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Composition of the Evaluation Team

The evaluation team is composed of team leader Herma Majoor (agriculture and rural development expert) and team members Karl Kaiser (agriculture and rural development expert), Haroon Sseguya (extension and organisational capacity expert), Peter Tingwa (local governance expert) and Willem van den Toorn (capacity building and institutional development expert). The profiles of the team members are displayed in Annex 2.

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Acronyms

ABG	Agro-Business Group
AHA	Animal Health Associate
AIRP	Aweil Irrigation and Rehabilitation Project
ARS	Aweil Rice Scheme
AWP	Annual Work Plan
BEG	Bahr el Ghazal
CA	Conservation Agriculture
CAD	County Agriculture Department
CAHW	Community Animal Health Worker
CARDA	Community Animal Resource Development Associate
CB	Capacity Building
CBNA	Capacity Building Needs Assessment
CES	Central Equatoria State
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DG	Director General
EC	European Commission
EQM	Evaluation Questions and Topics Matrix
EU	European Union
EUD	Delegation of the European Union
FFMC	Fresh Fish Multipurpose Cooperative
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organization
FFS	Farmer Field School
FMO	Framework of Mutual Obligations
FPMP	Fisheries Production and Marketing Project
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HQ	Headquarters
HRD	Human Resource Development
HRM	Human Resource Management
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
IT	Information Technology
KUCDA	Kueng Community Development Agency
LPMP	Livestock Production and Marketing Project
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFFMC	Mamenze Fresh Fish Multipurpose Cooperative
MAF	Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
MP	Model Projects
MRDA	Mundri Rural Development Association
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
MT	Master Trainer
NALEP	National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Policy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NBEG	Northern Bahr el Ghazal
NSA	Non-State Actor
OED	FAO Office of Evaluation
PAB	Project Advisory Board
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PPP	Public Private Partnership

PSC	Programme Steering Committee
PTF	Project Task Force
RM-SBG	Rural Marketing – Small Business Groups
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SIFSIA	Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action
SMACE	State Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Environment
SMAF	State Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
SMARF	State Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SPCRP	Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme
TC	Technical Committee
TNA	Training Needs Assessment
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Training of Trainers
TSU	Technical Support Unit
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development programme
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
WBEG	Western Bahr el Ghazal

Executive Summary

Information about the evaluation

- ES1. A Framework of Mutual Obligations (FMO) was concluded for the use and implementation of the STABEX allocation for Sudan. The Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP) was formulated under the 'Productive Infrastructures and Rural Livelihoods Rehabilitation' chapter of the FMO. It consisted of a Capacity Building Component (CB), implemented by FAO (contract signed August 2007 for €19.07 million, plus €1.5 million in 2008 and €2 million in 2010, until December 2012; and a Model Projects Component (MP), implemented by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ); contract signed in March 2008 for €13.2 million (48 + 6 months).
- ES2. SPCR was implemented in the States of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Lakes and Western Equatoria under the CB and the MP component. The MP component was also implemented in Central Equatoria and Unity States. The MP component consisted of the Fisheries Production and Marketing Project, Livestock Production and Marketing Project and the Aweil Irrigation Rehabilitation Project.
- ES3. The final evaluation was conducted in the Sudan and South Sudan from October 2012 until January 2013. This report covers the mission to South Sudan (November 2012). A synthesis report will be prepared on the commonalities and differences between the two countries with respect to design and implementation of the SPCR. The evaluation consisted of a desk review and stakeholder interviews at national Federal and State levels, supported by an evaluation matrix and an evaluation questions/topic matrix.

Key findings

- ES4. 25 years of war have left South Sudan without infrastructure and well-functioning public administration. Social and health indicators in South Sudan are among the lowest globally; austerity measures hamper efforts aimed at positive long-lasting impacts. Other development actors are active, but most of the interventions are emergency related. Against this background, the achievements of SPCR were considered significant.
- ES5. The evaluation was supposed to focus on implementation after the MTE, but the Team could not ignore the design limitations. The design led to an increase in the capacity building in of the Government in staff and farmers' skills, but it largely neglected to build institutional and organisational structures. Also, the design did not acknowledge the extremely low public administration and governance capacity.
- ES6. The design was output focused and the government's financial and technical contributions were insufficiently addressed. There was no mandatory coordination mechanism between the two implementing organisations, and the four-year time frame and the high level of ambition of SPCR were unrealistic. The CB and MP components did not combine their action in one logframe. Programme management and M&E were done independently. The resulting fragmentation led to a sub-optimal outcome of SPCR.
- ES7. No specific Project Document, Terms of Reference and Inception Reports were prepared for the States. The work was guided by state specific Annual Work Plans, but these led to a focus on output and prevented oversight of achievements against indicators. This only allowed for ad-hoc adaptations. The project rightly targeted the ministries dealing with agriculture, forestry, animal production and fisheries for capacity building.

- ES8. FAO had spent 88% of project funds by June 2012; GIZ between 52 and 82% up to December 2011. These figures are expected to be considerably higher by the end of 2012, since the majority of activities were implemented towards the end of the project.
- ES9. In general, SPCR has been implemented efficiently and effectively and provided good value for money as far as the circumstances allowed, although structural capacity was not built. Most activities were implemented as planned and the targets set were met, but not always to the extent or quality expected, especially in the MP component.
- ES10. FAO support was offered from the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) in Juba and Technical Support Units (TSUs) in the 5 States. The TSUs have done excellent work and had good relationships with the governments and partner NGOs. GIZ implemented its MPs through 3 Project Implementation Units and support from the capital. The Project Steering Committee provided strategic oversight. The Project Task Force from FAO did not play a significant role in the post-MTE period apart from technical backstopping.
- ES11. The M&E system was not entirely adequate. Baseline surveys have been conducted in the MPs, but not systematically; no impact has been measured. M&E by government, though improved under SPCR, was still of limited quality.
- ES12. Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock have been split at Federal and State levels after independence, except in Western Equatoria State. At county level, there is a poor relation between the agricultural and animal resources related departments and staff, which has a detrimental effect on the functioning of the State Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Environment. SPCR emphasized the agriculture related activities, resulting in more training and assets provided to the State Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry, which was resented by the State Ministries of Animal Resources and Fisheries. The handover committee is yet to deal with the left over assets.
- ES13. Relationships and communication between Federal and State level are poor and there are policy inconsistencies and mutual lack of information sharing. A considerable gap in knowledge and capacity was found between people at the higher level in Juba and those responsible for implementation in the States. As a result of austerity measures, the budget of the Federal Government had decreased to the extent that even though the States make strategic and operational plans, they cannot be funded from Federal budget.
- ES14. Delays at various levels, caused by bureaucracy and protocols, transport problems and procurement issues are seen by all stakeholders as hampering progress. Security is a remaining concern, as fights and conflicts are still intermittently ongoing.
- ES15. SPCR's focus on training was relevant, since the levels of skills in public bodies, NSAs, families and the private sector were low at the time the project was conceived. Suitable trainees were hard to identify for lack of general education which led to fewer people being trained than planned. The capacity of extension workers was found exceptionally low. Many training courses were imparted, but without strategic direction.
- ES16. The MP component was incorporated into the project design to serve as exercise ground for the Government to use and improve the skills they had acquired under the CB component. The limited result of the MP enabled the government to use that opportunity only to a modest extent. In the CB component, trainings had been postponed from the beginning, resulting in an important number of trainings now being abandoned.
- ES17. Activities necessary to generate a robust institutional and organizational structure were not incorporated in the programme. Organogrammes are mostly non-existent, job

descriptions were not linked to the organisational structure. Organisational reviews have taken place only superficially, which threatened the collective strength of the ministries.

- ES18. Physical capacity increased a lot and is still of generally good quality and appreciated by stakeholders. Government is only partly supporting the fuel, maintenance and repair for lack of funding. Sustainable energy opportunities were not used.
- ES19. SPCRP was selected as vehicle to pilot the FFS approach in South Sudan. 378 FFS have been established and 258 are still active. The quality is limited but 20-25% of the FFS groups may be able to sustain themselves. The government appeared ready to use the participatory group approach and upscale the projects as soon as the funding improves. There was no grant policy for graduating FFS, which led to a non-transparent situation.
- ES20. Involvement of CAHWs was found valuable by the stakeholders. They appreciated the additional training and toolkits from SPCRP, and reported that it had helped to decrease livestock mortality. Drugs and vaccines are hard to come by and quality is unreliable. Bicycles and solar fridges were found to be useful. CAHWs receive a very small fee for their work which decreases sustainability but they earn community respect.
- ES21. 32 SBGs have been established and partially trained. The CB supported construction of 3 food processing plants, but they are not ready yet and related training still has not been conducted. FAO has promised a follow-up.
- ES22. The implementation by the MP has been very poor. Activities have been implemented late, to a smaller extent than expected and of poor quality. The relationship between GIZ, the implementing agency, and the government has been constrained and the government felt that it had not always been consulted. In AIRP, fewer activities have been carried out with regard to rice production and irrigation than planned; the 500,000 Euro rice mill could not be made operational prior to the project's end.
- ES23. Even though auction grounds and slaughterhouses were found useful, the two biogas installations, constructed adjacent to slaughterhouses are still not working. As animal excreta have been pouring out for about two months, the situation has now become a public health threat, which should be addressed soonest. One of the fisheries centres was built 45 miles away from the landing site and will probably never be put into use.
- ES24. Impact may have been sub-optimal in some fields but was still found positive. Mindsets and the vocabulary have changed in particular in planning and M&E. The impact of human capacity building was good but could have been greater if training had been part of a robust institutional and organisational development process. The training equipment and materials which the project provided to ABGs and FFS had enabled participants to improve their livelihoods.
- ES25. The impact of the MP implementation was considered limited and not always positive. Auction kraals may have improved the financial situation of livestock owners, butchers and the government, but at community and State Ministry levels, promises made and not kept have reduced the commitment and achievements.
- ES26. A sustainability strategy was lacking and the exit strategy was developed too late. Regarding financial sustainability, budgetary arrangements and public administrative capacity were not acknowledged in the design. There is limited scope for financial sustainability of FFS, but institutionally they still may be sustainable and the stronger FFS have a potential to build upon. CAHWs' training has yielded entrenched results.
- ES27. The design has largely neglected activities necessary to generate robust institutional and organizational structure. On the other hand, the manuals provided by SPCRP for

CAHWs and FFS are useful, user friendly and based on the newest information. Human capacity building needs continuous attention, which is not expected to happen.

- ES28. An inclusive procedure was established to produce the first 3-year strategic plan (2010-2012) as a compass for annual planning and it was continued by the government with limited project support (2013-2015 plans). Unfortunately, the State Governments have insufficient money and human resources available to carry on the activities.
- ES29. There are major cultural obstructions to involving women and moving towards gender equality. Gender mainstreaming had not been included in the project design and efforts were made to increase female participation, but needs and opportunities of men and women were not analysed or adequately addressed by SPCRP.
- ES30. Synergy was weak at all levels. Cooperation between the components was sub-optimal, hardly any exchange was found between the Sudan and South Sudan and between result areas, and consequently, opportunities have been missed.
- ES31. Lessons learned from SPCRP were that the design was too ambitious and that at least 8-10 years are needed for a similar programme. Equipment used by the MP was too complicated. Training is not enough to improve human capacity in view of the funding problems and the many priorities government is facing.
- ES32. Good practices were found in the use of trainee selection committees, improved human resource practices and planning, addressing seed selection in FFS, the evolution of the FFS into SBG and the intercropping of agricultural crops with teak.

Conclusions

- ES33. The relevance as well as the achieved outputs of SPCRP were found to be reasonably good, especially in view of the difficult circumstances. Adverse design characteristics still had major consequences for the quality of the implementation of SPCRP and especially on its impact and sustainability.
- ES34. The duration of four years would already have been short for a highly complex program like SPCRP even if it would have started in time. Delays, the lack of focus on effective delivery of institutional and organizational capacity and the absence of a framework of cooperation between the two contractors curtailed the impact and sustainability.
- ES35. Embedding the state programme in the State Ministries enhanced involvement and ownership of the governments and government staff members.
- ES36. The relationship between GIZ project staff and governments was tense. The performance of GIZ in the MP has been found to be very disappointing. Activities were downscaled, downsized or not implemented at all, or with compromised quality, even to the extent that the public health was threatened (e.g. the biogas installations).
- ES37. FAO was struggling with delays regarding the finalization of food processing plants but committed verbally to finalizing those projects according to plan. GIZ verbally promised to follow up the rice mill and the biogas installations.
- ES38. In general, the FFS and CAHW components appeared most successful, in view of the local circumstances and impact. Sustainability of capacity building and upscaling of FFS and CAHW may become possible if the government manages to bridge the financial gap resulting from temporary lack of oil revenues and consequent austerity measures.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: To EU and GIZ on establishing accountability of implementing partners.

GIZ may be held responsible and accountable for rectifying or finishing some of the unfinished work they left behind, in particular non-functional biogas installation and the rice mills in Aweil. Not only should these be made operational, training should also be provided on how to operate them. As these matters are complex and many details are outside the scope of the evaluation, it is recommended that a full audit should be undertaken to identify what were the extent and the reasons of poor delivery and to outline the implications.

Recommendation 2: To EU and FAO Senior Management on funding and implementation of programmes and projects by multiple organisations.

EU should provide guidelines and a mandatory framework to the implementers of project and programmes, if these are co-implemented by multiple organisations; these are to be closely followed by implementers including FAO. If private entities are selected, sustainability must be truly embedded in the proposal and mechanisms should be elaborated to ensure that such entities work with and build capacity of local institutions. Budgets of prospective programmes should be feasible and scrutinized closely and have built-in allowance for considerable price rises in future years, since this is an unavoidable feature in post-conflict countries.

Recommendation 3: To EU and FAO Country Office on sustainable energy promotion.

In a country like South Sudan where water, fuel and electricity are expensive and sustainable solutions like water harvesting and solar energy should be incorporated in each intervention and proposal, where feasible. Raising awareness on sustainable solutions should also be part of new programmes and projects.

Recommendation 4: To EU and FAO Senior Management on programme/project design.

Especially in post-conflict countries with low government capacity and limited budget, an exit strategy should be elaborated and incorporated in the programme/project design starting from the very beginning. The phase-in and phase-out mechanism will not work if only brought up towards the end and must be implemented throughout the project's duration. Additional intermittent backstopping and support after the phasing out of the project's activities will enhance its sustainability and impact. The duration of a programme should exceed the usual 5-year cycle to produce tangible impact and sustainable results. To overcome the 5-year EDF-based planning cycle, the EU is recommended to develop a kind of long-term master plan which would identify the key areas of cooperation and support for the duration of several EDFs.

Recommendation 5: To EU and FAO Senior Management on programme/project design.

The Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) approach should be observed and integrated throughout the food chain in food security programmes. Links between WASH and food security should be identified and exploited, based on relevant findings of the baseline survey, which includes data collection on WASH related issues. Access to safe water should be ensured at all project sites.

Recommendation 6: To FAO Senior Management, on incorporating FFS in programmes and projects.

In future programmes and projects, FFS may be considered as a valuable component,

provided existing rules and guidelines are followed as closely as possible and feasible, whilst taking into account local characteristics. FAO avails of a large number of normative products and guidelines which should be used to the maximum extent. These also allow the incorporation of crosscutting issues like gender, nutrition and HIV AIDS.

Recommendation 7: To EU, FAO HQ and FAO Country Office in South Sudan on identifying needs of government.

In a country like South Sudan, it is inadvisable to roll out a blanket capacity building approach since the capacity of government is very low at all levels and with regard to many subjects. Capacity building should be a structured process following the needs of government and public administration, starting with addressing planning capacity - resource allocation and public finance management. In the process, learning while doing would steadily increase the number of qualified government staff.

Recommendation 8: To EU and FAO Country Office in South Sudan on identifying and addressing needs.

The ultimate backbone of sustainable and successful development in South Sudan is the competence of the organisations of public administration at federal, state and county levels. With the federal level as the nation's policy and standards setting centre, actual development on the ground is executed at state and county level. The quality of county level public administration depends on the competence at state level public administration. At both levels, competence and structure need to be urgently strengthened. A professional Organisational and Institutional Review of key state ministries should be agreed upon and implemented with the state governments. Follow-up Organisation, Institutional and Capacity Development Plans should be implemented by state governments supported by external professional staff in a participatory approach.

Recommendation 9: To FAO Country Office in South Sudan on coordination and cooperation.

The fragile conditions prevalent in South Sudan render better donor coordination and focus imperative, in a thorough dialogue with the government and incorporating large NGOs operational in South Sudan. FAO and donors should advocate with and support the government to design a long term path of assistance and identify the different roles that can be played by various donor and implementing agencies. Of key importance is a long term role to be played by agencies capable to be concerned with long term assistance (such as various UN agencies) with complementary roles accepted by agencies with shorter time horizons (amongst which the EU). A high-level consultancy may be launched to chart the major contours of this long term development path and the roles to be played by the various actors involved.

Recommendation 10: To FAO Country Office in South Sudan on funding and continuation of the Capacity Building

FAO should advocate with the State and Federal Government of South Sudan to make every effort to build forward on the achievements created by the project jointly with the stakeholders. Support from international donors aimed at the continuation of the most promising SPCR activities should be actively sought. FAO may assist developing a proposal, which should also contain a well planned budget and policies and strategies in order to determine and ensure the government's role and contribution in such future programme. The State Government should subject the ministries dealing with agriculture and livestock to a thorough and professional organisation review and organisation

development plan, and implement the plan accordingly. Institutional and organisational structures are weak at the moment and make it difficult to sustain the positive effects of the SPCR and other project-type interventions

1 Introduction

1. On 9 January 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) after 21 years of civil war which left 2 million people dead, 4-5 million internally displaced people and refugees and considerable physical, economic and institutional damages. An interim period of 6 years was agreed, on a 'one country/two systems' basis, and started with the Interim Constitution (September 2005) signed by the Government of National Unity and Government of Southern Sudan. The referendum of 2011 led to separation of the two countries and the birth of the new country 'Republic of South Sudan'.
2. In this context, the European Commission (EC) commissioned the 'Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP)'. The SPCRPP sought to stabilize peace, enhance food security and improve the rural livelihoods in selected vulnerable states of the Sudan. It was prepared in 2004 and 2005 with full involvement and ownership of Sudanese counterparts and with assistance of FAO. The SPCRPP was focused on two major components, i.e. 'Capacity Building' and 'Support to Rural Livelihoods'. The total commitment was € 80 million.
3. Two SPCRPP sub-programmes were agreed with similar objectives and activities, one for Sudan and one for South Sudan (called Northern and Southern Sudan in the Project Document, 2005). The Final Evaluation was conducted in both countries separately. This evaluation report reflects the findings in South Sudan, while another presents those of a similar evaluation carried in the Sudan, and an addition synthesis report focused on commonalities and differences between the two programmes.
4. The Mission reviewed a large body of literature and had the opportunity to meet with key decision makers, donor agencies and hundreds of beneficiaries and staff of the ministries involved at Federal, State and Field levels. Their names may be found in Annex 4. The Report builds on this information and on the detailed evaluation of the programme conducted in the States. The States Reports in Annexes 6-9 contain detailed information and findings concerning the state-specific evaluations.

1.1 Background of the project

5. Framed under the 'Productive Infrastructures and Rural Livelihoods Rehabilitation' chapter of the Framework of Mutual Obligations (FMO), the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP) was formulated to contribute to long-term reduction of poverty and food insecurity by:
 - Enhancing income generating activities in agriculture, livestock production and off-farm rural activities;
 - Strengthening the capacities of local administrations and non-state actors (NSAs).
6. The SPCRPP is a 4-year programme, that aims at contributing to stabilizing peace, enhancing food security and improving livelihoods in selected vulnerable states in the Sudan and South Sudan through building human, institutional and physical productive capacities. It was divided into two separate sub-programmes: one for the North and one for the South, with both sub-programmes having similar objectives and activities, and each one with its own budget and separate implementation arrangements.

7. The programme is implemented in the States of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Lakes and Western Equatoria under the Capacity Building (CB) component and the Model Project (MP) component. The MP component was additionally implemented in Central Equatoria and Unity States. All project documents as well as all implementers however refer to 5 states of implementation.
8. Each sub-programme of SPCRP has two major components:
 - a. The Capacity Building project to build human, organisational and physical capacity of public and private institutions is implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). It includes three sub-components:
 - Strengthening key institutions, namely local State and Non-State Actors;
 - Pilot development of key agricultural support services;
 - Support to programme implementation capacity.
 - b. Support to Rural Livelihoods through financing and implementing investment projects in the selected States/Counties. That includes:
 - The Aweil Irrigation and Rehabilitation Project (AIRP) in Northern Bahr el Ghazal (NBEG);
 - The Fisheries Production and Marketing Project (FPMP) in Central Equatoria (CES), Unity and Lakes; and
 - The Livestock Production and Marketing Project (LPMP) in NBEG, Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBEG) and Warrap.
9. The CB contract with FAO was signed in August 2007 for €19.07 million (with an additional topping up of €1.5 million in 2008 and €2 million in 2010) for South Sudan and a final duration until December 2012. The MP component was implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ); this contract was signed in March 2008 for an amount of €13.2 million and a period of 48 months and an extension of 6 months. The Micro Projects Programme component, which was originally planned for both the Sudan and South Sudan, was only implemented in the Sudan.

1.2 Purpose and Objectives of Final Evaluation

10. The final evaluation has been conducted in both the Sudan and South Sudan and examined the performance and achievements of the project in the Sudan and South Sudan in relation to the expected outputs, envisaged objectives and results. More specifically, the independent evaluation has:
 1. Determined the relevance of the programme;
 2. Evaluated project efficiency at sub-national, national and regional level;
 3. Evaluated project effectiveness, assessing the degree to which planned outputs and outcomes have been achieved at the time of the evaluation;
 4. Identified any impacts or likely impacts (positive or negative, determined or undetermined) of the project;
 5. Assessed the likelihood of sustainability of the project, i.e. what the enduring results are likely to be after the termination of the project;
 6. Assessed the synergy and connections between the various project components, implementers and geographic locations;

7. Provided lessons learned and recommendations for future normative, operational and organization strategies for food security and rural development related programmes and projects.
11. The evaluation has strived to provide decision makers in the governments, FAO and the EU with sufficient information to make decisions about future related interventions in the area of food security and rural development in the Sudan and South Sudan.

1.3 *Evaluation methodology*

12. The evaluation started with a desk review of key documents developed by FAO, EU and implementation partners and stakeholders as well as background documents on the developmental situation in Sudan and South Sudan to develop an overview of the project and its context, including major performance, achievements and constraints.
13. The Team Leader participated in an initial internal 1-day consultation in Rome at FAO Headquarters and a 1-day consultation in Addis Ababa to discuss the ToR for the evaluation with OED evaluation service staff and to interview the key technical and operational units within FAO responsible for supporting the delivery of the SPCR project. Based upon these interviews and desk review findings, an evaluation matrix and data gathering tools were developed. An Inception Report, outlining the Evaluation approach and methods, was submitted on 30 September 2012. An Inception Report, outlining the Evaluation approach and methods, was submitted on 30 September 2012.
14. Semi-structured questionnaires were developed, based on the evaluation matrix. These were administered in key informant interviews and focus group discussions held with a range of stakeholders to obtain feedback on the programme activities, results and outcomes. Tracer studies were used for target groups that have been addressed by the intervention at an earlier point in time. Questions were developed relevant to the groups of stakeholders as per the evaluation matrix in Annex 6.
15. The Evaluation visit of South Sudan consisted of a country visit by the entire Team from 28 October to 13 November. Stakeholder interviews at national level as well as field visits to the target states were carried out during the country visit. The team was split up in 3 teams of 2 in order to perform state visits. Each team came up with a State Report (submitted separately as Annex 9) containing also an Evaluation Questions and Topics Matrix. The results of these reports contributed in an important manner to the body of the report.
16. A debriefing and presentation was held for the Project Steering Committee (PSC) before leaving the country on 12 November 2012, where a summary of the findings was presented. A brief consolidation report/synthesis, highlighting the main findings, conclusions and recommendations, was presented to the PSC in the form of a PowerPoint Presentation. Comments, additions and suggestions from stakeholders were collected and incorporated into the report.

1.4 *Report structure*

17. The report will start with a brief description of the developmental context in South Sudan and some of the most important interventions of other development actors in the target area. Subsequently relevance, coherence, consistence, set-up and adequacy will be elaborated based on the findings.

18. The report will then move on to implementation related issues like programme management, monitoring and evaluation, technical backstopping and constraints to implementation. The outputs and results will be reflected, followed by the sustainability of SPCR, a subject that has been deemed of high importance by the Evaluation Team. Impact and crosscutting issues like gender and nutrition will be described.
19. Subsequently, synergy and connections at various levels will be discussed, between implementing organisations, but also between result areas and other programmes and projects. The report will then provide lessons learned, good practices and conclusions and end with recommendations, targeted to the relevant stakeholders on specific subjects.

2 Context of the Programme

2.1 *Developmental context*

20. A hundred years of slave raiding, 25 years of war, 5 years of intense political positioning internally within South Sudan and externally vis-à-vis the Sudan and a long history of inter-tribal and inter-clan fighting left the Republic of South Sudan an empty place. Few institutions and organisations were built and survived, public administration is in its infancy, basic social services and human and budgetary resources are at a record low from a global perspective as the statistics indicate. Building a nation, public administration and human and institutional capacities in these conditions is of an order of challenge rarely encountered in the world.
21. Social and health indicators in South Sudan are among the lowest in the world. Against this perspective, the work undertaken under the auspices of the SPCR must be considered to have contributed positively, especially in view of the severe constraints and difficulties faced.
22. Since South Sudan is a very young nation, national strategic plans or policies were not yet in place. At the beginning of the project, the country was still one with the Sudan and Sudanese policies and strategies were still relevant but after the secession, the country faced the huge challenge of developing a whole new set of policies and strategies.
23. The austerity measures, which the government had to take after the loss of oil revenues, hamper each and every effort to create long lasting impact and sustainability. Even though it has been possible to increase knowledge and capacity of government at State and Federal levels, there is no budget to sustain and use this.
24. The poor condition of infrastructure and markets complicates planning, delays implementation and hampers the quality of the intervention. It is difficult if not impossible to reach target areas, to buy goods and equipments and to communicate in a regular manner. Providing quality inputs on time has become an almost impossible task.
25. Many organisations and donors are active in South Sudan, but most of the interventions in South Sudan are emergency related. The World Bank has implemented an agricultural development programme (crop and livestock) east of the River Nile in the States which are not covered by SPCR. The World Bank programme relied largely on NGOs, e.g. Norwegian People's Aid, for the implementation of the programme. UNDP is involved in a wide array of development activities including capacity strengthening through 'gap filling' and capacity development.
26. There is limited coordination between donors, UN agencies and NGOs. Even though clusters like the food security cluster exist and a donor coordination mechanism with thematic groups is operational, the approach is insufficiently structured and success has been limited. Most development actors are focused on their own programmes and projects and have little knowledge about interventions implemented by other development partners. There is no consensus about the approach, there has been no gap or need analysis to better target ongoing interventions and plan new ones, there is limited cooperation.

3 Concept and relevance

3.1 *Relevance of the programme and its activities*

27. The design of the SPCR was relevant. It sought to address some critical challenges faced by South Sudan. All stakeholders agreed that the project helped build a foundation and create a potential.
28. The design did not take into consideration the conditions specific for South Sudan as described in section 2.1. The design provided a blanket approach to the Sudan and South Sudan, at that time still being the northern and southern territories of the single country 'Sudan'. The programme was tailored to Sudan more than to South Sudan. The design did not distinguish between the existing public administration structure in the Sudan and the virtual absence of such structure and capacity in South Sudan. What was 'strengthening the public bodies' in the Sudan, should have been 'building public bodies' in South Sudan. The notion of 'recovery' in SPCR was misleading and little reflected these different realities.
29. In general, SPCR has a good fit with the EU strategy and policy focus on peace and food security. The intervention addressed the general needs and food insecurity levels in South Sudan as well as the low levels of institutional and human resources capacity. The design implicitly and explicitly co-opts communities, state and local public bodies and NSAs and is therefore geared to leverage project resources and create 'good value for money'. Recovery of productive capacity, the key ambition of the SPCR, has not been achieved to the expected extent, largely because ministries lack staff presence at grassroots level.
30. No specific Project Document, Terms of Reference and Inception Reports were prepared for the states. There is therefore no state-specific design or framework for SPCR. The CB component is designed with a focus on the entire country and the MP component focuses on singular projects. The project operates through Annual Work Plans to be approved at the central level. The state-specific work plans however were very output focused, without preventing oversight of achievements against indicators.
31. The design was implicitly geared to crop agriculture more than livestock even though in the target states, livelihood systems are dominated by livestock, with agriculture and fisheries being supplementary.
32. The design was output focused instead of providing additional orientation towards results, purposes and impact. Design limitations have been brought up by many stakeholders as underlying the problems faced today. Too many activities and outputs are part of the intervention and focus is lacking, geographically as well as action-wise. The duration of the project has been too short, especially in view of the difficult situation with regard to security and availability of infrastructure and inputs. Effective delivery of institutional and organizational capacity was not planned nor achieved.
33. Contributions to peace-building, Government's financial and technical contribution and sustainability analysis have been insufficiently addressed in the design. An exit strategy study has been conducted in 2011 as recommended in the MTE but the exit strategy was weak and rather general in nature. Its development came too late and should have been part and parcel of the project from day one.
34. In addition to the separation of the CB and MP components, the design does not include a mandatory coordination mechanism between the two components and implementing organisations. Furthermore, the four-year time frame and high ambition level of SPCR

were unrealistic and bound to disappoint in terms of results and achievable ‘sustainability’.

35. The Evaluation Team concludes that the MTE did not identify the fundamental issue of the design not totally acknowledging the local context and problems, at a time when it may have been possible to reorient the next two years of the work of SPCR to better fall in line with the South Sudan conditions, while retaining the overall goal and purposes of the SPCR.

3.1.1 Target groups

36. In all States, a number of Counties were targeted and others were left out. According to the stakeholders, it would have been better to target fewer communities in all counties, to prevent disappointment from other counties and increase the chance of up-scaling.
37. NSAs as target groups were involved to some extent in the programme in community mobilization and training for Farmer Field Schools (FFSs); they received training from SPCR. In the training as Master Trainers, they were trained together with the State Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (SMAF) extensionists and thus built up a relationship with them. In NBEG, their performance was found good.
38. The project rightly targeted the ministries dealing with agriculture, forestry, animal resources and fisheries for institutional, organisational and human resource capacity building. These ministries are the backbone of the public administration dealing with the states’ agricultural, animal production capacity and hence food security and livelihood, indispensable from the point of view of sustainability.
39. The coverage of the programme with regard to Bomas (villages) and locations was dispersed. Counties were far apart and their population consisted of only a minor part of the States’ population. This will have a dampening effect on future up-scaling and may give rise to tensions among the large part of the population that did not benefit.
40. Selection criteria and procedure for FFS beneficiaries were not always clear or documented. It was reported that “the vulnerables” were selected, but it could not be explained what made someone vulnerable or what were the criteria to select from within the large group of vulnerable people. Members of the fishing-related FFS were usually professional fishermen and not the poorest, which is not necessarily negative in view of their entrepreneurial spirit and networks. Women in the crop production-related FFS groups were poor, often heads of households and frequently malnourished.

3.2 Coherence and consistency between objectives, outcomes and outputs

41. At the time of the MTE, there were several logframes around. Following the MTE recommendations, FAO developed two separate logframes, one for Sudan and one for South Sudan. These logframes still focused on the CB component and did not contain MP related activities or results, obstructing the creation of synergy between the two project components.
42. The absence of a commensurate state-specific SPCR Plan forced the evaluation to investigate activities, achievements and outputs in their own right at State level. Annual Work Plans were formulated and implemented, approved by the central management office of FAO, and at state-level one can only assume that these are in line with the SPCR overall Project Document. GIZ in South Sudan used their own plans and budgets for each Model Project.

43. The evaluation was supposed to focus on implementation after MTE; however, design limitations affected implementation throughout the lifetime of the project and could therefore not be neglected. The Project Document is focused on activities and outputs, and it is not results-oriented as a matter of principle. Annex 1 and Sub-annexes 1.1 and 1.2 to the FMO bear witness. Consequently,, the implementation was activity-oriented, pursuing the completion of the list of outputs reflected in the Project Document.
44. Even though SPCRP was supposed to “enhance income generating activities in agriculture, livestock production and off-farm rural activities that benefit poor rural people”, due to the fragmented nature of the project and insufficient coherence, an increase of income generation did not happen. The second objective, “strengthening the capacity of local authorities and non-state actors to maintain and further develop (the income generating activities)” was equally difficult as a result of weak coherence and only achieved in so far as building staff capacity in agriculture, livestock and fisheries related activities, and mainly limited to local authorities. The translation into income generation activities developed for the population at grassroots level however was lacking.
45. Programme management between FAO and GIZ was not synergetic; the offices were in different places. Overall there was an inconsistency in timing, also as a result of limited project duration and the fact that the duration of the CB and MP component were different.
46. The four year time-frame is considered unrealistic to deliver a programme of this nature; a duration of 8-10 years was considered necessary. It is however unlikely that future programmes will have a longer duration when taking into account the (maximally) 5 year strategic planning cycles of EU and the government.

4 Implementation

4.1 Efficiency of financial resource use

4.1.1 Programme budget and expenditure

47. The budget for the CB component of the SPCRP is divided between Programme Coordination Units (principally technical assistance); Physical Capacity Building (principally building infrastructure and providing furniture and equipment); Human Capacity Building (principally training) of government staff; and Development of Rural Services (FFS, CAHWs and Market Access). The budget allocation for each of these principal budget lines is indicated in Table 1 below with an indication of the accumulated expenditure against budget as of June 2012. The total expenditure was already at 88.93%. Most of the expenditures were around or above 80% at the end of June 2012. CAHW and FFS related expenditure was slightly lower at 65.78 and 70.06% respectively. A number of activities were still ongoing at the time of the Evaluation Team's visit. It is therefore highly likely that the singular budget lines will increase until end December 2012.

Table 1: 2007-2012 Programme Expenditure against Budget for SPCRP - CB Component in Euro as per end of June 2012

CB Component	Total budget	Spent up to June 2012	Expenditure (%)
SPCRP-South PCU	7,047,792	6,507,237	92.33%
Physical CB	6,106,978	6,007,748	98.38%
Human CB	4,511,708	3,590,076	79.57%
Development of Rural Services	3,890,501	3,081,453	79.20%
FFS	1,659,338	1,162,556	70.06%
CAHW	494,629	323,367	65.78%
Market access	306,200	290,177	94.77%
Support Costs	1,015,187	887,093	87.38%
Total	22,572,165	20,073,607	88.93%

48. Financial expenditure for the Model Projects was reported per Model Project against respective budgets. Even though the final progress report had already been submitted, it was not approved and cleared by EU and there was no financial reporting available to the Evaluation Team. The tables underneath reflect therefore the expenditure until December 2011. In the FPMP, total expenditure was 50.65%, in the LPMP 57.62% and in the AIRP it was 82.52%. In the AIRP, the expenditure percentage was probably high since the rice mill, by far the most expensive piece of equipment in that Model Project, had already been procured. In the other projects, a number of activities still had to be rounded up and it is well possible that the expenditure level per end of the project will be considerably higher.

Table 2A: March 2008 - December 2011 Programme Expenditure against Budget for SPCRP MP - Fisheries Production and Marketing Project (FPMP)

Expenses	Total budget	Expenditure	Expenses %
Human Resources	1,101,772	984,774.72	89.38
Travel	78,233	73,941.04	94.51
Equipment and supplies	426,667	268,520.76	62.93
Local office	296,100	151,557.38	51.18
Services cost	1,510,917	377,625.78	24.9
Other costs	219,033	37,003.61	16.89

Subtotal direct eligible costs	3,632,722	1,893,423.29	52.12
Contingency reserve	105,596	0.00	0
Total direct eligible costs	3,738,318	1,893,423.29	50.65
Administrative costs	261,682	132,539.63	50.65
Total eligible costs	4,000,000	2,025,962.92	50.65

Table 2B: March 2008- December 2011 Programme Expenditure against Budget for SPCRP MP - Livestock Production and Marketing Project (LPMP)

Expenses	Total budget	Expenditure	Expenses %
Human Resources	1,416,777	1,074,220.41	75.82
Travel	91,033	86,610.63	95.14
Equipment and supplies	1,700,667	636,264.73	37.41
Local office	224,100	157,279.25	70.18
Services cost	269,917	256,346.06	94.97
Other costs	177,033	54,798.26	30.95
Subtotal direct eligible costs	3,879,527	2,265,519.34	58.40
Contingency reserve	45,707	0.00	0.00
Total direct eligible costs	3,925,234	2,265,519.34	57.72
Administrative costs	274,766	158,586.35	57.72
Net total eligible costs	4,200,000	2,420,197.63	57.62

Table 2C: March 2008- December 2011 Programme Expenditure against Budget for SPCRP MP - Aweil Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (AIRP)

Expenses	Total budget	Expenditure	Expenses %
Human Resources	1, 421,007	793,452.46	55.84
Travel	91,033.4	88,385.52	97.09
Equipment and supplies	2,390,154	2,547,994.20	106.60
Local office	252,900	202,074.37	79.90
Services cost	285,917	197,039.17	68.91
Other costs	174,033	26,971.61	15.49
Subtotal direct eligible costs	4,615,044	3,855,917.33	83.55
Provision for contingency reserve	57,841	0.00	0.00
Total direct eligible costs	4,672,885	3,855,917.33	82.52
Administrative costs	3 27,103	269,914.21	82.52
Total eligible costs	5,000,000	4,125,831.55	82.52

4.1.2 Implementation of activities

49. In general, the Programme has been implemented efficiently and effectively and value for money was found good, especially when the difficult circumstances are taken into account. Still, structural capacity was not built, and outputs were produced often with limited impact and little perspective for sustainability.

50. Various backlogs were caused by protocols and bureaucratic procedures within FAO, GIZ and EU and government procedures. Activities were implemented through subcontractors and it was difficult to ensure that the time plan was even remotely followed. Especially GIZ was struggling to ensure implementation of the planned activities towards the end of the project's duration.
51. The design implicitly and explicitly co-opts communities, state and local public bodies (and to a lesser extent NSAs) and is therefore geared to leverage project resources and create 'good value for money'. Insufficient allowance was made for disturbances and conflicts with regard to flexibility and additional budget, even though these were to be expected even at the moment of design.
52. Most of the activities were implemented as planned, but not always to the extent or quality expected. Trainings were not conducted as per comprehensive training planning, the number of people targeted per training was lower than planned, and not always the right people were trained for the right job. The number of FFS was almost achieved as planned (378 out of 400) but the quality guidelines were not always observed and only a limited percentage of the originally initialized FFSs are still active.

4.2 Programme management and coordination

53. FAO support was offered from the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) in Juba and Technical Support Units (TSUs) in the 5 States. The TSUs are housed at the SMAF. The MPs were coordinated from Juba and from 3 Project Implementation Units (PIUs) in the States. The locations of PIUs and TSUs were not always close, even though in Aweil, the PIU coordinator resided on the FAO compound together with SPCR staff, which benefitted cooperation at a human but not necessarily technical level. The TSU worked well together with the Ministries and departments concerned and established coordination procedures early in the project. . GIZ implemented its MPs through 3 PIUs and support from the capital.
54. The TSUs have done excellent work, exceeding what could reasonably have been expected from them. TSU staff members were very knowledgeable and committed, notwithstanding the difficult circumstances they had to work in often far from home and their struggle with logistics and bureaucracy, and they had good relationships with the government and partner NGOs.
55. The SPCR Programme Steering Committee (PSC) is the oversight mechanism, envisaged to meet regularly and provide strategic oversight as well as operational guidance and arbitration where and when deemed desirable. A national PSC comprised of members from both Sudan and South Sudan was not initialized as foreseen in the original plan. The PSC for South Sudan included members from various State Ministries of Agriculture, Animal Resources, FAO, GIZ and the European Union. The PSC was tasked to provide technical support and assistance to local institutions involved in implementation; to monitor and review the progress and to oversee and approve procurement and funds disbursement under the CB component. The PSC may have duly executed this task, as is reflected in the minutes of the PSC meetings conducted, but it did not succeed in systematically bridging the separation of the two components; the PSC meetings concerned operational rather than strategic matters and oversight.
56. At Federal level, the Technical Committee (TC) met every 3 months. Members were DGs, Undersecretaries and SPCR staff. Technical issues and problems were discussed

and reports and advice were provided to the PSC. At State level, Project Advisory Boards (PABs) were operational; State ministry staff and project staff were members. They met every 3 months on programmatic issues. Their advice would be taken into consideration by the TCs and subsequently by the PSC. As for problems that had emerged, the time lapse resulting from this mechanism made it difficult for the PSC to react in an adequate manner.

57. The Project Task Force (PTF) from FAO has not played any role in the post-MTE period. As far as the Team could find, there had been no (virtual) meetings and there were no specific issues addressed. A number of the listed members were not even aware of their membership and had never participated in any PTF related communication. Technical backstopping was nonetheless regularly offered by FAO staff from Addis Ababa and Rome and by independent subject matter specialists.
58. In 2011 and 2012, technical backstopping missions were conducted on the subject of National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Policy (NALEP) (2), land tenure, conservation agriculture, FFS (2), Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) (2), Agro-Business Groups (ABGs) (2), Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), exit strategy and general programme support (2). The visits were thus evenly balanced over the areas of interest.
59. No communication strategy or visibility strategy was available to guide the project implementation. The use of audio-visual materials under the CB component was mostly ad-hoc, not deliberately or strategically intended to support the project. The MP component had produced more visibility materials, often of reasonable quality.

