Tools and Methods Series

Reference Document No 26

Social Protection across the Humanitarian-Development Nexus.
A Game Changer in Supporting People through Crises

February 2019
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Acknowledgements

This reference document was produced as part of the initiative jointly led by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR) aimed at developing a common ‘Guidance Package on Social Protection across the Humanitarian-Development Nexus (SPaN)’. Such a package is to contribute to a better understanding of the conditions under which humanitarian action and social protection can coexist, converge and be mutually supporting. The Methodological and Knowledge Sharing (MKS) programme managed by DEVCO Unit 04 and the ASiST advisory service have supported the implementation of the initiative. The main contact persons are:

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A note to the reader

The topic covered in this document is an emerging field. This guidance note thus remains a work in progress and will need to be updated over time as experiences with its utility and appropriateness increase. For updates, readers are invited to join two specific communities of practice created to offer a direct link between learning and performance:

- The global, open online community on ‘Social protection in crisis contexts’ on socialprotection.org, which is accessible at https://goo.gl/aRzVqb;
- The unrestricted group, mainly for EU staff members and on ‘Social protection across the humanitarian-development nexus’ on capacity4dev, which is accessible at https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/sp-nexus.

These spaces are exclusively designed to collectively and progressively build the knowledge base around the nexus between social protection and humanitarian assistance. Through these groups, readers can share ideas and news, ask questions, share experience through testimonials, upload and access documents, take part in online events, expand their network and much more.

Please note: there is an online Supplementary Volume of Operational Notes to this Reference Document. It focuses on important thematic issues encountered within SPaN. The Operational Notes provide a structured approach to key thematic issues by setting out why the thematic issue is important, what are the main operational challenges, what are the main guiding principles, lessons learned and promising practices (with links to case studies illustrating the ‘dos and don’ts’ and checklists), and identifying outstanding issues. They cover topics such as 1) Benefit Modalities, 2) Targeting, 3) Stakeholders, 4) Operations, 5) Integrated Financing, 6) Health and Education, 7) Nutrition, 8) Vulnerable Groups, 9) Contexts of Fragility, and 10) Contexts of Forced Displacement. The Notes are accessible both as a single volume and individually.
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Executive Summary

**Humanitarian crises are becoming more frequent, severe, complex and protracted.** In 2017, an estimated 201 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance. Many countries requiring assistance are affected by multiple and compounded crises, such as conflict, natural disasters and forced displacement. Crises are lasting longer: two thirds of international humanitarian assistance now goes to long-term recipients. Besides, forced displacement is witnessed on unprecedented scale, reaching over 68 million forcibly displaced persons (UNHCR, 2018a). As a result, the humanitarian system is under strain. Response capacity is stretched while the funding gap is widening. Alternatives need to be thought through.

**Against this background, international commitments, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Grand Bargain, forge closer links between humanitarian and development programming.** Social protection interventions are a promising avenue for common action. This approach is rooted in the growth of social protection systems in low- and middle-income countries, the increasing use of cash transfers as a humanitarian response modality, and robust evidence of the efficacy of social protection and social transfers in both development and crisis contexts. Significant gains can be made by working with social protection systems and approaches. There is now a clear international consensus to maximise the use of social protection systems and approaches in fragile and conflict-affected environments to provide more effective, efficient and sustainable responses to affected populations.

**Governments, international organisations, donors, and civil society organisations have gained significant and wide-ranging experience of working with social protection in crisis contexts over the past decade.** Their work has yielded valuable knowledge and lessons learnt on the use of a variety of approaches across the humanitarian-development nexus in countries in crisis. It reveals that it is possible to work with any type of social protection instruments in crisis settings. Most experiences are linked to social transfer schemes, and their added value in terms of broad coverage and robust operational set-up. Social protection instruments can support the most vulnerable people living in fragile and conflict settings to build their resilience before shocks occur, and stabilise their livelihoods and fully recover after a shock.

**Working with social protection in countries in crisis, vulnerable to crises and countries impacted by crises presents many challenges.** Though experiences to date are promising, this topic is relatively new and response options are conditional on a certain degree of maturity of a country’s social protection system. Much of the evidence to date is from relatively stable countries prone to natural disasters. An overarching evidence gap exists around exactly how to work with social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts. There is a need to generate broader and deeper evidence on which concrete and generalisable lessons may be drawn. As such, there is a need to invest in quality monitoring and evaluation for all interventions.

**This is why the EU has produced this reference document on providing Social Protection across the humanitarian–development Nexus (SPaN) for dissemination to practitioners working at EU Headquarters, EU Delegations, DG ECHO Field offices and EU Member States’ (MS) agencies.** It provides an overview of the key information, tools and procedures for implementing and operating social protection programmes in situations of shocks and protracted crises and linking humanitarian aid with social protection systems. It identifies criteria for informing the most appropriate response option, to be embedded in the specificity of its own context, and key enabling features to work together.

Making further progress on social protection is expected to be a game changer in supporting people through crises, building on global experience including the EU emerging experiences in fragile and forced displacement contexts, such as in Lebanon, Somalia, Turkey, and many other countries.
**Introduction**

The world is experiencing devastating levels of violence and displacement, driven by insecurity and conflict, complex emergencies, and disasters. The international humanitarian system is delivering assistance and protection to more people than ever. In 2017, an estimated 201 million people were in need of humanitarian aid (Development Initiatives 2018). Such global trends have also led to displacement on an unprecedented scale. In 2017, the number of forcibly displaced persons reached 68.5 million, the highest recorded total to date. As a result of all these factors, the humanitarian system is under strain; response capacity is stretched while the funding gap is widening year on year (UNHCR Global Trends 2018a). ‘Business as usual’ is no longer an option.

Over the past few years, international commitments, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Grand Bargain, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the new European Consensus on Development, have created closer links between humanitarian and development programming. They notably include the Grand Bargain commitments coming out of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants adopted in 2016, which lays the foundation for the development of a global compact on refugees, as well as the Recommendation on Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation (No. 205) adopted by the International Labour Conference in 2017 (see Annex 2, p.77).

The intense global focus on this topic requires European Commission’s staff to have a clear understanding of the options, issues, opportunities and challenges of working in this way, particularly as they relate to fragile, conflict- and disaster-affected situations and resultant forced displacement contexts. Across all sectors, one third of the total amount contracted by the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) in 2016 was linked to cash-based interventions and over half of the European Commission’s humanitarian food assistance was provided in the form of cash-based responses in the same year (ECHO 2018). There is now a clear international consensus to work towards maximising the use of social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts to provide more effective, efficient and sustainable responses to affected populations. The issue is complex and encompasses many different aspects in different types of crises (protracted, armed conflict-related, weather-induced, etc.) affecting different types of populations (vulnerable persons in their communities, internally displaced persons, refugees, returnees, etc.) in different settings (urban, rural, conflict-affected, remote areas, etc.) in a whole range of different country contexts (from very fragile to middle-income countries) with national social protection systems at different levels of maturity (non-existent, nascent, expanding, mature, etc.). Emerging experience in these various contexts shows that working with social protection systems and approaches has considerable potential to support recovery, resilience and livelihoods among crisis-affected populations.

This reference document was produced as part of the initiative jointly led by three services of the European Commission, namely the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) and the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). Specifically, this reference document aims to:

- Articulate what is meant by working with social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts;
- Provide an overview of global experience and approaches to date;
- Highlight specific challenges and suggest key criteria to inform decisions as to the most appropriate response option;
- Provide guidance on key issues to consider when working with social protection in crisis contexts;
- Highlight key features of social protection-related interventions in crisis contexts and offer practical tips;
- Identify outstanding questions to inform future research.

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1 See, for example, the conclusions of the Council of the European Union on operationalising the humanitarian-development nexus, adopted on 19 May 2017, as well as the Outcome Document of the International Conference on Social Protection in Contexts of Fragility and Forced Displacement held in Brussels on 28-29 September 2017.
The primary target audience are European Commission practitioners, specifically staff working in European Union (EU) Delegations and ECHO field offices, as well as in headquarters – in DG ECHO, DG DEVCO (Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development), DG NEAR (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations) operational desks, EEAS (European External Action Service) and DG EMPL (Directorate-General of Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion). This document is also intended to be of use to EU Member States’ staff in headquarters and in the field.

The reference document contains the following chapters:

**CHAPTER A** presents a brief overview of social protection, including the instruments dealt with in this paper. It sets out the similarities and differences between social protection and humanitarian action.

**CHAPTER B** outlines some of the well-established impacts of social protection programmes and approaches across a range of outcomes. It provides an overview of the major reasons why there is growing interest in working with social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts. It sets out an evidence-based rebuttal to some common concerns about working with social protection in crisis contexts.

**CHAPTER C** highlights how social protection instruments can and have been used in crisis contexts. It presents a typology for understanding different types of responses to date, followed by an outline of the challenges. It offers a comparison of the pros and cons of different social protection instruments in crisis contexts and a comparison of social transfer response approaches. Finally, it provides a framework for assessing different response options.

**CHAPTER D** introduces the important features of social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts that reflect currently promising practices.

**CHAPTER E** highlights a number of research and operational questions in relation to this topic that still need to be answered.

**ANNEXES** contain complementary resources, including in particular a glossary of key terms used in this paper, a list of relevant policy commitments, three case studies of responses in different crisis contexts, and a selection of further tools and resources.
Chapter A

SOCIAL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION

Overview
This chapter presents a definition, main objectives, underlying principles and core instruments of social protection. It highlights the similarities and differences between social protection and humanitarian action.

Outline
A1. Social protection: what is it and what are the instruments?
A2. Complementarities and convergence in humanitarian and social protection approaches

A1. Social protection: what is it and what are the instruments?

Social protection can be defined as a broad range of public, and sometimes private, instruments to tackle the challenges of poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion (European Commission 2015b). An internationally agreed upon working definition focuses on ‘the set of policies and programmes aimed at preventing or protecting all people against poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion throughout their lifecycles, with a particular emphasis towards vulnerable groups’ (ISPA 2016). Social protection programmes and systems exhibit a wide range of objectives from directly reducing income poverty and other deprivations (such as lack of access to health, education, hygiene, nutrition, protection, shelter, etc.) to promoting human development, access to jobs and basic social services, addressing economic and social vulnerabilities and contributing to pro-poor economic growth.

Figure 1  A typology of social protection instruments
Source  Authors, building on OPM (2017).

2 A social protection system can be defined as “a policy and legislative framework for social protection, including the budget framework, together with the set of specific social protection programmes and their corresponding implementation mechanisms. ‘Systematisation’ represents the idea that social protection instruments can be integrated into a more comprehensive system of policies and programmes that not only tackle poverty and vulnerability over the life cycle, but also strengthen pro-poor and inclusive economic growth and social development” (European Commission 2015b).
Social protection instruments include a range of both non-contributory (where the beneficiary does not have to pay directly into a scheme to receive something back) and contributory schemes (where only those who financially contribute into a scheme’s fund, or on whose behalf a payment is made, can receive something back), as well as selected instruments to strengthen skills and competencies to diversify livelihoods, increase employability and support entrepreneurial activities. Figure 1 above presents a typology of instruments of formal, public social protection. This reference document considers evidence and approaches to working in crisis contexts with the range of social protection instruments outlined above. Annex 1 (p.74) provides a glossary of key terms, including the social protection instruments dealt with in this note. Annex 6 (p.94) offers a selection of introductory resources on social protection.

KEY MESSAGES

There is increasing recognition of the complementarities and convergence in approaches between assistance provided in crisis contexts versus social protection approaches in more stable contexts.

The distinctions between humanitarian and social protection approaches, in terms of duration, objectives, operational instruments and guiding principles in particular, are lessening.

As a result, growing operational experience shows how social protection can help bridge the humanitarian-development divide in several ways.

There is increasing recognition of the multiple complementarities and growing convergence in approaches between assistance provided in crisis contexts and social protection approaches adopted in more stable contexts.

Timing is no longer seen as a valid criterion for differentiating between humanitarian and development interventions. Humanitarian interventions are traditionally implemented in the immediate aftermath of a shock and continue for a matter of months. However, as crises become more protracted, ‘humanitarian’ interventions are increasingly established over a longer period of time and continue for years. Today, seven years is the average length of a humanitarian appeal (OCHA 2015). Similarly, long-term traditional ‘development’ activities, including social protection interventions, are often implemented before, during and after crises occur. The distinction between a short-term emergency response and long-term development is therefore becoming less clear-cut.

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3 This typology is indicative and not definitive. Some agencies may include public works, fee waivers and subsidies under the heading of ‘social transfers’ or ‘safety nets.’

4 The objective of humanitarian assistance is to provide an emergency response that specifically aims to save and preserve life and to prevent and relieve human suffering wherever the need arises if local actors are overwhelmed, unable or unwilling to act (European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, 2007). Readers unfamiliar with humanitarian assistance may refer to Annex 6 for a selection of introductory resources.
Humanitarian and social protection objectives are increasingly aligned. The conventional understanding is that humanitarian objectives are focused on saving lives through the provision of basic goods and services whereas social protection objectives tend to be focused on addressing chronic poverty or inequality. However, there is also less of a distinction between the two approaches in practice. As multi-year humanitarian responses become more common, humanitarian objectives are being framed accordingly. At the same time, social protection interventions are often delivered in contexts of extreme poverty where the interventions contribute directly to saving lives and objectives may be framed as such. Whereas traditionally, social protection policies and programmes have not necessarily been conceived to respond well to shocks that affect a large proportion of the population simultaneously (for their design is not built on an analysis of covariate risks), efforts are increasingly being focused on making social protection programmes and systems ‘shock-responsive’ (O’Brien et al. 2018b). Thus, although there are still obvious differences, there is clearly complementarity between a range of humanitarian objectives and those articulated in social protection programmes, as illustrated in Figure 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian objectives</th>
<th>...map to...</th>
<th>Social protection objectives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keep people alive</td>
<td></td>
<td>Protect people through life-course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alleviate suffering</td>
<td></td>
<td>Protect from poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain human dignity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Promote human dignity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide basic needs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support livelihoods</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide basic social services</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support access to social services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide child and family services</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support child and family services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide labour opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support access to labour markets</td>
</tr>
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Figure 2 Convergence of humanitarian and social protection objectives
Source Authors, building on Cherrier et al. (2017b).

Many operational instruments used in crisis contexts are similar to those used in social protection. The clearest overlap, and where most of the evidence to date is based, pertains to cash transfers. These form the core of most social protection systems and are increasingly used in humanitarian response. However, other social protection instruments also bear similarities to humanitarian interventions, as illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1  Similarities between humanitarian and social protection instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social protection instruments</th>
<th>Humanitarian instruments</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social assistance</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Basic income guarantees</td>
<td>• Multi-purpose cash grants (unconditional/conditional)</td>
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<td>• Child grants</td>
<td>• Cash plus</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Social pensions</td>
<td>• Cash/food for work/asset</td>
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<td>• Vulnerable family grants</td>
<td>• Cash/food/training</td>
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<td>• Disability grants</td>
<td>• Value and commodity vouchers</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Conditional/unconditional cash transfers</td>
<td>• In-kind transfers (food and non-food items)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Food transfers</td>
<td>• Free school meals</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Free school meals</td>
<td>• Subsidies for accessing school and health systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public works and employment guarantee schemes</td>
<td>• ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fee waivers/subsidies for accessing school and health systems</td>
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| **Social insurance**          |                          |
| • Contributory pensions       | • Partially subsidised micro or national health insurance |
| • Provident funds             | • ...                   |
| • Health insurance / maternity benefits |                          |
| • Maternity / paternity pay   |                          |
| • Workmen's compensation insurance |                          |
| • Unemployment insurance      |                          |
| • Index-based livestock/crop insurance |                          |
| • ...                         |                          |

| **Social care services**      |                          |
| • Institutional care          | • Psychosocial support  |
| • Psychosocial support        | • Child protection support |
| • Child protection and family services | • Sexual and gender-based violence support |
| • Gender-based violence support | • ...                   |
| • Case monitoring, management and referrals |                          |
| • Alternative care for children |                          |
| • Early intervention and rehabilitation services for persons with disabilities |                          |
| • Personal care services for older people |                          |
| • ...                         |                          |

| **Active labour market programmes** |                          |
| • Vocational training            | • Cash/food-for-work     |
| • Business development support   | • Cash plus              |
| • Livelihoods support            | • Livelihoods recovery   |
| • Public works & employment guarantee schemes | • Work permits and basic working conditions support |
| • Graduation measures            | • ...                   |

*Note: This list is in no way exhaustive. It is only illustrative of the similarities between social protection and ex post humanitarian instruments.*

*Source: Authors.*
Approaches towards working with government are becoming less distinct. The core humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence map onto some of the key underlying principles of social protection interventions, including solidarity (human rights), universality, equality and non-discrimination. A potential tension arises between the humanitarian principle of independence and the core social protection principle of government ownership. In many contexts, while the ultimate long-term aim is for government to take over service delivery, in crisis situations it is not uncommon for intermediaries to establish and operate large-scale social-protection-like programmes for many years with minimal government involvement. Conversely, in emergency contexts, governments often take a leading role and work closely with humanitarian actors to coordinate responses.

Indeed, it is argued that the principle of independence does not necessarily preclude working with governments and the use of government systems (O’Brien et al. 2018c). The need to maintain independence and impartiality are relevant only in contexts where the role of the state is suspect, typically armed conflict situations where the government is an active stakeholder in the conflict. In other contexts, governments should be involved, acting on the commitment made at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit to strengthen the capacities of national and local actors to effectively respond to needs, risk and vulnerability, and the related call for a ‘New way of working’ to bridge the humanitarian-development divide, which highlights the importance of government leadership and ownership. In line with these principles, the third draft of the global compact on refugees reads:

Humanitarian assistance remains needs-driven and guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Wherever possible, it will be delivered in a way that benefits both refugees and host communities. This will include efforts to deliver assistance through local and national service providers where appropriate (including through multi-purpose cash assistance), instead of establishing parallel systems for refugees from which host communities do not benefit over time. Increasingly, refugees find themselves in urban and rural areas outside of camps, and it is important to respond to this reality. (UNHCR 2018b, para. 66)

Financing of social protection and financing for humanitarian responses have traditionally been separated, but there is scope to increase complementary. In 2014, the vast majority of the 329 billion US dollars (USD) spent on social assistance programmes came from domestic revenue sources, while the USD 12 billion spent on humanitarian responses came from international donors (Development Initiatives 2015). However, an increasing number of countries (particularly those highly vulnerable to crises) are introducing new financial instruments to ‘bridge’ the historical separation of financing. This means a country can have financial resources readily available to respond to ‘predictable’ crises rather than relying on the vagaries of humanitarian financing. For example, budgetary instruments (reserve fund, contingent fund) and market risk-transfer instruments (sovereign risk insurance, contingent credit, etc.) enable a country to plan for likely responses to crises and blend traditional humanitarian and development financial resources strategically.

It should be noted that EU-funded humanitarian assistance may be provided by the EU’s partner organisations, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), specialised services of the Member States or international agencies and organisations having the requisite expertise.
Considering the above, growing operational experience illustrates common ways in which social protection can help bridge the humanitarian-development divide:

- During periods of stability, building social protection programmes and systems that are resilient to fragility, conflict and displacement;
- During periods of fragility, conflict or forced displacement, adapting existing social protection programmes and systems during periods of fragility, conflict or forced displacement which can respond to the needs of affected populations;
- During crises, building new programmes that include design and operational features to facilitate the transition of the programme or caseload into social protection programmes that are more regular and predictable, with prospects of being sustained and ultimately nationally owned – see, for instance, the case of Somalia presented in Box 1.

**From the ground up: The long road to social protection in Somalia**
https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/articles/ground-long-road-social-protection-somalia

**Towards shock-responsive safety nets: The case of Somalia**
Duration: 01:00:17

**Box 1 Transitional programming in Somalia: A roadmap to long-term social protection**

After more than two decades of protracted conflicts and political instability, Somalia established a federal government in Mogadishu in 2012. However, the government’s capacity, reach and legitimacy in some areas, together with the effects of conflict and instability, have meant that state building and the establishment of (a variety of) national systems have been slow.

During the periods of instability, conflict and repeated droughts, humanitarian assistance has dominated aid flows into the country—and continues to do so. Most of the responses have focused on short-term assistance, funded through short-term financing instruments and delivered through multiple actors, often resulting in underlying causes being unaddressed due to the level of fragmentation and siloed programming. Given the uncertainty in country, development programmes with longer-term objectives and predictable funding delivered through national (often government) systems have been slow to start and hard to implement.

Nonetheless, there is a real momentum to bring together development and humanitarian actors to transition short-term, emergency responses into longer-term social protection programmes that are aligned behind the government’s vision. The challenge is not to lose the strengths of existing interventions while moving to programmes that provide more regular, predictable, appropriate support that address chronic and transitory needs of poor and vulnerable households. A roadmap has been developed for incrementally transitioning the numerous emergency cash transfer projects into a medium-term social assistance programme, in which both humanitarian and development actors can play a role. The roadmap recognises that if drought eventually returns – and it will – humanitarians will need to step in to provide immediate support that complements (and does not compete with) the social assistance programme.

Source: Authors based on Goodman and Majid (2017).
<table>
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<th>Subject</th>
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<td>Jean-Louis De Brouwer, Director of Europe, Eastern Neighbourhood and Middle East, DG ECHO</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&amp;v=qRbQcoU8L-w">https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&amp;v=qRbQcoU8L-w</a></td>
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<td>Social protection as an instrument for emergency contexts</td>
<td>Jean-Louis Ville, former acting Director of People and Peace Directorate, DG DEVCO</td>
<td><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/119144-fi">https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/119144-fi</a></td>
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Overview
This chapter outlines some of the well-established impacts of social protection programmes and approaches across a range of outcomes. It provides an overview of the major reasons why there is growing interest in working with social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts. It sets out an evidence-based rebuttal to some common concerns about working with social protection in crisis contexts.

Outline
B1. Social protection’s demonstrated impacts towards the SDGs
B2. Opportunities for bringing together humanitarian response and social protection in crisis contexts
B3. Common negative perceptions largely unfounded

B1. Social protection’s demonstrated impacts towards the SDGs

KEY MESSAGES

● A large body of robust, empirical evidence from across the globe over the past three decades demonstrates the impacts that social protection interventions can have across a range of outcomes including poverty, inequality, food security, education, and local economic growth.

● These outcome areas are relevant to both development and humanitarian actors.

● For these reasons, policy makers from national governments, donor agencies, UN agencies and NGOs now view social protection as a core policy tool for addressing major socio-economic challenges.

Based on robust evaluations from low- and middle-income countries over more than 30 years, there is strong evidence for the role of social protection in achieving a range of outcomes. There is now consensus in the international development debate that social protection plays a key role not only for the social but also for the economic and political development of countries. This very insight has made a deep impression on the text of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN 2015). Social protection has not been made one of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) itself, but it is explicitly mentioned as a key instrument for the achievement of SDG1 (eradication of income poverty) and SDG10 (reduction of income inequality) and equally key for the achievement of SDGs 2-6 (ending hunger, healthy lives, education, gender equality, access to water). In addition, empirical research confirms that social protection is also a fundamental instrument for the achievement of pro-poor growth, employment and the development of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SDGs 8-9) as well as for social inclusion, social cohesion, state building, political stability and international cooperation (SDGs 16-17). Social protection can also promote sustainable consumption and production patterns and hence climate stability (SDGs 7 and 12-15). The SDGs, and the recognised role social protection can play in meeting them (see Figure 3), provide a core justification for pushing social protection into more fragile and displacement-affected contexts following the ‘Leave No One Behind’ principle, learning from the failure of the Millennium Development Goals to address these contexts specifically.
TACKLING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

One of the primary aims of many social protection programmes is to directly address poverty and vulnerability directly. By transferring resources into households, in cash or in kind, social assistance and social insurance programmes directly contribute to addressing household consumption poverty. Other social protection instruments such as active labour market programmes can support the ability of households to earn or generate income. A recent analysis of studies considering the impact of cash transfers on total expenditure found a statistically significant, positive effect demonstrated in 26 out of 31 studies (Bastagli et al. 2016). The same review identified nine studies that considered the impact of transfers on poverty headcount (proportion of people below the poverty line), poverty gap (depth of poverty), and squared poverty gap (a measure of the severity of poverty). Around two thirds of these identified a statistically significant positive impact across these indicators. Similar results have been found in multiple other cross-country analyses.

There is convincing evidence from a number of countries that long-term, predictable social assistance at scale can reduce income inequality. For example, in Brazil, the two major social protection programmes – *Bolsa Família* and the *Benefício de Prestação Continuada* (BPC) are widely credited with being jointly responsible for 28 per cent of the fall in Gini inequality between 1995 and 2004 – 7 per cent due to the BPC, and 21 per cent due to *Bolsa Família* (DFID 2011). Similarly, South Africa’s social transfers system is estimated to have reduced the country’s Gini coefficient by three percentage points – approximately doubling the share of national income that the poorest 20 per cent receives (DFID 2011).

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6. Another primary aim of social protection is investing in human development.

7. See, for example, Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa (2011), Hagen-Zanker et al. (2011) and UNICEF (2015).
STRENGTHENING FOOD SECURITY

A large body of robust evidence demonstrates that social protection can directly and indirectly address the four pillars of food security.

