



EU Joint Programming Guidance Pack

1. QUICK GUIDE

What is Joint Programming?

- Joint programming means the **joint planning of development cooperation**¹ by the EU development partners working in a partner country. It includes a joint analysis of the country situation followed by a joint response setting out how EU development partners will provide support and measure progress. Joint analysis and joint response together are hereinafter called 'joint strategy'.²
- In Joint Programming, EU development partners develop together a **joint strategy** which responds to the partner country's national development plan and sets out the overall rationale and direction for their support. It also coordinates which sectors/areas each of them will work in, what the overall objectives for these sectors are, and gives provisional figures for their financing over the joint strategy period. The individual more detailed objectives, projects and programmes that each EU development partner will carry out in order to implement their contribution to the joint strategy are detailed in their own in-house programming and implementation plans.
- The timing of the joint strategy is **synchronised** to match the timing of the partner country's national plan so that EU development partners are planning and implementing at the same time and for the same period as the government and can therefore be more responsive to national needs.
- The joint strategy is developed at the **partner country level** by the EU Delegation, other EU Institutions field offices and EU Member States' staff to ensure that it provides the best possible response to the situation on the ground. This also allows close cooperation with the government, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders.
- **Non-EU development partners** who share the principles of joint programming are welcome to sign up to the strategy too. They will therefore need to agree to a division of labour, to synchronise their programming cycle if possible, and to provide indicative financial commitments for their support to each sector they will work in.

Why is it a good idea?

- **Alignment** and national **ownership** could improve as the partner country government sets its strategy, and in response the EU development partners lay out their support for it, at the same time and for the same period. **Predictability** and **transparency** will increase as EU development partners plan together, setting out what overall objectives and sectors they are going to support in a single document.
- Joint Programming will lower **transaction costs** for government as they have only one country analysis and response strategy to deal with for all EU development partners. The strategy includes a clear and coherent division of labour across sectors and the timing is aligned to the national plan and its results framework.

¹ Bilateral government to government development cooperation, if possible also regional and thematic funds

² See EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 29 November – 1 December 2011) - Council Conclusions https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf



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- There will be less aid fragmentation as EU development partners plan together, cutting out **gaps** and **overlaps**. This allows each to focus on the sectors where they can add the most value while ensuring that all bases are covered under the joint strategy.
- **Joint Programming can make Europe happen on the ground**, translating shared European values and policies on issues such as fundamental rights and good governance into coherent, targeted action in partner countries.
- We can expect higher **impact** aid and better **value for money** as EU development partners combine their resources. As together they make up more than half of official development aid funding (ODA) worldwide, this new approach is going to make a real **difference to global aid effectiveness**, improving how tens of billions of euros are spent each year.
- Joint Programming can help to **raise public image and accountability** of development aid among EU national constituencies.
- There will be more opportunities for **joint initiatives** on the ground, as EU development partners are planning at the same time and for the same period, and subsequent savings in terms of economies of scale and reduced overhead costs.
- EU development partners can show **more coherence** vis-à-vis government and other players as they work together and speak with a common voice, backed by a single EU strategy with a large overall funding envelope behind it.
- There should be more **visibility** for EU Development Partners support as a whole, with a single “EU brand” of high quality aid, plus more visibility for each participating Development Partners as they are associated with everything done under the joint response strategy. In addition, each Development Partner will still have their agency’s recognition on the projects and programmes they are implementing.
- There should be **less domestic pressure** on each DP to tackle all of the sectors and issues in a given country that are in need of attention – they can now instead credibly demonstrate that they are part and parcel of a coherent Joint Programming which, through a division of labour, ensures that all relevant sectors and issues are being covered.

What have we promised to do?

- The EU’s **Lisbon Treaty** of 2009 promised more joint working and “whole of Europe” approaches, including on development policy. Joint programming is one of the key aid effectiveness commitments of EU development partners and features in the “**Agenda for Change**”, the overall EU development policy agreed by EU Ministers in 2012. It is also committed to by all development partners in the current global aid and development effectiveness compact, **the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation**.

How are we doing so far?

- Joint programming is currently **planned in 50 partner countries** across the world including more than 20 fragile states. In around 20 of these countries the process has already started. Please check [here](#) for a detailed overview³ on JP, country by country. You can also find more background info on Joint Programming on <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/>

³ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/country-cases/joint-programming-tracker>



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1. WHAT IS “JOINT PROGRAMMING”?

EU joint programming (JP) means the **joint planning of development cooperation**¹ by the EU development partners (DPs) working in a partner country. It consists of a **joint analysis** of the country situation followed by a **joint response**. The joint response sets out how DPs will contribute to the national development strategy and how progress will be monitored; it contains the **division of labour** between the participating DPs, spelling out which donor(s) will work in which sector and indicative financial commitments per sector from each DP for their financing over the strategy period².

The joint analysis and joint response together is what we call a “joint strategy”. The Joint Analysis and Joint Response are primarily developed at the **partner country level** by EU Delegation³ and EU Member States’ staff to ensure that they have the best possible fit to the situation on the ground. This allows for close cooperation with the government, civil society, the private sector and other national stakeholders. Non-EU DPs who are like-minded and committed are welcome to sign up to the strategy too if they wish to do so.

The timing of JP should be **synchronised**. This means that the joint strategy should match the timing of the partner country’s national plan so that EU DPs are planning at the same time and for the same period as the government and can therefore be more responsive to national needs. Thus, if the national plan runs from 2015 to 2019 for example, then so too should the joint strategy.

A joint strategy remains at strategic level and should avoid going into the details of the projects and programmes that each EU DP will carry out. The strategy will instead be limiting itself to outlining sectors, overall objectives, indicative allocations and where possible expected results. Details of how each DP will deliver its agreed contribution to the joint strategy are instead set out in DPs’ individual **bilateral programming and/or implementation plans**, linking up to their own internal requirements and procedures. Such plans should, however, be guided by the joint strategy and also be synchronised to match its timing.

The joint EU strategies should **serve as a strategic umbrella to the DPs’** bilateral programming documents, and might allow substituting these plans⁴. Through substitution, administrative procedures and costs could be decreased.

