



TIMOR-LESTE

**EU COUNTRY ROADMAP FOR
ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY**

2016-2020

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ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY

AECID	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CAFOD	Catholic Agency For Overseas Development
CBO	Community-based organisation
CPD-RDTL	Conselho Popular pela Defesa da República Democrática de Timor-Leste
CSF	Civil Society Fund of the Government of Timor-Leste
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
ETCAS	East Timor Community Assistance Scheme
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
EWER	Early Warning Early Response
FONGTIL	The NGO Forum of Timor-Leste
GHI	Global Hunger Index
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit / German Development Cooperation
GMF	Grupo Manajamentu Fasilidade – water users’ group
GoTL	Government of Timor-Leste
HASATIL	Hadomi Sustentabilidade Agrikultura Timor - agriculture network
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
JSMP	Judicial Sector Monitoring Programme
LCSO	Local Civil Society Organisation
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organisation
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NSA/LA	Non-State Actors / Local Authorities
NZAID	New Zealand Aid Programme
PNDS	<i>Programa Nasional Desenvolvementu Suku</i> / National Programme for Village Development
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
<i>suku</i>	Tetum word for village
TLCE	Timor-Leste Education Coalition
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

INTRODUCTION

Country context

Timor-Leste is often held up as a post-conflict success story. However, this was also the case before 2006, when a significant political-military crisis and subsequent election related violence in 2007 brought this story tumbling back down to reality. In terms of personal security, since 2006-2008 there have been notable reductions in various forms of violence in Timor-Leste. The reasons for this include a combination of the role of peacekeeping interventions which eventually transitioned into nationally owned decision making, a relatively stable political settlement, the government's attempts to 'buy the peace' with oil and gas reserves, effective state responses to threats to stability, ongoing development of a national police force and a range of responses by local actors and civil society organizations to insecurity.

A number of tensions and trends threaten to undermine the gains made to date, however. Various forms of violence persist, including those related to sexual and other forms of gender-based violence, the security sector and violence in urban areas, often linked to youth groups or land. Crucially, many of the factors that have brought some recent improvements to Timor-Leste's security situation appear precarious in the long run. For example, questions remain over how Timor-Leste can transition away from the highly enigmatic but centralised political domination of former prime-minister Xanana Gusmão, whether it can move away from a 'buying the peace' approach, which has been the predominant governmental approach since 2008, and how problems in the security sector can be resolved. Finally, while security has undoubtedly improved, this may be negated by socio-economic inequalities and questions around how gains made to date may be sustained (in the context of rapidly declining oil and gas revenues).

Of particular concern to civil society are uncertainties around whether the space for open debate and dissent toward government policies will narrow as the government moves further towards a more 'consensual' style and centralised political decision-making process. This is occurring in parallel to a shrinking of available funding channels for civil society advocacy and policy work.

The EU and civil society in Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste has a vibrant civil society. Indigenous and international civil society organisations (CSOs) are delivering social services, researching the changing development context, advocating on key public policy issues and fostering social life. Growing out of Timor-Leste's experiences of occupation and resistance, its membership and characteristics have changed as the independent nation-state has matured.

Civil society in Timor-Leste has been a significant partner for the European Union (EU) since its Delegation opened in November 2008, although the EU had been a major funder of programmes in Timor-Leste since 1999 through multilateral mechanisms. In the framework of the 10th European Development Fund (EDF), about 23% of the EU's development cooperation was provided through Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)¹. EU Member States

¹ European Commission, 2014, 'Evaluation of the European Union's Cooperation with Timor-Leste' Draft Final Report Volume 1, p.52.

such as Finland, France, Germany and Portugal also work with a number of international and local CSOs through their bilateral programmes and co-fund activities with the EU. Ireland, which had been a major supporter of civil society after independence, closed its development cooperation programme in 2012, as did Spain at the end of 2013.

The November 2014 *Evaluation of the EU's Cooperation with Timor-Leste* found that the EU was perceived by civil society stakeholders as a valuable, reliable and neutral partner. It has provided important financing to local organisations for programmes on relevant development issues. The Evaluation also found, however, that the EU did not engage strategically with civil society to build shared understandings and common purpose for addressing development challenges in Timor-Leste. There was no systematic, effective dialogue and sharing of lessons between CSOs and the EUD. Short-term project-based funding was unpredictable for CSOs and it fragmented and inhibited development outcomes. The EC's administration processes were burdensome for CSOs to manage².

The Evaluation's findings on the EU's engagement with CSOs were similar to the overall findings. All development partners are adjusting their goals and strategy to a changing political economy, one in which the state is the dominant development actor, funded by large but time-limited natural resource revenues. Government and non-government capacity and confidence has grown significantly, although poverty and instability underlie that competence. In accordance with the New Deal on Fragile States, which Timor-Leste helped broker, the Evaluation recommended that, across the scope of its work, the EU: systematically assess, and adapt its processes better to, the country context; develop stronger, strategic policy relationships; design sectoral programmes that strengthen country systems and can have long-term impacts on poverty; and improve outcomes on key issues like gender and the environment.

The Roadmap

This *Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Timor-Leste* will provide the background and priorities for a common strategic framework under which the European Union Delegation (EUD) and Member States can work with civil society. Its preparation was foreshadowed in the 2012 policy paper *The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations*. The European Commission (EC) set down its understanding of CSOs as strategic partners in development, stating that an empowered civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system and an asset in itself. The EC is committed to supporting CSOs to build stronger democratic processes and accountability systems and to achieve better development outcomes. In fragile or post-conflict situations, the EC recognises CSOs as important players in conflict prevention, peace-building and state-building³. This policy position reflects the EC's commitments under the *Paris Declaration*, the *Accra Agenda for Action on Aid Effectiveness*, the *Busan Declaration* and the *Cotonou Agreement*.

The preparation of this roadmap is thus one step in broader planning for the EU's work in Timor-Leste. Steps to make the EUD and EU Member States' engagement with civil society more strategic, effective and efficient are feasible and will benefit efforts to make the entirety of the EU's relations in Timor-Leste so. In its essence, the Roadmap aims at improving the

² EC, 2014, 'Evaluation' Vol. 1, p.53; Vol. 2, p.114.

³ European Commission, 2012, 'The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations', p.4; EC, 2014, 'Evaluation' Vol. 2, p.110.

impact, predictability, coordination and visibility of the EUD and Member States' engagement with civil society in Timor-Leste.

The EC has three strategies for improving the impact of the EU's support to civil society in partner countries:

- Enhance efforts to promote a conducive environment for CSOs in partner countries;
- Promote a meaningful and structured participation of CSOs in domestic policies of partner countries, in the EU programming cycle and in international processes; and
- Increase local CSOs' capacity to perform their roles as independent development actors more effectively.

Based on the research and analysis undertaken, this roadmap recommends four priorities for action by the EUD and EU Member States to help achieve the three goals above:

- Establish closer partnerships between the EU and CSOs to promote an improved environment and space for CSOs in Timor-Leste.
- Promote peace-building, civic education and awareness raising around fundamental rights.
- Support Civil Society's social accountability efforts to improve the quality and effectiveness of public policies and promote good management of public resources.
- Foster partnerships between CSOs and the government to enhance the quality of public goods, particularly in rural areas to reduce food insecurity, improve nutrition and economic opportunities.

The analytical part of this Roadmap has been developed through interviews with local CSOs, government representatives, EU Member States and other bilateral donors and programmes. A round of consultations with CSOs was held in May 2016 to validate the priorities mentioned above.

A summary of the analytical part and the priorities and actions will be made publicly available. The Roadmap is valid for the period 2016-2020. The EUD will contemplate the need to update the Roadmap, including priorities for engagement with civil society, in case developments significantly affecting the enabling environment for civil society occur, namely in the post-2017 elections context.

1 STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Defining civil society in Timor-Leste

The Roadmap adopts the definition of civil society set out in the European Commission's 2012 Communication: "All non-state, not-for-profit structures, non-partisan and non-violent, through which people organise to pursue shared objectives and ideals, whether political, cultural, social or economic. Operating from the local to the national, regional and international levels, they comprise urban and rural, formal and informal organisations"⁴.

The breadth of this definition is largely appropriate for Timor-Leste, where "civil society" captures many forms of association. In terms of formally constituted "civil society organisations", some are involved in development activities. These include local, district, national and international non-government organisations (NGOs). It also includes networks of NGOs such as Rede ba Rai (land network), Timor-Leste Education Coalition (TLCE), Rede Feto (women's network), HASATIL (agriculture network) and the umbrella NGO organisation, FONGTIL, which has over 300 "active" registered NGO members. Many international NGOs, community associations and volunteer-sending agencies were linked to Timor-Leste prior to independence and have formed long-term partnerships with Timorese development NGOs.

Civil society also includes community-based organisations (CBOs) operating within and between sukus (villages), such as water management groups (GMFs - Tetum acronym for Grupo Manajementu Fasilidade), farmers' groups, seed groups and the community committees established to implement the Government's National Programme for Suku Development (PNDS - Tetum acronym for Programa Nasional Dezenvolvimentu Suku). CBOs often form part of the reach of government and donor programmes into rural areas (e.g. water user groups maintain donor or government-funded infrastructure) and are also connected into farmers and trade unions, cooperatives and collectives. Note that many cooperatives and trade groups (such as farmers) operate for profit, although these earnings are usually relatively low.

Groups involved in religious and cultural practice include the formal church structures, orders, parishes and prayer groups, as well as social groups including women's, youth, veterans and sporting groups for girls and boys (football, volleyball and basketball). There are education providers, including catholic education providers, universities and vocational training organisations⁵. There are also a number of media operators in Timor-Leste which can to some degree be considered to form part of civil society – particularly the community radio stations and journalists' associations.

It is important to note that kinship ties and traditional authorities (*lia nain*) and beliefs play fundamental roles in defining social relationships in Timor-Leste. The formally-defined groups commonly understood to comprise civil society are formed by individuals who belong to traditional ancestral 'houses' (*uma lisan*) and are members of complex social networks with complex histories. They must draw on and respect strong webs of social and political relationships which provide the context in which their groups can act. This is not to make any definitive judgement about the scope for formal civil society groups to influence public policy and community life, but to acknowledge that the exercise of technical agency by civil society occurs within a context of maintaining the relationships that shape social action.

⁴ European Commission, 2012, 'The roots of democracy...', p.3.

⁵ Whalen M & Grenfell D 2013, 'Review of AusAID's engagement with civil society in Timor-Leste: Final report' (unpublished), p.12.

Local governance structures as well as the relationships that support national political leaders affect the scope for civil society to act. The roles of *suku* chief and *suku* council are set out in the constitution. They are not civil servants but have important mediation and organisation roles within villages, as well as strong lines of communication to the government through the Ministry of State Administration. There are also associations of community-based groups (*suku* leaders associations and farmers associations). The law governing *suku* governance is currently being revised to make the *suku* into a collective legal entity. This may lead to the delegation of additional responsibilities to *suku* level, including for public services and community empowerment programmes. That is likely to affect, in turn, how CSOs work at the sub-district level.

The EUD and EU Member States have worked with many actors from across the breadth of formally associated civil society in Timor-Leste. This paper focuses on the roles and capacities of Timorese NGOs and CBOs, as they are the most common recipients of European funding to date.

1.1 ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

1.1.a Basic legal rights

Political operating environment

Timor-Leste's political leaders must juggle three overarching and ambitious goals of stability, peace and prosperity and are making political, economic and social trade-offs in the way they do so. Timor-Leste has established many of the institutions and practices of a democratic nation-state, including through the Parliament, courts and bureaucracy. It has demonstrated commitment and capacity to convene genuine and democratic elections. Civil liberties, including freedom of political association, have been generally respected and freedom of speech is constitutionally protected⁶. Several occurrences suggest, however, that the long-term consolidation of strong democratic intent into substantively democratic institutions and freedoms cannot be assumed. In 2014, the government dismissed international judges and legal advisers and prepared legislation on the media that would potentially have curtailed freedom of expression⁷. It has been highlighted that the prime-minister's decision to bring a defamation action against two journalists from a local newspaper underlines the thin nature of the country's democratic politics⁸. The alleged defamation relates to an article in Timor Post in November 2015 about the tendering process for a USD 13m contract to install computers at the Ministry of Finance, where the prime-minister was an advisor at the time. National and international organisations protested against the decision of the prime-minister to press charges for 'slandorous denunciation' under Timor-Leste's penal code which may lead to a maximum penalty of three years imprisonment to the journalists involved. Such occurrences occur on top of structural vulnerabilities like widespread poverty, youth unemployment, old political divisions and opportunities for fraud and corruption which have grown as oil revenues have⁹. Senior government leaders have reacted strongly against perceived threats, with the response ranging from strong language threatening violence against misbehaving

⁶ Kingsbury D 2014, 'Democratic Consolidation in Timor-Leste: Achievements, Problems and Prospects', *Asian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp.189, 193-194.

