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**The EU Roadmap process: taking stock**

**Capitalisation report**

**Tome II – Annexes**

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The EU Roadmap process: taking stock  
Capitalisation report

Tome II - Annexes

**DISCLAIMER**

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## Annex 1. Clusters of countries

**A. Countries in Fragile situation (FS)** (according to the 2014 State Fragility Index; see <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2014> / information on the new Deal)

Africa	Asia & Pacific	ENI & Middle East	LatAm & Caribbean
Somalia South Sudan CAR DRC Sudan Chad Cote d'Ivoire Guinea Conakry Zimbabwe Nigeria	Pakistan Afghanistan	Libya Syria Iraq Yemen	Haiti

**B. Countries with a non-enabling environments (RE)** ( $\leq 0,45$  Civicus EE index; see <http://www.civicus.org/eei/> )

Africa	Asia & Pacific	ENI & middle East	LatAm & Caribbean
Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Angola Burundi Kenya Rwanda Madagascar Gambia Gabon Swaziland Uganda Zambia Guinea Bissau	China Vietnam Tajikistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Timor Leste	Azerbaijan Belarus Egypt Jordan Morocco Russia	Venezuela Honduras Bolivia

**C. Low income countries** (according to WB categorization;  $< \$1,045$ ) that are not in a situation of fragility and with a more or less enabling environment ( $> 0,45$  EEI)

Africa	Asia & Pacific	ENI & middle East	LatAm & Caribbean
Tanzania Malawi Mozambique Benin Burkina Faso Mauritania Niger Senegal Togo Mali Sierra Leone Liberia Comoros	Bangladesh Cambodia Laos Myanmar	Palestine	

**D. Middle income countries (including lower and upper middle income – according to WB categorisation)**

**D.1. Lower middle income countries (\$1,045 to \$4,125 )**

Africa	Asia & Pacific	ENI & middle East	LatAm & Caribbean
Cameroon Congo Brazzaville Sao Tome & Principe Lesotho Cape Vert Ghana	India Indonesia Maldives Mongolia Nepal Philippines Sri Lanka Thailand Papua New Guinea Samoa Solomon Islands	Armenia Georgia Moldova Ukraine Tunisia	Belize Salvador Guatemala Nicaragua Ecuador Guyana Paraguay

**D.2. Upper middle income countries (\$4,125 to \$12,746)**

Africa	Asia & Pacific	ENI & middle East	LatAm & Caribbean
Botswana Mauritius Namibia Seychelles South Africa	Malaysia Fiji	Algeria Lebanon	Dominican Republic Jamaica Mexico Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Cuba Peru Surinam Uruguay

**E. High income countries** (according to WB categorization; > \$12,746)

Africa	Asia & Pacific	ENI & middle East	LatAm & caribbean
	Hong Kong	Israel	Barbados Trinidad & Tobago

**F. Other /NA**

Africa	Asia & Pacific	ENI & middle East	LatAm &Caribbean
	Macao ? Pacific region		

## Annex 2. Reports by clusters

### Annex 2.1. Report on the RM process in countries in situations of fragility

#### 1. Introduction

For this report, fragility is defined as low capacity and poor state performance with respect to security and development. A state is fragile when it is unable to provide basic human security and/or it is unable to create the public goods and conditions needed for a minimum of human development. The causes of fragility may be indirect. There may also be pushback as different factors interact, and debates on the causal relationships between the root causes and drivers of fragility are contentious. All in all, the drivers of fragility can be grouped into four broad dimensions, namely: (i) poor or weak governance; (ii) high levels of conflict and violence; (iii) high levels of inequality and economic exclusion; and (iv) prevailing poverty<sup>1</sup>.

According to the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States<sup>2</sup>, 1.5 billion people live in conflict-affected and fragile states. About 70% of fragile states have seen conflict since 1989. Even though 30% of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) is spent in these countries, armed conflict and insecurity limit movement and therefore the access to aid. These are countries with high illiteracy rates, low life expectancy, endemic poverty and lack of access to basic services, and which face monumental development challenges. Tribalism and fractious politics are also a major point of concern.

Based on the assessments of the 2015 State Fragility Index<sup>3</sup> and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, 17 of the countries where a roadmap (RM) process has taken place, is underway, or is planned in the future fall into this category<sup>4</sup>. Information is only available, however, in 10 countries, as the challenging conditions have delayed several of the RM processes. The analysis that follows is based on the review of the processes and documents in these 10 countries<sup>5</sup>.

#### 2. The context vis-à-vis the 3 ambitions of the 2012 Communication

##### 2.1. The environment in which CSOs operate

It is difficult to provide an overall assessment of the enabling environment (EE) in the contexts assessed as the records are mixed. In some countries, such as Nigeria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Haiti, despite the insecurity and/or prevalence of armed conflict, the environment is generally viewed as supportive to civil society organisations (CSOs). Basic freedoms are for the most part respected. CSOs, particularly those providing services to the people, are tolerated and even respected. Positive trends are also apparent in other contexts, despite the huge challenges ahead. This is the case in Somalia, Cote d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe, as is testified to by the

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<sup>1</sup> Jakkie Cilliers and Timothy D Sisk (2013): Prospects for Africa's 26 fragile countries. African futures paper. Knowledge empowers Africa! Le savoir émancipe l'Afrique. Number 8. October 2013.

<sup>2</sup> At the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea in 2011, the g7+, a group of the world's most fragile and conflict-affected states, proposed a major change in the way the international donor community engaged with them. The new framework, known as the New Deal, challenges traditional donor-led development concepts, and has since been endorsed by more than 40 countries and international organisations, including the EU. <http://www.newdeal4peace.org/>

<sup>3</sup> <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> These "high alert" and "alert" countries according to the 2015 Fragility Index + Libya. In Africa: South Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Conakry, Zimbabwe and Nigeria. In Asia & Pacific: Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the Neighbourhood region and the Middle East: Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. In Latin America and the Caribbean: Haiti

Burundi has not been included in this category, as at the time when the roadmap was drafted the country was not yet considered to be in a situation of fragility.

<sup>5</sup> These are: Somalia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire (draft as the document hasn't yet been approved), Afghanistan (draft), Iraq, and Haiti. In terms of support, the Roadmap Facility (RMF) has provided support to Somalia, Zimbabwe, Cote d'Ivoire and Haiti (with field missions and remote assistance). Remote assistance has also been provided to Afghanistan by reading and commenting on the draft RM document. Chad and Afghanistan also benefitted from TA locally recruited by the EUD.

progress made in the establishment of new constitutions, the efforts to deepen federalization, the renewed juridical frameworks and/or election prospects.

Yet impediments and challenges are still numerous and composite. Often, CSOs are confronted with incomplete legal frameworks (i.e. too old and/or not acknowledging the different types of CSOs, particularly networks) or the absence of enactment mechanisms, as well as complex and cumbersome registration procedures. Arbitrary state decisions are also common practice (in contexts like Sudan and Zimbabwe) coupled with strict state scrutiny and control over CS operations.

International funding is not restricted in most of the contexts assessed. Yet CSOs are for the most part confronted with disabling fiscal systems and a lack of tax incentives supporting their fundraising efforts.

When it comes to “political” action by CSOs, this is not tolerated in most of the countries assessed (i.e. it is seen as an interference with state affairs) or even expressly forbidden. Media is often under government control, and in some contexts (such as Sudan) activists are forced to take extreme risks as they attempt to exercise basic rights and freedoms.

## 2.2. CS involvement in public policies

In most of the countries assessed, CSOs are acknowledged as development actors in their own right. Reportedly they have been widely consulted in the definition of national compacts and development/transition assistance frameworks (e.g. the Compact in Somalia; the different conferences organised around the support to the transition in Afghanistan, etc.). CSOs, particularly NGOs, are also well known to the public, namely with regards to their bridging the service-provision role between the state and the people. Therefore, in most of the contexts assessed, CSOs are not “new kids on the block”.

However, CSOs’ actual involvement in the elaboration, implementation and/or monitoring of public policies (to further elaborate on the aforementioned development frameworks), both at local and national level, remains, for the most part, limited. CSOs interviewed in the course of the RM elaboration processes report how consultation is often selective, symbolic and even tokenistic, particularly in more sensitive areas (e.g. governance-related, mining and natural resources-related, etc.).

Governmental NGOs (the so-called GONGOs) have also grown in some contexts (such as Sudan), further contributing to the fragmentation of CS. On another note, information is often absent, while the historical background of mistrust and lack of cooperation still plays a part. Even at the local level, where one would expect to find bigger windows of opportunity for CS engagement, opportunities are often hampered by tribalism and partisan politics.

Some positive developments are to be noted, however. In Nigeria, for instance, areas of public policy impact include constitutional reform, health (especially HIV/AIDS), women's equality, child law, human trafficking, national budgeting processes, and electoral reform.

In Somalia, among several other examples, CSOs have been actively engaged in the local observations of the elections and in policy discussion on the state budget. They also took part in discussions about the NGO Act through the “NGO Consultative Committee” set up by the Somaliland Ministry of Planning.

CSOs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are also involved in the 15 thematic groups set up to discuss sectoral policies. However, lack of knowledge on social contract principles is prevalent on the sides of both the government and CS. Additionally, only a handful of CSOs have sufficient research-based advocacy, accountability and engagement skills. These obstacles are also manifest in Chad.

## 2.3. CS capacity

In several of the contexts assessed, the EU has a proven track record in supporting the capacity development of CSOs. Particularly but not limited to ACP contexts (such as DRC, Somalia or

Zimbabwe), CSO capacity has developed through a number of capacity development initiatives (with INGOs playing a paramount role) particularly focusing on the technical and managerial capacities of CSOs, and to a lesser extent on networking and coalition building and CS internal governance systems.

In most of the contexts assessed a cleavage appears to exist between a handful of large urban based NGOs, well experienced in project implementation and service delivery and well known to the donors, on the one hand, and the rest of organisations on the other, particularly community-based organisations and proximity and self-help groups.

CSOs and think tanks specialised in policy analysis, research-based advocacy, dialogue and institution building (the so-called infrastructure CSOs) are less developed but growing in several contexts.

Women groups (and their umbrella bodies) are also quickly developing and becoming more articulate and present in the public sphere, in most of the contexts analysed.

### 3. The RM process

In spite of the volatile and fragile conditions, almost 60% of the countries considered have finalised their RM for the period 2014-2017 and are now in the process of implementing them. In other countries, such as South Sudan, Pakistan and Yemen, the process is underway and a document is expected to be ready in the coming months.

#### 3.1. About consultation with CSOs

One of the first outstanding features of the roadmap process in the reviewed countries under fragility is **the intensity and inclusiveness of the consultation processes organised with CSOs around the roadmap**. Out of the 10 processes reviewed, eight benefitted from either intensive or very intensive consultation processes, with several workshops organised, often in combination with a written survey reaching out to a wide spectrum of CSOs.

In Somalia, for instance, several consultation sessions were organised in Puntland and Somaliland<sup>6</sup>, with the support of Interpeace and Saferworld, two INGOs active in the field. All in all, a wide array of CS actors was consulted, ranging from formally established NGOs to women and youth groups, human rights defenders, the media, traditional and religious leaders and elders.

The Roadmap in Zimbabwe is based on data collection and an intense consultation process involving over 200 CS stakeholders. The process, conducted between March and June 2014, encompassed several workshops as well as a written questionnaire disseminated throughout the country, to which 85 local CSOs and 7 INGOs working in Zimbabwe responded. In total 17 consultative meetings were held in five different cities, focusing on regional and thematic specificities. In total, the impressive number of 200 CSOs participated in this exercise.

In Afghanistan, the Roadmap is also based on several consultations with CSOs, combining the use of a questionnaire with meetings. About 127 CSOs representing over 14,000 staff members, including 3,000 women, participated in the online consultation (73 replied in English, 52 in Dari and two in Pashto). The second phase of the consultation consisted of the organisation of a two-day workshop in February 2015. More than 100 CSO representatives, including 20 from province, attended the workshop contributing to the Roadmap.

This “highly participatory approach,” involving a wide spectrum of CS stakeholders beyond traditional NGOs (e.g. traditional and religious leaders or informal groups) is fully in line with the recommendations around inclusiveness put forward by the New Deal<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> In view of the security situation, Mogadishu could not be visited, but representatives from this region attended the workshop in Puntland.

<sup>7</sup> Indeed as the New Deal underlines, despite the significant investment and the commitments made by donors over the past decades, results have been mixed in most fragile contexts. Transitioning out of fragility is long, political work that requires country leadership and ownership. Processes of political



### 3.2. About dialogue with Member States (MS)

**Strong coordination between development partners is another important stipulation for development assistance in contexts offragility.** All of the roadmaps analysed mirror this requirement and depict a strong involvement of MS as well as of other relevant partners, including UN agencies, USAID, etc. Specific mechanisms are, however, not specified in most of the roadmaps analysed, and one could conclude that available coordination mechanisms – such as existing governance and CS coordination groups – have been used to discuss the roadmaps and agree on the priorities. It is also worth mentioning that compacts often exist in fragile contexts (e.g. Somalia), conceived of as strategic frameworks for coordinating political, security and development efforts.