4.3 *Monitoring and evaluation*

60. The M&E system was of limited quality and no detailed framework was available. The M&E activities were conducted on parallel trails by FAO and GIZ. No data were shared and no collective reporting took place. No efforts took place to reflect the impact of SPCRP as a whole. The stakeholders at field level were not clearly involved in collection or analysis of data. M&E training was conducted for government staff but the acquired knowledge was not used to the full extent in the project's monitoring.
61. Baseline surveys had not been conducted in a sufficiently systematic manner and came late, and no impact has been measured. Under the MP component, 3 extensive baseline surveys had been conducted, one for each Model Project. Since the MP started much later than the CB component, this baseline was of little use to the entire project. M&E in general was performed in a quantitative way and had not led to adaptations in implementation.
62. The M&E training had not been entirely linked to the existing capacity. The capacity at the start of SPCRP was extremely low and bridging the gap to the planned achievement of training was virtually impossible.
63. Monitoring and evaluation done by government, even though improved under SPCRP, is still of limited quality. Data are often collected on paper only and activities are rarely adapted based on findings. The government was provided with computers and computer training but since they had to learn operating computers from a very low level, they did not really get into the habit of using them for more complex tasks. Still, overall understanding of conducting M&E has improved which may lead to better programming in future.

64. A technical backstopping mission was conducted to review M&E. Simple data collection tools were developed like the beneficiary assessment tool and the end-of-project training questionnaire to facilitate the understanding and use of monitoring. Two tools were developed for the ministry to monitor extension and agricultural production. 38 staff members were trained on results based monitoring. There is no evidence that monitoring data were analysed/evaluated and used as a tool of management.
65. The M&E related training topics were not always suitable for the existing capacity. Training government staff on SPSS for instance proved difficult for starters in the field of computers and statistics. Only 2 people were selected to be trained on SPSS and found the training time far too short to even be able to use it; training their colleagues on the subject was not found realistic. Furthermore, since many people do not have access to a computer and their colleagues are not educated on SPSS, it is almost impossible to use this program as a vehicle of monitoring or research. This problem is pertinent to much of the training under the project which generally over-estimated the absorptive capacity of the participants and most staff training was of short duration – most of it typically less than 10 days for subjects and skill/knowledge levels that participants were not particularly familiar with.

4.4 *Government's participation*

66. Ministries of Agriculture and Animal Resources were united immediately after South Sudan's independence. They have been split at Federal level at an early stage and at State level in 2010 into State Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (SMAF) and State Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries (SMARF). At county level, sometimes the ministries are split and sometimes united. In WES, the agriculture and the animal resources departments are both part of the State Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Environment (SMACE). The deep division within the SMACE between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Animal Resources related units and their staff have a detrimental effect on the functioning of the SMACE.
67. The programme had a bias in favour of crop agriculture and related organisational units. In its CB activities, the project often did not sufficiently take into due account the importance of livestock and the Department of Animal Resources for the economy and the livelihood systems at present and for future development. In the FFS, the emphasis was more on crop production when compared to livestock. The distribution of assets and training resources at state level between the two ministries has been found to be unbalanced (typically 80% of training was targeted to the agricultural ministries). It should also be noted, however, that SMARF has less staff members at county level than SMAF. The distribution of assets was found unbalanced in favour of the SMAF as well. In the handover procedure, an effort should be made to rectify this. The handover of assets is guided by a handover committee at federal level constituted of MAF, MARF and SPCRP project staff. Looking at the distribution of assets during the implementation, SMARF fears it will end up almost empty handed.
68. Relationships and communication between Federal and State level are poor and constrained. Policy inconsistencies and mutual lack of information sharing between Federal and State levels add to that concern. Government staff at Federal level reports that they are usually left out and do not get any information, whilst government staff at State level argue that they get too little support and they find it difficult to defend their

interests amidst all other pressing priorities at Federal level. The communication between State level and County level is also sub-optimal.

69. Even though the State Ministries were quite happy with their degree of involvement, the Federal Ministries feel that their involvement in the SPCR programme has been too little and that they have not been provided with sufficient information. They reported that they missed a coordination unit at national level and had only been able to participate in the PSC and Technical Committees. The meeting frequency of these bodies is however limited. The Federal Ministries resent this, since they feel responsible for setting and following the compliance of national standards. As a result, they reported to feel no ownership and were not very much inclined to free up budget for SPCR initiated activities.
70. A considerable gap in knowledge and capacity was found between people at the higher level in Juba and those responsible for implementation located at State level. Government staff members at higher level were well educated and had a long institutional memory, whereas staff members at lower levels were often insufficiently educated and experienced. Vacancies within the Ministries are sometimes filled following war related merits, which may lead to a knowledge and qualification gap with regard to technical issues.
71. State Ministries develop plans for funding from Federal level. Federal level government subsequently provides grants for specific inputs and activities, provided they would fit in with the national policy and funds are available. For a certain activity to be continued after the project's phasing out therefore, the State Ministry must specifically ask for funding.
72. As a result of the austerity measures after independence of South Sudan, the government budget has been decreased considerably, some reported by up to 98%. As a result, plans were made and government seemed committed to continue activities started under SPCR, but future funding was highly insecure. Some government staff appeared hopeful that the oil revenue related problems would be solved within 6 months. If this is the case, the government may survive this period with short term external support; if not, the future looks bleak.
73. The government has developed the NALEP and a related policy implementation framework with the help of SPCR-CB which may help the Federal and State ministries in planning for extension related activities, including those initiated by SPCR. Use of FFS as a suitable approach has been incorporated in this policy framework.

4.5 Constraints to implementation

74. Delays at various levels are seen by all stakeholders as hampering the progress. Delays were caused by various reasons; the transport problems and difficulties to get access to inputs and construction materials certainly contributed. Even though these problems could have been partly foreseen, expected and planned for, they also occurred more often and the situation, which was supposed to improve over time, in fact often worsened.
75. Even though most of the delay took place at the beginning of the programme, the effects still weighed on today's outcome. Since the activities in all areas had started much later than foreseen, it was difficult to round them up in time and even more difficult to ensure and measure any impact at various levels.

76. The infrastructure is very poor. Even in the dry season, it is very difficult to travel and the average speed is often 30 km/h or less. During the rainy season, travelling by car to many destinations is virtually impossible and even planes cannot land for lack of modern landing strips, leading to cancelations of up to two weeks.
77. Security is a remaining concern. From the time of design the situation was expected to improve as the war is officially over, but fights and conflicts are still intermittently ongoing. The Mile 14 zone (Safe Demilitarised Border Zone) at the border with The Sudan is a constant source of problems and tensions. In Western Equatoria, the LRA incursions between 2008 and 2011 had highly significant impacts on the lives of the people and the project implementation.
78. Some goods are still not produced and hard to come by. Fuel, drugs and construction materials, which are currently mostly imported, are not always available and if they are, their quality is inconsistent. Prices may rise very quickly, which makes financial planning very complex. At State level, in most cases there is no electricity and one has to work with a generator, which is difficult as access to fuel is not consistent. Lack of water has been frequently reported as a serious constraint as well. Changing government rules, permits and tax regulations have led to a frequent need to change documentation and procedures in the program, leading to loss of time, money and other resources. Within the implementing organisations, there was staff turnover, but it did not hamper implementation. FAO had ensured the presence of local staff with contracts for the entire length of the project duration.

5 Results and contribution to objectives

79. Overall, SPCRP has achieved its results to a certain extent and has contributed to the objectives, even though to a more modest extent than expected. Under the CB component, human capacity building and physical capacity building contributed directly to government staff members being able to do their work in a better and more qualitative way; indirectly it contributed to beneficiaries improving their livelihoods through better services. Institutional capacity building was found less sturdy. Regarding rural extension services, the CARDA approach was found successful and FFS, even though teething problems were faced, was observed to be very promising. The ABG approach was too limited in size and too late in time to contribute to the results.
80. The MP provided the stakeholders and beneficiaries mainly with input and technical assistance. As a result of (seemingly) insufficient technical knowledge and tensions in relationships with government, the implementation of activities was much poorer than planned in a number of ways and thus, outputs and outcomes could not be achieved as was expected. The LPMP was most successful in this regard by leaving behind finalized and working auction kraals and slaughterhouses; the AIRP achieved far less than planned and hardly any results were seen from the FPMP. The MP left behind unfinished business with regard to non-working biogas installations and a rice mill. These problems need to be addressed at short notice to prevent lack of outcome turning into a negative outcome.

5.1 Outputs and outcomes under the Capacity Building Component

5.1.1 Human capacity building

81. The improvement of human capacity building was good but would have been greater if training had been part of a robust organisational development process starting with a mandate analysis followed by functional analysis, structure analysis and commensurate actions to strengthen the organisational and institutional dimensions of the ministries. In that case, training would have been organically embedded rather than ad hoc raising of skills and knowledge as was done now.
82. Under SPCRP, training was carried out on various subjects related to better practices in farming and livestock as well as project management and related issues. The levels of skills in public bodies, NSAs, families and the private sector were low at the time the project was conceived. The project's strong emphasis on training as a major means of human development was and is therefore fully relevant.
83. No comprehensive training needs assessments have been undertaken, apart from the one done at the beginning of the project. The training needs assessments that have been conducted were mostly agreements between SPCRP and the ministries identifying the annual training contingent based on the perceived needs by the ministries.
84. Suitable trainees were hard to identify for lack of general education qualifications; at times it proved even impossible to identify sufficient qualified people to train. The design had probably been too ambitious in its plans. As a result, in many of the cases, fewer trainees were selected for training than planned. For longer term training, selection committees were put in place in 2010, to ensure the right candidates were selected. Whilst this was definitely a good practice, it also led to selection of fewer or sometimes even no candidates, reflecting a trade-off between loss of opportunities and loss of resources. The capacity of extension workers was found exceptionally low, and extension departments

were highly understaffed, which was difficult in view of the pivotal role of extensionists as Master Trainers and supervisors of FFS.

85. In general, training courses were conducted for many people on numerous subjects, but a training strategy was lacking. There were various sorts of training with different durations; selection of trainees was done by a committee of FAO, SMAF and/or SMARF. Still, the people that were selected were not always the most appropriate ones, or they were not given the opportunity within their ministry to use their newly acquired skills. The considerable staff rotation aggravated the situation. Those government staff members on the other hand, who were and remained involved in FFS related work, were often able to use the acquired capacities.
86. The MP component was incorporated into the design to serve as an exercise ground for the government to use and improve the skills they had acquired under the CB component. The fact that the MP implementation was not up to standards hampered the trained government staff members from performing this to the full extent.
87. Various forms of training were carried out, inside and outside South Sudan, of short term, medium term and long term duration. The short term training was found useful but too short, and was even sometimes cut shorter than planned. Since the people have very low education, the knowledge gap was often too large to be covered in such a short period. Many government employees shared that they were still not capable to implement what they had learned and that they needed longer-term or refreshment training. The quality and content of the training was found good by most trainees.
88. The long-term training was usually imparted abroad. Even though this was probably expensive, these trainings usually concerned university level education for individuals, which are not found in South Sudan. Trainings in-country were imparted on technical subjects related to agricultural and livestock related practices and techniques as well as on programme management related issues. Even though generally the quality of training was found adequate, the training in human resource and administration was found very poor. The duration was reported as extremely short by stakeholders from various state ministries and lack of functioning password and internet made it impossible to use the acquired knowledge and skills.
89. Both SMAF and SMARF staff shared that trainings had been postponed from the beginning, resulting in an important number of trainings now not taking place due to time constraints. They appreciated the fact that they had been involved in the planning and were aware of this problem but were also disappointed about this shortcoming. From the progress reports, it became clear that the number of trained people from the trainings which were carried out, appeared lower than expected since there was not enough trainable staff, a problem which was faced by both CB and MP.

5.1.2 Institutional capacity building

90. The current organizational structure of public institutions in the states (and at national level) has a problem of 'top heavy' orientation, whereby the majority of staff in the organizations are either director general, directors, senior inspectors or inspectors and lacking sufficient numbers of capable staff to do the actual work at field level. This would have warranted activities to generate a robust institutional and organizational structure, which were however not incorporated in the programme. The feasibility of establishing strategic planning, M&E, HRD and effective management practices was taken for granted. Mandate and functional analysis of key public agencies, review of organizational structure and procedures in light of results of the previous step, review of departmental

and other units' responsibilities and operational Terms of Reference and review of staffing requirements were not planned and therefore not conducted. The same observation was made regarding review and strengthening of planning processes and planning tools and techniques.

91. In most cases, SPCRP did not succeed in supporting the establishment of units under the Planning Department, like an M&E, Planning and/or Training Unit. Efforts were made but frequent staff turnover hampered the success. Thus, the opportunity for the ministries and the SPCRP to provide sense of direction, generate attention and emphasize as well as channel funds and human resources towards these subjects could not be created.
92. Organisational reviews generally have not taken place, threatening the cohesion and collective strength of the ministries even more so in the light of separation and re-unification of State Ministries. And when they did take place, like in the case of the Aweil Rice Scheme, they were not implemented. Organogrammes are mostly non-existent, or where they exist, they have little anchor in the functions to be performed to deliver on mandate and strategy. Job descriptions are not always available or suitable and are not linked to the organisational structure. The absence of performance appraisals also limits the possibility to assess to what extent trainings have been used in the daily work. .
93. Institutional memory rests with the senior government staff at Federal and State levels and has not been documented. This is a very risky situation, since most of them are close to retirement and will take their knowledge when they leave. There is also the risk that the young staff members, recruited to replace them, will only stay until they identify a better paid job, which means transmitted knowledge may get lost as well.
94. The government has been guided by SPCRP in developing and implementing strategic plans and work plans, including the sharing of training knowledge. Knowledge and capacity on M&E and planning has been enhanced to a certain extent.

5.1.3 Physical capacity building

95. Physical capacity building was a highly appreciated and very much needed sub-component. Even though some disagreement took place at government level over the ownership of assets, all were put to good use and still appeared in good condition. There is still a big need related to markets, but too many priorities would have made it difficult for the project to also cover that issue.
96. At the start of SPCRP, the ministries did not have good quality offices or even sufficient sitting space. Under SPCRP, government was provided with 19 buildings (1 building of 10 rooms in each of the 5 States, 1 building of 4 rooms in each of the 14 counties the CB component was implemented), as well as furniture, equipment and transport means. The buildings were built by UNOPS and were much more expensive than expected, but appeared of good quality and are still in acceptable condition. Unfortunately the buildings do not have water harvesting techniques installed, and as a result rainwater is wasted in a situation where water is sometimes hard to come by. Solar panels were only used for the fridges for CAHWs, not as an integral part of the buildings.
97. In WBEG, the county office was built at a 1 hour driving distance from the State capital, resulting in government staff abandoning it and even to it being burned down recently.
98. Even though there are large problems of distribution of assets between SMAF and SMARF, the FAO progress report of the first half of 2012 reports that 100% of monitoring the use and utilization of assets has been achieved. The programme thus implicitly neglects the existing lack of balance in asset distribution.

99. Due to the poor condition of roads the cars suffer a lot and more maintenance and repair was and will be necessary than expected at the time of design. Even though government has been providing fuel for cars and generators in the past few months, repair and maintenance are a problem.
100. Computers were provided by SPCRP and were found on the desks, but few staff seemed fully able to operate them. Internet was no longer connected. No IT specialist had been trained, and government staff reported that therefore in case of the slightest problem they had to abolish working on the computer, as they could not afford to hire a specialist.
101. In NBEG, WBEG and Warrap, the food processing plants built under the CB component are not ready yet, but FAO has committed to ensuring that the buildings will be ready before the end of the project and the equipment in place.

5.1.4 *FFS*

102. Even though a number of observations on the FFS sub-component are made underneath, the approach was found promising. Because of the fact that the FFS was seen as a pilot approach and teething problems were faced, the current outcome was less than expected. Still, government staff became better able and more willing to provide quality extension services in a facilitative manner. Farmers and fishermen acquired knowledge of and experience in best practices and were empowered by the FFS process. In circumstances as faced currently in South Sudan, FFS is an acceptable approach, provided government finds funding and guidelines are adhered to.
103. The SPCRP was selected as a vehicle to pilot the FFS approach in South Sudan and it was found an appropriate selection within the scope of the design. 378 FFS have been established and 258 are still active. As a result of the fact that the approach is new and the capacity of government, and particularly extension services, is very low, it is unlikely that FFS will move beyond the pilot stage yet. Upscaling or even continuation does not appear probable. 20-25% of the established FFS groups are expected to be able to proceed in the long run.
104. 100 FFS were only started in 2012. These FFS could be assisted for at most one season before SPCRP's phasing out. Sustainability and impact are questionable though, since follow up and support by the project would be needed for two years, and measuring of this impact will be impossible. The 'only one growing season' approach adopted by the project is out of tune with international best practice which stipulates the need for support for at least 2 growing seasons. This once again exemplifies the output orientation of the project – close to the 400 FFS target were established, but impact and sustainability were not seriously considered. Reducing the number of FFSs and providing longer support might have contributed to improving sustainability.
105. Even though the government of South Sudan appeared committed to try to further adopt the FFS approach, the concept and approach still need to be further adapted to local conditions and requirements by taking into due account the constraints faced by farmers related to inputs and marketing. Without providing appropriate solutions in these areas, farmers will soon lose ability and interest to continue boosting production and the FFS approach will be doomed to fade out.
106. SPCRP has not systematically assessed or determined the benefits the FFS and its members obtained from applying improved planting material and recommended practices. Before any future expansion of the FFS approach, the benefits and e.g. gross margins from introducing new planting materials and agronomic practices have to be assessed and as much as possible determined.

107. Each FFS was budgeted to receive an input of \$1,000. In principle, 20% of this amount was meant for start up costs and input, 20% for facilitation and 60% for the post-FFS grant. Rules were “flexibly” implemented: some groups received more than \$600 grant, if their proposal was found good, whereas others received nothing. There were no clear criteria; most grants were provided in-kind, but some were also in cash. A clear grant policy, based on FAOs existing normative products, was not available to implementers and beneficiaries. The grants requests were not honoured partly due to budget, partly due to lack of maturity of many FFSs which, in turn, was due to limited support as mentioned above and below.
108. The FFS approach revealed to have various caveats due to design and implementation issues. There was only one season per FFS, which diminished the chance of creating a long term change. Most stakeholders agreed that to be truly able to progress, two seasons would have been necessary. Furthermore, there was only one facilitator per FFS instead of two, as per the guidelines. The facilitators would often come to the FFS for sessions of 4-5 consecutive days, and after that pay visits at certain intervals. Extension messages, most of the training materials and IEC materials produced are geared towards literate farmers in writing/text form with few/no pictures and drawings. This is of little practical value to the mostly illiterate members of the FFS.
109. The current FFS implementation strategy is highly production and protection oriented, does not yet address costs related and financial and marketing aspects and is at best only lightly geared towards production and marketing of (surplus) produce. Still, in view of above mentioned limitations, it is unrealistic to yet expect otherwise.
110. 32 FFS developed into ABGs. The FFS in NBEG guided by the NSAs performed best in that regard. These groups were working on groundnut production and had joined the groundnut cooperative. The ABGs were mostly supported by the project and local NGOs and the role of government was less explicit.
111. SPCRP was building a processing plant for the ABGs and cooperatives and had provided the ABG members with seeds and tools. Unfortunately the plant had only just been started at the time of the evaluation and it was not entirely clear whether it would be finished before the end of December. The training on business management and accounts would possibly still be imparted by FAO but it would be impossible to still conduct the training on how to operate the factory before the end of the year 2012.
112. The fishermen’s FFS were found successful. They were provided with equipment and taught about methods to catch more fish and to improve processing of the fish. They were also introduced to proper fish management, and even though most of them were afraid the method would prevent them from catching small fish and thus threaten their income possibilities, most of them also understood the purpose and adhered to it.
113. Though Conservation Agriculture (CA) according to the Project Document and FAO HQ was expected to be promoted by the programme, it does not feature prominently or directly among the recommended practices. Among all FFS, agro-forestry FFS are the FFS dealing mostly with CA.
114. The technology transfer and involvement of research institutes was non-existent. Apparently there are no capable research institutes in South Sudan and the agreement made with a research institute in Kenya has yet to be formalized. There was no exchange mechanism between facilitators or with facilitators funded by other donors like SDC. No facilitator exchange platforms were established or encouraged by SPCRP. The facilitators

would meet on an occasional basis in the trainings and refresher trainings, but there were no regular planned exchange meetings.

5.1.5 CAHWS

115. The CAHW sub-component was found to be the most successful component, probably supported by the fact that CAHWs had already been working in South Sudan for a number of years and SPCRPs mainly improved their training and provided them with inputs. The CAHWs fill a considerable gap with their work and are instrumental in reducing morbidity and mortality of livestock, thus not only improving the livelihood of their clients but also of other livestock owners. If drug provision and payment for services are solved, the impact will easily be made sustainable.
116. In 2009, the CAHW concept was reviewed and endorsed at Federal and State levels as the official model in South Sudan for dealing with livestock and animal health related matters in governmental services.
117. Involvement of CAHWs was found very valuable by various stakeholders. In a number of states, each county is covered by two CAHWs, partly trained by SPCRPs and partly by other development partners. Most of the CAHWs had already been active for a number of years; so the training was seen as a refresher. The government is keen to support the approach but struggles again with lack of funding.
118. The CAHWs were generally positive about the content and duration of the training and the refresher training. Even though a number of them had been involved as CAHWs before the project's onset, they shared that especially in the field of disease identification, they had learned a lot. They estimated that animal mortality among their target groups had decreased by 15-20% as a result of their training. The SPCRPs training was found better than training by other development partners since toolkits were provided. SPCRPs have been instrumental in preparing the guidelines for all agencies involved in Community Animal Health Services in South Sudan and supported the standardization of the CAHWs training curriculum.
119. CAHWS need supervision from a government official or veterinary doctor but there is insufficient human capacity for adequate supervision. Drugs and vaccines are generally brought in by traders from the Sudan since they are not available at local level. There is no certainty about the quality and historic life of these drugs and the regularity of supply.
120. SPCRPs supported the formation of 2 Livestock Associations in Western Equatoria, but did not support CAHWs to establish associations in all states; group formation was reported to be difficult considering the large distances. Such a group would nonetheless have many advantages, running from cooperatively approaching humanitarian organisations to provide them with drugs (for procurement) to solving non-payment problems and ensuring adequate support from "official" animal health channels.
121. The solar fridges in the offices at county level, established by SPCRPs, are used to keep perishable drugs and vaccines. The bicycles were found very useful even during the rainy season since distances between clients are huge. The starter kits were appreciated and used.
122. CAHWs receive a very small fee additional to the payment of drugs or vaccines. The payment of this fee may encourage them to progress, but it seems hardly sufficient to ensure sustainability. Apparently, it frequently occurs that clients are unable to pay; also costs like drug expiry and repair and maintenance of the SPCRPs provided bicycles are far too high to be covered from this income. Most of the CAHWs cover their livelihood by

their agricultural business and continue their work because they are respected for it in the community.

123. In a number of states, drugs had not been transported yet from Juba and therefore CAHWs could only do a limited amount of vaccination. Requests for drugs took a long time and transport was difficult.

5.1.6 Rural markets and small business groups

124. ABGs as a sub-component were seen as one of the least successful under CB. The number of ABGs established was small and they started too late. The food processing plants, which were supposed to help them translate their efforts into income, were not yet ready at the time of evaluation. The link to FFS was not strong enough, and the involvement of government should have been more encouraged. Lack of market access and infrastructure hampers the ABG participants from fully benefitting from their produce. If FAO manages to complete the planned processing plants and related training at short notice, at least some of the ABG members may enjoy an increase in income.
125. 32 ABGs were selected on the basis of pre-existing criteria, mostly evolving from FFS groups, but they started only in 2012. The time therefore was too short to establish or measure their degree of success. In NBEG four groundnut groups seemed to be achieving good progress and were linked up to the groundnut cooperative. Food processing plants were under construction in NBEG, WBEG and Warrap.
126. Of the FFS, most of the additional output did not reach the market and this may also become a problem when ABGs work through the food processing plants, as access to transport is difficult and expensive. The produce is still low and barely sufficient to cover the household needs. Markets are hardly developed and the link of the farmers with the market is weak. Even the groundnuts, introduced as a cash crop, were only partly sold. Unfortunately, supporting market infrastructure was not incorporated in design of the project.
127. In the target states NBEG, WBEG and Warrap, food processing plants are still being built, but it is unsure whether they will be completed in time, even though close supervision of the construction was promised by FAO. The training on operating the plants can only be imparted after the construction is ready and the equipment installed. Acknowledging the fact that postponement was caused by problems with local contractors but also that these should have been tackled at an earlier stage, FAO made a firm commitment to conduct these trainings under their programme, as well as the necessary follow up to the marketing training and the management training. FAO assured as well, that the initial management, budget/finance and marketing training will be imparted before SPCR phases out.
128. In Western Equatoria only one ABG was established, the Mamenze Fresh Fish Multipurpose Cooperative (MFFMC). SPCR supported this ABG with various technical trainings on how to design and build fish ponds as well as how to stock and feed Tilapia and catfish fingerlings. The members of the MFFMC are fully occupied with the technicalities of raising fish and have not yet started to actually implement their business plan. Other FFS groups did not develop business plans or evolve into ABGs.
129. Business plans were often not developed and if they were, they were rudimentary and insufficiently detailed. Little was known about the possible income to be generated by the different SBGs with the help of the received training and equipment.

5.2 *Outputs and outcomes under the Model Project Component*

130. The outputs and outcomes under the MP component were achieved to a very small extent only. Delays, poor quality implementation and tense relationships with government led to outputs being produced to a lesser extent than planned or not produced at all, thus hampering the component to achieve its outcomes and objectives. From the sub-projects, the LPMP may be seen as most successful because at the end of the project, slaughterhouses and auction kraals were finalized and used as planned. On the other hand, the AIRP related activities were not all implemented as per plan and the FPMP showed very little results, if at all. Unfinished business regarding a rice mill in Aweil and not working biogas installations not only may be seen as non-achievement of outputs and outcomes, but also as serious disinvestment if these problems are not solved.
131. The design of the project looked reasonable combining input and marketing in the field of agriculture, fisheries and livestock. It is unclear however to which extent the MP projects were planned as the Mission has not found evidence of Terms of Reference, tendering procedures, TA or supply contracts and Inception Reports. The implementation of the MP projects went through leaps and bounds and ran into serious delays hampering proper handing over.
132. The reporting of GIZ is of reasonable quality and looks informative. The implementation however has not at all been up to standard. Many delays have been faced; some activities were not implemented, others had to be downscaled or were not yet finished, and quality was sometimes lacking. Even though achievements have been reached, a number of the basic problems, which should have been addressed, like water points and roads, were not completed. Throughout the reporting, shortage of funds, price rises and rainy season and problematic communication between GIZ and the government are brought up as causes of the weak implementation.
133. There appeared to be tension between the various government partners and GIZ. Government at both Federal and State levels complained they were not sufficiently involved in planning, their consultation was ignored and the budget was not shared with them. They had observations on the quality and location and felt that the value for money was rather limited. This fact led to severe disappointment by the government. On the other hand, the PSC has endorsed all decisions.
134. Due to delay in implementation, GIZ had no time to follow EU procedures to import from nearby countries. Equipment therefore was imported at a higher price than budgeted and it finally arrived much later than planned. As a result, other activities had to be abandoned or decreased and stakeholders could not be trained and guided to use and maintain the equipment. This happened with the rice mill in Aweil, where finally the equipment had to be imported from Germany, leaving no time to make it operational or train government staff.

5.2.1 *Aweil Irrigation and Rehabilitation Project*

135. In the AIRP in NBEG the results suffered from a sequencing problem. The selected rice varieties were already sown at a large scale testing was still on-going. It appeared the selected varieties needed irrigation to produce good yields and nonetheless, GIZ had only achieved minimal progress on irrigation and roads as in many cases, only the bush had been taken out. The expected increase in production was therefore not achieved.
136. The cost of rehabilitation of the irrigation system in the area under consideration seems to be underestimated. Lack of equipment further hampered the progress; most of the equipment arrived at a very late stage. Water Users Organisations were not formed in

the Aweil Rice Scheme, even though this was planned. The detailed topographic survey which was planned with regard to the future development plan was downscaled to a simple ground survey.

137. A rice mill was installed at the rice scheme. The procurement and installation took up much more time than planned, and by the start of 2012 the engine was still not ready. The rice mill was much bigger than its predecessor, and it was decided to excavate a pit in order to make it fit in the barn. During the rainy season however, the groundwater level rose and the pit appeared to be insufficiently water tight. As a result of water in the excavation pit, the test run had to be stopped; the matter still has not been solved. GIZ is reported to have promised to return in March 2013 to solve the issue. It is important that the matter is solved soonest, because not only is there a large amount of un-milled rice already waiting to be processed, but the new harvested rice was expected to arrive in November 2012. As a result, farmers are currently unable to sell their produce.
138. The rice mill is a complicated piece of equipment and requires a certain minimum of skills and experience for its operation. The government partners have not been trained in this regard. The unproductive relationship between GIZ and SMAF hampered reaching a workable solution, which may now lead to the rice mill not becoming operational and/or will not be used.
139. Restructuring the management of the Aweil Rice Scheme was one of the expected outcomes of the MP. A workshop was held in November 2011 and a roadmap developed and approved, but nothing else was done. Currently the stakeholders are moving towards establishing a public private partnership (PPP), where a private company will take care of input and infrastructure. The private entity has yet to be identified and details have not been made available. At this point in time though, it is too late to really support and guide the development of such partnership.

5.2.2 Livestock Production and Marketing Programme

140. As per plan, three auction kraals (enclosures for livestock) should have been supported/built at state capital level and six at secondary places. From these 9, only 5 were established and for 4, private operators were trained; the Lokoloko (WBEG) auction kraal was not functional. The quality of the kraals appeared reasonable, even though there were already signs of deterioration and fences had appeared too low and weak for the cattle. There were complaints about a budgeted new generator which was reported to be second hand and with too little capacity, becoming non-functional after 3 days of use. The access roads were problematic, and cattle had to be led close around the landing strip of the airport in Warrap.
141. The auction kraals provided a cost reduction for the cattle owners because they did not need to pay for overnight stay for the animals; the private operator managed to generate a reasonable income and the government therefore has access to tax revenue. With exception of the centre at Nyang in Lakes State, the fisheries centres, if provided with budget by government or the private sector and utilised properly in the future may have lasting positive impact. Unfortunately, modalities for ownership and operating costs for buildings, (offices, fish market, landing site) and equipment (vehicles, ice machines) have not been agreed upon prior to project closure.
142. Under the LPMP, only two out of the planned three slaughterhouses were built. The biogas installations planned adjacent to the slaughterhouses in NBEG and Warrap were a complete failure. GIZ did not train operational technicians and nobody knew how to handle it. Two experts were reported to have visited the plants without success; the last

expert even reported that, as a result of poor gas quality, he did not expect the biogas installations to ever be operational. The Evaluation Team visited the installation in NBEG. Since the opening of the slaughterhouses in the beginning of October 2012 all excreta and blood had been streaming into the installation. Now, one of the containers was full and the contents floated freely into the environment, covered with flies. The container was fully open to the air and there was no lid, which should be part of the installation; nobody knew about the need to cover it. The biogas installations are adjacent to the slaughterhouses and it is only a matter of time before contagious diseases will spread through flies from the biogas plant to the butcher shops and the meat, which is transported without cooling. The available biogas expertise in South Sudan is close to zero.

143. The CTA of GIZ observed that from the beginning, it was clear that the introduction of such new technology would require at least six months of intensive training and monitoring making sure that the system would work. It is therefore all the more surprising that the installations were constructed and only finalized at the very end of the project duration with only a very limited amount of training.
144. Out of the 66 milk production groups which were started up, 26 only were still active. Their production at an average of 40 litres per day is very low and was not found viable.

5.2.3 Fisheries Production and Marketing Project

145. The Fisheries Production and Marketing Project (FPMP) was implemented in the States Central Equatoria (CES), Unity and Lakes. It aimed at making available basic information on fish and improving marketing and landing of fish, thus increasing income of fishermen in the Nyal-Terekeka corridor. Constructing fisheries centres was one of the envisaged activities and outputs.
146. Even though the design of the Fisheries project was reasonably relevant, the actual implementation and the selected locations of the Centres have contributed to its failure. Most results have not been achieved and the activities were all severely delayed as a result of weak project management, lack of guidance and poor planning. Lack of qualified fisheries staff in the labour market as well as insufficient and late seconding of government staff are the other prime causes for the project's low achievement.
147. The project design had not considered the high risk emanating from the security situation. In Western Equatoria, project staff had to be evacuated and long discussions had to take place on the possibility of even starting the implementation. As a result, the stated objectives and outputs did not fit well into the conditions prevailing during implementation; they were overly optimistic in view of the actual situation on the ground. Despite the 1-year long inception period, these limitations were not rectified.
148. The selected locations in two of the three States were difficult to reach and had security problems; combined with very few staff assigned to the project management, good quality implementation became very difficult. Managing the project from Juba and having for a long time no permanently assigned project staff at the Fisheries Centre had a detrimental effect on the project's effectiveness.
149. Project staff had very limited direct contact with the target group; In Terekeka (CES) the project focused on supporting the Sernum Cooperative Society until 2010 when the relationship was ended due to irreconcilable differences. The scant interaction of the project team with the final beneficiaries resulted in less than 100 fishermen trained in just 3 training courses over the project's whole implementation period.

150. Long decision making processes by government, partly the result of limited commitment and partly of political influence, considerably delayed implementation in general, and site selection and construction of fisheries centres in all 3 States in particular. Security problems resulted in the frequent conceptual changes of location and ultimate reallocation of project sites and the invalidation of work done in 2 States (Unity and Lakes) and to a disruption of project implementation in CES.
151. Project management was unable to find an acceptable *modus operandi* for all stakeholders in the bush shops and for the ice making machines, leaving opportunities of providing fishing gear and inputs to the fishing communities unutilized.
152. The landing site and the housing facilities as built at Terekeka were far below expectations of the government and indicate a weak communication and poor relation between SMARF and the contractor.
153. The best visible result of the MP has been the hardware provided, i.e. 3 Fisheries Centres plus office equipment (including generators) and materials, one fish market in Terekeka (though not yet completed, it is also not accepted by SMARF, not yet handed over and not in use at the time of the Final Evaluation), vehicles, motorbikes and fishing boats, 2 ice making machines, and some fishing gear. In Lakes State, the 'centre' has been delivered at Nyang, far away from fisheries landing and with very poor road facilities, and will be of little use to the fishing communities.
154. In WES, different activities were originally planned to be implemented with various interest groups, including beekeeping, honey production and hide and skin preparation. Hide and skin preparation was dismissed as being too difficult and no trace of effort could be found regarding the beekeeping exercise.
155. The visibility of MP was good. In the project areas, posters were available as well as T-shirts with GIZ and EU logo. At every project site there was a billboard showing the names of EU and the implementing partners; coverage through television and radio had taken place. Looking at the quality of the MP implementation though, this may not be recorded as a good achievement.

5.3 Impact

156. Overall, notwithstanding the difficult circumstances, a modest impact has been achieved even though quantification is not possible based on the findings of this Evaluation. The activities have led directly or indirectly, to some improvement in income, which may translate into income increase of other members in the community at a later stage. Food security of some beneficiaries has improved and food security may improve further if government finds funds to continue their support. Slight improvements in nutrition may have been achieved through FFS and food processing, but it is doubtful whether these are measurable.
157. Interactions between state ministries and population have increased in quality and also in quantity, even though not by percentages as mentioned in the logframe; based on the achievements of the project though, they may increase in future.
158. The services provided by the MP may have improved the incomes and the conditions of the beneficiaries slightly, but as a result of the sub-optimal implementation and problematic relations with government partners, the extent is much smaller than planned and the upscaling or replication is highly unlikely.

159. The design aimed at positive and considerable impact in the areas of support to peace and conflict reduction, tangible support to people in need by helping them to improve their livelihood conditions, and strengthening the structure of public bodies. With regard to peace and conflict prevention, the impact has been negligible and mostly indirect by making participants aware in the group process of the benefits of respecting needs of others.
160. Even though the achievement regarding improvement of livelihood conditions of various target groups was limited at the moment of evaluation, it is hoped that the combination of government capacity building and increased agricultural and livestock related skills among farmers and government staff may contribute to spreading this impact over a larger group of beneficiaries.
161. The impact emanating from strengthening the structure of public bodies is viewed as sub-optimal. This component was not sufficiently structured to enable government to seriously scale up the activities, instigated by the project.
162. Mindsets and the vocabulary have changed. In particular planning and M&E have improved and staff members were successfully trained in these fields. Extension staff members were trained in 'modern' extension services and approaches including FFS and Animal Health Care.
163. The project has directly and generally positively impacted through FFS, some of the ABG and part of the MP on a number of rural families; improved knowledge, skills and networks and inputs, which have been provided to them may help them slowly overcome the worst poverty, which may benefit their community in the long run.
164. The project has positively impacted the livelihood of cattle owners through the enhanced services provided by the CAHWs. Through the services of CAHWs, decreased mortality and morbidity will improve the financial situation of the livestock owners. Their support in awareness raising and vaccination diminishes the risk of epidemic outbreaks, indirectly contributing to better livelihood for others.
165. Promises not kept with regard to grants and training led to target groups being disappointed as well as angry and suspicious. This did not encourage continuing the newly acquired improved practices and may be detrimental to engagement in future similar projects.
166. Even though the equipment and materials the project provided to ABGs and graduating FFS was considered to be essential for these beneficiaries to develop their small businesses, huge quantities of inputs both in physical and financial terms perpetuated the emergency approach and cemented the dependency syndrome and may render the enterprises and the groups promoted as unviable as soon as the programme's support will end.
167. SPCR was instrumental in the introduction of FFS; now, other organisations are also starting up FFS, building on the lessons learned and experiences from the programme. Even if FFS participants do not always succeed in selling of all their improved production, they will benefit from better nutrition, since they concentrate on food eaten at household level.
168. The impact of the MP implementation was considered questionable. A large part of the MP focused on delivery of inputs, which may have helped improve the livelihood of the target population but only in the short run. Furthermore this input was much smaller than planned. No mechanism was included to guide the target population to obtain a

continuing access to such inputs. The promises made and not kept at community level have reduced the commitment, the impact and sustainability of project related activities and results.

169. The two groups of (female) milk produces set up under the MP have lost two-thirds of their members and produce too little to be viable. The target group is too small to generate any impact and looking at the fact that cows usually give ½-2 litre milk per day, viability even for the women originally targeted is out of the question as long as milk production is not addressed. Still, the women interviewed shared that participation had empowered them and their livelihood had improved.
170. Improved fish drying and smoking methods by both MP and CB (FFS) already show signs of becoming accepted more generally by fishing communities, increasing both shelf life and marketability. Fisheries statistics, though still weak, are the basis for future planning and M&E of the SMARF.

5.4 Sustainability

171. Sustainability is a complex matter, comprising social, environmental, financial, cultural and organisational dimensions. It furthermore alludes to ownership, competence, resource availability, political and communities' will to continue with selected activities. Such references have not been reflected in the SPCR design and could therefore not be observed in the implementation.
172. Through seeking to involve the communities and NSAs and ascertaining their acceptance as well as an implicit intention to support the project's positive results upon termination of the project, SPCR has made an effort to make the results sustainable.
173. A sustainability strategy was lacking from the beginning. Even though an exit strategy was formulated in 2011, its quality was limited and its development came far too late. Elements of the exit strategy should have been incorporated in the design. By now, it was too late to expect a serious effort from the government to undertake to continue the activities initiated by SPCR, especially when looking at the amount of other priorities and the extremely limited budget.

5.4.1 Financial sustainability

174. The two 'killer' conditions to financial sustainability - minimum required fiscal base, budgetary arrangements and public administrative capacity - are not acknowledged in the design. As a result, the level of ambition was set too high regarding the capacity of the government to effectively accept the transfer of administrative and finance related obligations from the SPCR upon programme termination.
175. Financial sustainability might have been better ensured, if the planning processes had been done more rigorously. Structured review and strengthening of planning processes, tools and techniques have not been performed. The project should have put more emphasis on review and strengthening of budgetary arrangements and procedures and on resource allocation planning. This would have enabled the government to address these issues independently after the project's ending.
176. In general, the financial sustainability depends on the planning and the budget allocation of future activities as well as the availability of funds for 2013 and onwards. For activities related to fisheries initiated by MP, insufficient or no plans are made or funds allocated, making sustainability unlikely.

177. There is limited scope for sustainability of FFS. Supervisors and Master Trainers (MTs) may remain active since they are government employees. A small number of FFS have been proposed in the 2013 plan but looking at the austerity policy these will unlikely be funded. The lack of enthusiasm at federal level about FFS and their complaint that the government has not been sufficiently involved may further hamper future funding, even though this observation was not supported by the State Ministry. On the other hand, the technical skills and commitment of 28 supervisors and Master Trainers in government may help to continue FFS practice. Also, FAO in South Sudan is currently mainstreaming FFS into their main intervention, which may bridge the gap until the government will be able to scale up the approach.
178. CAHWs' training has yielded sturdy and entrenched results, and will continue to support the cattle herds, without much further support. CAHWs functioning may be partly sustainable, since they recover costs from the drugs and receive a small additional fee, enabling them to continue their work at the same pace as long as they do not meet major problems. The government has no funds for addressing an epidemic outbreak of animal disease or for state wide support of CAHWs. The accessibility and quality management of drugs need to be addressed in order for the CAHW system to become truly sustainable.

5.4.2 *Institutional sustainability*

179. The design has largely neglected activities that are necessary to generate robust institutional and organizational structure which is a primary condition to ensuring sustainability. It seems to take for granted that elements such as strategic planning, effective M&E, human resource development and inclusive and effective management practices can be established and kept going without comprehensive institutional and organizational development.
180. The manuals provided by SPCRP for CAHWs and FFS are useful, user friendly and based on the newest information. The ABGs groups started late; their achievements are still in their infancy. It must be doubted that they will prove sustainable without substantial further support.
181. The CAHWs are independent operators chosen by their communities for training and offering animal health support. The project has strengthened the CAHWs in their position. The CAHWs are a promising step towards private sector development, but would need guidance to establish themselves formally as small entrepreneurs.
182. FFS in itself, even though under this project the impact was limited, has the potential to become a sustainable institution with a few adaptations. A sharper focus is needed though. A high number of different crops, crop husbandry practices and livestock were promoted through FFS. It remains doubtful, if for each different innovation and technology promoted sufficiently positive prior experience had been gained and appropriate recommendations were available, justifying the setting up of FFS for promoting these innovations.
183. Some of the stronger FFS have the potential to build upon. The FFS and CAHW concepts are accepted both at State and Federal levels as well as by crop and livestock farmers and pastoralists alike, because crop and livestock farmers and pastoralists realise the appropriateness of these models under and for their socio-economic conditions. To achieve a tangible impact at grassroots level, the number and the quality of extension staff based at County and Payam levels have to be significantly increased resp. improved.
184. The trained grassroots level participants will soon be unable to apply the acquired knowledge and skills on their own farms, increase production and productivity

significantly and improve tangibly their livelihoods, if they will not have adequate infrastructure as well as access to the required inputs, credit and markets. . If the government is unable to create the required enabling socio-economic environment and inputs, credit and markets will not become available, trained farmers will more sooner than later lose the ability and interest of practising what they learned.