⁷ Three articles in the legislation were removed after the President requested a review by the Court of Appeal; it found them unconstitutional. The final version of the law retained a fourth article assessed a second time by the Court as unconstitutional; the Official Gazette documented the Court's judgement alongside the legislation.

⁸ Prime-Minister rejects overseas criticism, 16 March 2016, The Economist Intelligence Unit, <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1114222495&Country=Timor-Leste&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Political+stability&u=1&pid=1684121152&oid=1684121152&uid=1> [last visited: 20 May 2016]

⁹ Kingsbury 2014,

youth, to steps to contain and arrest groups which have established (some allegedly armed) operations (such as Mauk Moruk's Revolutionary Council of Maubere¹⁰).

It is beyond the role of this roadmap to provide a full political economy analysis of the dynamics at play in Timor-Leste. In a future with potentially declining natural resource returns, Timor-Leste needs to diversify its economy and sources of revenue¹¹ under the risk of undermining the degree of stability and normalcy in every-day life attained in the last five years. The number of public demonstrations has declined since the formation of the fourth constitutional government in 2007. Moves such as those outlined above have, however, been interpreted by some stakeholders as possible steps towards the consolidation of elite political power and protection against criticism. Resource rents make the state the dominant stakeholder vis-à-vis the private sector, civil society and international donors and supporters. The fifth constitutional government has exhibited an Asian-style preference for strong macro-economic management, bureaucracy-driven consolidation of a 'strong state' and a commitment to long-run development¹². Some stakeholders caution that efforts to assert national leadership of the development agenda, 'Timorise' key institutions and manage an interventionist economic approach have been accompanied by carefully buying off dissent. Veterans' pensions, funding for churches, special economic opportunities for the Oecusse exclave and cooperation with the main opposition party, Fretilin, through a "National Political Consensus" are each valid public policy measures to support poverty reduction and stability. This consensus was further bolstered by the formation, in February 2015, of the current Fretilin-led coalition government, which includes almost all political parties represented in the Parliament¹³.

Civil society in this environment

The operating environment for civil society is understood to be relatively safe and free, but able to change quickly and not safe for all groups at all times. Creating and organising a CSO is considered relatively easy in Timor-Leste. The NGO Forum, FONGTIL, has registered CSOs since 1998, but since the Non-Profit Corporate Bodies Law 5/2005¹⁴ the government has required CSOs to register with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). MoJ initially required all applicant organisations to have capital of \$45,000. Following advocacy by FONGTIL, this requirement was dropped. Another limit is the requirement that a CSO be either a "foundation" or an "association". This is believed to rule out registration of less specific umbrella groups or social movements, which formed the genesis of modern civil society in the resistance. It is thought that many organisations have not yet registered with MoJ and CSOs have welcomed donors' willingness to accept registration with FONGTIL as a legal basis to enter into grant arrangements. Although it has sometimes been difficult to register with MoJ, CSOs do not report any difficulties or controls arising after registration. Many of those registered with FONGTIL are no longer considered active CSOs and the level and quality of services provided by FONGTIL to its members is weak.

¹⁰ Mauk Moruk was killed during a shootout with the police and military forces in the region of Baucau, east of Dili, in August 2015.

¹¹ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/timor-leste/overview>

¹² Cheung, ABL 2005, 'The politics of administrative reforms in Asia: paradigms and legacies, paths and diversities', *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp.262-263.

¹³ In February 2015, a unity government, that included the former parliamentary opposition, was brokered by Xanana Gusmão before he stepped down as prime-minister. At present, the government operates on the basis of national consensus between all parties in the legislature, with no real organised opposition.

¹⁴ The law "lays down the legal regime for non-profit-making corporate bodies, also known as NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations)" [unofficial translation from Portuguese of law's article 1].

National and community-based organisations have been advocates for Timor-Leste's development and they deliver and monitor important services to communities. Traditional leaders, village authorities, church leaders and cultural and sporting groups have helped stabilise and foster social life as Timor-Leste has recovered from national conflict. In 2014, national NGOs and journalists spoke strongly against proposed media legislation that would have made it difficult to criticise the government. They lobbied the President of the Republic to request the Court of Appeal to review the legislation's constitutionality. Theirs were relatively lonely voices with little opposition within the Parliament. Interestingly, the national political consensus since the 2012 election may have enabled local civil society to express dissent more comfortably, as the closeness between political parties has diminished the assumption that CSOs' advocacy is automatically aligned with an adversarial opposition. However, it may also have closed off an audience within Parliament for CSOs' analysis. With fewer small parties holding seats during the current parliamentary term and more cooperation between the government and opposition on the national budget, there is potentially less space to inject different information into debates. It has also been easier for CSOs to mobilise protests against external interests (for example, the Timor Sea Campaign¹⁵) than against internal interests. The culture of consensus has seen CSOs form new, sector-based advocacy networks, helping dampen the party political divisions in civil society which the 2006-2008 crisis prised open. An example is the land network *Rede ba Rai* which was formed to address a key policy issue that had yet attracted little attention from donors and government. The network became a primary source of information for donors.

Some stakeholders suggest that the operating environment for CSOs has deteriorated in recent years. CSOs which have spoken openly about some government decisions have been threatened in turn by the government, while CSOs which might have been expected to speak up have remained silent. Some CSOs have been threatened by veterans groups, for example on the south coast. Some commentators consider the government's Civil Society Fund a potential silencer of criticism by church and secular groups, particularly when selection procedures and outcomes lack transparency. Notably, the Government is now the largest funder of FONGTIL. Some CSOs have experienced a lack of transparent intentions from government in consultations on key legislation, such as the land law¹⁶. Other stakeholders point to active working relationships between ministries and civil society as sign of maturity in the ability of government and civil society to cooperate in the interests of development (for example, the Ministry of State Administration's Memorandum of Understanding with FONGTIL for its members to monitor the National Programme for *Suku* (village) Development, PNDS). A leadership transition within civil society is also likely to affect, over time, the ways in which civil society representatives speak and are heard.

It cannot be assumed that civil society will always be able to offer dissent. Many older activists have moved into government, academia or the private sector, getting less involved in advocacy. The emerging younger breed of civil society leaders is likely to be more interested in pursuing advocacy on particular policy issues, but may have less perceived personal legitimacy and social standing to draw on to gain influence. The government has previously

¹⁵ An example are the recent protests on 22-23 March 2016 in front of the Australian Embassy demanding Australia to negotiate its maritime borders with Timor-Leste and not to steal oil from the country. Although some observers note that, in this particular case, civil society may have been manipulated by the state in the promotion of its own interests.

¹⁶ The original plan for consultation devised by the Ministry of Justice allowed comments and submissions on the law within a three-month period. Despite praise, the process turned out to be severely flawed. Copies of the law were handed out on the morning of the consultations and the minister of justice misrepresented the law on multiple occasions, stating that its purpose was to ensure fair distribution of land to all people. Community concerns were dismissed and rarely, if ever, documented by government officials. Source: <http://press.anu.edu.au/apps/bookworm/view/A+New+Era%3F11781/ch09.xhtml> [last visited: 20 May 2016]

shown its defensiveness to civil society and inter-governmental critique. In 2014 it reacted against the Global Hunger Index (GHI) for suggesting Timor-Leste was failing to improve nutrition; in 2012 the government criticised UNICEF and Save the Children for reporting that Timor-Leste was failing the Millennium Development Goals; and in 2011 delayed the publication of a UNDP Human Development Report over concern at its findings¹⁷. Recent changes in the political environment will need to be watched closely for their impact on civil society.

1.1.b Organisational and financial sustainability

The ability of Timorese CSOs to function effectively over the long-term depends on their having capacity and sustainability in three inter-linked areas: their financial base, their organisational management and their ability to deliver high quality activities. Donor processes for funding CSOs and supporting organisational capacity building in Timor-Leste have been largely ill-fitted for the high-level objectives they pursue. Grant management has often focused exclusively on financial accountability, with less mutual accountability exerted for development and capacity impacts. External funding, whether from international donors or the government, will remain the primary means for Timorese CSOs at least in the 2016-2020 period. Organisational management is highlighted by CSOs themselves and by donors as weak on average, while many CSOs deliver good quality services and advocacy across a range of sectors. Drawing on fifteen years of experience in Timor-Leste, as well as from global practice, donors now have an opportunity to improve CSO impact by providing more predictable, longer-term funding and capacity building support.

Sources of funding for CSOs

CSOs in Timor-Leste are nearly wholly dependent on the government and/or international organisations for funding. While there are no legal barriers to raising money from domestic sources, there are few self-generated sources of funding. Even though Timorese society is strongly involved in welfare, particularly culturally-shaped (i.e. due to strong family and kinship networks), there is only a limited philanthropic base to sustain civil society activities. Engagement at the level of funding is more evident at grass root level, where a number of CBOs collect membership funds to support particular resources – and women’s involvement in such activities has been shown to be instrumental - but these are small. For example, water management groups collect a small fee from village members (50c per member per month) to fund repairs to water taps and pipes. Government and international funding can be expected, however, to remain essential to the operations of Timorese CSOs at least in the 2016-2020 period.

With regard to social corporate responsibility, the Timorese private sector is expected to remain relatively small for some time, with only few private companies engaging in philanthropy. These include coffee companies paying for health services in the coffee-producing district, Ermera, and petroleum companies funding CSO activities.

A few social enterprises are using innovative business models to support the delivery of essential services. For example, Casa Vida, a shelter for girls who are victims of domestic and sexual abuse, is supported by the restaurants Kafe Aroma and Doce Vida, which also trains women who’ve accessed the shelter’s services. While the restaurants are successful they cannot raise the scale of funding needed to support Casa Vida’s operations. The shelter

¹⁷ RDTL 2012, ‘UNICEF and Save the Children media campaign should be aligned with good international engagement’, press release 20 February 2012; RDTL 2014, ‘Global Hunger Index misrepresents progress in Timor-Leste’, press release 17 October 2014, viewed 3 November 2014.

remains dependent on donor funding and advice to improve the quality of shelter services and the organisation's internal governance.

From the emergency response that started in 1999 until about 2009, international partners were the largest source of funding to Timorese CSOs. These included bilateral donors, UN agencies and international NGOs. As the national situation stabilised after 2008, stakeholders shifted to a long-term development trajectory which, in a relatively small country, required fewer partners. The global recession in 2008 also eroded the funding base of many international organisations. Many bilateral and INGO operations have closed or downsized. Since 2010 this includes Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Irish Aid, Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), Concern, Trócaire, CAFOD, Save the Children and Peace and Development Canada, many of which had established relationships with Timor-Leste in the occupation era. Importantly, many of the organisations which closed had a particular commitment to strengthening the capacities of civil society, rather than seeing CSOs only as contractors. The number of international organisations active in Timor-Leste in 1999 and 2006-2008 was not necessarily sustainable in the long-term, but local CSOs have lost some well-established relationships, common values bases and funding sources with the withdrawal of international organisations.

Concurrently, since 2009, the government has become a significant funder of CSO activities in Timor-Leste. Several ministries and secretaries of state, including social solidarity, promotion of equality, health, youth and sport and tourism, provide grants or contracts for sector-specific activities that fit government plans. Donors seeking to improve the reach of government funding and ensure timely service delivery will need to work more closely with the government and non-government providers to improve government contracting, funding and monitoring procedures. For example, while the ministry of social solidarity funds part of the costs of emergency shelter provided by national NGOs to survivors of domestic violence, the payments are often made very late, do not cover organisational costs and salaries, do not grow annually in response to increased demand and are not dependent on regular service quality assessments.

Additionally, the growth in the national budget and the government's confidence in allocating it has allowed the office of the prime-minister to operate a Civil Society Fund (CSF) making small grants to CSOs. The establishment of the Fund reflected the desire of the government to mobilise people for the process of national development and its awareness that international donor funds had declined.