The case of Afghanistan is also worth mentioning in light of the depth of the consultation process engaged with MS. Indeed, a questionnaire of 20 questions was sent to MS to gather information on their support to CSOs in terms of aid, coordination, mandate and sectors. The survey also included questions to indicate recommendations to enhance support to CSOs. Eight MS (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) and two international partners (Norway and Switzerland) answered the questionnaire. In February 2015, the Delegation also organised a session with the development partners to discuss and agree upon the priorities for the RM.

### 4. The contents of EU engagement

Despite the volatility that characterises contexts in fragility, most of the roadmaps assessed portray **specific priorities and actions**, duly tailored to the context.

Roadmaps for countries in fragile contexts have an average of seven priorities. Some countries, such as Haiti, Cote d'Ivoire or Iraq, have identified only three priorities, while others, including Afghanistan or Chad, go as far as 11 or 14 (the latter within a framework of three general priorities). More detail is provided in the figure below, which also depicts the number of indicators per roadmap assessed.

Figure 1: Priorities and indicators in the RMs assessed



dialogue often fail because they lack trust, inclusiveness, and leadership. The New Deal prompts donors to better align and harmonise with national interests and actors, avoid an overly technocratic approach to development assistance, and support medium to long-term results brought about by building capacity and systems.

Priorities linked to the enabling environment are present in all of the roadmaps assessed. In this regard, most of the roadmaps in contexts of fragility focus on space for CSOs to operate. Three areas appear to be of particular relevance: (i) the support to develop (and enact) civil society legislation, especially in countries where the legal framework is obsolete or non-existent; (ii) an enhanced recognition of CSOs as legitimate development actors in their own right, free from unwarranted state interference, entitled to receive foreign funding and allowed in public policy processes; and (iii) enhanced monitoring efforts of the context evolution. A few of the roadmaps (this is the case of Iraq, for instance) put the emphasis on the preservation of basic freedoms and liberties including the protection of human rights defenders, peace building, conflict prevention and the promotion of the Rule of Law. Freedom of speech and information and media preservation are also key areas in a number of roadmaps assessed (e.g. Zimbabwe).

Examples of innovative practices to promote the EE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Research into traditional reconciliation processes, how they have evolved over time and how they can be leveraged (Somalia)</li> <li>▪ Research into land rights and conflict with particular emphasis on returning internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees and diaspora (Somalia)</li> <li>▪ Research study exploring alternative and sustainable funding mechanisms for local CSOs (Chad)</li> <li>▪ Study on the harmonisation of existing laws (e.g. PVO Act, POSA, AIPPA, etc.) with the newly adopted constitution (Zimbabwe)</li> <li>▪ Sponsor an information portal with links to a variety of research that has been done about the context (Zimbabwe)</li> <li>▪ Funding of public awareness raising initiatives around the shortcomings of the current legal and institutional framework (draft, Cote d'Ivoire).</li> </ul>

Priorities linked to the involvement of CSOs in public policies (the second overall ambition of the 2012 Communication) are also widely represented in all the roadmaps assessed. In some countries, such as Somalia, Chad and Zimbabwe, they are particularly prominent. This focus on State - CS interactions mirrors the important role that the EU grants to CSOs in its peace building, security support, and good governance efforts in contexts of fragility. The case of Zimbabwe is illustrative. As the EUD acknowledges, the RM process could not have come at a more appropriate time for both the EU and civil society in Zimbabwe, considering the quickly evolving context of EU-Zimbabwe relations from a time of restricted cooperation towards a progressive normalisation of relations with the government. All in all, a strong facilitation role is envisaged for the EU in an effort to bring CSOs closer to the respective national/regional/federal authorities and progressively strengthen CS involvement in key political processes as well as in the development, oversight and monitoring of national policy priorities. In the case of Haiti, for instance, an incremental and sequential approach is proposed in an effort to build trust between the State and CSOs.

Deepening and even structuring EU-CS dialogue is also a key area of interest. Even in the contexts where no formal mechanism for dialogue exists, the EU maintains regular contact with several CSOs, especially with networks and key advocacy actors (also individuals), particularly those actively working on the preservation of basic freedoms and rights and on sectors such as education and health, representing a valuable option for conflict prevention and institution building.

Examples of innovative practices to promote CS participation in public policies & dialogue
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Update the 2009 mapping study with a view to: (i) better define the notion of CS in Haiti, and (ii) identify the potential drivers for change in the focal sector of EU cooperation with whom to deepen dialogue (Haiti)</li> </ul>


- Map out existing mechanisms for participatory policymaking/budgeting and citizen engagement and conduct a mapping/CS assessment with a political economy angle to identify drivers for change, and include them in the focal sectors of cooperation (Nigeria)
- Elaboration of guidelines addressed towards CSOs on social accountability (i.e. “how to hold governments acceptable”) (DRC)
- Adopt a “do no harm” approach given the sensitivities exacerbated by the crisis. All avenues shall remain open, establishing dialogue with both state and non-state actors. There are clear geographical differences, but one area shall not be prioritised at the expense of the other. This will require both a political and balancing act, as reconciliation initiatives are likely to top the agenda. A bottom-up/grassroots approach - even localised – might be desirable, with less risk of it being spun on political grounds (Iraq).

Capacity is another dimension that is also well represented in the roadmaps assessed, particularly in African countries like Chad and Zimbabwe, which include support to CS in the National Indicative Programme in line with the Cotonou Provisions. The RM for Afghanistan also places a strong emphasis on the capacity development of CSOs. Overall, capacity development needs are particularly manifest regarding research-based advocacy, policy dialogue, networking and fundraising. Another important area for improvement is the development of internal governance and mutual accountability systems, and of codes of conduct.

#### Examples of innovative practices on capacity development

- Development of a publicly accessible platform (modelled on the example of Cash Atlas) with information on all projects implemented by CSOs, including monitoring and evaluation reports and information from remote monitoring (Afghanistan).
- Capitalisation study about the public-private-partnerships (PPP) developed to provide services across the country (DRC).
- Set up of a CS working group to explore the possibility for more coordinated, flexible, demand and results-driven capacity development, ensuring appropriate reach and geographic coverage (Nigeria).
- Comparative study assessing the different capacity development initiatives and schemes (Chad).
- Support of capacity development initiatives for policy dialogue, particularly targeting CSOs, networks, and platforms active at local and national level (Zimbabwe).
- Embedding “internal governance & accountability” incentives into the projects to be funded under Call for Proposals mechanisms (Haiti).
- Integration of a transversal internal governance/transparency component in all the projects to be funded under the Call for Proposals (CfP) launched by the EU (draft, Cote d’Ivoire).
- Targeted capacity development support reaching out to key CSOs acting as drivers for change in the focal sectors of EU cooperation (draft, Cote d’Ivoire).

Figure 2: Break down of priorities in the RMs assessed



**Mainstreaming is not a priority in most of the RMs assessed** considering the context of fragility, with some exceptions, such as Chad, where efforts are being made to deepen the involvement of CSOs in justice, peace-building and budget support. Haiti also foresees deepening mainstreaming in the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF, even though concrete modalities are yet to be defined. It is important to underline that the roadmap has served as a first step to raise the interest of the EU focal sectors of cooperation into civil society.

Besides, as mentioned before, CS is often very present in the public life of the contexts assessed, particularly in the provision of basic services. The different dialogue mechanisms and frameworks set up to coordinate assistance also bring on board CSOs. In Iraq, for instance, the EUD is supporting the establishment of public authorities - CS dialogue mechanism, an action that could become an important entry point to effective CS mainstreaming if EU support is resumed in a sustainable and predictable way in the near future.

Finally, with regards to **the involvement of MS in the implementation of the RM**, only the documents for Haiti and Ivory Coast refer to the available MS programmes and tools. MS appear also to be actively involved in the implementation of the RM in Somalia.

## 5. SWOT analysis

Strengths and Opportunities	Challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Alignment of the RM process with other relevant country processes (e.g. Somalia national compact).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is difficult to establish a medium term engagement framework considering the volatility of the context.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Depth and scope of the consultations with CSOs. CSOs are well known development partners.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High insecurity may compromise outreach to CSOs.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High degree of cooperation with MS and other donors. Coordination mechanisms exist and can be used and further strengthened.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In some contexts human rights activists and “politically active” CSOs are under strict scrutiny or even pursued.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RM offers an opportunity to deepen engagement with local CSOs and offers a “somewhat stable” framework for engagement.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CSOs are mostly acknowledged for their service delivery role (bridging the gap between the state and the people) and to a lesser extent for their governance-related roles.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>State and institution-building processes can offer a unique opportunity to embed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Societal fragmentation/tribalism and partisan politics hamper CS</li> </ul>

constructive/innovative State-CS engagement practices.	engagement.
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## Annex 2.2. Report on the RM process in countries with non-enabling environments

### 1. Introduction

The ability of CSOs to participate in different domains of public life depends on a set of preconditions commonly referred to as the "CSO enabling environment", for which different actors hold responsibility. To operate, CSOs need a functioning democratic legal and judicial system – giving them the de jure and de facto right to associate and secure funding, coupled with freedom of expression, access to information and participation in public life. The primary responsibility to ensure these basic conditions lies with the state<sup>8</sup>.

For this report, this second cluster includes the countries which are not in a situation of fragility (as they are already analysed under the cluster 'Fragility' regardless of the situation of the environment and their level of income) and which have a grade of < 0,45 in the Enabling Environment index (EEI) produced by CIVICUS<sup>9</sup>.

Thirty countries fall under this category, with twenty-six roadmaps being finalised. Of these, twenty were assessed for the purpose of the present report. It was not possible to assess some of the roadmap documents even though they are ready, namely those of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia and Egypt, as they are considered highly confidential. Feedback forms for some of these countries were, however, consulted.

The case of Burundi is also worth mentioning as the country has experienced turmoil and a constantly evolving and degrading context since the roadmap document was signed. In the past six months EUD personnel was repatriated and all structural cooperation put to a halt. All of this makes the country eligible for the fragility cluster and the roadmap document, as it was drafted, out-dated vis-à-vis the new context.

The RM Facility provided support to a number of EUDs under this category, through field missions (Rwanda and Kenya) and remote assistance (Uganda and Kazakhstan, Venezuela and Bolivia). Some EUDs recruited their own TA (Madagascar, Venezuela, etc.).

## 2. The context vis-à-vis the 3 ambitions of the 2012 Communication

### 2.1. The environment in which CSOs operate

In spite of the widespread recognition of CSOs as critical development actors, recent years have witnessed a rising tide of restrictions on civil society, which not only defies fundamental freedoms and international promises, but also undermines any development goal, as the consortium members of the Civic Space Initiative<sup>10</sup> report and the 2013 CIVICUS "State of Civil Society" report concludes. Since 2011, more than fifty restrictive laws have been passed or considered worldwide that would restrict the formation, operation, and funding of CSOs, as well as the right to peaceful assembly. This trend has been more acute since 2013.

Generally, legal barriers to CS include restrictions to entry into the sector and/or run operations (e.g. through imprecise, incomplete or restrictive legal frameworks; cumbersome and/or arbitrary registration procedures; establishment of parallel regulatory mechanisms such as endorsement of new laws and/or amendments that limit CS participation; or simply by putting no means for law implementation), limitations to the freedom of speech, assembly and advocacy, and/or restrictive financial regulations (e.g. restrictions or the need to obtain prior approval to receive international funding). This is the case of countries like Djibouti,

<sup>8</sup>EC (2012): The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations. Brussels, 12.9.2012. COM(2012) 492 final

<sup>9</sup><http://www.civicus.org/eei/>

<sup>10</sup>Submission on an Enabling Environment for Civil Society to the UN High Level Panel on the Post 2015 Development Agenda by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ARTICLE 19, CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, and the World Movement for Democracy

Madagascar, Gambia, Swaziland and Jordan amongst others. Laws are often vague and arbitrarily implemented, impose prohibitions that are biased and do not reflect legitimate policy aims, or are severe and disproportionate to any legitimate development or even counter-terrorist goal.

When it comes to “political” action by CSOs, it is only tolerated to a very limited extent in certain contexts, often circumscribed to selected topics, agreed to by the authorities. Human rights and governance-related actions (including the fight against corruption, governance of natural resources, etc.), which might imply confrontation to central government, tend to be limited, controlled and even forbidden (e.g. strikes, demonstrations). CSOs operating in these areas and challenging the status quo are particularly targeted, and remain at risk of unwarranted government interference and harassment, including arbitrary closure, severe sanctions or imprisonment of their CS leaders (e.g. Azerbaijan, Venezuela). Generally speaking the media is under government control and independent journalists are often at risk, even when advocating for basic development rights.

