief ones.</p> <p>Cost effectiveness of food aid compared to other livelihood interventions</p>	
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