The CSF is one of the few small grants schemes remaining open to local CSOs and which is relatively easy to apply for. Its design reflects good intentions although it is unclear how well it contributes to development effectiveness.

About 80% of the CSF funds are channelled to parishes and religious organisations for pastoral care, education, Christian development, capacity building, administration costs and infrastructure. Of the remaining 20% of funds available, non-religious CSOs can apply for grants for civic education and poverty reduction; and activities should be aligned with the government's sectoral priorities. Guidelines and applications are in Tetum and grant size is tiered depending on the scale of a CSO's activities, from \$30,000 to \$500,000. While the scheme intends to support multi-year activities, it can only make one-year commitments. A small team administers the grants, managing a short-listing process which includes representatives of line ministries. The prime-minister exercises discretion over grant selections. The office faces the administrative burdens international donors have experienced

managing small grants schemes and is unable to monitor all projects in the field. There is a lack of clarity about results and value for money of the scheme and transparency is low. A comprehensive list of recipients has not been published. One (or more) national NGO has decided not to apply for CSF funds, assessing this as its best measure for remaining independent of government. During the round of consultations with CSOs held in May 2016, some noted that their dependency of government funds has led to their loss of ability to openly criticise the government for fears that it may affect their access to funds in future selection procedures.

Funding structure

A key constraint to the ability of Timorese CSOs to consolidate their organisational capacity and maintain and expand their activities is the structure of funding available. The majority of donor funding for local CSOs in Timor-Leste has been short-term and project-based. Donors and government fund organisations for a specific set of activities and a proportion of directly related staff and office costs. Donors (including the EU, European Member States and the US) use project-based funding because it is a straightforward way to manage the financial accountabilities their tax-payers demand. It is clear what activities the organisation will deliver and donors can monitor expenditure against very detailed project plans. If donors lack predictability on their own future funding, one or two-year project-based grants minimise the risk of not being able to meet forward-year contracted commitments. An example of this model is a small grants programme such as Australia's East Timor Community Assistance Programme (ETCAS). ETCAS ran for about ten years and achieved strong branding for Australia across the districts in Timor-Leste. It funded hundreds of small organisations for values of \$5,000 to \$50,000. For many CBOs and NGOs, ETCAS and small grants schemes like it run by NZAID, USAID and Irish Aid provided easy-to-access funds across a wide range of sectoral areas. In the post-conflict environment after 1999, these models helped get money out to district areas and engage citizens in development work.

Most of the funding for CSOs has been project-based and action-oriented (i.e. funding through CSOs as opposed to funding to CSOs). It has focused on poverty reduction, development and policy impact to the detriment of the capacity development of local organisations¹⁸.

Some INGOs (such as Trocaire, CAFOD; Caritas, etc) have used alternative models, which focus on the “partnership” dimension, and aim to expand mutual accountability from just financial tracking to results and capacity. This is a model that can also be found in the Australian-funded Justice Sector Support Facility¹⁹. This “partnership model” involves

¹⁸ Reviews of ETCAS found that development impact was inconsistent and often very weak. Moreover organisations attained little sustainable organisational capacity. Donors have since closed their small grants schemes. “*You can't build a country project by project*”: reliance on project-based funding makes it difficult for a CSO to maintain its own strategic, long-term intent, encouraging it, instead, to respond to the timelines and changing priorities of donors. For service delivery organisations, short-term funding weakens the quality of relationships with communities, their ability to work at a community's pace and their ability to deliver services that can be sustained longer-term. Advocacy organisations are prevented from conducting the long-term campaigns and dialogue required to realise impact. Facing “perpetual uncertainty”, CSOs spend too little time on activities essential for organisational longevity and performance, such as staff development, programme development, networking, relationship management and research and advocacy. CSO staff members spend significant time bidding for multiple projects to help cover office costs and it can be difficult to retain good staff. For more information see: AusAID Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012, ‘Working beyond government: evaluation of AusAID's engagement with civil society in developing countries’, p.13.

¹⁹ For example, the Justice Facility provided flexible funding to key legal and domestic violence services, with risks minimised by staff providing close accompaniment of partners' corporate management. This enabled organisations to adjust their activities and meet essential operational costs that allowed them to deliver services but which often weren't funded by other donors¹⁹. In line with development effectiveness principles, the model creates and exerts a higher level of trust and

providing core funding over at least a three-year period and “accompanying” the local CSO recipient in its work²⁰.

With the exception of a number of INGOs, as aforementioned, and Australia, most donors have been reluctant to provide multi-year core funding, which CSOs can use with some discretion for their own operational and policy objectives, as well as on activities that reflect shared objectives. Some donors’ funding rules explicitly prevent core funding.

1.1.c Participation in public life

The Government of Timor-Leste is the principal initiator of laws, although the Parliament, President of the Republic, civil society and religious groups can initiate the development of policy and legislation. The Parliament’s power to review and debate legislation can be side-stepped by the government’s power to pass decree laws through the Council of Ministers with no obligation for public consultation.

Entry points for civil society into the legislative process include:

- Policy formulation – by collaborating between CSOs and with parliamentarians to draft proposed laws, such as the law against domestic violence; or conducting feasibility assessments and community consultations on proposed policies;
- Policy development – by influencing parliamentarians and parliamentary committees to review proposed laws or budget allocations;
- Policy promulgation – by lobbying the President to veto or refer legislation to the Court of Appeal, as in the case of proposed land laws in 2012/13;
- Policy reform – by lobbying parliamentarians or the Court of Appeal to amend existing laws, as in the case of the Penal Code which didn’t protect victims of sexual, gender-based or domestic violence adequately during judicial proceedings; and
- Policy implementation – by monitoring government services, collecting data, and proposing and lobbying for ways to improve service delivery, for example monitoring the operations of mobile health clinics and working with the Ministry of Health to improve service quality.

The Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030 (SDP) stands as the government’s long-term vision and programme for developing a peaceful and prosperous civil society. Civil society is mentioned only briefly in the SDP and there is no clear definition of civil society’s role in national development processes²¹. In practice, government and civil society are negotiating and renegotiating their relationships and respective roles through their process of interaction in sectors and through grants. The coordination mechanisms envisaged by the government for the implementation of the SDP, Development Policy Committees, which were to have included civil society, have not been established. Some ministries have established policy committees on key issues (see 1.2.a). The government has invited CSOs to monitor particular programmes and policies at district levels. For example, in 2014 the Ministry of State

respect between partners and requires active relationships and a willingness of both parties to identify and address problems openly.

²⁰ Where the local CSO has the capacity to manage it, a multi-year agreement with core funding allows scope for organisations to adjust objectives and activities in response to monitoring and evaluation. This provides the CSO with the opportunity to spend time building relationships with government and partners and focus energy on improving the quality and impact of its services and advocacy activities. Well-planned, integrated training and close accompaniment of CSOs, as well as up-front agreement on reporting and dispute resolution processes, provides the donor with confidence that their partners are managing their grants with probity and accountability. CSOs which are constantly seeking new funds or are scared of losing funds, and which are not working with a donor within the context of a mutually supportive relationship, are less likely to be open about the capacity and governance challenges they face.

²¹ Whalen & Grenfell 2013, p.20.

Administration signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to enable FONGTIL to monitor the implementation of the National Programme for *Suku* (village) Development (PNDS) in thirteen districts. Civil society organisations have also been invited to join networks that oversee the performance of state institutions at the district level such as the Gender Based Violence Referral Network and District Disaster Management Committees. More recently, in May 2015, the prime-minister signed a Memorandum of Understanding with FONGTIL to conduct social audit of the government's work in four pilot areas (health, education, infrastructures and agriculture); the National Network for Social Auditing - *Rede Nasional ba Auditoria Social* (ReNAS) – was established under FONGTIL.

CSOs must build constructive relationships and present their findings sensitively to ensure their voices are welcomed. Many CSO leaders have backgrounds in resistance networks, which give them access to government officials and legitimacy as collaborators in the independence struggle. Donors have a role to play, in their focal sectors, in encouraging government's initiative to welcome civil society monitoring. Where sectoral coordination by the government is weak, donors share policy information among themselves, including INGOs. Sector meetings do not generally include local CSOs, however. Local CSOs note how few opportunities they feel are open to them to build relationships and influence donor priorities, including with the EU.

1.2 PARTICIPATION AND ROLES

1.2.a Participation in public policy formulation

Timorese CSOs shape policy-making by delivering services, monitoring government service delivery and advocating for evidence-based policy. Their level of impact on government and parliamentary decisions has been variable, with good access to decision-makers not always being translated into action by policy-makers²². This reflects a number of variables, potentially including political standing, the electoral cycle, the variable capacity for policy formulation and budget execution across the government and the sheer scale of the development challenge and the difficulty of choosing advocacy priorities. Civil society and the government have established sectoral forums which allow CSOs space to join policy discussion and propose new ideas. For example, the Superior Council on Defence and Security in the President's Office includes Fundasaun Mahein; the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries' Consultative Council on food security and nutrition includes HASATIL; the Petroleum Fund Consultative Council includes two members representing CSOs; and the National Network for Conflict Prevention, hosted, by the Secretary of State for Security includes several CSO members. Parliamentary committees often seek CSOs' views on budget proposals. At other times, government is more likely to treat civil society as a group to be informed and to whom public policy must be "socialised".

Evidence shows that the relevance and quality of public policy in Timor-Leste would likely be increased if a diverse range of voices were heard, particularly from the districts²³. Some successful examples include the work of women's organisations and their supporters to develop and promote a law against domestic violence, which was critical in creating policy space on an issue that affects over a third of Timor-Leste's women in their lifetimes.

²² Ingram 2013, p15.

²³ Whalen & Grenfell 2013, p18.

At the national level, a number of NGOs have established reputations for good quality policy analysis in their areas of expertise. For example, Belun on conflict incidence, La'o Hamutuk and Luta Hamutuk on economic policy and natural resources, Fundasaun Mahein on the security sector, the Judicial Sector Monitoring Programme (JSMP) on justice policy and court operations, Rede ba Rai on land policy and mediation and legal aid for land conflict disputants and TLEC for education quality. Their collection and analysis of information is important to national and international stakeholders, as there is relatively little in-depth and nuanced coverage of Timor-Leste issues from foreign media and the quality of domestic media analysis tends to be limited. Information collected by CSOs is not, necessarily however, changing public policy. Further work is needed to understand how public policy changes in Timor-Leste, from both a supply and demand perspective. As the situation in Timor-Leste changes from an overriding concern with stability to the dominance of economic policy, there is potentially space to increase civil society expertise on economic issues and how policies impact on Timor-Leste's development goals, while maintaining a watch on security issues. In this regard, and through their outreach to community level, CSOs have a unique voice to bring to policy reform. Donors can help facilitate CSOs' contribution to policy-making in sectors where they have long-term relationships and investment.

1.2.b Transparency and accountability

Civil society's role in transparency and accountability is essential to good governance in Timor-Leste and the political space for it needs to be fostered and protected. Some Timorese CSOs have established expertise in monitoring government policy and programmes both from within government institutions and externally to them. There appears to be increasing capacity and maturity on the part of both NGOs and government to accept independent monitoring which can help improve service delivery for the Timorese people, at least on less contentious areas of policy such as community development initiatives.²⁴

Some CSOs have established relationships and MoUs with government ministries which allow them to place staff within institutions. These monitor day-to-day performance – such as in the Office of the Prosecutor General, committees of parliament and in the national police's community policing programme – or accompany government staff and community members to monitor programmes in the field – such as on PNDS. These arrangements help establish constructive relationships whereby civil society has access to good amounts of information and government staff and civil society members can discuss how to improve policy and programmes. CBOs which are formed from within particular communities often work to improve *suku* governance and monitor services in cooperation with government staff (for example water user groups). Changes to the local governance law will have an impact on how *suku* councils and community members work together with more delegated authority.

Other organisations undertake research and analysis externally to government. This includes national NGOs monitoring the budget, justice and security issues. They publish media releases, analytical papers and research findings regularly. It is difficult to track the impact of this work, beyond when it triggers particular government responses. Working externally allows these NGOs to play an important watchdog role and to connect with international monitoring networks (such as jurists and transparency organisations). A lack of access to full information on government policy can be a constraint, as can funding to maintain this work, and improve its quality, in the long-term. Organisations which employ strong monitoring methodologies, such as collecting data on incidents of conflict in all sub-districts, are better

²⁴ Whalen & Grenfell 2013, p25.

positioned to provide evidence of the government's positive performance as well as policy weaknesses. The potential for rapid changes in the enabling environment for civil society, noted earlier, is of particular relevance for those NGOs monitoring and critiquing government policy.