Availability—At the local and national levels, social protection can support aggregate food production through the systematic transfer, at scale, of cash or vouchers to support household food production. For example, an evaluation of the Mchinji cash transfer programme in Malawi found that 50 per cent of recipients reported being more likely to produce crops since receiving the cash transfer (European Commission 2012). Cash transfers can also generate increased demand in local markets, which can trigger a supply response by local producers (DFID 2011). The direct distribution of basic inputs such as seeds, tools, fertiliser and livestock for agriculture or inputs for fisheries can also directly contribute to supporting national food production. For example, the transfer of high-quality seeds and fertilisers was considered a major priority for coping with the 2009 food-price crisis (DFID 2011).

Access—At the household level, by transferring resources – food, cash, vouchers or productive assets (including tools or livestock) – directly into households, social protection contributes to increasing access to more, better quality and more diverse food. This includes transfers distributed through public works or school feeding schemes. Food price subsidies also enable households to purchase more, better quality and more diverse foods. Social insurance payments help to protect household food consumption in the event of personal (idiosyncratic) shocks. In the medium term, various social protection instruments support household-level productivity through the distribution of cash, which is invested in farm or non-farm productive assets. This can also reduce credit constraints faced by farmers, enabling them to invest in productive assets. The assets created through public works, such as terraces or irrigation canals, can also enhance household production. Over the longer term, cash transfers invested in health or education, as well as school feeding, can help to increase long-term productivity (UNICEF 2016a).

These impact pathways are confirmed by global evidence. For example, a meta-analysis conducted in 2017 assessed food consumption and expenditure and asset formation outcomes reported in 71 evaluations of cash and food transfers and public works programmes across 25 countries over the past 24 years. The average social transfer programme increased the value of food consumed / expenditure by 13 per cent and caloric acquisition by 8 per cent. The value of food consumed from animal sources rose by 19 per cent. The programmes also consistently led to increased holdings of livestock, non-farm productive assets, farm productive assets, and savings (Hidrobo et al. 2018). Similar results have been found in many other multi-country analyses. For example, a systematic review of 31 studies found that almost 75 per cent reported statistically significant positive increases in food expenditure (Bastagli et al. 2016).

Utilisation—Food utilisation is concerned with the conversion of food into adequate nutrition at the individual level. Social protection, which promotes access to and utilisation of health services, can improve the health status of beneficiaries, leading to greater nutritional uptake. Examples include health fee waivers, cash transfers, which enable payment for out-of-pocket health or sanitation expenses, and health service uptake conditions attached to conditional cash transfers. Micronutrients and de-worming interventions delivered as part of school feeding packages can also support better nutritional outcomes. Social and behavioural change interventions delivered as complementary initiatives to social protection schemes can also support better nutritional outcomes. These include awareness-raising on health, dietary and sanitation practices and infant and young child feeding practices (such as the promotion of breast feeding).

8 Broadly, two types of risks and shocks can be distinguished: covariate and idiosyncratic. Social protection is by essence meant to protect people in the event of a shock, be it the death of a breadwinner in the household (idiosyncratic) or global recession (covariant). The case of covariant shocks present specific challenges for a social protection system. It implies that an extra number of individuals are in need of social protection benefits at the same time (or the same number of individuals are in need of extra benefits) while, at the same time, the consequences of the shock may limit the capacity of the system to deliver.

9 While there is positive evidence about the impact of social protection on food security, there are still many knowledge gaps when it comes to nutrition. For instance, de Groot et al. (2015) find that cash transfers have an impact on household food consumption, diet diversity, and food security, as well as health care (preventive care visits, caregiver physical health), two underlying determinants of nutrition, but underline that the jury is still out on intermediate determinants and outcomes. Evidence on cash-transfer impacts on more proximate nutrition-related outcomes, such as children’s dietary diversity, as well as caregiver behaviours, intra-household violence, and stress (all of which have implications for child health and wellbeing), remains inconclusive.
**Stability**—Stability of access to food is concerned with ensuring that people maintain access to food at all times; for example, during seasonal hunger periods, during covariate crises or household level shocks. The regular, predictable transfer of resources into households is designed to smooth consumption – enabling households to better manage small and more pronounced shocks. Indeed, this is the primary purpose of safety nets. Programmes that have been specifically designed to respond to seasonal hunger periods include Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme and Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme.10

**STRENGTHENING EDUCATION**

There is consistent evidence that social protection programmes can increase educational enrolment and attendance, improve grade progression, and decrease educational dropout. When quality schooling is available, social protection schemes can also improve learning outcomes (Bastagi et al. 2016). Increased income through social protection schemes – be it fee waivers, social transfers, public works, price subsidies, social insurance or active labour market programmes – enables households to cover the costs of out-of-pocket expenses such as transport, school uniforms or books as well as the opportunity costs of children not working. A systematic review, conducted in 2016 by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), found “a clear link between cash transfer receipt and increased school attendance” as well as positive impacts on absenteeism (Bastagi et al. 2016). A number of cross-country studies find similar results.11 Similarly, school feeding is consistently found to provide an incentive for families to send their children to and keep them in school.12

**FOSTERING INCLUSIVE GROWTH, DECENT WORK AND MORE PRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT**

Social protection can have positive effects on local economies through a number of pathways. At the household level, it can enable households to invest in the health, nutrition and education of their children, leading to greater individual productivity in adulthood. There is strong evidence that the regular and predictable transfer of resources enables households to save and invest in on- and off-farm productive activities.13 This may result from the use of transfers to purchase productive assets directly or to facilitate access to credit for investment. For example, a systematic review conducted by DFID in 2011 found evidence that receipt of transfers increased urban entrepreneurship and the diversity of household income sources (DFID 2011). In Brazil, the social pension programme allows beneficiaries to access loans from banks by showing their pension enrolment cards (DFID 2011). The systematic review carried out by ODI in 2016 found that, out of 10 studies looking at the effect of cash transfers on household savings, half find statistically significant increases in the share of households reporting savings or the amount of savings accumulated (Bastagi et al. 2016).

There is also evidence that transfers enable people to shift their productive activities away from low paying, ‘last-resort’ agricultural labour on other people’s farms towards more productive activities on their own farms. The Transfer Project assessment of eight social transfer programmes in Africa found evidence of such shifts in Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia (UNICEF 2015).

At the community level, cash transfers can stimulate demand for local goods and services. For example, from the Protection to Production study carried out by the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) and the governments of Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe found, through economic modelling, consistent evidence of positive impacts on the local economies. In particular, it estimated the local multiplier effects (that is, the estimated benefit to the local economy for every dollar transferred to beneficiaries) to be USD 2.52 in one region of Ethiopia, USD 1.81 in Western Kenya, USD 1.34 in Eastern Kenya and USD 1.79 in Zambia (UNICEF 2015).

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10 For more information on Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme, see Box 10 (p. 59) and visit www.hsnp.or.ke
11 See, for example, UNICEF (2015) and Baird et al. (2013).
12 A systematic review of school feeding programmes conducted by the World Bank and the WFP states “What is clear from this report is that we are beyond the debate about whether school feeding makes sense as a way to reach the most vulnerable. It does.” (Bundy et al. 2009)
13 The effects of social protection on on-farm productivity are covered under the food security and nutrition sub-section above.
B2. Opportunities for bringing together humanitarian response and social protection in crisis contexts

KEY MESSAGES

- The number, severity, complexity and duration of recent crises have overburdened the traditional systems such that financing on the scale needed is not available. New, more flexible, comprehensive and predictable approaches are required.

- There are significant efficiency, impact and sustainability gains to be made by working with social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts.

- Global and institutional commitments have been made to increase the use of social protection systems and approaches during crises, notably in protracted crisis contexts, to help bridge the humanitarian-development divide.

- National governments, donor agencies, UN agencies and NGOs have generated significant and wide-ranging experience of working with social protection in crisis contexts over the past decade. This is an intense area of focus for both humanitarian and development actors.
CHANGES IN THE NATURE AND SCALE OF CRISES REQUIRE NEW WAYS OF WORKING

Humanitarian crises are becoming more frequent, severe, complex and protracted. Every year, an increasing number of people need humanitarian assistance. Fragility is a major driver of crises with 62 per cent of the world’s poor projected to be living in fragile states by 2030 (OECD 2015). Most countries requiring international assistance are affected by multiple types of crisis – with many conflict-affected countries also hosting refugees and experiencing disasters associated with natural hazards exacerbated by stressors such as climate change, rapid urbanisation or globalisation. Crises are also becoming more protracted: an estimated 88 per cent of official humanitarian assistance went to medium- or long-term recipients in 2015 (Development Initiatives 2017). Between 1980 and 2012, the annual frequency of national disasters increased by 250 per cent and the number of people affected increased by 140 per cent (World Bank 2018), as illustrated in in Figure 4 below.

![Figure 4](image)

**Figure 4**  Total number of disasters and affected people, 1980-2012  

Such protracted fragility, conflict and natural disasters have caused displacement on an unprecedented scale. In 2017, there were over 68 million people living in forced displacement – the highest recorded total to date (UNHCR 2018a). More than 80 per cent of refugee crises last for 10 years or more (Crawford et al. 2015) and the average duration of displacement is now 17 years (OCHA 2015). As a result, the humanitarian system is under strain; response capacity is stretched while the funding gap is widening year on year (Development Initiatives 2017).
These global changes have led to an increased recognition that short-term responses and annual humanitarian appeals are inadequate, on their own, to address protracted or predictable crises. Instead, longer-term, more flexible, comprehensive and predictable systems are needed to effectively address the needs of crisis-affected populations as well as underlying issues. New ways of working need to be introduced to better prevent and mitigate shocks, build the resilience of populations to withstand shocks,\(^{14}\) ensure sustainability for humanitarian investments and impacts, and progressively pass on the responsibility to government and development actors in protracted crises. In this context, there has been a growing focus on bringing together humanitarian, risk-reduction, resilience-building and developmental approaches to generate more predictable, organised, effective, efficient and flexible responses. This is highlighted in the conclusions of the Council of the European Union (EU) on operationalising the humanitarian-development nexus, as captured in Box 2.

\(^{14}\) This involves building individual, household and community financial and physical resilience.
The Council conclusions as adopted by the Council on 19 May 2017, recognise that poverty, conflict, fragility, and forced displacement are ‘deeply inter-linked and must be addressed in a coherent and comprehensive way.’ The Council stresses the importance of investing in risk reduction and prevention and addressing the underlying root causes of vulnerability, fragility and conflict and fostering self-reliance so that vulnerable communities can withstand future crises. The communication highlights the need to develop a common vision, conduct systematic joint context analyses, define common objectives and outcomes and increase the use of multiannual planning and programming cycles to strengthen resilience, participation, livelihoods and local capacities. It is recognised that this requires flexible and well-coordinated multi-annual financing instruments. The importance of systematically mainstreaming a gender perspective and recognising the role of women as actors of change as well as their heightened vulnerability in crises is emphasised. The communication stresses the need to enhance coordination internally within the EU institutions and between the EU and its Member States, as well as externally with other actors. Innovative partnerships with the private sector are encouraged as worth pursuing when appropriate, as are investments in social protection systems. The communication stresses the importance of ‘strengthening democratic national and local ownership, governments’ leadership and governance capabilities [...] to improve transparency and accountability, and governments’ capacity to reduce violence, build inclusive societies, improve service delivery, social justice and economic opportunities.’ The communication concludes by highlighting the need to generate and share best practices to ensure the development of effective, sustainable solutions.

Source: Authors, based on Council of the European Union (2017).

**Box 2 Council conclusions on operationalising the humanitarian-development nexus**

The Council conclusions as adopted by the Council on 19 May 2017, recognise that poverty, conflict, fragility, and forced displacement are ‘deeply inter-linked and must be addressed in a coherent and comprehensive way.’ The Council stresses the importance of investing in risk reduction and prevention and addressing the underlying root causes of vulnerability, fragility and conflict and fostering self-reliance so that vulnerable communities can withstand future crises. The communication highlights the need to develop a common vision, conduct systematic joint context analyses, define common objectives and outcomes and increase the use of multiannual planning and programming cycles to strengthen resilience, participation, livelihoods and local capacities. It is recognised that this requires flexible and well-coordinated multi-annual financing instruments. The importance of systematically mainstreaming a gender perspective and recognising the role of women as actors of change as well as their heightened vulnerability in crises is emphasised. The communication stresses the need to enhance coordination internally within the EU institutions and between the EU and its Member States, as well as externally with other actors. Innovative partnerships with the private sector are encouraged as worth pursuing when appropriate, as are investments in social protection systems. The communication stresses the importance of ‘strengthening democratic national and local ownership, governments’ leadership and governance capabilities [...] to improve transparency and accountability, and governments’ capacity to reduce violence, build inclusive societies, improve service delivery, social justice and economic opportunities.’ The communication concludes by highlighting the need to generate and share best practices to ensure the development of effective, sustainable solutions.

Source: Authors, based on Council of the European Union (2017).

**INCREASING OPPORTUNITIES TO CONNECT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS**

As outlined in Section B2 (p. 20), humanitarian assistance and social protection share many similarities in terms of objectives, approaches and instruments. In particular, the last decade has seen, on one hand, a considerable increase in the use of cash and vouchers in humanitarian assistance, and on the other hand, an expansion of social cash transfer schemes in developing countries as part of efforts towards integrated social protection systems. As a result, humanitarian and social protection actors have to deal with a set of common operational issues around cash transfer design and implementation, and links with other sectors and interventions. This provides very concrete entry points for the two sectors to work together towards mutually reinforcing interventions.

**During the past 10 years, there has been an unprecedented investment in social protection systems in low and middle-income countries** (ILO 2017). The number of developing countries with social transfer schemes doubled in the last two decades, from 72 to 149 countries, such that every developing country in the world now has a scheme of some kind (World Bank 2017). A review of the 10 countries that were ECHO’s major focus for emergency cash and voucher transfers in the last three years found that approximately two thirds have a long-term social transfer scheme of some kind (Maunder et al. 2015). Cash transfers have formed the core of social protection systems due in part to the robust evidence generated on their impacts (see Section B1) and operational feasibility, at scale.
During the same period, there has been a growth of cash (and vouchers) in humanitarian aid including in situations of conflict, fragility and forced displacement. As the State of Evidence on Humanitarian Cash Transfers report states,

Cash transfers are one of the most heavily researched approaches in humanitarian aid in the last two decades [...] evaluations have established that [they] can be effective at achieving a wide range of aims – such as improving access to food, enabling households to meet basic needs, supporting livelihoods and improving access to shelter. (ODI and CGD 2015)

In 2016, over half of the European Commission’s humanitarian food assistance was provided in the form of cash assistance (ECHO 2018).

Figure 6  Social safety net coverage of the poor and humanitarian spending, 2010-15

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15  Cash transfers as humanitarian assistance are defined as “the provision of assistance in the form of money (either physical currency/cash or e-cash) to beneficiaries (individuals, households or communities) (CaLP, 2017). As such the mode of assistance is exactly the same as cash transfers provided through social protection programmes.
GREAT POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT EFFICIENCY, IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY GAINS

National social protection systems and humanitarian programming coexist to varying degrees, depending on the context. Looking at the coverage of social transfer schemes (or social safety nets) alongside a measurement of humanitarian aid received reveals three broad country groupings, as shown in Figure 6 above:

Countries in Group A have higher safety net coverage and lower humanitarian spending, indicating greater readiness and suitability for their safety nets to address the risk of shocks; examples include the Philippines’ Pantawid Conditional Cash Transfer Program and Kenya’s Hunger Safety Nets Program. Countries in Group C have lower safety net coverage and higher humanitarian spending – including countries mired in crises and fragility such as Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti – and may be less well prepared to institute government-led safety nets and more reliant on humanitarian funding and related programming. Countries in Group B have both low safety net coverage and low humanitarian spending, indicating they may be less beset by persistent crises than those countries in Group C. For such countries, it may be particularly beneficial to further invest in social transfers and their use for building household resilience to shocks. (World Bank 2018, p. 86)

In this context, interest in ‘shock-responsive’ or ‘adaptive’ social protection has emerged in recent years. This nascent field has begun to crystallise around two interrelated approaches: one focusing on boosting the role of social protection in building household resilience before shocks occur; and the second focusing on increasing the capability of social protection systems and programmes to respond to shocks after they occur (World Bank 2018).

Significant evidence confirms that reliable social protection schemes help improve resilience at individual and household levels.16 Beneficiaries of regular, predictable cash transfers are more likely to save. Routine recipients of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)17 and Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) were found not only to smooth consumption during the food gap period, but also to protect their asset levels and manage to bounce back faster than non-beneficiaries after periods of extreme drought (Knippenberg 2016, Maxwell et al. 2013). Evidence is also growing around the use of integrated approaches (called ‘graduation models’) combining the transfer of a productive asset with consumption support, training, and coaching, as well as efforts to encourage savings and access to health and education services. A rigorous evaluation of a similar integrated approach in six countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Pakistan, and Peru) found statistically significant, cost-effective impacts on consumption (fuelled mostly by increases in self-employment income) and the psychosocial status of the targeted households, with impacts on the poor households lasting at least a year after all implementation had ended (Banerjee et al. 2015).

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16 See, for instance, Ulrichs and Slater (2016).
17 For extensive literature on the impacts of Ethiopia’s PSNP over more than a decade, see the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) website.
Chapter B: why work with social protection in crisis contexts?

Having a national social protection system in place can help reach disaster-affected households in a more timely and efficient manner than traditional humanitarian response, as illustrated by the cases of the Philippines (presented in Box 3 below), Yemen (presented in Box 4, p. 27), and Turkey (presented in Annex 5). Furthermore, introducing greater flexibility and scalability into its design makes a social protection scheme capable of operating ‘horizontal expansion’ to non-regular social protection beneficiaries that have been affected by a shock and/or ‘vertical expansion’ to increase benefit amounts to existing social protection beneficiaries at an acute time of need, as illustrated in Figure 7 above. In Ethiopia, assistance through the PSNP in response to the 2011 food crisis proved cost-efficient, at USD 53 per beneficiary compared with USD 169 through the UN-coordinated humanitarian response (World Bank 2013). In Kenya, the HSNP was designed as a permanent safety net for chronically vulnerable households, but from the start put in place procedures and contingency funds that would allow it to become an effective response mechanism in case of emergency, and built anticipatory capacity at the systems level (Box 10, p. 56). Such design features enable the system to deliver assistance within 10 days of an emergency being declared. This has significantly increased the capacity to respond, as humanitarian aid used to take three to nine months to reach beneficiaries (NDMA 2016).

Figure 7  Programme scalability to enable responsiveness to shocks
Since 2007, the Government of the Philippines, through its Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), has implemented the flagship social transfer programme Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino (or Pantawid) meaning ‘subsidy to the Filipino family’. It is a nationwide conditional cash transfer aimed at poverty alleviation and improving the health, nutrition and education of poor children. The programme expanded rapidly, reaching over 4.4 million households in 2015. Beneficiaries receive monthly cash grants of up to 1,400 Philippine pesos (PHP), equivalent to 27 euros (EUR) as of 2016, disbursed every two months, conditional on regular school attendance and health checks for children and pregnant women, and attendance of parents at monthly family development sessions.

On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan caused widespread damage across nine provinces, including some of the poorest regions. Some 16 million people were affected – 4.1 million were displaced and 1.1 million houses were damaged or destroyed.

During the response and early recovery phase (November 2013 to February 2014), the WFP (World Food Programme) linked with DSWD’s Pantawid programme to deliver cash assistance, because the programme had significant coverage of the population in the Visayas regions worst affected by the typhoon, and the WFP saw the potential to leverage the existing administrative systems. The intervention targeted Pantawid beneficiaries in 60 of the 171 worst-affected municipalities. The WFP channelled its humanitarian funds to the DSWD, who provided these families with an unconditional cash ‘top-up’ of PHP 1,300 (EUR 26.8) per month per family. This was provided every month, for two months, through the standard payment processes used on the Pantawid programme. Thirty-one per cent were paid through ATM cards, and 69 per cent received cash payments.

From the start of the recovery phase (April 2014), UNICEF planned to deliver unconditional cash assistance to support economic recovery of families with children. They wished to prioritise structurally vulnerable households with children, persons with disabilities and chronic illnesses, the elderly, and households that were female- or child-headed or with high dependency ratios. It was found that Pantawid beneficiary households fitted many of these criteria. UNICEF’s humanitarian funds were transferred directly to the DSWD, for disbursement to Pantawid beneficiaries within the project location. The aim was to increase vulnerable households’ income stability in the immediate term, to support livelihood recovery and reduce negative coping strategies impacting on the long term development outcomes for poor households and children. Unconditional transfers of PHP 4,400 (EUR 89.2) per month per family were provided every month, for six months. The project was implemented in five of the 171 worst-affected municipalities, in the worst-affected province of Eastern Samar, and reached 5,801 Pantawid beneficiary households.

The Pantawid programme proved to be a more efficient way of reaching those disaster-affected households who were Pantawid beneficiaries than the establishment of a parallel humanitarian system. The use of existing systems reduced transaction costs compared to delivery through implementing partners. Time was also reduced – the WFP reached over 105,000 households within two months, compared to 85,000 through NGOs. The evaluation of UNICEF’s top-up project had similar findings regarding costs and timeliness.

Source: Authors, based on Smith et al. (2017), UNICEF (2016b) and World Bank (2016).
Over the past decade, major donors have also invested in the delivery of basic services and poverty reduction initiatives, such as social protection, as a means of addressing some of the drivers of violent conflict and unrest. While the evidence base is still emerging, investment in ‘upstream prevention’ continues to grow.

There is growing interest in the role that social protection might play in influencing decisions to migrate in crisis contexts. There is recognition that by increasing regular household income and access to jobs and social services, building capacity to cope with life-cycle risks and large-scale shocks, and potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the state (and the social contract with its citizens), the provision of social protection in migrant-origin countries may impact on some of the multiple factors that contribute to driving migration. Evidence to date is highly context-specific and tends to indicate a variable direction of impact, with social protection provision in source countries both reducing and facilitating migration. However, as a 2017 literature review on migration, forced displacement and social protection points out:

> While inadequate provision of, or access to, social protection is very unlikely to be the only or the primary factor precipitating movement, a lack of social protection undoubtedly contributes to the role poverty plays in shaping outward migration, and may also both reflect and contribute to general insecurity and a lack of state capacity, additional factors that may influence migrants’ decision to leave. (Long and Sabates-Wheeler 2017)

Investing in social protection is to be considered as part of preparedness and mitigation measures. It might help prevent forced displacements that put pressure on other systems. In a recent review, Clemens and Postel (2018) suggest that donors could achieve greater impact by leveraging development aid not to deter migration but to shape it for mutual benefit. Social protection might play a crucial role in that regard.

More recently, experience from a number of crisis-affected countries has shown that it is possible to deliver social protection during and in the immediate aftermath of crises, including violent conflict and in forced displacement settings. For example, as illustrated in Box 4 below and further described in Annex 5, Yemen’s Social Fund for Development, with support from the European Commission, among others, managed to provide support to around 300,000 people in 2017 despite the ongoing conflict. In Kyrgyzstan, UNICEF’s work with the State Agency for Social Welfare in the immediate aftermath of violent ethnic clashes saw the extension of two social transfer programmes to new disaster-affected households (Smith 2017c). In terms of cross-border displacement, the development of new programmes and extension of existing programmes has already helped countries such as Turkey to respond to large displaced populations – see Annex 5 for a summary of Turkey’s experience.

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18 See, for example, DFID et al. (2011) and O’Brien et al. (2018c).
19 See, for example, Clemens and Postel (2018), Hagen-Zanker et al. (2012), Long and Sabates-Wheeler (2017) and Schüring et al. (2017).
20 This was made possible by the fact that the delivery system had been set up before the conflict started. Close attention to the state of the social protection system is of course crucial before deciding on the approach to adopt for responding to a crisis (see Section C3, p. 47).
21 Please refer to C and Annex 5 for additional examples.
Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the world, descended into a full-fledged military conflict in March 2015. As of December 2017, 21.1 million people – or nearly 80 per cent of the population – required humanitarian aid or protection support. Most of the country’s formal social protection systems have collapsed. Among the few programmes still in operation is the Social Fund for Development (SFD), which, in 2017, provided support to around 300,000 people.

The Fund focuses on four elements: community and local development; capacity building; small and micro enterprise development; and labour-intensive cash-for-work programmes. ‘Most of our portfolio at the moment revolves around cash-for-work programmes, so people can earn wages and feed themselves, but also invest, creating a medium-term impact,’ said Lamis Al-Iryani, Evaluation Manager for SFD.

Despite the ongoing conflict, the programme continues to receive funding from the European Commission, Germany’s KfW Development Bank, DFID (United Kingdom’s Department for International Development), the Netherlands, and the World Bank in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme, as well as the Islamic Development Bank, among other partners.

Among the reasons why the SFD has been able to endure the conflict, Al-Iryani pointed to its focus on communities’ needs. ‘We have built strong relationships with the people… they trust us,’ she said. ‘This is a community-based undertaking. We don’t come from the top down, telling people what projects they should be implementing. We try to understand their needs and have a dialogue, so they can execute the projects themselves.’

While the humanitarian actors in the country focus on providing immediate relief to people affected by the conflict, the SFD has retained its longer-term, development vision. Nevertheless, it has also needed to adapt to the changing environment. ‘With the start of the conflict, SFD began targeting the most vulnerable communities, including the internally displaced people, as well as mothers and children,’ Al-Iryani said. According to her, the SFD has been able to reach almost 90 per cent of the country during the conflict. ‘The war’s negative impact is undeniable,’ she said. ‘But sometimes, when there is fighting in one area, we just have to stop for a while, until the situation is clear. In the meantime, we continue working in other parts of the country.’