Without entering into the details of an implementation plan, a joint strategy might provide a basis for a progressive move towards **more coordinated modalities** of cooperation, if appropriate in the country context

¹ Bilateral government to government development cooperation, if feasible also regional and thematic funds

² See EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 29 November – 1 December 2011) – **Council Conclusions** https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf

³ In close consultation with other EU Institutions field offices, if active in the given partner country

⁴ Joint Programming documents can replace Multi-annual Indicative Programmes/National Indicative Programmes/Single Support Frameworks or other programming documents if their quality meets the standards for bilateral programming documents (see also the related regulations on EU instruments). In JP countries the timing of the EU MIP/NIP/SSF reviews will be synchronised with partner country planning cycles.



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There is currently **no template** for joint strategies, so the content of a joint strategy can be developed according to the specific requirements of each country. Increasingly, Heads of Mission and Heads of Cooperation on the ground are choosing to include references to other EU policies in joint strategies in order to promote **policy coherence for development** and increase political leverage. This can include anything from a civil society road map to commitments on security, human rights and references to trade agreements. In a similar vein, DPs may also want to combine existing joint EU initiatives such as risk assessments and results' frameworks with the joint strategy.

While close cooperation and dialogue between individual DPs' HQ and field offices should be ensured, joint response strategies are usually **endorsed by EU Heads of Mission** in-country before being sent to capitals. Each capital – depending on its internal procedures – would then normally approve the general parts of the document as well as their own specific contribution, i.e. their focal sectors and indicative financial allocations, but not comment on the focal sectors and allocations of other participating DPs. In order to ensure the correct appropriation by the partner country, participating DPs may decide to ask the partner country government to sign the document, taking into account any implications this may have for its content.

“Menus” of potential content for a joint analysis ([here](#)⁵) and a joint response ([here](#)⁶) are available. **Examples** of complete joint strategies, with a joint analysis and joint response from a number of countries can be found [here](#)⁷.

2. WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS?

- **Alignment** and national **ownership** could improve as the partner country government sets its strategy, and in response the EU development partners lay out their support for it, at the same time and for the same period.
- **Predictability** and **transparency** will increase as EU development partners plan together, setting out what overall objectives and sectors they are going to support in a single document.
- There should be **less domestic pressure** on each DP to tackle all of the sectors and issues in a given country that are in need of attention – they can now instead credibly demonstrate that they are part and parcel of a coherent JP which, through a division of labour, ensures that all relevant sectors and issues are being covered.
- JP will lower **transaction costs** for government as they have only one country analysis and response strategy to deal with for all EU development partners. The strategy includes a clear and coherent division of labour across sectors and the timing is aligned to the national plan and its results framework.

⁵ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/joint-analysis-menu>

⁶ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/joint-response-menu>

⁷ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/3-country-cases#strats>



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- There will be less aid fragmentation as EU development partners plan together, cutting out **gaps** and **overlaps**. This allows each to focus on the sectors where they can add the most value while ensuring that all bases are covered under the joint strategy.
- **JP can make Europe happen on the ground**, translating shared European values and policies on issues such as fundamental rights and good governance into coherent, targeted action in partner countries.
- We can expect higher **impact** aid and better **value for money** as EU development partners combine their resources. As together they make up more than half of official development aid funding (ODA) worldwide, this new approach is going to make a real **difference to global aid effectiveness**, improving how tens of billions of euros are spent each year.
- JP can help to **raise public image and accountability** of development aid among EU national constituencies.
- There will be more opportunities for **joint initiatives** on the ground, as EU development partners are planning at the same time and for the same period, and subsequent savings in terms of economies of scale and reduced overhead costs.
- EU development partners can show **more coherence** vis-à-vis government and other players as they work together and speak with a common voice, backed by a single EU strategy with a large overall funding envelope behind it.
- There should be more **visibility** for EU DPs' support as a whole, with a single "EU brand" of high quality aid, plus more visibility for each participating DP as they are associated with everything done under the joint response strategy. In addition, each DP will still have its agency's recognition for the projects and programmes they are implementing.

3. HOW DO YOU REACH JOINT PROGRAMMING?

JP is led by the partner country wherever possible⁸. It is based on a partner country's national development strategy and is aligned to the partner country's strategy and programming cycles.⁹ JP processes are normally facilitated by EU Delegations and Member States' Heads of Cooperation **in-country**. In most cases, EU DPs will first agree on a **roadmap** setting out who needs to do what and when in order to make JP a reality. The content of this roadmap will vary from country to country depending on the local context. It is recommended that the tasks to be carried out are shared amongst DP to spread the workload and ensure joint ownership and buy-in. A menu of potential

⁸ This has been agreed in the EU Council Conclusions on the EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, November 2011. It is obvious that neither the joint analysis nor the joint response will be led by the partner country government.

⁹ EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 29 November – 1 December 2011) – Council Conclusions https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf



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content for such roadmaps is available [here](#)¹⁰ and some examples of actual roadmaps from different countries can be found [here](#)¹¹.

The process outlined in the roadmap would normally start with undertaking a **joint analysis**. A menu of potential content for such analysis is available [here](#)¹² while examples can be found [here](#)¹³. A **mapping** of DPs current work should also be carried out, if it does not already exist. This can then be used to initiate **division of labour discussions**. The **structure of the joint response** can then be agreed. **Partner country governments** must be included in the process and if possible should lead the discussions on division of labour. How this is done will depend on the local context though some ideas are provided under Question 6 below. After drafting, the joint analysis and joint response will usually be endorsed by Heads of Mission and Heads of Cooperation locally before being sent to capitals. Each capital – depending on its internal procedures - would then normally approve the general parts of the document as well as their own specific contribution, i.e. their focal sectors and indicative financial allocations, but not comment on the focal sectors and allocations of other participating DPs. In order to ensure the correct appropriation by the partner country, participating DPs may decide to ask the partner country government to sign the document, taking into account any implications this may have for its content.

4. HOW DO YOU DO DIVISION OF LABOUR?

On the basis of the joint analysis, DPs will agree with the partner country government on what support they will provide. ‘Division of labour’ simply means **sharing out the work to be done** in such a way as to avoid overlaps and ensure that DPs complement one another. This also allows each DP to specialise in what they do best (their area of comparative advantage) as opposed to spreading their support thinly over many sectors and issues. Geographical coverage within the country can also be part of the scope of the division of labour exercise. JP makes establishing a division of labour much easier as EU DPs are planning at the same time and for the same period.