Yet, allegedly in most of the contexts, a number of courageous individual CSOs are able to keep governance and human rights in their agenda, even if adaptations may be necessary (e.g. through adapting the jargon and using available spaces for dialogue). Of particular interest is the case of women’s and youth organisations, which seem to be “well tolerated” for conducting gender related work through behavioural change and rights-based approaches.

It is also to be noted that several of the countries assessed increasingly require CSOs to “harmonise” their activities with government priorities in national development plans (e.g. Uganda, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Bolivia, Jordan, etc.). While justified in the interest of aid effectiveness, these requirements may underline CSOs’ right of initiative and limit CSOs’ ability to reach out to marginalised communities or focus on issues neglected by governments.

Last but not least it is also worth mentioning that the CS landscape is strongly determined in several of the contexts assessed by a deep political cleavage between those CSOs that support the executive (e.g. GONGOs, co-opted CSOs<sup>11</sup> and even Royal NGOs in some contexts such as Jordan) and those CSOs that struggle to keep their independence and/or exercise opposition. This situation often results in an acute polarisation of CSOs, which works to the detriment of CS effectiveness. Yet, in several of the contexts assessed, the fabric of civil society is rapidly evolving (e.g. Vietnam) as new and younger organisations, networks and groups (often led by women and/or youths) emerge in the arena, thus shaping the discussion of the state of civil society.

Also, and despite the huge challenges, a number of positive trends can be identified in some of the contexts, including the existence of vibrant mass media sectors (e.g. Vietnam, Zambia), the “publicisation” of the debate around CS or the adoption of legislation more favourable to CSOs and the right to assembly (e.g. Tajikistan, Jordan) and/or related to access to information (e.g. Morocco).

## 2.2. CS involvement in public policies

CSOs’ actual involvement in the elaboration, implementation and/or monitoring of public policies both at local and national level shows a mixed record, depending on the context (and political will) and on the legal and institutional frameworks. In countries where legislation is not favourable, participation is very limited, symbolic and often selective. This is the case in contexts such as Gambia, Djibouti and Madagascar. In countries where the legislation and related policies are in principle favourable to CS, even if promoted by international donors (as in Uganda and Zambia), and/or where governments target and exercise control over certain types CSOs (as in Honduras and Vietnam), the degree of CS participation, at least of specific sectors within CS that are not critical to the government and in sectors that are not considered controversial, is more apparent and exercised through different formal and informal

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<sup>11</sup> See next section for a more elaborated explanation on GONGOs and co-opted CSOs.



mechanisms. These mechanisms are mainly developed at sector level as national development policies. Human rights and governance issues are considered ‘too sensitive’ and ‘confrontational’ to allow for “dissenting voices”.

All in all, as one would expect from an environment that is not conducive for CS operations, participation remains circumscribed to non-challenging sectors, such as the provision of basic services where CSOs are acknowledged for bringing in added value, particularly in terms of reach out to vulnerable groups. This is apparent across regions, in countries like Kazakhstan, Uganda and Honduras.

In other sectors, CS involvement is weak and even “superficial”, and often, as aforementioned, forced by international donors active in the country (when they have the leverage). Also, when formal spaces for dialogue are available, involvement is often limited to “friendly” CSOs (i.e. the so-called GONGOs, co-opted CSOs) and to broad and general “non-binding” consultations, and/or CSOs are mainly invited to provide input at the formulation stage of the policies (i.e. monitoring and evaluation are out of reach for them).

It is also important to understand that unlike GONGOs, co-opted organisations in the above mentioned countries have a long history of leading or being involved in political changes, so their focus and approach is strongly political. It is difficult at this stage, with the information available, to identify what type of organisations are co-opted by governmental powers, but it seems that mass organisations such as trade unions and movements are the type of organisations that tend to be close to government, while NGOs and women, youth and community based organisations struggle to keep independence through self-censorship or confrontation.

Some positive developments are nevertheless to be noted, as briefly evoked, at sector and local level. In Zambia, CSOs are present in the 30 existing sector advisory groups, and active in budget monitoring, including budget support. In Madagascar and Ethiopia, even if participation at national level is very limited, some budget monitoring and service quality control at community and local level is taking place (e.g. the Ethiopian Social Accountability programme in Ethiopia). Also, in Kyrgyzstan, Public Advisory Councils (PACs) have been established since 2011 to provide oversight and monitoring of the work of various government bodies, in most line ministries and agencies. At local level, CSOs are also highly involved in decision-making processes.

### 2.3. CS capacity

Reportedly, notwithstanding the risk of generalising, CSOs in non-enabling environments are confronted with technical and political shortcomings. In technical terms, with very few exceptions, CSOs in non-EE countries still lack important strategic planning and management skills. They face difficulties in defining organisational visions, evolving into transparent institutions and developing capacities to deepen in production of knowledge and sound empirical research. In political terms, weak leadership and legitimacy make coordination and articulation of common positions difficult, even though coordinating bodies exist. It is clear that CS capacity in this context is undermined by its relationship vis-à-vis government, as well as by relations among CSOs. Issues such as governments’ strategies to limit CSOs, monitored governance and human rights organisations, and co-option over certain organisations create a divide within CSOs. Self-censorship as well as a lack of incentives to be accountable are common issues which, in turn, undermine CSOs’ capacity to get organised and become credible.

Reportedly, in several of the contexts assessed, CSOs are also confronted with a lack of sustainable sources of income and funding (except GONGOs and Royal NGOs). This often leads to competition among CSOs over the available funds rather than coordination of activities.

Nevertheless, positive trends can be identified in certain countries. In several of the contexts assessed, the EU and MS have been supporting long-term programmes aimed at developing CSOs’ capacities. Particularly in ACP contexts CSO capacity has developed through a number of

capacity development initiatives focusing mainly on the technical and managerial as well as institutional capacities, including CS internal governance systems. For example, in Uganda a Quality Assurance Mechanism (QuAM) is being established to strengthen the integrity of CSOs/NGOs. In Zambia, 73% of CSOs are part of umbrella organisations. There also exist a large number of sector networks and coordination groups such as in education, gender and HIV, and sporadic alliances among them occur often.

### 3. The RM process

Despite the challenges posed by the contexts, around 85% of the countries considered (twenty six out of thirty) have finalised their RMs for the period 2014-2017 and are now in the process of implementing them. In other countries, such as Rwanda and Angola, the process is underway and a document is expected to be ready in the coming months.

#### 3.1. About consultation with CSOs

As with the contexts of fragility, roadmap processes in non-enabling environments are characterised by the **comprehensiveness and inclusiveness of the consultation processes organised with CSOs around the roadmap**. It is true that most of the EUDs have carried out several consultation sessions with CSOs. Some of the consultations were sectorial (e.g. Kyrgyzstan), hence focusing on the focal sectors of EU cooperation, while others were structured in order to gather information for the RM (e.g. Morocco, Jordan, Zambia). In some countries, consultations were organised coupled with written surveys reaching out to a wide spectrum of CSOs. This is the case of Kenya, Djibouti and Azerbaijan. In other countries parallel bilateral meetings with key informers or CS leaders (Kenya) were also organised. Only occasionally, INGOs were also invited to provide their contributions (Djibouti).

#### 3.2. About dialogue with Member States (MS)

All of the roadmaps analysed evidence involvement from MS during the elaboration of the roadmap. In some contexts (e.g. Ethiopia) the EUD used already existent and performing coordination mechanisms – such as donor governance coordination groups – to consult MS. For the rest of the countries, specific meetings relating to the drafting process of the RM were organised. In most cases, MS attended the meetings, yet their contributions and feedback were rather limited. In all cases however, MS have endorsed the RMs.

At implementation level, MS involvement varies from country to country, but in general is expected to be low. While in countries such as Ethiopia, Morocco, Tajikistan and Uganda, MS financial mechanisms have been identified to support the implementation of the RM, in the rest of the countries (except for five RMs where no instruments are identified) it is envisaged that the EU provide most of the funding. Important to note as an innovative practice, the RM for Morocco has also included funding sources from INGOs receiving MS funding in the instruments and programmes envisioned for the implementation of the RM.


### 4. The contents of EU engagement

Content-wise, the RMs assessed are mixed, portraying both specific as well as general priorities and indicators. The fact that almost half of the RMs contain general and broad priorities may be due to the challenges posed by a non-enabling context (often in constant evolution) or the often-ambivalent position of the government vis-à-vis CSOs. Another underlying reason could be the need to reach a consensus with MS in such difficult conditions for engagement.

On average, roadmaps for countries in non-enabling environments have four to five priorities. Only very few, such as Honduras, Zambia and Azerbaijan, have only identified three priorities. Most of the countries have identified four priorities, while others, like Russia, Tajikistan and Burundi, have identified more than 8 or 9. More detail is provided in the figure below, which also depicts the number of indicators per roadmap assessed.



Figure 3: priorities and indicators in the RM assessed



Considering the importance of the environment as the key factor in these contexts underlining CS action, and despite the challenges that any work in this regard entails, RM priorities linked to the enabling environment are present in all the roadmaps assessed. In countries like Russia, Venezuela and Madagascar, the RMs have more than one priority related to the first ambition of the 2012 Communication. EE priorities vary from country to country as they respond to different degrees of restrictiveness of the environment (and hence of what is feasible to support/aim towards). Priorities range from monitoring the evolution of the environment (including changes and impact of the legislative and institutional frameworks) to facilitating (as a third neutral party) the relations between the state and CSOs, research generating evidence of the positive impact of CS roles and work at different levels, or supporting intercultural and interreligious initiatives of dialogue to smooth social cleavages. Only Swaziland did not include any priority related to the EE.

Examples of innovative practices to promote the EE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct a mapping study to identify CSOs focusing on the promotion of good governance and transparent and accountable government, including a catalogue of CSO activities (Kazakhstan).</li> <li>Public awareness-raising campaigns targeting the general public and explaining the negative effects of official corruption and inadequate or poor, unchecked reporting on government activities. The campaigns should also include positive information about the introduction of programme budgeting and greater budget transparency. (Kyrgyzstan)</li> <li>EUD/MS/Other Donors (OD): TECS and CSFII - Evidence based research on impact of the Civil Society Proclamation (CSP) and directives on work of CSOs and consultations with CSOs on various subjects, such as the role of mass based organisations, income generation activities for civil society in Ethiopia and the interface between regional and federal level in the civil society sector (Ethiopia)</li> <li>Continue to support basket fund arrangements such as Amkeni Wakenya (UNDP) to harmonise development partner procedures and reach out to grassroots organisations (Kenya)</li> <li>Operational support to initiatives that support interreligious and intercultural dialogue on issues related to governance, social cohesion and the Rule of Law (Madagascar)</li> <li>Hold dialogue forums (in Hanoi and other selected cities) with civil society actors to</li> </ul>

promote discussion and dialogue on the role of civil society actors (Vietnam)

- As part of its call for proposals EIDHR/ENPI 2014, the EU has identified a specific priority for supporting actions in Jordan that contributes to monitoring and following up on the path of reforms, and the Association Law has been specifically mentioned as a topic to be closely monitored (Jordan)
- Facilitate platforms for debate and initiatives, through the participation in meetings and events promoted by CSOs and focusing on sensitive human rights issues (messages, stakeholders, partners, suitable platforms and coordination efforts) (Tajikistan).

Priorities linked to the involvement of CSOs in public policies (the second overall ambition of the 2012 Communication) are also widely represented in all the roadmaps assessed. All RMs have at least one priority devoted to enhancing CS participation in national and/or sectorial policies as well as to international development programmes. It must be noted that some of these priorities remain quite general by referring to CS participation in service delivery and in national policies. Other RMs are more focused, aiming at promoting CS involvement into public policies through specific sectors such as agriculture (Morocco, Zambia), social sectors including social protection (Gambia and Tajikistan) and energy (Jordan). It is interesting to note that no RM included as a priority the reinforcement of existing policy dialogue mechanisms between government and CSOs, and that some EUDs included strengthening the participation of CSOs in EU development programmes and policies (for instance in Ethiopia).

#### Examples of innovative practices to promote CS participation in public policies & dialogue

- Sectorial mapping/CS assessment in the focal sectors of EU cooperation to deepen the knowledge and understanding of CS involvement (Honduras)
- Accompanying technical assistance provided to the government to set standards for, regulate and monitor social services by CSOs (Kyrgyzstan)
- Support innovative CS initiatives to fight corruption (Madagascar)
- Send a calendar to CSOs well in advance with all the dialogue events foreseen in the year and their expected contributions (Morocco)
- Conduct a study to explore potential ideas for linking the corporate sector with CSOs including case studies and recommendations on how to build bridges between VCSOs, the private sector, and government agencies (Vietnam)
- EU funded programmes should integrate at least one indicator related to CS involvement (Honduras)
- EU grantees are to be trained/mentored by TA in the use of advocacy tools (Venezuela)
- Allocate ad hoc funds for CSOs' projects aiming at participation in policy focused and governance initiatives as well as at systematic monitoring of implementation of PRSP (Tajikistan).