1.2.c Service delivery

After independence, when government systems were emergent and weak, donors, INGOs and local civil society played a critical role delivering services across Timor-Leste. Currently, at sub-district level, service delivery gaps are still often filled by CSOs which provide services in a wide range of sectors: agriculture, natural disaster response, literacy, legal education, conflict resolution, health, water and sanitation and climate change adaptation. The majority of donor funding for civil society is directed to service delivery.²⁵ The level of motivation shown by civil society actors in mobilising and supporting community members is highly positive, reflecting a sense of national purpose and pride in development. A challenge is to ensure the quality and sustainability of non-government service delivery. This is variable across organisations and sectors.

As the government has clarified its development objectives and its capacity and budget have grown, it has become essential for all stakeholders, donors and CSOs alike, to align with government policy and work within or closely alongside government systems. This is important both at the national level and with district and sub-district administrators and *suku* chiefs and councils. However, there are no established standards or patterns of government and NGOs working together on services and modalities are defined very much on an ad-hoc manner, with some actions not even integrated in the policy framework.²⁶

In some sectors, such as health, international and national NGOs have memorandums of understanding with line ministries to work in under-served areas and in ways that align with government's policy (e.g. to support mobile health clinics, etc.). At the community level, CBOs are a key partner in sustaining government services, for example seed farmer groups and water user groups. Other NGOs are implementing innovative programmes, for example in mothers' nutrition, and using evidence to advocate that government integrate these innovations in their own programmes. The fight against domestic violence and provision of shelter services is another area where CSOs play an important role, with some funding by the Ministry of Social Solidarity.

Non-government service delivery, including by NGOs and churches, is likely to remain relevant in Timor-Leste for some time. Recognising that national civil society constitutes part of national systems, coordination and alignment will be the key to ensuring non-government providers help strengthen country systems in coherent ways and to facilitate the scale up of successful small initiatives. The government's ability to set standards and policy priorities but contract-out, regulate and monitor actual service delivery will be important where it is unlikely that government will be able to deliver all services itself.

1.2.d Inclusive and sustainable growth

Timor-Leste's economy is dominated by its oil and gas revenues and the value generated by the private sector is relatively small. Agriculture is the largest employer in Timor-Leste, engaging about 80% of the population, followed by the public sector, construction (driven by

²⁵ Whalen & Grenfell 2013, p6.

²⁶ Whalen & Grenfell 2013, p6.

public spending) and wholesale and retail trade services.²⁷ In this context, about 92 cooperatives with 10,000 members (as of 2011) and an unknown number of social businesses (those owned by the poor or with a social welfare objective) contribute a very small amount of the value of the economy. They do, however, play an important role in providing skills training and generating household income, particularly for women.²⁸

Local and international CSOs are working either as social businesses or supporting them. One area of focus is artisanal products including handicrafts and food products, marketed either to the local market or to tourists. Local or national NGOs working in this area include The Alola Foundation, Empreza Di'ak, Centro de Desenvolvimento Comunitário in Baucau, Organizasaun Haburas Moris in Bobonaro, Mos Bele in Maubara (formerly supported by the Portuguese cooperation) and the Canossian Sisters. Civil society is also active in using microfinance mechanisms to support economic growth and livelihoods. In 2011, about half of all cooperatives were financial cooperatives and had generated about \$1.3 million in savings.²⁹ The two national NGOs providing loans, insurance and savings mechanisms to poor and rural people are Moris Rasik, whose loan portfolio was about \$5.4 million in 2010 with 10,000 clients and Tuba Rai Metin with 7000 clients and \$1.9 million in loans in 2010³⁰.

There is little information published about the impacts of civil society, government and donor work to boost small business and microfinance. Viability is a key challenge for community groups and NGOs working in these areas. Many, including women's groups, have succeeded only marginally. Common challenges for social enterprises include weak value chains, poor product development, lack of access to markets and capital, weak business skills and market-based business planning and donor dependency. Female entrepreneurs may be additionally constrained by family and traditional obligations and unequal access to credit, technology and business skills³¹. Many of the enterprises in which CSOs have sought to engage women have focused on a limited range of handicraft products. These reflect existing gendered divisions of labour and expertise and create a surplus of goods for which there is insufficient consumer demand. Assumptions about women's ability to turn this small-scale production into meaningful incomes, and that they will gain more power and independence as a result, are often poorly thought through³².

1.2.e Conflict prevention, peace building, state building

To date, CSOs have played important roles, among other local actors and local leadership, in generating citizen demand for, and engagement in, peace-building, state-building and nation-building processes. NGOs have conducted their own advocacy on government policy and initiated citizen dialogue processes and policy discussion forums at both national and district levels. These initiatives include CEPAD's dialogue process to identify "Priorities for Peace" which are now being carried forward by policy groups on each priority. Belun's Early Warning Early Response (EWER) system provides an active monitoring, analysis and response feedback loop to address local issues. It has established 43 sub-district level Conflict Prevention and Response Networks and conducts research and advocacy on national level

²⁷ SEPFOPE 2014

²⁸ UNDP 2012, 'Mobilize Social Business to Accelerate Achievement of Timor-Leste MDGs(2012-2015) Project Document', p10.

²⁹ UNDP 2012

³⁰ <http://www.microcapital.org/microcapital-brief-national-insurance-timor-leste-nitl-tuba-rei-metin-moris-rasik-introduce-life-microinsurance-products/>; http://www.morirasik.com/About_Us.html

³¹ UNDP 2012, pp11-13. While several Ministries and large donors including UNDP, IFC and the ADB are active in the area of private sector development, there is little published in the way of evaluations and programme results.

³² Trembath A, Grenfell D & Moniz Noronha C, 2010, 'Impacts of National NGO Gender Programming in Local Communities in Timor-Leste', RMIT,

conflict dynamics. FONGTIL and Luta Hamutuk engage through District Development Forums to monitor government service delivery at the local level. Other national and district-based NGOs have played crucial roles in monitoring and influencing government performance in the economic, justice, security, health, education and other development sectors.

National and district-based NGOs have proven that interacting directly with cultural attitudes and traditional mechanisms can be a powerful means to generate societal change. For example, the NGO Hametin Demokrasi no Igualidade led a process to engage local and national NGOs, state actors and local leadership to develop a district-wide agreement on *Tara Bandu* regulations to govern social and environmental norms in Ermera district. Such processes are acknowledged by multiple actors as being extremely important contributions to social cohesion and a vibrant democracy. They demonstrate that citizens and local actors also have the power, capacity and responsibility to make changes in their social situation, and should not only rely on state institutions to respond to local challenges. CSOs need to continue playing a bridging role to channel citizen voices and concerns to government. Many are likely to continue their initiatives to address legitimate concerns of rural poor through democratic means – helping avoid further threats to stability by groups like CPD-RDTL.

1.3 CAPACITY

As noted under section 1.1.b, the long-term effectiveness of Timorese CSOs depends on their financial base, their organisational management and their ability to deliver high quality activities. Credibility in the eyes of the community and government derives generally from an organisation's ability to deliver high-quality services or advocacy activities, in line with community needs. Stakeholders agree that management and implementation capacity in civil society has grown significantly since independence. There are credible, capable partners available with whom donors can work. There is also a strong commitment to learning and improvement on the part of CSOs. Capacity overall tends, on average, to be stronger in national or Dili-based NGOs which have had greater access to sustained funding, mentoring, training and information than have many district-based NGOs. Conversely, district NGOs may have more clearly articulated missions as their mandate is more specific.

1.3.a Legitimacy, credibility and internal governance

Legitimacy

It does not appear to be any research specifically examining public perceptions of the representativeness and legitimacy of CSOs in Timor-Leste.

Some CSOs like HAK and FOKUPERS have a strong sense of membership, which may offer legitimacy among their members and may have enabled them to survive over time, even through periods of reduced donor attention. Others gain legitimacy with their target beneficiaries or community networks³³.

Government and donors appear to accept the legitimacy of the CSOs that they consult with, whose analytical work they draw on (see 1.2.a) or whose services they choose to fund (1.2.c).

³³ This is particularly the case for advocacy when consultation processes are seen to be neutral and well organised and if there is a feedback loop enabling beneficiaries or research participants to receive copies of the reports their data contributed to and to engage in follow-up processes.

In the case of efforts to improve the status and well being of women, these may encounter resistance at community level, but may also find legitimacy by engaging with practices in the rich community life, which forms the primary identity for many people in Timor-Leste.³⁴

Credibility & Leadership

Many organisations were initiated by resistance and youth leaders and today are a training ground for young leaders. One challenge for generating a younger and more diverse leadership is that the perceived legitimacy of many civil society leaders has resided in their personal histories in the resistance. As many of these leaders move on and a new, often better educated generation takes over, the challenge is for them to establish their relationships and credibility in other ways, not linked to a past of resistance.

Organisations focusing on women's rights and needs, such as Rede Feto, Fokupers, PRADET, GFFTL and ALFeLa, have been important in cultivating women's leadership in formal civil society and putting issues that affect women on the national agenda. Women are still, however, in the minority of leaders and staff across CSOs.

NGOs' work has also had mixed impacts on the recognition of women's leadership in the community. Participation in projects and collective organisations may improve some women's status as leaders and experts, and their eagerness to exercise their leadership by sharing their knowledge and skills with other women and girls, but this may not always be recognised within the community.³⁵

While change is occurring, traditional male-dominated images of leadership tend to persist and women spend more time than men on reproductive and household maintenance roles. It is important for CSOs to consider the extent to which their activities and opportunities create a "double workload" for women.³⁶

Internal governance

Internal governance tends to be weaker, on average, compared to programme implementation capacity. Yet this is not the sole responsibility of CSOs; donors' attitudes and schemes also play an important role³⁷. Many donors do not undertake capacity assessments of the CSOs they plan to work with and where capacity assessments are undertaken, they often focus on technical issues like financial procedures, rather than on leadership and organisational politics. It is also unclear the extent to which donors consider the organisation's commitment to gender equality in its recruitment, management and programming. Additionally, donors' project funding combined with the tendency to provide ad-hoc training priorities that are not backed up by sustained mentoring limit organisations' opportunities to consolidate international management procedures and retain skilled staff.

In contrast, medium to long-term partnerships between donors and CSOs provide the opportunity to stabilise internal governance over time. In Timor-Leste, there is evidence that Timorese CSOs' internal governance has improved and consolidated when donors and

³⁴ Trembath A, Grenfell D & Moniz Noronha C, 2010, pp.15-16.

³⁵ Trembath A, Grenfell D & Moniz Noronha C, 2010, p.10.

³⁶ Trembath A, Grenfell D & Moniz Noronha C, 2010, p.11.

³⁷ In saying this, it is important to clarify whether the expectations held by donors of Timorese CSOs are fair and realistic, especially given the history of occupation, resistance and crisis which interrupted most Timorese people's education, encouraged secret communications among tight networks of trusted people and prevented the open exercise of leadership. See: Whalen & Grenfell 2013, p7. Morrison E 2013, 'The history of CAFOD in Timor-Leste. Part two: 2000 – 2013' CAFOD, p12.

recipients have linked grant agreements to an assessment of the CSO's existing capacity, formulated a plan for improving capacity over time and provided intensive mentoring and training³⁸.

1.3.b Programme and project management

Programme management capacity is critical to CSOs' ability to deliver and maintain good quality services and advocacy. However, there is no systematic analysis available of programme management capacity in CSOs of different types or in different sectors. Stakeholders interviewed and the analysis available suggests that capacity varies from high to low depending on organisations' longevity, previous support and continuity in leadership and staffing.

A high percentage of the 267 organisations that participated in a 2013 baseline capacity assessment conducted by FONGTIL reported having key procedures documented and in place that support good programme management, including a vision and mission, human resource management, financial policies, methods to assess beneficiary needs, risk assessments and evaluation plans. However, actual implementation of such procedures appeared weak: 77% of organisations said monitoring and evaluation was undertaken only in response to donor requirements; less than 35% reviewed and adjusted their budgets on a monthly, three-monthly, six-monthly or annual basis; and few appeared to provide regular capacity development for staff.³⁹ This belies the fact that good work gets done by CSOs, perhaps not always under the rigorous systems preferred by donors.