Source: Authors, based on capacity4dev.eu (2017).
Bringing together social protection and humanitarian response in crisis contexts can therefore maximise efficiencies and sustainability across several areas by, for example:

**Reducing response times**—Working with social protection approaches or existing systems, such as beneficiary lists or payment mechanisms, can enable the rapid delivery of benefits and/or services to people most in need. It can allow for a more relevant and faster response that is better able to meet the priority needs of affected populations.

**Avoiding duplications and reducing confusion at community level**—Working with existing programmes avoids the need to establish parallel administrative systems and potentially reduces the overlap between agencies responding to a crisis. This also results in a streamlining of support to beneficiaries so that individual households do not face multiple processes for similar types of aid.

**Strengthening national systems and the social contract between the state and its citizens**—Where national systems already exist, there is evidence of humanitarian responses, when working with and through them, strengthening the underlying system. This can be done for example by building capacities of staff who deliver the regular social protection programmes or by updating and strengthening household registries and the management information systems which underpin targeting systems.

**Offering choice and dignity**—Those directly affected by conflict, disaster and displacement are often best placed to decide what they need. People can derive a sense of dignity and control over their situation through the provision of support through established, systematised (often cash-based) channels.

**Supporting local economies**—For example, using regular, predictable cash-based responses supports local markets, jobs and incomes, extending economic benefits beyond the direct recipients to wider populations including host communities. Ensuring complementary support for strengthening livelihoods, productive assets and responsible links to labour markets, in conjunction with similar efforts for poor host families, provides longer-term income stability.

**Offering a progressive exit strategy for protracted humanitarian aid**—Working with social protection systems or approaches can enable a smoother transition between assistance in normal times and during a crisis and vice versa – for example, allowing national governments to take responsibility for meeting the needs of citizens and refugees, and providing a medium-term transfer and exit strategy for humanitarian aid.

**Leading to the sustainability of the impacts of humanitarian investments and enhancing Value for Money**—The effectiveness and efficiencies brought about by combining social protection and humanitarian approaches can promote greater value for money. When accompanied by a greater focus on preparedness and risk management, investment in social protection approaches and systems also provides an opportunity for substantial savings in subsequent humanitarian responses (O’Brien et al. 2018c).
In recognition of the above drivers, the international community has, in recent years, agreed to a range of commitments around social protection, including in crisis contexts. These include global commitments, such as the Sustainable Development Goals, the Grand Bargain commitments coming out of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants adopted in 2016 (which lays the foundation for the development of a global compact on refugees by the end of 2018), as well as Recommendation 205 concerning employment and decent work for peace and resilience and Recommendation 202 concerning national floors of social protection adopted by the International Labour Conference in 2017 and 2012 respectively. In addition, EU-specific commitments include, in particular, the New European Consensus on Development, the European Agenda on Migration, the Joint Communication on a Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action, and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, all adopted in 2017, as well as the 2016 Communication on Forced Displacement and Development, the Action Plan on the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, and the Communication on Social Protection in EU Development Cooperation adopted in 2012. Annex 2 provides details on each of these major policy commitments.

**B3. Common negative perceptions largely unfounded**

### KEY MESSAGES

- While historically there were seen to be risks in bringing these approaches together, many concerns have been allayed by empirical research.
- Specific concerns relating to the use of cash as a modality in fragile and conflict settings (corruption, misuse, inflation, safety, dependency, etc.) do not seem to be born out in practice.

Negative perceptions have impeded progress towards the international commitments cited above despite the fact that many of them are largely unfounded. It is important to keep in mind that any humanitarian or development intervention involves risk. Many of the risks associated with bringing together humanitarian assistance and social protection in crisis contexts apply equally to the provision of support through separate humanitarian and development channels. Many perceived risks relate to working with government systems and to using cash transfers.

**Mistrust in government systems**—Government systems are perceived by humanitarian actors as more prone to diversion and corruption. Interestingly, this is not a perception shared by development stakeholders. Development funding continues to be routed via governments, while only a tiny share of humanitarian resources is channelled through national government systems or delivered through local and national partners (ALNAP 2015). This situation can partly be attributed to the current architecture of the humanitarian system, but also to corporate culture and a common assumption and conviction that humanitarian assistance delivers better and faster than government systems. Reasons advanced for not working with local or national governments may sometimes be valid (e.g. when the role of the state is suspect in an armed conflict situation),

22 but are sometimes questionable. In particular, a misconception of the humanitarian principle of independence may push humanitarian actors not to work with government systems. As underlined in Section A2 (p. 11), the humanitarian principle of independence does not mean no engagement with government, but rather that any engagement with government needs to have been considered for its potential to compromise the delivery of support in a manner prejudicial to beneficiaries experiencing a crisis. Engaging a government early on in a humanitarian response and, where possible, at all stages of the project cycle, will strengthen its ownership beyond an acute response phase. Such an approach recognises that the state is ultimately legally responsible for its citizens and that social protection is ultimately a state responsibility.

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22 Please refer to Section C3 (p. 47) for an overview of the main challenges of working with social protection system in crisis contexts, and to Section C4 (p. 51) for a framework for assessing response options.
Chapter B: why work with social protection in crisis contexts?

Working with and through government institutions may raise transparency and corruption concerns for humanitarian actors. The use of cash transfers in crisis contexts may raise extra concerns about corruption or diversion of aid. A concern that social transfers may be captured for patronage purposes and directed to certain groups – thus increasing the risk of conflict – is also heard. In all programmes and in all contexts, there is a risk that people who are not eligible for aid will still obtain it, be they community members, middle men such as payment service providers, warehouse or government staff. As the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers reports, cash transfers have been used in fragile and conflict-affected states and to date there is no evidence that this results in large-scale diversion of aid or that cash is more prone to diversion than in-kind aid. (ODI and CGD 2015) Where government-owned social protection systems exist, it is likely that development actors will have experience of working with these institutions and can be a valuable source of advice.

Fear of misuse of cash transfers—Interestingly, this issue rarely comes up for in-kind transfers although there is a lot of evidence showing that beneficiaries tend to sell parts of food and non-food items received (for instance, to access preferred food, or cover health expenses). There are many rigorous empirical studies on the use of cash transfers. A growing number of such studies indicate that concerns about the use of cash transfers for alcohol and tobacco or other temptation goods are unfounded. Evidence overwhelmingly shows that people tend to use cash transfers wisely and buy items they need most such as food, productive assets, and health and education services. In 2017, an examination of eight robust evaluations conducted on large-scale government unconditional cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa, under the Transfer Project, found that evidence clearly shows that on average, the misuse of transfers for temptation goods, specifically alcohol and tobacco, is not supported by data […] Evidence invites an opposing hypothesis, whereby transfers encourage substitution into human capital-related investments and reduce poverty-related stress. In so doing, transfers have potential to reduce consumption of undesirables. (UNICEF 2015)

Concerns around safety and protection of staff and beneficiaries in cash distributions—Evidence shows that ways can usually be found to distribute cash safely and securely. In Afghanistan and Somalia, agencies have used local remittance companies or individuals, such as the hawala system, to deliver money to people in remote and insecure areas. In Haiti, prepaid cards were issued to reduce security risks. The increased use of locally accepted, commercial outlets for distributing transfers together with the increased use of new technology in payment systems have minimised security concerns for staff and beneficiaries.

Fears of encouraging laziness and creating dependency—A review of 165 studies by ODI found, on the whole, that cash transfer programmes increased the likelihood of an adult being in work and increased the number of hours they worked per week (Bastagli et al. 2016). Similarly, the Transfer Project’s review of eight evaluations of large-scale cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa found that overall, the results do not indicate a reduction in work participation; rather, they show that beneficiary households have increased their autonomy over productive activities and have more flexibility in how they allocate their time – often choosing to work in their own farms instead of agricultural wage labour. (UNICEF 2015)

Concerns around unproductiveness of cash transfers—The use of unconditional transfers in crisis contexts may raise concerns that the cash will be spent only on short-term consumption needs rather than invested in productive activities. Evidence overwhelmingly shows that, once basic needs are met, people tend to invest in productive activities. The 2016 ODI review found, for those programmes that were tracking these indicators, overall statistically significant positive impacts on the purchase of agricultural inputs and livestock ownership (Bastagli et al. 2016). The Transfer Project found similar results. Assessing eight evaluations, the team identified ‘significant, positive impacts’ on at least one of the following three indicators: livestock ownership; ownership of agricultural assets; and agricultural inputs/outputs (seed expenditure, fertiliser use, etc., and value of harvest) (UNICEF 2015). Multiple multi-country assessments and meta-analyses over the past two decades have reported similar results. As underlined in Section 0 (p. 16), the multiplier effects of cash transfers in the local economy are significant.

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23 See, for instance, Evans and Popova (2017) and Handa et al. (2017).
24 For more information on The Transfer Project, a multi-country research initiative to provide rigorous evidence on the impact of large-scale national cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa, visit https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu.
Concerns that cash transfers induce price inflation—A common fear is that cash-based transfers injected into communities where markets are not fully functioning may lead to price inflation. Although quality market assessments conducted before and throughout any humanitarian cash transfer intervention are essential,\(^2\) the bulk of evidence does not support this concern. For example, the 2017 Transfer Project assessment of eight large-scale cash transfer programmes finds no evidence for inflationary effects attributed to the programme. This is thought to be due to the fact that, on the whole, transfers tend to be relatively small—both in terms of the individual transfer value and the coverage in a community—compared to the size of most markets and, in many cases, markets recover sufficiently quickly from a rapid onset crisis to respond effectively to increased demand.

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Cash Transfers: Myths vs. Reality

Duration: 02 min 27 s

Cash Transfers: Myths vs. Reality
Infographics (one-pager):
Research paper (25 pages):

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\(^2\) See, for example, the Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis (EMMA) toolkit (accessible at https://www.emma-toolkit.org), the Minimum Standard for Market Analysis (MISMA) (accessible at http://www.cashlearning.org/resources/library/351-minimum-standard-for-market-analysis-misma), and the Pre-Crisis Market Analysis (PCMA) (accessible at https://www.emma-toolkit.org/pre-crisis).
Chapter C

WHAT DOES WORKING WITH SOCIAL PROTECTION IN CRISIS CONTEXTS LOOK LIKE?

Overview
This chapter presents a working typology for understanding what working with social protection to respond to a crisis might look like. It provides an overview of how different social protection instruments can and have been used in crisis contexts. It outlines key challenges, and provides a framework for assessing different response options.

Outline
C1. A working typology of approaches to date
C2. Operational experiences in crisis contexts
C3. Challenges to working with social protection in crisis contexts
C4. Assessing response options

C1. A working typology of approaches to date

Global experiences of working with social protection systems and approaches to respond to a crisis have recently been organised into a working typology. As part of research efforts to better understand whether and how long-term social protection systems can foster resilience to and respond to crises, O’Brien et al. (2018c) classified relevant global experiences to date into five main types of response, respectively labelled design tweaks, piggybacking, vertical expansion, horizontal expansion, and alignment. The typology is illustrated in Figure 9 and described in Table 2 below. This typology has been a useful way of demonstrating what working with social protection systems and approaches in humanitarian contexts might look like, and categorising common features, enablers, constraining factors and risks. Annex 4 (p. 84) outlines, for each of these five response types, prerequisites and enablers, advantages, disadvantages, risks to be aware of, and implications for interventions in fragile and conflict-affected situations and contexts of forced displacement.

Figure 8  Social protection in humanitarian contexts: A working typology of experiences
These different types of response have certain prerequisites that must be in place for them to be useful for addressing humanitarian needs. Determinants for selecting a particular approach will include the nature of the shock, the extent of the vulnerability, and the maturity of the underlying social protection programmes or system – this is discussed in section 0 below. Four of the five approaches involve somehow leveraging existing social protection programmes to rapidly provide assistance to those who need it during crises, and scale back afterwards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Approach</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Design tweaks</strong></td>
<td>The design of social protection programmes and systems can be adjusted in a way that takes into consideration the crises that a country typically faces. These are small adjustments to a routine social protection programme. They can introduce flexibility to maintain the regular service in a shock. For example, the Philippines allows compliance with conditionality for its cash transfer programme, Pantawid, to be waived in a calamity. Alternatively, they can improve coverage, timeliness or predictability without requiring any ‘flex’ at the moment of the shock. For example, Mozambique’s cash transfer programme regularly experiences disbursement delays at the start of each new financial year in January; unfortunately, that coincides with the period of greatest risk of climate shocks such as cyclones. A design tweak, such as a double payment in December in place of one in January, might ensure that households were covered at the time of increased vulnerability. The merits of different design tweaks would need to be examined on a case-by-case basis. The risks – if the change is implemented sensitively – are low, provided the adjustment does not divert the programme from its core objective or close off opportunities to achieve greater impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Piggy-backing</strong></td>
<td>A social protection programme’s administrative systems can be used by humanitarian (or other) actors to deliver assistance, but the response programme itself is managed separately from the social protection programme. For example, this could be when a humanitarian response uses a specific programme’s beneficiary list, a country’s national registries or programme databases of households underpinning social protection programmes, a social assistance programme’s particular payment mechanism, or makes use of social protection staff. Similarly, a humanitarian response could use the payment system of a contributory pension scheme (as happened in Lesotho). The essence of this approach is to provide a faster, more effective response through tried-and-tested methods that communities and end-beneficiaries are familiar with. This saves the set-up time and costs associated with establishing a parallel system through emergency response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vertical expansion</strong></td>
<td>A social protection programme can temporarily increase the benefit value or duration of a benefit provided through an existing programme, either for all or for some of the existing beneficiaries. This can be done via an adjustment of transfer amounts, or through the introduction of extraordinary payments or transfers, to a regular social assistance programme implemented in non-crisis times. The rationale may be to recognise the increased household costs as a result of the crises, or to temporarily harmonise the size of payments from the social assistance programme with a humanitarian response. Alternatively, if the payments are to be extended in duration, the rationale may be that there has been an extended period of need as a result of market disruption or agricultural production. With this approach, any extra support is provided as an integral part of the existing intervention – that is, it uses the same implementers and delivery channels.</td>
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26 Design tweaks often need to be customised and localised to type of disasters and operational plans, so more than one might be needed per programme. For example, Myanmar’s Maternal and Child Cash Transfer Program which operates currently in Chin state (affected by floods and landslides) and Rakhine (affected by many natural disasters as well as conflict) would need customised design tweaks given different operations plans and risk profile.

27 This approach can consider the use of other national administrative systems, such as vulnerability databases maintained by national disaster management offices, or administrative systems in the health or rural development sectors.
### Response Approach

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<tr>
<td><strong>Horizontal expansion</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social assistance programmes can temporarily include new, crisis-affected beneficiaries in an existing social protection programme. This option may involve extending the programme to more people in the same geographical area or an extension of the programme's geographical coverage to areas affected by the crises but not in the footprint of the ‘regular’ programme. The expansion of the regular programme into new territories can be achieved through either a pre-screening of potential beneficiaries before a crisis event and/or through an extraordinary enrolment campaign to rapidly enrol those who fit programme criteria and who have been affected, or a modification/relaxation of eligibility criteria to allow more people to benefit. While the most effective and rapid scale-ups have agreed a number of parameters ex ante, these are not prerequisites. Ideally, the parameters to be agreed ex ante are where the scale-up should take place, which households are to receive support through the programme, and what the (objective) triggers to authorise a scale-up will be.</td>
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| **Alignment** |
| An emergency response can be deliberately designed to align with another (actual or future) social protection programme or system. Where the country systems are not mature or do not penetrate across the entire country, there have been examples where humanitarian projects have been designed explicitly with the expectation that the projects could evolve and mature over time into fully fledged, national social protection systems (e.g. the Cadre Commun sur les Filets Sociaux in Mali, and the Urban Food Security programme in Kenya). This could be achieved through greater alignment of humanitarian interventions into something more predictable and ‘systemic’, or alignment of a response programme with an existing or future social protection programme, to facilitate potential integration and national ownership in the future. |


**Users of the typology should bear in mind that the categories presented here are not mutually exclusive.** The best potential may well involve implementing a combination of these approaches – for instance, combining horizontal and vertical expansions (as demonstrated with case studies from Ethiopia and Kenya) or, when designing an emergency response, aligning some elements (such as transfer level) and piggybacking on others (such as national vulnerability databases), or combining fee waivers (e.g. Vietnam waives school fees for disaster-affected populations) and making market solutions (e.g. micro-insurance) fully or partially subsidised. Also, these options are not exhaustive or prescriptive ways in which humanitarian and social protection partners can collaborate in humanitarian settings. It is intended as a categorisation of experiences to date, only. Some experiences (such as Turkey’s Emergency Social Safety Net, described in Annex 5, p. 90) have characteristics which can be difficult to identify wholly with one or other of these ways of working. Furthermore, this is an emerging area and other typologies and ways of working may become clear in the future.
This typology is clearly work in progress. While very useful for people new to the topic for a grasp of what working with social protection to respond to crises is about, from an operational perspective it might be more valuable to distinguish between coverage and systems. The coverage of an emergency response would rarely coincide exactly with that of current social protection systems. Responding to a shock might require greater or different coverage, which may involve horizontal and/or vertical expansion (Figure 7, p. 25). Then, leaving the coverage question aside, the crucial issue becomes to what degree existing systems can be used to serve the common purpose:

- **Not at all** – running a stand-alone humanitarian response;
- **Prospectively** – aligning approaches with a view that humanitarian responses will eventually become integrated into the national system, as illustrated by the case of Mali presented in Annex 5 (p. 90);
- **Partially** – piggybacking — that is, using the best components of the existing system;
- **Substantially** – operating design tweaks;
- **Completely** – expanding in a general sense (through vertical and/or horizontal expansion, or by waiving fees on accessing social services).

Such an approach might better encourage humanitarian actors to reflect on why they are not working with existing social protection systems, programmes or approaches, or what would be needed to do so. This, in turn, forces attention on improving the different components of the system (such as registration, enrolment, delivery, case management, grievance, communication, monitoring and evaluation, etc.) so that they can better be used for shared social protection and humanitarian response. It may be that, in each country, some are easier to achieve or more important than others, so different stakeholders can jointly plan and prioritise – for instance, humanitarian actors may have developed effective grievance systems, social protection may have a comprehensive registry, etc.

The typology is focused on response options, but working with social protection across the humanitarian-development nexus implies focusing on preparedness and supporting a systems approach to social protection. It requires considering which components of existing national systems for social protection and beyond can be used/aligned with. This may include, for example, using existing information and data on poverty and vulnerability in the country, piggybacking on existing pension payment mechanisms, connecting with the civil registry, etc. For instance, analysing the ways in which Malawi’s existing social protection system components can more effectively prepare for and address the impacts of events that give rise to humanitarian emergency responses, Holmes et al. (2017) focus on the following social protection system components: the policy and institutional framework; social protection programme design and implementation; social protection systems (data, information systems and targeting, delivery systems and early warning systems); and financing arrangements.

Finally, as this typology focuses on aligning or transitioning from humanitarian assistance to a national social protection system, there might be latitude for (additionally) supporting informal or locally-led social protection mechanisms in crisis contexts, particularly where the government cannot (lacking capacity) or will not (prohibitive legal framework) include humanitarian caseloads. This third pillar can serve as a stepping stone towards formal social protection and/or can be complementary to humanitarian efforts.

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28 Responding to a shock might even involve ‘refocusing’ – that is, in case of budget cut, adjusting the social protection system to refocus assistance on groups most vulnerable to the shock (Bastagli 2014). However, this option is problematic as it goes against the principle of approaching social protection from a rights-based perspective and of working towards the progressive realisation of universal coverage of social protection (floors). Addressing the needs of affected populations should not supersede the chronic needs of already vulnerable populations and disaster financing should not divert budgets from development objectives. The whole point of working on preparedness and ex ante planning of shock-responsive social protection and adequate risk financing is to avoid ad-hoc budget reallocations and disinvestments in long-term human development to the profit of short-term relief and recovery.

29 For more information on strengthening social protection systems, see European Commission (2015b).
C2. Operational experiences in crisis contexts

**KEY MESSAGES**

- It is possible to work with any type of social protection instrument in crisis settings, as long as it is adapted to the crisis context, the maturity of the national social protection system and the legal framework regulating access to it.
- Most experience to date is on working with social assistance in crisis contexts due to the prevalence of social transfer schemes and their typically comparatively large coverage and robust operational systems and processes.
- Social protection instruments need to link to other services to support people in fragile and conflict-affected settings, build their resilience before shocks occur, stabilise their livelihoods and address their social needs for full recovery after a shock.
- Transitioning from humanitarian assistance to national social protection programmes can also be supported by responsibly strengthening proven, locally led, informal social protection mechanisms, notably in contexts where the state cannot, or will not, include humanitarian caseloads into their national system.

While there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ in terms of a social protection response to, and mitigation of, crises, there is a range of instruments that can contribute to providing an effective response and, when designed and implemented together, can provide pathways out of vulnerability. Having a social protection system in place ex ante increases the probability that people affected by a crisis will continue to access regular, predictable support, regardless of the crisis type. The aim is to develop a means of sequencing all responses – from nationally owned systems through to internationally supported systems – which can be mobilised at relatively short notice and meet immediate needs without compromising long-term development. In all crisis contexts, it is important that international stakeholders recognise the national systems in place and build on what is already there rather than introducing parallel systems – this may include, for example, using existing information and data on poverty and vulnerability in the country. This is not currently the case: in 2015, only three per cent of humanitarian resources were channelled through national government systems, and only two per cent of international humanitarian assistance was delivered to local and national partners (ALNAP 2015). This situation can partly be attributed to the current architecture and corporate culture of the humanitarian system, as well as a common conviction that humanitarian assistance delivers better than national systems – a perception that is to be challenged, as outlined in Chapter B above.

This section highlights how social protection instruments can be and have been used in crisis contexts and how linkages can be made among social protection instruments and with other services and sectors. Annex 3 (p. 79) outlines, for each of the four main types of instruments considered below (social assistance, social insurance, ALMP and social care services), the enabling factors, advantages, disadvantages and risks, as well as considerations for using them in fragile and conflict-affected situations and contexts of forced displacement. Also, Annex 5 (p. 90) provides three country examples where humanitarian and development outcomes have been supported through common social protection programming in fragile, forced displacement and conflict contexts.
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE

Social assistance programmes are often well positioned to support crisis response due in part to the fact that they are often designed to reach the poorest and/or most vulnerable in society and have relatively large coverage compared to other social protection instruments, as well as the ubiquity of the cash transfer instrument as the most common form of delivery for both social and humanitarian assistance. Using social assistance programmes to deliver transfers to those affected by a crisis allows them to meet their immediate consumption needs in the aftermath of a crisis. For these reasons, most of the experience to date of working with social protection in crisis situations comes from social assistance – in the form of cash transfers, vouchers and in-kind transfers.

Multiple ways of working with social assistance have been used. For example, where programmes have large coverage, robust administrative systems and institutional arrangements, and where there is an overlap between those affected by a crisis and those receiving support, programmes have been used to channel additional resources to existing beneficiaries – for example, in the Philippines (Box 3, p. 25), Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nepal (Box 9, p. 45). Social assistance programmes have also been used to temporarily include new, crisis-affected beneficiaries in an existing programme – for example, in Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Social assistance programmes’ administrative systems, such as payment mechanisms, or administrative staff, have been used by humanitarian actors to deliver assistance, but with the response programme itself managed separately from the social protection programme – for example, in Yemen, and Turkey (Annex 5, p.90). The design of social assistance programmes and systems has been adjusted ex ante, in a way that takes into consideration the crises that a country typically faces – for example, in the Philippines and Mali. And an emergency response can be designed to align with another (actual or future) social assistance programme or system – as is happening in Mali and Kenya, and is planned in Somalia (Box 1, p. 15).

Public works programmes can be expanded to respond to crises, and emergency cash/food-for-work/asset programmes can be designed to align with public works programmes. Cash-for-work projects and social protection public works programmes have much in common, both in terms of objectives and in terms of design and implementation. With the rapid rise of public works programmes over the last decade, there is significant potential for these interventions to work more harmoniously together, to respond to immediate, short-term needs and to be able to address underlying, chronic livelihood and food security issues. The objectives of both interventions typically focus on addressing household consumption shortfalls (whether crisis- or livelihood-related) and constructing works that add value to local economies, although the emphasis may change in different periods of stress/crisis. Similar design and implementation considerations are required for both interventions, addressed to questions such as the types of asset creation expected, nature/size of benefits, timing and duration, coherence across ‘works’, targeting and eligibility, conditions and work and labour, etc. Emergency cash-for-work schemes can be designed to not only meet immediate needs but also to incorporate into the design the possibilities of transitioning the emergency intervention into a long-term programme of works, should the context allow. In addition, social protection public works programmes can include plans, logistics and financing for new community assets to be built. This can be done using existing programme administration and modalities when a crisis affects communities. In fragile, conflict and displacement settings, emergency cash-for-work schemes and public works programmes may be understood as common programmes implemented with different emphases at different points of the development-humanitarian ‘contiguum’.30

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30 When the concept of relief-development continuum was first introduced, it suggested that the progression from relief to development programming was linear. In 1995, DG ECHO suggested that the term ‘contiguum’ would better reflect the reality that operations in relief, rehabilitation and development contexts may all be taking place simultaneously, or contiguously.
Mali is characterised by frequent, predictable droughts and widespread food insecurity. Each year, three to five million people are classified as food insecure, of whom around 400,000 need immediate assistance. From 2012 to 2015, a conflict in the north of the country impacted three million people and displaced around 400,000.