Capacity is also well represented in all the RMs assessed. Only in the case of Venezuela does the RM not have a priority related to strengthening CS capacities, while the RMs of Burundi, Swaziland and Russia contain three priorities devoted to supporting CS capacity development. Overall, capacity development needs revolve around networking, fundraising, internal governance, enhanced legitimacy as well as budget monitoring. One area of particular attention is the strengthening of coordination and cooperation among CSOs and the reduction of cleavages amongst organisations in an effort to overcome the challenges that hinder CS capacity to influence and promote change.


#### Examples of innovative practices on capacity development

- Systematic approach of bringing EU funding beneficiaries together as a community of practitioners leading to mutual empowerment (exchange of best practices led by the TA)

supporting the EDF funded Civil Society Fund) between old and new CSF grantees, possibly to be enlarged with the beneficiaries of other programmes as well (Ethiopian Social Accountability programme, the DFID-led Civil Society Support Programme, etc.) (Ethiopia)

- In order to promote partnerships/networks among CSOs in implementing projects, the Financing Agreement "Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan" will assist selected CBOs by contracting NGOs (either national or international) to provide them with training activities in various fields (e.g. key topics such as team-building, strategic planning and communication, lobbying, advocacy) and to support the building of alliances or networks among organisations (Jordan)
- Development of training modules for training of CSOs on different topical issues regarding organisational management and development cooperation (Swaziland)
- Set up of a NGO help desk under the Coordinating Assembly of NGOs (CANGO) to share information on EU funding and other relevant information on project cycle management (Swaziland)
- The EUD is to introduce new funding modalities with more flexibility to support strategies for sustainability, encourage a more programmatic approach including longer term funding, support for consortiums to enable multiple dimensions of an issue to be addressed by NGOs collaborating and increase effectiveness/ impact (Uganda).

Figure 4: Breakdown of priorities in the RM assessed



**Mainstreaming does not appear as a priority in most of the RMs assessed**, but rather as a mechanism through which dialogue and CS participation can be further promoted. This is particularly relevant in social sectors, such as health education, etc., which are considered to be non-confrontational and which offer an entry point to deepen CS engagement. Around 13 RMs include CS mainstreaming in different sectors of interventions (e.g. Madagascar, Kazakhstan).

Some of the RMs assessed also underline the complementarity of instruments (both geographic and thematic) in order to support CS mainstreaming. This is the case for Zambia and Tajikistan. Others make reference to CS mainstreaming, but mechanisms to support this are not clearly identified.

Finally, regarding **the level of involvement of MS in the implementation of the RM**, it is **difficult to define a general trend**. In some countries, such as Morocco, Zambia, Uganda, Ethiopia and Tajikistan, the involvement of MS can be considered high, with even joint actions identified, while in the rest of the countries it should be considered medium to low. It can be

observed that such involvement is highly influenced by the existence, on the one hand, of MS programmes dedicated to support CSOs and, on the other hand, by the existence and performance of both ad-hoc and formal coordination mechanisms around CS and/or broader governance issues among MS and development partners.

## 5. SWOT analysis

Strengths and opportunities	Challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RM is an invitation to deepen knowledge of political economy analysis of State-CS relations and think strategically on how to support CSOs and, in turn, increase aid effectiveness to development and democratic governance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RM process might create some frustrations within the Delegations due to lack of support for implementation or unexpected political changes. Keeping up the momentum and the importance of the process will be key.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The possibility to strengthen EU – CS relations in partner countries through RM processes. RMs can become a mechanism to set a structured dialogue in partner countries.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>While MS have been actively participating in the RM elaboration, some remain vigilant when it comes to implementation level. This means MS do not incorporate new activities to their agendas as result of the RM, rather the RM are ‘adapted’ to MS’s on-going programmes.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Important degree of involvement with MS at formulation and implementation level.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In most cases, the analysis remains quite general (and un-confrontational despite the challenges posed by the context) and key issues are mentioned but not further developed. This is the case for those countries where CSOs are co-opted by government, creating a cleavage within CS landscape (Honduras, Venezuela, Jordan...).</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Opportunities to deepen CS mainstreaming in key cooperation sectors.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Weak capacity to operationalise CS mainstreaming or to identify entry points as well as to use aid mechanisms in a complementary manner.</li> </ul>

## Annex 2.3. Report on the RM process in Low Income Countries

### 1. Introduction

As of the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 2014, low-income (LIC) economies are defined as those with a gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the *World Bank Atlas* method, of \$1,045 or less in 2013.

For the purpose of this report this category includes only the countries falling under this category that are not in a situation of fragility (as fragile LIC are already analyzed under the fragility category) and for which the environment is not categorized as non-enabling<sup>12</sup> (as these countries are also analysed under the cluster “non-enabling environments”). In total, there are 18 countries where a roadmap (RM) process has taken place, is underway or planned in the future that fall under this category<sup>13</sup>. Out of these countries, 15 have finalised their

<sup>12</sup> Countries with a grade of < 0,50 in the Enabling Environment index (EEI) produced by CIVICUS (<http://www.civicus.org/eei/>) are considered non-enabling environments.

<sup>13</sup> These are In Africa: Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Comoros. In Asia and the Pacific: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos

roadmaps and one is underway (Mozambique), while in two countries the process has been delayed due to the Ebola crisis (Liberia and Sierra Leone). The present report is based on the assessment of all the roadmaps available, including the draft RM from Mozambique.

Throughout 2014 and 2015, the RM Facility (RMF) has provided support to seven of these countries: Benin, Mauritania, Mozambique, Tanzania, Senegal, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

## 2. The context vis-à-vis the 3 ambitions of the 2012 Communication

### 2.1 The environment in which CSOs operate

The majority of low-income countries show characteristics of a favourable environment or a noticeable improvement in the direction of a supportive environment. Countries and development partners, which have confirmed the leading role of CSOs in development, committed themselves to truly integrating in the search for an "enabling environment" and supporting a dynamic and frameworks that encourage active participation of CSOs in reform. In some cases positive government measures provide for funding for CSOs, for example through a Rapid Funding Envelope.

However, the roadmaps also show examples of legislative and regulatory frameworks that are evolving, with a combination of liberal and repressive developments. This combination can be found in countries such as Myanmar, where the once limited space for civil society in public life has expanded as a result of extensive political and economic reform, but controversial legislation and political, legal and judicial systems restrict fundamental freedoms and CSOs' ability to participate in the different domains of public life. Laos offers space for a certain level of pluralist debate, but restricts and regulates formal operating space for independent CSOs tightly. Civil society organisations in Bangladesh are key actors in development processes and have been considered examples of how it is possible to scale up innovative antipoverty experiments into nationwide programs. However, at the same time, the existing legal framework is considered ineffective in defending freedom of expression, association and assembly.

Within this perspective of simultaneous positive and restrictive developments, the status of the legal and regulatory framework for civil society in low income countries can be divided into four categories:

- **Countries where** (despite not being classified as non-enabling environments using the EEI categorisation), **trends are worrying as the formal operating space for independent CSOs is becoming increasingly regulated** and/or restricted and basic freedoms can be threatened. This is the case of countries such as Laos and Bangladesh. There are also countries, such as Myanmar where unclear legal provisions can lead to a "climate of uncertainty, intimidation and fear of arrest". These environments are considered to be particularly threatening for human rights organisations, as well as those that hold critical positions vis-à-vis the authorities, given the judicial and extra-judicial harassment of CSOs, active citizens and individual activists or journalists. Severe restrictions of the operating space can also be caused by conflicts in the geographic environment, which lead to limiting measures against CSOs. This is the case in Palestine.
- **Countries that apply a framework that has not been adjusted to the evolution of civil society** (Mauritania) and only **recognise declared and authorised CSOs**. These frameworks result in an exclusion mechanism since the registration system operates as a filter and excludes several types of CSOs, as is the case of Niger where foundations, platforms, forums, and the majority of community-based organisations are excluded. A practical example of exclusion is the limitation of the issuance of legal permits for unregistered organisation for public demonstration and assembly (Tanzania). Tensions

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and Myanmar. In the Neighbourhood region: Palestine. There are no countries in Latin America under this category.

between formal institutions and informal traditional leaders in social and cultural complex environments, as is the case in Senegal, influence exclusion as well. These trends are worrying because the space for CS is shrinking while the CSO landscape is evolving in terms of the number and variety of CS actors, and the criteria for recognition stays the same. Reasons to stick to existing criteria may be a country's inability to cope with sensitive issues such as human rights, principles of good governance, or conflicts between different layers of society (social, political, religious, language).

- **Countries where the framework presents no major obstacles to CSO operations, but the knowledge level and application does.** Citizens do not always feel well informed about the law (Mali), and agencies in charge of the implementation of the framework do not always know the provisions regarding specific groups of CSOs, or appear to be disorganized (Togo). As far as application is concerned, some countries have burdensome or time-consuming procedures for registration (Cambodia), particularly for those CSOs that work on sensitive issues such as human rights violations. They also run into problems due to the registration language or a lack of transparency and objectivity regarding the criteria that are applied in order to obtain a legal status (Mauritania). This category includes countries in which the multiplicity of laws is a source of confusion (Tanzania) and countries where improvements are not applied uniformly across the country.
- **Countries with an open space for civil society,** respecting the independent position of CSOs and their role in development, but where CSOs face a lack of openness to criticism in the government, where it is difficult for INGOs to register (Malawi), where there is an absence of specific regulations regarding civil society (Benin) or where there is pressure /social punishment when key political interests are at stake (Comoros).

## 2.2 CS involvement in public policies

CS involvement in public policies is reported on a scale **from 'limited' to 'high'**. The countries with a limited level of involvement experience either resistance from the government to including CSOs in policy processes and allowing them to work on advocacy aspects of the development process (Laos), or superficial modalities and absence of legislation to regulate national decision-making and planning processes (Palestine), ad hoc consultation mechanisms without proper preparation (Senegal) and/or weak participation and stagnating processes (Togo). Countries with mixed records, portraying positive as well as restrictive factors that influence CSOs involvement include Bangladesh, Benin, Cambodia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar and Tanzania.

All in all, the importance of CSOs' contributions in development is acknowledged and participation at different degrees exists in the framework of governmental decisions and actions. However, the effectiveness of CS participation is weakened by various factors and influences including lack information, generalised absence of formalised interaction mechanisms, the fact that CS efforts in policy monitoring are rarely taken to heart by local authorities and, last but not least, the existence of mistrust and exclusion of certain actors. CSOs, among others, call for a broader perception of authorities regarding the role of CSOs so that they can engage in a critical way with public authorities and public policies.

Countries with a high level of CS involvement in public policies (e.g. Comoros, Mali, Malawi, and Niger) **are characterised by several dialogue mechanisms**, at national, sectoral and local level and, in the case of Mali, involvement even in sensitive areas such as budget supervision, the fight against corruption, or governance. However, even in these countries, CSOs face obstacles, for example when CSO participation is only superficial and the government does not include issues raised by CS in its final documents, when governments are less receptive of CSOs monitoring government service delivery (Malawi), or when the security situation in the country does not allow an inclusive policy dialogue (Mali).

The whole array of LIC shows a **strong government focus on CSOs as service providers**. The roadmaps provide examples of inclusion in sector-related policy dialogue (health, education,

water & sanitation, food & agriculture, extractives, etc.), examples of inclusion of specific CSOs (women, farmers, trade unions) and of inclusion in human rights issues, good governance, reform programmes and national development policies. Several positive trends have been mentioned in the roadmaps as well: CSOs are getting more daring and confident in advocacy activities, and there has been a further rise in CSO legitimacy, an increased level of openness and political will to engage with CSOs and the establishment of a set of conditions that can facilitate citizens' monitoring of public policies and of the activities of public bodies.

In many cases a distinction has been made between the involvement of urban and rural CSOs that do not seem to have equal opportunities for involvement. Urban CSOs are much more likely to be consulted than rural ones, and changes in policies and laws are often not adequately communicated to local authorities, or alternatively they choose to ignore them (Myanmar). In Laos, independent CSOs remain mostly an urban phenomenon, based within the relatively small set of the educated elite

Finally, while CS involvement varies widely from one country to the other, the roadmaps from low income countries shed light on two subjects that put the role of CSOs as independent actors in policy dialogue under severe pressure.