185. The capacity of the government is still too weak for it to be able to stand on its own feet, despite the valuable efforts of SPCRP. It is doubtful that state public administration can mature if no robust institutional and organisational review and development are undertaken.
186. Human capacity building and development and targeted training need continuous attention while considering for instance staff transfers, promotions, record keeping and special attention to field staff. It is highly doubtful whether the government will be able to provide the resources to continue this attention after the project's phasing out.
187. Training Needs Assessments need to be used and rolled over at least once every two years to ascertain whether skills are still up to standard, refresher courses are needed or new staff entered need training. At the time of this evaluation, there were no such plans and the connection with ministries' functions and structures was largely absent
188. SPCRP set up internet for the SMAF but as soon as the Ministry was supposed to pay the monthly fee of \$500, they discontinued. As a result, the Ministry has been without internet for a couple of months, hampering their communication capacity and disabling them to practice and share their learning. This is a disappointing foreboding of the Ministry's capacity and willingness to continue the SPCRP related action.
189. If the government succeeds in finding suitable arrangements with another donor and/or NGO, there is hope that the hard- and software related to fisheries provided by the project will become the foundation for future interventions in the fisheries sector.
190. An exit strategy and related implementation plan have been formulated and regularly updated but the focus has been mainly on phasing out of project staff. This implies that the few remaining staff are left with a larger work burden. The phasing in of government appears much more unlikely as a result of still low capacity and austerity measures.

5.4.3 Sustainability at policy level

191. Even though human and some institutional capacity have been built, the location of responsibility is still centralised. Sustainability will only become possible if the changes brought about by SPCRP are entrenched in the system. To ensure entrenchment, policies will need to be developed or adapted, reflecting all relevant issues with regard to responsibilities and finance in the area of rural development, agriculture and livestock.
192. An inclusive procedure was established to produce the first 3-year strategic plan as a compass for annual planning. In all states a strategic plan 2010-2012 was developed, which was really used even though budget was a problem. Based on these strategies and the experiences of the past years, TORs for the development of new strategic plans for the 5 states were developed for 2013-2016, and the plans are currently in the final stages of development.
193. Support was provided to the development of NALEP, which has been finalized and will serve as an implementation framework for extension at Federal and State level.
194. The government has reflected FFS in their planning, but austerity measures make it unlikely that this activity will be funded. The adoption of FFS by the government as the

preferred extension approach is highly unlikely in the short run. On the other hand government staff shared, that even if FFS would not be feasible, they did appreciate the group based and facilitative approach and would certainly continue using it in future. They found their technical capacity sustainable, even without financial support.

195. Government has insufficient money and human resources available to carry on the activities for which their capacity was built. Unfortunately, the design of the project did not contain sustainability approaches like the progressive transfer of responsibility or compulsory increasing of government funding. When these were identified in the exit strategy study, it was too late to rectify.

5.5 Gender, nutrition and other crosscutting issues

196. In the project document, it is stipulated that “gender and HIV/AIDS related problems are considered as cross-cutting issues whenever relevant”. Whereas gender sensitiveness has at least been observed to a certain extent, nutrition has hardly been addressed and HIV/AIDS is even nowhere mentioned.

5.5.1 Gender

197. There are still major cultural obstructions to involving women and moving towards gender equality. Women are not always allowed to mix with men, even though the situation has improved over the past years. They are supposed to take care of all household tasks and they cannot travel long distances. The educational level of women is generally lower than that of men, one of the reasons being that they are married off at a tender age. The security situation aggravates these constraints. These general gender related characteristics have not been incorporated in the design, nor has a clear attempt been made to address them.
198. Women are involved in particular tasks. In fishery groups, men go out to catch fish, which they stipulate to be impossible for women due to threatening wildlife. Women await them on the shore and are involved in processing and selling the fish. Still, the FFS and SBG training are often only imparted to the men, even though a large part of the content is on fish processing. A visited groundnut group consisted of 30 women and 1 man. Whilst the women were sitting on the ground peeling groundnuts, the man was watching only because it would have been “shameful for a man” to participate in the presence of ‘visitors.’ This was accepted by the facilitators and no attempt was made to address it.
199. Cattle herds play a major role in the economy of South Sudan. This may hamper achieving gender equality, since generally working with cattle is still seen as a man’s business, whereas agriculture and fisheries are supplementary to cattle, and fishing may be carried out as an occupation by people located at lower social strata. Nonetheless, women may even now already be involved in activities in related to cattle holding; these activities could have been identified by a proper gender analysis and incorporated in the project.
200. As result of the many decades of war and the ensuing disruption of society, very few women got trained and qualified and were hired for government services. Throughout the trainings at government level, there were very few women involved or none at all. In meetings with stakeholder groups in government, the percentage of women was very low. In coordination interactions, the participation of women was less than 10%. The project

missed an opportunity by not seriously trying to increase the participation of women in this regard.

201. Gender sensitivity surpasses only looking at gender parity. Gender mainstreaming was not really included at the design phase or in implementation. Even though it was difficult for SPCRP to involve women in training since they were not employed with government to begin with and at field level due to cultural factors, looking into the specific needs and opportunities of men and women and possibilities for the project to decrease the knowledge and education gap between men and women would have helped to make an impact at gender level.
202. In the FFS, one third of participants were female; most of them were in crop production. Among the CAHWs, especially the active ones, the number of women was extremely low. Out of 100 facilitators trained in 2012, only 4 were women.

5.5.2 Other crosscutting issues

203. Nutrition was hardly addressed in SPCRP. This is a lost opportunity, since malnutrition is widespread and the fact that agriculture and fisheries are practiced by the same people would have offered opening to emphasize the importance and possibility of having varied meals. Only in one of the fisheries groups, the nutritional value of fish was reported as a subject.
204. HIV/AIDS was incorporated to a small extent as a regular subject in the FFS curriculum. Other important issues like disaster preparedness, conflict management and human rights were insufficiently addressed.

6 Synergies and connections

6.1 Collaboration between FAO and GIZ

205. At the design stage of the programme, the intervention was developed based on the assumption that FAO would implement both the CB and the MP component. The synergy between CB and MP was not only foreseen, it was the backbone of the proposed action. Thus, the MP would be used to support the government in applying their acquired capacity and knowledge, as a sort of “on-the-job” training. When EU decided to grant the two components to different implementers, the assumption was that synergy would establish itself automatically. This was not the case, nor in planning activities nor in geographical distribution.
206. The TSU and the PCU of the CB component did not manage to connect to the implementers of the Model Project in the States. The project document did not stipulate a mandatory coordination mechanism and none could be effectively put in place. The structure of the Programme completely changed by splitting it up in two components, but no coordination mechanism was introduced to link the CB to the MP at various levels and no further attention was paid to the issue. No compulsory collaborative activities were introduced into the programme to facilitate synergy and cooperation.
207. Synergy between the two project partners existed mainly in training provided by CB for MP beneficiaries. In NBEG, this took place in the livestock area. The MP built slaughterhouses and trained staff on operating it; the CB component trained meat inspectors and butchers on hygiene observation. CB funded the training of auction stakeholders on market information collection and dissemination, which was developed by the MP.
208. Even though the MTE had recommended consolidation of monitoring data of the CB and the MP component, no evidence of effort towards consolidation was found by the Evaluation Team. Both FAO and GIZ worked independently according to their own logframes and plans. GIZ participated in a workshop to develop the annual work plan for 2012 with FAO, SMAF and SMARF.
209. The management of the project was highly centralised. The absence of state-specific SPCRP Plans prevented strategic oversight at state level and ensured that the implementation was output driven at state as well as at central level and that the CB and MP components went their own ways. The minutes of PSC meetings indicate, that the discussions at that level were focused on operational and not on strategic matters, and that they rarely concerned synergy.

6.2 Synergy and exchange within South Sudan and with other countries

210. Even though the programme was meant to cover both Sudan and South Sudan (which belonged to one country in the beginning of the project), there was never a synergy or exchange between the two. As both areas/countries are very different, this may be understandable, but still opportunities were missed. The countries were mainly backstopped and guided by different staff members at FAO Headquarters, and different private companies were responsible for the implementation of the MP.
211. There has been only one exchange meeting with Sudan, organized for the Ministry of Agriculture, GIZ and Euroconsult Mott MacDonald, the private company involved in

implementing the MP in the Sudan. After the MTE, a meeting was organized on the way forward to address recommendations. Furthermore, the Evaluation Team has not found any trace of SPCR related communication and exchanges of lessons learned and experiences.

- 212. Some training materials (for CARDA/CAHW and FFS) have been used in both Sudan and South Sudan. Looking at the fact that the project made use of activities and approaches, suitable for various countries, more effort could have been made to develop and use materials in a concerted manner.
- 213. A number of cross learning visits have been carried out, to Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. In Kenya, SPCR stakeholders participated in the 8th African Dairy Conference.
- 214. Even though the World Bank is implementing a similar programme in the eastern states, which have not been covered by SPCR, the Evaluation Team has found no evidence of contact, coordination or exchange of lessons learned or experiences. It was only reported that World Bank has participated in some PSC meetings, but no exchange at practical level had taken place.

6.3 Links between result areas and activities

- 215. MP and CB have their separate logframes; after MTE, FAO combined its various logframes into one, but GIZ still used separate logframes for each project. Thus, there is very little coherence and consistency between the result areas.
- 216. Even though a number of FFS and all CAHWs are focusing on livestock, there is no clear link between the two. The link between fisheries and crop production is also missing, even though the fishing and agricultural season are largely complementary and most fishermen practice crop production as well.

7 Lessons learned and good practices

7.1 Lessons Learned

217. The following lessons have been identified:

1. SPCR was too ambitious and fully target and output oriented and had too many different activities and geographical locations. A sharper focus and results orientation would have been beneficial for the outcome.
2. The equipment provided, especially by the MP, appeared at times too sophisticated for its target audience. Building biogas installations in a country without any such expertise or providing machines with complicated guidelines to low literacy people may be expected to turn out a failure.
3. Even though SPCR has delivered a considerable amount of capacity building, particularly with regards to human skills and knowledge, and as a result government staff members are more capable and knowledgeable, low availability of financial and human resources and absence of a conducive institutional and organisational structures hamper optimal use of that capacity.
4. Training only is not enough to ensure improved capacity. Support, performance assessment and technical backstopping at regular intervals after training may help to embed the knowledge into the working environment.
5. The governments have many priorities and limited budgets. Even though the SPCR activities are now often incorporated into the regular state budgets and may be approved, this does not guarantee the arrival of funds.
6. Activities introduced by the program should be incorporated into the government budget at an early stage; a good cost calculation needs to be made for upscaling from the onset and planning needs to be done in a participatory way.
7. Elaborating planning documents/logframes, budgets as well as Annual Work Plans at State level would be more operational and would increase both understanding and ownership of the programme.
8. 'Sustainability' and the necessary exit strategy should be defined during project design and monitored and regularly evaluated during implementation.
9. Implementing a recovery and development programme similar to SPCR but focused and results oriented would require a minimum duration 8-10 years for realising and measuring tangible impact at community level and in the public administration.

7.2 Good practices

218. The following good practices have been identified:

1. In South Sudan, the programme since 2010 made use of selection committees consisting of the Agricultural and Animal Resource Ministries and FAO, to select and interview candidates for medium- and long term training; candidates also had to do a written and oral test. This practise decreased considerably the number of candidates failing the training or not being able to use the acquired knowledge in their work.
2. Planning was supported by SPCR from the level of the state strategic plans down to county level. The planning was adopted and led to the government developing the new state strategic plans for 2013-2016 single-handedly.
3. FFS appeared a good practice by creating a platform for the farmers. The seed selection, preservation and multiplication, even though only introduced at a late stage, helped to partially overcome the low availability of inputs.

4. Supporting the evolvement of FFS into ABG, providing them with training, inputs and sometimes food processing plants and linking them to cooperatives worked well. Once marketing issues have been solved, these businesses will be viable.
5. Training and supporting people from the community level as was done on the subject of animal health has appeared a good solution to address the shortage of veterinarians and bridge the gap until the country will avail of sufficient educated veterinarians to also cover the needs at rural level.
6. In WES, FFS was intercropping agricultural crops with teak trees. The agricultural crops will provide immediate income and nutrition, whilst the teak trees provide a long-term sustainable income source. The teak trees planning will also contribute to natural resources management.

7.3 Follow up to the recommendations of the Mid-Term Evaluation

219. The outcome of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), far-reaching autonomy of South Sudan or South Sudan as a new nation, would have serious implications for the project's design features and implementation. The MTE was a potentially ideal mechanism to deal with this and suggest probably substantial modifications. The MTE did not do this and therefore must be considered a missed opportunity. Conclusions were lumped together and gave an ambiguous overview with little analysis regarding the differences between South Sudan and the Sudan. Especially South Sudan suffered from this missed opportunity.
220. The Mid-Term Evaluation came up with a number of recommendations. Some were for the Sudan and will not be addressed here. Underneath, the extent of follow up of the relevant and most important recommendations in the second part of the project's duration is highlighted.
221. *The Programme Steering Committees (PSC) at Federal levels should now assume a more "strategic" oversight and coordination function and be inclusive of other relevant Government Ministries and other projects complementary to the SPCRP.* This has been followed up to a reasonable extent with, though, strategic oversight perhaps less developed. The PSC uses information from PABs and TUs and is not involved in micro-management. No other ministries however were invited and there was only limited effort to link to other relevant projects. The PABs had assumed their responsibility as was recommended.
222. *Each State should articulate its strategy for moving forward on developing Rural Advisory and Extension Services (agriculture, animal resources, private institutions and rural businesses); should develop joint annual work plans and budgets.* This recommendation was followed: state level strategies were in process of development for 2013-2016 and the NALEP had been endorsed.
223. *FAO must immediately review its management and technical structure and consolidate inputs from both MP and CB.* This recommendation was partly followed. Even though the name of the project staff in the TSUs has been changed, their role largely remained the same. The FAO PTF, which was supposed to have become more accountable, has actually become less accountable and active after MTE. The monitoring data of CB and MP were not consolidated at all.
224. *The Nyal-Shambe-Terekeka fisheries project was reported to require a radical review of scope, objectives and implementation modalities.* The project revised the logframe and reduced the number of results from 5 to 3; nevertheless, no clear decision

was reached as to which the main focus of the project should be – to increase the fish catch or to improve the marketing of fish and within marketing focusing either on supporting trade networks or on improving the quality of fish products.

225. The Micro Project Programme was awarded to Euroconsult Mott MacDonald instead of FAO and was not implemented in South Sudan as per recommendation of the MTE.

226. *To ensure sustainability, TSUs and Project Implementation Units (PIUs) must be fully embedded within appropriate government structures at State level and financial incentives to government staff must stop immediately. Exit strategies for implementing partners and entry strategies for government counterparts must be developed.* This recommendation was partly followed. Even though an exit strategy was developed, it was more focused on exit of the external implementer than on entry of the government and there are too many constraints for the government to enable them to undertake the progress of the action. It was reported, that financial incentives to government were not given. Even during longer meetings with the Team no food or drinks were provided, even if government staff appeared slightly unhappy.

227. *A no-cost extension was granted until December 2012* as was recommended by the MTE. The MP component had stayed on longer than planned to solve problems in the rice mills which were part of AIRP but had finalized its last activities and payments at the time of the Evaluation. The CB Component has also used the additional time to complete its activities.

8 Conclusions and recommendations

8.1 Conclusions

228. The relevance of SPCR was found reasonably good. Most of the stakeholders shared that SPCR was one of the few programmes pursuing government capacity building, which was seen as indispensable for sustainability.
229. The achieved outputs and outcomes from the CB were found acceptable especially in view of the difficult circumstances in the country, which might have impeded the full achievement of the results. In comparison the outputs of the MP were found far less adequate. The MP component suffered from the same problems, but their achievement nonetheless was considerably lower.
230. The same observation was made regarding the impact. The CB component created a modest impact, albeit less than planned. The impact of the MP component is almost negligible, as a result of sub-optimal implementation and the unlikelihood of any upscaling or replication of activities and results, brought about by the project. The tense relationship with the government has further lowered this likelihood.
231. Even though the programme has only been able to achieve part of the envisaged results and impact, the achievements were still found valuable. There was little synergy between MP and CB; the relationship at the human level was found reasonable but each component was focused on its own part of the intervention.
232. The Evaluation as per TOR should focus on the post-MTE implementation, but it was found that adverse design characteristics still had major consequences for the quality of the implementation of SPCR and especially on its impact and sustainability. The focus on output and lack of incorporation of sustainability in the design clearly had an influence on the quality of the implementation.
233. A duration of four years is short for a highly complex program like SPCR even if it had been started in time. As it happened, delays and postponements at various levels shortened the actual implementation period to less than 3 years. Lack of proper planning aggravated this fact, leading to shortened cycles of activities and hastened implementation and disbursement at the end of the project.
234. Embedding the state programme at the State Ministries under the CB component enhanced ownership of the project by the government staff members. All government employees interviewed were knowledgeable about this part of the programme and were committed to trying to continue, even if struggling with capacity and funding. If it were not for the austerity measures, part of SPCR could be continued and was in fact incorporated in the plans for 2013.
235. The relationship between GIZ project staff and government was tense at various levels and communication was faltering. Whereas complaints at federal government about the CB component appeared often to be made out of ignorance and were contradicted by government at state level and field findings, the observations of government regarding the achievements and quality of the MP were confirmed throughout.
236. The performance of GIZ in the MP has been found disappointing by many stakeholders. From the work plan, activities are downscaled or downsized or have not been implemented at all or with compromised quality, even to the extent that the public

health was threatened (biogas installation). Shortage of funds, price rises, rainy season and problematic communication at State level were brought up as reasons. The project design has probably been too ambitious and GIZ may not have been sufficiently well informed about the many constraints to be faced. GIZ has not ensured ownership of the project by leaving the country before most of the problems were solved.

237. FAO was struggling with delays regarding the finalization of food processing plants and related trainings. They acknowledged that a solution should have been identified and pursued at an earlier stage but they firmly committed themselves to finalizing the constructions and the related training, even under their own programme if that would appear necessary.
238. In general, the components of CAHW looked most successful in view of the local circumstances and impact. A 20-25% proportion of the FFS, even if they did not operate exactly as per guidelines, worked reasonably well and had at least a small impact on livelihoods. CAHWs were operating in many counties and were well respected. The government has incorporated both in their strategic plan but even though the mindset is there, the future availability of funding is unclear.
239. Real sustainability of the various forms of capacity building and upscaling of FFS and CAHW may become possible if the government manages to minimize and bridge the financial gap resulting from temporary lack of oil revenues and austerity measures.

8.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: To EU and GIZ on establishing accountability of implementing partners.

GIZ may be held responsible and accountable for rectifying or finishing some of the unfinished work they left behind, in particular non-functional biogas installation and the rice mills in Aweil. Not only should these be made operational, training should also be provided on how to operate them. As these matters are complex and many details are outside the scope of the evaluation, it is recommended that a full audit should be undertaken to identify what were the extent and the reasons of poor delivery and to outline the implications.

Recommendation 2: To EU and FAO Senior Management on funding and implementation of programmes and projects by multiple organisations.

EU should provide guidelines and a mandatory framework to the implementers of project and programmes, if these are co-implemented by multiple organisations; these are to be closely followed by implementers including FAO. If private entities are selected, sustainability must be truly embedded in the proposal and mechanisms should be elaborated to ensure that such entities work with and build capacity of local institutions. Budgets of prospective programmes should be feasible and scrutinized closely and have built-in allowance for considerable price rises in future years, since this is an unavoidable feature in post-conflict countries.

Recommendation 3: To EU and FAO Country Office on sustainable energy promotion.

In a country like South Sudan where water, fuel and electricity are expensive and sustainable solutions like water harvesting and solar energy should be incorporated in each intervention and proposal, where feasible. Raising awareness on sustainable solutions should also be part of new programmes and projects.

Recommendation 4: To EU and FAO Senior Management on programme/project design.

Especially in post-conflict countries with low government capacity and limited budget, an exit strategy should be elaborated and incorporated in the programme/project design starting from the very beginning. The phase-in and phase-out mechanism will not work if only brought up towards the end and must be implemented throughout the project's duration. Additional intermittent backstopping and support after the phasing out of the project's activities will enhance its sustainability and impact. The duration of a programme should exceed the usual 5-year cycle to produce tangible impact and sustainable results. To overcome the 5-year EDF-based planning cycle, the EU is recommended to develop a kind of long-term master plan which would identify the key areas of cooperation and support for the duration of several EDFs.

Recommendation 5: To EU and FAO Senior Management on programme/project design.

The Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) approach should be observed and integrated throughout the food chain in food security programmes. Links between WASH and food security should be identified and exploited, based on relevant findings of the baseline survey, which includes data collection on WASH related issues. Access to safe water should be ensured at all project sites.

Recommendation 6: To FAO Senior Management, on incorporating FFS in programmes and projects.

In future programmes and projects, FFS may be considered as a valuable component, provided existing rules and guidelines are followed as closely as possible and feasible, whilst taking into account local characteristics. FAO avails of a large number of normative products and guidelines which should be used to the maximum extent. These also allow the incorporation of crosscutting issues like gender, nutrition and HIV AIDS.

Recommendation 7: To EU, FAO HQ and FAO Country Office in South Sudan on identifying needs of government.

In a country like South Sudan, it is inadvisable to roll out a blanket capacity building approach since the capacity of government is very low at all levels and with regard to many subjects. Capacity building should be a structured process following the needs of government and public administration, starting with addressing planning capacity - resource allocation and public finance management. In the process, learning while doing would steadily increase the number of qualified government staff.

Recommendation 8: To EU and FAO Country Office in South Sudan on identifying and addressing needs.

The ultimate backbone of sustainable and successful development in South Sudan is the competence of the organisations of public administration at federal, state and county levels. With the federal level as the nation's policy and standards setting centre, actual development on the ground is executed at state and county level. The quality of county level public administration depends on the competence at state level public administration. At both levels, competence and structure need to be urgently strengthened. A professional Organisational and Institutional Review of key state ministries should be agreed upon and implemented with the state governments. Follow-up Organisation, Institutional and Capacity Development Plans should be implemented by state governments supported by external professional staff in a participatory approach.

Recommendation 9: To FAO Country Office in South Sudan on coordination and cooperation.

The fragile conditions prevalent in South Sudan render better donor coordination and focus imperative, in a thorough dialogue with the government and incorporating large NGOs operational in South Sudan. FAO and donors should advocate with and support the government to design a long term path of assistance and identify the different roles that can be played by various donor and implementing agencies. Of key importance is a long term role to be played by agencies capable to be concerned with long term assistance (such as various UN agencies) with complementary roles accepted by agencies with shorter time horizons (amongst which the EU). A high-level consultancy may be launched to chart the major contours of this long term development path and the roles to be played by the various actors involved.

Recommendation 10: To FAO Country Office in South Sudan on funding and continuation of the Capacity Building

FAO should advocate with the State and Federal Government of South Sudan to make every effort to build forward on the achievements created by the project jointly with the stakeholders. Support from international donors aimed at the continuation of the most promising SPCRP activities should be actively sought. FAO may assist developing a

proposal, which should also contain a well planned budget and policies and strategies in order to determine and ensure the government's role and contribution in such future programme. The State Government should subject the ministries dealing with agriculture and livestock to a thorough and professional organisation review and organisation development plan, and implement the plan accordingly. Institutional and organisational structures are weak at the moment and make it difficult to sustain the positive effects of the SPCR and other project-type interventions

Annex 1. Evaluation terms of reference

Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP)

Terms of Reference (Aug/2012) - Final Evaluation 2012

Commissioned by: The European Union, Sudan

Technically Supported/Managed by: The Office of Evaluation, FAO

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Acronyms

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
EU	European Union
EMM	Euroconsult Mott MacDonald
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
GoS	Government of Sudan
GIZ IS	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (German Technical Cooperation)
MPP	Model Project

MTE	Mid Term Evaluation
NAO	National Authorising Officer (GoS)
OED	Office of Evaluation (FAO)
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PSC	Programme Steering Committee
RSS	Republic of South Sudan
SIFSIA	Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action
SPCRP	Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (analysis)
ToRs	Terms of Reference

1. Background of the Initiative

1.1 The Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP) is to be seen in the framework of the overall objective or development goal of the European Commission's development assistance to Sudan that is *consolidated peace with sustainable and equitable development*. The EU assistance is based on a multi track response strategy involving the design of interventions for different timeframes (immediate, medium, long term) and for different geographic/administrative levels. Among the different initiatives foreseen under the 'Productive infrastructures and rural livelihoods rehabilitation' chapter of the Framework of Mutual Obligations (FMO), the SPCR is expected to contribute to a significant long-term reduction in the level of poverty and food insecurity by i) enhancing income generating activities in agriculture, livestock production and off-farm rural activities that primarily benefit poor households and ii) strengthening the capacity of local administrations and non state actors to maintain and further develop them.

1.2 SPCR is a four-year National programme that aims to contribute to stabilizing peace, enhancing food security and improving rural livelihoods in selected vulnerable states of the Sudan through building human, institutional and physical productive capacities. Given the different human, institutional and food security situation and related needs and institutional frameworks that exist in the Sudan and South Sudan, the SPCR programme has been divided into two separate sub programmes: one for the North and one for the South. Both sub-programmes have similar objectives and activities, and each one has its own budget and separate implementation arrangements. These Terms of reference (ToRs) are therefore common for two similar evaluations to be conducted in parallel, for each of the sub-programmes. This also reflects one of the basic tenets of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on 9th of January 2005 that is the *One Country- Two Systems* principle. This is reinforced by the latest political context in the Sudan that the referendum in early 2011 has resulted in the succession of the South from the North by July 2011. Given the

context, the final evaluation will be done in the context of two complementary projects funded by the EU in two neighboring countries.

1.3 Each sub-programme of SPCRP has two major components:

A Capacity Building project to build human, organisational and physical capacity of public and private institutions, including three sub-components:

- Strengthening key institutions, namely local State and Non-State Actors;
- Pilot development of key agricultural support services;
- Support to programme implementation capacity.

This component is implemented both in the Sudan and South Sudan by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

B Support to Rural Livelihoods through financing and implementing investment projects in the selected States and Counties/Localities. That includes¹:

- 8 model projects, as follows:

In the Sudan: Tokar Delta Rehabilitation Project; South Kordofan Livelihoods Improvement Project; Blue Nile Livelihoods Improvement Project (all three implemented by Euroconsult Mott MacDonald) and Kadugli - Talodi Market Access Project (works contract awarded to the local contractor Manga for Drilling Ltd and supervision services to the engineering company Newtech Consulting Group).

In South Sudan: Aweil Irrigation Rehabilitation Project; Bahr el Ghazal Livestock Production and Marketing Project; Nyal - Shambe - Terekaka Fisheries Production and Marketing Project (all three implemented by GIZ IS-IS) and Wau-Tambura Bo and Busere Bridges Project (design and supervision services awarded to Newtech Consulting Group and work contract awarded to EYAT Group.).

- Micro Project Programme (it launched only in the Sudan, implemented by Euroconsult Mott MacDonald)

1.4 The direct beneficiaries of the SPCRP are:

- public institutions concerned with agriculture and rural development in around nine selected States and localities (mainly State Ministries of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Irrigation; Locality/County Agricultural Offices; Area Agricultural Department);
- Community based organizations and other non state actors including the private sector (i.e. farmer unions, water associations, marketing associations, Village Development Committees, trader associations, women groups, etc) in the selected States.
- farmers, livestock owners, fisher-folk, traders and retailers.

The indirect beneficiaries of the above will include all those who benefit from the services that the above organizations will deliver during the project and from the improved services that the organizations will be able to deliver after the capacity building has been completed.

¹ Originally, Micro Project Programme was also foreseen to be implemented but the implementing agency was not determined at the beginning of the programme implementation. A decision was made after the MTE that Micro Project Programme was awarded to Euroconsult Mott MacDonald in the Sudan, while in South Sudan, the Capacity Building component implemented by FAO received additional funding to increase the overall budget.

1.5 The total funds allocated for the implementation of the two major components of SPCR, being the Capacity Building Component and the Support to Rural Livelihoods, is €80 million. After a long consultative formulation process, FAO was entrusted by the National Authorizing Officer (NAO), in consultation with the European Commission, to implement the **Capacity Building** component of the SPCR. The remaining funds for the Support to Rural Livelihoods components was allocated to the Governments and the responsibility for the implementation of these was decided by the SPCR Steering Committees. For the **Model Project** component in South Sudan concerned, GIZ IS was entrusted by the NAO to implement the component of the SPCR South sub-programme. In the Sudan, a private consultancy company Euroconsult Mott MacDonald was sub-contracted to implement the Model Project. The Micro-Project Programme (MPP), previously referred to as the Rural Development Fund, was intended to be launched after the Mid-Term Review, to support small projects identified and proposed by the communities in each of the selected States. The management of this Programme was to be decided by the respective Northern and Southern Steering Committees and after the MTE, in the Sudan, it was awarded to Euroconsult Mott MacDonald by the EU Delegation to implement the component, while in South Sudan, it was never implemented.

1.6 The Contribution Agreement for the Capacity Building component of SPCR was signed by the Government of National Unity (National Authorizing Officer, NAO), European Commission (EC) and **FAO** on 18 August 2007, and endorsed by the Government of Southern Sudan (currently the Government of the Republic of South Sudan). In accordance with the Contribution Agreement, the implementation of the project commenced retroactively on 1 January 2007, and the end date of the project was 31 December 2010. A major programme revision was conducted after the Mid-Term Evaluation taking into account of the MTE recommendations, and the fourth Addendum to the Contribution Agreement was signed by all parties (FAO NAO of the GoS, EU and GRSS²) in 28 January 2011, which resulted in the CB programme extension up to 31 December 2012. The total budget of this CB component of €38,144,330 has been equally divided between the Sudan (€19.07 million) and South Sudan (€19.07 million), of which the European Commission contributes with €37 million, equivalent to 97 percent of the total cost while the remaining 3 % were to be co-financed by the different donor. In 2008, Southern Sudan received an additional Euro 1.5 million from the EC to cover extra costs related to the physical capacity building component. In addition, during the course of major revision conducted in 2010, SPCR South capacity building component was further increased by €2 million, amounting to €22.57 million in total. Consequently, the total capacity building programme budget is €41 644 330, of which the European Commission contributes with €40.5 million.

1.7 The Grant Contract for the Model Projects for South Sudan under the SPCR was signed by the NAO/GoNU and **GIZ IS** on 28th March 2008 for a 48 month period and was extended for six months up to 27 September in 2012. The first pre-financing contribution was received by GIZ IS on 17 July 2008 and activities commenced in May 2008. The Service Contract for the Model Projects in the Sudan was signed by the NAO/GoS and **Euroconsult Mott MacDonald** on July 21, 2008 for a 48 month period. The first pre-financing contribution was received by Euroconsult in December 2008 and activities commenced in

² The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) becomes the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) after its independence in July 2011. Hereafter it is referred as either GRSS or RSS.

September 2008. The total budget of the Model projects component is €9 million (Euroconsult) and €13,200 million (GIZ IS) for the Sudan and South Sudan respectively, of which the European Union contribution is 100%. In addition, the design and supervision contract for the Kadugli Talodi Market Access Project was signed with "Newtech Consulting Group" on 31 December 2008, the contract for the work has been signed on 21 January 2010. The Wau-Tambura Bo and Busere Bridges project design and supervision contract has been awarded to Newtech Consulting Group on 01 December 2009. The works contract was tendered on 11 September 2010 and awarded to Eyat Group on 31 December 2010.

1.8 **SPCRP Steering Committees** have been established: A Northern Sudan Steering Committee (NS SC) and a Southern Sudan Steering Committee (SS SC) provide guidance and supervision of the SPCR implementation for their respective sub-programmes, and between the Capacity Building and Support to Rural Livelihoods components. As per Stabex regulations, the European Union and FAO are members on both Steering Committees. GIZ IS and Mott MacDonald are members in the South and North SC respectively. The originally envisioned overarching National Steering Committee (N SC), which was to provide overall guidance and facilitate linkages and coordination between the Capacity Building and Support to Rural Livelihoods components, and between Northern and Southern sub-programmes, has to date never been convened.

1.9 To technically and operationally support SPCR implementation, two programme coordination units (PCU) have been set up in Khartoum and Juba as well as 9 State level Technical Support Units (TSUs) and six [model] project implementation units (PSU) at decentralized levels in States where activities are being implemented.

1.10 The Mid Term Evaluation (MTE) assessed project performance at midpoint (2010) and made specific recommendations for the remaining duration of the programme. The main conclusions and recommendations are annexed to the ToRs (Annex 5).

2. Purpose of the Evaluation

2.1 A final evaluation is foreseen in the programme document on completion of the programme. This terms of reference has been prepared by the Office of Evaluation at FAO in consultation with key stakeholders involved in the funding, management and implementation of the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP). The terms of reference are prepared with respect to a planned final evaluation which is prescribed within the EU Stabex Implementation Protocol for this Programme. The final evaluation will include all components of the programme (including both the Sudan and South Sudan) and will comply with evaluation good practices as defined by the EU and the Office of Evaluation.

2.2 The overall purpose of this final evaluation is to review project delivery of the expected outputs and achievement of outcomes (purpose and objectives), and provide decision makers in the Governments (GoS and GoSS), and the EU with sufficient information to make an informed judgment about the performance of the programme (its relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact) and make decisions about future related interventions and the future of food security / rural development intervention in the Sudan and South Sudan, acknowledging the recent division into two separate countries.

2.3 In addition, the evaluation is an opportunity to learn from this experience in order to improve the design and implementation of similar interventions in the future that aim to improve food and nutrition security in fragile states. For this reason, it is expected that the evaluation findings will lead to conclusions and recommendations useful for future normative, operational and organization strategies for food and nutrition security programmes/projects.

2.4 Key issues identified by Programme stakeholders a priori include:

- Quality of programme design and appropriacy of redesign efforts during implementation.
- Synergies between components (north/south, and between activities implemented by the different partners with each country);
- implementation of the recommendations from the MTE;
- quality and implementation of the programme exit strategy;
- Quality and effectiveness of steering/oversight (EU/PSC) and management arrangements (GOS, GOSS, FAO, EMM, GIZ);
- Effectiveness of the programme to date in contributing to human capacity development and institutional change;
- Contribution of SPCRP to changes at farmer and community level.
- Lessons learned and good practices

2.5 The principle audience of the evaluation includes mainly governmental authorities in both Sudan (GoS) and South Sudan (GoSS) represented in the PSCs, the EU, and FAO, GIZ IS and Mott MacDonald management and programme staff at country level.

3. The Scope of the Evaluation

3.1 The final evaluation will evaluate the overall SPCRP programme's performance implemented by the various implementing agencies throughout all phases from formulation to handover but with a particular focus on results since the mid term evaluation. This evaluation will have as a reference point the original project log frames but will base itself on the revised consolidated log frame (including both Model Project and Capacity Building components).

3.2 The final evaluation will assess the programme against the standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, i.e. relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. In addition, the programme will also be assessed in terms of its performance on gender equality, social inclusion and environmental impact.

3.3 Within these criteria, the evaluation will assess the following features of the programme, as appropriate.

- a. Relevance and contribution of the SPCRP programme to national development priorities of the GoS and GRoSS and priority needs in the area of food security;
- b. Comparative advantage of each agency as implementing agency for the programme;
- c. Theory of change underpinning the intervention;
- d. Quality and realism of the project design, including: links and causal relationships between inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impact (specific and development objectives) in the Logical Framework and Annual Work Plans; relevance and appropriateness of indicators selected; validity of assumptions and risks; approach

and methodology; time frame and resources; institutional set-up; management arrangements; and stakeholders and beneficiaries identification;

- e. Project management and implementation at MAF, MARF and State Ministry levels, including: effectiveness and efficiency of operations management;(including staff quality and quantity) effectiveness of strategic management; efficiency and effectiveness of projects' coordination and steering bodies and mechanisms; set-up, efficiency and effectiveness of monitoring and internal review processes, rate of delivery and financial management; quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by the implementing agencies; and implementation gaps and delays if any, their causes and consequences, between planned and implemented outputs and outcomes; and assessment of any remedial measures taken. Relevance of budget allocations to programme objectives; cost-effectiveness of budget allocations in relation to project objectives.
- f. Programme outputs and outcomes (activities and objectives), in particular including in the analysis the programmes' achievements to date in promoting public investments and institutional reforms and improved service provision and better policies (annex 1. SPCRP Implementation Protocol). A complete list of outputs prepared by the implementing agencies will be prepared for the evaluation team and will be included as annex to the evaluation report³.
- g. Gender and social equality, including: extent and quality of women's and minority groups' participation in programme activities, their access to programme resources and benefits; analysis of how gender relations, gender equity and processes of social inclusion were and will be affected by the programme in the area/sector of intervention; contribution to women's and minority groups' visibility, participation in local development processes and empowerment; and extent to which gender equality and social inclusion were pursued in programme management; Prospects for improving service provision to the poor/ minority groups; prospects for pro-poor policy development;
- h. Capacity development⁴, including: extent and quality of programme activities, outputs, outcomes and impact in terms of capacity development of agricultural service providers and community level beneficiaries, including of women and minority groups; institutional uptake and mainstreaming of the newly acquired capacities and perspectives for diffusion of newly acquired capacities, if any, beyond programmes' boundaries;
- i. Change in Governance structures / institutional arrangements: extent and quality of programme activities, outputs, outcomes and impact in terms of institutional and organisational change of agricultural service providers, including institutional reform, legislation, decentralisation and privatisation of services; improvements in service provision (e.g. volume and quality service delivery, processes, transaction costs of managing public resources)
- j. The prospects for sustaining and possibly upscaling the programme's results by the beneficiaries and the host institutions after the termination of the programme. The

³ The ToR can suggest a list of particular outputs and outcomes for the evaluation to assess, however the evaluation team should be free to explore in detail other specific outputs and outcomes.

⁴ Both "hardware", e.g., the construction of facilities or provision of equipment, and "software" including staff knowledge, skills, and attitudes

assessment of sustainability will include: institutional, technical, economic and social sustainability of proposed technologies/innovations/processes; project contribution and/or impact on natural resources in terms of maintenance and/or regeneration of the natural resource base (environmental sustainability).

- k. The current and foreseeable positive and negative impact or lasting changes produced by the programme, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

More detailed key questions as well as data gathering tools will be prepared by the Team Leader and capture in the inception report.

3.4 Based on the above analysis the final evaluation will draw specific conclusions and make recommendations for any necessary further action by Governments and/or FAO and other key implementing agencies to ensure sustainable development, including any need for follow-up action. The evaluation will draw attention to any lessons of general interest.

4. Evaluation methodology

4.1 The final evaluation will draw on existing documentation including but not limited to programme component progress reports, financial reports, reviews of various component outputs (assessments, training reports, etc), internal stakeholder reviews, related evaluation reports, administrative data, etc. Information gathering will also include a field mission with interviews (individual and group) with stakeholders and beneficiaries at national and state levels. Other specific data gathering activities may be undertaken such as trainee tracer studies, expert (desk) reviews of training materials, beneficiary assessments, etc. The specific tools and methods to be used will be defined at the inception phase of the final evaluation which will be reviewed by the PSC and cleared by the OED. The final evaluation will adhere to the following key principles:

4.2 The evaluation will adopt a consultative, iterative and transparent approach with internal and external stakeholders throughout the whole process. Triangulation will be a key method for validation of information and evidence. A range of tools will be used, including: consultation of existing reports, semi-structured interviews with key informants and stakeholders and focus group discussions supported by check lists and/or protocols, direct observation during field visits, etc. Particular attention will be devoted to ensure that under-privileged groups will be consulted in adequate manner.

4.3 The evaluation will also draw upon the views and perspectives of Governments, EU, FAO, EMM and GiZ staff at country level, as well as those of other key decision maker and partner stakeholders. While ultimate beneficiaries of the programme are households vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition being farmers, livestock owners, fisher-folk, traders and retailers, for the purposes of this evaluation, the primary beneficiaries are considered to be decision makers dealing with food security policy and programming. These are principally the Government(s) of the Sudan and South Sudan, public institutions concerned with agriculture and rural development in around nine selected States and localities (mainly State Ministries of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Irrigation; Locality/County Agricultural Offices; Area Agricultural Department); and local organizations dealing with food security issues either in emergency or in longer term development contexts such as community based organizations and other non state actors including the private sector (i.e. farmer unions, water associations, marketing associations, Village Development Committees, trader associations, women groups, etc) in the selected States. Other beneficiaries are the international community (donors, UN, NGOs) and those who benefit

from the services that the above organizations will deliver during the project and from the improved services that the organizations will be able to deliver after the capacity building has been completed. Target groups for the overall SPCRP will also include beneficiaries of the model projects, which broadly speaking target rural communities and households.

4.4 The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework⁵ will be used as the reference for assessing contributions to poverty alleviation, food security, gender mainstreaming, social, economic and environmental sustainability, etc. The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) framework will be one major analytical tool for assessment of the projects' results⁶.

4.5 The evaluation will strictly adhere to EU and UNEG evaluation norms & standards⁷.

5. Consultation process

5.1 The preparation and finalization of the Terms of Reference is a participative effort involving all main stakeholders to the SPCRP. At the request of the EU and with the endorsement of the NAO (Government of Sudan) and chairpersons of the PSC-NS and PSC-SS the Final Evaluation will be managed by the Office of Evaluation of FAO (OED). This implies that the OED will support the evaluation process in terms of the finalization of the TOR, the selection of the team, provision of essential briefing documentation to team members, and organization of logistical aspects of the field mission,. The Office of Evaluation has a quality assurance role on the final report, in terms of presentation, compliance with the ToR, timely delivery, quality of the evidence and analysis done.