A wide range of social protection and humanitarian interventions are implemented across government and by external agencies, and there is a strong willingness to invest in social protection for both long-term development and shorter-term crisis response. The country has two major complementary school feeding programmes; one scheme delivered by government, with long-term education aims, and one implemented by the WFP in partnership with UNICEF, which targets at-risk and crisis-affected zones, and areas where the state system is not yet, or no longer, functioning. It is designed to flex in response to changing needs.

The school meals system has several features that enable it to respond to shocks:

- The government scheme currently covers 20 per cent of primary schools and prioritises the 166 communes most vulnerable to food insecurity. Priority is given to schools with low enrolment and retention rates, especially of girls.

- The WFP’s programme provides take-home rations of vegetable oil, in addition to meals eaten at school, for girls who attend regularly. Mothers who prepare the meals are also entitled to take a set amount of food home. In response to changing needs, the programme can increase the number of daily meals provided, extend the provision of meals into the school holidays and increase take-home rations. It can add new beneficiaries as required (enabling it, for example, to address the additional caseloads brought about by the return of displaced families after the 2015 ceasefire in the north) and move location relatively easily, in line with the opening and closing of schools in response to shifting patterns of insecurity.

By maintaining or re-establishing school attendance after a shock or crisis, school feeding can protect and support long-term human capital development and food security. In the context of the north, key informants also indicated that school feeding promoted early recovery by bolstering demand for the rapid reopening of schools, proving a stable social context to support psychological needs and protecting children from potential radicalisation.

WFP’s intervention forms part of the annual National Response Plan and is aligned with the government’s policy and guidelines for school feeding. This may, in future, support its gradual transition into the existing state system. Government capacities and financing currently impede the transition of the WFP programme into the state system though this remains a long-term aim. In the meantime, it is considered important to support the government programme while at the same time continuing with the WFP government-aligned initiative so that, over time, the WFP programme may transition over to government management and the existing government programme may be strengthened to respond more flexibly to crises.

Source: Authors, based on O’Brien et al. (2018a).
SOCIAL INSURANCE

Although social insurance is explicitly designed to become effective in the event of (individual, idiosyncratic) shocks, its utility in a widespread (covariate) crisis is limited due to the typically low coverage of such schemes in low-income contexts with high levels of informality in the labour market. Nonetheless, social insurance has been used in crisis contexts in the following ways.

The predictability of pension funds and stipends has been used as collateral during crises to advance cash payments to those affected by crises. Most countries will have at least one state pension scheme, typically for the military and civil servants. But these schemes may extend beyond that core beneficiary base. The certainty and predictability of a state pension of this kind has enabled some crisis-affected households to use their future monthly allowances as surety for an immediate, advance payout. In some cases this advance has been from the state, and in other cases it has come from local traders.

Rules and regulations have been relaxed in a number of countries in order to expand benefits to existing recipients and increase total coverage. For example, during the financial, fuel and food crisis from 2008 in China and Uruguay, changes to the contributory pension system were made to reduce the contribution period and reduce the age at which benefits could be drawn, to increase income streams to those previously employed in the formal sector (McCord 2013a, cited in OPM 2017). Uruguay changed the regulations for unemployment insurance to allow payments to be extended from six to eight months during recessions (Beazley et al. 2016, cited in OPM 2017), and Mexico’s Social Security Institute extended health insurance coverage for up to six months for dismissed workers and their families. In Chile, eligibility requirements for the Solidarity Fund were relaxed so that contributions did not need to be made every month, thus increasing the total number of members from 10,000 to 30,000 (Grosh et al. 2013, cited in OPM 2017). In Fiji, as described in Box 6 below, in response to Tropical Cyclone Winston, the National Provident Fund, Fiji’s largest social insurance scheme, relaxed its rules to allow members to withdraw cash in the first two months following the disaster. Advance payouts have been authorised by pension scheme administrators in Indonesia, the Philippines, and India. Once the decision to advance payments has been made, the regular pension administration system for delivering benefits is used, to ensure that those in need can access their benefits in the ways and places they are familiar with. However, mechanisms should be put in place to enable members to increase contributions following recovery from a crisis, to ensure an adequate level of pension benefits during retirement.
Tropical Cyclone Winston hit Fiji in 2016, affecting around 60 per cent of the population – more than 540,000 people. The value of physical damage and economic losses was estimated at two billion Fijian dollars (FJD), or EUR 0.85 billion – that is, more than 20 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP).

The humanitarian response was quick and led effectively by the government. Working with partners, including the European Commission, the government put in place several responses that built upon the national social protection system, notably:

- *Existing social assistance schemes* were used to rapidly and efficiently disburse FJD 19.9 million (equivalent to EUR 8.46 million), providing immediate assistance to households and injecting much-needed cash into the economy. A follow-up food voucher payment of FJD 4.6 million (EUR 1.96 million) for two months was developed by the government and channelled through the WFP to social assistance recipients.
- *Fiji’s largest social insurance scheme* – the National Provident Fund (similar to a pension scheme) allowed affected members to withdraw cash nine days after the disaster. Active members were allowed to withdraw up to FJD 1,000 (EUR 425), plus an additional FJD 5,000 (EUR 2,128) if they could present proof of having a house in the affected area. Although the scheme is available only to formal-sector workers, within the first two months of the disaster more than 170,000 withdrawals were approved, disbursing about FJD 250.2 million (EUR 106 million). This represented a cash injection of around three per cent of GDP into the economy.

A World Bank evaluation of the responses delivered through the social protection system found:

- 99 per cent of payments were used for essentials – food, shelter, clothes, school and medical supplies;
- Households receiving the top-up transfers were quicker to recover;
- Nearly all beneficiaries reported receiving the correct amount;
- Markets were re-established to near pre-cyclone levels within four weeks;
- The in-kind humanitarian assistance provided effective immediate assistance to all affected.

Source: Authors, based on Mansur et al. (2017).

**ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET PROGRAMMES**

Targeted active labour market programmes (ALMPs) can provide support in the form of vertical or horizontal expansion to crisis-affected populations by temporarily increasing the package of services in a programme or increasing the size of the programme to include more people. For example, it may be possible to scale up a vocational training scheme that is already operational, to accommodate additional beneficiaries during a crisis. Political economy and local sensitivities are important here. But in principle, schemes can be expanded to bring in new beneficiaries and even to expand the range of trainings being offered to reflect the existing skills of new beneficiaries and the new market demands as a result of the crisis itself. Countries that have introduced these mechanisms include China, Uruguay, Chile, and Korea, among others.

Crisis-affected populations could benefit from wage subsidies, which are aimed at stimulating private sector engagement and retention in crisis-affected areas. In schemes such as this, the government provides a monthly income support to workers, which companies then deduct from workers’ salaries to reduce their own costs. Argentina introduced such a scheme in 2007, in response to the financial, fuel and food crises. They gradually increased it from 14,000 employees to over 144,000 in three years. Classic ALMPs, such as training and wage subsidies, are likely to only assist those in the formal sector.

31 On vertical and horizontal expansion, see Figure 7 (p.27) and table 2 (p.36).
32 Political economy and local sensitivities are important for any type of social protection instrument, as underlined on various occasions later in this document.
Given the current average displacement duration, integrating displaced people into local labour markets as quickly as possible is an essential part of providing social protection in crisis contexts, as is maintaining, or increasing, labour market interventions for host communities. Social cohesion is often brittle in fragile, conflict and displacement settings both between individuals and the local or state authorities, as well as between individuals. Nowhere is this felt more acutely than in local job markets. ALMPs that develop technical and soft skills, identify skills gaps, assist with job search, support small business development, provide apprenticeships, match supply and demand of skills and support targeted wage subsidies can all assist with the integration of displaced people into new local markets. This needs to be done, and seen to be done, equitably. Traditional humanitarian responses certainly do not focus on these interventions. But given global patterns indicating a concentration of displacement, urbanisation and crises, humanitarians are likely to need to expand into these areas. Or development actors need to complement the work of humanitarians in these settings by engaging in ‘emergency’ solutions. One example could be the rapid removal of local barriers to entrepreneurship such as access to local employers, rapid training and (re) certification in times of crises. The experience of the refugee compact in Jordan, agreed in 2016 and described in Box 7 below, can bring valuable lessons on how to widen access to livelihoods in situations of protracted displacement.

In protracted or repeat crisis contexts, ALMPs with portable benefits are likely to have greater impact. A feature of fragile, conflict and displacement contexts is the frequent movement of people. Sometimes this is cross-border, but more often it is within recognised territories. Skill development may be more important than physical assets in these contexts – and within the broad umbrella of ‘skills’, portable or cross-cultural skills are more highly valued, perhaps for obvious reasons. Social protection schemes that prioritise the development of soft skills may support the early integration of people into new communities and new labour markets.

Box 7 Integrating Syrian refugees into local labour markets in Jordan

More than five million people have fled the civil war in Syria since 2011, with most settling in neighbouring countries. Jordan alone is home to more than 650,000 Syrian refugees but struggles with economic development for its own nationals. In 2016, the Jordan Compact was agreed, which aspires to turn ‘the Syrian refugee crisis into a development opportunity’ for Jordan by shifting the focus from short-term humanitarian aid to education, growth, investment and job creation, both for Jordanians and for Syrian refugees.

The Compact combines humanitarian and development funding through multi-year grants and concessional loans, with pledges of USD 700 million in grants annually for three years, and concessional loans of USD 1.9 billion (all linked to specific targets). Under the terms of the Compact, Jordan has to inter alia issue 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees in specific sectors, reform the business investment environment and formalise Syrian businesses, and provide vocational training opportunities to Syrian refugees. The EU in turn will relax the rules of origin regulation to stimulate exports from 18 designated economic zones and industrial areas where Syrian refugees are employed.

The Compact has led to considerable improvements in education and labour market access for Syrian refugees. Prior to the Compact, only some 3,000 work permits were issued to Syrians annually; from February 2016 to October 2017, some 71,000 permits had been issued (although the ‘active’ number of permits is unknown). Challenges remain that will need to be tackled through targeted interventions, but the blending of development financing into a protracted humanitarian crisis changed the game for the refugees involved.

Recent findings on the socio-economic impact of the Compact indicate that putting refugees at the centre of the design process and providing them with a voice could have accelerated positive changes in the lives of refugees. Effective communications to dispel negative perceptions among refugee populations would have improved the instrument’s application greatly. Ensuring that monitoring was focused less on outputs and more on outcomes would also have assisted with making necessary tweaks to the implementation in real time.

The Jordan Compact is a unique example of how a focus on understanding incentives and partnerships can open up an increasingly restrictive policy environment for refugees, replacing short-term humanitarian support with efforts towards longer-term sustainable livelihoods. It is the first example of such an experiment on such a considerable scale, and policy-makers designing other refugee compacts (in Ethiopia, Turkey or Lebanon), or thinking about how to widen access to livelihoods in situations of protracted displacement, can build on its lessons.

Source: Authors, based on Barbelet et al. (2018).
SOCIAL CARE SERVICES

The great potential of social care services in crisis context remains largely unexploited. Even in non-crisis contexts, the provision of social care services is often low; in crisis contexts, these services are virtually non-existent at significant scale. As part of a recent three-year shock-responsive research study led by Oxford Policy Management (OPM), an extensive literature search reported ‘almost no discussion on planning for or execution of the scale up of social care services in the event of a disaster’ (OPM 2017). This is likely because scaling up social care services in any crisis context would require an injection of skilled, qualified human resources. Starting from a very low base, as is the case in many countries (notably but not exclusively low-income, crisis-affected contexts), this would be challenging. Three examples identified by OPM (2017) are:

- The establishment of mobile units by the Government of Colombia in 2015, to provide Venezuelan refugees with psychosocial care and legal advice (Beazley et al. 2016, cited in OPM 2017) – see Box 8 below.

- In 2014, UNICEF, other donors and NGOs supported Social Work Centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina to assist communities affected by flooding. Support included financial resources, assistance with case registration and provision of psychosocial support. Following this experience, UNICEF recently supported the government to develop a manual defining the roles and responsibilities of Social Work Centres in crisis situations (Buljubašić et al. 2015, cited in OPM 2017).

- The Government of Kenya has adopted a surge capacity model for use in Community Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) systems, which respond to child malnutrition. The Surge Capacity Model aims to strengthen the capacity of health systems to withstand and recover from short-term increases in demand such as those caused by drought. Health facility staff analyse indicators of worsening nutritional status such as rainfall, conflict and population movement and monitor new admissions. Staff can then request additional resources, consisting of a pre-defined package of support as required (OPM 2017).

Social care services are a huge connection point between the protection services of humanitarian assistance and the national social protection system. Participants at the international conference on ‘Social protection in contexts of fragility and forced displacement’ held in Brussels on 28-29 September 2017 underlined the importance and potential of developing social care services and building the capacity of social workers, yet identified it as a currently neglected area, with much of the attention put on cash transfers and other support measures. Social workers remain needed in all contexts; they are a way to link the work of humanitarian and development actors. The integrated information technology system for case management in Mariupol city in Eastern Ukraine is an example of such humanitarian-development integration. It allows online access to the cases via tablets; it integrates all the required forms, including needs assessment, documenting progress made and reporting to the centralised database (UNICEF and European Commission 2017). More efforts are required in that field in the years to come.

33 For more information, visit https://www.opml.co.uk/projects/shock-responsive-social-protection-systems.
In August 2015, the shooting of three Venezuelan soldiers and subsequent closure of the border between Venezuela and Colombia triggered the voluntary return and deportation of almost 24,000 Colombians and the immigration of some Venezuelan nationals into Colombia.

The rapid influx of so many families triggered the Government of Colombia’s National System for Management of Risks and Disasters to respond. This involved 15 local, regional and national agencies working together, using the existing social protection system as the basis to extend support to around 9,500 families.

Assistance was provided across the four pillars of the national social protection system: health, education, housing and vulnerability. Amid concerns about community tensions, plans were developed to ensure the effective integration of affected families into host communities. Mobile units of interdisciplinary teams, including social workers, were deployed to identify beneficiaries and their needs, refer them to appropriate services and monitor the support provided. ‘Social inclusion and reconciliation’ plans included the documentation of beneficiary needs, the creation of opportunities for productive inclusion, support from social workers in housing and financial assistance, and child and adolescent protection activities. Several existing programmes and services were scaled up to provide psychosocial assistance, legal advice, nutritional guidance, public works and technical training for skills development.

Key factors that enabled this rapid and effective response were the availability of a network of qualified professional social workers and the existence of a range of social protection programmes with broad coverage and robust delivery systems. The active and permeable nature of the border meant that Colombian nationals frequently travelled between the two countries accessing markets, job opportunities and services in both countries. This meant that at the time of the crisis, around 45 per cent of identified beneficiaries were already registered on one or more Colombian social protection programmes, making the rapid scale-up of services easier.

Source: Authors, based on Uribe (2016).

**BEYOND FORMAL SOCIAL PROTECTION**

Transitioning from humanitarian assistance to national social protection programmes can also be supported by responsibly strengthening proven, locally-led, informal social protection mechanisms. In many crisis contexts, people primarily rely on informal or locally-led systems (informal labour, religious charity, local user and savings groups) that can be strengthened by international financing and connected up to community-based development. These can provide local safety nets, social support networks and access to informal labour, particularly in countries where the state cannot or will not include humanitarian caseloads or certain groups of the population into its national system. This is often a stepping-stone in the transition from international to government-led social protection mechanisms. Such an approach fits well with the whole conflict-sensitive, community-based protection, conflict management approaches. It is being explored in Iraq in particular.

**The contribution of private sector measures might also be explored.** Such measures might not always fit, but sometimes initial subsidies are provided for crop insurance products as an incentive to kick-start the practice. For example, One Acre Fund is promoting crop insurance as a form of protection against climate risks. 34

For more information, please visit https://oneacrefund.org.
KEY MESSAGES

While intuitively social protection can contribute to building/restoring the social contract in fragile and conflict settings, thorough contextual analysis is required, as is a strong adherence to a Do No Harm approach.

Politics matters greatly. Local political factors, both around social protection and around the nature of a crisis, can increase or decrease the response options available. Comprehensive efforts are required to offer governments political, economic and social incentives to link their national system to humanitarian caseloads.

The maturity of a country’s social protection system will inform the degree to which it can be leveraged, as a whole or through selected programmes, to respond to a crisis. When assessing a country’s social protection system, attention is to be paid to preparedness needs and the work needed for strengthening the system and increasing, over time, its maturity level and ability to cover the needs of people in crisis.

A nation’s fiscal space, financial preparedness and transparent financial systems will influence the nature and extent of social protection provision both before and after a crisis occurs.

Restrictions on accessing territories and populations in crises areas mean that it may be a challenge for social protection instruments to be used to respond to a crisis; the use of informal or locally led mechanisms should be explored.

Robust, transparent and enforceable administrative and financial systems, supported by adequate human resources, need to be in place to provide an appropriate audit trail for the use of resources.

Crisis, by definition, increase people’s vulnerability while often simultaneously undermining the ability of existing programmes and services to address needs. Several issues inherent to crisis contexts can influence the nature and extent of social protection provision both before and after a crisis occurs. These can be broadly categorised under institutional and operational issues.

INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

Political support to the national social protection sector and political sensitivities around the nature of a crisis combine to influence the nature and extent of social protection provision. Local political factors can increase or decrease the response options available. National political champions can advocate for the use of social protection systems as vehicles of support to crisis-affected populations. The perspectives of the national government towards social protection in general may be influential in the role that social protection can play in responding to the crisis, as will its view of the affected population – see, for example, the case of the Philippines, which leveraged the national Pantawid programme for a crisis response to Typhon Haiyan, presented in Box 3 (p. 25). Similarly, the approach to crisis-affected populations ex ante may influence the approach of any support ex post – as illustrated by Lebanon’s approach to integrating Syrian refugees into host communities from 2011 onwards. On the other hand, crises can be opportunities to influence political priorities and realise policy shifts in favour of social protection – as exemplified by Ethiopia’s policy move in 2003 to assume proactive management of crisis-affected people, through a social protection instrument. A related challenge is that authorities in fragile and conflict-affected states may be less concerned with seeking legitimacy from their citizens and may therefore de-prioritise the functioning of local social services, including social protection services.
A crisis-affected country’s social protection system may not be sufficiently mature to extend benefits and services during crises. A country’s social protection programme, for example, may be too new, have limited coverage of people, or have insufficiently institutionalised operational procedures that enable them to be ‘tweaked’ to respond to a crisis – see, for example, the successful, yet challenging case of Nepal’s 2015 earthquake response presented in Box 9 below. In practice, there is a wide continuum of maturity which affects the options for introduction or continuity of social protection support as well as citizens’ decisions to (e)migrate or return, among other things.

**Box 9  Nepal’s 2015 earthquake response**

When a devastating earthquake hit Nepal in April 2015 the well-established, state social protection system was quickly identified as a vehicle through which to reach large numbers of affected households.

In partnership with the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD), UNICEF designed the Emergency Cash Transfer Programme (ECTP). The MoFALD was in overall charge of implementation and UNICEF transferred their funds directly to District Development Committees. Phase 1 of the programme provided cash assistance through a top-up transfer of 3,000 Nepalese rupees to existing beneficiaries of the government social transfer programmes in the worst affected areas. Over 434,000 people were reached over a three-month period. Phase 2 aimed to meet recovery needs a year after the earthquake and the target population changed from existing social transfer beneficiaries, to all children below five years of age.

The intervention is generally seen as highly successful. Other humanitarian actors working independently delivered cash support within a similar timeframe but not at such a significant scale as the ECTP. Partially because of the intervention, the underlying social transfer systems have been strengthened and the government has agreed to extend the geographical coverage of its child grant.

However, the underlying capacity constraints of the government system did impact on ECTP delivery. For example:

- As no social registry of the population existed from which to identify new caseloads, the Phase 2 extension of the ECTP beyond existing social transfer beneficiaries required the identification and registration of new beneficiaries – this proved to be immensely challenging and time consuming;
- Disbursement of social transfers to beneficiaries in Nepal is still largely done by hand, which imposed constraints to the speed and efficiency with which the transfers could be disbursed;
- Capacity constraints of District Development Committees (and the complexity of UNICEF’s own administrative procedures) led to delays with financial reporting, which further contributed to delays in implementation.

The ECTP evaluation concluded that effectiveness would have been improved significantly through assessments of the real capacity of administrative processes and staff and the provision of necessary support.

Source: Authors, based on Kukrety (2016) and Merttens et al. (2017).
A crisis-affected country’s social protection system may not deliver the range of services needed to assist a full response. A country’s social protection system, for example, may only consist of one, or a handful of, stand-alone social assistance programmes, rather than a suite of inter-connected programmes that link together to provide citizens with a pathway out of poverty towards human development. While this speaks to the ‘maturity challenge’ above, it is more likely that in fragile and conflict-affected countries only social assistance programmes (and often low-coverage social insurance for government workers) are in place. A 2014 World Bank study found that not only did social assistance programmes dominate in fragile and conflict-affected countries but that these programmes were disconnected from labour market programmes, which were typically small-scale, fragmented and primarily focused on short-term/temporary job creation (Ovadiya et al. 2015). Further, the lack of programme connectivity with a wider range of social services reduces the likelihood of achieving broad social protection outcomes.

In crisis contexts, state capacity and governance can be weak. This often translates into unclear institutional arrangements and organisational mandates around the provision of social protection, which can lead to slow decision making and poor coordination. Operationally, lack of clarity over the roles and responsibilities of multiple actors will affect the speed of a response and its comprehensiveness. In the absence of this clarity, a rapid and significant increase in the number of actors can lead to inevitable coordination challenges. It took some two years to resolve these issues (among others) in the Lebanese government’s National Poverty Targeting Programme before support could be provided through state structures and the programme used to reach the poor and vulnerable host populations affected by the Syrian conflict. Contrast this with the clarity surrounding mandates and institutional arrangements in Iraq, which allowed state structures to maintain operations during the conflict, in part because there was existing clarity about the roles and responsibilities of individual ministries and their mandates.

Although social protection is often introduced as a means of addressing fragility and building state legitimacy, several concerns are also apparent. For example, in cross-border displacement settings a key area of tension may be around host communities feeling that refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are receiving preferential treatment. In fragile and conflict-affected settings where there is little government capacity or legitimacy, a key concern is that poorly delivered or communicated social protection may serve to undermine trust. In all contexts, if communities do not understand or agree with the targeting criteria of a programme, this can lead to conflict within communities and hostility towards programme implementers. In general, evidence on these issues is highly context-specific and points to both the positive and negative impacts that social protection can have on community cohesion and relationships with the state, depending on how this is promoted. This mixed picture underscores the need for highly context-specific analyses and responses as well as adherence to a Do No Harm approach.

A lack of fiscal space, risk-financing instruments, and strict rules around the use and channelling of humanitarian financing affects how countries can support state-led social protection responses to crises. International humanitarian support signifies that national capacities have been exhausted and that additional, external support is required to meet the basic needs of the affected population. The source of this funding is important. Humanitarian funding typically comes from a broad range of international donors, who channel this through international agencies, which in turn rarely channel these resources through state systems (sometimes for legal reasons, but often for lack of capacity reasons). A determinant of a country’s national capacities is the fiscal space and range of financial instruments it has to flexibly finance a response. Countries that have invested in diversifying away from a reliance on humanitarian support, or insuring against a number of risks (with instruments such as reserve funds, contingent credit, insurance, etc.), are more likely to have the financial means to mount a nationally led crises response. Kenya, for example, has made an explicit commitment to invest in instruments with insurance-based principles that will provide payments to citizens through national systems in the event of a specific event of a specific magnitude. As a result, the government can rely less on the vagaries of humanitarian support and has more resources available to provide predictable responses to crises when they emerge.

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35 See, for example, Bastagli et al. (2016), Ovadiya et al. (2015), Beazley et al. (2016) and Nixon and Mallett (2017).
36 Do No Harm is an important principle of conflict sensitivity. For more information on the Do No Harm approach, please refer to Section D4 (p.66) and visit http://cdacollaborative.org/what-we-do/conflict-sensitivity.
OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

In many crisis contexts, affected populations have a wide range of chronic and transitory needs across a range of sectors. As indicated above, many fragile and conflict-affected contexts rely on social assistance programmes in (sometimes) limited areas. Yet in addition to basic needs, vulnerabilities in these contexts may include protection concerns, psychosocial and counselling, as well as labour market and livelihood needs. The operational challenge for the provision of social protection, then, is the assessment and analysis of ‘transitory’ needs, the harmonisation of this assessment with any assessment concerning chronic needs, and the rapid decision-making necessary for ensuring an appropriate response. In displacement contexts, the challenges are magnified as a result of the need to support displaced and host communities.

In some countries affected by crises, there are populations that are inaccessible or difficult to reach by those seeking to provide support. In conflict settings or protracted crises in particular, populations may be difficult to access as a result of insecurity or government-enforced restrictions. In these cases, the challenge for practitioners then becomes how to assess (and then deliver) the range of benefits and services that are needed. Critical questions – such as who is in need, where are they, how many people are there, what is the nature of the need, etc. – all need answering before a programmatic response can be considered. While in some instances it will be possible to ‘outsource’ or ‘subcontract’ the collection of this information, the execution of any response will remain a challenge on many fronts.