First of all, the roadmap processes assessed illustrate the **influence that international aid (and its actors) has on processes of local development agenda setting**. The majority of CSOs depend on international partners and shape their agenda and activities according to the themes of calls for proposals or agendas of those partners. As a result, the number of specialised and professional CSOs is low because most CSOs tend to be involved in different sectors, following the availability of funding (Togo, Niger). Their strong dependence threatens their own sustainability and freedom of action (Tanzania, Malawi). Donors 'projectise' the work of CSOs. Local ownership and participation are limited since CSOs tend to be more accountable to these international actors than to local stakeholders and citizens. This often results in limited legitimacy in front of public authorities and in front of the public (Bangladesh). They carry out imposed agendas, activities and projects, and apply approaches that are not adapted to local conditions (Palestine). The upward accountability to the donors suggests that they are in fact not a part of 'home-grown or organic' civil society since foreign interests are imbedded in their work (Cambodia). The variability of funds of development partners makes it very difficult for CSOs to elaborate strategic and multiple year plans (Togo) and to position themselves for relevant inclusion in policy dialogue. Organisational systems and professional skills are built up to fit donor requirements and not to support their own strategies. The pattern of reduced resources in all countries leads to competition between CSOs (to be a privileged partner) and often overtakes the desire to work in coalition with others. This undermines the defence of CSOs and beneficiaries' interests.

**Secondly, CSOs' affiliation with political parties and/or individuals with close ties to the government and its institutions are sources of concern** as well. Several forms can be observed, ranging from dependency on charismatic individuals, often former or current civil servants, politicisation of certain CSOs (Togo), representatives of CS which are co-opted by certain public institutions (Senegal), to political infiltration that distorts the fundamental legitimacy of civil society (Niger). NGOs have been accused of being affiliated to political parties, causing a decrease in public trust in the civil society sector itself (Palestine). In Comoros, internal legitimacy is limited due to the control by one person who has contacts with the government and determines the level of engagement of the CSOs to policy dialogue and decision making processes. In some contexts CSOs are being instrumentalised by politics and politically active organisations are under greater political scrutiny. Cambodia introduced the "Hybrid Civil Society", referring to sub-national NGOs that have occasionally local authorities as members or even leaders. In Laos, government representatives sit on all INGO project steering committees and partnerships with district or provincial level state institutions are required in most cases for projects implemented by CSOs. While having close ties with governments and politics does not mean that these CSOs are not important actors in the development landscape, their representativeness and independency become question marks.



## 2.3 Capacities

### 2.3.1 Coordination

A high number of CSOs in low income countries **have limited capacities with regard to coordination and collaboration** (Bangladesh, Benin, Cambodia, Comoros, Laos Mauritania, Niger, Palestine). Although coordinating structures (federations, platforms, networks, coalitions) may involve a large number of organisations, member organisations consider them in general neither as a vehicle for channelling their voices and interests, nor as spaces in which a common agenda can be built up or discussed or for joining forces to generate opportunities for mutual strengthening. Sometimes this is due to the fact that there is a total lack of member-based CSOs (with the exception of trade unions) and coalitions are in an early stage of development (Cambodia), or due to competing interests between coordinating structures and their members, and between the members themselves (Benin, Niger), lack of recognition from governments of representative structures (Laos), lack of strategic positioning of coordinating structures (Comoros) or 'de facto division', like in the case of Palestine, which restricts the creation of a unified civil society vision and common position. International CSOs have played a unifying role, facilitating a single project to be carried out in a coordinated way in the different areas of the Palestinian territories, with different local partners.

Examples of countries with medium coordination capacities are Myanmar, where coordination between civil society organisations is gradually being stepped up while facing 'segmentation' of CSOs along ethnic and religious lines; Senegal, where coordinating structures are very productive in creating links with the government and assuring dialogue, but face problems of synergy; and Tanzania, where almost every district and region has a network of CSOs and many CSOs take part in African level networks and networks beyond the continent. Growing international interest in a country combined with the organisation of large-scale conferences and networking events strengthens the links with regional or global networks of CSOs (Myanmar).

### 2.3.2 Legitimacy and internal governance

Legitimacy is an area of concern in all roadmaps and is partly due to the lack of capacity to effectively develop a strong and critical mass of citizens with a mid- or long-term vision, partly due to the obligation of CSOs to respond to the agendas of international aid actors, and partly to the level of corruption, lack of transparency, absence of proper internal democratic structures, and poor monitoring and visibility of the work of CSOs. The promotion of operating standards, a code of ethics, and a code of conduct is often a subject of discussion.

The quality of internal governance varies between the countries, but is mostly low and refers to the principles of good governance, the quality of leadership, strategic planning, financial stability, effective management systems and structures, human resources, project management skills, monitoring, and to availability of tools such as accounting software, a procedural manual, etc. In Mali and Palestine the changing context requires frequent reorientation and organisational adaptation.

Research and advocacy need more attention. Local civil society is not sufficiently equipped to conduct research and engage in evidence-based advocacy. Relationships with research institutes are limited. In Myanmar quality research and advocacy are still restricted by the local authorities, as CSOs need to obtain prior approval to carry out research activities, especially if these are deemed politically sensitive. In Tanzania most CSOs lack the skills needed for undertaking research that is seen as credible by government and other development actors. In Bangladesh dissemination and knowledge sharing are limited. In Cambodia research appears to be a 'lost skill', and the lack of analytic and research capacity may to an extent stem from deeper cultural traditions where teachers lead and students follow and are not allowed to question the teachings.



### 3. The RM process

Almost 90% of the countries considered (i.e. low income countries not in a fragile situation and with a reasonable enabling environment) have finalised their RM for the period 2014-2017 and are now in the process of implementation. In Mozambique, the process is underway and a document is expected to be ready in the coming months.

#### 3.1 About consultation with CSOs

Although some feedback forms / roadmaps did not clearly state the number and type of CSOs that have been included in the consultations, they do illustrate the richness of the processes. They indicate the level of decentralisation, state whether or not the consultations were part of a joint EU/MS programming exercise (like they were in Bangladesh), specify if they were embedded in a more permanent system of structured dialogue (Comoros) and include an overview of consultation mechanisms (Palestine). CSOs have been included in relation to their structural characteristics and thematic diversity, or to the focus areas of the EU in a country. In some cases the consultations included urban as well as rural areas and local and international CSOs/NGOs. Consultations were with a range of twelve participating CSOs up to 472 in Mauritania. Myanmar and Mauritania organized consultations with CS in different regions, Mauritania with simultaneous translation facilities. Mali consulted CS through existing coordination groups. CSOs received questionnaires that served as input in the process. Workshops with stakeholders and focus groups, and separate consultations with the government at the level of ministries were organized as well. Several meetings were organized to identify the priorities and to elaborate the RM in a more detailed way. In Laos and Cambodia the main ideas of the roadmap were discussed with INGOs, networks and umbrella organisations. Burkina Faso presented the roadmap priorities during a symposium. In many countries CSOs have been included in separate meetings to validate the RM.

#### 3.2 About dialogue with Member States (MS)


Member states active in the countries have participated actively in the elaboration of the roadmaps, sometimes as co-writer. In some of the countries one of the member states took on a role of co-leader with the delegation in the process, as was for example the case in Senegal. In Mauritania, the EUD and the member states joined forces to elaborate the roadmap together. In Bangladesh, the RM process was closely linked to the joint programming exercise which offered a unique opportunity to: (i) confirm the importance of support to CS “as a sector”; and (ii) support effort to mainstream CS into the other sectors. A specific task force was created on the Civil Society Roadmap in Palestine where two non-EU MS participated in the drafting of the document: Norway and Switzerland.

### 4. The contents of EU engagement

#### 4.1 EU Priorities

Across the spectrum of roadmaps from low income countries, the priorities related to the **enabling environment** cover a wide range of issues and are mostly focused on finalising reforms, the improvement of existing legal frameworks, extending its scope by inclusion of emerging actors or giving a positive impulse to the growing role of CSOs. Knowledge and application of the legal framework as well as access to information are matters of serious concern. Recognition of CSOs, their inclusive participation in legislative processes related to constitutional freedoms, and political dialogue regarding the enabling environment are mentioned as essential cornerstones in order to move in the right direction. Some priorities aim to assure better geographical coverage or a higher level of inclusiveness of CSOs.

Figure 5: priorities and indicators in the RM assessed




The roadmaps underline a **clear acknowledgement** that **meaningful and constructive relationships between governments and civil society** and involvement of CSOs in public policies not only depend on legal and institutional frameworks, but also require a thoughtful investment in confidence building, political will and greater responsiveness of governments at different levels, and CSOs' capacity to act as an independent and accountable partners. It has been underlined that dialogue should not be limited to administrative levels but also reach out to cultures, religions and different language groups in society and cross-border exchange.

With regards to capacity, although with less emphasis on purpose and roles, and some concern about their effectiveness, bilateral and multi-actor partnerships are being viewed as a means to achieve inclusion and involvement of diverse stakeholders' viewpoints. The varieties of partnerships mentioned in the roadmaps aim to strengthen collaboration over a broad set of actors. They include networking between CSOs, coalition-, platform- and network building, CSO/LA/private sector partnerships, cross-level partnerships, partnerships between CSOs and local governments, public-private partnerships at local level, links between CSOs and their constituencies, partnerships between CSOs and development partners and between North-South or South-South platforms and networks, although the latter received less attention.

Needs are widely being expressed regarding support to the elaboration and/or implementation of 'an official Code of Practice', 'a chart/code of conduct' and other internal governance mechanisms in order to increase local CSOs' capacity to perform their roles as independent development actors more effectively and, more specifically, to support good governance and to provide clear principles and standards for CSOs engagement.

Finally, partnerships are also sought after with the private sector. As several of the assessed roadmaps underline, "it is time to strengthen the relationship between CSOs and the private sector to increase the number of private actors in corporate social responsibility and to explore alternative ways for funding". Many roadmaps highlight the need for support for an effective contribution of CSOs to economic development and them to become players in the economic realm, including rural development, food security, local energy, environment, women's economic empowerment, transformation and commercialisation of producers' organisations and cooperatives and the promotion of entrepreneurship and job creation.

Figure 6: Break down of priorities in the RM assessed



#### 4.2 Mainstreaming

For several EUD and MS **mainstreaming is an ongoing process**, although sometimes limited to specific sectors (particularly but not necessarily the focal sector of EU cooperation) and sometimes with activities that are not focused on specific sectors but more generally on bringing CSOs on board as governance actors into the relevant public policy debates (e.g. Niger), including EU-partner country programming of assistance.

In Benin, the elaboration of program strategies (11th EDF, NSA/LA, EIDHR) includes regular consultations with CSOs. The assessed roadmaps show that efforts are made on an on-going basis to facilitate complementarity and coherence of programmes, instruments and sectors (Cambodia) and that alignment between national and EU/MS priorities and initiatives is encouraged (Laos).

Malawi and Tanzania indicate that the UK has a concrete approach to mainstreaming. In Malawi, through DFID, a score-carding program aims to enhance policy monitoring and quality of service delivery implemented by grassroots organisations, complemented with support to various levels of the government responsible for the policy implementation and service provision in the sectors.

Most development partners consult all other donors prior to developing a country strategy in order to avoid duplication and enhance complementarity (Tanzania). Coordination efforts include specific attention for areas where programmes are not being carried out (Myanmar).

Mainstreaming CS has also become one of the principles of the EU Local Strategy on Development Cooperation in Palestine, and CSOs have been associated in EU programming and monitoring exercises. Others will build up civil society mainstreaming towards the achievement of the identified priorities in the roadmap (Bangladesh). It has been underlined that the roadmap offers a means to progress on CSO mainstreaming and engagement with other types of CSOs, beyond traditional NGOs, such as CBO, think tanks and movements.

#### 4.3 The involvement of MS in the implementation of the roadmap

The level of involvement is not clearly defined in all roadmaps. MS are sometimes mentioned in general terms and associated with activities as “MS”, without reference to the specific MS that will be involved or responsible.

In Bangladesh (where the roadmap process is strongly linked to joint programming) a Task Team of CS Focal Points was established to assure the active involvement of MS in the implementation of priorities and the achievement of outcomes. In Benin, each semester/trimester a follow up meeting will be organised.

The RM of Laos explains clearly the division of labour, the coordination mechanisms between the EUD and MS, the support different MS (i.e. Luxembourg, France, UK Germany, Switzerland and Australia) provide to Lao CS and also specifies in very good detail, how the EUD, in coordination with MS, intends to fund the actions proposed by the RM.

The same goes for Mauritania where MS will be active in the implementation of the RM, as financing and operational mechanisms have been identified to support achievement of the priorities. In Palestine, references to EU MS are well introduced in the Roadmap under the four priorities and in relation to the proposed actions. Results are shaped in a way that the EU and MS share roles and responsibilities, seeking to enhance complementarity and avoid overlapping.