Division of labour should lead to **fewer and larger** individual initiatives, delivering economies of scale and reducing administrative costs. It should also promote **more joint implementation** in cases where more than one DP wants to work on the same sector or thematic issue. Lastly, it makes it easier to see what donors are doing and therefore improves **transparency** and **predictability**.

Ideally, it will be the **government** who decides or at least guides which DP works in which sector. Such decisions should, however, also be informed by the joint analysis that has been carried out and by an examination of what non-EU DPs are working on. As much as possible, use should be made of the **government’s sector definitions** to ensure national ownership and as different DPs often use different sector definitions from one another.

¹⁰ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/roadmaps-menu>

¹¹ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/3-country-cases#roadmaps>

¹² <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/joint-analysis-menu>

¹³ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/3-country-cases#analysis>



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Targets of not more than three sectors per donor and not more than five donors per sector have previously been agreed in the [EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour](#)¹⁴ and can be useful benchmark figures to aim for.

It can be useful to start with a **mapping** of which sectors/ thematic issues DPs currently work on and then assess where gaps and overlaps lie. Suggestions can then be made for where DPs might wish to re-align their work, following consultation with the partner government, in order to address these gaps and overlaps. A dedicated donor retreat/workshop can be a useful way of taking this forward.

Where multiple donors who are participating in JP do want to contribute to the same sector, it can be useful to consider joint implementation options such as sector-wide approaches, **pooled funding and delegated cooperation** in order to help ensure that their support is delivered as efficiently and effectively as possible.

Where DPs define **‘results’ or ‘results areas’** as opposed to sectors, the division of labour process should still have the same goal, that is to prevent gaps and overlaps in DPs’ work and to encourage them to specialise in what they are best at rather than trying to do a little of everything.

It may well be that **not all of the aid** provided by a DP’s HQ is under the control of country-based staff (e.g. global, regional and thematic funds). It should be acknowledged that such aid is outside the sphere of influence of Heads of Mission / Heads of Cooperation. It may also be decided to send a message to those responsible for planning such aid to ask them to do so in coordination with the JP process in future / to only provide aid to their country’s focus sectors that have been set in the JP / to channel support through existing local vehicles wherever possible.

A useful reference is the EU **Toolkit on Division of Labour** available [here](#)¹⁵. A comparison of the situation before and after division of labour could be added, to the JP response document to show impact of joint programming

5. HOW DO YOU DO SYNCHRONISATION?

Synchronisation means that DPs plan their aid *at the same time* as the national development plan is being developed and *for the same period* as that plan. Therefore, if the national development plan runs from 2016 to 2019 for example, then so too should the joint strategy. This allows DPs to better support the national plan and its objectives, and to improve the policy dialogue, as DPs can make a direct link between policies, expected results and DPs’ future support to them.

Where DPs have had only **limited involvement in the development of the national plan**, they may however need to wait until its publication before formulating their joint analysis and joint response, meaning that the joint strategy will only be able to commence sometime after the national plan does.

¹⁴ http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/30/05/2012 - 1223/eu_code_of_conduct_on_division_of_labour.pdf

¹⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/methodology-division-of-labour-in-development-policy-toolkit-200906_en_2.pdf



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In order to achieve synchronisation to a given country's *next* national plan, DPs can **extend or shorten their current planning cycles** so that they finish at the same time as the *current* national plan, allowing them to align from that point on. Alternatively, DPs can undertake a (ad hoc or mid-term review) to coincide with the start of the next national plan, allowing them to re-align their support at this point as necessary.

Where a DP's financing cycle is fixed, they can still synchronise by **separating their planning cycle from their financing cycle**, making an indicative commitment on which sectors they will work in for the whole period of the national plan even though they are unable to confirm the total financing for them at the start of the period. In such cases it can be useful for DPs to provide average annual indications of financing per sector and subsequently update these every year.

Where there is **no fixed timetable for the national plan** or it is seen to be unreliable, DPs should nevertheless still seek to agree a common cycle for the JP, for example aligned to the national electoral cycle. This will still bring a very clear benefit in that all participating DPs will be planning at the DPs' individual **bilateral programming and/or implementation plans**, detailing how each will deliver their agreed contribution to the joint response, should either also be synchronised to the period of the strategy or open for review so as to align their support as necessary.

6. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE PARTNER COUNTRY GOVERNMENT?

One of the aims of JP is to **promote partner government ownership** of DPs' support. This is in line with the international aid effectiveness commitments made in the [Paris Declaration](#)¹⁶ the [Accra Agenda for Action](#)¹⁷, the [Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation](#)¹⁸ and the [Mexico Communiqué](#)¹⁹, all of which recognise that such ownership is crucial if aid is to be truly effective.

As the [EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum](#)²⁰ states, "JP is led by the partner country wherever possible, is based on a partner country's national development strategy and is aligned to the partner country's strategy and programming cycles." The joint strategy **responds to the national plan**, is guided by its priorities and policies, and synchronised to its timing. The sector definitions used in division of labour should be based on those of the national plan as far as possible and national sector strategies should be used as the framework for DPs' support.

In order to gain **government buy-in** for JP, it is advisable to involve the partner country government in the process as early as possible and to raise their awareness of its implications, setting out the potential benefits as well as providing reassurances that it will not, for example, lead to a decrease in their choice and voice, or a reduction in participating DPs' funding to the country. Government can

¹⁶ <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf>

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf>

¹⁹ http://effectivecooperation.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ENG_Final-ConsensusMexicoHLMCommunique.pdf

²⁰ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf



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also be asked to provide written endorsement of the JP process which is subsequently forwarded to participating DPs' capitals.

As JP is led by the partner country wherever possible, and is based on a partner country's national development strategy it is key to seek the partner country government's **inputs** on the content of the joint strategy and on which DPs will work in which sectors. It is understood however that DPs may not always agree with government's preferences for who works where and that therefore a process of negotiation may be required.

Regular **meetings** should be scheduled with government during the drafting of the joint strategy to provide updates on progress and to solicit inputs.

Where the joint analysis has identified **improvements** that could be useful in the national plan and its results framework, the joint response could, following consultation with the government, include actions to support national stakeholders in taking these forward, as well as to increase DPs' participation in the planning process in future.