Populations affected by a crisis face a range of barriers to accessing support. In particular, there are likely to be challenges in terms of beneficiaries’ personal documentation, which may have been lost during the crisis, barriers to information (especially in the case of cross-border displacement and changes in language), changes in cultural approaches (especially with regard to gender), etc. Finally, populations displaced across borders are highly likely to face legal challenges in new contexts. These challenges may include a lack of clarity about residency status, rights to enter the local labour markets, rights to access local benefits and services, etc.

Does shock-responsive social protection promote gender equality?
Duration: 01:18:23

Shock protection: Linking humanitarian aid and social protection

Financing and administration systems in crisis-affected countries are often the victim of reduced transparency. A critical challenge, especially within rapidly moving, fluid and volatile contexts, is that of fiduciary risks and accountability of agencies. The challenge is to ensure that there are robust, transparent and enforceable administrative systems in place that provide an appropriate audit trail for the use of resources. While not an absolute, it is a general rule of thumb that the opaque nature of financing and administration systems increases in step with instability, conflict and crises. When considering the nature and provision of social protection in crisis contexts, therefore, an operational risk to consider is the credibility of the system, together with its internal and external checks and balances, to meet standards of execution and the measurability inputs and outputs to the system at large. While the general principle should be to default to the use of national systems wherever possible, the integrity of the system needs to be assessed prior to its usage.
C4. Assessing response options

KEY MESSAGES

Humanitarian practitioners should be required to demonstrate why they are not working with existing social protection systems, programmes or approaches to prepare for and support crisis responses – not just at the onset of a disaster (ex post) but also in preparedness (ex ante), notably in contexts of cyclical crises, disaster and displacement events.

Assessments should consider and compare the various ways in which responses might work with social protection programmes and approaches and compare social protection-oriented responses against stand-alone humanitarian responses.

Practitioners should be confident that overall, a social-protection-oriented response is, on balance, at least equivalent to, and not worse than working through a stand-alone humanitarian response.

Six criteria are suggested for informing decisions as to the most appropriate response option. These are: meeting needs; coverage; timeliness; predictability; duplication of systems and processes; and sustainability.

The suggested six criteria are not exhaustive. Each context will require an assessment on its own terms, possibly giving relevance to different or additional criteria and applying a different weighting to the criteria selected.

Given the long-term anticipated benefits of working with social protection systems and approaches in crisis situations, practitioners should be required to demonstrate why they are not planning to work in this way for at least some of the response. The question must be whether a traditional humanitarian stand-alone response can deliver substantially better than working with social protection systems, not only considering short-term improvements of the living situation but also medium- and longer-term beneficial effects for the population. Such a perspective can create a virtuous circle whereby social protection is strengthened for improved outcomes both for chronic as well as acute interventions.

This assessment should be made against agreed criteria. The criteria should be applied to all response options being considered, including the various different ways in which a response might work with a social protection programme or approach, and how such interventions compare to stand-alone humanitarian responses. Based on common concerns and motivations for working with social protection systems and approaches reported by practitioners in a set of country case studies on shock-responsive social protection systems, O’Brien et al. (2018c) criteria offer a useful approach to insert in the below outcomes matrix, which is based on Eugene Bardach’s Policy Analysis Model (2012). Building on it, a set of criteria can be highlighted:

- **Meeting needs**: Is the proposed intervention likely to deliver at least an equal impact to alternative response options? Is it at least equally well targeted to the people most in need, as identified through needs assessments? Does the proposed intervention provide at least a similar amount of support compared to alternatives? Does it provide support of a comparable nature?37

- **Coverage**: Will the proposed intervention lead to at least as many of those in need receiving assistance as with alternative approaches?38

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37 In terms of delivery of impact, life-saving interventions put aside, interventions should be judged against a standard that can be sustainably provided, not a much higher standard than can only be ensured through stand-alone humanitarian interventions with no prospect of continuity over the medium to long term. Indeed, in terms of equity, humanitarian responses should not be considered better because they apply standards that others in the country not affected by the crisis cannot (aspire to) have access to.

38 This can be built incrementally. For example, one could start with a smaller caseload of the most vulnerable (those vulnerable before the crisis) and expand coverage to new areas. This would also depend on the objective and stage of the humanitarian response. A recovery programme would not have the same needs as the immediate life-saving response.
Timeliness: Will households receive support at least as quickly as they would have done through alternative approaches?

Predictability: Will the funding to agencies be predictable through this response option? Will it result in predictable assistance for households?

Duplication of delivery systems and processes: Will the proposed response option enable a reduction in the duplication of efforts (for example, multiple agencies conducting targeting exercises or distribution of resources in the same communities), or a harmonization of aspects of programme delivery?

Sustainability: Will it lead to strengthened organisational capacity? Will the response embedded in government-led systems?

While it is not anticipated that working with social protection systems or approaches will represent an improvement on all of these criteria when compared to a traditional stand-alone humanitarian response, the above criteria do represent a framework for guiding decisions on different response options and encouraging new ways of working.

Table 3 below suggests a means of assessing the merits of adopting a traditional stand-alone humanitarian response compared with different social protection-oriented options. It provides a framework to assist practitioners in deciding which response option is most likely to adhere to the criteria outlined above. To inform a decision about which response option could be used, each cell in the table should be awarded a mark between -1 and 3. A score of 3 may be awarded where the response option will comply with the criteria to a significant extent, a score of -1 may be awarded where the response option would undermine the criteria. Importantly, this assessment should be completed by development and humanitarian practitioners together, so that there is a shared decision about which response option should be prioritised. With the burden of proof shifting onto humanitarian agencies to justify why they are not using social protection systems or approaches to work on preparedness and responses, a completed matrix could then form the basis of any justification for why social protection-oriented approaches are not being integrated into the response.

The result will depend on the timing of this assessment – that is, whether it is conducted five years in advance in anticipation of future crises (in which case the more integrated approaches 3 and 4 might be more likely to be considered) or on the onset of the crisis (in which case it will depend on what exists then and there, and the maturity of the social protection system and willingness of stakeholders to engage in an integrated approach). It is important to keep in mind that working with the national social protection system does not always have to be in the first phase of the crisis. As long as humanitarian and development stakeholders are working on a shared vision, traditional humanitarian programming can be implemented in the early phase of the crisis, but measures can be put in place to allow a transition into social protection soon after – as in the case of UNICEF-supported responses in the Philippines or Nepal, where an approach 2 or 3 was adopted in the first phase, and an approach 4 in the second phase.

Conducting a joint assessment of response options and of the readiness of a country’s social protection system to support a humanitarian response should not be seen as a one-off activity. Again, the idea of working through social protection systems and approaches is to progressively improve on responses to crises while ensuring that the government’s contingent liability and capacity is improved in the context of an increased humanitarian financing gap, increased national resource mobilisation capacity and increased coverage of social protection.
Several caveats should be noted about the matrix below:

- It is expected to inform decision-making; it is not a decision tree in its own right.
- It is likely that a comprehensive response encompasses a combination of options (and sometimes different options within one response) – potentially across several programmes.
- There may be additional or alternative criteria that should be factored in to a modified version of the matrix – such as, for example, the nature of the crisis (rapid or slow onset, anticipated duration, etc.), the nature of the affected population (for instance, whether they are nationals or non-nationals), the operational challenges unique to the local environment, and the maturity of the existing social protection system.
- Different weighting may need to be applied to the selected criteria depending on the priorities and perspectives of stakeholders.
- Other assessment frameworks and approaches may also be relevant including the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) guidance for evaluating humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies (1999) and DFID’s ‘4Es’ framework for assessing value for money.\(^{39}\)

However, despite the above caveats, Table 3 below does offer a consistent and uniform approach to guide the decisions of practitioners, so that each country operation starts from a common set of criteria that will inform and justify strategic decisions. It remains a work in progress and will need to be updated over time as experiences with its utility and appropriateness increase. Conceptually, the table could be a helpful means of bringing development and humanitarian practitioners together to agree a response model; practically, it needs to be ‘proofed’ in the real-world, and until then its applicability should be viewed with caution.

\(^{39}\) See, for instance, White et al. (2015).
### Table 3  Assessing response options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Approach 1</th>
<th>Approach 2</th>
<th>Approach 3</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stand-alone humanitarian response</td>
<td>Stand-alone programme that aligns with existing or future SP programme</td>
<td>Work with existing programme to increase benefit value or duration</td>
<td>Work with existing programme to add new beneficiaries</td>
<td>Use elements of an existing programme or system infrastructure</td>
<td>Adjusting the design of routine SP programmes</td>
<td>Hybrid / new / alternative approach</td>
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<td>Meeting needs</td>
<td>Anticipated impact</td>
<td>Approach 1</td>
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<td>Appropriateness of targeting compared to identified target group</td>
<td>Approach 1</td>
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<td>Adequacy of support</td>
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<td>Relevance/appropriateness of nature of support</td>
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<td>Coverage</td>
<td>Level of coverage</td>
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<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>Speed of response</td>
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<td>Predictability</td>
<td>Predictability of funding to agencies</td>
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<td>Predictability of support to households</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duplication of delivery systems and processes</td>
<td>Extent to which it supports/enables coordination with government and long-term development actors</td>
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<td>Level of harmonisation with existing systems</td>
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<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Extent of government or long-term development partner organisational capacity building</td>
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<td>Extent to which embedded in government systems</td>
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**Notes:** SP: social protection; scoring system: high = 3; medium = 2; low = 1; negligible = 0; detrimental = -1.

**Source:** Nadia Giske, authors building on Bardach, O’Brien et al (2018c).

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**Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems Toolkit: Appraising the use of social protection in addressing large-scale shocks**

O’Brien et al. (2018b)


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– End of C –

54
Overview
This chapter introduces the important features of social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts that reflect currently promising practices.

Outline
D1. Design
D2. Operations
D3. Stakeholders
D4. Financing features
D5. Principles of engagement

KEY MESSAGES
Recent experiences suggest several key features of interventions that enable social protection and humanitarian responses in crisis contexts to work together for common programming.

The issues that emerge focus on five broad areas including the design of interventions, the stakeholders involved, operations, financing and the underlying principles of engagement.

Across these five areas, practitioners should seek to consider and address the following points:

- Invest in preparedness;
- Develop a joint vision, complementary objectives and multi-year programming;
- Compromise on design;
- Put people at the centre;
- Operational realism, flexibility and simplicity;
- Synergies and linkages;
- Balance priorities and consider political will;
- Engage government;
- Ensure sustainable and available resources, working towards the ability of people to pay into systems and contribute to the economy;
- Do No Harm;
- Develop evidence-based programming.
Recent experiences suggest several key features of interventions that enable social protection and humanitarian responses in crisis contexts to work together for common programming. Based on a review of experiences to date, there are a number of features that emerge as having been instrumental in successfully facilitating or delivering common programming between development and humanitarian practitioners in crisis contexts. These features focus on five broad areas, namely: the design of interventions, the stakeholders involved, operations, financing and the underlying principles of engagement. These five features address two fundamental questions:

- What are the attributes of successful common programming?
- How can development and humanitarian actors work together for common programming?

Figure 10 below shows the five features and the various elements within each. This paper does not suggest that responding to a crisis demands all of these features to be in place, but experience to date suggests that there is a better likelihood of success if a number of these features are present.

![Diagram showing key features of interventions that enable social protection and humanitarian responses to work together for common programming in crisis contexts](image)

**Figure 9**  Key features of interventions that enable social protection and humanitarian responses to work together for common programming in crisis contexts

**Source:** Authors.
Chapter D: key features of social protection responses in crisis contexts

D1. Design

PREPAREDNESS

Evidence now increasingly shows that crises, both naturally triggered and conflict-based, are mostly predictable (OCHA 2015). To maximise the opportunities for a quality, effective response, as much preparation as possible can and should take place in advance of a crisis.

Building or strengthening social protection in stable times by developing new programmes, extending the coverage of existing programmes or investing in the underlying systems, processes and institutions is intrinsically worthwhile, and an important means of building capacity to cope with the effects of generalised shocks. This is because social protection, by definition, aims to support households to deal with small-scale, individual (idiosyncratic) shocks. And the better households are able to cope with day-to-day shocks, the more resilient they will be to the additional stresses placed on them during crises. For example, results from Zambia’s Child Grant Programme found that cash received prior to a shock had a greater effect on preventing negative coping strategies than cash received after a shock. For the European Commission, this could mean investing themselves or making sure this is covered by other donors.

In stable times, social protection programmes may also be designed with an explicit focus on resilience in the face of crises. Building resilient social protection systems requires consideration of the risks to the system and people’s capacity from relevant shocks and the adoption of appropriate mitigation measures and continuity plans (O’Brien et al. 2018c). This might include agreeing details of alternative payment mechanisms in the event of a shock, procedures for how to communicate with beneficiaries, and deployment and management of core operational staff during crises. Collaboration and linkages with the Disaster Risk Management (DRM) sector are important, as there are significant overlaps between DRM activities and those needed to prepare for social protection scale-up in a crisis.40

Building individual, household and community physical and financial resilience is essential. Social protection can play a key role in that regard in supporting continued/maintained investments in human development, linkages with Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), access to financial risk-management tools, diversified livelihoods, and building adaptive capacity to stressors such as climate change, rapid urbanisation, globalisation, etc. To efficiently support people’s resilience, the social protection system itself needs to be resilient in the face of crises. Stefan Dercon (2017) argues that, at the design level, resilient social protection systems are (or should be) characterised by clarity around: i) decision-making – who owns the risk and what risk are they taking on; ii) investment in preparedness plans; and iii) credible financing plans. These issues are explored later in this chapter.

Resilient social protection: a Stefan Dercon’s keynote speech
Duration: 00:50:07
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6SjcYMJB99A

40 For a discussion on the links and complementarities between DRM and social protection systems, see O’Brien et al. (2018c).
Key preparedness actions include:

- Generating baseline information such as multi-hazard risk assessments, poverty and vulnerability analyses, appraisal of the social protection system, market assessments, mapping of service providers and regulatory frameworks.
- Systematically analysing risks, severity trends and coping capacities, using a variety of tools and instruments is also essential in order to positioning all actors to better respond to crises when they occur (OCHA 2015);
- Mapping, coordinating and building relationships with relevant institutions such as social protection, finance, planning and DRM ministries, NGOs and private sector companies, and institutionally anchoring some of these approaches with specific standard operating procedures, operational plan annexes, risk-financing instruments, etc.;
- Jointly agreeing contingency plans – at best, this would entail guidance and procedures on which existing social protection programmes or systems to work with in which circumstances and how this would be done, including links to early warning systems, trigger mechanisms and risk-financing strategies;
- Recognising the role of early warning systems for natural as well as man-made shocks (using weather and climate data, meteorological and hydrological data, in-situ and remote data, as well as conflict and displacement data) in preparing for and executing responses;
- Developing agency-specific internal procedures, capacities and systems, and considering how these complement other stakeholders;
- Pre-positioning materials (such as smart cards or public works administration tools) and data – such as unified registries of vulnerable households or Memoranda of Understanding with service providers;
- Pre-enrolling potential beneficiaries (notably, maintaining a live database, or ‘single registry’, of all social assistance beneficiaries and other vulnerable households) – see, for instance, the case of Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme presented in Box 10 below.

Do:

- Build and strengthen social protection systems in stable times, which can continue to operate during crises.
- Ensure that social protection and humanitarian actors work together to develop scenario planning that would model activities and responses based on various severities of crisis.
- Create the necessary coordination mechanisms within government entities, as well as between government, humanitarian and development actors that can meet as soon as the disaster strikes.
- Identify what changes can be introduced to existing social protection programmes ex ante in order that responding to crises can be seamless – this could include pre-crisis targeting and registration, reviewing payment delivery mechanisms, stress-testing existing capacity requirements, etc.
- Catalogue the range of DRM tools that are used for prevention and preparation – such as early warning systems, contingency/preparedness plans, hazard maps, etc. – and interrogate how these could be used by social protection programmes during crises.
- Ensure clarity around which decision-making process is agreed during which crisis and who the ultimate decision maker is.
- Invest in preparing plans for how common programming can be financed and identifying who can finance the programming (or discrete components of the programming), considering donor (development and humanitarian) resources as well as national resource mobilisation and risk-financing instruments.
- Work to offer the government an evidence-based incentivisation package backed by a financing plan to better open up the possibility of including humanitarian caseload into their national system in the future.

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41 Such a live database should be linked with other databases managed by other ministries responsible for their sectors, updated regularly, and managed by the development stakeholders.

42 For instance, between the ministries and other governmental entities in charge on social protection, DRM and emergency responses, finance, planning, etc.
The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in Kenya was designed to provide poor and vulnerable households with regular cash transfers to mitigate the negative effects of drought by smoothing their consumption and avoiding negative coping strategies (such as the sale of productive assets). The HSNP was piloted in Kenya from 2007 to 2013 and reached 69,000 households in four northern counties with a cash transfer payment every two months. Phase 2 of the HSNP ran from 2013 to 2017 and expanded coverage within the same four counties to 100,000 households, which represented about 25 per cent of households in the region.

The Phase 2 design of the HSNP introduced a new component to enable a rules-based rapid response to droughts, to prevent the impact of droughts on poor and vulnerable households. A scalable emergency cash transfer was built for 470,000 households. The scalability component is designed so that if conditions reach severe levels in any given month, an additional (to the regular HSNP caseload) 25 per cent of households in drought-affected areas receive a one-off ‘emergency’ payment. If conditions worsen to extreme levels, then coverage increases to 75 per cent of all households. At maximum capacity, the HSNP could reach up to an additional 180,000 households with periodic emergency payments to help mitigate the effects of a drought.

The programme invested in three main areas to ensure it was prepared to scale up when needed. These were:

- **Triggers** – Significant preparation was done to ensure there were pre-agreed criteria for scaling up that were objective, quantitative and auditable, as this increased the likelihood of the programme being acceptable to potential risk financiers. The ‘triggers’ that would justify a response (of differing magnitude) came from satellite imagery. The Vegetation Condition Index (VCI) was selected as the objective trigger. Agreeing the thresholds for when responses were to take place took considerable discussion between a wide range of stakeholders: practitioners, scientists, politicians and actuaries, among others. The 2015 and 2016 experiences of scaling up the HSNP have demonstrated the ability of the VCI to trigger a rapid response – the triggering data has been available at the end of the month, and payments have been made to beneficiaries 15-16 days later. This compares favourably to the traditional response mechanism, where the assessment of the March to May long rains typically takes place in August, with the first food distribution on the basis of this assessment taking place in September or October.

- **Systems** – To enable the scale-up, prior to the HSNP2 rollout, all the 2,383,235 households in the region were (voluntarily) registered and their details entered into the HSNP Management Information System. This registration exercise took place between December 2012 and June 2013 and was intended to be a census of the population of the four counties. This open registration was a pre-condition to the HSNP’s design and created a database of most households in northern Kenya that could be ranked – whether or not targeted as core HSNP beneficiaries or not. This feature was adopted to enable the programme to both identify recipients of the regular HSNP transfer but also to facilitate the scaling up of cash transfers in response to shocks. When households in the four counties were registered, they were also ‘banked’ (provided with bank accounts) through Equity Bank. Ensuring registered households were banked ensured that additional households could readily be reached in times of need.

- **Financing** – Based on agreeing the objective triggers for when a response should take place, financing was provided by DFID and the Government of Kenya’s policy with the drought insurance scheme African Risk Capacity. Agreeing the sources and channels of financing ahead of the crises has accelerated response times significantly.

Source: Authors, based on NDMA (2016), Otulana et al. (2016) and Sandford et al. (2016).
JOINT VISION, COMPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES AND MULTI-YEAR PROGRAMMING

As crises become more regular and protracted, developing a long-term vision and multi-year programming at the outset is essential. Although multi-year strategies are becoming much more common, for various reasons, these are often not translated into multi-year actions (OCHA 2015). The development of a joint long-term vision and multi-year programming is more likely where there is focus on joint analysis and the development of common objectives.

It is important to ensure joint, multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder assessments and response analyses, which bring together humanitarian and development practitioners. This helps to avoid duplication of effort, leverage specific technical expertise/comparative advantages of particular actors and systems, and encourage programming based on a common understanding of needs and priorities. Unless unfeasible or inappropriate, it is critical for the government to be in the driving seat and to ensure the meaningful involvement of government social protection and DRM actors. Even when a government’s capacity is deemed low, government bodies should be involved and capacitated as much as possible. A response plan with input from both humanitarian and development communities and government adds credibility to the plan, and confidence that risks have been fully considered, and that short, medium and long-term time horizons are embedded in the programme.

In crisis contexts, strategies developed with objectives and outcomes that speak to government, development and humanitarian stakeholders allow for more effective, sustainable responses. A single multi-year strategy encompassing a set of coherent interventions with short and long-term time horizons will support the transition of households along the continuum of humanitarian-development support.

Complementary objectives enable government actors and their development and humanitarian partners to coalesce around a single intervention. They assist all actors to see humanitarian intervention not as a stand-alone activity but as part of a continuum of support to households. By agreeing complementary objectives at the outset of an intervention, implementing agencies can ensure a smooth handover of responsibilities at different stages of the risk cycle, when the emphasis between government/development and humanitarian stakeholders’ responsibility changes.

Do:

> Conduct joint assessment and analysis in partnership with government, where feasible and appropriate, to develop a common understanding of the issues.

> Clarify the risks that are to be covered and who will pay for that risk.

> Generate a shared long-term vision and priority common goal for DG ECHO and DG DEVCO/DG NEAR to inform multi-year programming.

COMPROMISE

Key design decisions in social protection and humanitarian programmes are made based on different priorities. Social protection programmes tend to be designed with scalability and government capacity in mind. They are often developed with political economy considerations at the forefront rather than purely technical data. The underlying approaches to social protection programmes and humanitarian actions may differ. These distinctions lead to very different design priorities.

43 For instance, when government involvement compromises certain humanitarian principles.
44 Indeed, risk-financing instruments, risk assessments, and vulnerable population registry sometimes sit with DRM actors.
45 Humanitarian interventions are never independent of other mechanisms, family or community-based, organised by the state or with support from development cooperation. Any humanitarian intervention needs to understand how it can add value to these processes, even where it is designed as a stand-alone intervention.
For instance, in social protection programmes, technical complexity of design may be sacrificed to achieve delivery at scale; benefit levels are often much lower than those set in humanitarian interventions due to long-term financial sustainability constraints; targeting decisions may be based on considerations of social cohesion and community acceptability, the costs of targeting processes at scale and political economy, rather than being based purely on what poverty and vulnerability data indicates. The design of humanitarian responses tends to be guided by the Sphere Handbook, which offers approaches to programming and a set of universal minimum standards in four life-saving areas of humanitarian responses: water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement and non-food items; and health action. But, the Sphere standards are only aspirational. Putting aside real life-saving interventions, setting the benefit level too high in the quest to meet the Sphere standards, might actually contradict the humanitarian Do No Harm principle and cause harm on the level of equity between disaster-affected populations and other vulnerable populations in the country.

When working with social protection across the humanitarian-development nexus it is important to keep scalability and sustainability in mind. Evidence on social cash transfer schemes reveals that more than the amount of the transfer, it is the regularity, predictability and reliability of the transfer that counts. It also suggests that a transfer pegged at 20 per cent of the consumption level is what leads to meaningful change in people's lives (Davis et al. 2016).

Compromise is therefore essential, between ideal technical approaches and what is appropriate, feasible and affordable from a long-term development and government-ownership perspective. Such compromise requires that decisions on programme design must therefore be made jointly and transparently between a variety of stakeholders including humanitarian, development and government agencies, as well as citizens (as beneficiaries or tax payers) and civil society organisations whenever possible.

**Do:**

- Seek to understand the different priorities underpinning planned emergency responses and longer-term social protection interventions.
- Ensure decisions on programme design are made jointly and transparently.
- Be willing to compromise on design issues, and find the right balance with humanitarian principles.
- Do not get caught up in the quest for technical perfection; keep in mind scalability and long-term affordability.

**PEOPLE AT THE CENTRE**

Social protection is often designed to address chronic needs of populations, but households with chronic needs are often the most likely to need additional, transitory support to meet acute needs during crises. Social protection and humanitarian interventions therefore often aim to reach the same, or similar, populations, with the poorest households disproportionately affected by a crisis. For example, when hurricane Mitch hit Honduras in 1998, poor households lost on average three times more than better-off households, and when Cyclone Aila hit Bangladesh in 2009, 25 per cent of poor households were exposed to the cyclone compared to only 14 per cent of non-poor households (Hallegatte et al. 2016).

Putting people at the centre of design (and implementation) of interventions allows practitioners to more readily identify synergies and efficiencies between humanitarian and social protection interventions. This approach encourages agencies to think about how people can most easily and continuously receive support during fluctuating periods of stability-fragility regardless of the context, institutional mandate, project cycle or delivery mechanisms of individual agencies. Putting peoples’ needs at the centre can bring agencies together to identify comparative advantages and complementarities, and give perspective on what interventions are needed and how they can best be delivered. It can also mean that households’ constraints and opportunities are more effectively taken into account during implementation or can help identify potential social tensions between host countries and displaced people.

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46 For more information on The Sphere Project, please visit http://www.sphereproject.org/
47 Tangible examples include considering challenges around accessibility to registration and enrolment points for all sections of the population or considering the accessibility/usability of new technologies introduced for programme delivery such as ATM cards or mobile money.
Failing to put people at the centre of programmes has resulted in duplication of benefits and ‘breaks’ in benefits in a number of contexts, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

Do:

- Start with people’s needs when designing projects, not the resources or agencies available in government and development/humanitarian partners.
- Agree how agencies can complement each other’s interventions, providing a ‘seamless’ transition of support.