## 5. SWOT analysis

Strengths and opportunities	Challenges
The RM process has benefitted most countries with a sound knowledge base that fed into the formulation of priorities, indicators and actions and that has proven to be a very valuable way to understand the CS arena and the wider context in which civil society operates (joint studies, mappings, dialogue, internal meetings within the EU, consultations with CS, interested partners, and bilateral meetings with governments and non EU partners).	It will be important to keep the momentum going by inspiring follow up and inviting feedback mechanisms in order to maintain the enthusiasm of all actors involved.  Almost all roadmaps contain lessons learned from EU engagement towards civil society so far. What should be done with them? If not capitalised upon, learning will be difficult.
The RMs have a strong potential to set a common agenda around which EUD,MS and other international partners/donors can have dialogue, not only discussing projects and CSO funding, but also discussing processes in relation to the priorities.	
The roadmaps underline the context differences and justify locally-owned and tailor-made approaches.	Better tools may be required to identify at country level CSOs' specific operational boundaries and to elaborate strategies to open up concrete restrictions. Cross cultural communication, building trust, overcoming language barriers, bridging the gap between generations of CSOs are equally important challenges to effectively elaborate a roadmap for strategic engagement with civil society and to engage strategically in practice.
Several roadmaps identified the strength of emerging civil society.	There is a need to move beyond the understanding of civil society as being represented by development NGOs only, and expand concrete cooperation to a more diverse representation of CSOs.
CSOs' acknowledgement of the danger of not	It will be necessary to allow CSOs to elaborate the scenarios to position

being in the driving seat of their agendas.	themselves in a different and more independent way in their relationship with development partners and the political arena.
A search for legitimacy and representativeness.	<p>Transfer of knowledge and skills to leaders of umbrellas, platforms and networks on how collaborative practice can be managed more effectively and representativeness can take shape.</p> <p>Peer to peer support regarding the elaboration of codes of conduct / codes of practice.</p>


## Annex 2.4. Report on the RM process in lower middle income countries (LMIC)

### 1. Introduction

Countries analysed under this report fall under the lower middle income countries (LMIC)<sup>14</sup> classification, with no fragile situation and where the environment is relatively conducive (>0,45 EEI)<sup>15</sup>. Under this cluster, 29 countries have a roadmap (RM) underway or planned in the future. Information is currently only available for 25 countries<sup>16</sup>. The analysis that follows is based on the review of the processes and documents of these 25 countries.

LMICs are distributed through every region of the developing world. Nevertheless, the regions with the highest proportion of LMICs are Asia & Pacific (38%) and Latin America (24%) followed by Africa (21%) and the EU Neighbourhood & Middle East (17%).

Figure 7: Regions grouping LMIC countries assessed



In terms of support, the RM Facility (RMF) has provided support to Cameroon, Ghana, Sao Tomé & Principe and Indonesia with a field mission, and Nicaragua and Congo Brazzaville with

<sup>14</sup>Countries with between \$1,045 and \$4,125 per capita gross national income (GNI) using World Bank classification: [http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups#Lower\\_middle\\_income](http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups#Lower_middle_income)

<sup>15</sup><http://www.civicus.org/eei/>

<sup>16</sup>In Asia (India, Nepal, Indonesia, Maldives, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands), Latin America (Belize, Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Paraguay, Guyana), Africa (Ghana, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Sao Tomé & Principe, Lesotho, Cape Verde), and ENPI & the Middle East (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Tunisia).

remote assistance. Georgia has also benefited from a DEVCO B2 mission and an EU regional project has supported the EUD in Ukraine for RM consultations.

## **2. The context vis-à-vis the 3 ambitions of the 2012 Communication**

### **2.1. The environment in which CSOs operate**

Beyond the economic considerations, important differences persist between these countries due to their historical, cultural, political and social differences, making it difficult to give an overall assessment of the enabling environment (EE) context. CSO weight and structure varies greatly among these different contexts:

- Industrialised Asian countries, such as India, Philippines, Maldives, etc. have relatively high levels of growth, coexisting with high rates of poverty and strong inequalities
- Latin American countries, such as Nicaragua, Guatemala, etc. have an active civil society with a long tradition of human rights advocacy
- African countries, such as Ghana, Cameroon, etc. experience a certain economic growth, combined with poverty and high levels of exclusion. Participation of CSOs has not been encouraged
- EU Neighbourhood & Middle Eastern countries, such as Armenia, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, are characterised by a historically authoritarian state (former communist states) where political transformations have resulted in partially democratic systems, and Tunisia, which is at present in a democratic transition.

The rights of freedom, assembly, association and expression, protected in most countries, are examined. Thailand is a particular case as the civil society space has shrunk significantly since the 2014 Military Coup. The new government has imposed martial law and a nationwide curfew, banned political gatherings, arrested and detained politicians and anti-coup activists, imposed Internet censorship and took control of the media.

In many LMIC countries, legal frameworks and policy contexts are still challenging. CSOs have a restrictive regulatory environment with bureaucratic obstacles and/or political mistrust. This is the case of for example Armenia, Moldova, Tunisia, Ecuador, Belize, Nicaragua, Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville.

In some other countries, despite the apparent openness of the government, there are still a number of burdens that CSOs face, such as the lack of transparency and proper access to relevant public information. For the most part, access to information is either very partial or unavailable on a straightforward and timely basis. Tax laws and related legislation often establish significant obstacles for the operation of CSOs. Moreover, in the field of human rights, some CSOs still suffer from harassment and violence (India, Philippines, Maldives, Sri Lanka).

However, an interesting aspect to point out is the development of media. This development has helped civil society publicise an increasingly large number of issues, and build pressure around topics such as corruption or failures of justice (Georgia, Tunisia, India, Sao Tomé & Principe).

### **2.2. CS involvement in public policies**

The current situation of CSOs' involvement in the elaboration, implementation and/or monitoring of public policies at national and local level remains very different from one country to another among those analysed.

In some countries consultations often remain ad-hoc and governments avoid selecting CSOs that might put forward a critical perspective to government policies (Ecuador, Lesotho, India, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea (PNG)).

In other countries, consultations are based on limited or no access to relevant information on government draft policies. For the most part, this is often related to corruption problems (Ukraine, Moldova, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Cape Verde).

There are also superficial consultations in the final stages of policy development, designed for information sharing only, with limited opportunities to influence policy for CSOs. Sri Lanka, Philippines, Cameroon, etc. are characterised by tokenistic engagement, particularly in more sensitive governance-related areas, human rights, religious freedom, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual (LGBT) or democratic issues.

It is also the case that in countries where there exist wide, open consultations at the planning stage, once implementation is started there is very limited to inexistent space for constructive state-civil society cooperation (India, Salvador, PNG).

However, on the positive side, some governments are making efforts to improve conditions for CSOs. They have created permanent institutionalised spaces for multi-stakeholder dialogue that include a diversity of civil society actors in monitoring development policies. There are several recent examples of progress in formally established multi-stakeholder dialogue that deserve closer attention and might be applicable in other countries, such as in Nicaragua and Guatemala.

Yet it is also interesting to see that in a same region sometimes the picture is mixed. For example, Ecuador has a specific department within the Presidency that is tasked with promoting dialogue with civil society, but the government has thus far resisted demands to make this dialogue more formalised. Nicaragua and Guatemala, by contrast, have made more substantial efforts to institutionalise policy dialogue with civil society.

Most of the governments recognise the contribution of civil society in addressing social policies and delivery services (education, health, youth, gender, etc.). However, significant barriers often exist for CSOs with mandates that include the critique of and/or advocacy for policy change or for those that represent the views of marginalised and vulnerable populations (Maldives, Congo-Brazzaville). Governments have also been particularly intolerant towards CSOs opposing the appropriation of natural resources such as oil, timber, mining, etc. (Armenia, Cameroun, Congo Brazzaville, Ecuador).

In some countries, such as Cape Verde, a greater space for civil society engagement with local authorities on local development issues has been created. Working at the grassroots level, there has been an interesting space in the development process for CSOs, giving voice to marginalised communities, providing expertise and knowledge, testing innovative approaches to poverty reduction, and ensuring beneficiary participation in projects, such as in Armenia, Georgia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Congo-Brazzaville, Philippines, etc. While in other countries, such as in Sri Lanka, CSOs suffer from restrictive conditions imposed by local authorities.

### 2.3. CS capacity

Despite EU cooperation efforts in terms of capacity-building and structural support of civil society, in most of the countries analysed, the level of CSO capacity stilis a critical factor for effective policy engagement that undermines the credibility of CSOs. CSOs' capacity encompasses many aspects, from policy advocacy skills to technical knowledge, research skills, and availability of the resources necessary to support an organisation. CSO sustainability challenges and raises the issue of high dependency on donor funds (either directly or indirectly through INGOs). As a matter of fact, in many countries CSO financing has been decreasing for several years as many international donors have withdrawn from countries when they have achieved middle-income country status (Thailand, Philippines, Maldives, Samoa). CSOs remain fragile and struggle to influence decision-makers or public opinion at large. Their lack of capacity leaves considerable room to increase their engagement in the areas of transparency and accountability.



Another key obstacle to overcome by CSOs concerns the issue of their legitimacy, as they come to play an increasingly significant role in policy identification, implementation and assessment. Increasingly, CSOs use methods to improve their own governance (code of conducts and peer reviews) such as for example Filipino CSOs, which have made tremendous progress in CSO self-regulation with the Philippine Council for NGO Certification.

RMs play an important role at both levels: supporting civil society development, and at the same time backing government-led reforms. In some countries, like Ukraine or Georgia, the EU is seen as a mediator, whose role is primarily to enforce dialogue between the authorities and civil society.

### 3. The RM process

Almost all countries concerned have finalised their RMs for the period 2014-2017 and are now in the process of implementing them. The process in four countries (Paraguay, Guyana, Nepal and the Solomon Islands) is underway and a document is expected to be ready in the coming months.

#### 3.1. About consultation with CSOs

A wide spectrum analysis of actors and roles has been achieved in many countries as a first step to launch the process (Armenia, Georgia, Guatemala, Cameroon, Sao Tomé & Príncipe, Philippines). Nevertheless, this has not always been the case. EC&MS have not always undertaken a regular civil society analysis or mapping study before starting the RM process. This has implied that a number of RMs lack a nuanced understanding of the civil society landscape, which consequently affects the overall impact of their civil society support (Sao Tomé & Príncipe, Belize, Ecuador). Strategic civil society support should always **start from a comprehensive context analysis of the diversity of roles and agendas of CSOs.**

In terms of the consultative process, in some countries in order to foster understanding and ownership, create opportunities for partnerships, and ensure matching expectations, a step further has been taken by creating transparent and structured dialogue in close consultation with CSOs.

The EUD in Georgia has done a commendable job that could serve as inspiration to others. The process has involved: the set-up of a multi-stakeholder reference group (three meetings organised), two consultations in Tbilisi, three regional consultations, two web-based consultations and 30 bilateral meetings.

The EUD in the Philippines has organised consultations with a broad range of CSOs, respecting principles of access to information, sufficient advance notice and clear provisions for feedback and follow-up. Different means and techniques have been used: e-consultation focused on identifying priorities as perceived, analysed and formulated by CSOs from various sectors, interviews with specific CSOs. Small group consultations on the concept of diversity were also organised, as well as meetings with networks and umbrella organisations.

The EUD in Nicaragua has also organised very good participation from both MS and CSOs. The RM methodology demonstrates a very good and structured approach. A questionnaire was sent out first; eight consultation workshops were organised to expand, supplement and validate aspects more important in the written consultation; and five workshops in different regions (led by different MS) were organised. In each of the workshops, there was broad and diverse participation by CSOs. A questionnaire was also sent to INGOs. The whole process was carried out completely independent from the government of Nicaragua. Nevertheless, the national authorities and association of municipalities were kept informed. The actions demonstrate a concrete and specific direction in contributing meaningfully towards the priorities proposed in a logical timeframe. It would be very positive to keep the good cooperation with CS and try to involve even more CSOs, especially into actions targeting citizens' participation in public life and decision-making processes.



The case of Ghana is also worth mentioning as they have organised an excellent and inclusive process. Several participatory meetings took place to get input from CSOs on priorities for the engagement of the EU with civil society in the period 2014-2017. National authorities were also informed of the process and involved as much as possible in the definition of the priorities. Four consultative meetings in Accra with think tanks and research institutions, implementing NGOs, thematic lead platforms, grassroots organisations and CBOs took place. The CSO representatives compiled a questionnaire with specific questions on the functioning of their organisations, the challenges they faced in terms of capacity, as well as the general operational environment. One final multi-stakeholder workshop took place where the priorities for future EU engagement with civil society were set, and possible actions defined (over 60 CSO representatives, in addition to EUD and MS officials). Finally, the EUD and MS endorsed the five main priorities chosen, and this document was finalised.

In several countries, efforts to reach local authorities have been made as well (such as in Georgia, Moldova, Nicaragua, Salvador, Philippines, Thailand, Congo-Brazzaville).

Still, in some other countries consultations have been reduced to little more than a presentation from the EUD to a limited number of CSOs, often at a late stage of the process (Belize).