5.2 Important roles will be played by other key stakeholders in the Programme including:

- EU Delegation(s) in Sudan/South Sudan – Commissioning agency for the evaluation. Coordinate communication between stakeholder agencies with respect to the evaluation. Identification of qualified national and international independent consultants for consideration for the final evaluation. Providing financing for the evaluation as needed.
- SPCRP Programme Steering Committees (comprising members of relevant government stakeholders and the EU, FAO, GIZ IS and EuroConsult) –Contribute to the definition of the Terms of Reference for the final evaluation. Act as a consultative group for the evaluation, meeting together with the team at least twice during the evaluation mission. Review and provide collective comments on the draft evaluation report. Prepare a management response to the final report.
- FAO SPCRP CB project – provide/organize logistical support for the evaluation mission. All 3 agencies (FAO, GIZ IS, Euroconsult, Newtech) will facilitate ground transportation for the mission.

5.3 The Evaluation Team is responsible for conducting the final evaluation, applying the methodology as appropriate and for producing the evaluation report. All team members, including the

⁵ The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework identifies five different capitals (human, social, natural, financial, and physical), each including different assets. It helps in improving understanding of livelihoods, in particular of the poor. For more information, among others: http://www.livelihoods.org/info/guidance_sheets_pdfs/section2.pdf

⁶ SWOT is a widely used strategic planning tool, useful also in analysis of projects and interventions, to assess their strengths and weaknesses and perspectives in the future. It is particularly used in focus group, but it can be adapted to individual interviews as well.

⁷ <http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards>

Team Leader, will participate in briefing and debriefing meetings, discussions, field visits, and will contribute to the evaluation with written inputs for the final draft and final report.

5.4 The Team Leader guides and coordinates the team members in their specific work, discusses their findings, conclusions and recommendations and prepares the final draft and the final report, consolidating the inputs from the team members with his/her own.

5.5 The mission is fully responsible for its independent report which may not necessarily reflect the views of the Government, the EU or other stakeholders. The Office of Evaluation will review the report and ensure its conformity with the terms of reference, but is not entitled to modify its contents.

5.6 While the mission will maintain a close liaison with the FAO Office of Evaluation throughout the evaluation process, the EU Delegation at country level will, as appropriate, liaise with and support the team during the field work, ensuring that all key stakeholders are involved. Although the mission is free to discuss with the authorities concerned anything relevant to its assignment, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government, the donor or the implementing agencies (FAO, GIZ IS, EuroConsult). At the end of the data and information gathering phase, the team will present its preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations to the key stakeholders, to discuss and obtain feedback from them. The draft evaluation report will be circulated among key stakeholders for comment before finalisation; suggestions will be incorporated as deemed appropriate by the evaluation team.

6. The evaluation team

6.1 The evaluation team shall comprise the best available mix of skills and competences that are required to assess the initiative and the issues at stake; among others, it will include competence and skills in evaluation and preferably, experience in the Sudan, South Sudan and the region; it will be balanced in terms of geographical and gender representation to ensure diversity and complementarity of perspectives.

6.2 The evaluation team will combine among its members the following fields of expertise:

- Institutional change, decentralization and privatization,
- Human capacity development
- Agricultural development (crop production & extension, irrigation, livestock production, fisheries, agricultural marketing, natural resource management and land use).
- Food Security and rural livelihood support (including rural credit and market oriented approaches)
- Gender equity analysis
- Social development and participatory processes
- Public administration and management
- Project management and evaluation

6.3 The OED will take the lead in preparing for the recruitment of independent team members. The EU will utilize its framework agreement to competitively tender for team members to be funded by them. All parties are kindly invited to suggest suitable candidates for national consultant team members. Due to the size of the countries, the high level of activity at State level, the complexity of the programme, a relatively large team will be necessary. The team will be tentatively composed of 6-7 team members, who together will cover all the fields of expertise listed above.

6.4 All team members will have a University Degree and a minimum of 10 years of professional experience in their respective areas of specialization. All will be fluent in English. A working

knowledge of Arabic will be a distinct advantage. Mission members will have no previous direct involvement with the Programme either with regard to its formulation, implementation or backstopping. All will have signed the Declaration of Interest form of the FAO Office of Evaluation.

6.5 The final composition of the team will be the responsibility of FAO Office of Evaluation, according to the criteria set out above. The Evaluation Manager from FAO's Office of Evaluation (OED) will oversee the management of the evaluation process to ensure that the evaluation proceeds smoothly and adheres to acceptable evaluation norms and standards.

6.6 The evaluation team is fully responsible for its independent report which may not necessarily reflect the views of the Government(s), EU or of FAO. A final evaluation report is not subject to technical clearance by FAO although OED is responsible for ensuring conformity of the evaluation report with standards for project/programme evaluation in FAO.

6.7 It is understood that Sudan and South Sudan are considered a hardship countries and that travel under difficult conditions will occur and specific security precautions are in place.

7. The Evaluation Report

7.1 The mission is fully responsible for its independent reporting which may not necessarily reflect the views of the government, the donor or FAO. The reports will be written in conformity with the headings and length indicated in Annex 1.

7.2 The evaluation team, lead by the team leader will prepare **two evaluation reports**, one for each of the sub-programmes. Findings, conclusions and recommendations will be disaggregated by implementing agency as well. The draft outline of the report is attached as Annex 1. The Evaluation team leader will agree the final format with the Office of Evaluation and this will be an annex to the Inception Report. The Team Leader will decide on the role of individual team members in report writing early in the evaluation process. The report will be prepared in English with numbered paragraphs. A translation of the final version of the report into Arabic will be undertaken by the Office of Evaluation if it is required.

7.3 In addition, the Team Leader will prepare a brief consolidation report/synthesis, providing a contextual analysis and highlighting the main findings of each report. The draft report will be completed, to the extent possible, in the country and the findings and recommendations fully discussed with all concerned parties during a presentation prior to the departure of the mission.

7.4 Each draft report will be presented by the Team leader to the respective Steering Committee in two workshops, to be organized by the EUD in Juba and Khartoum prior to the departure of the team from Sudan and South Sudan. Members of the Steering Committees should receive the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations before the workshop, so that they can provide informed comments at the workshop. An aide memoir of the feedback session will be prepared. The team leader bears responsibility for submitting an aide memoire to the Programme Committee(s) prior to departure from Sudan/South Sudan.

7.5 The draft report will be submitted to OED within two weeks from the conclusion of each mission. The OED will circulate the draft report for comment and questions of

clarification. Comments must be received by OED within two weeks of the drafts' circulation and will be provided to the Team Leader for consideration in the preparation of the final report. The final report is due two weeks after all comments have been received.

7.6 The Team Leader will incorporate comments received from stakeholders as appropriate and prepare one independent **Final Report**, which will include the brief consolidation report as well as the two separate reports for each sub-programme, including conclusions and recommendations for the future similar intervention in the countries. The final report will be submitted to the OED within three weeks of the completion of the second half of the mission. OED will be then responsible to formally disseminate the report to the EU, the NAO and to the members of both (north and south) SPCRP Steering Committees on behalf of the Evaluation Team.

7.7 After the report has been finalized, to improve the utilization of the evaluation report, Govt/Donor/Implementing Agency Stakeholders will prepare their respective management responses. The final evaluation report will be a public document that should be broadly disseminated to stakeholders and primary beneficiaries (an Arabic version may be required).

7.8 The evaluation report will illustrate the evidence found that responds to the evaluation issues and the evaluation criteria listed in the ToR. The report will be as clear and concise as possible and will be a self-standing document. Adequate balance will be given to its different parts, with focus on findings, conclusions and recommendations. Supporting data and analysis should be annexed to the report when considered important to complement the main report and for future reference. The report should be no longer than 60 pages excluding annexes.

7.9 The structure of the report should facilitate in so far as possible the links between body of evidence, analysis and formulation of recommendations. These will be addressed to the different stakeholders: they may be strategic and/or operational and will have to be evidence-based, relevant, focused, clearly formulated and actionable.

7.10 Annexes to the final evaluation report will include, through not limited to, the following as relevant:

- Terms of reference for the final evaluation;
- Profile of team members;
- List of documents reviewed;
- List of institutions and stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation team;
- List of project outputs;
- Evaluation tools.

8. Evaluation budget and timetable

8.1 Evaluation budget

The cost of the additional data gathering and costs associated with the independent evaluation team work will be covered by the evaluation funds earmarked within FAO SPCRP project agreements as well as by evaluation funds available directly from the EU.

8.2 Evaluation timetable

May-June 2012	Preparation of the draft ToR – feedback from internal and external stakeholders
July/Aug 2012	Finalization of the TOR Selection of the Team Leader EUD FWC – Call for Expressions of Interest Collection of all programme related documentation. TL desk review and development of draft evaluation matrix and tools
September 2012 (20/21)	OED & TL Preparatory Mission to Khartoum 25-28 Sept.
October/Nov 2012	29Sept-14Oct Sudan 16-27 Oct Draft report writing from home 29Oct-12Nov South Sudan 14-28 Nov Draft report writing from home (preliminary debriefings in Khartoum 14 th Oct and Juba 12Nov)
Dec 2012	9 th Dec – TL submission of draft report to OED and is circulated for review to EUD, FAO, EMM, GiZ IS and PSC N/S members.
Dec 2012	By 31Dec - Feedback provided to Team Leader.
January 2012	10 Jan - Final report prepared, submitted to OED and circulated 10 Feb - Management response submitted to OED.

The Team Leader will have preparation days and receive a two-day briefing in Rome and Addis Ababa prior to traveling to Sudan in order to a) discuss the ToRs for the evaluation with OED evaluation service staff, b) interview the key technical and operational units within FAO responsible for supporting the delivery of the SPCRP project, and c) revise the evaluation matrix for the evaluation and prepare data gathering tools during this period. Other team members will have reading and preparation days from home and will be provided with a briefing package of SPCRP project and contextual information for the Sudan and South Sudan.

The next phase involves **Field Final Evaluation Mission to the Sudan and South Sudan**. Field work will be carried out in the Sudan/South Sudan during the month of October/November 2012. The entire team should meet in Khartoum the weekend of Sept 29 in order to have a day of team preparation prior to the formal start of the mission on 1st October. The team members will have an initial one day country and security brief in Khartoum, meeting with the National Authorizing Officer (NAO) and the EUD. The Team Leader will be responsible for managing the evaluation team, analyzing the relevance of the project in both the Sudan and South Sudan through interviews with senior food security information users/decision-makers in government and partner organizations, and for presenting the main findings and recommendations to Project Steering Committee members in Juba and Khartoum in a debriefing prior to the departure of the mission.

Annex 2. Profile of team members

The evaluation team is composed of team leader Herma Majoor and team members Ian Bartlett, Karl Kaiser, Abdul Hamid Rhametalla, Haroon Sseguya and Willem van den Toorn.

- 1) Herma Majoor is educated as economist as well as nutritionist and works as independent expert in gender, food security and nutrition and monitoring & evaluation in developing countries. She works with international and supranational organisations, governments, universities, international and national NGOs and civil society. She has worked as team leader in various long-term and short-term projects. She has worked over 15 years in Central, and South-East and South Asia, the Middle East and Anglophone and Francophone Africa.
- 2) Karl Kaiser is an agricultural economist with 36 years experience in rural development. He worked in various countries in Africa and Asia for multi- and bilateral organizations. More than 18 years he worked as team leader in long-term projects in Africa and Asia focused on rural development, sustainable natural resources management and capacity development. He made 2 short-term assignments in Southern Sudan in 2002 (MTR of EU funded PACE project) and in 2009 (German funded bilateral refugee resettlement project in Central and Eastern Equatorial States).
- 3) Peter Tingwa is an agricultural professor and an expert in agriculture (education, research, planning and implementation), peace operations (economic recovery, reconciliation, and the restoration of governance and state authorities) and higher education (teaching, research planning and the management of universities). He has worked in peace keeping operations in many countries and in agriculture in South Sudan for various donors.
- 4) Haroon Sseguya is an agricultural sociologist with expertise and experience in agricultural extension systems, food security and livelihoods programming, program/project planning, monitoring and evaluation, communication for development and capacity building for rural and development organizations. He has over 12 years experience in Anglophone Africa and North America. In the recent past, he has consulted for local and international NGOs, government departments, The World Bank, CG Centers and Universities.
- 5) Willem van den Toorn is educated as an economist with a mid-career PhD 'Multi-system society and trade-off based planning'. He has worked with all major donor agencies in over 35 countries in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Middle East (including the Sudan and South Sudan), Caribbean Region and Europe. Over the last decade his focus shifted to institutional and organisational development, capacity building and evaluation. He worked as expert, TL, project director, managing director of management consulting firm, professor of sustainable resources planning and development.

Annex 3. List of documents reviewed

Capacity Building Component

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- Meeting minutes Programme Steering Committee 2 June 2011; 13 October 2011; 9 February 2102
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- GFRAS – Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services. Guide to evaluating rural extensions. April 2012
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Annex 4. List of institutions and stakeholders met during the evaluation process

Time	Name	Designation/ Department	Organisation
29 October 2012, Juba			
8:30-9:30	Sue Lautze	Head of Office	FAO South Sudan
10:00-11:00	Massimiliano Pedretti	Head Rural Development Section	Delegation of the European Union to South Sudan
11:00-13:00	Susan Kilobia Severino, Opio Simon Baka Data Godfrey Isaac Bazugba	CTA (acting) Programme Manager Rural Development Extension Specialist Administration & Finance Officer RI – Capacity Building Specialist	SPCRP PCU Juba
14:00-15:00	Bodo Immink	Country Director	GIZ
30 October 2012, Juba			
9:00-10:00	Martin E. Lomuro	Minister	Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries
	Nadia Arop Dudi		
10:00-13:00	John Ogoio Kanisio	DG Veterinary Services	
	Noel Lamude	Market Officer	
	Lewis K. Jaja	DG Research	
	Anna Felix Baigo	DG APRM	
	Sarofino Alome	DG Fisheries	
	Augustino Atillio	DG Extension	
	Martin Lomuro	Minister of Animal Resources and Fisheries	
14:30-15:30	Isaac Liabwel C. Yol	Undersecretary	Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation
16:00-17:00	Jiben Jeremiah	Director	
31 October 2012, Juba			
9:00-10:00	Betty Ogwaro	Minister	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and cooperatives
10:00-13:00	Matthew Udo	Undersecretary	
	Loro George Laju Lugar	DG Agr Prod Extension Services	
	Atem Garang Malual	Head of Plant Protection Unit	
	Timothy Thwol Onak	DG Forestry	
	John Deng Ayan	Admin & Finance	
	Lino Loku Gori	AG/DG Planning	
	Stephen Lomeling	DG Finance	

Time	Name	Designation/ Department	Organisation
	Cirino Oketayot	Head of Research	
	Aggney Moluk Lueth	DG Rural Development	
	Abden Ayuen Kuol	DG Coop & Rural Devt	
	Mary Benjamin Loki	Director Post Harvest and Home Economics	
	Max Osco Abucha	AG Director Coop Devt	
14:30-15:30	Jesus P. Tolentino	Programme Manager	UNOPS
	Stephen Robinson	Programme Director	

Time	Name	Designation/ Department	Organisation
1 November Aweil - Northern Bahr el Ghazal			
11:30-13:00	Joseph Lodu	Admin Assistant	SPCRP, TSU NBEG
	Kepa Dima	Coordinator CB	SPCRP, TSU NBEG
14:00-15:30	Ayii Bol Akol	Minister	SMAF
	Gabriel Mali Fonguyo	DG/Director Admin/Finance	SMAF
16:00-17:00	Albino Madhan Anei	Minister	SMARF
	Stephen Ajok Mou	Director General	SMARF
	Maror Klol Majou	Director Admin/Finance	SMARF
17:00-18:30	Makur James Achuouf	Training/Development Specialist	SPCRP, TSU NBEG
2 November Aweil - Northern Bahr el Ghazal			
9:00-13:00	Angui Lual Angui	Admin and Finance	SMAF
	John Leon Lollis	DD Forestry	SMAF
	Ganang Tang Akeon	D Admin and Finance	ARS
	Garang Ngong		SMAF
	Deng William Malitt		SMAF
	Angelo Bihar Thuo		SMAF
	Albino Garang Maror		ARS
	Jakob Jak Mal	Forestry Department	SMAF
	Gabriel Mali Fongrang		SMAF
14:00-17:00	Paul Kuel Kuel	Director Planning & Budget	SMARF
	Peter Jak Dut	Director Animal Health	SMARF
	Anaheed Mohamed Ahmed	Vet Officer	SMARF
	Luka Angui	Fisheries specialist	SMARF
	Samuel Ajung		SMARF

Time	Name	Designation/ Department	Organisation
	Joseph Aguer Aguer	Inspector Fisheries	SMARF
	Hassan Hassan		SMARF
	Agastino Ugar		SMARF
	Mavor Woi Majok		SMARF
	Stephen Ajok Mom		SMARF
3 November Gokmachar - Northern Bahr el Ghazal			
11:30-12:00	Francis Kolmou	Inspector Fisheries	SMARF
12:00-13:00	Deng Anei Inach	CAHW	
	Santino Lual Liai	CAHW	
	Vuot Wol Kur	CAHW	
	Joseph Lual Reech	CAHW	
	Atem Anak Anei	CAHW	
	James Liai Dut	CAHW	
	Piol Chan Buk	CAHW	
13:00-14:00	13 members	Fisheries group	
5 November Nyamlel - Northern Bahr el Ghazal			
11:00-12:00	James Anei matok	Fisheries Inspector	
	William Wany Guen	Senior Inspector Agriculture	
	Diing Wawien Diing	Forestry Inspector	
	Herny Pioth Achiak	Senior Inspector Agriculture	
	13 members	Wol Pit Chok Fisheries FFS	
	20 members	Marial Baai Groundnut FFS	
6 November Malek Alel - Northern Bahr el Ghazal			
9:00-10:00	Kerubiro Wol Bol	Director	KUCDA
11:00-12:00	8 members	Groundnut cooperation	Aweil
	4 staff members	Auction kraal	Aweil
	5 staff members	Slaughterhouse	Aweil
7 November – Aweil Rice Scheme - Northern Bahr el Ghazal			
10:00-17:00	Paul Agui Malooc	Manager	Aweil Rice Scheme
	Garang Tong Alheren	D/Administration	
	Albino Garang Maror	Senior Agronomy	
	Martin Ahel	Clerk	
	Mauro Mawien	Senior Surveyor	
	Madul Kuai Ngo		
	Mangesto Thou Aguot	Extensionist	
	William Ajal Deng	Irrigation Officer	

Time	Name	Designation/ Department	Organisation
	Lual Wol Alwar	Extensionist	
	Edward Ruai Dut Ruai	Extensionist	
	Chan Kuac Iogor	Extensionist	
	Deng Willam Mapih	Extensionist	
	Auei Deng Akok Deng	Agronomist	
	Mathuc Akol Akol		
	Kerusino Boy Augnei Khal	Senior Extension	
	John Jongo Cosmos	HSC	
8 November Aweil - Northern Bahr el Ghazal			
9:00-14:00	Mark Ngeko	CBC Warrap	FAO
	Kiden Susan Phamel	SPCRP WBEG	FAO
	Tito Akol Tiit		SMARF WBEG
	Hilbary Taban	SPCRP Warrap	FAO
	Karlo Kamilo		SMAFF WBEG
	Martin Madut		SMAF Warrap
	Andrea Adera Akoc	Master Trainer	SMAF
	John Agok Deng		
	Abraham Matuc Mel		Warrap
	Nyankem Akueth Anei		Warrap
	Nafisa Abd Elmahman		SMAF
	Ibrahim Abdalla Deng		SMARF
	Albert Awad Zakaria		Farmers Coop
	Hassan Mohammed Ali		SMARF WBEG
	Johnny Denis Okeny	SPCRP WBEG	FAO
	Paul Andrea Ujang		WBEG
	Paul Udangalla		WBEG
	Mario Battista Rabeh		WBEG
	Samilbrahim Ahmed		WBEG

1-6 November Lakes State

Table 1: State Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

S/No.	Name	Sex	Position	Ministry or Department	Work Location
1.	Isaac Lueth Marier	M	Director General	SMAF	HQ
2.	David Bol Machok	M	Director- Agriculture	SMAF	HQ
3.	Barnaba Chol Makoi	M	Ag. Director- Mech.	SMAF	HQ
4.	James Mapuor Makorou	M	Ag. Director- Forestry	SMAF	HQ
5.	Placido Lual M.	M	D/Director- Planning	SMAF	HQ
6.	Bith Maguruk Macol	M	D/Director- Adm/Fin	SMAF	HQ
7.	Samuel Mabor Makom	M	S/Inspector- Establishmt	SMAF	HQ
8.	John Amuri Rual	M	Ass/Inspector- Mech	SMAF	HQ
9.	Chol Marou Banok	M	Inspector- Establishment	SMAF	HQ
10.	Hanson Ater Gabriel	M	Ass/Director- Forestry	SMAF	HQ
11.	Kerbino Dut John	M	Inspector- Horticulture	SMAF	HQ
12.	Makur Marol Majok	M	S/Inspector- Procuremt	SMAF	HQ
13.	Mabor Kau Lam	M	Director- Adm/Finance	SMAF	HQ

Table 2: State Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries

S/No.	Name	Sex	Position	Ministry or Department	Work Location
1.	Paul Maker Degal	M	Director General	SMARF	HQ
2.	Samuel Dook M.	M	Snr Inspector- Veterinary	SMARF	HQ
3.	Paul Bil Jokngeth	M	D/Director- Hides/Skins	SMARF	HQ
4.	Benjamin Mading Amuor	M	Director- Animal Prodn	SMARF	HQ
5.	Dr. Matur Alembanu	M	Ag. Director- Veterinary	SMARF	HQ
6.	Mabor Machar	M	Snr Inspector- Hides/Skins	SMARF	HQ
7.	Benjamin Makoi	M	Ass Director- Animal Pdn	SMARF	HQ
8.	Benjamin Mangar Y.	M	Fisheries Inspector	SMARF	HQ
9.	Enock Makuoch	M	Office Ass Manager	SMARF	HQ

Table 3: County Agriculture Departments- CADs

S/No.	Name	Sex	Position	Ministry or Department	Work Location
1.	Gabriel Ngic-nhom	M	Agric County Director	CAD	Cueibet
2.	Tereza Apen	F	Agent Officer	CAD	Cueibet
3.	Peter Kuch	M	Supervisor- Forestry	CAD	Cueibet
4.	Abraham Malok Rok	M	Snr Inspector- Forestry	CAD	Cueibet
5.	John Chol Mawan	M	Snr Inspector- Veterinary	CAD	Cueibet
6.	Santino Matur	M	Agric Extension Officer	CAD	Cueibet
7.	George Machiek Wel	M	Inspector- Fisheries	CAD	Cueibet

Table 4: County Agriculture Departments- CADs

S/No.	Name	Sex	Position	Ministry or Department	Work Location
1.	Ezekiel Magok Rual	M	Agric County Director	CAD	Rumbek East
2.	Malith Matuet Buoch	M	Snr Inspector- Agriculture	CAD	Rumbek East
3.	Abraham Sebit Mading	M	Snr Inspector- Animal Re.	CAD	Rumbek East
4.	John Majok Majak	M	Snr Inspector- Fisheries	CAD	Rumbek East
5.	Joseph Bith Cadar	M	Inspector- Forestry	CAD	Rumbek East
6.	Joseph Makoi Gol	M	Agric Extension Officer	CAD	Rumbek East
7.	Samuel Mayar Gorjok	M	Agric Extension Officer	CAD	Rumbek East
8.	John Madong Mawana	M	Supervisor- Forestry	CAD	Rumbek East
9.	Makur Akol	M	H/CAHW	CAD	Rumbek East
10.	Mading Makueicimith	M	H/Labourer- Agriculture	CAD	Rumbek East
11.	Mourwel Dongnin M.	M	Inspector- Forestry	CAD	Rumbek East
12.	Yom Rokoch Nhial	F	Messenger- Agriculture	CAD	Rumbek East
13.	Yar Juro Ajuong	F	Cleaner- Agriculture	CAD	Rumbek East
14.	Monica Agar Makueigak	F	Cleaner- Agriculture	CAD	Rumbek East
15.	Chol Gakmar Maguar	M	Gardner- Agriculture	CAD	Rumbek East

16.	Marial Lueth Domkoch	M	Gardner- Agriculture	CAD	Rumbek East
17.	Maker Mayar Makuach	M	Gardner- Agriculture	CAD	Rumbek East

Table 5: FFS Implementing partners

S/No.	Name	Sex	Position	Agency or Organisation	Work Location
1.	Samson M. Muema	M	Project Coordinator	ACMI/LIA (YAFAO)	Rumbek
2.	Ambrose N. Ruri	M	Programme Officer	DRDA	Rumbek

Table 6: Community Animal Health Workers

S/No.	Name	Sex	Position	Agency or Organisation	Work Location
1.	James Malok	M	CAHW	CAD	Cueibet
2.	Samuel Marier	M	CAHW	CAD	Cueibet
3.	Mourwel Madit	M	AHA	CAD	Cueibet
4.	Zakaria Mamer	M	CAHW	CAD	Cueibet
5.	Machok Kormac	M	CAHW	CAD	Cueibet
6.	Marial Ajak	M	CAHW	CAD	Cueibet
7.	Chol Riak	M	CAHW	CAD	Cueibet
8.	James Mabor Pading	M	CAHW	CAD	Cueibet
9.	Peter Matueny	M	AHA	CAD	Cueibet
10.	Kur Majuech	M	CAHW	CAD	Cueibet
11.	Bith Abiel	M	CAHW	CAD	Cueibet
12.	Thuc Mathiang	M	CAHW	CAD	Cueibet
13.	Mayor Malek	M	CAHW	CAD	Cueibet

S/No.	Name	Sex	Position	Agency or Organisation	Work Location
1.	Makoth Puoram Mabor	M	CAHW	CAD	Rumbek East
2.	Isaac Mourwel Apac	M	CAHW	CAD	Rumbek East
3.	Makoi Aterdit Bol	M	CAHW	CAD	Rumbek East
4.	Isaac Madhel Rial	M	CAHW	CAD	Rumbek East
5.	Joseph Akuoch Makeung	M	CAHW	CAD	Rumbek East
6.	Makuar Abuok Jooth	M	CAHW	CAD	Rumbek East

Table 7: FFS/Cooperatives

S/No.	Name of Cooperative or FFS Group	Sex			Enterprise or Learning Technology	Work Location
		Male	Female	Total		
1.	Tong-diar Puoth	1	17	18	Vegetable and Groundnut	Cueibet (Mayath Payam)
2.	Kony Rot	7	3	10	Fruit and Forestry Species Propagation	Cueibet (Cueibet Payam)
3.	Kony Baai (Bahr Naam) Cooperative Society	20	12	32	Fish Production, Preservation and Marketing	Rumbek East (Aduel Payam)
4.	Loro Cooperative Society	11	25	36	Vegetable and Groundnut	Rumbek East (Aduel Payam)
5.	Nhom Lau Cooperative Society	6	16	22	Fruit, Vegetable and Groundnut Cultivation	Rumbek East (Atiaba Payam)
TOTAL		45	73	118		

1-8 November Central and Western Equatoria

Name	Designation/Department	Organisation
Francis Soma	Director General	SMARF, CES, Juba
Lukak Morgan	Director General	SMARF, CES, Juba
Alfredo Gulaj	Head Statistics and M&E Unit	SMARF, CES, Juba
Stephen Rojas	Head Fisheries, Terekeka County	SMARF, CES, Terekeka
Jacob Gere	Commissioner	Terekeka County, CES
Elias Luete	Executive Director	Terekeka County, CES
John Tom	Chairman Fish Traders Association	Terekeka Town, CES
Moses Modi + seven members	Lowi Fishing Association	Buko Village, Terekeka County, CES
William Haqim Ushalla	Fisheries Specialist	FAO Juba Office
Ines Wiedemann	Project Manager	Food Security & Agriculture Development Project/GIZ, Juba
Juergen Koch	Project Director	Food Security & Agriculture Development Project/GIZ, Juba
Hon. West Yugulle	Minister	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Marcello Constantino Bakuyo	Director General Agriculture	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Clement Mokorondere	Director Department of Agriculture	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Cyrilo Kumborani	Acting Director CAD, SMACE	Ezo County, WES
Sentina Anima Peter	Extension Worker	Ezo County, WES
Mordecai Maderco Bierwa	Inspector Fisheries	Ezo County, WES
Saeed Mariaka Wayo	Senior Inspector Commissioner's Office	Ibba County, WES
Jackson Timon Maranyi	Executive Director	Ibba County, WES
Seth Salahmaripso	Extension Worker	Ibba County, WES
James Elias Bandasi	Extension Worker	Ibba County, WES
Umjima Ehizai	H.C.S Agriculture	Ibba County, WES
Stephen Ariyo Abduel	Inspector Forestry	Ibba County, WES
Martin Nyessi	Community Mobilizer	GIZ-DETA, Ibba County, WES
Peter Manur (plus 6 members)	Chairman Makiba FFS (sorghum)	Ibba County, WES
Daniel Paulino Gomoro	Primary Education Administrator, Sanaga Primary School	Madebe Payam, Ibba County, WES
Wilson Michael	FFS Facilitator (agro-forestry)	Madebe Payam, Ibba County, WES
Graciano Elsamah	Member FFS (agro-forestry)	Madebe Payam, Ibba County, WES
Louis Bagare	Agriculture Field Officer	ERCC, FAO, Yambio, WES
Taata Bate	Administration Assistant	SPCRP, FAO, Yambio, WES
Philip Bullen	Assistant Agriculture Inspector	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Julius Lonyong	CB Coordinator, Head TSU	SPCRP, Yambio, WES
Fred Samanya	Project Officer	World Vision International, Yambio, WES

Name	Designation/Department	Organisation
Charles Kpumbetu	Assistant Livelihood Coordinator	World Vision International, Yambio, WES
Paul Elia Kuze	Member	Mamenze FFMC, Yambio, WES
Michael Lenzoh	Information Officer	Mamenze FFMC, Yambio, WES
Daniel Michael	Member	Mamenze FFMC, Yambio, WES
Alex Foukpio	Secretary	Mamenze FFMC, Yambio, WES
John Ezra Bawira	Inspector Fisheries	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Aulthory Morigu	Director Planning	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Luke Umerebati	Director M&E, Planning Department	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Grace Duani Mohamed	Director Food and Nutrition	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Scopas Onje Tokporo	Deputy Director Forestry	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Johnson Ezibon Lagure	Director Forestry	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Ehias Peter Rusum	Assistant Director Agriculture	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Grace Duani Mohamed	Director Food and Nutrition	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Lawrick Mobwurk Kenneth	Forest Ranger	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Tito R. Arona	Deputy Director Agriculture	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Edward Bongomin	Inspector Forestry	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Godfrey Augustus	Deputy Director Animal Resources	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Philip Lado	Assistant Inspector Animal Resources	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Dr. John Mamur Bogo	Deputy Director Animal Health	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Samuel T. Zingbondo	Livestock Officer	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Elia Solomon	Deputy Director Fisheries	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Charles Nurussi Cristo	Senior Inspector Animal Production	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Emmanuel Lita Jambo	Deputy Director Planning Animal Resources	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Dr. Peter P. Wohalla	Director Animal Resources	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Edward Kisanga	Director General Animal Resources	SMACE, Yambio, WES
Kiden Grace Wani	Coordinator GIZ-DETA	Yambio, Western Equatoria State

Annex 5. List of project outputs achieved
GREATER BAHR EL GHAZAL – OUTPUTS

Northern Bahr el Ghazal Output

Capacity Building Summary The 2012 Biannual Financial Report has the latest data on Project Costs. The evaluation team has been informed that there will be no update till project end. Furthermore, budget breakdowns by State are not available since several cost items are joint costs. For further details see the end report.		Budget: €22,572,720 Expenditure: €20,073,607 %: 88.93%
Capacity Building Outputs		
Physical (New Buildings)	Location	Quantities
SMAF HQ	Aweil	1
CADs	Nyamlel	1
	Gok Machar	1
	Malek Alel	1
	Total	4
Hardtop Land cruiser	SMAF	1
Hardtop Land cruiser	TSU	1
Pickup Land cruiser	SMAF	1
Pickup Land cruiser	TSU	1
Motorcycles	SMAF	2
Furniture and Equipment		
Laptops	TSU	3
Desks	TSU	3
Chairs	TSU	3
Mobile phones	TSU	4
Office furniture sets	SMAF	1
Office furniture sets	CADs	4
IT equipments (computers, printers etc)	SMAF and CADs	Set
Generators	SMAF and 3 CADs	4 (one each)
Internal telephone communication (IP PABX)	SMAF	1
VSAT	SMAF	1
HF base radio communication	SMAF	1
HF base radio communication	CADs	3
Institutional and Human CB		
Strategic Planning workshop	SMAF and NSA	34 participants (all male)
Strategic Plan 2010 – 2012	SMAF	1 document
Planning and budgeting	SMAF	14 participants

training		
Computer training	SMAF HQ	12 participant (all male)
Computer training for CADs	CADs	10 participants (all male)
Human Resources and Administration Procedures Manual	SMAF	1
Financial/Accounting Systems and Procedures Manual	SMAF	1
Procurement and Supplies Procedure Manual	SMAF	1
Training on accounting, procurement and office management	SMAF	3 participants (one for each subject)
Training on leadership and management	SMAF	11 participants (all male)
ToT training on Project Cycle Management (PCM)	SMAF and CADs	NA
Training on SPSS	SMAF HQ	2 participants (all male)
Training on M&E	SMAF	22 participants (all male)
	Rural Advisory and Extension Services	
<i>Farmer Field Schools (FFS)</i>		
Formation and establishment of FFS groups in 2009	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	8 FFS groups of 231 members (136 male and 95 female)
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through NSAs in 2010	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	40 FFS established by Christian Agenda for Development (10), Aweil Project and Agriculture Development (10), Kueng Community Development Agency (10) and AMURT International (10).
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through State SMAF and SMARF in 2011	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	20 FFS of 400 members (229 male, 171 female)
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through State SMAF and SMARF in 2012	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	14 FFS of 354 members (234 male, 120 female)
Training of FFS supervisors and facilitators	SMAF and CADs	66 (58 facilitators and 9 supervisors)
Participatory Rural	SMAF and FFS	28 participants from 5 states.

Appraisal (PRA) Training	facilitators	Annex 14 of 2010 annual report indicating details not available.
Refresher and Basic FFS Training in 2010	FFS facilitators and supervisors	25 participants from 5 states. Annex 14 of 2010 annual report indicating details not available.
Refresher and Basic FFS Training in 2011 and 2012	FFS facilitators	46 participants (44 male, 2 female)
Development of FFS implementation Guidelines	SMAF	FFS manual developed and distributed to Supervisors and Facilitators
Grant Support for FFS (1,000 USD per FFS group)	3 CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	47 FFS provided with grants for agro forestry, crop production and fisheries activities
Training on conservation agriculture, and crop management	FFS Groups	43 members (27 male 16 female)
Conservation agriculture demonstration	2 demonstration plots	60 farmers (32 male, 28 female)
Training on improved agro forestry practices.	8 FFS Groups	233 members (185 male and 48 female)
Training on vegetables and fruits production	FFS Groups	60 members (no breakdown by gender)
Training on IPPM	SMAF	5 participants (4 male and 1 female)
Training on IPPM	FFS Groups	60 participants (32 male and 28female)
Initiation of on-farm collaborative trials	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	Help farmers identify suitable varieties of sorghum, groundnut, and sugarcane. In absence of capable research institutions within South Sudan, SPCRP initiated discussions for ICRISAT to start collaborative on-farm trials.
Establishment of state demonstration gardens	SMAF HQ	1 acre garden to demonstrate both irrigated and rainfed farming techniques for growing subsistence and cash crops
Development, production and dissemination of messages on extension materials	SMAF and CADs	Extension materials disseminated for major crops sorghum, groundnuts, maize, sesame and vegetables.
Motorcycles	CADs	5 (4 for facilitators and 1 for supervisor)
Bicycles	SMAF	20 for FFS facilitators
<i>Community Animal Health Workers</i>		
Identification of active	County level	213 in all five states, no

CAHWs		disaggregated figures available for WBeG
Refresher training for active and functional CAHWs	SMARF	23 CAHWs (19 male, 4 female)
Livestock awareness campaigns	6 Cattle camps	441 cattle owners (311 male, 130 female)
Training on animal health and production for upgrading of CAHWs to Animal Health Auxiliaries	CADs	2 CAHWs (all male)
Formation of CAHWs associations	SMARF	2 associations (planned?)
Guideline for all agencies involved in community animal health services in South Sudan.	SMARF	1 National Minimum Standards and Guidelines for Community Animal Health Services Systems produced
Standardizing the CAHWs training curricula	SMARF	1 training manual produced
Solar operated fridges	SMARF and CADs	4 (1 MOARF and 3 county level)
CAHWs tool kits	County level	20 kits distributed
Bicycles	County level	20 distributed to active CAHWs after attending the refresher course
Certificate course in fisheries	SMARF	1 staff member
<i>Market Access and Business Development</i>		
Rural enterprise and market	SMAF	1 market study produced
Value chain analysis training	SMAF	3 staff members trained
Identification, technical and financial support to the small agribusiness	Aweil	1 association, KUCDA for groundnut oil processing plant. Total member 5,323 (3,510 male, 1,813 female). Local contribution: SSP 125 000 (USD 43 857) Money used for development of the Association: No information Balance at hand: No information
Business plan development	SMAF	1 business plan developed for KUCDA for groundnut oil processing plant
	Model Project Outputs	
<i>Bahr El Ghazal Livestock Production and Marketing Project (LPMP)</i>		
Establishment of auction	SMARF, county level	2 auction kraals constructed in

kraals		Warawar and Aweil. Only one is operational in Warawar
Trainings on use and management of auction kraals	Auction user and management	On average 50 – 150 users, private operator and some members of the management board trained every month.
Slaughter slabs/houses	SMARF and County authorities	1 Slaughter house constructed and operational in Aweil
Establishment of organisational structures and management systems	Aweil	1 Management boards as overall decision making bodies formed.
Training on use and utility of improved slaughter houses	Aweil	2 SMARF staff and 2 staff of the private operator trained.
Training on meat inspection	SMARF	20 participants (17 male, 3 female). Training delivered by CB component.
Provision of hygienic milk handling containers	Cattle camps	XX milk handling containers provided on cost recovery basis to rural women
	Model Project Outputs	
<i>Aweil Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (AIRP)</i>		
Machinery		
D6 Bull Dozer	ARS	1
Excavator	ARS	1
Compacter 10 MT	ARS	1
Towed Water Tanks	ARS	2
Tipper truck (20 MT capacity)	ARS	2
Grader	ARS	1
Back hoe loader 428E	ARS	1
Raw water Pumps	ARS	2
Rice mill	ARS	1
Seed cleaner	ARS	1
Rehabilitation of culverts and other simple water control structures		Irrigation infrastructure in basin 9, 8 & 7 was rehabilitated and is operational
Allocation of plots to tenant farmers as per tenant service agreement on a seasonal basis		In the 2011 planting season, 499 farmers (163 Udhum, 205 Maduany and 131 Aweil) were allocated a total of 1,172 feddan in basins 9 & 8. Out of the 499 farmers, 178 women, 47 farmers were allocated 4 feddan, 444 were

		allocated 2 feddan and 7 were allocated 1 feddan. The remaining feddan were left for variety observation in the agronomy.
Area planted in 2011		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) 1,120 feddan planted with rice and allocated to 499 farmers, including 114 returnees. b) 700 feddan planted with sorghum by private farmers
Farmers Groups and Association		<p>55 farmers groups have been established including all 499 rice farmers of the scheme.</p> <p>Aweil Rice Farmers Association (ARFA) was established, with 5 elected office bearers and 15 committee members. Over 450 members paid registration fees of 50 SSP for 2012.</p>
Training for rice farmers groups		175 farmers (84 males & 51 females) were trained for 1 week in collaboration with the FAO CB component.
Studies and assessments	ARS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Land use/land rights study conducted in collaboration with FAO CB b) Traditional farming systems assessment conducted
Staff Training	ARS	14 front line scheme staff trained (3 extension staff, 3 agronomy staff , 4 agronomists and 4 irrigation officers). Trained facilitated by FAO CBC
Road Access	ARS	36 km out dyke road towards Aweil centre have been cleared of tree stumps, back filled, levelled and compacted

Western Bahr el Ghazal Outputs

Capacity Building Summary The 2012 Biannual Financial Report has the latest data on Project Costs. The evaluation team has been informed that there will be no update till project end. Furthermore, breakdowns by State are not available since several cost items are joint costs. For further details see the end report.		Budget: €22,572,720 Expenditure: €20,073,607 %: 88.93%
Capacity Building Outputs		
Physical (New Buildings)		
SMAF HQ	Wau	1
CADs	Bazia	1
	Raja	1
	Total	3
Hardtop Land cruiser	SMAF	1
Hardtop Land cruiser	TSU	1
Pickup Land cruiser	SMAF	1
Pickup Land cruiser	TSU	1
Motorcycles	SMAF	2
Furniture and Equipment		
Laptops	TSU	3
Desks	TSU	3
Chairs	TSU	3
Mobile phones	TSU	4
Office furniture sets	SMAF	1
Office furniture sets	CADs	3
IT equipments (computers, printers etc)	SMAF and CADs	Set
Generators	SMAF and CADs	3 (one each)
Internal telephone communication (IP PABX)	SMAF	1
VSAT	SMAF	1
HF base radio communication	SMAF	1
HF base radio communication	CADs	2
Institutional and Human CB		
Strategic Planning workshop	SMAF and NSA	31 participants (30 male, 1 female)
Strategic Plan 2010 - 2012	SMAF	1 document
Planning and budgeting training	SMAF	14 participants
Computer training	SMAF HQ	20 participant (14 male, 6 female)
Computer training for CADs	CADs	21 participants (19 male, 2 female)
Human Resources and	SMAF	1

Administration Procedures Manual		
Financial/Accounting Systems and Procedures Manual	SMAF	1
Procurement and Supplies Procedure Manual	SMAF	1
Training on accounting, procurement and office management	SMAF	3 participants (one for each subject)
Training on leadership and management	SMAF	8 participants (all male)
ToT training on Project Cycle Management (PCM)	SMAF and CADs	20 participants (15 male, 5 female)
Training on SPSS	SMAF HQ	2 participants (all male)
Training on M&E	SMAF	31 participants (29 male, 2 female)
	Rural Advisory and Extension Services	
<i>Farmer Field Schools (FFS)</i>		
Formation and establishment of FFS groups in 2009	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	8 FFS groups of 193 members (102 male and 91 female)
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through NSAs in 2010	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	32 FFS established by; Women Training and Promotion (10), Women Development Group (7), Intermon Oxfam (5) and Sudanese Red Crescent (10)
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through State SMAF and SMARF in 2011	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	13 FFS of 281 members (146 male, 135 female)
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through State SMAF and SMARF in 2012	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	14 FFS of 354 members (234 male, 120 female)
Training of FFS supervisors and facilitators	SMAF and CADs	70 (62 facilitators and 8 supervisors)
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Training	SMAF and FFS facilitators	28 participants from 5 states. Annex 14 of 2010 annual report indicating details not available.
Refresher and Basic FFS Training	FFS facilitators and supervisors	25 participants from 5 states. Annex 14 of 2010 annual report indicating details not available.