Given that JP is synchronised to the national planning cycle, DPs will rely on that cycle. They may therefore want to sensitise the government to this fact, urging them to **stick to a predictable and reliable timetable** and requesting that DPs are involved in the planning process wherever possible.

7. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF EU CAPITALS?

JP should be **driven at the country level** with Heads of Mission and Heads of Cooperation on the ground agreeing on the steps to be taken and the content of the joint strategy. This should help ensure best fit with local conditions, legitimacy and ownership. Each DP's capital can help facilitate the process by providing support where needed.

After drafting, the joint response strategy would be **endorsed by Heads of Mission locally** before being sent to capitals. Following bilateral procedures, each capital would then normally approve the general parts of the document as well as their own specific contribution, i.e. their focal sectors and indicative financial allocations, but not comment on the focal sectors and allocations of other participating DPs.²¹

The joint EU strategies should **serve as a strategic umbrella to the DPs'** bilateral programming documents, and might allow substituting for these plans. Capitals will therefore need to verify whether this is possible. Through substitution, administrative procedures and costs could be decreased.

DPs' capitals may also consider adjusting their approach to **global and thematic funds**, for example only activating these in a country where they correspond to their agreed focal sectors under the JP or channelling them through existing local vehicles for the sector.

²¹ As mentioned in other chapters – timely government involvement, depending on local context, is key.



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DPs' capitals have now set up a **network of JP focal points** to support local JP processes. This network can be accessed by contacting the Joint JP Helpdesk in EEAS and DEVCO. See annex II for the role of this helpdesk and contact details.

8. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF NON-EU DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS?

Existing commitments made by EU Ministers clearly state that JP processes should be **open to all DPs** who are willing and able to participate. There is also an international commitment to making more use of JP in the [Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation](#)²².

Non-EU DPs are in fact **already involved** in Joint Assistance Strategies (JAS) in several countries. Norway and Switzerland are the most common participants.

Any interested non-EU DP would **need to share the aims and values** of the EU development cooperation as well as the principles of JP. They would also need to be able to agree to a division of labour, to synchronise their programming cycle, and to be able to provide indicative financial commitments of their support for each sector they will work in.

JP **should not be delayed** while the involvement of non-EU DPs is sought. Indeed such DPs may be more likely to come on board once they can see that the process has momentum and will go ahead with or without their participation.

All DPs in the country should nevertheless be **consulted** on the JP process to ensure that it is coordinated with their on-going work and to request feedback from them which can then be taken on board, at the discretion of those DPs who will actually be signing up to the joint strategy.

9. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR?

As with any strategic planning process, it is key to **consult** civil society, the private sector and also other relevant stakeholders (local authorities, parliamentarians, etc.). Such consultation should ideally take place early on in the process when participating DPs are looking to establish their overall approach and vision and to agree which sectors and issues will be targeted by the JP.

The joint strategy itself can also provide a useful platform for setting out **common approaches** to groups such as civil society and the private sector. In the case of the former, the joint strategy could for example integrate the EU Civil Society Roadmap that EU DPs have agreed to produce in all partner countries (see the 2012 [Communication from the European Commission on The roots of Democracy and Sustainable Development: Europe's Engagement with Civil Society in External Relations](#)²³). Such an approach can help enhance policy coherence for development and add value to the joint strategy. However consideration also needs to be given to whether the strategy will be

²² <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf>

²³ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0492:FIN:EN:PDF>



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signed by the partner country government and, if so, whether this might put limitations on the kind of content that could be included.

10. WHAT IF ONE OR MORE EU DPs DO NOT WISH TO JOIN IN?

Firstly, it can be useful to ensure that all relevant DPs fully **understand** what JP does / does not actually involve, given that misunderstandings on this issue have to date been the most common cause of non-participation. Attention can also be called to capitals' commitments on taking JP forward and on the DP's participation in JP processes in other countries.

While an EU DP may have sound reasons for not participating in JP in a given partner country, this should not hinder the process from going ahead with the other EU DPs that are present.

The **JP Helpdesks** at DEVCO EuropeAid-JOINT-PROGRAMMING-SUPPORT@ec.europa.eu and EEAS Joint-ProgrammingSupport@eeas.europa.eu can also be requested to provide assistance.

11. HOW DO YOU IMPLEMENT AND MONITOR JOINT PROGRAMMING?

A joint strategy should include a **framework for monitoring** its overall implementation and the results achieved against agreed indicators. Wherever possible, DPs should draw on existing in-country results frameworks to provide such indicators and reporting.

Along with macro-level economic and social indicators, it can be useful to include a small number of **key indicators for each sector** that is targeted by the joint strategy. In addition monitoring should include tangible efficiency indicators with regard to (a) aid fragmentation (e.g. number of sectors, number of donors per sector, average financing volume per sector and per project), (b) transaction costs (e.g. number of countries that substitute their bilateral cooperation strategy with the JP strategy, number of joint implementation initiatives etc.) and (c) predictability (indicative financial commitments, synchronisation of planning cycles etc.) so that an assessment can be made of what benefits JP has delivered in this regard. The menu of content for [joint response strategies](#)²⁴ provides further ideas for possible indicators.

Monitoring can be **led by Heads of Cooperation** on the ground, combined with joint missions from capitals where it is felt that this could add value.

The details of the individual initiatives that each DP will pursue in order to deliver their agreed contribution to the joint strategy are set out in their bilateral programming and/or implementation plans. These plans will be implemented and monitored in accordance with each DP's in-house procedures. Participating DPs may however wish to produce a **regular report** on such implementation to allow easy cross-DP comparisons and to complement the monitoring of the overall joint strategy.

Ideally, annual joint reports will be **sent to capitals** on the progress made on JP and lessons learned.

²⁴ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/joint-response-menu>



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12. IS JOINT PROGRAMMING RELEVANT IN FRAGILE & TRANSITIONAL STATES?

Ensuring the coherence and coordination of EU support is all the **more relevant** in fragile and transitional states and situations. In these countries, replacing several bilateral cooperation strategies and planning cycles with a single plan and cycle can provide significant benefits in terms of reducing fragmentation, lowering transaction costs and improving predictability. Such benefits can be particularly valuable in the areas of peace-building and the provision of basic services. This has been reflected in the uptake of JP in such situations – more than half of the countries where JP processes have been launched are classified by the OECD²⁵ as fragile states.