1.3.c Research and advocacy

Timorese NGOs employ a variety of skills and methods in policy advocacy. Many of their strategies are appropriate to a context in which they must negotiate a way between the highly personal and informal ways in which social and political relationships work and information is shared in Timor-Leste, and the more formal structures of the state. Their success is dependent on government ministers and ministries, which have different levels of receptiveness to receiving feedback, ideas and criticism. Access and receptiveness often depends on timing, informal meetings and the personalities and relationships of the advocate and the government decision-maker.

As the political environment changes, several CSOs have initiated a shift in their advocacy approaches, moving away from a purely activist model (which featured during and after independence) and embracing a more dialogue and partnership oriented approach, whereby CSOs are involved in public policies and even monitor government's public services.

³⁸ Even some of the longest established CSOs in Timor-Leste have, at times, relied on donors' commitment to stick by them during periods of weak governance. A donor's willingness to do so can help CSOs to rebuild for the long-term. This "partnership" model has seen donors or their intermediary organisations support the development of CSOs' organizational capacity in governance, financial management, reporting, programme implementation and sustainability, all of which support programme quality. It is an intensive model. Methods include regular information sharing, frequent monitoring visits to the organisation's office as well as to field sites, provision of common-sense advice to deal with challenges, periodic audits, risk management, targeted mentoring and formal training. Such partnerships have worked best where there is a sense of shared values, mutual trust, flexibility and commitment by donor staff, meaning the CSO feels able to bring problems to the donor's attention and work through them together to find solutions. See: Wilson, B 2014; Hameed S 2013, 'Capacity Development: an evaluation of Trócaire's capacity development approach in Timor-Leste'.

³⁹ Soares E & Zen K 2014, 'FONGTIL members' organisational capacity assessment MOCA Analytical Report' FONGTIL / Insight, December 2013-January 2014, pp.4-5.

The skills employed by CSOs tend to work fairly well in Timor-Leste's context, but could be strengthened over time. National NGOs tend to have a good understanding of the political context they operate in, allowing them to advocate on broader policy issues, while district-based NGOs tend to have a good understanding of service delivery problems and are most strongly networked with district-based officials and community members. Preparation for advocacy appears relatively informal, although some NGOs map stakeholders and strategies. It is often difficult to access information from government about policy and programme plans and results.

Systematic monitoring and research is used by relatively few organisations. Those whose data, collected at district or below-district level, aids their advocacy includes Belun (conflict monitoring), TLCE (education monitoring and lobbying), Luta Hamutuk (government project implementation monitoring) and JSMP (court case and justice sector monitoring). Various communication methods are employed to target relevant stakeholders, including distributing reports to stakeholders, making presentations at sector meetings and holding seminars. Face-to-face communication is often most effective, due to a strong oral culture, and many NGOs are effective at talking with stakeholders at all levels of government and society. Organisations could improve their communication planning, testing key messages with audiences and tracking impact of their communications.⁴⁰ An important consideration for the future is how to build greater demand from the Timorese people for good public policy. If public opinion lends legitimacy to advocacy objectives, CSOs need to improve their skills in engaging with the public as well as with a government and donor audience.

1.3.d Organisation, coordination and collaboration

Timorese civil society has formed domestic networks and joined international networks in a range of sectors. During the Indonesian occupation, despite severe controls, the church, peace activists and clandestine resistance built domestic and international networks that enabled them to share information and channel support to the population. With independence, the ability to connect, communicate and collaborate freely across geographic areas within Timor-Leste, as well as with like-minded people and organisations internationally, is important⁴¹.

Civil society has formed a number of domestic networks of local NGOs and CBOs. A network structure has been used to enable NGOs to share resources and promote a coherent public voice on key policy issues. This includes the women's network on the development of the domestic violence law and the land network on land legislation. As noted in 1.2.a, CSO network representatives also participate in some government-led sectoral networks. Networks are also used to support the delivery of services to people. The gender-based violence Referral Network operates in each district and allows government and NGOs to refer clients to the appropriate legal, health and shelter services and to share case information. CSOs like Red Cross also participate with government bodies in District Disaster Management Committees that review disaster preparedness and assist with coordination during disaster response.

Connections to international networks have been important for CSOs seeking to influence the Timor-Leste government and development partners. Making these connections is strategic as

⁴⁰ Results from unpublished research.

⁴¹ These connections remind Timorese that they are cared about and part of a larger world, while they also provide information, funding, learning and opportunities for joint action. They can be important for women's groups in particular, showing them that they are part of a broader movement for change and that their objectives derive legitimacy from national and international commitments. See: Trembath A, Grenfell D & Moniz Noronha C, 2010, p.16.

the government itself is a strong participator in international networks (such as the G7+ group of fragile states) and plays a role as a good international citizen (for example, as making donations to other countries in crisis). Some CSOs have joined ASEAN's NGO networks and participated in the ASEAN People's Forum, a strategic move given the government's policy priority to become a member of ASEAN. Others lobby and communicate with prominent international organisations such as the ICRC, UNICEF and UN special rapporteurs. Partnerships with INGOs in Timor-Leste also provide the opportunity for LNGOs to gain publicity overseas, for their expertise to inform international research and advocacy and for NGO members to receive training, travel opportunities and support from those INGOs' networks. This can generate a sense for those LNGOs of being valued and respected.⁴²

⁴² Morrison E 2013, p.17.

2 CURRENT EU ENGAGEMENT

2.1 STRUCTURED EU DIALOGUE WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

Despite the importance of dialogue to achieve the ambitions for the New Deal for Fragile States, EU engagement to date with CSOs in Timor-Leste has been mostly limited to the provision and management of grants for activities, particularly in areas such as peace-building, youth training and agriculture, with little consultation on sectoral policy or economy-wide issues like transparency and state accountability.

This lack of strategic engagement has had several impacts. First, it has hampered project effectiveness, with results appearing to have been limited and fragmented.⁴³ Second, it has also hindered mutual understanding between the EU and local CSOs⁴⁴. Third, it has prevented the development of relationships beyond funding or technical cooperation.

The New Deal recognises that the transition from conflict to development is inherently political. Civil society has an important role in peace-building and state-building in Timor-Leste. CSOs say they would like to work with the EU with a sense of shared purpose to overcome shared problems. They would welcome the EU's leadership in creating and sustaining mechanisms for genuine policy dialogue between the EU, CSOs and government. While policy dialogue is not always easy – for example donors and local CSOs have very different ideas on good agricultural policy – sustained policy engagement would help build trust between the EU and civil society and generate increased civil society support for sector policy and programmes.⁴⁵ It would provide space to share information and learning about democracy, peace-building and development, as CSOs feel they have important contextual understanding and experience to share of what works and doesn't. They would also like the EU's support to build their longer-term capacities. Access to mutual learning could improve the quality of strategic analysis, advocacy and programming for both the EU and civil society.

2.2 POLICY DIALOGUE FOR AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

EU support to civil society to engage with the government, either in terms of laws and policies affecting CSOs' capacity to operate or in terms of facilitating their contribution to national policy formulation, exists but is limited.

The EU has funded UN agencies and NGOs to support policy dialogue, policy making and policy advocacy. For example the EU funded UN Women to work with Fokupers to draft the law on domestic violence. It also funded Ba Futuru to advocate to the government on

⁴³ EU review vol1 p.vi.

⁴⁴ Local CSOs find it difficult to understand the EU's priorities, what opportunities for engagement exist and why particular organisations are successful in grant rounds and others not. They tend to interpret what they see as inflexible grant design and implementation procedures as the Delegation's failure to understand the Timorese context and the challenges LCSOs face. They do not necessarily understand that policies and operational procedures are set by the EU at a global level and the constraints that EUD country staff face. Similarly, the lack of systematic dialogue and monitoring means that Delegation and Member State staff have relatively limited knowledge about the roles, capacities and knowledge of the CSOs that they work with. Staff members undertake ad hoc monitoring and are responsive to grant recipients who approach them with problems. However, with few staff members and high workloads, their attention is directed necessarily towards contract administration and financial tracking, with insufficient time spent on systematic capacity assessment, design, monitoring and accompaniment. Regular policy-based dialogue between the EU and CSOs, as well as more systematic programme monitoring, would improve understanding of each other's context and perhaps facilitate more cooperative planning and risk-taking.

⁴⁵ Whalen & Grenfell 2013, p6.

community-level protection for women and children facing violence. Such funding mechanisms help the EU maintain its reputation for neutrality while supporting local actors to engage in national policy development. Many CSOs have their own relationships with government leaders and ministries and ways of working effectively within the political context.

As noted above, since 2014 a number of worrying trends in the enabling environment for civil society are emerging. As the EU seeks to strengthen the quality of its political and policy dialogue with the government and take a more strategic approach to sectoral programming,⁴⁶ it should assess opportunities for including and advocating more directly for the role of civil society in national policy and programme design, focusing on EU's priorities sectors. CSOs have been most positive about their experience of policy dialogue when it occurred as part of a structured, deliberate programme of engagement.⁴⁷

Where the EU has sector relationships with the government, it could work with the government and civil society to map who and how civil society is delivering or monitoring services and support the design of cooperation mechanisms. The EU can also support its CSO partners to increase their capacity in policy research, analysis and formulation and working with the media.⁴⁸ To create and keep open more space for government and civil society, the EU and Member States can draw on its own reputation as neutral development partners with strong ties to the solidarity movement pre-independence.

2.3 MAINSTREAMING CIVIL SOCIETY

To date, EU mainstreaming of civil society appears to have been limited. The EU and Member States' primary mechanism to fund civil society has been through Calls for Proposals. Some co-funded programmes also include CSOs as partners. For example, the Rural Development Programme IV has contracted seven NGOs to design and deliver community training and to evaluate programme impacts at community level. RDP IV has also supported CSOs to join government and donors in coordinated planning for the programme. Likewise, LNGOs and youth centres are integrated within the design of GIZ's Peace Fund activities, which promote joint training and activities between community, civil society and government members to support positive youth mobilisation. There appears, however, to be little sharing of information between EUD, Member States and civil society partners about how the peace and development context is changing.

The National Indicative Programme (NIP) of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) in Timor-Leste foresees support to civil society, in the order of about €4.6 million from 2014-2020, being mainstreamed into the EU's two focal areas, Good Governance (€30 million total budget) and Rural Development (€57 million total budget). Sector-wide programming for these two focal areas is currently under preparation, while the 10th EDF is still under completion.

As it programmes the 11th EDF, the EU is now including civil society input early in the design of new programmes. The NIP foresees mainstreaming CSOs to carry out "soft activities" such as community participation and awareness, cooperation with local authorities, training, research, advocacy and oversight. It recommends only limited support for direct service delivery by CSOs. The appropriate role for CSOs in particular sector programmes should be determined through particular analysis of the relative roles, strengths and

⁴⁶ EU review vol1 pvii.

⁴⁷ Whalen & Grenfell 2013, p6.

⁴⁸ Whalen & Grenfell 2013, p9.

weaknesses of government, civil society, communities and development partners in service delivery in particular sectors and geographic areas.

2.4 FUNDING CIVIL SOCIETY

Funding selection procedures

International donors have used a range of modalities to select and fund local and international CSOs in Timor-Leste. These include contractual relationships, partnerships that depend on a deeper relationship, consortium arrangements and support for regional networks (such as the Timor-Leste Coalition for Education – TLCE - which is linked to a Pacific-wide network for improving the quality of government education services). As noted above, small grants schemes have been a common modality, as are ‘calls for proposals’. Grant size ranges from \$5,000 to up to about \$1 million, depending on the objective and target groups. The EU, USAID, GIZ and Camões IP have each managed recent calls for proposals. Donors tend to manage bilateral funding schemes in-country as well as issuing global calls from head offices in which Timorese organisations compete internationally. As an aid modality, a call for proposals is intended to ensure transparency and neutrality in the selection of grant recipients. Common practice is to publish application information publicly; receive proposals by organisations which meet baseline eligibility criteria; and establish a selection committee comprised of donor staff, government and peak civil society representatives. Selection is made according to published criteria.