Development of FFS implementation Guidelines	SMAF	FFS manual developed and distributed to the Supervisors and Facilitators
Grant Support for FFS (1,000 USD per FFS group)	2 CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	14 FFS groups provided with grants for agro forestry, livestock, crop production and fisheries activities
Training on conservation agriculture, and crop management	FFS Groups	33 members (no breakdown by gender)
Training on improved agro forestry practices.	8 FFS Groups	233 members (185 male and 48 female)
Training on vegetables and fruits production	FFS Groups	60 members (no breakdown by gender)
Training on IPPM	SMAF	5 participants (4 male and 1 female)
9 months certificate course	SMARF	2 participants (all male)
Diploma course in forestry	SMAF	1 student
Initiation of on-farm collaborative trials	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	Help farmers identify suitable varieties of sorghum, groundnut, and sugarcane. In absence of capable research institutions within South Sudan, SPCRP initiated discussions for ICRISAT to start collaborative on-farm trials.
Establishment of state demonstration gardens	SMAF HQ	1 acre garden to demonstrate both irrigated and rain-fed farming techniques for growing subsistence and cash crops
Development, production and dissemination of messages on extension materials	SMAF and CADs	Extension materials disseminated for major crops sorghum, groundnuts, maize, sesame and vegetables.
Motorcycles	CADs	5 (4 for facilitators and 1 for supervisor)
Bicycles	SMAF	20 for FFS facilitators
<i>Community Animal Health Workers</i>		
Identification of active CAHWs	County level	213 in all five states, no disaggregated figures available for WBeG
Refresher training for active and functional CAHWs	SMARF	16 CAHWs (15 male, 1 female)
Livestock awareness campaigns	5 cattle camps (Jur river)	230 cattle owners with an average holding of 20,000 cattle
Vaccination	County level	45,000 heads of cattle, sheep and

		goats vaccinated against CBPP, BQ, Anthrax and HS
Training on animal health and production for upgrading of CAHWs to Animal Health Auxiliaries	CADs	2 CAHWs (all male)
Formation of CAHWs association	SMARF	2 associations (planned?)
Guideline for all agencies involved in community animal health services in South Sudan.	SMARF	1 National Minimum Standards and Guidelines for Community Animal Health Services Systems produced
Standardizing the CAHWs training curricula	SMARF	1 training manual produced
Solar operated fridges	CADs	4 (distributed at county levels)
CAHWs tool kits	County level	20 kits distributed
Bicycles	County level	20 distributed to active CAHWs after attending the refresher course
Certificate course in fisheries	SMARF	1 staff member
<i>Market Access and Business Development</i>		
Rural enterprise and market	SMAF	1 market study produced
Value chain analysis training	SMAF	3 staff members trained
Identification, technical and financial support to the small agribusiness	Wau	1 association, NATABU Farmers association for tomato value chain development for up-market. Total membership 17 (13 male, 4 female)
Business plan development	SMAF	1 business plan developed for NATABU Farmers association
	Model Project Outputs	
<i>Bahr El Ghazal Livestock Production and Marketing Project (LPMP)</i>		
Establishment of auction kraals	SMARF, county level	1 auction kraals is operational in Lokoloko
Trainings on use and management of auction kraals	Auction user and management	On average 50 – 150 users, private operator and some members of the management board trained every month.
Provision of hygienic milk handling containers	Cattle camps	40 milk handling containers provided (at cost) to rural women

Warrap Output

Capacity Building Summary The 2012 Biannual Financial Report has the latest data on Project Costs. The evaluation team has been informed that there will be no update till project end. Furthermore, budget breakdowns by State are not available since several cost items are joint costs. For further details see the end report.		Budget: €22,572,720 Expenditure: €20,073,607 %: 88.93%
Capacity Building Outputs		
Physical (New Buildings)		
SMAF HQ	Kuajok	1
CADs	Lientnom	1
	Warrap	1
	Romic	1
	Total	4
Hardtop Land cruiser	SMAF	1
Hardtop Land cruiser	TSU	1
Pickup Land cruiser	SMAF	1
Pickup Land cruiser	TSU	1
Motorcycles	SMAF	2
Furniture and Equipment		
Laptops	TSU	3
Desks	TSU	3
Chairs	TSU	3
Mobile phones	TSU	4
Office furniture sets	SMAF	1
Office furniture sets	CADs	3
IT equipments (computers, printers etc)	SMAF and 3 CADs	Set
Generators	SMAF and 3 CADs	4 (one each)
Internal telephone communication (IP PABX)	SMAF	1
VSAT	SMAF	1
HF base radio communication	SMAF	1
HF base radio communication	CADs	3
Institutional and Human CB		
Strategic Planning workshop	SMAF and NSA	24 participants (23 male, 1 female)
Strategic Plan 2010 - 2012	SMAF	1 document
Planning and budgeting training	SMAF	14 participants
Computer training	SMAF HQ	29 participant (all male)
Computer training	CADs	10 participants (all male)
Human Resources and	SMAF	1

Administration Procedures Manual		
Financial/Accounting Systems and Procedures Manual	SMAF	1
Procurement and Supplies Procedure Manual	SMAF	1
Training on accounting, procurement and office management	SMAF	3 participants (one for each subject)
Training on leadership and management	SMAF	NA
ToT training on Project Cycle Management (PCM)	SMAF and CADs	14 participants (13 male, 1 female)
Training on SPSS	SMAF HQ	2 participants (all male)
Training on M&E	SMAF	8 participants (all male)
	Rural Advisory and Extension Services	
<i>Farmer Field Schools (FFS)</i>		
Formation and establishment of FFS groups in 2009	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	8 FFS groups of 220 members (159 male and 61 female)
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through NSAs in 2010	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	10 FFS established by World Concern
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through State SMAF and SMARF in 2011	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	17 FFS of 444 members (264 male, 180 female)
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through State SMAF and SMARF in 2012	County level	21 FFS of 625 members (332 male, 293 female)
Training of FFS supervisors and facilitators	SMAF and CADs	54 (43 facilitators and 8 supervisors)
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Training	SMAF and FFS facilitators	28 participants from 5 states. Annex 14 of 2010 annual report indicating details not available.
Refresher and Basic FFS Training in 2010	FFS facilitators and supervisors	25 participants from 5 states. Annex 14 of 2010 annual report indicating details not available.
Refresher and Basic FFS Training in 2011 and 2012	FFS facilitators	16 facilitators in 2011 and 18 in 2011 participants
Development of FFS	SMAF	FFS manual developed and

implementation Guidelines		distributed to the Supervisors and Facilitators
Grant Support for FFS (1,000 USD per FFS group)	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	42 FFS provided with grants for agro forestry, Poultry Management, Goat Management and Fish Preservation and Marketing activities
Training in poultry	FFS groups	6 FFS of 151 members (72 male, 79 female)
Training on IPPM	SMAF	3 participants (all male)
Training on IPPM	FFS Groups	NA
Initiation of on-farm collaborative trials	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	Help farmers identify suitable varieties of sorghum, groundnut, and sugarcane. In absence of capable research institutions within South Sudan, SPCR initiated discussions for ICRISAT to start collaborative on-farm trials.
Establishment of state demonstration gardens	SMAF HQ	1 acre garden to demonstrate both irrigated and rainfed farming techniques for growing subsistence and cash crops
Development, production and dissemination of messages on extension materials	SMAF and CADs	Extension materials disseminated for major crops sorghum, groundnuts, maize, sesame and vegetables.
Motorcycles	CADs	5 (4 for facilitators and 1 for supervisor)
Bicycles	SMAF	20 for FFS facilitators
<i>Community Animal Health Workers</i>		
Identification of active CAHWs	County level	213 in all five states, no disaggregated figures available for WBEG
Refresher training for active and functional CAHWs	SMARF	14 CAHWs (all male)
Livestock awareness campaigns	6 Cattle camps	260 cattle owners, average holding 25,000 cattle head.
Training on animal health and production for upgrading of CAHWs to Animal Health Auxiliaries	CADs	2 CAHWs (all male)
Formation of CAHWs association	SMARF	2 associations (planned?)
Guideline for all agencies involved in community	SMARF	1 National Minimum Standards and Guidelines for Community

animal health services in South Sudan.		Animal Health Services Systems produced
Standardizing the CAHWs training curricula	SMARF	1 training manual produced
Solar operated fridges	SMARF and CADs	4 (1 SMARF and 3 county level)
Cold chain operators training	County level	6 technicians (5 male, 1 female)
CAHWs tool kits	County level	20 kits distributed
Bicycles	County level	20 distributed to active CAHWs after attending the refresher course
Certificate course in fisheries	SMARF	1 staff member
<i>Market Access and Business Development</i>		
Rural enterprise and market	SMAF	1 market study produced
Value chain analysis training	SMAF	3 staff members trained
Identification, technical and financial support to the small agribusiness	Gorgrial East	1 association, Buosch Grain Banking Cooperative Society. Total members: 30 (17 males, 13 females). Local contribution: SSP 7,200 Money used for development of the Association: SSP 5,700 Balance at hand: SSP 1,500
Business plan development	SMAF	1 business plan developed for Buosch Grain Banking Cooperative Society.
	Model Project Outputs	
<i>Bahr El Ghazal Livestock Production and Marketing Project (LPMP)</i>		
Establishment of auction kraals	SMARF and County authorities	2 auction kraals is operational in Turalei and Kuajok
Trainings on use and management of auction kraals	Auction user and management	On average 50 – 150 users, private operator and some members of the management board trained every month.
Slaughter slabs/houses	SMARF	1 Slaughter house is operational in Kuajok. In collaboration with UNICEF, a borehole was drilled at the slaughter house
Training on meat hygiene	SMARF	5 veterinary officers trained by FAO CB Component.
Establishment of organisational structures	Kuajok	1 Management boards as overall decision making bodies formed.

and management systems		
Training on meat inspection	SMARF	20 participants (17 male, 3 female). Training delivered by FAO CB Component.
Identification of milk business entrepreneurs	Kuajok	6 women entrepreneurs and one male entrepreneur supported
Provision of hygienic milk handling containers	Cattle camps	Xx milk handling containers provided (at cost) to rural women
Training in business management	Women organisations	3 women from War-You and 2 women from Puondak were trained on group dynamics and business management.

WESTERN EQUATORIA OUTPUTS

Capacity Building Summary The 2012 Biannual Financial Report has the latest data on Project Costs. The evaluation team has been informed that there will be no update till project end. Furthermore, budget breakdowns by State are not available since several cost items are joint costs. For further details see the end report.		Budget: €22,572,720 Expenditure: €20,073,607 %: 88.93%
Capacity Building Outputs		
Physical (New Buildings)		
SMAF HQ	Yambio	1
CADs	Ezo	1
	Tambura	1
	Total	3
Hardtop Land cruiser	SMAF	1
Hardtop Land cruiser	TSU	1
Pickup Land cruiser	SMAF	1
Pickup Land cruiser	TSU	1
Motorcycles	SMAF	2
Furniture and Equipment		
Laptops	TSU	3
Desks	TSU	3
Chairs	TSU	3
Mobile phones	TSU	4
Office furniture sets	SMAF	1
Office furniture sets	CADs	2
IT equipments (computers, printers etc)	SMAF and CADs	Set
Generators	SMAF and 2 CADs	3 (one each)
Internal telephone communication (IP PABX)	SMAF	1
VSAT	SMAF	1
HF base radio	SMAF	1

communication		
HF base radio communication	CADs	2
Institutional and Human CB		
Strategic Planning workshop	SMAF and NSA	28 participants (26 male, 2 female)
Strategic Plan 2010 - 2012	SMAF	1 document
Planning and budgeting training	SMAF	16 participants
Computer training	SMAF HQ	39 participant (28 male, 11 female)
Computer training for CADs	CADs	15 participants (10 male, 5 female)
Human Resources and Administration Procedures Manual	SMAF	1
Financial/Accounting Systems and Procedures Manual	SMAF	1
Procurement and Supplies Procedure Manual	SMAF	1
Training on accounting, procurement and office management	SMAF	3 participants (one for each subject)
Training on leadership and management	SMAF	10 participants (all male)
ToT training on Project Cycle Management (PCM)	SMAF and CADs	14 (13 male, 1 female)
Training on SPSS	SMAF HQ	7 participants (6 male, 1 female)
Training on M&E	SMAF	16 participants (all male)
	Rural Advisory and Extension Services	
<i>Farmer Field Schools (FFS)</i>		
Formation and establishment of FFS groups in 2009	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	8 FFS groups of 280 members (211 male and 69 female)
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through NSAs in 2010	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	40 FFS established by: Mundri Rural Development Agency (10), INTERSOS (10) and World Vision (20)
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through State SMAF and SMARF in	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	14 FFS groups of 281 members (164 male, 117 female)

2011		
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through State SMAF and SMARF in 2012	County level	15 FFS groups of 391 members (261 male, 130 female)
Training of FFS supervisors and facilitators	SMAF and CADs	58 (50 facilitators and 8 supervisors)
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Training	SMAF and FFS facilitators	4 participants from 5 states. Annex 14 of 2010 annual report indicating details not available.
Refresher and Basic FFS Training in 2010	FFS facilitators and supervisors	25 participants from 5 states. Annex 14 of 2010 annual report indicating details not available.
Refresher and Basic FFS Training in 2011 and 2012	FFS facilitators	54 participants (44 all 10 male)
Development of FFS implementation Guidelines	SMAF	FFS manual developed and distributed to the Supervisors and Facilitators
Grant Support for FFS (1,000 USD per FFS group)	2 CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	29 FFS provided with grants for agro forestry, crop production and fisheries activities
Training on conservation agriculture, and crop management	FFS Groups	11 members (10 male 1 female)
Training on improved agro forestry practices.	4 FFS Groups	127 members (72 male and 55 female)
Training on poultry	2 FFS	39 participants (23 male, 16 female)
Training on IPPM	SMAF	4 participants (3 male and 1 female)
Training on IPPM	12 FFS Groups	241 participants (138 male and 103 female)
Initiation of on-farm collaborative trials	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	Help farmers identify suitable varieties of sorghum, groundnut, and sugarcane. In absence of capable research institutions within South Sudan, SPCR initiated discussions for ICRISAT for collaborative on-farm trials.
Establishment of state demonstration gardens	SMAF HQ	1 acre garden to demonstrate both irrigated and rain-fed farming techniques for growing subsistence and cash crops
Development, production and dissemination of messages on extension materials	SMAF and CADs	Extension materials disseminated for major crops sorghum, groundnuts, maize, sesame and vegetables.
Motorcycles	CADs	5 (4 for facilitators and 1 for

		supervisor)
Bicycles	SMAF	20 for FFS facilitators
<i>Community Animal Health Workers</i>		
Identification of active CAHWs	County level	213 in all five states, no disaggregated figures available for WBeG
Refresher training for active and functional CAHWs	SMARF	17 CAHWs (15 male, 2 female)
Livestock awareness campaigns	19 Cattle camps	210 cattle owners, average holding 10,000 cattle head
Training on animal health and production for upgrading of CAHWs to Animal Health Auxiliaries	CADs	2 CAHWs (all male)
Formation of CAHWs association	SMARF	2 associations formed; a) CAHWs Association in Tambura of 6 members all male. b) White-Bird Agro-vet Drug Shop Association in East Mundri of 9 members (8 male, 1 female).
Guideline for all agencies involved in community animal health services in South Sudan.	SMARF	1 National Minimum Standards and Guidelines for Community Animal Health Services Systems produced
Standardizing the CAHWs training curricula	SMARF	1 training manual produced
Solar operated fridges	SMARF and CADs	4 (2 MOARF and 2 county level)
CAHWs tool kits	County level	20 kits distributed
Bicycles	County level	20 distributed to active CAHWs after the refresher course
Certificate course in fisheries	SMARF	2 staff member (1 male, 1 female)
<i>Market Access and Business Development</i>		
Rural enterprise and market	SMAF	1 market study produced
Value chain analysis training	SMAF	3 staff members trained
Identification, technical and financial support to the small agribusiness		1 association; Mamenze Fisheries Cooperative. 10 fish ponds constructed (4 nurseries and 6 feeders)
Business plan development	SMAF	1 business plan developed for Mamenze Fisheries Cooperative

LAKES– OUTPUTS

Capacity Building Summary The 2012 Biannual Financial Report has the latest data on Project Costs. The evaluation team has been informed that there will be no update till project end. Furthermore, budget breakdowns by State are not available since several cost items are joint costs. For further details see the end report.		Budget: €22,572,720 Expenditure: €20,073,607 %: 88.93%
Capacity Building Outputs		
Physical (New Buildings)		
SMAF HQ	Rumbek	1
CADs	Cuibet	1
	Akot	1
	Nyang	1
	Awerial	1
	Total	5
Hardtop Land cruiser	SMAF	1
Hardtop Land cruiser	TSU	1
Pickup Land cruiser	SMAF	1
Pickup Land cruiser	TSU	1
Motorcycles	SMAF	2
Furniture and Equipment		
Laptops	TSU	3
Desks	TSU	3
Chairs	TSU	3
Mobile phones	TSU	4
Office furniture sets	SMAF	1
Office furniture sets	CADs	4
IT equipments (computers, printers etc)	SMAF and CADs	Various
Generators	SMAF and CADs	2 (one each)
Internal telephone communication (IP PABX)	SMAF	1
VSAT	SMAF	1
HF base radio communication	SMAF	1
HF base radio communication	CADs	4
Institutional and Human CB		
Strategic Planning workshop	SMAF and NSA	30 participants (28 male, 2 female)
Strategic Plan (2010 – 2012)	SMAF	1 document
Computer training	SMAF HQ	20 participant (19 male, 1 female)
Computer training for CADs	CADs	35 participants (all male)

Human Resources and Administration Procedures Manual	SMAF	1
Financial/Accounting Systems and Procedures Manual	SMAF	1
Procurement and Supplies Procedure Manual	SMAF	1
Training on accounting, procurement and office management	SMAF	3 participants (one for each training)
Training on leadership and management	SMAF	12 participants (all male)
ToT training on Project Cycle Management (PCM)	SMAF and CADs	15 participants (14 male, 1 female)
Training on SPSS	SMAF HQ	2 participants (all male)
Training on M&E	SMAF	39 participants (37 male, 2 female)
	Rural Advisory and Extension Services	
<i>Farmer Field Schools (FFS)</i>		
Formation and establishment of FFS groups in 2009	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	8 FFS groups of 228 members (127 male and 101 female)
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through NSAs in 2010	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	32 FFS established by DIAR (10), ACMI (12) and Women for Women International (10).
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through State SMAF and SMARF in 2011	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	28 FFS of 573 members (507 male, 67 female)
Formation and establishment of FFS groups through State SMAF and SMARF in 2012	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	28 FFS of 867 members (719 male, 148 female)
Training of FFS supervisors and facilitators	SMAF and CADs	99 (95 facilitators and 4 supervisors)
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Training	SMAF and FFS facilitators	28 participants from 5 states. Annex 14 of 2010 annual report indicating details not available.
Refresher and Basic FFS Training	FFS facilitators and supervisors	25 participants from 5 states. Annex 14 of 2010 annual report indicating details not available.
Development of FFS	SMAF	FFS manual developed and

implementation Guidelines		distributed to Supervisors and Facilitators
Grant Support for FFS (1,000 USD per FFS group)	4 CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	36 FFS provided with grants for agro forestry, livestock, crop production and fisheries activities
Training on conservation agriculture, and crop management	FFS Groups	30 members
Training on improved agro forestry practices.	8 FFS Groups	233 members (185 male and 48 female)
Training on vegetables and fruits production	FFS Groups	60 members
Training on IPPM	SMAF	5 participants (4 male and 1 female)
Initiation of on-farm collaborative trials	CADs (Payam and Boma levels)	Help farmers identify suitable varieties of sorghum, groundnut, sugarcane etc. In absence of capable research institutions within South Sudan, SPCR initiated discussions for ICRISAT to start collaborative on-farm trials.
Establishment of state demonstration gardens	SMAF HQ	1 acre garden to demonstrate both irrigated and rainfed farming techniques for growing subsistence and cash crops
Development, production and dissemination of extension messages	SMAF and CADs	Extension materials disseminated for major crops sorghum, groundnuts, maize, sesame and vegetables.
Motorcycles	CADs	5 (4 for facilitators and 1 for supervisor)
Bicycles	SMAF	20 for FFS facilitators
<i>Community Animal Health Workers</i>		
Identification of active CAHWs	County level	NA
Refresher training for active and functional CAHWs	SMARF	21 CAHWs (all male)
Livestock awareness campaigns	Boma level (cattle camps)	
Training on animal health and production for upgrading of CAHWs to Animal Health Auxiliaries	CADs	2 CAHWs (all male)
Formation of CAHWs association	SMARF	4 associations planned

Guideline for all agencies involved in community animal health services in South Sudan.	SMARF	1 National Minimum Standards and Guidelines for Community Animal Health Services Systems produced
Standardizing the CAHWs training curricula	SMARF	1 training manual produced
Solar operated fridges	CADs	4 (distributed at county levels)
CAHWs tool kits	County level	20 kits distributed
Bicycles	County level	20 distributed to active CAHWs after attending the refresher course
Certificate course in fisheries	SMARF	2 staff member, all male
<i>Market Access and Business Development</i>		
Identification, technical and financial support to the small agribusiness	Rumbek East	1 associations formed in 2012 (Baar naam Fisheries Association).
Trainings for rural business groups		1 training
	Model Project Outputs	
<i>Fisheries Production and Marketing Project (FPMP)</i>		
Toyota Hilux	SMARF	1
Renovations of offices	SMARF	Office of Director of Fisheries in Rumbek
Fisheries sector baseline survey	Shambe	I study
Construction of fisheries centre	Nyang	1 centre established
Compilation of database on Fishing Communities	County level	Database in “Access” has been established for Shambe, use of database is limited
Setting up fishermen associations	Shambe	7 fisher folk associations were formed, with a total of 207 members.

CENTRAL EQUATORIA OUTPUTS
Fisheries Production and Marketing Project (FPMP)

Toyota Hilux	SSMARF	1
Fisheries sector baseline survey	Terekeka	1 study
Construction of fish landing sites/boat docks	Terekeka	1 floating dock of 2m x 6m built at the fisheries centre
Construction of fisheries centre	Terekeka	1 centre established
Training on fisheries management and fish processing at the Fisheries Training Institute of Entebbe, Uganda (FTI)	SSMARF	3 staff members
Setting up fishermen associations	Terekeka	7 fisher folk associations formed with a total of 305 members.
Improving fish smoking and drying techniques	Terekeka	17 chorkor fish smoking kilns constructed. 1 improved fish drying enclosure constructed.
Improvement of local fish handling and processing	Terekeka	28 fisher folk were trained in fish smoking and processing. Participants included fishermen, traders and SMARF staff.
Training fishermen in the production of traps	Terekeka	26 fishermen trained

UNITY OUTPUTS**Fisheries Production and Marketing Project (FPMP)**

Toyota Hilux	State SMARF	1
Fisheries sector baseline survey	Adok	I study
Construction of fisheries centre	Liap/Adok	1 centre established
Training on fisheries management and fish processing at the Fisheries Training Institute of Entebbe, Uganda (FTI)	SMARF	4 staff members
Compilation of database on Fishing Communities	County level	Database in “Access” has been established for Adok, use of database is limited
Open up access channels to fishing communities	Adok	Water ways from Nyal to Lake Mundydeeng were cleared, with 62 participants through Cash For Work.
Improving fish smoking and drying techniques	Adok	1 fish drying cage set up.

Annex 6. Evaluation matrix

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)				
Key Issues	Key Questions	Sources of Information	Respondents	Data collection method
1. RELEVANCE				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Relevance of SPCRP to country needs •Relevance of SPCRP to government priorities •Relevance of SPCRP to needs of rural communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •What are the most important needs of the country and the rural communities? •Have the needs changed from the beginning of the programme? •How relevant has the SPCRP been to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ The rehabilitation and development needs of rural communities? ◦ The country needs? ◦ The strategic priorities of the government? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Background documents on the project and development situation; •Government policies and strategy papers; •Interviews with different categories of respondents; •Other sources of evidence of government strategies and commitment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Government policy-makers; •Steering Committee members; •State level government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Semi-structured interviews
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Quality of programme design 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses in the programme design? More specifically, regarding: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Logframe (current as compared to first) ◦ Objectives, results, indicators and activities? ◦ The institutional, coordination and partnership arrangements ◦ The resource allocation (technical, human and financial)? ◦ The risks and assumptions? ◦ Impact? ◦ Sustainability? •Quality of planning <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Timing and quality of concept formulation and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Project related documents; •Logical frameworks •Interviews with different categories of respondents; •Interviews with development actors in similar fields. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Government policy-makers; •FAO (SPCRP) Task Force; •Steering Committee members; •Project Managers; •SPCRP project staff 	

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)				
Key Issues	Key Questions	Sources of Information	Respondents	Data collection method
	endorsement <ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Coherence between objectives and with the stated indicators, time frame, activities, responsibilities and budget.			
•Cross-cutting issues	•Have relevant cross-cutting issues been adequately mainstreamed in the SPCRCP design? Specifically: <ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Environment,○ Gender,○ Human rights,○ Governance	•Project related documents; •Logical frameworks •Interviews with different categories of respondents; •Interviews with development actors in similar fields.	•FAO (SPCRP) Task Force; •Steering Committee members; •Project Managers; •SPCRP project staff •Other development actors	
•Adaptability/flexibility	•Which changes have been made based on the MTE recommendations? •What was the effect of these changes? •Has anything been missed? •Was the programme flexible to changing institutional, political and policy contexts? •What changes have been made as a result of changing contexts?	•Project related documents; •Background documents on country context in the past decade; •Interviews with different categories of respondents.	•FAO (SPCRP) Task Force; •Steering Committee members; •State level government •Project Managers; •SPCRP project staff	
2. EFFECTIVENESS				
•Achievement of specific objectives based on the delivery and use of its outputs by the beneficiaries	•How well has the SPCRCP achieved its planned results in the target areas? •How well was the synergy between training under the capacity building component and the implementation of the model project component?	•Project progress reports; •Monitoring reports; •Training reports; •SPCRP Steering Committee minutes;	•FAO Task Force; •Steering Committee members; •State level government;	•Desk review •Semi-structured interviews

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)

Key Issues	Key Questions	Sources of Information	Respondents	Data collection method
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •How far have human, organizational and physical capacities of public and private institutions concerned with agriculture and rural development been built in selected States and states/counties? •To what extent has the programme management capacity been built at Federal and State level? •Have key agricultural support services been established and what is their quality? • To what degree have rural target populations gained physical and social access to the services provided? •To what extent has the programme increased the capacity of rural communities and their organizations? •Have the establishment of PCUs and TSUs ensured effective and quality implementation of capacity building? •Has the organizational capacity and effectiveness of government and non-governmental actors improved as a result of training? •Have recipients of training used their capacity to good effect in their work/livelihoods? •To what extent have the model projects increased the output in various sectors? •Has there been improvement in food security, incomes and overall productivity of the beneficiaries in the target communities? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Logical frameworks; •Interviews with different categories of respondents. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Project Managers; •SPCRP project staff •(Former) trainees; •Community representatives and beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus group discussions • Tracer studies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Additional unintended effects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Have there been any (unplanned) negative or positive effects on the target groups or areas which have affected or contributed to the results? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Project progress reports; •Monitoring reports; •Logical frameworks; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •FAO Task Force; •Steering Committee members; 	

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)				
Key Issues	Key Questions	Sources of Information	Respondents	Data collection method
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Changes in state level government structures or local administrative areas? ○ Government resources and contributions to the programme? ○ Lack of clear authority on agricultural schemes? ○ Issues of land ownership/tenure? ○ Ethnic conflicts? ○ Other project interventions? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with different categories of respondents; • SPCRCP Steering Committee minutes; • Project correspondence. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State level government; • Project Managers; • SPCRCP project staff 	
3. EFFICIENCY				
• Overall programme efficiency	• Are the number of beneficiaries who have benefited from the capacity building and model projects sufficient in view of the investments made?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project progress reports; • Monitoring reports; • Logical frameworks; • Interviews with different categories of respondents; • SPCRCP Steering Committee minutes; • Project correspondence. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAO Task Force; • Steering Committee members; • State level government; • Project Managers; • SPCRCP project staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Semi-structured interviews
• Technical and procedural quality of implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have there been delays to programme implementation and if so, what have been the causes and consequences of the delays? • How efficiently have human and technical resources been mobilized and applied? 			
• Financial quality of implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the current status of expenditure as compared to planning? • How efficiently have financial resources been applied? • Are the costs reasonable for the activities undertaken? • Have funds been committed, transferred and spent in line with the implementation timescale? 			
• Organizational quality of implementation	• Has the quality of project management, training and technical services provided by FAO (UNOPS), GTZ and			

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)				
Key Issues	Key Questions	Sources of Information	Respondents	Data collection method
	<p>EMM been of sufficient quality to support the efficient implementation of the SPCRCP?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">•Has there been duplication realized between the different SPCRCP components?•What was the quality of cooperation and coordination between the different SPCRCP components?•Has the role of the PSC been appropriate and has it contributed to the overall programme efficiency?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Logical frameworks;•Interviews with different categories of respondents;•SPCRP Steering Committee minutes;•Project correspondence.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Project Managers;•SPCRP project staff	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Management of implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Has the (after MTE) logframe been used as a management tool?•Have the MTE recommendations been appropriately followed up?•Have work plans been developed and used by project management?•How well have activities been monitored by the various project components and have adaptations been made based upon the results?•Have monitoring results from various components been adequately collated?		<ul style="list-style-type: none">•FAO Task Force;•Steering Committee members;•State level government;•Project Managers;•SPCRP project staff	
4. IMPACT				
<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Wider and long-term effects	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•What impacts are have been achieved in the area of:<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Institutional strengthening of government at State level?◦ Capacity building and training?◦ Output production in the agriculture, livestock or fisheries sectors?◦ Food security of target communities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Project documents;•Monitoring reports;•Project progress reports•Impact assessments;•Interviews with different categories of respondents	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•FAO Task Force;•Steering Committee members;•State level government;•Project Managers;•SPCRP project staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Desk review• Semi-structured interviews• Focus group

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)				
Key Issues	Key Questions	Sources of Information	Respondents	Data collection method
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Livelihoods of target households? 			discussions
•Extent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •What has been the coverage (institutional, geographical and estimated numbers) of the impact? •Are their gaps, that have not been addressed? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Project documents; •Monitoring reports; •Project progress reports •Impact assessments; •Interviews with different categories of respondents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •FAO Task Force; •Steering Committee members; •State level government; •Project Managers; •SPCRP project staff •Community representatives and beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Semi-structured interviews
•Measurement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Have OVI's been regularly monitored and reported upon? •Have OVI's as reflected in the last logframe been achieved? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Project progress reports •Monitoring reports; •Logical framework •Monitoring framework •Interviews with different categories of respondents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •FAO Task Force; •Steering Committee members; •State level government; •Project Managers; •SPCRP project staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Semi-structured interviews
•Crosscutting issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Has the programme had any impact on gender equality? •Are there clear impacts on environment? •Are their impacts to be reported on other issues including but not limited to human rights, rights of minorities and conflict management? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Project documents; •Monitoring reports; •Project progress reports •Impact assessments; •Interviews with different categories of respondents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •FAO Task Force; •PSC members; •State level government; •Project Managers; •SPCRP project staff •Community and beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Semi-structured interviews • Focus group discussions

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)				
Key Issues	Key Questions	Sources of Information	Respondents	Data collection method
5. SUSTAINABILITY				
•Continuation of results and effects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Are funds budgeted and available to continue services? •Will services/results be affordable for the target group? •Can the services be maintained if economic factors change? •Are the beneficiaries and/or relevant authorities/institutions able to use and afford maintenance/replacement of the technologies/services now that the programme is ending? •Has a financial/economic phase-out strategy been implemented? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Project progress reports; •Project documents; •Financial data on government's budgetary contribution to the sector; •Monitoring reports; •Interviews with different categories of respondents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •FAO Task Force; •Steering Committee members; •State level government; •Project Managers; •SPCRP project staff •Community representatives and beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Desk review •Semi-structured interviews •Focus group discussions
•Ownership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •How far is the programme embedded in local structures? •What is the likelihood that target groups will continue to make use of the SPCR results? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Project progress reports; •Project documents; •Financial data on government's budgetary contribution to the sector; •Monitoring reports; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •FAO Task Force; •Steering Committee members; •State level government; •Project Managers; •SPCRP project staff •Community representatives and beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Desk review •Semi-structured interviews •Focus group discussions
•Institutional sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •How far has the project been embedded institutionally? •How will the input and function of PCUs and TSUs be taken over by government? •Has the capacity-building component been appropriate to keep ensuring the delivery of services/benefits? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Project progress reports; •Project documents; •Government's policy and strategy papers; •Monitoring reports; •Interviews with different 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Government policy-makers; •FAO (SPCRP) Task Force; •Steering Committee members; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Desk review •Semi-structured interviews

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)				
Key Issues	Key Questions	Sources of Information	Respondents	Data collection method
		categories of respondents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State level government; • SPCR project staff • Project Managers. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainability at policy level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the normative guidance that has been developed relevant and useful to the target groups in the longer term? • What policy and strategic papers are available at government level demonstrating continuation of the programme? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project progress reports; • Project documents; • Government's policy and strategy papers; • Monitoring reports; • Interviews with different categories of respondents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government policy-makers; • FAO (SPCRP) Task Force; • Steering Committee members; • State level government; • SPCR project staff • Project Managers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Semi-structured interviews
6. SYNERGY				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperation and coordination between partners, connectedness and synergy between components 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How effective have been the working relationships between FAO-GoS/GRSS, FAO-EMM/GIZ and EMM/GIZ and GoS/GRSS at federal and state levels in support of the overall SPCR objectives? • How has been the compliance with EC conditions and procedures and coordination between these and FAO rules and procedures? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project progress reports; • Project documents; • Monitoring reports; • Interviews with different categories of respondents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAO (SPCRP) Task Force; • Steering Committee members; • State level government; • SPCR project staff • Project Managers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Semi-structured interviews
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementing partners' contribution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What has been the specific added value of the FAO technical task force (Rome and Addis Ababa)? • What has been the specific added value of the GIZ and EMM technical services? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project progress reports; • Project documents; • Monitoring reports; • Interviews with different 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAO (SPCRP) Task Force; • Steering Committee members; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Semi-structured

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE SUDAN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (SPCRP)				
Key Issues	Key Questions	Sources of Information	Respondents	Data collection method
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •What are the complementarities of SPCRCP with other programmes and projects in the area? 	categories of respondents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •State level government; •SPCRP project staff •Project Managers. 	interviews
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Synergy between Sudan and South Sudan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •To what extent have project stakeholders in Sudan and South Sudan exchanged experience and learning? •To what extent have they shared methodologies, information and analysis? •Has the recent official division by the two countries influenced this process? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Project progress reports; •Project documents; •PSC minutes; •Monitoring reports; •Interviews with different categories of respondents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •FAO (SPCRP) Task Force; •Steering Committee members; •State level government; •SPCRP project staff •Project Managers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Semi-structured interviews

Annex 7. Evaluation against DAC criteria

Overall rating of project design and activities in Greater Bahr el Ghazal against DAC Criteria*

Key elements	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact Prospects	Potential Sustainability
Project Design	B-C	B-C	B	B-C	B-C
Human CB	B	B	B	B-C	B-C
FFS	B	B-C	B	B-C	B-C
CARDA/CAHW	B	B-C	B	B-C	B-C
RM-SB	B	C	C	B-C	B-D
Model projects	C	D	D	C	B-D
Project management	A	B-C	B-C	B	B-C
Overall	B	C	C	B-C	B-C

Overall rating of project design and activities in Western Equatoria against DAC Criteria*

Key elements	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact Prospects	Potential Sustainability
Project Design	B	C	C	B	C
Human CB	A	B	C	C	C
FFS	B	C	C	C	C
CAHW	B	C	B	C	C
RM-SB	C	D	D	C	C
Gender	A	B	B	C	C
Training	A	B	B	C	C
Project management	B	C	C	C	C
Overall	B	C	C	C	C

Overall rating of project design and activities in Central Equatoria and Unity against DAC Criteria*

Key Elements	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact Prospects	Potential Sustainability
Project Design	B	C	C	C	C
Physical CB	B	C	C	C	C
Human CB	B	D	D	C	C
Institutional CB	C	D	D	C	C
Gender	B	C	C	C	C
Training	B	D	D	D	C
Project management	B	D	D	C	C
OVERALL	B	D	D	C	C

Overall rating of project design and activities in Lakes State against DAC Criteria*

Key elements	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact Prospects	Potential Sustainability
Project Design	C	C	C	C	Not applicable
Public administration	B	C-D	C-D	D	B-D
FFS	B	B	B	B-D	B-D
CAHW	A	A	A	A	A
Training	B	B-C	B-C	C-D	C-D
Gender	C	C	B-C	B-C	C
Project management CB component	A	B	B	Not applicable	Not applicable
Model Project	Original design – B	D	D	D	D
OVERALL - CB	B	C	C	C	B-D

* DAC terms score: A 'very good', B 'good', C 'problems' and D 'serious deficiencies'

Annex 8. Evaluation Questions/Topics Matrices per State

EQM SPCRP GENERAL

RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
<p>Purposes, expected results, components, beneficiaries:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <u>Goal:</u> To stabilize peace, enhance food security and improve the rural livelihoods in selected vulnerable states of the Sudan through building human, institutional and physical productive capacities. <u>Purpose:</u> Human, organizational and physical capacity of key public and private institutions built in the selected states and counties to provide administrative, advisory and capacitating services to the rural areas. <u>Results:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacities built in public administration, policies and strategies; Key agricultural support services in place. <u>Basic components:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity Building (physical, institutional, organisational, human resources (entrusted to FAO); Supporting Rural Livelihoods (3 Model Investment Projects (entrusted to GIZ). <u>Beneficiaries:</u> 1) States: Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Western Equatoria, Warrap; 2) 14 County Agricultural Departments, rural communities, NGOs, NSAs; 3) Ministries: Agriculture and Forestry, Animal Resources and Fisheries. <p>Was the design relevant to South Sudan?</p> <p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Good fit with EU strategy and policy focus on peace and food security; Intervention addressed the general and food insecurity levels in South Sudan, and the low levels of 	<p>Was the design efficient?</p> <p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The design implicitly and explicitly co-opts communities, state and local public bodies, NSAs / NGOs, and is therefore geared to leverage project resources and create 'good value for money'. <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Virtually all negative design features discussed under 'relevance' led to inefficiencies during programme implementation. The split between CB (FAO) and MP (GIZ) without mandatory coordination prevented synergy between the two 	<p>Was the design effective?</p> <p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The design and later annual work plans sought to start many activities and deliver outputs in accordance with defined targets. <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The design did not plan for the effective delivery of institutional and organizational capacity. The design did not plan for coordination between the two principal contractors FAO and GIZ. 	<p>Was the design geared to deliver impact?</p> <p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The design aimed at positive and considerable impact in three main areas: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support to 'peace' and to 'conflict reduction'; Tangible support to people in need by helping them to strengthen their livelihood systems; Strengthening the 'structure' of public bodies. <p>Negative</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The design was geared to deliver the first two impacts / results, but less so regarding the third impact. This is regrettable as the state ministries lack the manpower at central and field levels, as 	<p>Was the design tailored to ensuring sustainability?</p> <p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Largely implicitly: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Through seeking to involve the communities and NSAs / NGOs and get their acceptance, and an 'implicit' intention for the government to support the project results upon termination of SPCRP; Through nominating CB of the public bodies concerned as result area 1, and nominating institutional / organisational CB as the first one of the two CB components; Through seeking the active involvement of women who are more used than men to the development and economic side of the households. <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 'Sustainability' is a complex matter, comprising social, environmental, financial, cultural and organisational dimensions. It furthermore alludes to e.g. ownership, competence, resource availability, political and communities' will to continue, selection of the 'subjects' of sustainability. Such references are not reflected in the SPCRP design. An exit strategy was developed but did not bring the 'exit' and necessary transfer of certain activities to government and communities. The design largely neglects components/activities that are necessary to generate robust institutional and organizational 'structure' which after all is the primary

RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
<p>institutional and human resources capacity;</p> <p>3. SPCRP was welcome at Federal, State and County levels although the latter was not explicitly ascertained and the process of consultation is not entirely transparent.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The SPCRP design is a 'blanket' design encompassing both present Sudan and South Sudan. It does not acknowledge the deep differences between the two countries. The design is implicitly geared to crop agriculture more than livestock. The design does not address the specificity of the States, amongst and between which differences in resource endowment, culture, traditions and livelihood systems are often considerable.</p> <p>2. Arguably the dominant key factors separating Sudan from South Sudan are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The long-drawn war between the two countries left Sudan without much scars in the make-up of society and public administration, whereas South Sudan was deeply and negatively affected; • There is a very long tradition of unequal partnership between 'North' and South' with 'North', i.e. present Sudan, being the dominant partner. <p>3. The above is not adequately reflected in the SPCRP and its implementation in South Sudan. Key features in this regard for South Sudan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No 'normal effective adequate public administration, demands of war dominated for a long time, and no single tight 'ideology' present as the organising principle of society and the war machinery ; • Leadership was focused on winning the war, not on building a new nation; • Deep divides between the various segments, tribes and clans that make up South Sudan society; • Physical infrastructure (roads) was deficient to the extent of non-existence in large parts of the country; • Wide generational capacity gap, with skills and expertise at top levels created by the war-linked wasting two generations of education could not be 	<p>components.</p>		<p>well as the budgetary resources, to deliver on their mandate and functions.</p> <p>2. The design did not distinguish between the existing public administration structure in 'North' and the virtual absence of such structure and capacity in 'South'.</p> <p>3. What was 'strengthening the public bodies' in 'North', should have been 'building public bodies' in 'South'. The notion of 'recovery' in SPCRP was misleading and little reflected these realities.</p> <p>4. SPCRP was strongly output orientated with outputs not necessarily expressed in terms of lasting impact.</p> <p>5. The four year timeframe for the project is not enough to demonstrate impact in South Sudan context. Even more time is required when comparing with the situation in Sudan programme.</p>	<p>condition to ensuring sustainability. It takes for granted that elements such as strategic planning, M&E, HRD, effective management practices can be established and kept going without comprehensive institutional and organizational development. Important factors that do not feature in the design in this regard are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organisation: a. Mandate and functional analysis of key public agencies, and follow-up; b. Review of organizational structure and procedures in light of results of the previous step, and follow-up; c. Review of departmental and other units' responsibilities and operational Terms of Reference, and follow-up; d. review of staffing requirements / job descriptions and of tools and techniques; e. HRD fully responsive to the previous Organisation Development steps. • Planning: a. Review and strengthening of planning processes; b. Review and strengthening of planning tools and techniques; and c. HRD. <p>Budget: a. Review and strengthening of budgetary arrangements and procedures; b. Review and strengthening of connections between budgetary and financial management on the one hand and substantive planning and resource allocation on the other.</p> <p>4. Virtually all the adverse observations presented under 'relevance', 1st column of this EQM, operate against 'sustainability'.</p>

RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
<p>adequately solved by SPCRP;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Across the board training was not a good solution, as the necessary function definition, job descriptions, organisational structures, and basic educational levels were not there. <p>4. The design is targets / activities / outputs oriented, not results / purpose oriented, inviting contractors to ‘tick off the boxes’ and project management to focus on operational rather than strategic result-oriented issues.</p> <p>5. Insufficient (rapid) baseline studies were undertaken. Project activities were mostly ‘parachuted’ in conditions on which the knowledge was limited.</p> <p>6. In addition to the unfortunate separation of CB and MP, the design does not include a mandatory coordination mechanism between the two components and implementing organisations.</p> <p>7. Sustainability does not feature in the design, nor did an appropriate exit strategy. There is facile paragraph in the project document which assumes that government will take over when the project terminates.</p> <p>8. Risks and assumptions are paid attention to in the project document in a general sense. There is no designed and procedure flexibility facing possible conflicts, disturbances, uncertainties. . Given the fragile situation in South Sudan, the project design has not considered developing a clear risk management strategy</p> <p>9. The two ‘killer’ conditions to ‘sustainability’, i.e. minimally required fiscal base / budgetary arrangements and public administrative capacity, are not acknowledged in the design. This could have prevented too high levels of ambition regarding the capacity of the government to accept the transfer of administrative and finance related obligations upon programme termination.</p> <p>10. The four-year time frame and high ambition level of SPCRP were unrealistic and bound to disappoint in terms</p>			<p>6. Comparing the performance of the project in South Sudan with that in Sudan must take into account that the war struck South Sudan rather deeper than Sudan which saw its basic structures hardly affected.</p>	

RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
<p>of results and achievable ‘sustainability’.</p> <p>Regarding the MTE:</p> <p>11. The outcome of the CPA, far-reaching autonomy of South Sudan as new nation, would have serious implications for the project’s design features and implementation. The MTE was a potentially ideal mechanism to deal with this and suggest substantial modifications. This was a missed opportunity.</p> <p>12. The MTE did not separate ‘South’ from ‘North’, lumped conclusions together, and gave an ambiguous overview with little analysis on the difference. SPCR South Sudan has suffered from the missed opportunity.</p>				

EQM GREATER BAHR EL GAZAL

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC DESIGN / PROJECT FRAMEWORK FOR BEG STATES	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Absence of State specific designs. The project operates through Annual Work Plans to be approved at the central level, both for CB and MP components. This made it hard for evaluation of the project against a comprehensive framework specific to each of the states.</p> <p>2. Late start of several project activities due to late project staff mobilization and agreement on procedures especially for AIRP led to reduction of the project lifespan by almost two years.</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>Efficiency suffered from late start of the project and design shortcomings</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>The absence of a state-specific project framework, and other conditions mentioned under 'relevance' reduced the effectiveness of the project.</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Absence of a state-specific project framework absorbing state-specific constraints reduced the impact of the project.</p> <p>2. Late start of activities and lack of clarity of implementation and exit strategies for most sub-components reduced significantly the level of potential and actual achievements.</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Sustainability suffered from the absence of a state-specific project frameworks reflecting state-specific conditions</p> <p>2. SPCRP established a good foundation for enhancing productive capacities in BEG states. However, without continued support of money and human resources, many achievements will merely survive thereby affecting the long-term realisation of successes attributable to the project</p>
OVERALL PERFORMANCE	<p>Positive</p> <p>1. The project has performed well in line with needs as identified in the CBNA, perceived by the communities and public bodies, and in line with the AWP.</p> <p>2. The effect of the CB component is clearly visible</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The CB and MP components worked well together</p> <p>2. For CB and auction kraals, management on site has been reasonably inclusive and communicative, thereby contributing to efficient realisation of achievements.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. For AIRP, management was not good. The implementers did not</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The achievements contribute to the project's overall goal, purposes and expected results.</p> <p>2. The AWP have generally been met, taking into account adjustments as a result of adverse developments outside the control of project management at States level.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>The absence of comprehensive state specific</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The project helped build a foundation for further development the various levels, e.g. public bodies and central and field level, farmers' and herders' communities, personal human capacities / skills / knowledge</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The project has an enclave nature- did not target all potential beneficiaries in the State. The majority of the</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The CB achievements that can be attributed to FFS, CAHWs, auction kraals, slaughter houses and CB of public bodies are generally entrenched. Most of them will probably prove sustainable to a fair degree but they will need some additional support to address shortcomings.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The Agribusiness groups started late, in 2011. Their</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
		adequately involve other stakeholders.	plans renders a formal evaluation of project performance impossible.	<p>population not reached by the project may drag the project performance but may not lead to social unrest.</p> <p>Undetermined: 1. It has not been possible to establish the numbers of households who benefited from the project.</p>	<p>achievements are in their infancy. It must be doubted that they will prove sustainable without substantial further support</p> <p>2. The project helped build a 'foundation'. Even a foundation needs maintenance and satisfactory budgetary and human resource arrangements must be concluded to avoid erosion.</p> <p>3. The Exit Strategy for the SPCRP, and its corollary at BEG States level, holds little promise and is not a strategy but rather a wish list for which there is little resource support.</p> <p>4. The FFS, CAHWs and livestock structures (auction sites and slaughter houses) rehabilitation experience would need more support in terms of further capacity building and infrastructural support (e.g. drugs for CAHWs). If no further budgetary and other resource support is provided, the potential will largely fade out.</p> <p>5. The CB at the ministries, especially SMARF would need support to conduct a</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
					thorough organisational review and follow-up action. Without this, further gains in effectiveness will be hard to achieve and much of the achievements by the project risk erosion.
PUBLIC BODIES	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The project rightly targeted the ministries dealing with agriculture, animal resources, and fisheries for institutional, organisational and human resource capacity building. The ministries are the backbone of the public administration dealing with the states' agricultural and animal production capacity.</p> <p>2. The project rightly seeks capacity building for BEG States as well as the respective county/field offices.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1 The TSU jointly with the ministries and departments concerned worked well together and established coordination procedures early in the project.</p> <p>2. To a great extent, The TSUs and the Administration, managed to secure complementarity between the MP and the CB components of the project which resulted in efficient and synergetic deployment of resources.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The project's effectiveness on human, institutional and organisational CB of public bodies can be summarized as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Competent staff were recruited and staff trained in relevant subjects •Efficient and inclusive procedures were established for strategic and annual planning. <p>2. Physical CB has been provided by the project, in conjunctive efforts of the CB and some MP components (livestock structures), based largely on needs analysis.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Training results evaluation and performance assessment are undertaken but have no further implications. It is unclear to which degree staff performance assessment is fully professionally done.</p> <p>2. Some established units do not have active staff(e.g.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The new organisational units established during the project are seen as contributing to the competence and reach of the respective ministries.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The absence of a thorough organisation review and systematic follow-up action leaves the ministries 'un-balanced'. A number of areas have been strengthened and others have not. Without a robust organisational review and analysis, it is hard to identify duplications, ambiguity of authority, omissions, potential sources of conflict and dismal performance, at State and county levels.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Widely across the ministries, at both state and county levels, human capacity has been positively affected by the project. Targeted training has been extended in generic subjects such as basic computer skills, and in a range of specialized subjects like statistical analysis (e.g. SPSS), evaluation methods, plant and veterinary practices, and others.</p> <p>2. Most of that will be of value to the ministries as long as it is supported by management at the various levels concerned, and included in staff performance assessment.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. HRD and targeted training need continuous attention: staff transfers, promotions, staff leaving, keeping up to date, special attention to field staff who tend to be somewhat 'neglected'.</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
			M&E, data base and evaluation)		<p>2. There is lack of staff performance assessment in the ministries yet this is necessary for ensuring professional development of staff capabilities.</p> <p>4. There is still a problem of lack of access to financial resources by state and county staff in WBEG. The increased strength of the state ministries will weaken if the budgetary resources cannot be secured that are minimally required for directorates, departments, units and staff to fulfil their mandatory tasks. Equally, physical facilities and equipment must be adequately maintained insofar as required for the mandated tasks.</p>
FARMER FIELD SCHOOLS	<p>1. FFS is a proven and successful approach to raise farmers' productivity. FFS is targeted and works with selected willing farming communities.</p> <p>2. Over 80% of the population of the greater Bahr El Ghazal depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. The FFS approach can be successfully tailored to the local conditions and are expected</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The FFS approach trains supervisors and facilitators for specific subject matter. This prepares the ground for expansion of knowledge and skills to communities not reached by the project.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. There was a considerably high drop out rate for FFS groups since the project was implemented in the context of development yet</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The project has established 130 operating FFSs (30 in Warrap, 33 in WBEG and 67 in NBEG) The project trained one coordinator per school and a varying number of facilitators.</p> <p>2. The FFSs operate to full satisfaction of the farming communities and the individual farmers. Net production values have gone up, quality of fish has</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The currently active FFSs have had lasting positive impacts on the communities in a number of ways: knowledge sharing, collective activities such as production and marketing.</p>	<p>Positive</p> <p>1. The post-FFS farming and fishing communities will continue to practice what they have learned.</p> <p>2. Both SMAF and SMARF extension services have adopted FFS in their programs.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The interaction between the post-FFS farmers and extension services is</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>to serve the farming communities and their members well.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. FFS is a targeted approach. It does not provide a 'blanket' approach aimed at raising agricultural productivity across BEG states.</p> <p>2. To be successfully applied, FFS requires commitment from the ministries and support and encouragement of its field staff.</p>	<p>communities were used to humanitarian aid.</p>	<p>improved thus enhancing market access and the farmers and fishermen report lasting increases in knowledge and improvement of farming practices and fish management..</p> <p>3. The FFSs and the communities report rewarding communication with the ministries' extension services, which was non-existent before the project</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Extension message and IEC materials produced are geared towards literate farmers.</p> <p>2. There is virtually no research system in the country to support FFS and other extension efforts</p>		<p>important. It is unclear to what degree the interaction will continue in future and enhance further improvement of agricultural practices and productivity.</p> <p>2. The FFS helped build a 'foundation' and created a potential for expanding the improvements, either through new FFSs or through other approaches yet using the trained coordinators, facilitators and 'advanced' farmers and fishermen. Without further support, this achievement will not be realized.</p>
CAHWs	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Most households in the greater BEG keep livestock. The area is home to over 5.6 million heads of cattle, 8.1 million shoats and 2.7 million local poultry. With a constrained ministry of animal resources and other operational challenges, the system is extremely relevant in the three states.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The CAHW approach involves training CAHWs who are also provided with kits to enable them reach remote locations.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The project has trained 126 CAHWs in the three states who are providing services to community members (52 in Warrap, 34 in WBEG and 40 in NBEG)</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The CAHWs have not been able to access drugs with which they are expected to treat animals, which has been a set back to their work.</p>	<p>Undetermined:</p> <p>1. The impact of CAHW services is hard to establish because of lack of drugs</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The ministries of animal resources and fisheries have adopted CAHWs are part of extension services</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1 The CAHW component helped build a 'foundation' and created a potential for expanding the improvements, to other livestock farmers and herders. Without further support, this potential is unlikely to be realised.</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
			2. The CAHWs do not earn income from their work especially now that they do not have drugs		
RURAL MARKETING/ SMALL BUSINESS GROUPS	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The small business groups have been a good fit, complementing FSS activities. They are intended to provide on- and off-farm employment as well as entrepreneurship and incomes outside, yet often connected with, regular agricultural and animal husbandry.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The projects started late, mostly in 2011 and have been around for a short time and not far from the date of termination of SPCRP.</p> <p>2. They are still in their infancy and have not had the time to mature and get entrenched.</p>	<p>Undetermined</p> <p>1. The projects have not matured enough at this point in time to allow efficiency evaluation.</p> <p>2. The approach is through working with groups. This may be more efficient than when targeting individual, entrepreneurs, but perhaps also less penetrating, particularly so in the micro-finance and small business activities.</p>	<p>Undetermined</p> <p>1. The activities are still too 'fresh', to assess results for the processing initiatives (groundnuts in NBEG; tomato/vegetable packaging and marketing in WBEG and sorghum production in Warrap State).</p>	<p>Undetermined</p> <p>1. The activities are too 'fresh' to allow an assessment of their impact or their potential impact.</p> <p>2. The interest from groups and individuals to join the activities has been substantial, indicating demand for this kind of support.</p>	<p>Undetermined</p> <p>1. The state of infancy of the project activities renders it doubtful that they can survive with project support. Exceptions may occur where new 'mind sets' have taken root.</p>
GENDER	<p>Undetermined / Positive:</p> <p>1. The project has articulated gender as an issue to be explicitly incorporated in the various project activities, to the extent possible and meaningful.</p> <p>2. In the communities, men and women have traditional roles with the</p>		<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Both FFS and CAHW services under the project have addressed groups without specific gender bias and where women are sometimes the majority of the participants.</p> <p>2. In the small business groups, women form a</p>	<p>Positive/undetermined:</p> <p>1. The traditional role of women in the communities and families, particularly 'nutrition', make the women a good repository for changes in the mind sets, attitude and activities regarding nutrition / health issues. The project has endeavoured to achieve</p>	<p>Undetermined:</p> <p>1. The project has helped build a foundation aimed at raising agricultural and animal husbandry / livestock productivity. This has received the main attention, irrespective of gender.</p> <p>2. The traditional role of women discussed under</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	women normally more involved than men in the nutritional side of the household		significant proportion. Negative: 1. The FFS and CAHW groups have very few coordinators and facilitators that are women. The reason mostly given is that that work is heavy and requires mobility which do not favour women	impact in this direction. Negative: 1. The project has helped build a foundation. It is too early to judge the project's real impact on raising the role and voice of women in the communities.	'impact' renders it probable that where 'impact' is assessed as positive, the women will form a lasting repository of change with a potential to gradually see change and raised productivity gain ground and, with that, see their role and voice expanding.
TRAINING	Positive: 1. Levels of skills in the state – public bodies, NSAs, families, private sector – were low at the time the project was conceived. The project's strong emphasis on training as a major means of human development is therefore fully relevant.	Positive: 1. Training has been prepared, conducted and followed up efficiently. Proper procedures were followed and the required coordinating infrastructure at project level was provided. 2. Given the limited expertise and training resources available at state level, the decision to acquire trainers and curricula from elsewhere, often using the PCU for that purpose, was efficient and to the point.	Positive: 1. The project delivered massive training, e.g.: 130 FFS facilitators, 126 CAHWs and 3 small business groups	Positive: 1. For the ministry staff, the training went through post-training evaluation and they were also able to develop action plans for application of what has been learnt Negative: 1. The assessments, above, were generally 'light', based on participants' satisfaction and 'easy to answer' questions about the application of the newly acquired skills	Positive: 1. The ministry is professionally stronger today than it was before the project, due to the project and the training provided through the project, as discussed under 'public bodies', above. Negative: 1. The TNA needs to be rolled over at least once every 2 years to ascertain whether skills are still up to standard, refresher courses are needed, new staff entered needing training. The Training Unit at the ministry should see to that, and ensure that they themselves are an up to standard HRD unit. It is unclear if they have that mandate and budget
MODEL PROJECT COMPONENT	Positive: 1. Two major types of Model projects were established in BEG under SPCRP: Aweil Irrigation and Rice Project	Negative: 1. No studies in most cases were conducted to inform planning and implementation of project. In cases where	Positive: 1. Some structures have been established for livestock auction and slaughter	Negative: 1. Poor design of structures (slaughter houses) may prove to be a health disaster unless it is addressed	Positive: 1. The knowledge acquired, especially for private managers of the livestock structures (auction kraal and

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>(AIRP) and Livestock Production and Marketing Project (LPMP) – Auction Kraals and Slaughter houses. These were well thought out projects aimed at enhancing the livelihoods of the states and the country</p> <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Due to inadequate involvement of stakeholders by the implementer, the relevance of the two projects was diminished. Ownership of the interventions by the states was diminished. 2. Late implementation of project activities. 	<p>these were conducted, recommendations were not adequately implemented.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Poor quality and incomplete work was done, especially at AIRP and slaughter houses, given the allocated resources 3. Poor involvement of stakeholders rendered the implementation of some activities inefficient than would be otherwise necessary e.g. location of auction kraal in Warrap state near an airstrip 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Some land (approximately 1,300 feddans) has been cleared for rice production 3. The capacity of private managers for slaughter houses and auction kraals were enhanced <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Shoddy work was done on slaughter houses which is a public health disaster. 2. The machinery at AIRP is faulty, which threatens the effectiveness of the MP 3. Some priority technical works such as rehabilitation of the workshop shed were neglected 	<p>Undetermined:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. It is too early to judge, but establishment of the structures will potentially improve the productivity of the sector (auction kraals) 	<p>slaughter sites) will have a lasting impact at households level.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The equipment established are complex. Unless more support is provided, sustainability of the interventions will be compromised. 2. In the absence of a clear strategy for operating the MPs (AIRP, Livestock structures), it is doubtful whether the achievements made will be sustainable
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT	<p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The connections between state level and central SPCR-CB management have been good. There has been no undue need for central management and PSU to interfere. <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The split between SPCR-CB and MP led to coordination problems especially for MP which was not well coordinated and therefore required closer supervision. 2. Project management at 	<p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The effective coordination and communication for the CB component at state level allowed the efficient implementation of project activities. Duplication and omissions were avoided, synergy was sought and realised. <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The ineffective coordination for the MP component led to shoddy work and consequently, poor results 	<p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The AWP were prepared on time, progress reporting was timely and to the point, project activities were largely implemented on time and progressed generally as planned. 2. The TSU and the leaders of the CB components proved capable of handling constraints where and when they arose. <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. State level management did not adequately prevail over the shoddy work 	<p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The many activities, the constraints in the state, the split between the basic components and the multiple stakeholders, were, to a great extent well handled by state level management (except the challenges of MP). 	<p>Undetermined:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The SPCR is terminated and about to close the books. Management of the project activities and their sustainability is no longer in the hands of the State level project staff; it is unclear whether government can take over.

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>state level operated through AWP's to be approved at central level. While implementing, specific activities required additional approval from central.</p> <p>3. From central point of view, this operating mode makes sense – ensuring a tightly run operation. From state point of view and management at that level less so.</p> <p>4. The project at state level became necessarily output and not results oriented. It had no specific overall framework within which to work. 'Strategic oversight' at state level did not exist due to the absence of an overall state-specific project document. In fact, at state level, the goal, purposes, specific objectives and expected results of the SPCRP were no matter of concern.</p>		<p>implemented by PCU unit for the MPs</p>		

EQM WESTERN EQUATORIA

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC DESIGN / PROJECT FRAMEWORK FOR WESTERN EQUATORIA STATE	<p>Undetermined:</p> <p>1. The positive and negative connotations, above, for the ‘Overall Project’, equally apply to the selected States including Western Equatoria State. The project is implemented in five States at State, County, Payam and Boma/rural communities’ levels. The project bodies located in Juba provided supportive services and administrative management.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The long-drawn war plus the insecurities caused by the LRA from 2008 to 2011 in Western Equatoria State resulted not only in the destruction of large parts of the physical infrastructure, but also to the loss of generations of educated people. This lack of trained and trainable people is most evident at the county and Payam level where both the actual number of employed staff and the number of endorsed positions are far below the numbers required to re-vitalize the agriculture sector. This pervasive lack of capacity is not at all reflected in the design of the project, and is most relevant and evident with regard to Result 2. At all levels GOSS does not have the number nor in</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. For the Overall Project, the programme’s efficiency suffered from the uncertainties and other constraints mentioned under ‘Relevance’.</p> <p>2. Had there been a robust state-specific project framework, including budget and accounting system, the constraints could most likely have been dealt with more efficiently.</p> <p>3. The decision making power of the TSU was rather restricted and most decisions needed the prior approval from at least the PCU, in many cases also from FAO Rome.</p> <p>4. As in the case of the grants for FFS, PCU nor TSU agreed to clear criteria, guidelines and procedures resulting in confusion particularly with CAD staff and beneficiaries.</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The absence of a state-specific project framework, and the adverse conditions mentioned under ‘Relevance’ and ‘Efficiency’ reduced the Effectiveness of the project.</p> <p>2. Activities could not be started or late, other activities had to be abandoned, often for procedural reasons, decisions on replacement action came late in the project ‘life’ or too late to be implemented, communities hesitated to get fully engaged with the programme, and staff became less motivated.</p> <p>3. The incursions of the LRA into Tambura and Ezo Counties rendered the activities the programme had initially started highly paralyzed and ineffective.</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. As for ‘Efficiency’ and ‘Effectiveness’, the absence of a state-specific project framework absorbing state-specific constraints reduced the impact of the project.</p> <p>2. The effect of the instability caused by the LRA’s incursions on the programmes impact was highly negative, particularly in Tambura and Ezo Counties.</p> <p>3. Late start of activities and lack of clarity of implementation and exit strategies for all 3 RAES sub-components reduced significantly the level of potential and actual achievements and impact.</p> <p>3. To a degree, this affects ‘Sustainability’ perhaps more than ‘delivery’.</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. In spite of its otherwise good achievements in the face of serious constraints, including and particularly the insecurity as result of the incursion by the LRA from 2009 to 2011, ‘Sustainability’ suffered from the absence of a state-specific project framework absorbing state-specific constraints’.</p> <p>2. Roughly speaking, the project managed to establish a foundation for the restoration of productive capacities in Western Equatoria State. With the exception of achievements discussed later in this EQM, it must be feared that without further support of money and human resources, many achievements will merely survive, others will slowly erode, some will quickly discontinue, and expansion of productive ‘successes’ attributable to the project may not be achieved.</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>many cases the level of qualifications required to make CB measures meaningful and to obtain impact from CB. Without significant higher numbers of trainable staff at County and Payam level/the grassroots level, no contribution towards achieving the programmes Development Goal from CB towards increasing crops and livestock production and productivity and improving the livelihood of the people of South Sudan can be expected.</p> <p>2. The austerity measures deprived the States of funds needed to utilize meaningfully the little existing capacities in the States.</p> <p>3. No specific Project Document, Terms of Reference and Inception Reports were prepared at State level, including Western Equatoria State. There is therefore no State-specific design nor a state-specific logframe and indicators against which the project's performance could be evaluated.</p> <p>4. Instead, the project operates through Annual Work Plans to be approved at the central level. This applies to the CB as well as the MP component implemented in all 5 western States except Western Equatoria State.</p> <p>5. The Western Equatoria State Evaluation Mission could</p>				

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>therefore not evaluate the programme at State level against a Western Equatoria specific logframe and indicators. This also applies to Project Management at both State and Central levels (PCU and TSUs, respectively), and to the evaluation of the Overall Project. The Western Equatoria State Evaluation Mission has evaluated achievements, both in their own right and against the overall objectives and purposes of the programme.</p> <p>6. The absence of a state-specific project framework implied that a number of state-specific uncertainties and other adverse condition were and could only find their way into the AWP in an ad-hoc fashion. Factors to be mentioned:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The highly significant impacts the LRA incursion had from 2008 to 2011 on peace, stability, governance, the lives of ten thousands of people and development efforts in general; • During the project's implementation, frequent change of ministers (3x), DGs (2x) and TAs for the TSU (2x); • The deep division within the SMACE between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of 				

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>Animal Resources related units and their staff have a detrimental effect on the functioning of the SMACE, particularly with regard to its efficiency and effectiveness;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Late start of several project activities due to late project staff mobilization. 				
PUBLIC BODIES	<p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The project rightly targeted the SMACE as the public organisation responsible for agriculture including vegetables and fruit trees, animal production including fisheries, animal health, forestry, cooperatives and the environment for physical, institutional, and human resource capacity building. As the only Ministry among all ten States of Southern Sudan, the SMACE comprises all sectors of public administration dealing with the heart of Western Equatoria State's economy and society. The programme rightly seek capacity building for the SMACE central organization, staff and facilities at State, County, Payar and village level. So far, the SMACE resisted attempts to introduce hybrid and genetically manipulated planting materials allegedly to increase smallholders' crop production and productivity. 	<p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Since the current head of the TSU has taken up his position, the communication, coordination and transparency of the programme's presence and activities in the SMACE have significantly improved, and this is highly recognised by all of SMACE's staff members met. For the SMACE at State and County level, the programme has constructed the main building of the Ministry in Yambio and two CAD offices (in Ezo and Tambura), provided 3 generators, office equipment and furniture, sets of HF radio communication equipment, 4 vehicles, motorbikes and 6 solar fridges. The programme helped SMACE to carry out 51 short-term training courses with the total of 218 trainees (203 from SMACE, FFS and CAHWs, and 15 from NSAs/NGOs) and 357 chances (one training chance is defined as one person trained at a time). Of the 203 SMACE, 	<p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The project's effectiveness on physical, human, institutional and organisational CB of SMACE at State and County level can be summarised as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The programme constructed the main building of the SMACE and two CAD offices -1 in Ezo and 1 in Tambura - provided 2 Toyota Land cruiser vehicles to SMACE and 2 identical vehicles to the TSU, as well as 4 Honda and 5 Senke motorbikes, 3 generators and 3 sets of HF radio equipment, 12 sets of desktop computers, 3 photocopying machines, 4 printers and 4 scanners, other office equipment and office furniture; 20 CAHW tool kits and 6 solar-powered refrigerators for safe-keeping temperature-sensitive veterinary supplies. Competent staff was recruited and staff trained in relevant subjects – 33% of all 	<p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The project carried out the Capacity Needs Assessment, supported the development of SMACE's three-year Strategic Plan 2010-2012 for Agriculture Forestry, Livestock and Fisheries, and the National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Policy (NALEP). It also completed in October 2010 the Baseline Survey and in October 2011 the Exit Strategy for SPCR. 173 SMACE staff participated once or twice in short-term training courses (85%), while 30 staff members (15%) participated in three to ten short-term training activities. SPCRP funded staff to complete 17 medium term and 7 long-term studies, mainly in Uganda and Kenya. The project funded and carried out also exposure and learning visits for 11 staff members to the neighbouring countries Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda. Of all staff members having 	<p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Particularly at SMACE's head office level, physical and human capacity has been positively affected by the programme. Targeted training has been provided in extension specific knowledge and skills as well as in the technical fields of plant production and protection, in animal health as well as animal production and in fisheries. Targeted training covered to about one third various generic subjects such as budgeting and accounting, report writing and basic computer skills, and in a range of specialized subjects such as research methods, statistical analysis (e.g. SPSS), and evaluation methods. Most of these capacities built will be of value to the SMACE as long as it is supported by the provision of a minimum level of equipment needed to carry out and apply the acquired skills and knowledge, and included in staff

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The programme did not take into due account both the lack of employed staff at and positions endorsed for County and Payam level, thus curtailing significantly and by default the programme's presence and impact at grassroots level. 2. The programme had a clear bias in favour of Agriculture and the related Units, while in all of its CB activities it generally did not take into due account the importance livestock and the Department of Animal Resources have for the economy and the livelihood at present and for future development of people and the economy of Western Equatoria State. 	<p>FFS and CAHW trainees participating in short-term training courses, 85% were men and 15% women; 43% were from headquarters, 32% from CAD, 25% from the field (FFS & CAHWs); the remaining 15 trainees were from the TSU and from NSA/NGOs (World Vision International, INTERSOS and MRDA Mundri East).</p> <p>4. With the help of the programme, 17 medium training courses (12 men and 5 women), 7 long-term training courses (6 men, 1 woman) and 8 exposure visits for 9 men and 2 women to the neighbouring countries Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda were completed resp. conducted.</p> <p>Of the 203 short-term trainees, 129 trainees (63%) attended one time, 44 trainees (22%) attended two times, and 30 trainees (15%) attended from 3 to 10 times short-term training courses.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The project did not establish a Monitoring and Evaluation and a Training Unit under the Planning Department. 2. The high turn-over of Ministers (3x), Director Generals (2x) and CAD Directors slowed down the coordination and 	<p>training activities covered administrative and finance related topics, 17% dealt with FFS centred extension methodology, 24% with crop production, 6% with agro-forestry related issues, 15% with animal health and 6% with fisheries.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The programme trained 1 FFS Supervisor for Crops, 1 FFS Supervisor for Livestock, 1 Master Trainer for Fisheries and 2 Master Trainers for Agro-Forestry. All are still working with the SMACE. • Efficient and inclusive procedures were established for strategic and annual planning. <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Training results evaluation and performance assessment were regularly undertaken soon after the training had been administered but had little further implications, and the relevance of the information gained is doubtful. 2. An assessment of the 356 short-term training chances carried out since the start of CB in Western Equatoria State revealed that 63% (217) of these chances comprised 173 staff members who participated in only 1 (n=129) or 2 training 	<p>participated in human CB activities, 53% are based at head office, 28% were ministerial CAD staff at County level, 4% were FFS facilitators and 10% CAHWs.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In the wake of the fighting as result of the LRA's incursion between 2008 and 2011 the Ministry and SPCRP were forced to redirect the field activities from the originally selected Counties of Ezo and Tambura to Ibba and Mundri East. This situation resulted in reduced impact at County, Payam and Boma level both in the two originally selected counties Ezo and Tambura, and due to the short time left for implementation also in the Counties of Ibba and Mundri East. 2. The Baseline Survey, completed in October 2010, had come 2.5 years too late for the Western Equatoria State. Similarly, the Exit Strategy for SPCRP, completed in October 2011, came too late and in fact, the issues addressed in the Exit Strategy should have been dealt with from the very beginning of the programme's implementation. 3. Without a robust organisational review and 	<p>performance assessment.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The low level of security particularly in the Counties of Ezo and Tambura makes the interventions implemented by the programme rather unsustainable, lest the SMACE will continue supporting FFS and CAHW related activities. 2. The lack of sufficient field staff at County, Payam and Boma levels significantly reduced not only the impact but also the sustainability of the programme's interventions. 3. The misbalance between Agriculture and Animal Resources discussed under 'Impact', above, will weaken SMACE – its organisational cohesion, staff motivation, and effectiveness. 4. Generally, the increased strength of the ministry will weaken if the budgetary resources cannot be secured that are minimally required for directorates, departments, units and staff to fulfil their mandatory tasks. Equally, physical facilities and equipment must be adequately maintained insofar required for the organisation's mandatory tasks. 5. Successful HD and targeted training need continuous

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
		<p>implementation of the planned activities.</p> <p>3. The often highly bureaucratic procedures of both SMACE and FAO reduced significantly the Efficiency of project implementation.</p>	<p>course (n=44), while a little more than one third (n=70) had participated in three or more training courses.</p> <p>3. No organisational review of the SMACE had been carried out. Such a review would have offered the opportunity to address the negative feeling of particularly the staff of the Animal Resources Department who feels sidelined and neglected by the current organisational set-up.</p>	<p>analysis, it is hard to identify duplications, ambiguity of authority, omissions, potential sources of conflict and mal-performance, at State and County levels and on the cross-lines of the organization.</p> <p>4. Of all training activities carried out by SPCRP-CB, 47% had been given to staff from Agriculture - FFS, Crops and Forestry combined - while Animal Resources – CAHWs/ animal health and Fisheries combined comprised only 20% of all staff trained. This rather unbalanced allocation of training resources and capacities between Agriculture and Livestock did not contribute towards lowering the tensions between the two major departments in the SMACE.</p> <p>5. The very low number of field resp. extension staff at County, Payam and Boma level limits to a high degree the impact of all of SPCRP's CB activities on increasing production, productivity and the livelihood of people at grassroots level.</p> <p>6. The general lack of the means and inputs required to apply and replicate the skills and technologies learned through CB to more farmers limits further the impact SPCRP's CB may have on</p>	<p>attention: staff transfers, promotions, staff leaving, keeping up to date, special attention to field staff who tend to be somewhat 'neglected'. It is doubtful if the resources to maintain the HD strength reached with the support of the programme will continue in future. If not, the programme's achievements will inevitably and gradually erode.</p> <p>6. So far, SMACE did not carry out any assessment or planning as to how many FFS and extension staff and budget would be needed in the future to make a significant contribution towards Western Equatoria State's development as stipulated e.g. in the programme's development Goal.</p> <p>7. Staff performance assessment is not yet entrenched in the organisation to support ensuring sustainability of the professional staff capabilities achieved.</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
				<p>increasing production, productivity and the livelihood of people at grassroots level.</p> <p>7. The impact of having participated in just one or two training courses over 4 years on the performance of the staff is assumed to have at best a modest impact.</p> <p>8. The general shallowness of staff performance assessments, particularly the assessment as to which extent the trained staff apply their newly acquired knowledge and skills, limits further the impact of the CB measures carried out by SPCRP.</p> <p>9. Both the SMACE and the Agriculture Department lack a clear understanding and focus of the FFS concept, e.g. with regard to the duration of a FFS, and the resources required for a future expansion of the number of FFS. So far, SMACE did not carry out any assessment or planning as to how many FFS and extension staff and budget would be needed in the future to make a significant contribution towards achieving the programme's development Goal.</p> <p>10. The SMACE's and the Department of Agriculture's lack of means for maintaining and extending the FFS beyond 2012 threatens the impact and sustainability of this appropriate</p>	

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
				extension approach.	
FARMER SCHOOLS	FIELD Positive: 1. The FFS approach was developed in the late 1980-ties by FAO in Indonesia in and for irrigated rice with the aim to solve two major problems: reduce simultaneously the high crop losses from insects and the high use of pesticides. Since its success in Indonesia, the FFS has been proven as an appropriate and highly successful approach to raise agricultural production and productivity, particularly of smallholder farmers in many countries of the whole world. 2. The strength of the FFS approach is based on the participatory approach, and by focusing on a single commodity in working with selected and motivated farming communities and crop farmers/ households. 3. Since the MTR and two backstopping missions from FAO Rome, the approach was adjusted to its genuine strengths. 4. The FFS follows a clear methodology and schedule in training Supervisors and Extension Workers from government and/or NGOs, and facilitators and the FFS members/farmers. 5. Since 2008-09, the CB component introduced the FFS approach into the two centrally	Positive: 1. The CB component supported the Extension Department in establishing in total 76 FFS – 7, 40, 14 and 15 FFS in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. Of these, 15 FFS are considered defunct, and of 2 FFS the status was not clear at the time of the Final Evaluation, bringing the total number of operational FFS to 59 at the end of 2012. 2. The programme trained 2 FFS Supervisors – 1 for Crops and 1 for Livestock, 1 Master Trainer for Fisheries and 2 Master Trainers for Agro-Forestry; and 76 Facilitators (1 Facilitator per FFS; 56 men/20 women). 3. The programme supported the setting and follow up of the total of 76 FFS in the four Counties as follows: Ezo (13), Tambura (14), Ibba (24) and Mundri East County (25). 4. Of the 76 FFS, 36 were set up with the help of the CAD staff, while in 2010 3 NGOs established 40 FFS (INTERSOS 10 FFS, World Vision International 20 FFS, and MRDA 10 FFS). 5. The membership at the time of establishing the FFS were as follows: total 1,768 members, of which 1,181 (67%) were men	Positive: 1. The programme trained 2 FFS Supervisors – 1 for Crops and 1 for Livestock, 1 Master Trainer for Fisheries and 2 Master Trainers for Agro-Forestry; as well as 76 Facilitators (1 Facilitator per FFS; 56 men/20 women). 2. In response to the insecurity caused by the LRA intruding from the DRC and the CAR into Western Equatoria State, the SMACE and TSU redirected activities from Ezo and Tambura Counties to and established in Ibba and Mundri East Counties 24 and 25 FFS, respectively. 3. The project developed and disseminated recommended practices and some training materials for the following food and tree crops and livestock as selected by FFS: beans, cassava, groundnuts, maize, upland rice, sesame, sorghum and vegetables (mainly okra); intercropping teak, Grevillea, citrus and mango trees with food crops; and the raising of goats, poultry and Tilapia. 4. Members of at least 59 FFS acquired new knowledge and learned new farming practices and skills for two or more growing seasons, and members of 15 FFS for one growing	Positive: 1. In general, the FFS approach has gained a very high level of acceptance particularly among the farming communities of Western Equatoria State; the level of acceptance is perceived to be lower at the level of the State (and federal) governments. 2. Applying and following consequently throughout implementation of the FFS approach participatory approaches is considered the main factor for having achieved high level of acceptance and impact particularly at County, Payam and Boma level. 3. The project created capacity within SMACE by having trained 2 Supervisors and 3 Master Trainers in the formation and management of FFS, in the agronomy of the crops selected by the different FFS, and by Supervisors and Coordinators having gained and accumulated practical experience in how to implement the FFS approach. 4. The project was able to involve women actively in the development process by having assisted women in participating in all 76 FFS (469 women equivalent to about one third of all FFS members) and in establishing 2 women-only FFS (in 2010 by World Vision	Positive: 1. The commitment by State and federal governments and the willingness of other projects and NGOs applying the FFS approach in the future is the foundation on which the sustainability of the FFS concept rests in Western Equatoria State. 2. Another important factor guaranteeing the sustainability of the FFS approach is the sustainable use of natural resources built-into and promoted by the FFSs concept and its positive effects experienced by FFSs stakeholders – though tangible results may be achievable and recognizable in the medium to long run only. Negative: 1. The concept and approach has not yet been sufficiently adapted and as soon as possible must be better adapted to Southern Sudan's conditions and requirements, in particular by taking into due account the constraints faced by farmers related to infrastructure/ transport, inputs, credits and marketing. Without providing appropriate solutions in these areas, farmers will soon loose the ability and interest to