Fragile and transitional states and situations mean rapid and unpredictable change, so DPs need to be **flexible** and able to make decisions fast on the ground. As JP decentralises decision-making to local Heads of Mission and Heads of Cooperation, it is particularly well-suited to such an environment. Joint strategies for such countries can usefully be designed to be as agile as possible, allowing DPs to rapidly adjust their approach as necessary, and to include comprehensive vulnerability/risk analysis and mitigation policies.

JP processes in fragile states may seek to **include humanitarian work** in their division of labour, for example including EU humanitarian agencies, such as ECHO, in the process, as recommended in the Council of the European Union's Conclusions on an "[EU Approach to Resilience](#)"²⁶.

JP can also help support a **transition from relief and recovery to development** by joining efforts and helping build national capacity and a national development plan behind which to align these. Such an approach is recommended in the [EU's Communication on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development \(LRRD\)](#)²⁷ and in the "[New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States](#)"²⁸ which highlights the need for DPs to promote "country leadership and ownership", the "importance of harmonising with the national and local context", and the value of "one national vision and one plan to transition out of fragility"²⁹.

Given the above, it can be particularly valuable to involve as many of the **non-EU DPs** present in the country as possible (however see Question 8 regarding the caveats for this) and to link the JP and New Deal Compact processes.

13. IS JOINT PROGRAMMING RELEVANT IN MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES?

JP also adds value in Middle Income Countries (MICs) since these countries also still receive considerable amounts of aid. On the JP list there are several MICs included (see the [JP tracker](#)³⁰). For

²⁵ See OECD's Fragile States Principles (FSPs) <http://www.oecd.org/dac/fragilestates/>

²⁶ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137319.pdf

²⁷ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/humanitarian_aid/r10002_en.htm

²⁸ <http://www.pbsdialogue.org//documentupload/49151944.pdf>

²⁹ For a reference to the EU approach to conflict and fragility: "Operating in situations of conflict and fragility: EU staff handbook" http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/16/12/2014_-_1658/staff_handbook-web-dec12.pdf

³⁰ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/country-cases/joint-programming-tracker>



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some MICs, several DPs may well be in the process of **phasing out** their aid programmes. In such cases, JP can be useful to ensure coordinated exits by DPs and avoid leaving gaps in support. It may also be useful to include **non-aid elements** in the JP in such countries, such as trade and security, given that these are likely to be of increasing interest to DPs.

14. WHAT ADDITIONAL RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT JP PROCESSES?

The following resources are also available to provide support to JP processes on the ground:

- [JP Roadmaps Menu](#)³¹ & [Country Examples](#)³²
- [Joint Analysis Menu](#)³³ & [Country Examples](#)³⁴
- [Joint Response Menu](#)³⁵ & [Country Examples](#)³⁶
- [Quick Guide to JP](#)³⁷
- JP support and helpdesk:
DEVCO: EuropeAid-JOINT-PROGRAMMING-SUPPORT@ec.europa.eu
EEAS Joint-Programming-Support@eeas.europa.eu
- [JP Tracker](#)³⁸ - providing information on progress in all partner countries, where we do or will do Joint Programming.
- [EU MS guidance](#)³⁹

³¹ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/roadmaps-menu>

³² <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/3-country-cases#roadmaps>

³³ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/joint-analysis-menu>

³⁴ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/3-country-cases#analysis>

³⁵ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/joint-response-menu>

³⁶ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/3-country-cases#strats>

³⁷ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/jp-quick-guide>

³⁸ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/country-cases/joint-programming-tracker>

³⁹ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/eu-ms-guidelines>



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ANNEX I: WHAT COMMITMENTS HAVE WE MADE?

- [2014: EU Statement at the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation's High Level Meeting in Mexico City](#)⁴⁰ – flags the importance of EU+ JP and promoting partner country ownership of the process, aims to have JP operational in 40 countries by 2017 and to issue JP guidance by the end of 2014.
- 2012: EU HQ Letter to EU Heads of Mission⁴¹ – proposes 41 additional countries for JP and asks for subsequent verification from in-country EU MS representatives.
- 2012: EU Programming Instructions 2014-2020⁴² – affirm that joint analysis and strategies should be approved at country level with capitals only asked to comment on their own contributions; allows flexibility in the EU's programming cycle to align to national cycles.
- 2012; Joint letter⁴³ from HR/VP C. Ashton and Commissioners A. Piebalgs and S. Füle to Member States Ministers
- 2012: New EU Development Policy, "An Agenda for Change" ([Communication](#)⁴⁴; [Council Conclusions](#)⁴⁵) includes a commitment to JP, including division of labour and timing synchronisation.
- 2011: EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan⁴⁶ – commits to take forward JP at the country level.
- 2011: EU DGs Meeting – agrees priority countries for JP and asks for subsequent verification from EU MS' representatives in-country.
- 2011: EU Informal Meeting of Development Ministers – affirms the need for a single, joint EU strategy in each partner country, synchronised to the national planning cycle.
- 2010: Letter from all European Development DGs to all European Ambassadors in partner countries⁴⁷ – commits to doing more JP.
- 2009-2010: Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness⁴⁸ – commits to accelerating the implementation of JP and proposes identifying pilot countries.
- 2009: Lisbon Treaty⁴⁹ – states that the European Union has the competence to carry out a common policy in the field of development cooperation.
- 2007: EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour⁵⁰ – suggests that EU donors

⁴⁰ <http://effectivecooperation.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/FinalConsensusMexicoHLMCommunique.pdf>

⁴¹ [http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/09/02/2013_-_](http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/09/02/2013_-_1119/letter_from_eu_hq_to_heads_of_mission_requesting_joint_programming_reports.pdf)

[1119/letter_from_eu_hq_to_heads_of_mission_requesting_joint_programming_reports.pdf](http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/09/02/2013_-_1119/letter_from_eu_hq_to_heads_of_mission_requesting_joint_programming_reports.pdf)

⁴² http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/19/11/2012_-_1627/eu_programming_guidelines_-_2012.pdf

⁴³ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/commissioners-letter-eu-development-ministers-joint-programming>

⁴⁴ http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/24/10/2012_-_1820/eu_agenda_for_change_-_2012.pdf

⁴⁵ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130243.pdf

⁴⁶ http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/10/11/2012_-_1734/eu_common_position_for_busan_-_2011.pdf

⁴⁷ [http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/07/11/2012_-_](http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/07/11/2012_-_1333/letter_from_eu_dgs_to_ambassadors_on_dol_jp_-_2010.pdf)

[1333/letter_from_eu_dgs_to_ambassadors_on_dol_jp_-_2010.pdf](http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/07/11/2012_-_1333/letter_from_eu_dgs_to_ambassadors_on_dol_jp_-_2010.pdf)

⁴⁸ http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/10/11/2012_-_1939/operational_framework_on_aid_effectiveness_-_2011.pdf

⁴⁹ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT>

⁵⁰ http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/30/05/2012_-_1223/eu_code_of_conduct_on_division_of_labour.pdf



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limit themselves to three sectors per country and to five per sector and commits to JP.