In principle, this approach provides transparency and a sense of a level playing field, while also allowing the freedom for CSOs to apply for grant rounds as suit their organisation’s objectives and funding needs. In practice, many organisations develop proposals to respond to the objectives for which funding is available, rather than maintaining a core set of activities that fit their mandate. Civil society members report that application requirements, particularly the EU’s and those which are set by a donor’s headquarters, are very difficult to understand and fulfil. This has led to international NGOs, not always those with a clear mandate or established relationships in the sector, being selected over LNGOs. Additionally, whereas donors working under a partnership model will select recipients with whom they share a long-term development vision and values about how to work, stand-alone procedures for calls for proposals may reward organisations that do not have legitimacy and capacity to work in a particular area. The EU is required to select recipients on the basis only of the proposal received. Staff are unable to contact other donors or organisations with which the CSO works or has worked to solicit information about capacity and performance. This principled approach to neutrality may reduce long-term effectiveness in practice.

Grant selection processes are also very time and resource-intensive for donors, as is the management of many small contracts. It appears that donors in Timor-Leste, including the EU, spend substantial time and effort up-front on transparent selection procedures and on managing contract requirements over the course of the grant. They spend comparatively little time building relationships with successful recipients and actively monitoring grant implementation. This is a significant weakness in helping ensure funding accountability and that grants have long-term impact. A donor which is absent from real monitoring can also increase the burden on other donors to monitor a CSO’s probity.

The EU’s and Member States’ reliance on stand-alone grant funding rounds is common to other donors in Timor-Leste. The strengths and weaknesses of project-based grant mechanisms used by many donors to Timor-Leste was outlined in section 1.1.b. Local CSOs

and other stakeholders value EU funding for civil society work in Timor-Leste and the openness of the EUD to meet with CSOs and discuss project progress. They express serious concern, however, about the impacts of short-term project-based funding and the EU's procedures for grants funding. Many of the following experiences have discouraged CSOs from applying, or from applying again, for EU funding:

- CSOs have found the EU grant guidelines, application forms, budget templates and contracts to be overly complex. They are difficult for CSOs to understand and implement, including in relation to what activity and budget revisions are allowed during implementation;
- The requirement that applications and reports be written in Portuguese or English has created dependency on international staff, volunteers or partner INGOs and has limited national staff members' understanding of their proposals and consequently their ability to implement projects.
- Expectations of CSOs' capacities have been unrealistic, namely in terms of CSO's technical capacity (its content expertise) as well as its organisational management capacity. Many CSOs can deliver good quality programs but internal governance is weaker in many organisations. Performance expectations need to be set against a baseline for both.
- Requirements on grant size and management have triggered CSOs to work in consortiums where these were not a natural fit. Some consortium arrangements have resulted in burdensome administration and coordination costs and tension between organisations.
- In other cases, the EU's capacity expectations and grant size preferences have been perceived by CSOs as leading to favourable selection of INGOs, some of whom appear to have had limited consultation with their proposed LNGO partners before submitting their proposals.
- While the EUD often agrees to contract addenda to amend project activities and budgets, at the outset CSOs may not clearly understand what level of flexibility the EU has to making adjustments.
- The EUD's overall budget management flexibility is constrained. For example, it is unable to extend project timelines to allow for slow-disbursing projects (noting that slow budget execution is a common challenge in Timor-Leste) or to redirect left-over money from the budget envelope to successful projects.
- The EU's strictness on funding only the percentage of the CSO's operational costs that reflects the size of the EU-funded activity (compared to funding core costs) has led to pressure on more flexible donors to absorb new or additional operational costs that arise. It has also encouraged a "grant-chasing culture" among LNGOs needing to maintain their operations which detract from time spent implementing programmes and building organisational strength.
- CSOs appreciate the EUD's "open door" which allows them to discuss project progress and problems. However some CSOs feel the EUD could have a stronger understanding of their operating context and more flexibility in programme management. Systematic, regular monitoring and relationship-building by the EUD might, as discussed earlier, help build mutual understanding of each other's opportunities and constraints and learning from each other's development experience.

2.5 COORDINATION

Coordination among all donors on matters related to civil society in Timor-Leste is weak. Each knows little of the others' funding size, CSO recipients or objectives and field cooperation is a lucky occurrence rather than a concerted goal.

Although many donors support the same organizations, they do not appear to share information about the organizations they intend to fund, nor do they conduct capacity assessments of proposed partners, either jointly or separately. There is no joint design of CSO programmes. Each agency follows its own funding guidelines. Agencies do not collaborate with CSOs and other funders to develop "global budgets". These would show all funds a CSO receives and allow the CSO and donors to avoid duplication and provide a basis for joint problem solving. No donor has made the most of opportunities to learn from CSOs and from each other about the changing development context in Timor-Leste and what makes for effective civil society programming.

2.6 LESSONS LEARNT

- Despite the limitations of the EU engagement modalities so far, the EU acknowledged that supporting civil society actors **is a key step in strengthening links between citizens and the state in Timor-Leste**. These links are crucial to strengthen the process of democratic transition, particularly in states such as Timor-Leste where this process remains fragile⁴⁹ and institution building is a priority.
- Furthermore, the EU and other donors appear to have evolved in the motivations guiding their support to civil society to go beyond service delivery (whereby CSOs are contracted to provide services). These motivations include democracy, peace and development and are in line with the policy framework set with the 2012 Communication on engagement with CSOs. However, their project-focus and strong emphasis on financial accountability and outputs works to the detriment of civil society ability to act as a development and governance actor on their own right (and not as a mere service provider) and fulfil its potential and to demonstrate real impact.
- For the future, **Timor-Leste's specific context** (including that of a fragile environment immersed in a democratic transition) should be considered when deciding on appropriate funding selection approaches and mechanisms. As noted above, there are about 300-400 registered NGOs in a country of about 1.2 million people. Visibility of development outcomes is weak, especially in rural areas. Open calls for proposals provide the opportunity for new or small organisations to access funding with which they may be able to implement innovative activities. It appears, however, that donors' tendency to support a large number of CBOs and NGOs for short-term project-based funding (particularly for service delivery), without proper assessment of their capacity or legitimacy, has dissipated the impact of the large amount of funding spent by donors on civil society.
- Over the last ten years, **a smaller set of highly capable local organisations with clear mandates in their sectors has emerged**. As donors' sectoral programming in Timor-Leste matures, it is worth donors being more deliberate about the nature of their support to CSOs (not just as service providers) and also about selecting and partnering with a number of CSO partners with a proven track record, legitimacy and relationships in their

⁴⁹ In Timor-Leste the priorities of stability and accountability are in a very delicate balance, with the latter occasionally compromised under the justification of protecting the former. The work of civil society in forming a bridge between citizens and state actors, increasing demand for accountability and encouraging evidence-based policy to meet citizen needs is important to increase prospects for longer-term stability.

sectors. This will also apply to the two sectors of cooperation of the EU in Timor-Leste: governance, on the one hand, and rural development, nutrition and food security, on the other hand. Donors can find ways to balance principles of competitiveness and transparency with selection based on demonstrated capacity and proven results⁵⁰. A range of models can be employed, such as: releasing restricted calls for proposals to a selected group of organisations; using direct awards with the well-established platforms; establishing multi-step selection processes whereby more information is sought from other donors and stakeholders on an applicant's performance to date; or training a wide range of initial participants and narrowing those selected over time based on performance⁵¹.

- When it comes to the operating environment for CSOs, it is workable yet since 2014 some a number of worrying are emerging, with risks to civil society representatives fluctuating over time. As a well-respected, neutral donor, **the EU could play an important role in monitoring and protecting civil society**, supporting constructive relationships between civil society and the government. In this, adequate policy dialogue emerges as an area where efforts will need to be strengthened.
- Mainstreaming also appears to be a priority, particularly in the two primary focal EU sectors, where incorporating civil society knowledge, actions and monitoring would improve the coherence and alignment of the EU's support to civil society. It would also provide a well-informed and more strategic basis for supporting policy engagement between the government, civil society and donors.
- More sustained long-term efforts towards the capacity development of CSOs also appear to be necessary, particularly in the fragile context of Timor-Leste. Adopting a partnership approach to working with civil society (and not just a project-based approach) needs to be considered to improve development impacts and civil society capacity over time.
- Finally, even if the proposed new ways of working may be time-intensive, require adjustment of funding guidelines and the allocation of more resources to staffing, they can be feasibly implemented if the EUD focuses on its key sectoral priorities. These new ways of working would be consistent with the overall effort to improve the strategic impact of the EU's relations with Timor-Leste.

⁵⁰ For example, over a five year period, Australia's Justice Facility, starting with open selection of partners to work on ending violence against women initiatives and progressively narrowed the competition as NGO partners proved their effectiveness.

⁵¹ AusAID Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012, p20.

3 PRIORITIES

For the 2016-2020 period, the EUD to Timor-Leste and Member States, together with both local and international CSOs (gathered in a consultation session organised in May 2016) identified the need to engage and cooperate in four key priorities. It is important to underline that such priorities have been identified in close cooperation with the EU focal points of cooperation, in an effort to ensure the alignment of the Roadmap with the EU cooperation portfolio in Timor-Leste.

The four identified priorities are:

PRIORITY 1

Establish closer partnerships between the EU and CSOs to promote an improved enabling environment and space for CSOs in Timor-Leste.

PRIORITY 2

Promote civic education and awareness raising on fundamental rights and on a peaceful and inclusive democracy.

PRIORITY 3 (*linked to the 1st sector of EU cooperation*)

Support civil society efforts to promote social accountability as a way to improve the quality and effectiveness of public policies and promote good management of public resources.

PRIORITY 4 (*linked to the 2nd sector of EU cooperation*)

Foster partnerships between CSOs and the government to enhance the delivery and quality of public goods, particularly in rural areas, to reduce food insecurity, improve nutrition and economic opportunities.

4 ACTIONS

Nota bene: the following table includes a first set of indicators. The will be further fine-tuned and streamlined with the indicators used in the programmes currently being identified for two focal sectors of cooperation, and those of the thematic programme CSO & LA.

Priority 1	
Establish closer partnerships between the EU and CSOs to promote an improved enabling environment (EE) and space for CSOs in Timor-Leste.	
Indicator(s)	
<p>1.1 Number of joint initiatives carried out by the EU and CSO with a view to promoting the EE in TL</p> <p>1.2. Number of times the EE-related topics discussed during the EU consultations with CSOs are included in the agenda of the EU political dialogue with the Government of Timor-Leste.</p> <p>1.3. Number of joint statements related to the enabling environment issued jointly by the EU and CSOs</p>	
Actions:	Funding/Instruments
A. Analysis: Studies, mappings and research	
<p>1.1. Mapping study of the CS landscape in Timor-Leste, covering: the situation of the EE (particularly emerging trends and changes since 2014) and an overview of the actors, spaces for engagement and entry points in the two sectors of EU cooperation (i.e. Governance, and rural development and nutrition) (see actions under 3.1. and 4.1.)</p> <p>Responsible: EUD, in close cooperation with Portugal and Germany</p>	1.1.: Support measures of the 2016 CSO&LA Thematic Programme (TP)/ Road Map Facility (RMF)
B. Policy dialogue, consultation and facilitation	

<p>1.2. Establishment of a more permanent dialogue with CSOs (i.e. consultations twice a year) closely linked to relevant events and/or political dialogue opportunities (e.g. before the budget debate, before Timor-Leste Development Partners Meeting, before the political dialogue between the EU and the Government in Timor-Leste)</p> <p>1.3. Based on the aforementioned research and dialogue, release joint communications/statements by EU and CSOs on issues relevant to the EE (i.e. Freedom of Information, access to transparent public funding, etc.) and other relevant topics (e.g. land, etc)</p> <p>Responsible: EUD + Portugal + Germany</p>	<p>1.2.: EU staff (both the cooperation and political sections) with support from Support measures of the 2016 CSO&LA TP / RMF / etc</p> <p>1.3.: EU staff (both the cooperation and political sections) to work with relevant actors in CS</p>
<p>C. Operational support including mainstreaming</p>	
<p>1.4. Support the development of systems and/or tools to monitor changes in the EE for CSOs, including the undertaking of a study on local funding sources (including line ministries public funds systems) and local fundraising opportunities in Timor-Leste</p> <p>1.5. Support the organisation of a CS forum and/or on-line platform to promote exchanges, share information and ultimately promote the visibility of CSOs' roles and work and contribute to strengthening the trust by the government and other key development stakeholders</p> <p>Responsible: EUD</p>	<p>1.4. & 1.5.:</p> <p>2017 (or onwards) CSO & LA allocation (to be further developed after the elections)</p> <p>Support measures of the CSO&LA Thematic Programme (TP)/ Road Map Facility (RMF)</p>