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>in Western Equatoria located Counties Ezo and Tambura. Without abandoning the FFS established in these two Counties, the programme added in 2009-10 the Counties of Mundri East and Ibba, in reaction to the insecurity and havoc created by the LRA fighters invading Western Equatoria State both from the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic.</p> <p>6. The single most important innovations promoted through FFS were: new/improved varieties, breeds and strains of cassava and millet; straight-row planting; intercropping combined with straight-row planting; agro-forestry combining food with tree crops; and small livestock and fisheries.</p> <p>7. With great foresight of the potential negative consequences the SMACE did not permit the importation and growing of hybrid and genetically modified planting material during the programme's implementation period. This ban should be maintained unaltered for the foreseeable future.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Until the MTR and after technical backstopping missions</p>	<p>and 587 (33%) were women; all but two women-only of the 76 FFS had mixed membership. At the time of the Final Evaluation membership was as follows: total 1,360 members, of which 891 (66%) were men and 469 (34%) were women; all operational 59 FFS had mixed membership.</p> <p>6. The main food crops plus new/improved varieties selected by the FFS were either planted in rows as single crop and/or were mixed/intercropped (the number in brackets refer to frequency of FFS using these crops single or intercropped): beans (1/8), cassava (0/6), groundnuts (4/14), maize (8/9), upland rice (0/1), sesame (1/0), and sorghum (9/12).</p> <p>7. In total, 8 FFS practised agro-forestry by intercropping groundnuts and maize resp. groundnuts and sorghum and sesame and sorghum with: teak (<i>Tectonis grandis</i>); grevillea (<i>Grevillea robusta</i>); and fruit trees (oranges and mangoes).</p> <p>8. In 2010 and in due recognition of the lack of a sufficient number and qualified own extension Workers, the TSU contracted the 3 NGOs World Vision International, INTERSOS and Mundri Rural Development Agency to establish and support 10, 20 and 10 FFS, respectively.</p>	<p>season.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The instability caused by the incursions of the LRA from 2009 to 2011, affected the effectiveness of the FFS approach particularly in Ezo and Tambura, the two counties where CB started to introduce the FFS approach, but also in Ibba and Tambura Counties because of the relatively short period available for implementation.</p> <p>2. The late technical backstopping leading to the adjustment of the FFS approach in 2010 resulted in the reorientation of the existing 27 FFS and the delayed formation of the other 40 FFS in 2010.</p> <p>3. The highly bureaucratic procedures of FAO in combination with those of SMACE reduced the effectiveness of most capacity building activities considerably.</p> <p>4. The striking lack of Extension Workers (numbers, quality) at County, Payam and Boma level combined with the discontinuation of working in 2011 with the NGOs most likely resulted in declining frequencies and quality of follow up of FFS in 2011 and 2012, though exact assessments were not made and are not available.</p>	<p>International, 1FFS in Tambura on improved poultry production – collapsed – and 1 FFS in Ibba on intercropping cassava with groundnuts, still operational).</p> <p>5. In total the project succeeded in reaching and training through 76 FFS 1,768 farmers new farming/cultural practices and increasing production – mostly on a test plot - from new cultivars of the major food and vegetable crops and fruit trees.</p> <p>6. Agro-forestry practices, consisting of planting perennial forest trees into food crops, establish the usufruct rights over the land planted with trees. Gaining the usufruct rights over land planted with a perennial crop is anticipated to have potentially a very high impact on the farming system, the income and livelihood of families.</p> <p>7. Planting fruit trees has also a very positive effect on the nutrition and potentially cash income of the family.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The number of farmers SPCRP-CB reached in Western Equatoria State is less than 1% of all households of Western Equatoria State and thus, still extremely small when compared to the overall number of</p>	<p>continue boosting production, and the FFS approach might be doomed to fade out.</p> <p>2. So far, the Agriculture Department, the Animal Resources Department and the Planning Department of SMACE have not yet compiled the costs incurred in implementing the FFS approach.</p> <p>3. Due the prevailing austerity measures, Planning, Agriculture and Animal Resources Departments have not yet prepared a plan and budget for maintaining and expanding the FFS activities in 2013. Without submitting in time the plan and budget request based on a full cost analysis the continuation and sustainability of the FFS activities initiated so far as well as the FFS approach in general in Western Equatoria State are in doubt.</p> <p>4. Carrying out extension work requires time and some minimum resources. The farmer facilitators trained by the project lack these resources, and have to work for their own farms at times when extension advice is needed most urgently. Therefore and realistically, it cannot be expected that trained facilitators will carry on extension work on a systematic and relevant scale on their own – i.e. without external support, after the</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>from FAO Rome the project followed an unfocused FFS approach by tolerating FFS to deal simultaneously with several crops and related problems.</p> <p>2. All FFS in Western Equatoria have only 1 facilitator as compared to the recommended 2 facilitators, thus rendering the impact and the sustainability of these FFS highly risky.</p> <p>3. Both PCU and TSU allowed a high number of different crops (7 food crops, 3 or more vegetables, and 4 tree crops), crop husbandry practices (at least 3) and livestock (3) to be promoted through FFS in Western Equatoria State. It could not be proven and therefore remains doubtful, if for each different innovation and technology promoted sufficiently positive prior experience had been gained and appropriate recommendations had been formulated/were available, justifying the setting up of FFS for promoting these innovations.</p> <p>4. In most villages of Western Equatoria State farmers suffer from poor infrastructure/road network and face constraints such as lack of access to inputs and credit and for marketing their surplus produce. So far, the FFS approach and strategy is</p>	<p>9. The 76 FFS received grants of US\$ 79,457 in total or US\$ 1,045 on average.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Between 2009 and 2011, the incursion and the insecurity caused by the LRA reduced significantly SPCRP-CB's efficiency of setting up and facilitating FFS in Western Equatoria State.</p> <p>2. The small number of 5-6 Extension Workers per County, their frequently inadequate level of technical and general knowledge and skills combined with the lack of adequate transport and other facilities limited the efficiency with which the programme's other resources were and could have been utilized, particularly at grassroots level.</p> <p>3. The late technical backstopping resp. intervention by FAO Rome for adjusting the FFS approach and the disturbances caused resulting from the incursion by LRA into Ezo and Tambura Counties in particular are considered as the main factor which contributed to the demise of more than 40% of the then established FFS in Ezo (8 of 13 FFS) and Tambura (3 out of 14 FFS) Counties.</p> <p>4. At the time of the Final Evaluation, the number of</p>	<p>5. Having started 15 new FFS in 2012 did not give these 397 new farmers (267 men and 130 women) enough time to master the new technologies being introduced; this applies particularly to the medium-to long-term time frame required to complete the activities started with tree crops by the 5 agro-forestry FFS and the 5 livestock/goat FFS (177 men and 76 women, total 253 FFS members).</p> <p>6. The new early maturing and short sorghum varieties referred to as Sereno, introduced some years back by the SMACE to Western Equatoria State, seem to be widely affected by the fungal smut disease leading to high yield losses and rendering the seed unsuitable for replanting, lest the seed will be treated against seed-borne diseases. Some of the early maturing sorghum varieties may also not be adapted to and suitable to be grown under the humid conditions of Western Equatoria State. Farmers should be persuaded not to grow the susceptible varieties, while the Ministry should obtain, test and introduce resistant varieties.</p> <p>7. So far most of the training materials produced are in writing/text form with few/no pictures and drawings which is</p>	<p>smallholder households in the State.</p> <p>2. The few numbers of trained and qualified staff, lack of government funds and the austerity measures on the one side, the relatively modest pay scales of government and the considerable better remuneration NGOs pay results in very low numbers of qualified Extension Workers based and working at CAD level and below. This lack of qualified staff significantly reduced the impact of the programme on agricultural production and productivity and on the livelihood of the farming communities.</p> <p>3. The pervasive lack of infrastructure and transport, inputs, credits and opportunities to market surplus produce limit the impact the improved agricultural practices have on the livelihood of farmers' households and the overall production and productivity of the agriculture sector.</p> <p>4. In addition to row planting and timely weeding, very few tested and proven agricultural innovations are available. Hybrid varieties are a double-edged sword and need to be very carefully handled. The lack of innovations makes it highly necessary for government to</p>	<p>project has ended. If this minimum support is not forthcoming, the trained facilitators will give up extension work, and the FFS approach is doomed to fade out rather sooner than later.</p> <p>5. The contamination of important sources of planting materials with fungal diseases may sharply reduce crop yield and threaten the continued use of high yielding varieties.</p> <p>6. The time required to consolidate and allow FFS to graduate from production and protection oriented groups to surplus producing and marketing oriented groups was and still is underestimated. The insecurity and turmoil as result of the LRA from 2009 to 2011 particularly in Ezo and Tambura Counties add further to the duration FFS may need for graduating to SBG groups.</p> <p>7. The high amount of US\$ 1,000 allocated and given to each FFS is very high and particularly under austerity conditions completely unsustainable.</p> <p>7. Similarly, by not having prior to payments agreed on uniform criteria, amount and procedures for grants, the whole FFS approach has become less sustainable.</p> <p>8. To conclude: the actual</p>

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	<p>wholly production and protection oriented and does not address the issues related to access to inputs, credit and marketing.</p> <p>5. The current FFS approach and strategy does not adequately integrate livestock into crop production, particularly with regard to utilizing effectively the manure for maintaining the still high soil fertility.</p> <p>6. The current FFS implementation strategy is highly production and protection oriented, does not yet address costs/financial and marketing aspects, and is at best only lightly geared towards production and marketing of (surplus) produce. During the programme's lifetime, a Rural Marketing – Small Business sub-component has not been set-up.</p> <p>7. The organizational set-up of Extension concentrates decision making at the State level and gives the Locality no role to play.</p> <p>8. So far, the Post FFS phase is not well understood and planned and poorly managed. The SMACE has not yet made any assessment as to how many FFS would be required nor the budget which would be needed in the future to achieve the programme's development goal.</p>	<p>defunct/operational FFS are by County as follows: Ezo (8/5), Tambura (3/11), Ibba (2/22) and Mundri East (2/23, with the status of a further 2 FFS unclear. One of the two women-only FFS set up in 2010 for raising poultry is also defunct.</p> <p>5. The 3 NGOs which had facilitated setting up and provided support to 40 FFS in 2010, ceased their support and facilitating role in the following two years, after the contracts had not been extended. Because SMACE had and could not employ additional Extension Workers nor provide regular transport to the few Extension Workers, the follow-up provided during 2011 and 2012 is assumed to have been below the required minimum level of support.</p> <p>6. In 2012 the programme added 15 new FFS, of which 10 FFS had selected as main crop or activities long-term activities which could never be completed within one growing season resp. one year. These FFS comprised 5 FFS engaging in agro-forestry, 2 FFs in Tilapia, 2FFS in goat and 1 FFS in chicken raising; at the time of the Final Evaluation, some of these FFS had not yet received the inputs promised to them, particularly Tilapia, but also poultry and goats.</p>	<p>of little practical value to the mostly illiterate members of the FFS.</p> <p>8. Planting in rows instead randomly makes weeding easier and increases yield if weeding is timely carried out. This applies generally to all food crops and is easily applicable by farmers for cassava, maize and beans. However, because of the large fields planted to sorghum, the staple crop in South Sudan, the small size of the sorghum seeds and the very high labour input required at planting time when labour is most needed and scarce, make row planting of sorghum as recommended by the programme and SMACE impractical and virtually impossible at farm level.</p> <p>9. Conservation Agriculture (CA) though according to the project Document expected to be promoted by the programme, does not feature prominently or directly among the recommended practices. Among all FFS, agro-forestry FFS are the FFS dealing mostly with CA.</p> <p>10. There is no systematic compilation and analysis of the results the FFS achieved in using new varieties, with seed and planting materials provided by the programme, and applying new cultural practices, foremost</p>	<p>strengthen adaptive agricultural research at crop training centres and the universities of the country.</p> <p>5. The use of planting material of high yielding varieties infected by diseases reduces significantly the impact these improved planting materials and varieties may have on yield and adoption by farmers and FFS.</p> <p>6. The lack of appropriate extension material limited and limits the impact FFS may otherwise have on production productivity and income from the promoted technologies.</p> <p>7. The programme has not systematically assessed/determined the benefits the FFS and its members obtained from applying improved planting material and recommended practices. Before any future expansion of the FFS approach the benefits and e.g. gross margins from introducing new planting materials and agronomic practices have to be assessed and as much as possible determined.</p> <p>8. FFS concept is not yet well understood and adapted to the conditions of Western Equatoria State /Southern Sudan. Instead of a FFS being considered and promoted as a temporary group of voluntary farmers just interested in learning as quickly as possible a specific production</p>	<p>sustainability of the FFS approach depends to a large extent on: the ability and willingness of SMACE to adapt the introduced and applied standard FFS approach to the concrete requirements of the socioeconomic environment prevailing resp. evolving in Western Equatoria State and Southern Sudan; the actual allocation of funds to consolidate and expand the FFS approach in Western Equatoria State/Southern Sudan; and an enabling socio-economic environment providing farmers access to inputs, credit and marketing services.</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
		<p>7. Though SPCRP CB prepared and disseminated recommended improved crop husbandry practices for the major food crops, these recommendations appeared in writing towards the end of the programme and consisted primarily as text-only handouts, lacking any pictorials. Text-only handouts must be considered of very little relevance to the facilitators and the mostly illiterate FFS members.</p> <p>8. T The programme did not develop and apply uniform and transparent criteria nor procedures for grants provided to 76 FFS.</p> <p>9. According to the information as prepared by the PCU and TSU, by the programme's end a total of US\$ 79,457 had been given to the 76 FFS. The average amount given to FFS fluctuated from US\$ 800 in 2009 (though only an average 54% had been paid), 1,000 in 2010, US\$931 in 2011 and US\$1,592 in 2012 (only 58% had been paid; if 100% would be paid, the average grant per FFS would amount to US\$2,745 - indicating that a clear grant policy is lacking.</p> <p>109. Of the 76 FFS established from 2009 to 2012, only 3 qualified and during 2012 were being supported to</p>	<p>among all row planting and timely weeding.</p> <p>11. There are no clear and straight-forward guidelines with regard to grants eligible by FFS</p> <p>12. The Evaluation Team gained the impression that both the SMACE and the TSU do not well understand the grant scheme and the implications it may have for expanding the FFS concept in the future.</p> <p>13. The SMACE seems not to understand well the post FFS phase.</p> <p>14. The SMACE has not yet carried out any assessment as to how many FFS might be needed and the budget required in the future.</p>	<p>and productivity enhancing crop or livestock technology and thereafter disbanding again, FFS are more considered and promoted as a long-term village-based organisation dedicated to agriculture and livestock production.</p> <p>9. Introducing FFS impacts group related and technical knowledge and skills, and needs initially much time and resources. After a FFS has graduated/reached Post FFS stage, many FFS and members want to continue learning improved production methods for a different crop. For such an exercise no full FFS course with all training modules will be needed. To utilize the limited resources more effectively, the implementation strategy needs to be reviewed and adjusted so as to maintain momentum resp. increase the FFS' impact and sustainability. This has not been done yet.</p> <p>10. No visits between FFS had been carried out, thus reducing the potential impact the FFS approach may have had with inter-FFS visits.</p> <p>11. Having by project's end not adapted the standard FFS model to the more complex situation and requirements of Western Equatoria /Southern Sudan, the potential impact of the FFS</p>	

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
		graduate to Small Business Groups.		approach was and could at best only partially be realized. 12. The 10 FFS set up in 2012, starting with crops and livestock activities which need several years to mature are afraid of not being provided the support needed in the coming years to complete their activities, and therefore, may fail. In general the experience shows that the majority of farmers having participated for only 1 season in a FFS will most likely be unable to master and continue applying the new technologies on their own farm, and even less to pass knowledge and skills on to other farmers.	
CAHW	Positive: 1. The concept of CAHWs (Community Animal Health Workers) evolved from the paravet concept which was developed and highly successfully practised and adapted to the emergency modus during the Operation Lifeline Sudan prior to the CPA of 2005; at the time, the main justification and focus of having developed and utilised paravets and the CAHWs was the eradication of Rinderpest. 2. In 2009, the CAHW concept was reviewed and endorsed at federal and State level as the official model for dealing in Southern Sudan with livestock	Positive: 1. Currently in total 11 Animal Resources staff are based at 7 Counties (6 staff at 6 Counties, and 5 staff at 1 County/Maridi), while 3 Counties (Nagero, Ezo and Ibba) have no Animal Resources staff. 2. The programme assisted the Animal Resources Department in training 1 male Livestock Coordinator and 1 male Master Trainer for Fisheries. The main subjects trained were: primary animal health care; and basics of fish catching, fish raising as well as fish processing and preservation. 3. Prior to the start of retraining CAHWs, the	Positive: 1. The programme was instrumental in preparing the guidelines for all agencies involved in Community Animal Health Services in Southern Sudan. 2. The programme supported the standardization of the CAHW's training curriculum. 3. In the process of developing the guidelines and the curriculum for CAHW in Southern Sudan, the programme cooperated with other organisations involved in basic animal health care, e.g. VSF Belgium and VSF Germany. Negative	Positive: 1. The programme was essential in developing the guidelines for Community Animal Health Services and the curriculum for CAHW in Southern Sudan, and to get the guidelines and curriculum officially accepted, which are anticipated to have the greatest impact among all of the programme's interventions in the livestock sector. 2. At the time of the Final Evaluation, the trained Livestock Coordinator and the Master Trainer for Fisheries were still employed by and working for the Animal Resources Department in the	Positive: 1. The clear expression by NGOs and other organisations to continue applying and strengthening the CAHW concept is the foundation on which the sustainability of the CAHW concept rests in Western Equatoria State. Negative: 1. The lack of resources available to the SMACE and allocated to the Animal Resources Department threatens the consolidation and future expansion of the CAHW concept. 2. With the current endowment of staff and resources, SMACE

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>and animal health related matters below the government services.</p> <p>3. The CAHW concept is focused on primary animal health care and is well adjusted to the emergency modus still prevailing in many parts of Southern Sudan in general and Western Equatoria State in particular. Southern Sudan does not yet consider the conditions to have improved to the degree justifying shifting to the CARDA model as has been done in 2010 in Khartoum for the Sudan. The CARDA concept is more holistic than CAHW by complementing the basic animal health elements (the focus of CAHW) with animal nutrition, reproductive care of farm animals, as well as animal products processing and livestock marketing. However, with at least basic writing and numeric skills CARDA need also a higher level of formal education.</p> <p>4. The CAHW concept is more applicable to pastoralists but is also suitable for sedentary farmers and livestock owners.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Western Equatoria State is the only State in Southern Sudan which still has a single ministry for agriculture /crops</p>	<p>programme supported the staff of the Animal Resources Department in identifying active CAHWs (though the total number of active CAHWs is not known).</p> <p>4. During 2010 and 2011, the programme retrained 17 (15 men, 2 women) and 23 CAHWs (total: 40 CAHWs) who had received similar training already during previous years from different organisations promoting animal health.</p> <p>5. In 2011, two CAHWs were promoted to Animal Health Auxiliaries after having participated in a special training for Animal Health Auxiliaries provided by the programme.</p> <p>6. The programme sponsored 2 staff members to undergo certificate courses in fisheries development in Uganda.</p> <p>7. The programme supported the formation of Livestock Associations – the CAHWs Association in Tambura (6 members, all men); and the White Bird Agro-Vet Drug Shop association in Mundri East with 9 members (8 men, 1 woman).</p> <p>8. The programme provided 20 of the 40 retrained CAHWs with a basic tool kit.</p> <p>9. The programme planned to provide 20 of the 40 retrained CAHWs with a bicycle; actual</p>	<p>1. Of all 64 staff training activities funded under SPCRP-CB from 2008 to 2012, only 11 or 15% were for livestock/ animal health, and only 4 or 6% for fisheries.</p> <p>2. Only half of the 40 re-trained CAHWs were provided with toolkits and only 8 CAHWs with bicycles.</p> <p>3. Despite that 40 CAHWs had been retrained under the programme, only 2 animal resources/livestock associations had been formed throughout the programme's lifetime.</p> <p>4. By the time of the Final Evaluation, not all livestock raising FFS had received the inputs promised to them by the programme.</p> <p>5. Due to the long process until reaching maturity, the duration Animal Resources staff could support the FFS for goats, poultry and Tilapia is generally too short, particularly for the 5 livestock FFS set up in 2012, and for those FFS which did not receive all/only some of the inputs required and promised by the programme.</p>	<p>SMACE.</p> <p>3. The Animal Resources Department has prepared plans for upgrading its services – i.e. to the current 26 staff (12 at State and 14 at County level) 30 additional staff are needed, and to the current 40 CAHWs retrained so far 60 more CAHWs need to be trained/retrained. A budget of SSP 334,000 for headquarters and SSP 300,000 for County level are anticipated and requested; candidates are available in Southern Sudan, and would have to be selected and trained resp. re-trained. In addition 3 vchles and 10 motorbikes would be needed.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Without continued minimum support both to staff and FFS after the programme's end, the livestock FFS may not reach their objectives and may slowly disintegrate and disband.</p>	<p>and Western Equatoria State are ill-prepared to cope with the potential outbreak of a serious animal and/or zoonotic disease.</p> <p>3. The few means the staff of the Animal Resources Department have at its disposal for supervising the CAHWs may result in leaving undesired developments – e.g. with regard to the (ab-)use of drugs – unnoticed and discredit the CAHW approach.</p> <p>4. Should security improve significantly and over a prolonged period, the CAHW concept will have to evolve from a concept well adapted to emergency conditions into a concept well adapted to development. For this adaptation funds and resources are required. Under the prevailing situation and endowment with resources it is doubtful if SMACE would be in a position to facilitate this transformation of the Animal Resources Department.</p>

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	<p>and animal resources/ livestock, animal health and fisheries. However, the leadership, staff and current set-up of SMACE was unable to diffuse the deep-seated animosities existing between Agriculture and Animal Resources.</p> <p>2. The staff members of the Animal Resources Department are of the opinion that: the role of livestock and fisheries for Western Equatoria State's economy and livelihood as well as their potential for economic development are systematically downplayed, undervalued and neglected; and the large cattle herds existing in the eastern Counties are not adequately acknowledged resp. attention paid to by SMACE to develop the overall potential livestock has for Western Equatoria State's economic development.</p> <p>3. The staff of Animal Resources feels neglected and treated unfairly in all aspects, including with regard to training and equipment provided by/ received from SPCRP-CB.</p> <p>3. The CAHW model while fitting well into the emergency mode is less suitable for dealing with the livestock sector under a development approach.</p> <p>4. CAHWs do not receive a fee but have to obtain their income from being paid by the livestock</p>	<p>numbers of bicycles: 4 for Tambura and 4 for Ezo Counties.</p> <p>10. The programme provided also 6 solar powered refrigerators for safekeeping drugs, medicines and/or vaccines.</p> <p>11. With the assistance from the staff of Animal Resources, the programme supported the formation of 17 livestock centered FFS – 7 for goats, 6 for poultry and 4 for raising Tilapia.</p> <p>Negative</p> <p>1. By focusing its resource and attention more on crops and agricultural development, the potential and the opportunities remained underutilized the livestock and fisheries sector have for improving the nutritional status and livelihood of people as well as for the economic development for Western Equatoria State.</p> <p>2. The current 11 Animal Resources staff are based at 7 Counties only (6 staff at 6 Counties, and 5 staff at 1 County/Maridi), while 3 Counties (Nagero, Ezo and Ibba) have no Animal Resources staff at all.</p> <p>3. The remuneration for the services CAHWs provide to livestock owners and communities is not adequately</p>			

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	owners for treating their animals and/or selling drugs. Experience gained since the end of Operation Lifeline Sudan indicates strongly that most CAHWs are unable to earn sufficient income from treating animals against a fee and the mark-up they can obtain from selling/ administering drugs, because CAHWs, living together with their extended families are culturally and traditionally unable to charge relatives for their services.	addressed/ resolved. 4. Due to lack of remuneration the CAHWs carry out to only a limited scale the role and tasks expected, including their role in disease surveillance. 5. At least partly as result of the general neglect of animal resources, no attempt was made to set up a Drug Revolving Fund as was done in the Sudan/ Khartoum.			
RURAL MARKETING - SMALL BUSINESS GROUPS	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Since 2011, the programme started to support the Mamenze Fresh Fish Multipurpose Cooperative (MFFMC) for raising Tilapia as first RM-SGB in Western Equatoria. This group had already started in 2004 the raising of Tilapia and other income generating activities, though with modest success.</p> <p>2. In addition and starting in 2012, the programme supported several mature and consolidated FFS in graduating from simple subsistence food (crop) production and crop protection to surplus production and marketing, such as the Zangia FFS (since 2010, crops) in Tambura County, and Makiba FFS (since 2010, crops) in Ibba</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. At its end the programme had facilitated the setting up of 1 Small Business Group – the Mamenze Fresh Fish Multipurpose Cooperative (MFFMC) in Yambio for raising Tilapia as first RM-SGB in Western Equatoria. The MFFMC has currently 20 members – 12 men and 8 women.</p> <p>2. The programme assessed the status of various FFS established in 2009 and 2010 and identified 7 FFS which qualified for being supported further to graduate to the SBG status.</p> <p>3. The programme supported Mamenze FFMC with various technical trainings on how to design and build fish ponds as</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The equipment and materials the project provided to Mamenze FFMC and to the graduating FFS/evolving SBG is considered the backbone on which these groups may develop their small businesses.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The huge quantities of inputs both in physical and financial terms - without proper cost and e.g. gross margin calculations – perpetuated the emergency approach and cemented the dependency syndrome, and may render the enterprises and the groups promoted as unviable as soon as the programme's support will end.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The most visible impact left behind the programme with regard to small business promotion are arguably the 10 fish ponds built by the Mamenze FFMC.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The project was unable to make much use of the potential interest, willingness and capacities from groups and individuals to develop viable business activities in Western Equatoria State. The instability and insecurity in the wake of the LRA activities are a main but not the only reason for this low achievement.</p> <p>2. The impact on the livelihood of the beneficiaries/ members of Mamenze FFMC</p>	<p>Undetermined / Negative:</p> <p>1. At the project's end it is difficult to know if Mamenze FFMC and the other graduating FFS will continue without external support, resp. how many groups will be able to survive on their own and/or secure continuing support and/or funding from somewhere else.</p> <p>2. In its lifetime the programme was unable to establish a solid basis for identifying and promoting viable small business opportunities.</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>County.</p> <p>3. With the help of an external consultant contracted by FAO, the programme helped the Mamenze FFMC develop a business plan in 2011-12.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The socio-economic conditions prevailing in Western Equatoria State, particularly since the intrusion by LRA elements in 2009, were not conducive for developing small businesses and marketing.</p> <p>2. Though the SMACE has the Cooperative Department, it has not yet formed a small business promotion unit nor developed plans for promoting small agri-business groups.</p>	<p>well as how to stock and feed Tilapia fingerlings.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Except Mamenze FFMC, all other graduating FFS did not develop and had not a business plan.</p> <p>2. Only Mamenze FFMC may have received substantial training, though clearly restricted to technical subjects, while the graduating FFS receive extremely little additional training to prepare and support these groups in developing their activities into small businesses.</p> <p>3. Despite of having had an (externally) developed business plan, the members were and are still and totally immersed in grasping the different aspects of the technology for raising Tilapia and catfish in ponds. Nobody had started yet studying and implementing the business plan.</p> <p>4. One FAO fisheries expert hired by the PCU designed the plans, carried out all technical training courses and supervised the laying out and building of the 10 fish ponds with a total area of 1,920 m².</p> <p>5. Of the 4-5 staff of the Fisheries Unit of the Animal Resources Department, only 1 staff seems to have been</p>		<p>and the FFS graduating to small business status from the project's support is premature and little documented and therefore, difficult to assess.</p> <p>3. Having started small business promotion without a clear concept and business plans for the selected activities and FFS, as it has been done, may impact negatively and become a liability for future business promotion.</p>	

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
		<p>participating and trained by the FAO Fisheries technician from Juba.</p> <p>6. Mamenze FFMC and several graduating FFS received considerable quantities of free inputs, such as tools (hoes, slashers, axes, pangas and rakes), wheel barrows and tarpaulins.</p> <p>7. The lack of a clear SBG concept and business plans for each graduating FFS may cause considerable confusion among the FFS and CAD staff members.</p>			
GENDER	<p>Undetermined / Positive:</p> <p>1. The project has articulated gender as an issue to be explicitly incorporated in the various project activities, to the extent possible and meaningful.</p> <p>2. In the communities, men and women have traditional roles with the women normally more involved than men in the cash and nutritional side of the household.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Out of the 218 staff trained since the programme's start in 2008, 33 trainees equivalent to 15% of all trainees were women.</p> <p>2. Of all 40 CAHWs retrained, 33 were men and 7 women.</p> <p>3. Of all 1,768 FFS members, 587 or one third are women.</p> <p>4. All 57 operational FFS are mixed groups with on average two thirds being men and one third women. None of the operational 57 FFS is a women- or men-only group anymore.</p> <p>Undetermined/Negative:</p> <p>1. None of the Coordinators and Master Trainers and only 15% of all trained persons were women. As result of the many</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Both FSS and CAHWs services under the programme have addressed groups without specific gender bias.</p> <p>2. About one third of all FFS members and 7 out of 40 CAHWs are women.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. One of the two women only FFS established in 2010 for improved poultry production has collapsed.</p> <p>2. One women-only SBG received office equipment, including one computer with accessories, but so far no member of the SBG was trained in using this computer.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The traditional role of women in the communities and families, particularly 'cash' and 'nutrition', make the women a good repository for changes in the mind sets, attitude and activities regarding marketing, cash economy and nutrition / health issues. In this regard the programme has strengthened the role of women, particularly through FFS.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The programme could only to a limited extent make use of the positive roles of women with regard to their propensity of dealing responsibly with cash, and with new, nutritious food crops as well as their</p>	<p>Undetermined:</p> <p>1. The project has helped build a foundation aimed at raising agricultural and animal husbandry / livestock production and productivity. This has received the main attention, irrespective of gender.</p> <p>2. The traditional role of women mentioned under 'impact' renders it probable that where 'impact' is assessed as positive, the women will form a lasting repository of change with a potential to gradually see change and raised productivity gain ground and, with that, see their role and voice expanding.</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
		decades of war and the ensuing disruption of society, very few women got trained and qualified for government services and were hired by the SMACE.		preparation – e.g. extension did not promote the extremely nutritious and beneficial use of the leaves and seed of Moringa olivera especially for lactating women and children. 2. The low number of women trained from ministerial staff is the reflection of the small number of women employed by SMACE. 3. As said earlier, the programme has helped build a foundation. It is too early to judge the programme's real impact on raising role and voice of the women.	
TRAINING	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Levels of skills in Western Equatoria State – public bodies, NGOs, families, private sector – were very low at the time the project was conceived. The programme's strong emphasis on training as a major means of human development is therefore fully relevant.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The programme design did not take into due account the extremely low presence of the SMACE at grassroots level. As such and though strengthening the SMACE at State level was to a high degree achieved, most of SPCRP's capacity building measures had and can by default</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Training has been prepared and conducted efficiently, and to some extent, also followed up. Proper procedures were followed and the required coordinating infrastructure at project level was provided. 2. Given the limited expertise and training resources available at State level, the decision to contract trainers and acquire curricula from elsewhere, often using the PCU for that purpose, was efficient and to the point.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Not all training courses planned and promised by the programme had been carried out. This applies particularly to</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The project delivered massive training, e.g.: 155 staff of SMACE (88 from headquarters and 67 CAD staff), 11 staff members from NGOs, 76 FFS Facilitators, 1,768 farmers (FSS), re-trained 40 CAHWs, trained 20 members of the Mamenze FFMC in technical aspects of raising Tilapia in fish ponds; 2 Field Supervisors (1 for crops, 1 for livestock) and 2 Fisheries Master Trainers . 2. For the SMACE staff, a specific TNA was done; and FFS, CARDA and SBG Coordinators and group Facilitators were carefully selected.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. For the government staff at State and CAD level, the training went through post-training evaluation and later to a simple performance evaluation.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The annual training programmes were developed with little consultation and involvement by the Departments, particularly the Animal Resources Department. 2. About 63% staff of the SMACE both at State and CAD level was trained only once, 22% twice, and only 15% of the staff was trained more two times. The impact of participating in just one training</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The SMACE is professionally stronger today than it was before the programme, due to the programme and the training provided through the programme, as discussed under 'Public Bodies', above.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The TNA needs to be rolled over at least once every 2 years to ascertain whether skills are still up to standard, refresher courses are needed, and new staff entered needing training. 1. To better entrench systematic staff training as a core task of the SMACE, setting up a Training Unit within the</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>have only a highly limited impact on increasing agricultural production and productivity as well as raising the living standard of smallholder farmers as stipulated in SPCRP's Development Goal.</p> <p>2. The actual annual training programmes were designed with a limited strategic view and approach and instead give the impression of a mere accumulation of sometimes rather disconnected individual capacity building activities.</p>	<p>FFS specialised in the raising of animal/goats, poultry and Tilapia.</p>	<p>3. In total, 218 trainees had participated in 64 short-medium- and long-term training courses at State level with 396 chances. Of these 396 chances (= trained persons) 210 chances (53%) were from the State level, 112 chances from the CAD level (27%), and the remaining 20% from FFS facilitators (4%), CAHWs (10%), the TSU staff (3%) and NGOs (3%). Of the trainees having participated in short-term courses, 63% attended only 1 training course, 22% two training courses, and only 15% more than two training courses.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. A high staff turn-over is assumed to be one important factor having contributed to the low percentage of staff having attended more than 1 training activity, and thus reduced the potential effectiveness and impact of the project's training activities.</p> <p>2. The number of livestock production and animal health related training courses as well as staff of Animal Resources Department trained were in comparison to crops and the Department of Agriculture low and thus, the programme tended to increase instead to decrease the existing tensions between</p>	<p>course over a period of 4 years on the performance of the staff is assumed to have at best limited impact.</p> <p>3. It is proposed that having identified and selected fewer key areas for training and having trained fewer staff members but more intensively would have had a bigger and longer lasting impact than the CB strategy actually implemented.</p> <p>4. The relatively high staff turn-over might have been another important factor contributing to the low number of staff participating in more than one training activity.</p>	<p>Department of Planning is required and recommended, though it is doubtful if the required funds would be available.</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
			the two main departments of the SMACE. 3. Most likely as result of lack of staff, no Training Unit was set up within the Department of Planning.		
PROJECT MANAGEMENT	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The connections between State level/TSU and central SPCRP management/PCU have been good. There has been no undue need for central management resp. the PCU to interfere. Central management includes the tripartite construction of FAO Juba, GIZ IS and the Project Steering Committee. The latter met frequently, was generally well prepared, focused on operational rather than strategic issues and was instrumental to getting some uneasy issues solved / managed.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The Programme document did not contain a mechanism for coordinating the implementers and other major stakeholders. 2. Programme management at state level operated through overall AWP and Budgets to be approved at central level. From the existing overall annual CB budgets the amount of budget allocated to the different States are not stipulated. Managing the</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Taking into due account the existing problems between the two main Departments Agriculture and Animal Resources, which were also the two main counterpart departments of the programme, the overall coordination and communication at State level was relatively effective and allowed the generally efficient implementation of project activities. 2. The late backstopping from FAO Rome on the concept and strategy of FFS, and the pressure to significantly increase the number of FFS on the one side and the lack of qualified staff on the other side, made the TSU decide in 2010 to contract 3 NGOs for setting up 40 new FFS.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The decision making process of the TSU was generally made more difficult because of having always to consider the tensions between the two main counterpart</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The AWP were prepared on time, progress reporting was timely and to the point, project activities were largely implemented on time and progressed generally as planned.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. State level management allowed setting up 15 new FFS on the assurance by SMACE that after project closure the Ministry would continue assisting these FFS. 2. Despite having designed the Exit Strategy in 2011, no clear criteria and strategy for providing materials as well as the grants to FFS, particularly to FFS formed in 2012, had been agreed to, and the provision of materials and grants remained unsystematic and incomplete disappointing many beneficiaries and FFS.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The impact of the generally good relationship between TSU and SMACE management is positive and cannot be overrated. 2. The many activities and the constraints in Western Equatoria State, particularly after and during the insecurity caused by the LRA from 2009 to 2011, were all well handled by State level management.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The lack of clear guidelines as well as the complicated and slow decision making process re grants to FFS may prevent making the pending decisions in due time and allowing the programme to procure the items for the grants before the programme's closure.</p>	<p>Undetermined:</p> <p>1. The SPCRP is terminated and about to close the books. Management of the project activities and their sustainability is no longer in the hands of the State level project management.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Should SMACE, TSU and PCU not come in due time before project closure to meeting the expectations raised with the promises made earlier, especially re pending grants to FFS, the overall positive impression of programme management will certainly be negatively affected. 2. The amount the major stakeholders had agreed to for grants to FFS was not clearly assessed with regard to the viability and sustainability of the FFS approach cum grants – even in the absence of austerity measures, neither government nor the private/NGO sector my in the future have the means required to continue paying US\$ 1,000 for each FFS.</p>

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>budget and implementing activities at State level is thus extremely cumbersome and time-consuming.</p> <p>3. From central point of view, this operating mode makes sense – ensuring a tightly run operation, but from state point of view and management less.</p> <p>4. The programme at State level became necessarily output and not results oriented. It had no specific overall framework within which to work. ‘Strategic oversight’ at State level did and could not exist due to the absence of an overall State-specific programme document. In fact, at State level, the goal, purposes, specific objectives and expected results of the SPCRP were not specifically formulated.</p> <p>5. Programme management/the TSU was unable to mitigate the problems between the Agriculture Department and the Animal Resources Department which affected negatively the implementation of the programme throughout its lifetime.</p> <p>6. Neither the PSC nor the implementers FAO and GIZ IS proposed a mechanism for improving coordination and cooperation between the implementers.</p>	<p>Departments Agriculture and Animal Resources.</p> <p>2. Furthermore, the decision making process of the TSU was lengthy and additionally delayed because of having always to involve in decision making at activity level the PCU and often even FAO Rome.</p>			

EQM CENTRAL EQUATORIA AND UNITY

FISHERIES PRODUCTION AND MARKETING PROJECT (FPMP) – Central Equatoria, Unity and Lakes States

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
FISHERIES PRODUCTION AND MARKETING PROJECT (FPMP)	<p>Purposes and expected results:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Specific Objective: food security, production and income of vulnerable households improved by increasing the output of fisheries, both in terms of increasing the quantity of proteins available to consumers and creating employment. First result: Basic statistical information on fish stocks available. Second result: Marketing of fish improved. Third result: landing of fish increased. The project was implemented at 3 sites and in the 3 States Unity, Lakes and Central Equatoria, one site in each State. <p>Was the design relevant to South Sudan?</p> <p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Fisheries in South Sudan have an enormous potential in terms of production, food security and contribution to poverty reduction. As such, the project is highly relevant. 	<p>Was the design efficient?</p> <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Most results not achieved at all or significantly delayed. After 3 years less than 40% of the budget had been disbursed. After the second Project Manager had arrived, activities and disbursement picked up resulting to about 80% of budget spent at the project's end. Weak project management, lack of guidance and poor planning significantly contributed during nearly the first 3 years to the delays and poor results, e.g. after 2.5 years the planning documents were still rudimentary without prioritization and clear direction. Poor communication and interaction between the contractor and government affected the efficiency as well as the whole implementation of the project. Lack of qualified fisheries staff in the labour market as well as insufficient and late 	<p>Was the design effective?</p> <p>Positive / Undecided:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The most visible result is the hardware the project provided, i.e. 3 Fisheries Centres plus office equipment (including generators) and materials, one fish market in Terekeka (though not yet completed, nor accepted by MARF, nor handed over and not in use), vehicles, motorbikes and fishing boats, 2 ice making machines, and few fishing gear. Insisting and training fishermen in establishing and managing fisheries groups and associations as a prime strategy to change the mindset of beneficiaries from emergency and relief mode to development mode. <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Many activities were abandoned and results not achieved, largely due to poor understanding, communication and planning. Managing the project from Juba and having for a long time no permanently assigned project staff at the Fisheries Centre had 	<p>Was the design geared to deliver impact?</p> <p>Positive:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Fisheries centres, if provided with budget by government and utilised properly in the future have a high probability of lasting impact. Improved fish drying method and smoking ovens show in few fishing camps already signs of becoming accepted by fishing communities. Fisheries statistics, though still weak, are the basis for future planning as well as M&E of the State MARF. <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Modalities for ownership and operating costs for buildings, (offices, fish market, landing site) and equipment (vehicles, ice machines) not agreed upon and decided prior to project closure. The benefits fishermen obtained from the project are negligible. 	<p>Was the design tailored to ensuring sustainability?</p> <p>Positive / Undecided:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> If the government succeeds in finding suitable arrangements with another donor and/or NGO – e.g. SNV – there is hope that the hard- and software provided by the project will become the foundation for future interventions in the fisheries sector and thus, will have a chance of becoming sustainable. <p>Negative:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Neither the original design nor the logframe as revised in 2011 did address sustainability issues. Nearly all results and outputs were achieved towards the project's end. Without the government committing the resources required and/or making other arrangements to maintain or expand the current outputs, no sustainability is expected to be achieved. So far, State MARF have not yet allocated sufficient funds for the budget 2012-13 and thereafter as required to

FISHERIES PRODUCTION AND MARKETING PROJECT (FPMP) – Central Equatoria, Unity and Lakes States

QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>2. In view of the actual staff and office situation of the Fisheries Department, building Fisheries Centres was relevant.</p> <p>3. The project design stressed working closely with government services to strengthen the government of the newly independent South Sudan.</p> <p>4. Building fisheries centres is also relevant both for supporting the fishermen and strengthening the fisheries sector.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The original project design was formulated many years before the implementation started. It had been formulated on an extremely weak data basis. It also did not consider the high risks emanating from the security situation. Consequently the stated objectives and outputs did not fit well into the socio-economic conditions prevailing during implementation; they were also overly optimistic in view of the actual situation on the ground.</p> <p>2. It was expected that during the Inception Phase the design problems would be addressed</p>	<p>seconding of government staff are prime causes for the project's low achievement.</p> <p>5. Project staff had very limited direct contact to the target group, which at best is only partly the result of few project staff and the security situation. Instead, in Terekeka (CES) the project focused on supporting the Sernum Cooperative Society which in 2010 project management terminated because of irreconcilable differences.</p> <p>6. Scant interaction of the project team with the final beneficiaries resulted in less than 100 fishermen trained (only 3 training courses given for fishermen).</p> <p>7. Limited and irregular interaction with fishermen by the project combined with the attempt to switch in 2010 from relief to the development mode resulted in terminating many activities and fishermen receiving few direct benefits from the project.</p> <p>8. Long decision making processes by government, partly the result of limited commitment and political influence taking, delayed</p>	<p>a detrimental effect on the project's effectiveness.</p> <p>3. Training courses often given to all ranks of beneficiaries combined - from fishermen to State level government officials - rendered the few training courses largely unfocused and ineffective.</p> <p>4. Avoiding double counting, the project trained throughout its lifetime possibly less than 100 persons.</p> <p>5. Despite the considerable effort spent on convincing fishermen from the benefits of forming and acting in groups and cooperative societies, the members still expect from groups and cooperatives mainly the external provision of fishing inputs and less the provision of services.</p>		<p>continue the project interventions.</p>

FISHERIES PRODUCTION AND MARKETING PROJECT (FPMP) – Central Equatoria, Unity and Lakes States					
QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>and rectified. This did not happen, despite that the Inception Phase lasted for nearly a year; the logframe was adjusted only in 2010 and the baseline survey had been completed at all sites in 2011 only.</p> <p>3. The initial implementation was still in relief mode. Starting in 2010, project management switched to development mode and stopped as much as possible the free and unconditional distribution of inputs both to fishermen and government alike.</p> <p>4. Focusing on strengthening government did not take into due account the potentially negative repercussions this might have on increasing the production and reducing poverty among fishermen.</p> <p>5. The selected locations in two of the three States were difficult to reach and had security problems; combined with very few staff assigned to the project, management of the project became very difficult.</p> <p>6. After the MTE the project revised the logframe and reduced the number of results</p>	<p>considerably implementation in general, and site selection and construction of Fisheries Centres in all 3 States in particular.</p> <p>9. Security problems resulted in the reallocation of project sites and the invalidation of work done in 2 States (Unity and Lakes) and to a disruption of project implementation in CES.</p> <p>10. Unclear relationship, responsibilities and modus operandi between federal and state governments and ministries complicated the situation and delayed decision making and implementation further.</p> <p>11. Project management was unable to find an acceptable modus operandi for all stakeholders with regard to the bush shops and the ice making machines, leaving these and other opportunities of providing fishing gear and inputs to the fishing communities unutilized.</p> <p>12. The landing site and the housing facilities as built at Terekeka are way below expectations of the government and may indicate weak</p>			

FISHERIES PRODUCTION AND MARKETING PROJECT (FPMP) – Central Equatoria, Unity and Lakes States					
QUESTIONS- TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	from 5 to 3; nevertheless, no clear decision was reached as to which the main focus of the project should be – to increase the fish catch (R 3) or to improve the marketing of fish (R 2), and within marketing focusing either on supporting trade networks or on improving the quality of fish products.	communication between the MARF and the contractor.			