- 2006: External Relations Council Meeting – commits to synchronising to national cycles and urges flexibility in EU donors' planning procedures to allow alignment.
- 2006: Common Framework for Drafting Country Strategy Papers and Joint-Multi Annual Planning⁵¹ - sets out a path towards JP and principles for joint strategies.
- 2005: EU Consensus on Development⁵² - sets out a common aim and principles for EU donors' development work and commits to working towards JP.
- 2005: External Relations Council Meeting⁵³ - highlights the need for JP.
- 2004: Ad Hoc Working Party on Harmonisation

Further commitments on better coordination of EU development aid date back to 1976.

⁵¹ http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/10/11/2012_-_1917/common_framework_for_drafting_country_strategy_papers_-_2006_0.pdf

⁵² http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/01/04/2011_-_0622/The_European_Consensus_on_Development.pdf

⁵³ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/87093.pdf



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ANNEX II: SUPPORT AND HELPDESK

In order to support the JP processes at country level a support and helpdesk function has been established. Below you will find the components of this function and the contacts within the central EEAS and DEVCO helpdesk.

- EEAS and DEVCO as well as many EU Member States have their own JP focal point(s) in HQs. They can be contacted any time by their field offices on specific questions related to local JP processes.
- In addition the EEAS/DEVCO focal points provide for a central helpdesk function. This helpdesk serves the Member States HQs focal points as well as all field offices. It can be accessed through the following e-mail accounts:
 - EuropeAid-JOINT-PROGRAMMING-SUPPORT@ec.europa.eu
 - Joint-ProgrammingSupport@eeas.europa.eu
- Specific tasks that the central helpdesk conducts are:
 - coordinate feedback to documents submitted to HQs (roadmaps, actual JP documents);
 - coordinate the work of the consultants;
 - organise in-country support missions (could be jointly with Member States HQs);
 - provide a half day training session on JP, in Brussels as well as Member States' capitals;
 - update the dedicated [Cap4dev website](http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming)⁵⁴ including the JP tracker.

⁵⁴ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming>



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3. ROADMAP MENU

Joint Programming Roadmap Menu

A roadmap is a document that sets out who needs to do what and when in order to make joint programming (JP) a reality in a particular partner country. It is drafted by Heads of Cooperation on the ground. Below is a menu of ideas for content, based on the documents that have been agreed around the world to date. The menu is not prescriptive, should be applied as appropriate in the specific country context and respect DP's internal requirements and procedures.

1. Overview

This section could:

- Define what JP is and why it is seen as beneficial;
- Set out commitments made by the EU and Member States on JP;
- State what has happened on JP to date in the country including any Heads of Mission / Heads of Cooperation commitments to take the process forward;
- Show how JP fits with national priorities and on-going aid effectiveness initiatives (including the New Deal in the case of fragile states) and highlight any government endorsement of the process;
- Summarise the key steps that will have to be taken, e.g. agreement on common analysis, synchronisation, common vision, division of labour and indicative financial allocations.

2. Delivery Schedule / Process

The **specific steps** to be taken could be listed in this section along with **indicative due dates and responsible people / organisations**. The use of external technical assistance could be included, if required. Some possible steps are listed below; their applicability and sequencing will however vary according to the partner country concerned. This also applies to the appropriate involvement of the partner country government in this process

- i. Agreeing on the JP goals and added-value. Please refer to the "Quick Guide", chapter "Why is Joint Programming a good idea" and FAQ document, chapter 2. What are the potential benefits – you will find good argumentations for JP there.
- ii. Soliciting endorsement from government for JP.
- iii. Agreement on the roadmap.
- iv. Division of future tasks between DPs with regard to the (drafting) process.
- v. Consultation with other DPs.
- vi. Consultation with other development actors e.g. civil society, private sector and other stakeholders.



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- vii. Agreement on the draft structure of the joint analysis.
- viii. Starting joint analysis (including contracting process as necessary).
- ix. Agreement on the draft structure of the joint response including sections on monitoring and evaluation and communication and visibility.
- x. Joint communication from Heads of Mission to capitals briefing on progress, attaching the roadmap and government endorsement, and flagging actions needed at the headquarters level (see below).
- xi. Analysis of current division of labour.
- xii. Agreement on future division of labour.
- xiii. Completion of joint analysis and endorsement by HoMs, sending joint analysis to capitals
- xiv. Capitals' approval of joint analysis (joint analysis and joint response, i.e. the joint strategy, might be approved together in one process)
- xv. Agreement on how each DP will synchronise to the national timetable (NB. If there are already plans on how this will happen then they could be included in the roadmap).
- xvi. Drafting of joint response with division of labour and indicative financial allocations.
- xvii. Local endorsement of joint response by HoMs.
- xviii. Sending of joint response to capitals.
- xix. Capitals' approval of joint response (joint analysis and joint response, i.e. the joint strategy, might be approved together in one process)
- xx. Signing ceremony. Details to be consulted between HQ and Country Offices. NB: A decision will need to be made on whether to sign the joint strategy (including the joint analysis and the joint response) with Government, taking into account any constraints on content that this would involve and the legal requirements for participating DPs. Some EU donors might have internal rules that require the signature of the joint strategy by the Government, in order to allow the Joint Strategy to substitute (parts of the) bilateral country programming documents.

3. Participants

A list of the **DPs** that will be taking part in JP could be provided here together with a list of potential non-EU DPs.