### 3.2. About dialogue with Member States (MS)

In some countries, such as the experience of Nicaragua and Ghana described above, **MS have taken an active part in the development of the RM from its very early stages and supported the EUD with analysis, written contributions, preparation of the methodology, workshops, meetings of coordination, preparation of documents, etc.** It has represented an opportunity to harmonise visions, deepen coordination, and think together on the complementarities and synergies of accountability actions and citizen participation. This strong coordination has brought credibility to the RM process (Nicaragua, Guatemala, Salvador, Ghana, Cameroon and India). Moreover, when the country is already a Pilot Country for Joint Programming, which is the case for example of Guatemala and Nicaragua, EC & MS have always been active in the implementation of the RM priorities as they are already in close coordination on cooperation issues. Another interesting experience is the RM process in Georgia, where the CS engagement in the RM has been seen as a useful reference for the on-going exercise to develop a Democracy Profile. Likewise, CS RM is understood as being complementary to a Human Rights Strategy.

Some coordination mechanisms among MS (institutionalised groups, task forces, working groups) have led the whole process and EUD has assumed the coordination role. Regular follow-up meetings will be organised to take stock of implementation in order to better integrate EC and MS actions.

However, some EUDs have had difficulties in getting MS fully on board and actively contributing to the process, due to time and resource restrictions. Belize for example, is a satellite office depending on the Jamaica EUD. Another example is Mongolia's cooperation, which is implemented by the EUD in Beijing. This represents a challenge for genuine discussions and coordination with MS present in Ulaanbaatar.


In order for MS get actively involved in the implementation of the RM priorities and avoid the RM becoming just another bureaucratic form to fulfil, some countries have taken the necessary engagements to join forces (specific studies or operational support) so that RM actions don't only focus on EUD actions (Thailand, Salvador, Tunisia, Sao Tomé & Principe, Congo-Brazzaville).

## 4. The contents of EU engagement

Most of the RM assessed expose **specific priorities and actions**, duly tailored to the context.

RMs in LMIC have an average of almost six priorities per country. Some countries, like Mongolia and Belize have identified only two priorities, while others, such as Ecuador or Cameroon, go as far as 14 (although they are specific priorities within a framework of 3 to 5 global priorities). More details are provided in the figure below, which also describes the number of indicators per RM assessed.

Figure 8: priorities and indicators in the RM assessed



**Priorities linked to the enabling environment** are present in all the RMs assessed, except in four countries: Philippines, Mongolia, Maldives and Congo-Brazzaville. In this regard, most of them focus specifically on the harmonisation and modernisation of CS legislation.

#### Examples of innovative practices to promote the EE

- Facilitate and foster the implementation of the reforms foreseen in the Association Agreement (implementation of the AA articles on civil society involvement (e.g. Art. 299, 469, 443, 444. 445) (Ukraine)
- Regular political dialogue with the relevant national authorities, in particular but not limited to Attorney General, Ministry of Interior, and Human Rights Ombudsman (join action by all EU MS, Norway, Switzerland and OHCHR) (Guatemala)
- The EU will continue to hold CSO consultations during the information sessions of the local calls for proposals (e.g. CSO-LA, EIDHR) on a broader agenda linked to political dialogue with the government (i.e. annual Human Rights Dialogue) and to important

issues in relation with the impact of EU policies (migration, trade, agriculture, governance and human rights) in the spirit of Policy Coherence for Development, and make a follow-up part of the dialogue process in order to come to a truly structured dialogue (Indonesia)

Regular meetings held with organisations representing economic interests, including business and trade unions, professional associations and chambers of commerce, about the monitoring of regional integration and EPAs (Cameroon).

**Priorities linked to the involvement of CSOs in public policies** (the second overall ambition of the EC) are also widely represented in almost all the RMs assessed (except Lesotho, Maldives and Mongolia from the 25 assessed). The primary focus remains on the role and the participation of civil society in policy and decision-making. In almost all of the countries, the need for better involvement of civil society in the legislative process in specific areas such as in anti-corruption policy, human rights, and environment is highlighted.

#### Examples of innovative practices to promote CS participation in public policies & dialogue

- Policy dialogue on social protection will include social rights, indigenous peoples, rights of vulnerable groups, RM for Engagement with CSOs economic empowerment, persons with disabilities, women and gender equality, etc. (Philippines)
- CSO mapping study for gaining better understanding of the diverse CSOs, including their roles, capacity (constraints), legitimacy, interests and dynamics, particularly in the focal sectors of cooperation (education, fight against corruption, environment, etc.); the analysis may also include an assessment of their relationship with the state and other forces (e.g. private sector) and the prevailing enabling environment (at sector and national level, including the legal, institutional and political economy framework in which they operate (Indonesia)
- Political and diplomatic support, engaging with government and public authorities both in a public way (through public declarations) and through informal pressure (including meetings with government representatives) to promote and expand gender policies (Ghana).

**Capacity development** is represented in almost all RMs assessed. The goal is to reinforce CSOs' ability to engage in democratic governance, shape policy dialogues and promote government accountability (undertaking actions to improve research-based advocacy, policy dialogue, networking and fundraising, etc.). This is in order to both drive and sustain reforms and change. Another important area for improvement is the development of internal governance and mutual accountability systems, including gender mainstreaming, that CSOs exhort governments to follow.

#### Examples of innovative practices in capacity development


- Mapping of inclusion of active citizenship culture at all levels of the educational system (Armenia)
- Establish a CSO Code of Conduct to encourage accountability, transparency and effectiveness (Tunisia)
- Increase the capacity of research centres and/or communication for efficiency in providing relevant information in order to build an informed citizenship about public issues that affect them (Nicaragua).

It is interesting to point out the Georgia RM, as it has taken capacity development as a separated focal area. It is not seen as an end in itself. Capacity development takes place in order to achieve a specific objective. In this understanding, capacity development is taken as a

crosscutting issue, which will be supported in a sustained and long-term manner. For instance: capacity development for coalition building will certainly play a role in support of the development of regional and thematic coalitions. Or, again, capacity building for financial management will not only enhance CSOs' ability to manage donor funds, but will also increase their financial literacy in terms of the financial framework in which they operate, thereby increasing their sustainability. Thus, capacity building is present in every part of the RM and is a long-term commitment of the EU.

Furthermore, Tunisia, Lesotho and Guatemala, have selected **one other priority**, not related to the ambitions of the Communication putting the accent on **promoting coordination between EU, MS & other donors** (including division of labour and joint support where feasible), and **CSOs**. Conflict prevention (Ukraine), civic education and social enterprise (Georgia) are other priorities set.

Figure 9: Break down of priorities in the RM assessed



The process of developing the RM offers an **opportunity to promote the mainstreaming of CS inside EU cooperation** (Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova, Tunisia, Belize, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville). Georgia has a strong focus on mainstreaming, with all priority sectors of EU cooperation (justice, agriculture, public administration reform, vocational training, etc.) addressed. In Mongolia, the priorities are based on the focal sectors of cooperation: governance of revenues from extractive industries for sustainable growth, and employment (an approach which promotes mainstreaming of CSOs into these sectors).

**Further work needs to be done to develop a system for monitoring progress towards the agreed priorities.** The system should also include the development of a baseline and setting clear goals with measurable indicators, which will be the basis for monitoring the progress of implementation of the RM (Congo, Cameroon, Sao Tomé & Principe). An interesting experience is the Thailand RM, which already includes a dashboard that has begun to identify the planned actions for the implementation of the RM, linked to the different priorities and indicators. A baseline is planned for 2014/2015 and progress will be assessed annually. Special attention is also paid to establishing a mechanism for regular dialogue between the EUD, MS and other donors, and CS.

## 5. SWOT analysis

Strengths and opportunities	Challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Alignment of the RM process with other relevant country processes (e.g. Pilot Country for Joint Programming in Nicaragua and Guatemala; Democracy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishing an enabling legal environment for civil society action is a first step towards opening a way for a viable civil society sector. However, tax</li> </ul>

Profile in Georgia).	laws and related legislation can represent obstacles to the operation of CSOs.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High degree of cooperation with MS and other donors. Coordination mechanisms exist and can be used and further strengthened.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strategic civil society support should always start from a comprehensive context analysis of the diversity of roles and agendas of CSOs.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Permanent institutionalised spaces for multi-stakeholder dialogue on development policies, based on principles of mutual trust, respect and shared responsibilities. These spaces should engage a diversity of civil society actors and should have access to information and transparent accountability mechanisms protected by legislation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CSOs are mostly acknowledged for their service delivery role (bridging the gap between the state and the people) and to a lesser extent for their governance-related roles.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Working at the grassroots level, it is an interesting space in the development process for CSOs, giving voice to marginalised communities, providing expertise and knowledge, and testing innovative approaches to poverty reduction.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In some countries, CSOs particularly engaged in human rights work face significant and frequent restrictions on their operations (all the way up to regular threats and harassment by state authorities).</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The EU is seen as a mediator, whose role is primarily to enforce the dialogue between the authorities and civil society.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CSOs still often struggle with a dependency on donor funding which hinders sustainability, distracts from their missions, and encourages a short-term strategy of chasing funds. CSOs in MICs particularly face financial difficulties, since support from CSOs in donor countries declines.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Further work needs to be done to develop a system for monitoring progress towards the agreed priorities. The system should also include the development of a baseline and set clear goals with measurable indicators, which will be the basis for monitoring the progress of implementation of the RM.</li> </ul>

## Annex 2.5. Report on the Roadmap Process in UMIC and UIC

### 1. Introduction

The EU's 2006 European Consensus on Development addresses the topic of aid to middle-income countries, making it clear that the least developed countries (LDCs) and other low-income countries (LICs) will be the priority for EU aid, especially if they are in Africa, and that the lower middle-income countries (LMICs) should be the focus of assistance to MICs. In 2011, the EU development commissioner announced plans to withdraw aid from many middle-income countries. However, international support to MICs, including financial aid, continues to play an important role in global development: as a catalyst for change and as an important contribution to the graduation process from aid dependence.

The upper-middle (UMIC) and high-income countries (HIC) were allocated approximately 5.3 per cent of the ODA budget for the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF national and regional indicative programmes envelope. For the 11th EDF, around €1.2 billion could potentially be freed up. The European Commission's proposed policy of 'differentiation' aims to recalibrate aid and development cooperation in middle-income countries. Differentiation is a key feature of the EU's new development strategy, An Agenda for Change – and will shape the future of EU development cooperation over its multi-year budget period (2014-2020)<sup>17</sup>. Although poverty exists in MICs, they are considered sufficiently affluent to spend their own resources on development; it is therefore argued that in view of tight donor budgets, funds should be allocated to LIC and fragility states where they are most needed. Others, however, argue that aid is more than an attempt to eradicate poverty and should also support MICs in achieving the Millennium Development Goals<sup>18</sup>.

In the Development Cooperation Instrument (the EU's main aid funding stream for South Africa, Latin America and Asia), 16 middle-income countries are set to become ineligible for bilateral assistance, including higher middle-income countries. Despite their upper-middle-income status, South Africa and Cuba remain eligible for bilateral aid through DCI, in addition to Ecuador, Peru and Colombia. Both EDF and the DCI's bilateral programs channel assistance mainly to governments of beneficiary countries in the form of budget support or programmed funding. To the relief of many CSOs, the more modest EU thematic aid programmes (the bulk of funding through civil society) have been spared further cuts.

CSOs from higher middle-income countries play strategically important roles in effective development cooperation and in demanding transparency and accountability around the aid that their own countries still receive. They are therefore not just recipients of cooperation, but also innovators, providers of services in different sectors and promoters of accountability.

A comparative analysis of the roadmaps (RMs) from HIC and UMIC demonstrates the particular role civil society has in strengthening democratic processes, providing services and promoting development in a wide variety of sectors. It also shows a general trend of some concern about lack of funding, slowly shrinking enabling environments and lack of implementation of policies.

This report is based on an assessment of two HICs (Barbados and Israel) and 14 UMICs (Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa (Africa); Fiji (Asia & Pacific); Lebanon and Algeria (European Neighbourhood & Middle East); and Argentina, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and Peru (from Latin America & Caribbean)). No access was available to the roadmaps and feedback forms of Botswana, Malaysia, Chile, Cuba, Suriname and Uruguay.

Latin AM & Caribbean	8
Africa	4
ENI & Middle East	2
Asia and Pacific	1
Neighbourhood	1

The RM Facility (RMF) has provided in-country support to Mexico. Peru hired a local consultant to support the elaboration of the Roadmap and some initial remote support was offered to South Africa (a mission is foreseen in September 2015 to assist the EUD in the definition of the M&E mechanism), in addition to the support provided by ECDPM.