D2. Operations

**OPERATIONAL REALISM, FLEXIBILITY AND SIMPLICITY**

Countries in crisis and those impacted by crises are challenging places to work in. The situation on the ground is often complex and can change quickly and sometimes unpredictably. This demands that practitioners keep programmes simple and build flexibility into responses where possible.

The more complex and multi-dimensional an intervention is, the less likely it is to realise its objectives, be applicable at scale, or be sustained through government systems. ‘Keeping it simple’ implies a need to focus on addressing one main risk for the project and looking for the simplest, most scalable design and delivery approaches. The complexity of a programme should not exceed the capacity of government to take over responsibility once the immediate crisis is over. This emphasises again the importance of developing a shared longer-term vision, which can inform the design of interventions – towards increased complexity or solutions to simplify. Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of national or local institutions should be done in the preparedness phase, as a prerequisite for any intervention to inform the choice of response option, but also to yield capacity-building activities. Where appropriate, intervention ambition should be scaled back if it is clear that its complexity prevents any collaborative intervention with government and humanitarian actors.

Building flexibility into programme operations is also required if support is to continue to reach those in need throughout the course of a crisis. The fluid dynamics of crisis contexts require continual re-assessment and adaptation of strategies and actions. Flexibility may involve changing the ways that the programme is implemented, such as the mode of transfer delivery, how targeting is done, what documentation is needed, or who local partners are – prioritising on specific geographies/instruments, etc.

Do:

- ‘Keep it simple’ in crisis contexts and ensure programmes cohere with local circumstances.
- Be prepared for operations to be flexible, adjust and adapt as the situation changes.
- Review local government capacities before a response to ensure that a collaborative intervention is possible, within the constraints of local authorities.
SYNERGIES AND LINKAGES

Social protection cannot achieve change in the lives of beneficiaries single-handedly. It is an important part of the jigsaw of moving households away from fragility and instability but requires dedicated and pro-actively forged links to other sectors to maximise impact in both crisis and non-crisis situations.

Mounting evidence indicates that the provision of cash (or in-kind transfers) together with other interventions leads to improved household-level impacts compared to cash alone.48 There is therefore increasing attention given to ‘cash-plus’ measures which combine cash transfers with one or more types of complementary support. Types of complementary support can consist of: (i) components that are provided as integral elements of the cash transfer intervention, such as through the provision of additional benefits or in-kind transfers, information or behaviour change communication, or psycho-social support; and (ii) components that are external to the intervention but offer explicit linkages into services provided by other sectors, such as through direct provision of access to services, or facilitating linkages to services (Roelen et al. 2017).

In fragile, conflict-affected and forced displacement situations, the additional needs of target populations may be more complex and slightly different to those of social protection recipients in more stable contexts. For example, crisis-affected populations may have greater need for psychosocial counselling or protection interventions, as well as support to access basic services and livelihood opportunities. Understanding what these additional needs are and how they might best be provided is therefore important.

Various types of additional, complementary support can be provided. These include for example additional benefits or in-kind transfers (such as food or nutrition supplements), information, sensitisation and behaviour change communication (such as parenting advice or information on infant and young child feeding practices), and psychosocial support. These are often provided as an integral part of a programme. Linkages to external support may also be provided through the inclusion of cash transfer beneficiaries in insurance or micro-credit schemes to provide access to health or financial services, or through fee waivers for education or health services or referral to services such as child protection (Roelen et al. 2017).

Programmes may also be designed with logical, sequential pathways between services in mind. In protracted crises in particular, policy and planning linkages between different interventions provide pathways for beneficiaries to move from one programme to another as their needs change and as their reliance on social transfers reduces. It is necessary to adopt a strategic and sequenced approach to interventions that link acute emergencies to chronic emergencies to more development-oriented operations. Having a clear programmatic pathway that enables households affected by crises to transition out of the immediate emergency into more regular, predictable means of support is also necessary.

Do:

> Seek to understand the particular additional needs of affected populations in crisis contexts.

> Explore opportunities for linking social protection programming with other responses and seek to programme in the medium term for a ‘cash plus’ intervention, which is likely to magnify impacts compared to a stand-alone intervention.

> In protracted crises, consider opportunities for designing interventions that offer sequential pathways between programmes and services as needs change.

Beyond cash transfers: Social protection in fragile contexts

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48 See, for instance, Roelen et al. (2017).
PRIORITY AND POLITICAL WILL

Interventions that enable common social protection and humanitarian programming recognise and balance differing incentives. Government ministries and international agencies have different mandates, political authority, influence and expectations regarding short and long-term support for crisis-affected populations. They also have their own incentives and disincentives to work together for common programming. For example, national governments may not want to cede authority to international agencies; the legitimacy-seeking and accountability incentives of governments in crisis-affected countries may be different to those of governments in more stable contexts. In times of crisis, national politics often become magnified, which can broaden or limit the scope for joint interventions. And in contexts of cross-border displacement, broader historical and political factors may come into play. International agencies may have significant financial interests in maintaining a hands-on operational delivery role. They may also wish to get a response operational as early as possible and may prefer to not work with development partners or local or national governments for a host of other reasons – sometimes valid (e.g. when the role of the state is suspect in an armed conflict situation), sometimes questionable (e.g. when based on unfounded negative perceptions about government and development systems, corporate habits, an assumption that humanitarian assistance always delivers better, or a misconception of the humanitarian principle of independence). Recognising that these priorities and incentives exist and managing them at a strategic level will determine the nature of the response options considered feasible and the extent to which there can be common programming. Recognising and neutralising negative incentives between agencies needs to be dealt with at a leadership level and will likely lead to compromises from all stakeholders in the design and operational aspects of an intervention.

Political will is also critical in interventions that enable social protection and humanitarian responses in crisis contexts to work together for common programming. National policies can sometimes be useful entry points to strengthen the necessary political will to operationalise a response. Ethiopia, for example, has national policies on both disaster management and social protection that provide clarity on roles between the sectors as well as clear political champions to drive forward operations and fundraising when needed. Having policies clearly set out ex ante can sometimes minimise negotiation when political concentration is most needed and can provide a national ‘voice’ which donors and practitioners can align behind ex post. Agencies regularly involved with governments in setting up these policies and regulatory frameworks can play a critical role in providing support for integrating these programming areas and offering entry points.

Do:

> Recognise and neutralise wherever possible any negative incentives between the various stakeholders engaged in a response.

> Recognise that in crisis contexts, incentives may be different than in more stable contexts and so the more that can be agreed before a crisis the better any response will be.

49 By way of example, only three per cent of humanitarian resources were channelled through government systems in 2015 (ALNAP 2015).
ENGAGED GOVERNMENT

Independence does not mean no engagement at all with government, but rather, thoughtful and principled engagement. Independence means that any engagement with government needs to have been considered for its potential to compromise the delivery of support in a manner prejudicial to beneficiaries experiencing a crisis. Engaging a government early on in a humanitarian response and, where possible, at all stages of the project cycle, will strengthen its ownership beyond an acute response phase. Such an approach recognises that the state is ultimately legally responsible for its citizens and that social protection is ultimately a state responsibility.

This is becoming a reality, although strong leadership is still required to allow this to flourish. In Mauritania, for example, humanitarian interventions now leverage (and make improvements to) government data and processes to deliver humanitarian support to crisis-affected households, and in Senegal, the National Unique Registry is also being used by humanitarian actors to triangulate and improve their targeting.

For situations of forced displacement where affected populations are non-nationals, the state still has a role in the provision of social protection. The 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees sets out several rights to social protection for refugees, generally obliging states to award the same treatment as to nationals. In states not party to the 1951 Convention, specific regional instruments could apply, as would the obligation of non-discrimination, so that refugees and asylum-seekers are not treated worse than other foreigners in a similar situation. International human rights instruments on non-discrimination, notably the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), also apply in countries not having adopted the 1951 Convention. While their claim is being assessed, asylum seekers often benefit from less extensive access to social protection. While for asylum seekers the right to social protection is dependent on national laws, some argue that once recognised on a prima facie basis as a refugee, asylum seekers should be able to enjoy all the rights granted under the 1951 Convention, including the right to social protection (Long et al. 2017).

Building relationships between practitioners and governments during periods of (relative) stability is important for developing common programming. For example, humanitarian agencies have been working with the authorities in Afghanistan, Burundi, Myanmar and Niger to build their capacity for assessments and delivery methods. This has not only developed common approaches but also contributed to a transparent process for cooperation between humanitarian agencies and government, which has built strong relationships and a high degree of trust.

For the European Commission, a common overarching strategy agreed between a country Delegation and ECHO may facilitate such engagement by enabling Delegations to maintain dialogue with government, communicating policy messages mutually agreed between the Delegation and ECHO field office.

Do:

> Commit to working with (or ideally, through) government structures.

> Invest in relationships with relevant government departments during periods of stability in order to build trust and strong relationships.

50 Some provisions of the 1951 Convention grant equal treatment with other foreigners (for instance, for housing).
SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES

Effective risk-financing strategies and coordination of financing instruments between development programmes and humanitarian financing make common programming a reality. The gap between humanitarian needs and resources is dramatically widening. While humanitarian appeals have shown a 550 per cent increase since 2003 (World Humanitarian Summit Secretariat 2015), donor countries’ contributions remain below the international target set for official development aid.51 There is a need to both relieve the pressure from the international humanitarian financing system and move towards nationally owned, sustainable alternatives wherever feasible and appropriate. It is necessary to develop national (and regional) risk-financing strategies52 that incorporate financing instruments to bridge the gap between traditional development and humanitarian financing instruments is necessary. A risk-financing strategy that separates risks into tiers, to allow for more efficient financing and management of risks, ‘crowds in’ stakeholders (that is, incentivises more stakeholders to be able to say they can resource responses to a particular ‘tier’ of risk). A strategy can also allow for risks to be managed geographically. Similarly, it is necessary to invest in coordination mechanisms and platforms to manage transitions between humanitarian and more sustainable financing; without effective coordination, duplication of resources and interventions is a real threat and can compromise sustainability. Using humanitarian financing to extend or deepen the reach of existing social protection programmes rather than creating parallel projects requires agreements on how resources can be channelled and coordinated to ensure that there is no break in pipelines, for example. Such agreements should be made ex ante although, as always, flexibility is required to ensure that adjustments can be made ex post.

AVAILABLE RESOURCES

Clear definitions of ‘crises’, acceptance of risk by stakeholders and agreed thresholds of risk are pre-conditions to having financing available when needed. There is an increasingly large range of financial instruments that can help manage liabilities stemming from natural disasters and epidemics to a certain degree. Some of these instruments may be relevant for fragile and conflict contexts and displacement situations, though new financing facilities or instruments may need to be created by international financial institutions and donors for this purpose. There is a greater need to explore whether some of the risks associated with conflict and displacement may be managed ex ante, as is now the case with natural disasters. For example, technology (such as satellite imagery on vegetation coverage) is helping to strengthen the credibility of some ‘triggers’ but innovation is also required to introduce new ‘triggers’ for conflict and displacement situations. Layering risks (separating risks into tiers) through different financing instruments means introducing instruments that finance responses for differing magnitudes and frequencies of risk operated at different administrative levels. These new instruments do not make emergency financing mechanisms redundant; rather, they introduce a blend of (smaller) instruments that bridge the gap between current development financing and traditional emergency financing. Having these instruments in place avoids the ‘cliff edge’ associated with the current binary financing framework, where one financing system ceases to operate and another financing system is expected to seamlessly commence operations. In order to have ex ante instruments available, there needs to be clarity among the financiers about the exact risk that is being addressed. Understanding of the exact risk in question enables politicians and financiers to accept that they are responsible for that risk. Once this is achieved, politicians and financiers can agree at what point they become ‘responsible’ for responding to the risk (that is, how much of a deterioration in the context there is before they become liable). Clarifying these critical issues can then form the basis of an agreement to use ex ante financing to respond to crises.

51 The 0.7 per cent of donors’ national income target was first agreed in 1970 and has been repeatedly re-endorsed at the highest level at international aid and development conferences. Globally, only five countries live up to this threshold.
52 A strategy that identifies what, when and how risks and the consequences of residual risks can be managed, through products such as insurance contracts, national or multi-stakeholder pooled funds, contingency reserves, catastrophe bonds, reinsurance options, etc.
Financing for common programming needs to be available for pre-agreed purposes. Ensuring that new financing is quickly available to use in concert with other streams of financing for pre-agreed purposes is both a legal and administrative issue that should be tackled by governments and donors individually as well as together as part of a strategy for preparing and responding.

**Do:**

- Support governments to develop a financing strategy (and risk-financing instruments) that identifies what, when and how crises and the consequences of residual risks can be managed, through different financial instruments and partners’ contributions.
- Before a crisis, agree clear definitions of ‘crises’, establish the stakeholders’ level of acceptance of risk and agree thresholds of risk to ensure financing is available for specific risks.
- Identify legal and administrative blockages (within agencies and within country) that would restrict financing from flowing to common programmes and/or restrict additional donor support.

**D5. Principles of engagement**

**DO NO HARM**

A ‘Do No Harm’ (DNH) approach is important in fragile and conflict-affected situations where already complex operating environments can change rapidly and unpredictably. When considering working with social protection systems and approaches, the DNH principle could be expanded to ensure that households, over the medium to longer term, are not worse off with a stand-alone emergency response than they would have been with a social protection-oriented response, and that equity is maintained between disaster-affected populations and other vulnerable groups. The DNH principle should also apply to the need to do no harm to current and future social protection systems. For example, payment systems and frontline operational staff can become overwhelmed with the rapid and significant increase in demands placed on them in response to crises. Where no social protection programme or system is available and responses are laying the groundwork for future social protection systems, the long-term implications of short-term decisions for the future social protection system must be considered. For example, targeting decisions made in the context of responding to a short-term emergency may influence the future shape of any long-term social protection system.

**Do:**

- Familiarise non-humanitarian actors with the Do No Harm principle.
- Expand the principle to ensure that it covers doing no harm to underlying social protection systems or future social protection systems.

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53 For instance, being granted USD 50 a month over a year might be less useful than being granted USD 15 a month over 10 years.
EVIDENCE-BASED PROGRAMMING

There is not enough evidence about how social protection and humanitarian responses in crisis contexts can most effectively work together for common programming. While experiences to date demonstrate that the approach is valuable, and promising practices are emerging, much more needs to be understood about exactly how to work effectively with social protection systems and approaches in contexts of conflict, fragility and forced displacement in particular. Further detail on these outstanding questions is outlined in E. Jointly agreeing indicators and evidence generation methods from the outset is important, as is a greater emphasis on impartial learning and ‘learning by doing.’

Do:

> Jointly agree indicators and establish approaches that satisfy both humanitarian and development practitioners’ learning needs.

> Push for transparency in data sharing by, and between, government, development and humanitarian actors.
Chapter E

OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS

**KEY MESSAGES**

- Though experiences to date are promising, this topic is relatively new and as such key questions remain unanswered.
- Much of the evidence to date is from relatively stable countries prone to natural disasters.
- An overarching evidence gap exists around exactly how to work with social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts. There is a need to generate broader and deeper evidence on which concrete and generalisable lessons may be drawn. As such, there is a need to invest in quality monitoring and evaluation for all interventions.

Working with social protection systems and approaches in all types of crisis context is a relatively new topic and as such, though promising, the evidence base is still emerging. Research in this area is just moving from the stage of ‘evidence on concepts’ to ‘evidence on design’ rather than evidence on implementation and fine-tuning. Most of the evidence to date comes from countries prone to crises – particularly natural disasters – such as the Horn of Africa and South East Asia. Several questions therefore still need to be answered, each of which requires intensive analysis.

1. **Analysing what works, in which contexts and why**

The key overarching evidence gap is around specifically how to work effectively with social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts. While the evidence to date highlights promising practices and issues to consider in the design and delivery of interventions, there is insufficient experience to generate robust, evidence-based concrete ‘how-to guidance.’ Drawing on experience and evidence from social protection in development contexts can be informative, but generating more experience across different crisis contexts and investing in quality monitoring and evaluation will help build a deeper and broader evidence base on which more concrete, generalisable how-to guidance might be developed. Still, the generation of ‘generalisable’ lessons may be even more difficult in crisis contexts overall, as different crises have many different underlying drivers.

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54 There is a good argument for ensuring that all actors seeking to work with social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts have training and technical support on the fundamental building blocks of social protection in development situations.
2. Comparing social-protection-focused interventions to stand-alone humanitarian responses

The theoretical advantages of working with social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts, compared to a stand-alone humanitarian response, are clear. Programmatic evidence to date also generally tends to support the rationale. However, there is not yet a robust evidence base which systematically compares the short and long-term benefits, including cost-benefits, of this approach compared to a stand-alone humanitarian response; and there are also no globally agreed indicators which define what a ‘better’ response looks like (O’Brien et al. 2018c). Investment in comparative analysis would help to verify or refute the theoretical arguments and, importantly, generate evidence on how, why and in what specific situations working with social protection systems and approaches in crisis contexts is preferable to parallel, short-term responses.

3. Assessing social protection instruments beyond social assistance

Most experience of working with social protection in crisis contexts to date is with social assistance and particularly social (cash) transfers. As social protection systems evolve, so that social insurance, social care services and active labour market programmes reach larger sections of the population, it will be important to explore how these might be used in crisis contexts and invest in robust monitoring and evaluation to broaden the evidence base.

4. Understanding how political economy influences options and outcomes

The politics of social protection fundamentally shape the available options and outcomes. Although a body of literature exists for understanding the politics of social protection in development contexts, less is known about how the political dynamics in fragile, conflict-affected and forced displacement situations affect the options available. For example, it would be helpful to understand more about how ex post and ex ante political dynamics around refugees and asylum seekers influence the possibilities for the future shape of social protection provision to displaced people. Understanding more about such dynamics would help inform guidance as to how to work effectively with the political context to maximise social protection provision to these populations. In parallel, investigating how the political economy of humanitarian and development aid influences decisions to work with social protection across the humanitarian-development nexus can help identify further opportunities and bottlenecks to make progress towards international commitments and usefully inform debates around aid architecture.
5. Reviewing the range of financial instruments available for common programming

While significant strides have been made in breaking down silos between traditional humanitarian and development financing,\(^{55}\) it would be valuable to complete a more comprehensive review of the examples, and consider the appropriateness and adequacy of these financial instruments. A basic review of the existing instruments, exploring the bureaucratic, legal, administrative and technical advantages and disadvantages of these, as well as their applicability in different contexts, would be of benefit to all international actors seeking to bring about closer alignment between humanitarian and development programming.

6. Understanding whether and how social protection can address conflict and fragility and support state building

The theoretical rationale for the role of social protection, and service delivery more generally, in addressing conflict, fragility and state building is strong. The links between poverty, vulnerability, unrest and extremism are well articulated. In fragile and conflict-affected settings, social protection, such as veterans’ pensions, is often introduced to support the legitimacy of government and contribute to social cohesion. Official development assistance to fragile states has tended to reflect this ‘received wisdom’ that investing in service delivery can contribute to reducing conflict and fragility and building state legitimacy (Nixon and Mallet 2017). However, the empirical evidence base for this argument is emergent. The evidence that does exist does not point conclusively and simply in one direction. One issue of concern is the evidence that badly delivered social protection can lead to negative perceptions of government.\(^{56}\) While there is a growing recognition that how services are delivered shapes the extent to which they positively or negatively influence perceptions of state legitimacy, and that this in turn influences conflict and fragility, more research is required to deepen this understanding.

7. Assessing how social protection affects decisions to migrate and to return

While current evidence indicates that the availability and accessibility of social protection influences decisions to move within countries or across borders, the evidence does not point in any one direction (that is, the availability of social protection decreasing or increasing the propensity to migrate) and most of the evidence is generated from non-crisis contexts.\(^{57}\) It would be helpful to understand more about how the availability, accessibility and nature of social protection provision in crisis countries and in receiving countries influences decisions to migrate and to return (Long and Sabates-Wheeler 2017).

\(^{55}\) A good example could be the German “Transitional Development Assistance (TDA)” – a unique instrument, with its own budget line, which creates a bridge between short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term development cooperation focused on sustainability. The goal of transitional development assistance is to strengthen the resilience of individuals, local communities, civil society actors and state institutions, especially in situations of conflict and protracted crises. If well connected with humanitarian cash-based interventions and embedded in a (financing) strategy for long-term bilateral development cooperation, transitional development assistance can become a meaningful driver for and contributor to sustainable system building.

\(^{56}\) See, for instance, Nixon and Mallet (2017), whose findings are based on a review of the delivering services and perception of the state using a five-country panel survey conducted as part of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (https://securelivelihoods.org/).

\(^{57}\) See, for instance, Hagen-Zanker et al. (2012) and Schüring et al. (2017).
Social protection in humanitarian situations
Duration: 00:02:57
https://www.unicef-irc.org/video/?videoid=gthfmluYJq4

Generating evidence in fragile settings
Duration: 00:03:33
https://www.unicef-irc.org/video/?videoid=8M9sUZm42Wo

Workshop on evidence on social protection in contexts of fragility and forced displacement

New urban landscapes: social protection for refugee and displaced people
Duration: 00:02:55
https://www.unicef-irc.org/video/?videoid=XKXGbqzinzM
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ANNEX 1

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

BELOW ARE SELECTED DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS, AS USED IN THIS PAPER.

Adaptive social protection was, at the outset, conceptualised as ‘a series of measures which aim to build resilience of the poorest and most vulnerable people to climate change by combining elements of social protection, disaster risk reduction and climate change’ (Arnall et al. 2010 cited in World Bank 2018). Since then, it has come to be understood as entailing the need to better adapt social protection to all types of shocks (World Bank 2018).

Cash-for-work refers to payments provided on the condition of undertaking designated work. This is generally paid according to time worked (e.g. number of days, daily rate), but may also be quantified in terms of outputs (e.g. number of items produced, cubic metres dug). Cash-for-work interventions are usually in public or community work programmes, but can also include home-based and other forms of work (CaLP 2017).

Cash Plus refers to complementary programming where cash transfers are combined with other modalities or activities. Complementary interventions may be implemented by the same agency/agencies providing cash transfers, or potentially by other agencies working in collaboration. Examples might include provision of training and/or livelihood inputs, or behavioural change communication programmes (CaLP 2017).

Cash transfers are direct, regular and predictable transfers that raise and smooth incomes to reduce poverty and vulnerability. How to spend unconditional cash transfers is for the beneficiary to decide. Conditional cash transfers are given with the requirement that the beneficiary meets certain conditions – often related to human capital development, such as visiting a health clinic or ensuring children go to school (Browne 2015).

Commodity vouchers are exchanged for a fixed quantity and quality of specified goods or services at participating vendors. Commodity vouchers share some similarities with in-kind aid in that they restrict and specify the assistance received, but it is accessed at local markets through traders (CaLP 2017).

Conditionality refers to prerequisite or qualifying conditions that a beneficiary must fulfil to receive a cash transfer or voucher – that is, activities or obligations that must be fulfilled before receiving assistance. It is distinct from restriction, which pertains only to how transfers are used. Conditionality can in principle be used with any kind of cash, voucher or other type of assistance, depending on its objectives and design (CaLP 2017).

Conditional transfers require beneficiaries to undertake a specific action/activity (e.g. attend school, build a shelter, attend nutrition screenings, undertake work, etc.) to receive assistance – that is, a condition must be fulfilled before the transfer is received. Cash-for-work/assets/training are all forms of conditional transfers (CaLP 2017).

Delivery mechanism refers to the means of delivering a cash or voucher transfer (e.g. smart card, mobile money transfers, cash in envelopes, etc.) (CaLP 2017).

Disaster risk reduction means, according to the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, ‘actions taken to reduce the risk of disasters and the adverse impacts of natural hazards, through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causes of disasters, including through avoidance of hazards, reduced social and economic vulnerability to hazards, and improved preparedness for adverse events’ (European Commission 2012).

Effectiveness relates to how well outputs are converted to outcomes and impacts (e.g. reduction in poverty gap and inequality, improved nutrition, reduction in school dropout, increased use of health services, asset accumulation by the poor, increased smallholder productivity, social cohesion) (White et al. 2015).
Efficiency refers to the ability of a programme to achieve its intended objectives at the least cost possible in terms of use of inputs (i.e. capital, labour and other inputs) (White et al. 2015).

Modality refers to the form of assistance (e.g. cash transfer, vouchers, in-kind, service delivery, or a combination). This can include both direct transfers at household level, and assistance provided at a more general or community level, such as health services or WASH (water supply, sanitation and hygiene) infrastructure (CaLP 2017).

Multi-purpose cash grants (MPG) or Multi-purpose cash assistance (MCA) are defined as a transfer (either regular or one-off) corresponding to the amount of money a household needs to cover, fully or partially, a set of basic and/or recovery needs. They are by definition unrestricted cash transfers. The MPG/MCA can contribute to meeting a Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) or other calculation of the amount required to cover basic needs, but can also include other one-off or recovery needs (CaLP 2017).

Public works programmes provide jobs on infrastructure projects for cash or food. They are sometimes classified as labour market interventions, depending on whether their function is primarily poverty alleviation, job creation, or social protection (Browne 2015).

Shock-responsive social protection is a term used to bring focus on shocks that affect a large proportion of the population simultaneously (covariate shocks). It encompasses the adaptation of routine social protection programmes and systems to cope with changes in context and demand following large-scale shocks. This can be ex ante by building shock-responsive systems, plans and partnerships in advance of a shock to better prepare for emergency response; or ex post, to support households once the shock has occurred. In this way, social protection can complement and support other emergency response interventions (O’Brien et al. 2018b).