4. Communication to HQs

A joint communication could be sent with a copy of the roadmap to capitals, announcing and explaining that JP will be going ahead, what it will involve, and what specific support will be needed from headquarters to make it a success. **This could include soliciting permission**



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to substitute a bilateral country strategy with a JP document¹, proposing better synchronisation with the national cycle and asking for clarification on headquarters' procedures for approving a joint analysis/strategy. It could also set out local support for the process and emphasise the benefits offered.

5. Approach to Other Stakeholders

Agreed approaches of the EU and MS to government, other DPs, civil society and the private sector could be set out here, including how they will be kept **updated** on progress and when specific **inputs** will be solicited from them on the structure and content of the joint strategy.

6. Challenges / Risks

This section could set out the main **challenges** to the process and the **actions** needed by others – such as capitals and government – which may jeopardise the JP process if they are not taken. This assessment might be useful to have at an early stage of the JP process already.

7. Initial Proposals for Joint Strategy Structure

Please see the “[Joint Response Menu](#)”² document for a list of ideas for content.

¹ In case substitution is not possible, good integration of the bilateral country strategy to the JP document is to be envisaged.

² <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/joint-response-menu>



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4. JOINT ANALYSIS MENU

The **first step** in a joint programming process is often for EU donors to undertake a joint country analysis, which should not be just descriptive but truly analytical, also taking relevant EU Council Conclusions into account¹. It is advisable to make use of **existing analyses** that have been carried out by EU DPs or other institutions wherever possible².

As a joint analysis, it is recommended that it includes a basic set of **requirements** which could satisfy internal MS procedures for such a document. The decision on the structure of the joint analysis is ultimately up to Ambassadors and/or Heads of Cooperation **on the ground**.

A menu of potential content for a joint analysis is provided below. For all elements that are examined, consideration should be given to how the issue in question is **addressed by the national development plan**, together with constraints, challenges and perspectives not taken into account. It is important that issues such as gender equality and a rights-based approach are integrated throughout the analysis.

Existing analytical tools such as the Early Warning System³, risk assessment for budget support operations⁴ might feed into the joint analysis.

1. Political Situation

- Respect for democracy.
- Respect for human rights.
- Gender equality.
- Rule of law.
- Governance, corruption, accountability, incentives and power dynamics.
- Transparency.
- Security and conflict risk assessment/fragility.

¹ While a more complete template for a joint analysis document might be developed in case it is considered useful, the current menu provides an orientation for what a joint analysis might include

² Joint Programming partners to actively share information. The structure presented in this menu should be adapted according to what is already available. It is recommended to include reference to **international indicators** as suitable, such as the Millennium Development Goals, the Human Development Index, the Gini Co-efficient, Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments, the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), the World Bank's Doing Business report, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and relevant aid effectiveness indicators drawn from the monitoring framework of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.

³ http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/18/11/2014_-_1031/conflict_early_warning_system.pdf

⁴ Budget Support Guidelines <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/11996> and budget support EuropeAid webpage https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/budget-support-and-dialogue-partner-countries_en



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2. Economic Situation

- Macroeconomic situation.
- Public finance management (including domestic resource mobilisation).
- Productive capacity and access to resources (possibly including food security).
- Private sector.
- Employment.
- Remittances.
- Trade and investment climate.
- Vulnerability to shocks.

3. Social Situation and Vulnerability

- Poverty and inequality.
- Access to social services.
- Employment conditions.
- Social protection schemes.

4. Environmental Situation

- Overall natural resources management.
- Pollution.
- Effects of and approach to climate change
- Disaster resilience.

5. Regional Integration and Cooperation

- Involvement in regional cooperation initiatives and their influence on national policy (both actual and potential).

6. Country Capacities

- Public institutions and policies (including sector policies).
- Civil society.⁵
- Private sector (legal framework and other aspects that have an impact on private sector development).

7. Donor Presence

⁵⁵ This could include reference to the analysis carried out for the EU Country Roadmaps for Engagement with Civil Society in the country. See also <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-governance-civilsociety/minisite/eu-country-roadmaps-engagement-civil-society>



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- Description of donor presence in country (through a donor mapping).
- Short description of donor coordination and aid effectiveness mechanisms and how joint programming may build upon them.

8. Overarching issues

- Consistency with EU development policy (e.g. Agenda for Change).
- Final assessment of relevance of National Plan and its validity as basis for a joint EU strategy, including existence of a tenable national monitoring / results / performance assessment framework.



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5. JOINT RESPONSE MENU

A Joint Response replies to the partner country's national development plan and sets out the overall rationale and direction for the DP's support. It also coordinates which sectors/areas each of them will work in, what the overall objectives for these sectors are, and gives provisional figures for their financing over the strategy period. The individual projects and programmes that each EU development partner will carry out in order to implement their contribution to the joint response are however detailed in their own in-house plans, given that the joint strategy itself will not go down to this level of detail. The Joint Response is developed at the **partner country level** by EU Delegation and EU Member State staff¹ to ensure that it provides the best possible response to the situation on the ground. This also allows close cooperation with the government as well as civil society, private sector and other stakeholders.

The joint response, together with the joint analysis, composes the joint EU strategy. This joint strategy should **serve as a strategic umbrella to the participating DPs'** bilateral programming and implementation plans. Where agreed by the relevant DP, it could substitute the bilateral programming plans as far as possible, so as to decrease administrative procedures and costs at field and HQ². However, this means it would need to meet the in-house quality/legal requirements of each participating DP for programming plans. Capitals will therefore need to verify in time that this is the case.

The response constitutes the main part of the joint strategy. It will be endorsed locally prior to submission to HQ for approval of hierarchy (if needed). Approval of the joint strategy, including the joint analysis and the joint response, will follow internal rules of the participating DPs. After approval, DPs will sign the joint strategy. DPs can also ask the partner country to sign the joint strategy if they desire, after taking into account any implications this might have for the content of the joint strategy³.

The joint response should build on the findings of the joint analysis that has already been carried out and should include the following core elements:

- An **overall** vision for participating DPs' support to the country, setting out objectives for each sector to be covered.
- A commitment to **synchronise** DPs' planning cycles to the national cycle.