Priority 2	
Promote civic education and awareness raising on fundamental rights and on a peaceful and inclusive democracy.	
Indicator(s)	
2.1. Number of joint statements issues by the EU and CSOs on fundamental rights 2.2. Number of times fundamental rights are in the agenda of EU /CSO consultations 2.3. Number of workshops on human rights organized in Dili and the districts using screenings of episodes of the soap opera as basis for discussion	
Actions:	Funding/Instruments
A. Analysis: Studies, mappings and research	
n/a	n/a
B. Policy dialogue, consultation and facilitation	
2.1. Organise regular consultations with CSOs (see 1.2), around relevant questions such as the right to information, minorities rights, voter and civic education, etc and include human rights issues and concerns (when relevant) in the political dialogue between the EU and the Government. Responsible: EUD + Portugal + Germany	2.1.: EU staff (political and cooperation sections)
C. Operational support including mainstreaming	

<p>2.2. Production of 20 episodes of a soap opera on human rights and justice Responsible: EUD</p> <p>2.3. Organisation of a one-day workshop during the EU-TL week (May) on human rights and/or other cross-cutting issues such as such as climate change, gender, youth, land, etc. Responsible: EUD</p> <p>2.4. Operational support to peace building, civic education, awareness rising on basic and minorities' rights, youth engagement etc. Responsible: Portugal; Germany; Finland</p>	<p>2.2.: 2014/2015 EIDHR allocations – EUD 1,180,000 allocated for the production of a soap opera on human rights and justice</p> <p>2.3.: Budget line in the facility managed by the NAO Services for visibility of EU-TL Cooperation.</p> <p>2.4: GIZ through the Peace Fund programme provides funding and technical assistance to CSOs in the youth sector promoting non-violent conflict management, gender equality, human/child rights, civic education</p> <p>Portuguese Embassy and Camões I.P. provide small funds through the Small Projects Fund to support CSO to reduce poverty rates, social exclusion and to promote an integrated and sustainable local development, with prior focus on education projects</p> <p>The Embassy of Finland through its Local Cooperation Fund provides funds to projects with focus on gender equality and rights of marginalised groups.</p>
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Priority 3	
Support civil society efforts to promote social accountability as a way to improve the quality and effectiveness of public policies and promote good management of public resources.	
Indicator(s)	
<p>3.1. Number of EU and/or MS-funded initiatives aiming at supporting CSOs working on social audit.</p> <p>3.2. Number CSOs, supported by the EU/MS, that provide independent monitoring of government services at local and/or national level</p> <p>3.3. Number of initiatives led by the Government with a focus on Social accountability and CS participation in public policy oversight.</p>	
Actions:	Funding / instruments
A. Analysis: Studies, mappings and research	
<p>3.1. Mapping study of the CSOs active in social accountability and of the available spaces for engagements (claimed and invited). Indicatively the study should assess:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What Civil Society actors are playing a relevant role in social audit and social accountability in general at local and national level? Are there emerging actors? What is the role of the youth? • What invited and claimed spaces for dialogue and engagement exist, at local, sectoral and national level between CSOs, government and other State institutions? What Civil society actors have access (and don't have access) to dialogue and why? What are the entry exist points for a stronger engagement with CSOs at the different stages of the policy cycle? • How is Civil Society being organised to ensure a collective voice? What is the level of coordination, alliance and coalition building? How effective are existing fora and working groups? What are the key success factors? • What capacity needs are emerging (particularly in areas such as 	<p>3.1.: Bilateral funds for the 11th EDF PFMO programme (during the inception phase)</p> <p>Support measures of the 2016 CSO&LA TP / RMF</p>

<p>evidence based advocacy, engagement with the government and communication)? What strategies and tools can be used to address them?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the level of awareness of rights at grass root level? What strategies can be used to enhance citizenship? <p>Responsible: EUD, in close cooperation with Portugal</p>	
B. Policy dialogue, consultation and facilitation	
<p>3.2. Promote tripartite dialogue between EU, the Government and CSOs active in social auditing by strengthening the involvement of relevant CS actors (identified through the afore mentioned assessment) in the steering committee of the PFMO programme (even as observers) and any other relevant dialogue fora/ spaces for dialogue (to be further identified).</p> <p>Responsible: EUD & Portugal</p>	<p>3.2.: Use EU leverage to include the key Civil Society actors (possibly networks and coalitions) in the dialogue between the EU and the government on PFMO.</p>
C. Operational support including mainstreaming	
<p>3.3. Based on the assessment above (see 3.1.), support the capacity development of CSOs engaged in social audit efforts and include relevant CS actors, when relevant in the trainings offered by Camoes Institute (within the 11th EDF PFMO programme) particularly in the identified priority sectors.</p> <p>Responsible: EUD & Portugal</p> <p>3.4. Support exchanges amongst CSOs and coalition building to strengthen the collective advocacy role of CS.</p> <p>Responsible: EUD</p>	<p>3.3.: Oversight component of the PFMO programme (implemented by Camoes Institute) Grant to FONGTIL and Asia Foundation (CSO & LA 2016 allocation) with sub-grants awarded to CSOs active at local level undertaking social audit at local level - EUR 1,250,000</p> <p>2017 CSO & LA allocation (to be further developed after the elections) 2018-2020 CSO & LA Allocation</p> <p>Contingency funds within the 11th EDF PFMO programme</p> <p>3.4.: Budget line in the facility managed by the NAO Services for technical assistance, training and events.</p>

Priority 4	
Foster partnerships between CSOs and the government to enhance the delivery and quality of public goods, particularly in rural areas, to reduce food insecurity, improve nutrition and economic opportunities.	
Indicator(s)	
<p>4.1. Number of EU projects improving the quality of public goods, particularly in rural areas and/or targeting marginalised groups.</p> <p>4.2. Number of CSOs funded by EU and/or MS providing services in rural areas particularly to women, marginalised groups and communities at risk</p> <p>4.3. Number of for a/consultation mechanisms allowing to integrate the voice of CSOs into policy discussions around public goods</p>	
Actions:	Funding/ Instruments
A. Analysis: Studies, mappings and research	
<p>4.1. Mapping study of the CSOs that are active in the delivery of public goods and roles played at the different stages of the public policy cycle. Indicatively the study could look into:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What Civil Society actors are playing a relevant role both in service delivery (including innovation and piloting ne approaches) and advocacy & policy dialogue? Who are there emerging actors (i.e. youth, emerging movements, etc)? How do local actors interact with INGOs? • What is the level of development of PPP? What good practices emerge and what are the key success factors? • What capacity needs are emerging? What strategies can be used to address them? 	<p>4.1.: Support measures of the 2016 CSO&LA TP / RMF</p> <p>Bilateral funds (11th EDF)</p>
Responsible: EUD, in close cooperation with Germany	

B. Policy dialogue, consultation and facilitation	
<p>4.2. Based on the outcomes of the mapping, integrate key CS actors (beyond “the traditional EU grantees’ and INGOs) and private sector representatives (where relevant) into the available spaces for dialogue between the EU and the government around rural development, food security and nutrition</p> <p>4.3. Promote better interactions between the Government line ministries and CSOs, through more governmental field visits to EU rural projects where CSOs play a role.</p> <p>Responsible: EUD & Germany</p>	<p>4.2. & 4.3.: Use EU leverage to: (i) integrate relevant Civil Society actors in the formal structures for dialogue (i.e. working groups, ad-hoc fora, etc) and even the governance of the programme; (ii) promote exchanges between the Government and CSOs (e.g. through field visits, etc.)</p> <p>EDF 11th Agro-Forestry Programme</p>
C. Operational support including mainstreaming	
<p>4.4. Provide support to CSOs engaged in the economic development and/or the provision of public goods and services in complement to those of the Government (to pilot new approaches, reach out to marginalised communities, etc)</p> <p>Responsible: EUD & Germany</p> <p>4.5. Support the capacity development of the CSOs engaged in the economic development and/or the provision of public goods and services.</p> <p>Responsible: EUD & Germany</p> <p>4.6. Support exchanges amongst CSOs and coalition building around public goods</p> <p>Responsible: EUD</p>	<p>4.4. & 4.5.: CfP and contractual arrangements with CSOs developed by GIZ, UNICEF, etc</p> <p>TA support / CD provided to CSOs by GIZ, UNICEF</p> <p>4.6: Budget line in the facility managed by the NAO Services for technical assistance, training and events.</p>

5 DASHBOARD

Country: Timor-Leste		
Process indicators		
Area	Indicator	Achievement
Involvement of Member States in Roadmap elaboration	Member States present in the country are actively involved in the elaboration of the Roadmap	<p>Members States present in the country (France, Germany, Portugal) provided inputs to sections 1 and 2 and were involved in the drafting of the priorities, indicators and actions (sections 3 and 4).</p> <p>A meeting was organised in May 2016 following the consultation with CSOs to discuss the priorities and actions.</p> <p>Considering the PAGODA arrangements for the EU focal sectors of cooperation, MS involvement will be key for the implementation of the RM.</p>
Consultation with local civil society	The Roadmap has been prepared on the basis of consultations with a broad range of local CSOs respecting principles of access to information, sufficient advance notice, and clear provisions for feedback and follow-up.	For the analytical part (sections 1 &2), interviews were conducted were with selected representatives of civil society. With the support of the RMF, a round of consultations was organised in May 2016, in Dili, Timor-Leste, which was attended by approximately 40 representatives of CSOs to present, discuss and validate the priorities for engagement identified by the EUD. The inputs received during the meeting were consolidated and shared by email with all the participants who had the opportunity to provide comments which were incorporated in the present version.
Joint actions	Member States present in the country are actively involved in the implementation of the Roadmap priorities	Members States were actively involved in the drafting process and are expected to take part in the implementation of the priorities

Outcome indicators					
DRAFT PRIORITIES	DRAFT INDICATORS	TARGET	BASE LINE	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	MEANS OF VERIFICATION
1. Establish closer partnerships between the EU and CSOs to promote an improved enabling environment (EE) and space for CSOs in Timor-Leste	<p>1.1 Number of joint initiatives carried out by the EU and CSO with a view to promoting the EE in TL</p> <p>1.2. Number of times the EE-related topics discussed during the EU consultations with CSOs are included in the agenda of the EU political dialogue with the Government of Timor-Leste.</p> <p>1.3. Number of joint statements related to the enabling environment issued jointly by the EU and CSOs</p>	<p>1.1. Structured consultations twice a year</p> <p>1.2. At least every 1,5 year the EE is discussed in the political dialogue with the Government.</p> <p>1.3. At least two a year</p>	<p>1.1. Consultations are ad-hoc</p> <p>1.2. Done ad-hoc</p> <p>1.3. None</p>	EUD & MS FONGTIL	EUD reports (EAMR, political reports, human rights reports, etc) MS reports FONGTIL reports
2. Promote civic education and awareness raising on fundamental rights and on peaceful and inclusive democracy.	<p>2.1. Number of joint statements issues by the EU and CSOs on fundamental right</p> <p>2.2. Number of times fundamental rights are in the agenda of EU /CSO consultations</p> <p>2.3. Number of workshops on human rights organized in Dili and the districts using screenings of episodes of the soap opera as basis for discussion</p>	<p>2.1. At least one per year</p> <p>2.2. At least once per year</p> <p>2.3. Two workshops and mobile screenings followed by discussions in 13 districts</p>	<p>2.1. None</p> <p>2.2. Done ad-hoc</p> <p>2.3. None</p>	EUDMS AJAR	EUD reports (human rights and other political section reports MS reports ROM and evaluation reports of AJAR project AJAR own monitoring and regular reports
3. Support civil society efforts to promote social accountability as a way to improve the quality and effectiveness of public policies and promote good management of public	<p>3.1. Number of EU and/or MS-funded initiatives aiming at supporting CSOs working on social audit.</p> <p>3.2. Number CSOs, supported by the EU/MS, that provide independent monitoring of government services at local and/or national level</p>	<p>3.1 – 3.3. To be defined (during the formulation of the PFMO and the SA programmes, currently under preparation)</p>	<p>3.1. To be defined (base line information will be obtained through the mapping study of CSO active in SA)</p>	FONGTIL Asia Foundation Institute Camoos EUD Office of the	Mapping study FONGTIL & Asia Foundation monitoring and regular reports of the Eu funded SA programme

resources. (Linked to the 1st EU focal sector of cooperation)	3.3. Number of initiatives led by the Government with a focus on Social accountability and CS participation in public policy oversight.		3.2.and 3.3.To be defined (during the formulation of the PFMO and the SA programmes, currently under preparation)	Prime Minister (OPM)	ROM & independent evaluation reports of PFMO & SA programme Office of the Prime Minister reports
4. Foster partnerships between CSOs and the government to enhance the delivery and quality of public goods, particularly in rural areas, to reduce food insecurity, improve nutrition and economic opportunities (Linked to the 2nd EU focal sector of cooperation)	<p>4.1. Number of EU projects improving the quality of public goods, particularly in rural areas and/or targeting marginalised groups.</p> <p>4.2. Number of CSOs funded by EU and/or MS providing services in rural areas particularly to women, marginalised groups and communities at risk</p> <p>4.3. Number of for a/consultation mechanisms allowing to integrate the voice of CSOs into policy discussions around public goods (Check indicators developed by GIZ, UNICEF (for nutrition) to ensure consistency</p>	<p>4.1. and 4.2. To be defined (together with the colleagues from the focal sector)</p> <p>4.3. To be defined through the mapping study of the CSOs that are active in the delivery of public goods and their played at the different stages of the pubic policy cycle.</p>	<p>4.1. and 4.2. To be defined (together with the colleagues from the focal sector</p> <p>4.3. To be defined through the mapping study of the CSOs that are active in the delivery of public goods and their played at the different stages of the pubic policy cycle.</p>	GIZ UNICEF EUD	Mapping study GIZ, UNICEF reports ROM and evaluation reports