EQM LAKES STATE

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC DESIGN / PROJECT FRAMEWORK FOR LAKES STATE	<p>Undetermined:</p> <p>1. The positive and negative connotations discussed earlier for the ‘Overall Project in South Sudan’ equally apply to Lakes State. Specific and additional observations for Lakes State are made below.</p> <p>2. No specific Project Document, Terms of Reference and Inception Reports were prepared for Lakes State. There is therefore no state-specific design or framework for SPCRP in Lakes State.</p> <p>3. The project operates through Annual Work Plans to be approved at the central level (Juba), supposedly against the SPCRP Logical Framework Matrix for South Sudan. The latter is a sub-structure of the Overall LFM for SPCRP as a whole, i.e. for both, Sudan and South Sudan.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. In the absence of a SPCRP Plan specific to Lakes State, the Evaluation Mission could not evaluate the project against an appropriate comprehensive framework. The Mission has therefore evaluated project activities,</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Efficiency in implementing the project in Lakes State suffered from the constraints discussed in the column ‘relevance’ and the observations on the ‘overall design of the SPCRP (Section 1.3 of this report).</p> <p>2. Had there been a robust state-specific project framework, a number of constraints could probably have been dealt with more efficiently.</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The absence of a project framework specific for Lakes State reduced the effectiveness of the project. This refers to the number of activities and outputs, and negatively affected the intensity of support under the project and the attention paid to e.g. the FFSs which received only one single year of support rather than 2-3 growing cycles generally advocated for this FFS mechanism.</p> <p>2. The overall ‘blanket design’ of the SPCRP led to targets exceeding available budget. To achieve the targets, resources were spread thin, formal effectiveness was satisfied, but impact and sustainability suffered.</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. As for ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’, the absence of a state-specific project framework absorbing state-specific conditions reduced the impact of the project.</p> <p>2. To some degree, this affects ‘sustainability’ perhaps more than ‘delivery’.3. A state-specific project framework would probably have reduced the number and extent of promises made to the communities but not honoured, which, in turn, reduced impact and sustainability.</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The project may have established the beginnings of a ‘foundation’ for the ‘recovery’ or rather build-up of productive capacity in Lakes State. Yet, the absence of a state-specific framework for the project operated against selection of activities conducive to more robust structures supporting lasting development, e.g. more focus on institutional and organisation development regarding the public administration.</p> <p>2. ‘Recovery of productive capacity’, the key ambition of the SPCRP, has not been achieved, i.e. with the exception of a number of achievements discussed later in this EQM.</p> <p>3. Absence of a well-designed state-specific framework for the project is a key adverse factor in this regard. And so is the ‘myth’ of ‘recovery’ which does not apply to a situation where little is to be ‘recovered’ but much is to be ‘built’ on very low levels of strength.</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>outputs and results in their own right, as well as from the point of view of the ambitions of the SPCRCP as whole.</p> <p>2. State-specific conditions had no place in the blanket and target oriented SPCRCP project design and, therefore, not in the implementation of the project in Lakes State. Some specific conditions were incorporated in the AWP, ad-hoc, selectively and not always transparent.</p> <p>3. Lakes State livelihood systems are dominated by livestock, with agriculture and fisheries being supplementary. In the absence of a state-specific framework, the crops bias of SPCRCP prevented incorporating this orientation of the Lakes economy in the implementation of the project..</p>				
OVERALL PERFORMANCE	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The CB component has performed in accordance with the Annual Work Plans. This concerns both physical and non-physical CB.</p> <p>2. Achievements under the CB component, e.g. strengthened CAHWs, 20-25% success FFSs, and the training to prepare strategic</p>	<p>Positive</p> <p>1. Physical and non-physical CB has generally been efficiently delivered – ‘good value for money’, e.g. limited support for the FFS yet 20-25% success, uniform buildings design and fast delivery.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The achievements and outputs are listed and presented in Annex 5 to this report. The list shows that most targeted outputs have been delivered.</p> <p>2. Training of staff took place in accordance with annual TNAs, produced by the state ministries and</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The project helped build the beginnings of a foundation for further development.</p> <p>2. Mindsets and vocabularies changed, knowledge expanded, new techniques and methods were introduced.</p> <p>3. The project has directly</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. CAHWs training yielded sturdy and entrenched results, and will continue to support the cattle herds, without much further support. Part of the success is due to training and practice during the relief days which provided fertile absorptive capacity for SPCRCP training.</p> <p>2. The same applies to perhaps</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>plans and undertake better M&E are relevant now and in the future.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. For the reasons / factors expounded under ‘overall project design’ (Section 2) and ‘absence of state-specific design’ (this EQM, above), the overall performance of the project is disappointing from the point of view of the ambitions of SPCR.</p> <p>2. For the CB component, the less successful part of the performance is largely due to factors outside the control of Lakes State TSU. Most of it is attributable to: a. decisions guided by rigid adherence to ‘targets’ at Juba PCU level, and b. developments and processes beyond the control of the project as a whole, e.g. challenging PSC and Technical Committee decision processes and weak National and Federal public administration.</p> <p>3. <u>CB – FAO</u>. The CBNA for Lakes State completed early in the project failed to identify some critical needs and take these into account: a. The ‘cattle culture and traditions’ in the state, b. The insufficient warm bodies and</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The project would have benefited from more transparent and inclusive CBNA and TNA better reflecting the local conditions.</p> <p>2. a. Trainees were not always selected efficiently and transparently, b. The right training was not always provided to the right people; c. Most FFS groups received support for one growing cycle instead of 2-3-which is best practice; d. Promises were made to people and organizations, but not always honoured which led to frustration and lack of motivation and inefficiencies.</p>	<p>discussed and agreed with the TSU.</p> <p>3. The ‘Strategic plan’ was completed through a workshop involving DGs, directors and senior staff.</p> <p>4. Physical capacity was built and delivered according to plan.</p> <p>5. CAHWs training has been effective, and CAHWs report a decline in animal mortality of 15-20% attributable to the project.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Institutional and organisational CB, structures and procedures have hardly improved. Public administration in Lakes State is weak.</p> <p>2. The assets delivered through the project were not divided in a balanced manner between the two ministries – agriculture, animal resources. The same applies to ‘training’. In both case, ‘agriculture’ benefited significantly more.</p>	<p>and generally positively impacted on about 2,500 rural families, of a total of around 110,000 rural families in Lakes State, and on cattle owners through the enhanced services provided by the CAHWs (perhaps another 1,000 families).</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The project has an enclave nature, like most projects. Literature says that the weight of the 95% of the population not reached may drag project impact down, and may also give rise to social unrest. Replies to pertinent questions raised by the evaluators in this respect though rate these risks as very low.</p> <p>2. Impact on the public administration has been limited and is restricted to results from training. Structures and procedures hardly improved, the exception perhaps being the preparation of strategic plans if and to the degree this proves institutionalised in future.</p> <p>3. The impact prospect related to the MP is negative, due to building</p>	<p>half of the physical CB achieved.</p> <p>3. Some of the staff training and the FFS training will probably yield sustainable benefits</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The project helped build the beginnings of a ‘foundation’. Current and expected budget available to the state and the weak public administration make it doubtful if much of this can be sustained.</p> <p>2. Acquired skills, knowledge, techniques and technologies will disappear if not supported by structure and procedures within which these acquisitions can be practiced. Thorough Organisation and Institutional Review and a commensurate Organisation and Institutional Development Plan are urgently needed, followed by successful implementation.</p> <p>3. The Exit Strategy for the SPCR, and its corollary at Lakes State level, holds little promise and is not a strategy but rather a wish list for which there is little resource support.</p> <p>4. The FFS and CAHW enhancements delivered by</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>qualifications actually available for training, c. The 'scratch level' of the state ministries of agriculture and animal resources, d. The actual budget available at the ministries.</p> <p>4. The CBNA was a largely mechanistic inventory based on the blanket SPCRP approach discussed earlier.</p> <p>6. <u>MP – GIZ</u>. The design of the Fisheries Production and Marketing Model Project is relevant. Implementation and location though have rendered the Centre a failure.</p> <p>7. The location and timing of building the Centre was the subject of a confusing process: a. Non-participative and non-transparent, b. It disappointed and angered the state stakeholders, c. Yet was covered by PSC decisions.</p> <p>8. The centre was built at Nyang at 45 miles from Shambe where the fish is landed, completed by mid-2012, and incompletely equipped on handing over to state government. The Shambe-Nyang road is impassable during rainy periods. It takes 3 hours under good conditions for the fish to</p>			<p>of what is in fact a 'white elephant' which caused widespread frustration and anger amongst the stakeholders.</p> <p>4. The positive impact of the FFS is generally limited. Some 20-25% have experienced positive results due to newly acquired and improved practices, but most FFSs either started late, received not enough support. All suffer from the absence of efficient and beneficial marketing channels and facilities.</p>	<p>the project would lend themselves well to further expansion. If no budgetary and other resource support is extended though, this potential will largely fade out</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	reach the centre from fish landing, in high to very high temperatures without cooling facilities. Fish quality is bound to suffer, no longer usable, and fishermen will not make use of the Centre. Details are discussed later in this EQM, under 'Model Project'.				
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION / PUBLIC BODIES	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The project rightly targeted the ministries dealing with animal production, range land and fisheries, agriculture and forestry for institutional, organisational and human resource capacity building, i.e. the State Ministry for Animal Resources and Fisheries SMARF and the State Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry SMAF, respectively.</p> <p>2. The ministries are the backbone of the public administration dealing with the state's animal production and agricultural productive capacity which is the heart of Lakes State economy and society.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The project did insufficiently chart the existing low level of absorptive capacity at the ministries for capacity</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1 The TSU jointly with the ministries and departments concerned worked well together, both at central and county levels. This was conducive to transfer CB efforts and achievements to state government public bodies</p> <p>Negative</p> <p>1. The TSU and the Administration, did not manage to connect to the implementers of the Model Project in the state. The project document did not stipulate coordination mechanism and none could be put in place during implementation..</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The project's effectiveness regarding human, institutional and organisational CB of public bodies can be summarised as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staff has been trained in relevant subjects – some of a generic nature and others in specialized subject matter; • An inclusive procedure was established to produce the first 3-year strategic plan as compass for annual planning. <p>2. Physical CB has been provided by the project based on needs analysis and resource availability.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. No comprehensive TNA has been undertaken – what is called 'TNA' in Lakes State is an agreement between SPCRP and the ministries identifying the annual</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The ministries mandated to animal resources and agriculture benefited from both the physical and non-physical CB under the project.</p> <p>2. Mindsets and the vocabulary have changed. In particular planning and M&E have improved and staff was successfully trained in these fields. Extension staff members were trained in 'modern' extension services approaches including FFS and Animal Health Care.</p> <p>3. A reasonably inclusive approach to strategic planning produced a 3-year strategic plan, and was followed up in 2012 by a 5-year strategic plan.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The absence of a meaningful organisation</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Human capacity has been positively affected by the project. Targeted training has been extended in generic subjects such as report writing and basic computer skills, and in specialized subjects such as M&E, planning, extension services.</p> <p>2. Most of that will be of value to the ministries if supported by management at the various levels concerned, and included in staff performance assessment.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. HRD and targeted training need continuous attention: no undue staff transfers, efficient promotion policy, special attention to field staff who tend to be somewhat 'neglected'. It is unclear if the resources and the political and managerial will to maintain the HD strength reached with the support of the project will</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	enhancement and act accordingly. This applies to staff as well as to the institutional and organisation structures, procedures, tools, approaches and instruments.	2. 'Grants' (See FFS, below) and some other promises made to FFSs have not been kept. Groups concerned are disappointed, some are angry and still insist on honouring the promises made. In these conditions, the stakeholder public bodies hesitate to welcome the handing over of the project.	<p>training contingent.</p> <p>2. An organisational assessment took place in 2011. It was narrow and superficial, not seriously professional, did not allow the formulation of robust recommendations on functions, structures and procedures, protocols, HD needs quantitatively and qualitatively, TNA, results assessment.</p> <p>3. Little institutional capacity development has taken place. This applies to the ministries' functions, structure and procedures, and to its capacity to a. formulate and implement policy, b. undertake 'substantive' planning connected with public financial management, c. Consistent HRD and HRM.</p> <p>4. CB results varied across counties, largely as a result of differences in managerial competence. In Cuibet, office buildings were not maintained and hardly used, the computer was not used and the generator had not been working for a year partly due to fuel shortage and</p>	<p>review and development plan left the ministries functionally as well as structurally deficient. Respondents mentioned this, and the evaluators could confirm. This threatens the cohesion, effectiveness and collective strength of the ministry and, therewith, the impact of the positive results of non-physical CB.</p> <p>2. The distribution of the physical assets of the CB has been uneven between the two ministries. Together with the already weak state budgetary resources, particularly at SMARF, this does not encourage the public bodies involved to appraise and use the SPCRP results positively.</p>	<p>continue in future. If not, such 'strength' will gradually erode. The overall weak condition of the public administration is an aggravating factor.</p> <p>2. Regular staff performance assessment does not take place, which jeopardizes the sustainability and further development of the newly acquired skills and processes.</p> <p>3. The challenging condition of the public administration discussed above will if not addressed further weaken the ministries at both central and field levels.</p> <p>4. The precarious budget situation is a powerful factor discouraging ambitions and effectiveness of the ministries central and field staff. The longer this continues, the greater the challenges of 'setting this straight'.</p> <p>5 Without a robust organisational review and development operation, it is hard to see how the effectiveness of the ministries can improve.</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
			partly to needed small repairs. In Rumbek East, the dynamic CAD director managed to have the offices in good shape and used and the computer used, and the generator was operational partly as a result of a fuel and power sharing arrangement with the County Commissioner.		
FARMER FIELD SCHOOLS - FFSs	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. FFS is a proven and successful approach to raise farmers' productivity. FFS works with selected willing farming communities and groups. Support is provided on site. Current farm practices are reviewed, and improved practices are discussed, introduced, supported and implemented. Generally, farm incomes gain between 20-70%.</p> <p>2. Some 80% of the population of Lakes State consists of farming communities involved in livestock, with agriculture and fisheries as supplementary economic activities. The FFS concept and practice can be fully tailored to the local conditions.</p> <p>Negative:</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The FFSs deliver value for money. At limited cost, the FFS assist farmers to increase their productivity across a range of farming practices and gain knowledge and understanding.</p> <p>2. The project has trained the coordinators at the ministry who, in turn, have trained and continued to support the group 'facilitators' who work directly with the FFS groups in the field.</p> <p>3. To a limited extent, non-FFS farmers have adopted some of the</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The project has established 94 operating FFSs: 6, 32, 28 and 28 in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. Of these, 52 focused on crops, 17 on livestock, 11 on fisheries, and 14 on agro-forestry.</p> <p>2. About 90 facilitators and 15 coordinators have been trained under the project.</p> <p>3. The project partnered with 3 NGOs and subcontracted the establishment of 32 FFSs to them. According to the TSU, these NGOs have worked efficiently and effectively within the overall guidance by the TSU, and were hampered, as were the FAO FFSs, by financial promises made</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. An estimated 20-25% of the FFS groups have experienced probably lasting positive impact.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. FFS groups were promised grants to the tune of US\$ 1,000 equivalent in kind. Most of the pre-2011 groups have received all or most of the grant. The 2011 and 2012 FFSs have not, with the 2012 groups on average having received only 15%. The financial review of the project in June 2012 ruled out that the grants promises could be kept.</p> <p>2. Promises not kept led to groups being disappointed as well as angry and suspicious. This did not encourage</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The 20-25% successful FFS groups will probably stay together and continue to practice what they have learned, and possibly further improve.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The 'one growing cycle only' approach has not resulted in fully entrenched new practices, and between up to 75% of the FFSs established under the project may drop out of improved farming practices.</p> <p>2. Effective interaction between the post-FFS farmers, ministry's extension services, agricultural research and plant protection services is important. The ministry's budget and expertise resources are limited and will probably stay low for an appreciable time to come.</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>1. FFS is a targeted and support-intensive approach. It is not aimed at generically raising productivity of agricultural and animal production generically across the state.</p> <p>2. To be successfully applied, FFS requires commitment from the ministry and support and encouragement of its field staff. The challenging condition of the ministries' structure, practices and budget resources is not always compatible with these requirements.</p> <p>3. The international standard approach provides FFS support during at least 2 and often 3 growing cycles, to support the groups while facing different conditions as the seasons pass by. In Lakes State, support has been provided for only one single growing cycle.</p> <p>4. In Lakes State, the livelihood systems are livestock dominated while the FFS had a clear crops bias. Had there been a state-specific plan addressing state particulars, livestock FFS groups could have been more numerous.</p>	<p>improved practices, so increasing value for money spent by the project.</p> <p>Negative</p> <p>1. Due to the only one crop cycle support, the degree of 'entrenchment' of the new practices is limited. In addition, time has been too short to fully reap the benefits of FFS by the groups. 'Snowballing' has therefore been limited.</p> <p>2. The 28 FFS groups established in 2012 have been around for only a short period, and under downsized budget. The resources spent on these FFS groups could have been more efficiently spent on the pre-2012 FFS groups.</p>	<p>and budget shortfalls.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The rigid target orientation led to only one growing cycle FFS practice. This, in turn, led to essentially half-completed FFSs at best.</p>	<p>continuing the newly acquired improved practices.</p> <p>3. The grants were to be given in kind, such as good seeds, the right pesticides and fertilizers, better nets and hooks, good quality seedlings etc. Grants were part and parcel of the FFS concept and would have contributed to 'impact'. Not honouring the 'promises' therefore not only reduced encouragement but also production and benefit levels.</p>	<p>3. The FFS helped build the beginnings of a 'foundation' and a potential for expanding the improvements, either through new FFSs, continuing the support to the existing FFS till they 'graduate' or through other approaches while using the trained coordinators, facilitators and 'advanced' farmers. Without further support though, the potential will unlikely be realised and even the 'foundation' may slowly erode.</p>
COMMUNITY ANIMAL	Positive:	Positive:	Positive:	Positive:	Positive:

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
HEALTH WORKERS - CAHWs	<p>1. Lakes State is ‘cattle country’ and the pastoralist tradition runs deep and goes back to ancient times. The value of the herds cannot be overrated – cattle is a major source of social prestige, serves strongly in marriage arrangements, plays an important role in conflict mediation, and is the pivot in food security. Economically, cattle do not play a great role, and much of the Lakes State operates on pre-money basis. CAHWs’ training is a fully relevant component of SPCRP in the state.</p> <p>2. The herds are estimated to grow at a longer term rate of 1-2% annually and animal health will be a lasting concern.</p> <p>3. In capital terms, the value of the herds is enormous. It also embodies a huge potential for economic development, i.e. if traditional values can be made to absorb ‘modern’ economic values and practices.</p>	<p>1. CAHWs operate directly with the livestock pastoralist communities and largely render their services in and to the cattle camps which cater for often thousands of heads of cattle. The CAHWs have a considerable span of control and operate efficiently.</p> <p>2. A considerable number of CAHWs were trained already by other projects before SPCRP. The project could therefore build on good absorptive capacity.</p>	<p>1. The project has directly trained approximately 40 CAHWs as well as 4 SMARF extension staff.</p> <p>2. The CAHWs, in their own words, enhanced their knowledge, increased their skills, expanded their range of possible interventions, disseminated their enhanced skills to CAHWs not directly trained under the project and gained social prestige in their communities.</p> <p>3. No precise data could be obtained on productivity gains through the project’s contribution to the skills and knowledge of the CAHWs. Intensive and iterative interviews led to an estimated 15-20% drop in cattle mortality as a result of the project</p>	<p>1. The project’s impact is estimated at a decrease in cattle mortality of 15-20% attributable to the project.</p>	<p>1. CAHWs trained under the project will continue to benefit from the project and pass on what they have learned to the cattle communities. A lasting 15-20% drop in cattle mortality will most probably remain once the project is terminated.</p> <p>2. The ministry’s extension staff trained in animal health will most likely not lose the acquired skills and knowledge and be able to support the CAHWs, although the ministry’s resources put a brake on their mobility.</p> <p>3. The CAHWs are independent operators chosen by their communities for training and ‘doing the job’. The project has strengthened them. The CAHWs would seem to be a promising step towards private sector development, but would need guidance to establish themselves formally as small entrepreneurs.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. CAHWs receive a quite small financial contribution from the ministry. Most of their income comes from a 30% margin on the drugs sold and some payment sometimes for specific interventions.</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
					<p>They have to pay for their transport (typically 175 cc motor bikes, bicycles) and the gear needed to do the job. It is unclear as to whether they can and will continue spending their own money. The Mission is of the opinion that their development into formal small entrepreneurs may well be necessary and that support for them to do so needs to be provided.</p> <p>2. The ministry's precarious budget position may jeopardize effective support by the ministry to CAHWs and, generally, to the large livestock component of Lakes State's economy.</p>
MODEL PROJECT – FISHERIES PRODUCTION AND MARKETING PROJECT	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Fisheries is widespread along the Nile as well as smaller inland rivers and lakes. The original purpose of the Fisheries Production and Marketing Investment Project fitted in well with the sector.</p> <p>2. Initially, GIZ rallied the Shambe fishermen, gave them training and provided them with better nets and hooks. The MP would benefit them by providing a Centre including clean landings, cooling facilities, packaging possibilities and, generally, with the means to improve</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The implementation of the MP in Lakes State suffered from long drawn and in-transparent decision processes in the course of which possible locations for the Centre varied continuously, e.g. Shambe, Nyal, Yirol, Nyang.</p> <p>2. The Centre ultimately built does not deliver on the original design and</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The Centre has been built, delivered and transferred by the MP to the state government.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The MP has not delivered on strengthening the production and marketing of the Nile fishing communities; the Centre is of little or no use to the fishing communities, neither to those on the Nile nor elsewhere in the state.</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The MP has not positively impacted on the livelihood systems of the fishing communities in Lakes State, and has failed to deliver on the original purposes and promises.</p>	<p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The Centre has not contributed to improving fishing communities' livelihood systems, nor will it serve that purpose in the foreseeable future.</p> <p>2. The ministry has reluctantly accepted the handing over of the Centre from GIZ to state government, and had to complete the work by adding water and toilet facilities from the ministry's own financial resources. As there is little operational purpose envisaged for the Centre, due maintenance may not be</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>fish quality for fresh fish marketing further in the field.</p> <p>Negative</p> <p>1. Ultimately, the centre was not built at Shambe, but at Nyang at some 45 miles from Shambe landings without any further facilities at Shambe.</p> <p>2. The Shambe-Nyang road is rough and impassable during rainy periods. It takes 3 hours under good conditions for the fish to reach the centre from fish landing, in high to very high temperatures without cooling facilities. Fish quality is bound to suffer, no longer usable, and fishermen will not make use of the Centre.</p> <p>3. The Centre was completed mid 2012 and incompletely equipped on handing over to state government which were reluctant to accept the transfer of the Centre.</p> <p>4. The process that ultimately led to the Centre built at Nyang has been problematic, in-transparent and one-sided. There was no participative decision process between GIZ and the state government. Discussions took place at various points in time. They generally ended with GIZ taking the decisions, often</p>	<p>does not serve the purpose of support to fishing communities along the Nile.</p>			<p>provided and the Centre may slowly deteriorate.</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>against the arguments, local knowledge and reasoned standpoint of the state government.</p> <p>5. Security was an issue during the process. However, on various occasions, the state government put forward alternative solutions that minimized if not eliminated the security risks.</p> <p>6. The PSC endorsed the decisions taken by GIZ, but not necessarily the way the implementation of the decisions.</p> <p>7. Virtually everything about this MP has a shroud of mystery, e.g. a. What were the TORs for the project, b. Was there a tendering procedure, c. Who were mandated to take the decisions, d. Was there an agreed decision and communication procedure, e. Who was or were factually charged with M&E of the implementation of the MP and what has been the role of the EU delegation, f. Why did the PSC reach decisions that according to the sources the Mission spoke with were opposed by the state government.</p>				
GENDER	Undetermined / Positive	Undetermined	Positive:	Positive:	Undetermined

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>1. The project has articulated gender as an issue to be explicitly incorporated in the various project activities, to the extent possible and meaningful.</p> <p>2. In the communities, men and women have traditional roles with the women normally more involved than men in the cash and nutritional side of the household.</p> <p>3. The project activities in Lakes have targeted some all-female groups, and also the FFS groups aimed at small business development largely consist of women.</p> <p>4. On the other hand, the point remains that Lakes State is 'cattle country', that cattle carries prestige, that agriculture and fisheries are supplementary to cattle, and that cattle is a 'men's affair'</p>		<p>1. FFSs with considerable female focus have helped empower the women by giving more access to the cash economy which helped them being more independent from male decisions.</p> <p>2. The groups predominantly consisting of women have generally done well. Further utilization of their acquired skills and raised ambitions is not hampered by the gender issue, but by lack of water, marketing channels and marketing facilities, in addition to limited access to capital and good seed.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Access to capital and water, and poor marketing channels were mentioned above.</p> <p>2. A problem haunting women groups in Cuibet and Rumbek East is the promise made by the project that 1-2 boreholes would be drilled in the latter and 1 borehole in the former. The assessment to do this was done in May 2012 and apparently communicated firmly to the groups concerned. The</p>	<p>1. The traditional role of women in the communities and families, particularly 'cash' and 'nutrition', make the women a good repository for changes in the mind sets, attitude and activities regarding marketing, cash economy and nutrition / health issues.</p> <p>2. Reportedly, from our meetings and discussions, the above is actually the case and the project has had an identifiable and clear positive impact in this respect.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. As said earlier, the project has helped build a foundation. It is too early days to judge the project's real impact on raising the role and voice of the women. This point is aggravated by the 'only one growing cycle' formula adopted for the FSS.</p>	<p>1. The project has helped build a foundation aimed at raising agricultural and animal husbandry / livestock productivity. This has received the main attention, irrespective of gender. Gender has been specifically 'targeted' in project activities that, most of them, started late. Whether they will be sustainable without specific project support stands to be seen.</p> <p>2. The traditional role of women discussed under 'impact' renders it probable that where 'impact' is assessed as positive, the women will form a lasting repository of change with a potential to gradually see change and increased productivity gain ground and, with that, see their role and voice expanding.</p> <p>3. Generally women perform most of the chores of crop production. Adding more types of crops could inadvertently increase the chores women have to bear.</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
			financial review in June 2012 blocked honouring the promises made.		
TRAINING	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Levels of skills in the state – public bodies, NSAs, groups and communities – were excessively low at the time the project was conceived. The project’s strong emphasis on training as a major means of human development is therefore relevant.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Training was prepared and implemented according to annual training plans agreed between the ministries and the project.</p> <p>2. Given the limited expertise and training resources available at state level, the decision to acquire trainers and curricula from elsewhere, often using the PCU for that purpose, was efficient and to the point.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Comprehensive training needs assessment has not taken place. The annual contingents were decided ad-hoc and were not related to organisational and institutional dimensions and comprehensive HRD planning.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The project delivered massive training, e.g.: 2,500 farmers (FSS), 40 CAHWs, 350 ministry staff at central and county levels, and approximately 150 coordinators and facilitators (FSS).</p> <p>2. Added to the trainings should be a range of workshops such as those concerning and guiding the preparation of the strategic plans. In addition, a number of study tours were organized to e.g. Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, and were generally considered useful and raising professional competence.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The training of the 350 ministry staff was unevenly divided between SMAF and SMARF, with the latter accounting for 17% of the trainees, the former for 81% and the remainder spread over various denominations.</p> <p>2. The selection and preparation of curricula is somewhat of a mystery</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Generally, the trainings of ministry staff had positive impact, though not directly finding its way to enhanced professional performance. Training exposed professionals to a wider professional perspective, changing mindsets and vocabulary.</p> <p>2. The training of CAHWs has translated into reduction of cattle mortality.</p> <p>3. The training included in the FFS may not have all resulted in enhanced performance. Most of it has however contributed to introducing communities to improved farming practices and to new activities, e.g. vegetable farming, agro-forestry, new techniques in fishing and livestock care.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Challenging the use of newly acquired skills and knowledge is that people are not always employed</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Questioning the ministry staff in the field and centrally led to consensus that the human resources are professionally stronger today than before the project. Some staff are already deploying the new skills and knowledge in their work (e.g. M&E, Planning, report writing, extension services), and others would like to but are constrained by non-conducive organisations and institutions.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. ‘Sustainability’ hinges on the stability and quality of the organizations and institutions within which people work. As discussed at various places in this EQM, the public administration in Lakes State is weakly organized and institutionalized.</p> <p>2. There is clear need for impartial and comprehensive TNAs to guide training and other HRM measures. The TNA needs be rolled over at least once every two years. At this point in time, neither SMAF nor SMRF have a training unit capable to assume this role.</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
		2. The nomination of trainees was in the hands of the ministries. Although selection committee existed, it is not clear how precisely the selection process was done, and whether the right people got the right training. In a number of cases, people selected did not qualify for the training and the resources spent were largely wasted.	and does not seem to make sense in many cases. About 135 trainings were for less than 5 days, 85 between 6-12 days, and 17 took between 13 days and 30 weeks. Given the low absorptive capacities, the very short sessions cannot have resulted in much increase in skills and knowledge.	in positions where what they learned can be deployed. Transfers do not take this into account.	
PROJECT MANAGEMENT	<p>Positive: <u>CB-FAO</u></p> <p>1. Project management in Lakes State has generally met the targets set for the project in the state and maintained good and cooperative relationships with the various actors, e.g. ministries, CADs, communities, sub-contractors, partners and clients.</p> <p>2. The TSU has done excellent work, exceeding what could reasonably have been expected from them.</p> <p>3. The TSU worked under the overall leadership of the PCU in Juba which adhered strictly to the output orientation discussed under ‘Overall</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. Project management at state level provided good value for money. The TSU was reduced by one professional staff after the MTE, which though unfortunate, increased ‘value for money’. The effectiveness with which the project at state level operated to meet the targets set further underscores the efficiency of state project management.</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The AWP were prepared on time, progress reporting was timely and to the point, project activities were largely implemented on time and progressed generally as planned.</p> <p>2. The TSU proved capable of handling the significant constraints where and when they exercised their influence.</p> <p>3. The TSU managed to ensure the necessary cooperation of three NGOs in implementing the FFS targeted under the project, and provided the necessary</p>	<p>Positive:</p> <p>1. The positive impact of TSU management is reflected not only in the direct satisfaction of the targets set by the PCU, but also in the good cooperation with SMAF and SMARF which is conducive to the smooth handing over of the project to the state government.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. The TSU was not supposed to set their own strategy for Lakes State, as has been discussed at several places in this EQM.</p>	<p>Undetermined</p> <p>1. The SPCR is terminated and about to close the books. Management of the project activities and their sustainability is no longer in the hands of the state level project management.</p>

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>Design' in Section 2 of this state report.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Project management at state level operated through AWP's to be approved at central level. Once the AWP was approved, specific activities still required specific approval from central level, a procedure which sometimes led to undue delays</p> <p>2. From central point of view, this operating mode makes sense – ensuring a financially tightly run operation. From state point of view and management at that level, it makes less sense, as state-specific conditions could not easily be accommodated. The hard target of 100 FFSs is a case in point, as is the overall crop bias of SPCRP which in Lakes State could or perhaps should have been modified to better suit the 'cattle' bias of the state.</p> <p>3. The project at state level is necessarily output and not results oriented. It had no specific overall framework within which to work. 'Strategic oversight' at state level did not exist due to the absence of an overall state-</p>		<p>guidance for the NGOs to deliver as intended.</p> <p>Negative:</p> <p>1. Enough has been said about the project management exercised by GIZ which led to failure of the MP.</p>	<p>2. The Mission is of the opinion that had the TSU been able to tailor the project closer to Lakes State particulars, project impact could have been more extensive than it has proved to be. This would have been due to more flexibility in e.g. handling the FFSs and the extent and duration of project support, perhaps a greater emphasis on institutional and organisational development, and closer connection with the cattle bias of the state.</p>	

QUESTIONS-TOPICS	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>specific project document. In fact, at state level, the goal, purposes, specific objectives and expected results of the SPCRPs were no matter of concern.</p> <p>4. The ‘split’ between the CB and MP components has harmed the management of the SPCRPs at state level. Had there been a robust coordination mechanism, the failure of the MP project might have been registered long before the final outcome and remedied.</p>				

Annex 9. Report of findings per State

Will be submitted separately.

Annex 10. Meeting programme

Date	Time	Activity	Responsible
Thu 24 Oct		Arrival of M. Haroon Sseguya	Grace
Fri 25 Oct		Mission preparation led by M. Haroon Sseguya	Haroon
Sat 26 Oct		Mission preparation cont'd (H. Sseguya)	Haroon
Sun 28 Oct		Arrival international team: Herma Majoor, Abdul Hamid Rhametalla, Karl Kaiser and Willem van den Toorn	Grace
Mon 29 Oct	8:30 – 9:30	Meeting with FAO Head of Office	Opio
	10:00 – 11:00	Meeting EUD Juba Massimiliano PEDRETTI	Opio
	11:30 – 2:30	Meeting with FAO SPCRP Team (Grace to organise working lunch)	Opio
	3:00 – 4:00	UNDSS security briefing	Grace
	4.30-5.30	GIZ Country Director	Opio
Tue 30 Oct		Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries- Juba	
	9:00 – 10:00	H.E. Dr. Martin E. Lomuro, Minister and Chairperson of SPCRP Steering Committee and Dr. Makuei Malual Kang; Undersecretary and Chairperson of SPCRP Technical Committee	Susan
	10:30 – 1:00	Meeting with all Directors General (DGs)	William Olami
		Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation	
	2:30 – 3:30	Meeting with the undersecretary Eng Isaac Liabwel C Yol	John Chuol
	3:30 – 4:30	Meeting with Director for Irrigation- Jiben Jeremiah,	John Chuol
Wed 31 Oct		Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Cooperatives - Juba	
	9:00 – 10:00	Meeting with Dr Betty Ogwaro, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and Undersecretaries	John Chuol
	10:30 – 12:00	Meeting with all DGs	John Chuol
	12.00-1.00	Undersecretary Ministry of Finance	Opio
	2:30 – 3:30	UNOPS- Jess	Susan
	4:00 – 5:00	Preparation for field travels	Grace
Thu 01 Nov - Friday 09 Nov		Field visits to project areas Team 1 Northern Bhar el Ghazal 1. Herma Majoor 2. Haroon Sseguya Team 2: Lakes 1. Willem Van Den Toorn 2. Peter Tingwa Team 3: Western and Central Equatoria 1. Karl Kaiser	Opio
Sat 10 Nov		Analysis of information and preliminary findings, conclusions formulated.	All team
Sun 11 Nov		Analysis of information and preliminary findings, conclusions formulated.	All team
Mon 12 Nov		End-of-mission debriefing with SPCRP PSC	Opio
Tuesday 13 Nov Evening		Departure of team	Grace

Team 1 Northern Bhar el Ghazal

1. Herma Majoor
2. Haroon Sseguya

Date	Time	Activities
Thu 1 Nov	12:30	Arrival of evaluation team to
	13:00-14:30	Meeting with TSU staff
	15:00-16:00	Courtesy call to Hon. SMAFF
	16:00-17:00	Courtesy call to SMARF
Fri 2 Nov	09:00 – 01:00	Discussions with SMAF staff (ToTs and trainees).
	01:00 – 02:00	Lunch
	02:15 – 05:00	Discussions with SMARF staff (ToTs and trainees).
Sat 3 Nov 2	07:30 – 11:30	Travel to Gokmachar- Aweil North County
	11:30 – 12:30	-Courtesy call to the County Commissioner & Executive Director -.Meeting with CAD ⁸ staff in Aweil North County
		Interaction with CAHWs and fisheries FFS group
	02:30 – 05:30	Travel from Gokmachar to Aweil town
Sun 4 Nov		Analysis and report development
Mon 5 Nov	08:30 – 10:30	Travel to Nyamlel- Aweil West County
	11:30 – 12:30	-Courtesy call to the County Commissioner & Executive Director -.Meeting/interaction with CAD staff in Aweil West County
		Interaction with CAHWs group
	12:30 – 02:30	Interaction with Marial Baai FFS group
	02:30 – 05:30	Travel from Nyamlel to Aweil town
Tue 6 Nov 6	8.30-10.00	Meeting with NGOs/CBOs
	10:30 – 1:00	Travel from Aweil Town -Malek Alel Meeting with Kueng Farmers Cooperative Society members in Malek Alel Visit agribusiness site groundnuts value addition project Travel back to Aweil
	02:00 – 05:00	Livestock Marketing project Visit the slaughter house
Wed 7 Nov	8:30 – 10: 00	Aweil Rice Scheme management
	10:30 – 1:00	Visit to the W/shop, Stores, Machinery and Rice processing plant
	2:30 – 5:00	Visit the rice fields and meet Tenant farmers (in village or at the rice fields), In Udhum, Maduany & Aweil Meet Chairman & Representatives, Aweil Rice Farmers Association, NBEG
Nov 8, 2012	9:00-1:00	Workshop with delegates from WBGS and Warrap both Capacity Building and Model projects
	2:30-5:30	Finalize any pending issues
Nov 9, 2012		Departs Aweil for Juba

⁸ County Agriculture Department (CAD)

Team 2: Lakes

1. Willem Van Den Toorn
2. Peter Tingwa

Date	Timeframe	Activity	Responsible
Thu 1 Nov		Arrival of Evaluation Team in Rumbek and Team Checks in Hotel	William Door
Fri 2 Nov	9:00 -10:00	Courtesy Call to HE Minister SMARF/SMAF	James Taban
	10:30 - 1:00	Discussions DG SMAF staff (ToTs and trainees)	DG of SMAF
	2:30 - 5:00	Discussions DG SMARF staff a (ToTs and trainees)	DG of SMARF
Sat 3 Nov	8:30 - 10:00	Travel to Cueibet County	James Taban
	10:00 - 11:00	Courtesy call to the Commissioner, Executive Director and meet the CADs officials	CAD Director
	11:00 - 1:00	Meeting staff of Cueibet CAD	CAD Director
	1:00 - 2:00	Meeting CAHWs	John Chol
	2:00 - 3:30	Meeting Ram Diar Livestock FFS on project Support	Mawan
Mon 5 Nov	8:30 - 9:30	Travel to Cueibet County	CBC
	10:00 - 12:00	Courtesy call to the Commissioner, Executive Director and meet the CADs officials Meeting Tong-diar Puoth FFS (agro-business)	John Chol/Santino M.
	12:00 - 1:00	Meeting Kony-Rot Agroforestry FFS	John Chol
	11:00 - 1:00	Meeting Kony Baai Crop FFS	Mawan
Tue 6 Nov	8:30 - 9:30	Travel to Rumbek East County	CBC
	9:45 - 10:30	Courtesy call to the Commissioner, Executive Director and meet the CADs officials	CAD Director
	10:30 - 12:30	Meeting staff of Rumbek East CAD	CAD Director
	12:30 - 1:30	Meeting CAHWs in Rumbek East	Eli Aggrey & Sebit Abraham
	1:30 - 3:30	Meeting Loro FFS	Barnaba Chol
Wed 7 Nov	8:30 - 9:30	Travel to Rumbek East County	CBC
	9:45 -10:45	Meeting Kony Baai Fisheries Cooperatives in Bahr Naam on Project Support	Eli Aggrey & John Majok
	10:45 -12:00	Meeting Nhom Lau FFS (Atiaba) on (Rumbek East) agro-business project Support	Barnaba Chol & Peter Mabor
	12:00 - 3:00	Meeting Bakic Multipurpose Cooperative (Gok Akon)	Barnaba Chol & Jacob Marial
Thu 8 Nov	9:30 - 10:30	Meeting FFS Implementing Partners	CBC
	11:00 - 12:00	Meeting HE Minister, DGs and Directors on Findings of Mission	Consultants
	3:00 - 4:00	Debriefing to TSU	Consultants
Fri 9 Nov		Travel Back to Juba	

Team 3: Western and Central Equatoria

1. Karl Kaiser

Date	Time	Activity	Responsible
Wed 31 Oct	9:00 - 10:00	Ministry of Animal Resources, Central Equatoria- Courtesy call to the Minister	Stephen Rojas
Thu 1 Nov	8:30 – 5:00	Travel to Terekeka; visit Fisheries Centre & Fisheries market	Stephen Rojas
Friday 2/11/2012	8:00 – 12:00 pm	Travel: Juba – Yambio	Grace/Taata
	12:00 – 1:00 pm	Meeting with TSU and finalizing programme	Julius
	2:30 – 3:00 pm	Courtesy call to the Minister	Julius
	3:00 – 5:00 pm	Meeting with DG and other senior staff Overnight in Yambio	Julius
Saturday 3/11/2012	8:30 – 1:00 pm	Visit Mamenze Cooperative Group Visit Fish ponds for the group	Taata/Julius Julius/Philip Bullen
	2:30 – 5:00 pm	Meeting with some NGOs in the area (ones implementing FFS)	Julius
Sunday 4/11/2012	10:00 – 1:00 pm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Travel: Yambio – Tambura Overnight in Tambura 	Taata/Julius
Monday 5/11/2012	9:00 – 11:00 am	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Meeting with CAD staff in Tambura (Courtesy call to the Commissioner, Executive Director and meet the CADs officials) 	Julius
	11:00 – 1:00 pm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Visit Zangia FFS Group 	Julius/Masuet
	1:00 – 2:00 pm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lunch 	All
	2:00 – 5:00 pm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Travel: Tambura – Ezo Overnight in Ezo 	Julius
Tuesday 6/11/2012	9:00 – 11:00 am	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Meeting with CAD staff in Ezo (Courtesy call to the Commissioner, Executive Director and the CADs officials) 	Julius
	11:00 – 1:00 pm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Visit FFS groups 	Julius/Sentina
	1:00 – 2:00 pm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lunch 	All
	2:00 – 5:00 pm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Travel: Ezo – Yambio Overnight in Yambio 	Taata/Julius
Wednesday 7/11/2012	8:00 – 11:00 am	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Travel: Yambio – Ibba 	Taata/Julius

		11:00 – 1:00 pm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meet CAD staff in Ibba (Courtesy call to the Commissioner, Executive Director and the CADs officials) • Lunch 	Julius/Philip Bullen
		1:00 – 2:00 pm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visit FFS group in Ibba • Travel: Ibba – Yambio • Overnight in Yambio 	All
		2:00 – 3:00 pm		Julius/Philip Bullen
		3:30 – 6:00 pm		Taata/Julius
Thursday 8/11/2012		9:30 – 1:00 pm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meet some staff at the SMACE HQ • Debriefing the Minister and DG • Overnight in Yambio 	Julius
		2:30 – 3:00 pm		Evaluation team
Friday 9/11/2012			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Return to Juba 	Taata/Grace