¹ In some cases, the European Investment Bank and/or like-minded non EU-donors may wish to join and work together within the existing JP Framework

² Joint Programming documents can replace Multi-annual Indicative Programmes/National Indicative Programmes/Single Support Frameworks or other programming documents if their quality meets the standards for bilateral programming documents (see also the related regulations on EU instruments). In JP countries the EU MIP/NIP/SFF reviews will be synchronised with partner country planning cycles.

³ For example in case of synergies with the CSO Roadmaps process, the opportunity of a government endorsement/signature of a Joint Programming document should be carefully considered. It is also possible to exclude sensitive parts (i.e. analytical part) from the version to be shared/signed by the government. See also <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-governance-civilsociety/minisite/eu-country-roadmaps-engagement-civil-society>



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- A clear division of labour that shows which EU DP will work in which sectors, including a clear definition of sectors of intervention⁴.
- Indicative multi-annual **financial allocations** from each EU DP to each sector.

Beyond these core elements, the document can be shaped as local Heads of Mission and Heads of Cooperation see fit. The inclusion of a partner-country results framework for each sector on outcome/impact level⁵, and of a monitoring and evaluation framework for the Joint Programming process itself are highly recommended. Details of DP's sectoral/thematic objectives, individual projects, programmes and delivery modalities will usually be left to each DP's bilateral programming and implementation plans, which can be set out as they see fit. Such plans lay down how DPs will implement their respective contribution to the Joint Strategy, in line with its timing and coherent/coordinated amongst themselves.

A **menu of ideas** is provided below, both on content for the core elements of the joint response and on content for other additional sections that the participating DPs might want to include. This is based on the documents that have been agreed around the world to date. It is **highly recommended to split drafting responsibilities between participating DPs**.

1. Executive Summary

A short summary of the main points of the Strategy.

2. Overview / Introduction

This section could include:

- A **background** for the rationale for joint programming, its assessed or envisaged benefits locally and what has been agreed on the subject in-country and by capitals.
- The **strategic objectives** of joint programming in the country with clear reference to the national development plan.
- An overall picture of **EU presence** in the country, including a list of participating DPs. Existing examples of joint implementation by EU DPs could also be shortly referred to.
- A summary of the **past and present cooperation** of all DPs and lessons learned.
- The distinctly **European values** and principles that DPs will aim to promote and adhere to - their "brand" of cooperation - referencing agreements made at both the headquarters and local levels.

⁴ The division of labour part could explain the progress envisaged (i.e. in sector concentration, number of donors per sector, etc) as compared to the present situation

⁵ Joint programming – through division of labour – can enhance a common approach to results in that it may result in a lower number of development partners working in any particular sector. It therefore, helps to increase the possibility to work together to agree the indicators in the partner country framework which they would like to follow and support in priority.



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- **Aid effectiveness initiatives/structures** in the country (what has been done, what works, what needs working on), respective lessons learnt and specific aid effectiveness work to be taken forward over the strategy period.

3. Reference to the Joint Analysis [core element]

- The joint response will be typically based on the joint analysis, which could be referred to by a brief **summary** of the dedicated joint analysis document that has been produced as part of the joint programming process (see separate Menu). It could conclude by identifying the overall current country needs and priorities.

4. Joint Response [core element]

This section should include the main elements in the Joint Response as set out in the Council Conclusions⁶

- Overall **vision** for EU DPs' support to the country, based on the joint analysis.
- How DPs will **synchronise** their programming cycles to the national cycle.
- The **sectors / areas** that participating DPs plan to support and a justification for them, based on the vision identified above and the joint analysis.
- For each sector, a brief **overview** of the current situation followed by the overall objectives to be aimed for, an outline of the general approach to be taken and a list of which DPs will contribute. It could also be indicated where joint implementation might be considered. NB. Approaches to sectors should naturally be based on the national development plan and respective sector plans, where they exist.
- A list of ongoing and planned interventions by each DP in order to give a snapshot of the overall division of labour. A second table could show the division of labour prior to joint programming.
- Details of **common positions** on key issues to be established / taken forward, for example on human rights and governance. This could include existing joint EU work such as Civil Society Roadmaps.
- For **fragile / conflict affected states**, a special emphasis on stepping-up coordination between relief, rehabilitation and development work to build resilient societies.
- Links of joint programming process with any military/security and defence operations
- A table showing the **indicative financial allocations** (disbursements and/or commitments, possibly following partner country preferences) from **each DP to each sector** over the strategy period, including both grants and concessional loans. DPs may decide to review these indications every year.

5. Monitoring, review and evaluation

⁶ EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 29 November – 1 December 2011) - Council Conclusions

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf



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This section could include details of how monitoring, review and evaluation of the results aimed for by the Joint Response will be carried out. (A separate section could deal with the overall JP process itself). It might include:

- A limited set of expected **results for each sector of intervention**, possibly on outcome/impact level and related **indicators** with which to measure progress. These should be based on the national development plan and its results framework wherever possible, though may also include international measures (possibly including where feasible any **indicators on aid effectiveness** drawn from the locally agreed framework or the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation). They may include both macro economic and social indicators as well as selected sector indicators. In line with international good practice targets should be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound (SMART).
- An acknowledgement that more objectives, individual projects and programmes might be monitored under each DP's respective **bilateral** programming and **implementation plans**.
- A commitment that progress in implementing the Strategy will be **reviewed** on a regular basis, e.g. annually, and stating what this will include, for example tracking of the agreed indicators and a presentation by each DP of a possible standardised report on the delivery of their bilateral implementation plan. There could also be a more in-depth review to examine the overall approach, division of labour and indicative financial allocations, proposing adjustments where necessary in addition to laying out or updating a roadmap for the planning of the subsequent joint strategy.
- A commitment for a review of the **effectiveness and impact** of joint programming in the country which could take the form of a **Joint Evaluation** of the Joint Response. Its findings could feed into the following joint programming process.

6. Communication & visibility

This section could set out plans to enhance EU **visibility**, transparency on results, **voice** and **impact** and include commitments to establish joint **communications products**, such as:

- Joint website (with links to individual donors' sites) showcasing European support.
- Brochure showing the EU donors' work on in the country and what they have achieved.
- Joint newsletters and press releases.

It could also include agreement on standard text to be used in bilateral communications on projects and programmes, for example *"This [name of European donor] initiative is part of the overall Joint European Strategy for [name of partner country]."*

The inclusion of non-EU donor partners in joint communication activities is to be considered on a case by case basis.