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: HISTORY AND NATURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN TIMOR-LESTE

Growing out of Timor-Leste's experiences of occupation and resistance, the country's civil society membership and characteristics have changed as the independent nation-state has matured. The following analysis summarises how civil society has changed over particular periods in Timor-Leste's recent history. It does not provide a full political economy analysis of those periods.

Pre-1999

In the militarised environment of the Indonesian occupation, the scope for formal civil society activities was limited. The clandestine movement, including women, students and youth, played a significant role organising resistance, distributing supplies and raising awareness internationally about human rights violations. The church provided an important sanctuary for civilians and activists and gained local and international respect for standing up for human rights⁵². Local NGOs, along with international organisations (after Indonesia opened access to tourists and investors in 1989⁵³) implemented health, agriculture, water, sanitation and other technical activities. A few politically-focused, or advocacy-based, organisations were established after 1996, as a broader political transformation occurred in Indonesia. They lobbied for the rights of political prisoners and their families. They included Yayasan HAK, now known as Asosiasaun HAK, which was the first organisation to use legal institutions to advocate against the violation of human rights. Internationally, civil society in many European countries, the US, Australia, New Zealand and Portuguese-speaking countries played crucial roles in raising awareness about the conflict in Timor-Leste and supporting journalists, church leaders and Timorese human rights activists⁵⁴.

1999–2002: Emergency and UN Administration

In the emergency phase after the vote for independence and the large-scale violence that followed it, many international NGOs (INGOs) established operations in Timor-Leste, often in liaison with local groups. During the period of UN administration from 1999 to 2002, the number of locally-formed NGOs (LNGOs) proliferated. The NGO Forum of Timor-Leste (FONGTIL) registered 14 NGOs on its establishment in 1998. These grew to 231 by early 2002 and 332 by 2006⁵⁵. Early on, they implemented activities such as voter education and registration, recording human rights abuses and rehabilitating housing and water systems.

The UN controlled the formal political process and design of state institutions tightly, in liaison with the leaders of the resistance and returning diaspora members⁵⁶. Political organisations, private companies and groups wanting to rebuild their country could access funding most easily as NGOs. Civil society, in the form of formally-constituted NGOs, flourished as a result of funding available from the UN, bilateral agencies and international NGOs. They were heavily dependent on aid⁵⁷. Not all civil society groupings transformed

⁵² Wigglesworth A, 2012, 'The Growth of Civil Society in Timor-Leste: Three Moments of Activism,' *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, pp4-5.

⁵³ Wigglesworth, 2012, p4.

⁵⁴ See for example, Maynard, O 2013 'The history of CAFOD in Timor-Leste; part one: 1990-1999', CAFOD

⁵⁵ Ingram 2013, 'Making and shaping public policy in Timor-Leste: institutions, actors and the weight of political history' p.14.

⁵⁶ Ingram S 2012, 'Building the wrong peace: reviewing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) through a political settlement lens', *Political Science*, vol. 64, no. 1, pp.3–20.

⁵⁷ ACFID 2008, 'Timor Leste Civil Society Analysis: report of an in-country consultation and desk review for strengthening civil society' pp.2-3; Holloway 2004, 'What is civil society in Timor-Leste?' p.9.

themselves, however. Some social movements, including women's and resistance organisations, as well as church and local self-help groups retained their own identities and approaches, irrespective of foreign funding⁵⁸. There was also some tension between LNGOs and international actors about the willingness of the international community to recognise local knowledge and Timorese culture and to involve local organisations as full partners in the aid process⁵⁹.

2002–2006: Independence

As the Government of Timor-Leste took over the national leadership with formal independence in 2002, the emergency response shifted to a longer-term development focus. The number of donors active in Timor-Leste declined, although national revenue was very small. Overseas Development Assistance provided about 80% of the national budget in 2002. Local CSOs with wider remits – governance, service delivery, peace building, human rights and capacity development - emerged. With the shift in governance, development actors reconsidered the role of CSOs in Timor-Leste. INGOs began to establish partnership approaches with LNGOs to support country-driven development efforts. Capacity-building and sustainability became a stronger focus, but these were hampered by the fractures which became evidence in the lead up to the crisis.

2006–2008: Crisis

The crisis period prised open old political divisions for many individuals and groups, putting pressure on the ability of civil society to establish a voice and unity during a very difficult period. Some local organisations felt marginalised, again, by the international response to the political crises and internal displacement of thousands of people in 2006-2008. As international funding scaled back up, INGOs which had worked in partnership with local organisations took over operational roles and absorbed staff from LNGOs to deliver wide-spread assistance⁶⁰. Local NGOs with long-term commitment and which had worked with communities to build trust and peace in context-sensitive ways felt side-lined by donors and governments⁶¹. They also struggled to maintain their own operations, as staff members were displaced, facilities and equipment destroyed and the unsafe environment was difficult to work in.

2008–2014: Stabilisation

The process of national stabilisation and consolidation since 2009-2010 has seen local civil society respond to reconstruction needs and continuing high levels of poverty, finding space to act as levels of violence have stabilised. Oil and gas revenues have funded significant growth in the national budget and government spending has been a significant element in the process of stabilisation. The Government has become a significant source of funding for civil society and has sought to benefit, and engage, a wide range of local actors in development processes. Government programmes have targeted private sector development and community empowerment, rebuilding churches and traditional sacred spaces and providing welfare for vulnerable groups and veterans of the resistance. The recent decrease in oil prices, the declining global stock market and the rising US Dollar may, if these trends continue, affect the income from TL's Petroleum Fund and thus the availability of government funding. There has also been a loss of experienced civil society leaders from organisations into the government, academia and private sector.

⁵⁸ Holloway 2004, p.9.

⁵⁹ Wigglesworth, 2012, p.3.

⁶⁰ Wigglesworth, 2012, p.3.

⁶¹ Wigglesworth 2012, p.16.

At the same time, many bilateral donors and INGOs have withdrawn or reduced their cooperation programmes in Timor-Leste as long-term development objectives have succeeded the emergency response. Those that remain have sought, in line with commitments to aid effectiveness, and in particular to the New Deal on Fragile States, to align their objectives, funding and ways of working more closely with national development goals, capacities and systems. This should, ideally, flow through to how international partners work with civil society organisations, as members of the 'national system' and support the relationships between government and civil society to share learning and negotiate policy differences.

ANNEX 2: THE EU AND OTHER DONORS' SCOPE OF WORK WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN TIMOR-LESTE

The **EU Delegation's** current scope of work with civil society is as follows:

- The support human rights, through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, involves a € 2.2 million assistance package for the period 2014-2017. A grant of €1.2m has been allocated to the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice and NGO Asia Justice and Rights for the production of a soap opera focusing on relevant human rights topics, such as domestic violence, land, corruption, the rights of people with disabilities, LGBTI, amongst others. The first episodes will be aired in 2017. It is expected that mobile screenings in the districts and debate sessions will be organised simultaneously to disseminate key human rights messages, as well as to promote the role of the office of the Ombudsman.
- The support to Non-State Actors and Local Authorities involves a €2.5 million assistance package for the period 2016-2017. Its objective will be to support the current social audit initiative launched by the office of the prime-minister, namely by supporting CSOs as actors in governance and accountability. A €1.25m grant will seek to support CSOs to monitor the quality and effectiveness of public policies and services delivered by the government to the population. By holding public authorities to account, CSOs will directly contribute to improved democratic governance and accountability in the country.
- A grant of around €800.000 is currently ongoing to support a group of CSOs, including the national land network *Rede ba Rai*, working to increase access to justice and citizen participation in the definition and monitoring of land and housing policies.
- The National Indicative Programme (NIP) of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) in Timor-Leste foresees support to civil society, in the order of about €4.6 million from 2014-2020, being mainstreamed into the EU's two focal areas, Good Governance (€30 million total budget) and Rural Development (€57 million total budget). Sector-wide programming for these two focal areas is currently under preparation.

Each of the **EU Member States working in Timor-Leste** supports small civil society activities:

- **Portugal** generally only funds Portuguese NGOs, which may work in partnership with LNGOs. Currently, Camoes IP manages a fund for small projects directed at local Timorese CSOs. Furthermore, Lisbon issues periodic calls for proposals.
- **France** has an office for bilateral cooperation in Timor-Leste since 2008. France has been involved in two main sectors: protection of the cultural and geographical heritage with local INGOs, research development institutes and good governance with local authorities. It also co-funds several local INGOs' work to help end violence against women and support people with disabilities.
- **Germany** supports civil society primarily through its Peace and Youth Promotion / Peace Fund project which gives small grants to local organisations and works with district youth centres in cooperation with the Secretary of State for Youth and Sport. In addition, the Social Cohesion for Peaceful Development Programme which, through its two projects,

focus on consolidation of peace and stability by improving the employability and employment promotion for marginalized people, also engages NGOs as sub-contractors to implement community activities.

- **Finland**, through its Local Cooperation Fund, supports a few projects in Timor-Leste focusing on gender equality and rights of marginalized groups; climate change, energy efficiency and renewable energy, poverty reduction and economy development and access to justice.

In terms of **other donor funding** and relationships with civil society in Timor-Leste:

- The **US** presently supports civil society in multiple areas. Through its good governance portfolio, direct support is provided to two LNGOs engaged in security sector monitoring and freedom of information advocacy, respectively. In addition, through its Ba Distrito programme, the US provides small grants to CBOs to build their capacity as they work with suku councils to strengthen their engagement with communities under local governance and applicable laws. The US supports women's economic empowerment through two grants that have US-based NGOs as the prime, but partner with three LNGOs. Additionally, through its Ambassador's Small Grants program, the US provides support of up to \$20,000 per grant to LNGOs working on priority issue areas, including governance, domestic violence, and human rights. The US also expects to fund LNGOs in its rural development portfolio in future, with the aims of developing agricultural value chains, improving nutrition, and providing support for climate change adaptation.
- **Australia** has relatively significant funding relationships with civil society. Australian NGOs are very active in Timor-Leste, receiving funding through a Canberra-based funding stream, the Australian NGO Cooperation Program. Many of these INGOs have long-term relationships with Timorese CSOs. Many Australians have close personal ties to Timor-Leste, and a number of municipal 'friendship groups' collaborate with rural Timorese communities. Australia has narrowed the sectoral focus of its bilateral programme in recent years and sought to improve effectiveness in line with New Deal principles. Instead of providing broad-based small grants, it is building longer-term relationships with fewer CSOs as part of coherent investment strategies in the education, health, governance and ending violence against women sectors. Australia is also a major supporter of GoTL's National Programme for Suku Development (PNDS), supporting GoTL to partner directly with village communities and to involve local civil society in monitoring.