Social assistance is the direct, regular and predictable transfer of cash or in-kind resources transfers poor and vulnerable individuals or households. It is usually provided by the state and financed by national taxes. Support from donors is also important in lower-income contexts (Browne 2015).

Social care services refer to non-cash interventions such as family support services to prevent family breakdown, child protection services to respond to abuse and neglect, alternative care for children, and social work support to people with disabilities. The importance of psychosocial support in such circumstances is recognised in some quarters (OPM 2017).

Social insurance schemes are contributory programmes where participants make regular payments to a scheme that will cover costs related to life-course events (e.g. maternity, unemployment or illness). Sometimes costs are matched or subsidised by the scheme provider. Social insurance includes: contributory pensions; health, unemployment, or disaster insurance; and funeral assistance. It can be provided formally through a bank or employer, or informally through a community-based pooled fund. Social insurance is strongly linked to the formal labour market – meaning coverage is often limited to formal workers (Browne 2015).

Social protection system can be defined as ‘a policy and legislative framework for social protection, including the budget framework, together with the set of specific social protection programmes and their corresponding implementation mechanisms. ‘Systematisation’ represents the idea that social protection instruments can be integrated into a more comprehensive system of policies and programmes that not only tackle poverty and vulnerability over the life cycle, but also strengthen pro-poor and inclusive economic growth and social development.’ (European Commission 2015b)

Safety nets (or social safety nets) target the poor or vulnerable and consist of non-contributory transfers, such as in-kind food, cash or vouchers; they can be provided conditionally or unconditionally. They are a sub-set of broader social protection systems (CaLP 2017). The term was introduced to refer to a temporary measure to catch those who were transiently made vulnerable through structural adjustment and liberalisation (e.g. transfers to households or subsidy programmes). The term ‘(social) safety net’ is now widely used, sometimes with different meanings. There is no commonly agreed definition of this terminology, and actors may use it to refer to protective social transfer projects ensuring a minimum level of income (as per the original definition), or (humanitarian) cash transfer projects, or social transfer schemes developed within a broader social protection system (guaranteeing a long-term institutionalised social protection) (European Commission 2012).

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1 All social protection interventions are in some sense shock-responsive, in that they deal ex ante or ex post with chronic or sudden events that negatively affect households’ livelihoods. However, most social protection is designed to support households experiencing shocks as a result of life-cycle events such as a loss of jobs, illness or death (idiosyncratic shocks).

2 There is an effort to steer away from this narrow definition to mean social protection or social assistance as a long-term development tool.
Social transfers refer to non-contributory, publicly funded, direct, regular and predictable resource transfers (in cash or in kind) to poor and vulnerable individuals or households, aimed at reducing their deficits in consumption, protecting them from shocks (including economic and climatic shocks), and, in some cases, strengthening their productive capacity (European Commission 2012).

Unconditional transfers are provided to beneficiaries without the recipient having to do anything in return to receive the assistance (CaLP 2017).

Value for Money refers to the optimal use of resources to achieve the best outcomes for people affected by crisis and disaster (White et al. 2015).

Value vouchers have a denominated cash value and can be exchanged with participating vendors for goods or services of an equivalent monetary cost. Value vouchers tend to provide relatively greater flexibility and choice than commodity vouchers, but are still necessarily restricted as they can only be exchanged with designated vendors (CaLP 2017).

Vouchers are paper, token or e-vouchers that can be exchanged for a set quantity or value of goods, denominated either as a cash value (e.g. USD 15) or predetermined commodities or services (e.g. 5 kilos of maize; milling of 5 kilos of maize), or a combination of value and commodities. They are redeemable with preselected vendors or in ‘fairs’ created by the agency. Vouchers are used to provide access to a range of goods or services, at recognised retail outlets or service centres. Vouchers are by default a restricted form of transfer, although there are wide variations in the degree of restriction/flexibility different voucher-based programmes may provide. The terms vouchers, stamps, or coupons are often used interchangeably (CaLP 2017).
ANNEX 2

RELEVANT POLICY COMMITMENTS

GLOBAL COMMITMENTS

- The Sustainable Development Goals to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all include:
  - Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere, which Target 1.3 is to ‘Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.’

- The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit Grand Bargain commitments include:
  - Commitment 2: More support and funding tools for local and national responders: Increase and support multi-year investment in the institutional capacities of local and national responders...especially in fragile contexts...Make greater use of funding tools which increase and improve assistance delivered by local and national responders.
  - Commitment 3: Increase the use and coordination of cash-based programming. This includes commitments to use, link or align with local and national mechanisms such as social protection systems.
  - Commitment 10: Enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors. Working collaboratively across institutional boundaries based on comparative advantage...increase social protection programmes and strengthen national and local systems and coping mechanisms in order to build resilience in fragile contexts.

- The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2016, calls to improve the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to those countries most affected and, where appropriate, develop national strategies for the protection of refugees within the framework of national social protection systems, as appropriate. It lays the foundation for the development of a global compact on refugees, which is to be proposed by the High Commissioner for Refugees for consideration by the General Assembly in 2018.

- Recommendation 205 concerning employment and decent work for peace and resilience, adopted by the International Labour Conference in June 2017, recognises the need to promote decent work, social protection and employment opportunities for refugees and host communities.

- Recommendation 202 concerning national floors of social protection, adopted by the International Labour Conference in June 2012, reaffirms the right to social protection for all.

- The Joint statement of the members of the Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board (SPIAC-B) to the World Humanitarian Summit calls on governments, development and humanitarian actors to:
  - In extreme fragility and protracted crises, invest in the development of ‘nascent’ safety nets or social assistance delivery mechanisms, while further strengthening and developing technical and analytical capacity at national and sub-national levels; and
  - In contexts of forced displacement, strengthen the effective reach and design of social protection systems to mitigate forced displacement due to shocks and crises and ensure that host communities, IDPs and refugees are equitably assisted in the event of crises.
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COMMITMENTS

• The New European Consensus on Development (2017/C 210/01) acknowledges the role of social protection in providing a strong foundation for sustainable development and recognises its contribution to addressing inequality, preventing extreme poverty and building resilience.

• The European Agenda on Migration (COM(2015) 240) and the new Partnership Framework with third countries under the Agenda announced a new fund for external investments for leveraging additional funds from Member States and other donors. Investment in social infrastructure, which may include social protection administrative structures and instruments, is mentioned in particular.

• The Joint Communication on a Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action, (JOIN (2017) 21) and the Council conclusion of 13/11/2017 recognise ‘the need to move away from crisis containment to a more structural, long-term, non-linear approach to vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on anticipation, prevention and preparedness […]. The traditional linear division of labour between humanitarian aid and development cooperation has been changing […] The EU should […] prioritise and enhance close cooperation of EU political, humanitarian and development actors on protracted crises and protracted displacement, while respecting the distinct mandates established by the Treaties, and humanitarian principles.’

• The Communication on Forced Displacement and Development (COM(2016) 234), the Council conclusions of 12/05/2016 and the accompanying staff working document call for greater synergies between humanitarian and development actors regarding shared analysis, programming and flexible funding fostering self-reliance. The Communication describes social protection as imperative for empowering the forcibly displaced and giving them long-term, regular and predictable support to address chronic vulnerability. Investments in information-sharing systems and tracking of benefits, as well as contingency and finance planning between EU humanitarian and development actors and public authorities are identified as crucial.

• The Action Plan on the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SWD(2016) 205) recommends, within Key Area 4 on the development of a holistic disaster risk management approach, support to ‘the long term development and neighbourhood assistance programmes in prevention, preparedness, early warning system and risk information capacity building activities, including through the support of appropriate social safety net mechanism and social protection systems.’

• The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) for the period 2014-2020 (Regulation (EU) 235/2014), in its article 1 (b-xii) concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, promotes ‘economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to an adequate standard of living and core labour standards.’

• The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) for the period 2014-2020 (Regulation (EU) 233/2014), covering the geographical and thematic programmes, defines decent work as a cross-cutting issue (Art. 3 point 3), which in the Agenda for Change (COM(2011) 637) is formulated as a need to support the decent work agenda, social protection schemes and floors.

• The Communication on Social Protection in EU Development Cooperation (COM(2012) 446) and the related Council Conclusion advocate, in particular, the development of nationally owned social protection systems requiring the common pursuit of the values and interests of the stakeholders concerned. The Communication also affirms the EU rights-based approach to social protection.

• The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (2008/C 25/01) states that ‘humanitarian aid and development cooperation […] will be used in a coherent and complementary fashion especially in transitional contexts and situations of fragility, in order to use the full potential of short- and long-term aid and cooperation.’ It goes on to state, ‘it is important to ensure that humanitarian, development and other relevant aid instruments work better together, in particular in situations of fragility and where communities are seeking to recover from the effects of crisis.’
ANNEX 3
COMPARING SOCIAL PROTECTION INSTRUMENTS

The table below outlines, for each of the four main types of social protection instruments considered in this note (social assistance, social insurance, ALMP and social care services), the enabling factors, advantages, disadvantages and risks, as well as considerations for using them in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCAS) and contexts of forced displacement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Enablers</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages and risks</th>
<th>Implications in fragile and conflict-affected situations</th>
<th>Additional implications in contexts of forced displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social assistance</td>
<td>- Programmes with high coverage</td>
<td>- Provides ready mechanism for much-needed injection of resources into households after a crisis</td>
<td>- Common misperceptions around social transfers being non-productive or misused or being captured for patronage purposes or administrative misuse may be a barrier to scale-up in a crisis, when additional communications with communities are needed</td>
<td>- Programme infrastructure – e.g. payment systems, offices, and staff may be affected by the crisis</td>
<td>- Personal identification or other necessary administrative requirement may not be available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- State-led, robust administrative systems</td>
<td>- Relatively simple to scale up</td>
<td>- Potential risk of community tension in areas where social cohesion is already weak, if implementation not done well</td>
<td>- Physical access to beneficiaries may be difficult (for monitoring, auditing or other project element)</td>
<td>- If displacement is cross-border, complications may arise in delivery, enforcement or audit of transfers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- One or a variety of reliable payment delivery mechanisms and service providers that can access territories</td>
<td>- Often relatively high coverage</td>
<td>- Personal identification or other necessary administrative requirement may not be available</td>
<td>- Inclusion of new beneficiaries could be an issue in conflicts where government role is suspect</td>
<td>- Support may be required for host communities and relations with host communities must be handled sensitively to avoid creating resentment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Good management information systems and biometrics for identification (that can cut down on fraud and corruption)</td>
<td>- May, if implemented well, strengthen social contract between state and citizen</td>
<td>- National subsidy programmes (e.g. food, fuel) often do not benefit the most vulnerable</td>
<td>- The portability of new technologies means that remote payments can be made, addressing access issues</td>
<td>- May be difficult to link to national systems where the government is the source of forced displacement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Strong linkages with post-crisis recovery that uses transfers</td>
<td>- National programmes that are often highly fragmented result in duplication, corruption and inefficiencies</td>
<td>- Providing a digital identity and facilitating access to financial services can strengthen the status of displaced people and facilitate access to national systems</td>
<td>- Benefits may not be portable for internally displaced and refugee families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Pre-existing links to those already identified as ‘in need’</td>
<td>- National programmes in inaccessible areas</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Providing a digital identity and facilitating access to financial services can strengthen the status of displaced people and facilitate access to national systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Enablers</td>
<td>Advantages</td>
<td>Disadvantages and risks</td>
<td>Implications in fragile and conflict-affected situations</td>
<td>Additional implications in contexts of forced displacement</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **Social insurance** | · Well-functioning, highly automated schemes with high total coverage, particularly amongst less wealthy sections of population  
· Strong, comprehensive supply of services and benefit providers  
· Strong and objective enforcement and decision-making bodies  
· One or a variety of reliable payment delivery mechanisms and service providers that can access territories, including through a functioning private sector  
· People’s understanding about investing in social insurance schemes to manage life-cycle shocks | · Clarity about who will benefit  
· Clarity about when they will benefit  
· Clarity about what the benefits are  
· Often highly automated, relatively well functioning schemes with electronic payment systems  
· Designed to offer a predictable response to life-cycle shocks | · Coverage typically only for formal sector  
· Poorest and most vulnerable usually excluded because of their lack of income to contribute (middle class instrument)  
· Informal workers do not benefit from state-led schemes  
· Many countries have well-functioning public service schemes and poorly functioning private sector employee schemes  
· Most affected people may not be reached  
· Need a large pool of both poorer and better-off participants to ensure the economic stability of the scheme (e.g. be careful not to only target the poorest / most vulnerable who are in the worst position to contribute) | · Verification of who benefits, when they should benefit and what the benefits are, can be difficult in FCAS contexts  
Social insurance schemes in FCAS in particular tend to have low coverage, and these schemes are some of the first to be cut by national budgets during crisis  
Social insurance schemes may be relevant for piggybacking or as service provider for social transfers through their technical infrastructure and staff capacity | · Accessibility and portability of benefits for those displaced across borders is a challenge  
· Personal identification or other necessary admin requirement/proof of entitlement may not be available  
· The ability of displaced people to pay into systems rapidly tails off after their initial movement  
Better to use for protracted displacement in tandem with building up the income-earning capacity of families, typically kick-starting with subsidised access and decreasing this with time  
· In richer countries with functioning social insurance systems, access may already be guaranteed by law; key efforts here are to help people understand and acquire their rights |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Additional implications in contexts of forced displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Active labour market programmes | · Thriving private sector  
· Acceptance of entrepreneurs  
· Locally accepted labour movement  
· No or few restrictions on access to labour market for displaced groups  
· Properly set up labour laws and policies between the government, employers and trade unions adhering to international standards  
· Economic growth and poverty reduction plans that provide the blueprint for strengthening economic and labour opportunities at national and local level  
· Specific to public works programmes:  
  · Programmes with high coverage  
  · State-led, robust administrative systems | · Integrate crisis-affected households into communities, where lack of access to jobs is a key driver of conflict  
· Aim to restore normality as quickly as possible and to relieve dependence on social transfers  
· Can absorb labour supply where supply is high  
· Can increase supply where demand is high  
· Can (re)build community assets, restoring some normality  
· Are a key post-conflict action particularly for youth, reintegrating conflict parties back into society, and countering violent extremism  
· Are a key pre-requisite for people to participate in and benefit from social insurance health and work schemes  
· Specific to public works programmes:  
  · Can (re)build community assets, restoring some normality  
  · Provide ready mechanism for much-needed injection of resources into households after a crisis  
  · Relatively simple to scale up  
  · Often relatively high coverage  
  · May, if implemented well, strengthen social contract between state and citizen  
  · Strong linkages with post-crisis recovery that uses transfers  
  · Pre-existing links to those already identified as ‘in need’  
  · Can promote integration and normalisation  
  · Overcome some community concerns around dependency | · Usually formal labour programmes are difficult to support in conflict situations  
· Formal labour markets often not functioning in crisis contexts, with people turning to informal labour markets  
· Informal labour does not open up access to state-led and private-sector led schemes and benefits  
· Local labour dynamics need careful attention to ensure Do No Harm and that all vulnerable groups benefit  
· Need to match the demand side (people have skills and can access opportunities) with supply-side dynamics (work is available, labour markets are active)  
· Specific to public works programmes: for community assets to be useful, need to be linked with local planning processes (development plan, watershed plan, etc.) | · Formal labour markets often first thing to suffer in FCAS  
Specific to public works programmes:  
· Materials for public works programmes: can (re)build community assets, restoring some normality  
· Provide ready mechanism for much-needed injection of resources into households after a crisis  
· Relatively simple to scale up  
· Often relatively high coverage  
· May, if implemented well, strengthen social contract between state and citizen  
· Strong linkages with post-crisis recovery that uses transfers  
· Pre-existing links to those already identified as ‘in need’  
· Can promote integration and normalisation  
· Overcome some community concerns around dependency | · Focus on portability of skills  
· Consider portability in other ALMP activities  
· Help to assist in the certification of skills/ qualifications and information on rights and work that can be accessed  
· Need to work on joint ‘displaced-host family’ labour and business opportunities to promote social cohesion and out-of-camp initiatives  
· Often restrictions on access to the formal labour market for displaced groups, linked to the Right to Work, and the Right to Move (need to provide evidence base on how displaced people and the aid money they bring in, is a local economy multiplier)  
· Responsible support to skills and diversifying work opportunities can prepare people to return or find a dignified solution to displacement |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Enablers</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages and risks</th>
<th>Implications in fragile and conflict-affected situations</th>
<th>Additional implications in contexts of forced displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Social care services | · Appropriately trained and skilled human resources in social care available  
· Physical infrastructure for social service provision available  
· Consistent physical access to affected populations  
· Identification and monitoring of indicators that correlate with an impending increase in demand, agreed thresholds for triggering scale-up and scale-down  
· A pre-agreed package of support included in contingency plans  
· Key focus on the needs of the family, women and other key vulnerable groups | · Address non-monetary effects of crisis that affect people over long terms  
· Offer crises affected populations frequently needed physical, emotional, and psychosocial support in addition to basic needs  
· Provide international protection-related services to the national population  
· A strategic part of national systems for addressing gender issues and women’s empowerment  
· Bundle together a range of support services for different vulnerable groups under a common structure | · Often a relatively under-resourced area of service delivery in normal times and development contexts  
· Offer crises affected populations frequently needed physical, emotional, and psychosocial support in addition to basic needs  
· Provide international protection-related services to the national population  
· A strategic part of national systems for addressing gender issues and women’s empowerment  
· Bundle together a range of support services for different vulnerable groups under a common structure | · Physical access may be a problem  
· Pre-existing issues and documentation of personal history may be missing  
· Supply-side constraints  
· Data privacy issues need to be carefully managed  
· Increased demands for services due to the social impacts of conflict | · Cultural, social and language differences in cross-border displacement  
· Pre-existing issues and documentation of personal history likely to be missing  
· Supply-side constraints  
· Need to be aware of risks of transferring sensitive humanitarian protection-related data to national services |
ANNEX 4

COMPARING RESPONSE OPTIONS

The table below outlines, for each of the main ways in which social protection (SP) systems can be used to respond to crises identified by O’Brien et al. (2018c) and introduced in Chapter C, prerequisites/enablers, advantages, disadvantages, risks to be aware of, and considerations in tackling most contexts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Option</th>
<th>Prerequisites/Enablers</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
<th>Risks to be Aware of</th>
<th>Considerations in Tackling Most Contexts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cash Assistance</td>
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<td>In-kind Support</td>
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<td>Conditional Allocations</td>
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<td>Universal Programs</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Prerequisites and enablers</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
<th>Risks to be aware of</th>
<th>Implications in fragile, conflict-affected situations and contexts of forced displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design tweaks</td>
<td>i.e. minor changes to design or implementation processes that allow existing programmes to better support responses – tweaks can be introduced ex post or ex ante</td>
<td>- Strong, mature SP programme in place</td>
<td>- Ex ante tweaks may be quick and cost-effective way to reach some of those in need of assistance, as beneficiaries already identified and programme infrastructure already in place</td>
<td>- Tweaking the systems of long-term programmes can create misunderstanding of the humanitarian programme objectives</td>
<td>- Possible in FCAS where some institutions and systems exist but maybe less relevance in those FCAS where SP is not yet well developed</td>
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<td>- Strong and quick programme decision-making authority to approve design tweaks</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Systems being tweaked ex post risk being overwhelmed, impacting on the long-term SP system</td>
<td>- Conflict can mean government faces challenges in continuing to implement the regular SP programme (donor funds suspended, dangers to staff implementing programme) or that markets for goods and services are affected</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Good coverage of the geographical areas affected by the disaster, and of households affected by the crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Tweaking programmes may reduce clarity of the underlying programme’s core objectives and possibly even reduce popular or political support</td>
<td>Working through administrative staff of state programme could support access in insecure areas, or it may create barriers if government associated with the conflict</td>
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<td>- Clear understanding of who is can be affected by the shock and that SP beneficiaries are can be affected</td>
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<td>- May create confusion amongst beneficiaries about objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Preparedness plan in place showing feasibility of modality</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Delays in executing the tweaks may delay assistance and reduce the impact of support</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Response analysis shows present modality is feasible to provide in the crisis and is appropriate to support needs due to the crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Increased burden of labour for administrative staff (depending on nature of the tweak) can undermine the long-term programme</td>
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<td>- Robust administrative systems with good capacity to deliver timely and accurate payments</td>
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</table>
### Piggybacking on existing programmes or systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Prerequisites and enablers</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
<th>Risks to be aware of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|                       | - Some level of development of SP programme, with some strong and robust administrative systems or institutions that the intervention can build on  
  - Some coverage of the underlying SP programme in the geographic areas affected, so that the administrative systems and institutions have a presence in these locations  
  - Clear understanding of who is affected by the shock and characteristics of vulnerability                                                                                                                               | - Can make use of some existing systems and institutions for time and cost savings – but only those that are strong enough and relevant for an emergency response  
  - Can avoid any limiting factors inherent in the design of an existing SP programme (e.g. transfer value, payment schedule)  
  - May be more politically acceptable to host governments as it avoids diluting the ‘brand’ of a specific programme  
  - Can be implemented by different actors to those responsible for the core system or programme, working within their own political mandates and administrative structures  
  - Useful in contexts where humanitarian funds cannot be transferred to government  
  - May work well in situations where implementers already have a relationship with existing programmes                                                                                                                     | - May be time consuming and complex to assess and identify which system components to use and to train staff in the processes of emergency response  
  - Weaknesses of the underlying system may be transferred to the emergency programme (e.g. errors in beneficiary lists or household data, delays, staff capacity, etc.)  
  - Need to secure agreement of the implementers of the core programme to make use of these systems and institutions, which can take time post-disaster  
  - Increased coordination with multiple organisations and agencies required                                                                                                                                     | - Systems being piggybacked on risk being overwhelmed, impacting on the long-term SP system  
  - Lack of coordination between humanitarian actors may lead to competition and confusion – about which agencies piggyback on the systems, and for which needs  
  - Piggybacking on the systems of long-term programmes can create misunderstanding of the humanitarian programme objectives                                                                                           | - Possible in FCAS where some institutions and systems exist; can help to maintain some of these systems during a crisis  
  - Conflict can mean government faces challenges in continuing to implement SP systems (e.g. lack of funds for staff, dangers to staff implementing programme)  
  - Can be an option for working with and supporting existing national systems where donors cannot fund state actors due to the crisis  
  - Working through administrative staff of state programmes could support access in insecure areas, or create barriers if government associated with the conflict  
  - Refugees unlikely to be well represented in any existing SP beneficiary lists or registries for citizens; rather requires access to specific registries of refugee data  
  - Staff, institutions and processes of the SP system need to be accessible to and able to communicate with refugees/IDPs                                                                                      |
## Annexes

### Prerequisites and enablers

**Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vertical expansion</th>
<th>i.e. increase in benefits to existing beneficiaries</th>
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</table>

- Strong, mature SP programme in place
- Good coverage of the geographical areas affected by the disaster, and of households affected by the crisis
- Clear understanding of who is affected by the shock and that SP beneficiaries are affected
- Response analysis shows present modality is feasible to provide in the crisis and is appropriate to support needs due to the crisis
- Robust administrative systems with good capacity to deliver timely and accurate payments

### Advantages

- Proven potential to be quick and cost-effective way to reach some of those in need of assistance, as beneficiaries already identified and programme infrastructure already in place

### Disadvantages

- Will exclude those affected by the crisis but not enrolled in the programme
- Determining the size of the top-up can be complex (which humanitarian needs to support; whether or not to match other parallel emergency assistance for the same needs)
- Additional resources for making additional payments (staff, equipment, finances)
- Payment systems and staff may have been impacted by the crisis
- Beneficiaries may have lost their ID or programme registration cards during the crisis
- Inclusion and exclusion errors in the programme beneficiary list may mean the programme does not actually reach who it is designed to reach
- Administrative processes may not be the best design for providing emergency assistance (e.g. timing of payments, use of conditions)
- May be difficult to explain to communities why SP beneficiaries are getting even more assistance while affected non-beneficiaries receive nothing

### Risks to be aware of

- Not reaching a percentage of those affected unless there is strong coordination with other actors providing similar responses to non-beneficiaries
- Top-up may lead to negative impact on people’s perceptions of the generosity of the regular programme
- Increased burden of labour for administrative staff (especially those involved in payments) can undermine the long-term programme

### Implications in fragile, conflict-affected situations and contexts of forced displacement

- Less relevance in those FCAS where SP is not yet well developed
- Conflict can mean government faces challenges in continuing to implement the regular SP programme (donor funds suspended; dangers to staff implementing programme) or that markets for goods and services are affected
- Working through administrative staff of state programme could support access in insecure areas, or create barriers if government associated with the conflict
- In new crises, refugees unlikely to be well represented in beneficiary lists; in protracted crises potentially, if refugees are eligible to access SP
- Movement of IDPs may require updating of administrative records before payments can be made
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Prerequisites and enablers</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
<th>Risks to be aware of</th>
<th>Implications in fragile, conflict-affected situations and contexts of forced displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Horizontal expansion | - Strong, mature SP programme in place  
- Robust administrative processes and systems, with capacity to rapidly and accurately identify and enrol new cases  
- Good coverage in the geographic areas affected, or capacity to rapidly expand into these  
- Clear understanding of who is affected by the shock and availability of accurate data for the identification of new beneficiaries  
- Response analysis shows present modality is feasible to provide in the crisis and is appropriate to support needs due to the crisis  
- Capacity of the programme and of any complementary services connected with the programme (e.g. social welfare, education and health in case of conditional cash transfers) to manage a bigger caseload | - Potential to be quick and cost-effective way to reach some of those in need of assistance, as programme infrastructure already in place (and in some cases vulnerable temporary caseload already pre-identified)  
- Depending on the scale and nature of the crisis, potential to reach a higher percentage of those affected by the disaster than is likely through vertical expansion alone, as the worst-affected areas and communities can be specifically targeted  
- Identifying cases who are eligible for assistance in normal times can lead to their permanent enrolment, reducing exclusion errors on the SP programme | - Potential problems in reconciling benefit size from programme with other levels of assistance being provided through humanitarian structures, and it may be difficult to conceive what the benefit should cover  
- Challenge in deciding who should receive the extra benefit, how they should be selected, when and how they should exit, including trade-off between pre-positioned data and data that more accurately reflects the emergency  
- Timely inclusion of households can be problematic, especially if not pre-enrolled  
- Additional resource requirements (staff, equipment, finances)  
- Administrative processes may not be the best design for providing emergency assistance (e.g. timing of payments, use of conditions)  
- Considerable effort required for communication about entry and exit to the programme | - Relaxing programme eligibility criteria may reduce clarity of the underlying programme’s core objectives and reduce popular or political support  
- May create confusion amongst beneficiaries about objectives, and tensions when temporary caseloads are exited, especially if they are also chronically poor and vulnerable  
- Delays in identifying and enrolling new cases may delay assistance and reduce the impact of support  
- Increased burden of labour for administrative staff (targeting, enrolment and payments) can undermine the long-term programme | - Less relevance in those FCAS where SP is not yet well developed  
- Conflict can mean government faces challenges in continuing to implement the regular SP programme (donor funds suspended; dangers to staff implementing programme) or that markets for goods and services are affected  
- Working through administrative staff of state programme could support access in insecure areas, or create barriers if government associated with the conflict  
- If refugees are legally eligible to access SP, this may present a valid mechanism for providing assistance and for social integration – but perceptions of (ineligible) citizens would need to be carefully addressed  
- Movement of displaced populations may create challenges for identifying, enrolling and paying new beneficiaries |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Prerequisites and enablers</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
<th>Risks to be aware of</th>
<th>Implications in fragile, conflict-affected situations and contexts of forced displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Alignment between different programmes or systems | - No prerequisite for strong programmes or systems | - Highly relevant in FCAS where existing programmes have low coverage  
- In short term, can lead to efficiency savings if it reduces duplication within the humanitarian system  
- In medium to longer term, opportunity to build a more sustainable approach to emergency response, with more predictability of funding, and greater government ownership of and capacity to manage recurrent or protracted crises  
- In the longer term, potential for interventions that are aligned with government’s existing or planned SP priorities to inform and be integrated into the SP system | - Difficult to choose which elements of a SP system to align with – especially in cases where this is still emerging so design and implementation features are not well defined  
- Requires extensive coordination and cooperation between a range of stakeholders and organisations, and maintaining these relationships over the long term, given that full transition likely to take many years | - Aligning design of a humanitarian programme with elements of existing or planned SP systems may be important to generate government interest and opportunity to transition to national ownership, but this may not be the most optimal design for immediate humanitarian impact  
- Conversely, letting humanitarian interventions inform the development of the national SP system may result in narrow conceptualisation of SP, and/or take the direction of system development down a route that is not optimum for addressing chronic poverty and vulnerability and human development | - Can be applied in fragile contexts with weak SP infrastructure  
- Needs realism about what is feasible – unlikely that in the most fragile contexts such interventions will transition into full ‘social protection’ in the short-to-medium term, but will still be an improvement on the current ad hoc and fragmented way of working  
- Can be an interim measure to support refugees with a view to their full integration into existing national programmes for citizens, as political and financial space emerges |

Source: Authors, building on O’Brien et al. (2018c).
ANNEX 5

SELECTED CASE STUDIES

The intention of this annex is to provide the reader with an overview of how agencies have worked with social protection programmes and approaches in different crisis settings. Below are three country examples where humanitarian and development outcomes have been supported through common social protection programming in fragile, forced-displacement and conflict contexts.

FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, RECURRENT DROUGHTS: THE CASE OF MALI

A low-income, fragile country, Mali has high levels of poverty and is beset by recurrent and cyclical droughts, complicated by insecurity in the north the country. Historically, social protection had not been high on Mali’s political agenda and the country relied on humanitarian assistance to address food needs. By 2014, in the south of the country, the World Bank had begun to support the government in the design and implementation of a pilot poverty-targeted cash-based social transfer programme, known as Jigiséméjiri (meaning ‘tree of hope’ in the Bambara language), reaching some 44,000 poor households. In the insecure north of the country, needs continued to be largely addressed through major international NGO-delivered humanitarian projects, which had similar objectives and worked together in a coordinated fashion even though they were different projects in their own right. In a move away from the regular uncertainty of funding for these programmes, the EU set aside a ‘Linking Relief to Recovery and Development’ funding envelope of EUR 23 million to facilitate a transition, through provision of basic social services by international NGOs until state services were restored. Half of these resources were delivered to beneficiaries in the form of cash transfers.

Between 2014 and 2016, a number of developments occurred within both development and humanitarian communities that strengthened the emerging support to deliver social protection outcomes. Domestically, the government became increasingly engaged in the social protection programme in the south as well as the programmes in the north as a result of the evidence-based successes. This led to a policy commitment to transition out of humanitarian responses over time and strengthen the national social protection system so that it could absorb repeated, and relatively predictable, humanitarian caseloads. The Ministry of Solidarity was officially designated with responsibility for social transfers, an addition to its mandate, though there was not yet a dedicated budget line for establishing predictable and regular social transfers for the poorest. There is now political will for using social protection to address shocks, both ex ante and ex post: it is discussed in the national social protection policy of 2016 and in the national document of resilience priorities.

The early engagement of the government in operations was critical to the political will that led to policy commitments. The recognised need for quality evidence ensured that international NGOs invested in collecting data that would be relevant in future government discussions. This included evidence about the ‘implementability’ of the projects in the insecure north and the benefits of community-based approaches in registration, eligibility, and other targeting elements. In addition, international NGOs worked hard to establish common designs and administrative processes between their projects in the north which, together, formed an ad-hoc programme of works. Further, these common designs and administrative processes were aligned with the parameters of the government’s social protection programming in the south, resulting in the genesis of a de facto national programme. Linking the projects in the north to the national early warning system and surveys also assisted with engaging the government.

The alignment of the international NGO-led interventions (all funded by DG ECHO) with one another was a useful step in supporting the eventual transition between humanitarian assistance and social protection, as it was easier for government programmes to draw lessons from, and coordinate with, a harmonised programme than with many scattered interventions. Aspects of programme design and implementation that were coordinated across the NGOs included the logical framework, assessment tools, transfer value, registration method, and monitoring and evaluation.
DISPLACEMENT: THE CASE OF TURKEY

As a result of the conflict in Syria, millions of people have been displaced and have migrated across international borders into Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Iraq and elsewhere. Turkey alone has received some 3.1 million Syrian refugees. In Turkey, over 90 per cent of refugees reside outside of camps. While the refugees are dispersed across all provinces, 81 per cent of the refugees are concentrated in three provinces in the south-east of Turkey, and Istanbul.

A middle-income country, Turkey has historically had strong social protection programmes, especially in social assistance, with robust administrative systems that enabled comprehensive registration, enrolment, assessment and grievance-redress processes across multiple programmes. As large numbers of refugees made their way into Turkey, the capacity of these strong systems was stretched considerably. Initially, in 2012, the response to the displacement crisis arising from the conflict in Syria was managed through traditional humanitarian response mechanisms, with some USD 80 million funding, a projectised approach with resources being channelled through international and civil society organisations. Over time, as the scale of the displacement became apparent, international resources increased considerably to approximately USD 795 million in 2017. This is in addition to the Government of Turkey’s support to the refugee crisis, which amounts to over USD 25 billion since 2011.

From 2013 onwards, the response strategy of the humanitarian community was consolidated through the annual Regional Response and Resilience Plans (3RP). This coordinated the support from UN and NGO partners to the Government of Turkey in the sectors of food security, education, protection, basic needs, livelihoods, health and nutrition. Given the strong social protection systems in place across Turkey, and once it became clear that the displacement crisis was likely to become protracted, the 3RP transitioned from an externally driven plan to provide increased support to national and local systems, to enable a nationally led response while continuing to directly provide services and humanitarian assistance.

In 2015, the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) was established, designed to ensure that the humanitarian and longer-term development needs of refugees and host communities are addressed in a comprehensive and joined-up manner. Negotiations led to the FRiT supporting the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), which provides longer-term cash transfers to refugees and increases their self-reliance, as well as improving their access to quality education. The ESSN supports all registered Syrian and non-Syrian refugees living outside camps in Turkey, with the objective to stabilise or improve living standards of the most vulnerable out-of-camp refugee households.

The ESSN aims to provide monthly basic needs assistance to over one million refugees through multi-purpose cash grants – which were initially set at 100 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately USD 27) per person per month and subsequently increased to TRY 120. Funds are not transferred to government but rather are channelled directly from international organisations to the Turkish Red Crescent, as the implementing partner with responsibility for case management of citizens. The ESSN was designed in conjunction with the Government of Turkey and is implemented through a partnership of the WFP, the Turkish Red Crescent, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, the Directorate General for Migration Management, the Directorate General of Citizenship and Population Affairs, and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency. The government’s leadership in the response from the beginning, its willingness to engage in partnerships with international organisations and to compromise on aspects of programme design was a critical factor enabling the provision of cash at scale in Turkey. Building on existing national systems and processes contributed to demonstrable time and cost savings as well as developing more appropriate, effective, durable solutions to the protracted crisis.

Processes in implementing the ESSN have been adapted, where necessary, for the requirements of delivering humanitarian cash assistance at scale. Changes were made to the implementation systems soon after the programme started as a result of an honest assessment of the capacity of the government’s system to respond and deliver support to the increased number of people in a timely manner.

Even with the careful planning and mitigation measures introduced in the ESSN, and bearing in mind that the approach was being tried and tested for the first time and at scale, there were other bottlenecks and challenges which came to light only once implementation began and which presented barriers to vulnerable families receiving assistance. These bottlenecks and barriers would not have been identified or addressed without commitments both to continual monitoring and to a flexible and adaptive approach to dealing with these issues as they arose.

Recognising the needs of Syrian citizens and the challenges they faced, information and services, outreach and communication processes were prioritised, with information about the programmes being made available through a range of media outlets appropriate and accessible to the refugee caseload. Recognising that refugees had a range
of non-cash-related needs, linkages were also established to a range of other benefits and services, including to child protection services, to labour market programmes and to legal services to grant and enforce their right to stay in Turkey and to access public services including health, education and social assistance.

CONFLICT: THE CASE OF YEMEN

Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Middle East and North Africa region. In 2012, 45 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line. The flagship social protection programme in the country is the Social Welfare Fund (SWF), which was established in 1996 and provides quarterly unconditional cash transfers to beneficiaries – mostly through the Post Office as well as through two partner banks. In 2014, the National Social Protection Monitoring Survey reported that the implementation of the SWF was commendably pro-poor, being the only regular source of income for some families, without which they would be unable to buy even the most basic food items. It also noted that there were significant inclusion and exclusion errors.

In March 2015, Yemen again descended into armed conflict, between opposition and pro-regime groups following a coup, resulting in forced displacement, erosion of livelihoods and recourse to damaging coping strategies. The conflict caused the SWF to stop operations, since budget support from development partners had to be suspended, removing a vital source of assistance from poor and vulnerable people. As the situation continued to deteriorate, international organisations commenced traditional humanitarian interventions, initially using in-kind resources as no UN agency or international NGO had implemented humanitarian cash transfer programmes. There was a gradual transition to cash and voucher-based responses in late 2015 and 2016 with UNICEF’s humanitarian cash transfer programme being implemented in Amanat Al-Asima (city of Sana’a) before being rolled out to Taiz governorate, where armed conflict was still ongoing. Monthly unconditional, unrestricted cash transfers were provided for six months. The programme was funded by donors from humanitarian budget lines.

UNICEF implemented a stand-alone project parallel to the SWF but made use of some of the SWF’s administrative systems to implement the programme – in particular, some of the government’s human resources, the institutions, and the payment mechanism. The rationale for this approach was to leverage the best elements of the SWF operations (scale, proven functioning delivery systems, effective design, etc.) without compromising humanitarian principles.

While the principle of leveraging the SWF remained, a number of operational adaptations to the SWF’s implementation procedures were necessary for the programme to be effective. This flexibility in adapting SWF processes in the face of operational realities included a revised targeting process with a move from the ‘black box’ of proxy means testing to a categorical targeting approach, to reach Muhamasheen families (a highly marginalised group) with children, according to demographic vulnerability criteria agreed in partnership with the SWF, and the establishment of a targeting committee including the SWF and the Coalition of Taiz Support, comprising 20 NGOs, local council members and imams. Further adaptations were introduced by delivering payments to households through only one of the payment providers on the SWF, namely Al Amal Microfinance Bank (AMB). The AMB’s knowledge and their selection of disbursement sites ensured safe movement and availability of transportation between the Muhamasheen community and the disbursement sites. Operational changes were also made to the SWF’s staff, who were retained where possible but retrained in the changes being introduced through the UNICEF programme. To protect confidentiality during the conflict, the data management functions were outsourced to non-government personnel (previously the government had been managing these steps). UNICEF also introduced changes to the monitoring of the programme – a neutral civil society organisation accepted by all parties was selected to become
responsible for monitoring the cash disbursement process, undertaking additional post-distribution monitoring to triangulate findings from the third party monitor, raise awareness of the complaints hotline, and verify appeals against exclusion. Despite the adaptations that were necessary, working with the SWF’s existing systems wherever possible avoided the need for UNICEF to spend time and resources establishing new systems and processes. Further, the humanitarian programme benefited from AMB’s experience in working with populations excluded from formal financial services, and in taking services to people through a network of outlets.

**Yemen: Community-based support in times of war**

Lamis Al-Iryani, Evaluation Manager, Yemen’s Social Fund for Development

https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/articles/yemen-community-based-support-times-war
ANNEX 6
INTRODUCTORY MATERIALS

This annex offers a selection of resources providing readers with a general introduction to some of the main sectors engaged in the issue. For additional resources explicitly focused on the use of social protection systems and approaches across the humanitarian-development nexus, please refer to Annex 7.

SOCIAL PROTECTION

Basic set of online resources

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>URL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>00:03:12</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9edFfdqXJY">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9edFfdqXJY</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social protection in Africa</td>
<td>00:02:11</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5Dodpt5TKQ">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5Dodpt5TKQ</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Social Protection Floor for All</td>
<td>00:06:48</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VhdfxHrJAl0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VhdfxHrJAl0</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to social safety nets</td>
<td>04:00:00 (approx.)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fao.org/elearning/#/elc/en/course/FSSN">http://www.fao.org/elearning/#/elc/en/course/FSSN</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The course provides an overview of Social Safety Net programmes and systems and how they are used and customised according to different contexts. It also introduces the key processes for designing and implementing Social Safety Net programmes. The course consists of six lessons, ranging from approximately 30 to 60 minutes duration each, grouped into two units: 1 - What are Social Safety Nets; 2 - Designing and implementing Social Safety Nets.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Advanced set of online resources

**Supporting social protection systems**
European Commission (2015b)

**Social transfers in the fight against hunger**
European Commission (2012)

**Indicators to measure social protection performance, implications for EC programming**
European Commission (2017)

**For protection and promotion: The design and implementation of effective safety nets**
Grosh et al. (2008)
hhttp://hdl.handle.net/10986/6582

**Designing and implementing social transfer programmes**
Samson et al. (2010)

**Targeting**
Duration: 03:00:00 (approx.)
The course illustrates the basic principles related to the design, evaluation and monitoring of targeting systems. It also provides examples of how targeting principles can be applied both in emergency and longer-term food security contexts. The course consists of four lessons, of approximately 40 to 45 minutes duration each: 1 - Introduction to targeting; 2 - Monitoring and evaluation of targeting; 3 - Targeting in emergencies; 4 - Targeting for longer-term food security.

**Inter Agency Social Protection Assessments (ISPA)**
hhttp://ispatools.org/
A set of practical tools that help countries improve their social protection system by analysing its strengths and weaknesses and offering options for further action.

**Socialprotection.org**
hhttp://socialprotection.org/
Socialprotection.org aims to facilitate knowledge sharing and capacity building on effective social protection policies and programmes, particularly among low- and middle-income countries. It strives to achieve this goal by providing a centralised platform by means of which to access the most up-to-date, comprehensive database and multimedia learning materials on social protection, while simultaneously fostering a community of social protection practitioners.
On-site instructor-led courses

**Institute of Development Studies: Social Protection Policies, Programmes and Evidence**

http://www.ids.ac.uk/csp-course

This four-day course takes place annually, usually in the summer months, at the Institute of Development Studies in Brighton, UK. The course will enable participants to expand their knowledge base of approaches to social protection, develop an understanding of the challenges in designing and implementing social protection programmes, and critically assess current evidence of what works in social protection.

**Economic Policy Research Institute: Designing and Implementing Social Transfer Programmes**

http://www.eprionline.com/

For more than a decade, EPRI has been running a variety of social protection courses to policymakers, government officials, programme practitioners and representatives from multilateral agencies and NGOs. The courses build on the latest developments in social protection systems and provide participants with an in-depth understanding of the conceptual and practical issues involved in effectively designing and implementing social protection programmes. Courses cover a range of topics including social programme design, microsimulation, monitoring and evaluation and policy brief writing, and range in duration from day-long seminars to two-week accredited courses. An intensive one-week executive course for senior officials and practitioners is also available.

**The World Bank: The Design and Implementation of Effective Social Safety Nets**


The two-week ‘core course’ is offered by the World Bank’s ‘Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice’. It is held in Washington DC and aims to provide participants with an in-depth understanding of the conceptual and practical issues involved in the development of social protection systems and their foundation – social assistance or safety net programmes.

**United Nations University, UNU-MERIT: Introduction to Social Protection for the Poor**

https://www.merit.unu.edu/training/online-courses/introduction-to-social-protection-for-the-poor/

The main objective of the course is to provide an introduction to non-contributory social protection and its relevance for fighting poverty and vulnerability. The course will highlight the role social protection measures can play in the development process and it will show the advantages and disadvantages of different policy interventions and design options. The online course is based on open educational resources, and course materials are obtained by the participant himself or herself or will be shared on an electronic learning platform.

**The Maastricht Graduate School of Governance: Understanding Social Protection, from Justification to Intervention**

https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/meta/325177/understanding-social-protection-justification-intervention?print=1

How do established frameworks of social protection and development view poverty and inequality? How does it vary depending on the income level of the country? What are the different mechanisms that are applied to deal with problems of poverty and inequality? Is the welfare state the only way? In this course the students will be introduced to the socio-economic justification behind social protection, and the political economy setting and the different components of the state intervention. A contrast will be made among established welfare states, emerging welfare states and others. The course will present the history of the welfare state, while conducting an in-depth study of the range of state interventions, the economic effects of the welfare interventions, the political economy of government interventions, potential effects of benefits on poverty and income distributions and stakeholder interest analysis.
International Labour Organisation: Extending social protection to migrant workers, refugees and their families

Humanitarian aid

The humanitarian principles
Duration: 00:02:09
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hWtdpxVy2A

Humanitarian principles
Duration: 00:05:50
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tZE9NLfahw

Sphere minimum standards
Duration: 00:02:45
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XnQV63k07TU

Do No Harm principle
Duration: 00:02:08
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PZThWwVE_DY

Humanitarian essentials learning pathway
Duration: 18:40:40 (approx.)
https://ready.csod.com/LMS/LoDetails/DetailsLo.aspx?loid=05760a04-abbc-4893-97b7-28e4f3c-08c8f#t=1

Introduction to humanitarian aid
Duration: 3 hours per week over 2 weeks (approx.)
https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/disaster-management

The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP)
http://www.cashlearning.org/thematic-area/social-protection
CaLP provides leadership, expertise and evidence to support the use of cash transfers and vouchers in humanitarian situations. It provides online trainings, online forums and a wide range of practical tools and resources.

European consensus on humanitarian aid
2008/C 25/01
# Resilience

**Operating in situations of conflict and fragility: An EU staff handbook**
European Commission (2015a)

**Operationalising the EU strategic approach to resilience: Eight practical case studies**
European Commission (2017c)

**Guidelines for Resilience Systems Analysis: How to analyse risk and build a roadmap to resilience**
OECD (2014)

**Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)**
[https://www.gfdrr.org/](https://www.gfdrr.org/)
A global partnership that helps developing countries better understand and reduce their vulnerability to natural hazards and climate change.

**Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC)**
[https://securelivelihoods.org/](https://securelivelihoods.org/)
The SLRC is an eight-year global research programme launched in 2011 that aims to strengthen the evidence base and inform policy and practice around livelihoods, basic services and social protection in conflict-affected situations.

**Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action**
JOIN/2017/21

**The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from food security crises**
COM/2012/586
**Forced displacement**

**Human rights: The rights of refugees**
Duration: 3 to 5 hours per week over 3 weeks (approx.)
https://www.edx.org/course/human-rights-the-rights-of-refugees-0

**Addressing forced displacement through development planning and co-operation: Guidance for donor policy makers and practitioners**
OECD (2017)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264285590-en

**Lives in dignity: from aid-dependence to self-reliance – Forced displacement and development**
COM/2016/234
ANNEX 7
ADDITIONAL USEFUL RESOURCES

While Annex 6 provides links to general materials on social protection and humanitarian aid, this annex offers a selection of additional resources explicitly focused on the links between these two sectors.

Online communities of practice

Community on ‘Social protection in crisis contexts’ on socialprotection.org
https://goo.gl/aRzVqb
This community was created to serve as a platform for practitioners and researchers working on social protection across the humanitarian-development nexus to exchange, collaborate, and learn from each other’s experiences.

Group on ‘Social protection across the humanitarian-development nexus’ on capacity4dev.eu
https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/sp-nexus
The group, currently restricted to EU staff members, was created to give access to materials developed under the DG DEVCO-DG ECHO-DG NEAR initiative towards a ‘Guidance Package on Social Protection across the Humanitarian-Development Nexus’ and to offer a space where the Commission’s staff can exchange on their experiences.

Websites

Multi-country research on ‘Shock-responsive social protection systems’
https://www.opml.co.uk/projects/shock-responsive-social-protection-systems
These web pages host the various outputs from the three-year (2015-2017) DFID-funded and OPM-led research on shock-responsive social protection systems. The study aimed to strengthen the evidence base as to when and how social protection systems can better scale up in response to shocks in low-income countries and fragile and conflict-affected states, thus reducing the need for separate humanitarian responses. The key research questions were: ‘What are the constraints to social protection systems being more responsive to shocks, and, conversely, what factors would enable social protection systems to become more responsive to shocks?’ Key outputs include a comprehensive literature review, country case studies, a synthesis report, and a toolkit to guide policymakers and practitioners.

International conference on ‘Social protection in contexts of fragility and forced displacement’
This conference, co-organised by UNICEF and the European Commission together with many other development partners, aimed to shed new light on the prospects of using social protection systems in contexts of fragility and forced displacement, with the overall aim to better operationalise international commitments. These web pages host the various materials produced out of this conference in particular: outcome document, conference report, livestream recordings and country profiles.
**The World Bank: Sahel adaptive social protection programme**


These web pages host the various outputs from the ongoing Adaptive Social Protection (ASP) programme implemented by the World Bank in the Sahel.

**Webinars**

**What role can social protection systems play in responding to humanitarian emergencies? Findings from a global study**

Duration: 01:30:51
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=shQ9toLeR_U

**Shock-responsive social protection for resilience building: supporting livelihoods in protracted crisis, fragile and humanitarian contexts**

Duration: 01:16:33
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RN5O8sAqSV8&feature=youtu.be

**Online courses**

**Linking Humanitarian Cash Transfer Programming and Social Protection (Part 1): An introduction**

Duration: 01:30:00 (approx.)
https://kayaconnect.org/course/info.php?id=493

This course offers an introduction to social protection, and a first look at the ways in which it can be linked to humanitarian cash assistance. The course looks at the basic principles covered in the associated Guidance Note. It is designed for humanitarian staff with existing knowledge of cash transfer programming, who want an introduction to linking CTP with social protection. It does not provide an introduction to humanitarian cash-based programming.

**Linking Humanitarian Cash Transfer Programming and Social Protection (Part 2): Designing CTPs that are linked to social protection**

Duration: 03:00:00 (approx.)
https://kayaconnect.org/course/info.php?id=492

This is the second part of a 2-part course on linking humanitarian CTP and social protection. It is recommended to take Part 1 (above) first. This course involves an in-depth look at linking humanitarian CTP and social protection. It is designed for humanitarian staff with existing knowledge of cash transfer programming, who want to learn more about linking humanitarian CTP with social protection.
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Annexes


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Smith, G. (2017c). Supporting national social protection systems to respond to needs at times of crisis: lessons from Kyrgyzstan — a case study for UNICEF.


Uribe, M. J. (2016). El papel de Prosperidad Social em la atención a la emergência social de la frontera colombo-venezolana. Seminario International Optimizando la respuesta em emergências desde lo social, CEPAL,
Santiago, Chile.


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