<sup>17</sup>What future for EU development cooperation for Middle Income Countries. The state of play of negotiations between EU institutions, BOND, ODI, Sian Herbert, 2013

<sup>18</sup> See also: Jonathan Glennie: The role of aid to middle-income countries: a contribution to evolving EU development policy, working paper 331, June 2011, ODI UK

## 2. Country context and the three priorities for EU support

<p>HIC and UMIC</p> <p>Country Contexts</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Generally supportive enabling environment for civil society</li> <li>• Important advances in democratisation, political participation, economic growth, participation and dialogue, coupled with significant disparities in socio-economic situation of citizens</li> <li>• Functioning legal frameworks in place that ensure space for civil society</li> <li>• Active CS in a wide variety of sectors (from providing services to increasing responsibilities in the field of developing public policies and monitoring local and national governments)</li> <li>• In some countries, vibrant civil society plays an innovative role</li> <li>• In several RMs, the need for strengthening structured dialogue mechanisms between CSOs and national and local governments is highlighted.</li> </ul> <p>Issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Generally declining respect for the important role of CSOs</li> <li>• Lack of compliance with international commitments and national legal frameworks</li> <li>• Rights-based CSOs in particular are increasingly monitored and face challenges in operating activities and securing funding (particularly in graduating countries)</li> <li>• Although CSOs in many countries have created networks and platforms, there is an identified need for more effective coordination and collaboration between organisations and sectors.</li> </ul>
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### 2.1. The environment in which CSOs operate

A review of the HIC and UMIC EU Roadmaps for engagement with civil society demonstrates a number of parallels in the situation of the enabling environment in which civil society operates in the 16 countries of the cluster. Civil society has good space to operate and a rather supportive environment in 14 countries, but is more restricted in two (South Africa and Israel). In Israel the legal framework acknowledges the role of civil society and recognises the importance of consultation and dialogue with civil society actors; however, a clear framework for engagement between government institutions and civil society is missing and non-mainstream actors (i.e. Arab minority, socially disadvantaged groups, and social change organisations with a strong advocacy agenda) encounter difficulties and are often excluded from dialogue. In South Africa, the RM notes a declining respect for civic space, particularly with regards to the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression (i.e. violent police interventions during demonstrations). The RM also highlights a decline in access to information, an arbitrary application of the registration law and the need to reform the tax system for CSOs in the country.

Generally, in all countries of this cluster, those CSOs involved in service provision encounter little or no opposition. They work with their governments to a greater or lesser extent, but generally can operate rather freely. This is not the case for those organisations that focus on human rights issues, democratisation, transparency and sometimes rights of indigenous peoples, minorities, women or LGBTI. One third of the roadmaps are concerned about a shrinking operating space for these organisations.

Another general feature of the enabling environment is the fact that in all the countries, legal and policy frameworks are more or less in place. Certainly, in a number of countries, policies should be further adjusted; generally, though, there is a rule of law situation that regulates the role of civil society in a balanced manner. However, with regards to implementation of policies, there is room for improvement in a majority of the countries.



Yet another issue that is common among most countries of this cluster is the fact that there is growing social inequality (this is not only a trend for HIC and UMIC but a world-wide trend) and a general decline in international funding coupled with limited financial sustainability of CSOs.

A good number of countries also have a well-functioning, pro-active and comparatively capable civil society (particularly in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Israel, Peru and South Africa). Some other countries (such as Seychelles and Mexico) need their civil society actors to multiply and become more actively engaged.

## 2.2. Civil Society involvement in public policies (national and international)

Most roadmaps of this cluster recognise that civil society involvement in developing, implementing and monitoring government policies is relatively high. CSOs have campaigned to improve policies, monitor implementation, engage in advocacy, implement government programmes or act in those sectors or geographical areas where the government has little or no influence. These activities do not necessarily result in high impact, but in most countries CSOs are well aware of legislative issues, policy gaps and space for civil society.

CS involvement in public policies is weaker in Mexico, Fiji, Israel and Barbados. While participation of Mexican civil society in areas of global discussion began a few decades ago, recently it has seen an intensification of activities linking Mexican CSOs to international debates. In the Caribbean there is good potential for civil society to strengthen activities in service delivery and entrepreneurship and further develop its influence on policy making, also at regional level (implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) via the CARIFORUM-EU Consultative Committee). In Fiji, positive developments are noted in the health and environment sectors. Cooperation with the private sector is advancing and authorities have begun opening up for dialogue on sensitive matters. The UN Human Rights Council's UPR of Fiji in Geneva is an example of progress in dialogue with civil society on human rights issues. In areas such as education, governance, human rights and media, however, structured dialogue and engagement mechanisms are still not in place, with only ad-hoc consultations taking place at irregular intervals. The right to freedom of association has also been undermined by the Public Emergency Regulation (PER), which has restricted freedoms of assembly, expression and information. The Charitable Act reinforces traditional approaches (charity, welfare and relief) but is inadequate for civil society involved in advocacy work. Organisations that are regarded to be anti-government can be de-registered and prevented from conducting its activities. Following the 2006 military coup, the registration of new organisations has been hampered.

CSOs in all countries of the cluster engage in a wide variety of sectors, traditionally in the field of health, education, sanitation, nutrition, socially vulnerable groups (the disabled), development, research and also in gender, environment, development, minorities and indigenous peoples. As indicated in the former section, the latter activities are increasingly challenged by the government, and in some countries also by the media.

## 2.3. CSO capacity

As can be expected, coordination between CSOs in HICs and UMICs is relatively high. In most countries, umbrellas or networks are set up between sectors, at territorial or at national level. The quality of networking and cooperation between CSOs is still a challenge: both vertical and horizontal integration could benefit from further strengthening. In Barbados, for example, though local civil society benefits from the national NSA Panel platform, effective coordination around sectors is still weak, and this limits the opportunity of civil society to be heard and consulted in national and regional governance processes. The absence of effective umbrella organisations in each sector increases fragmentation and leads to duplication of activities and a waste of resources.

Several roadmaps indicate that networking and coordination beyond traditional NGOs and CSOs should improve. One exception was noted in the Seychelles. Recently, the umbrella that groups the country's CSOs was transformed into a Citizens Engagement Platform, representing all NSAs, including political parties, media organisations and trade unions. The state has formalised partnerships with CS through a Memorandum of Understanding with the umbrella organisation to increase collaboration with CSOs and encourage integrated development as identified in the National Action Plan on Social Development.

Albeit often challenging, there are also good practice consolidating alliances and strategies between different civil society actors, particularly in Latin America, the Dominican Republic, Peru and Colombia. In Namibia, the umbrella body for NCSOs (NANGOF Trust) was revived in 2009 and is recognised by the government as the representative body of CSOs. As such, the NANGOF Trust acts as a collective voice for CSOs and provides supportive services to its 122 member CSOs. Different platforms have also been established around sectors (health, environment, education, tourism, etc.).

The EUDs and other donors in several countries are working to enhance the financing of CS networks and umbrellas, providing an incentive for coordination and efficiency.

### 3. The Roadmap process

Roadmap Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Good MS involvement in roadmap development</li> <li>• Diverse and intense consultations with civil society, combining face to face meetings at the EUD, decentralised consultations and on-line questionnaires in several countries</li> <li>• No support received from the Facility (except in 2 countries)</li> <li>• 2/3 of the roadmaps restricted.</li> </ul>
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Despite the fact that the EUDs from this cluster work in relatively tranquil and balanced environments, six EU Delegations, from a total of 21, did not manage to present their roadmaps. There was no FBF for three.

#### 3.1. Consultation with civil society

In all but two countries, the EUDs used a participatory approach in developing the roadmap by engaging in intensive consultations with civil society actors. In South Africa, consultations were principally held with professional CSOs and think tanks. In all other countries, except for Barbados where no information on consultation with civil society was provided, a series of meetings combined with other mechanisms were set up to engage broader representations of civil society. In several cases, the roadmaps also included plans for their participation in implementing the priorities.

Examples:

- In Brazil, the EUD engaged in 8 consultations with CSOs, including two with NGO beneficiaries of EU funding, five in five different states and one with sector specialists.
- In Colombia, well known for its vibrant civil society, three meetings with platforms and six regional working groups were organised with the support of the Colombian confederation of NGOs.
- The Jamaica roadmap enjoys a high degree of support from CSOs that have displayed interest in participating in future annual forums to discuss strategies and joint initiatives. A questionnaire was sent to a wide range of CSOs (trade unions, private sector, NGOs in social sectors, right-based NGOs), and two meetings were held with CSOs in the capital.
- In Mexico, three consultations took place including CSOs, NGOs, trade unions, private sector, universities, research institutes, agricultural organisations, etc., two in the presence of the Cooperation Section and the Head of Delegation. One workshop included high-level representatives from the private sector and trade unions and discussed formalisation of relations between ECOSOC and Mexico. With the purpose of reaching out and involving

civil society outside the capital city, a survey was published at the website of the EUD and also widely distributed among networks and local organisations in the country. Also key informant interviews were conducted with five different experts and the RM includes a long bibliography of documents consulted. CSOs request the EUD to create a permanent dialogue mechanism in specific areas: environment and climate change, migration, children's rights, capacity building, advocacy.

- The EUD in Lebanon capitalised on seven consultation meetings organised in the framework of the drafting of a mapping study on Lebanese civil society under the Civil Society Facility. During a restitution seminar with Lebanese CSOs, both the roadmap and the mapping were presented.

### 3.2. Involvement of Member States in developing and implementing the Roadmap

In 9 cases, the roadmap was developed with good involvement from the Member States (MS), in four countries, the involvement was average, and in one case no information was provided. In Namibia, for example, coordination with the MS was excellent. The UK, Spain, France, Germany and Finland actively participated in drafting Section 2 of the roadmap. MS will also contribute to the implementation of the RM to the extent that it is possible. Finland might provide funding to implement some of the actions. Germany cannot select specific actions at this stage but might support some of the studies and policy facilitation. Spain will support the elaboration of case studies as well as policy facilitation. Relevant staff working at the National Planning & Communication unit in the government was also consulted. Heads of Missions from France, Germany, Finland, Spain, United Kingdom and the Delegation of the European Union approved the Roadmap. Also in Lebanon, EU MS were actively involved. A series of meetings between the EUD and MS were held and a 'Roadmap Group with 11 focal points' (EUD + 10 EU MS) was created.

Most roadmaps provide information on the involvement of MS in its development, but only a minority also give good detail about how MS are going to be part of the implementation process. Only three roadmaps state that the final document was approved by both the EUD and Member States. Jamaica includes the signatures of MS Ambassadors. Few roadmaps mention other donors. In the Seychelles, the two resident MS were consulted during the RM process and are involved in its implementation; UNDP and the government were also engaged in this process. Also in Mauritius, the UK and France were consulted and will be actively involved in implementation, as will UNDP, government agencies and the Ministry of Social Security in charge of NGOs. This is the right way forward.

## 4. The Roadmap priorities, indicators and actions

Roadmap document	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Priorities are in line with the EC Communication</li> <li>• At analytical level, most RMs include a wide variety of civil society actors</li> <li>• At the level of involvement of CS in elaborating the RM, it is not always clear who the actors are and it is not always explained what consultation mechanisms were used and who was engaged</li> <li>• The process of priority identification in all countries of this cluster resulted in the definition of properly contextualised and country-specific priorities</li> <li>• Six country roadmaps present too generally defined and not properly measurable indicators</li> <li>• The definition of viable actions is the weakest link. Only about one quarter of the roadmaps manages to define concrete actions and relate these to the financial instruments.</li> </ul>
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Number of priorities: Seven roadmaps present between two and three priorities, three selected four priorities and the remaining five EUDs defined between 5 and 13 specific and global priorities. All are considered relatively country specific and contextualised, except for the priorities of the roadmaps from Mauritius, the Seychelles and Fiji.

2-3 priorities/ 4-12 indicators	4 priorities/ 13-22 indicators	5-13 priorities/ 29-32 indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 7 Roadmaps</li> <li>• 4 Roadmaps</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3 Roadmaps</li> <li>• 7 Roadmaps</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 Roadmaps</li> <li>• 4 Roadmaps</li> </ul>

Quality of priorities: All UMIC country roadmaps divide their priorities among the three priorities of the 2012 Communication. In only three cases there are other, out-of-the-box priorities proposed. The HIC roadmaps show a different pattern. They do not include capacity building and, in the case of Barbados, neither does the roadmap identify priorities for an enabling environment. The focus of these roadmaps is, understandably given the context, on promoting civil society participation in public policies and dialogue.

Enabling Environment: All roadmaps define priorities related to the environment, except for Mauritius (with a focus on two priorities only). In Fiji, the EUD monitors the CS environment during regular meetings with key donors as well as through frequent informal meetings with CSOs funded through EIDHR programmes. A good example of a contextualised and practical priority for an EE came from Colombia: *“Establishing a structured, informed and consistent dialogue with CSOs, the state and the international community.”* The related indicators and actions are also practical and precise. Colombian civil society also benefits from international recognition for promoting democratic processes, constructive action in promoting human rights and participation in international forums.

Other roadmaps define priorities that are too general and fall way beyond the scope of EUD capacity and action, and rather than priorities express ideal situations. Priority 1 of the Algeria roadmap for example: *“Improving the legal and operational framework in which the Algerian civil society operates”* or Priority 4 of the Namibia Roadmap: *“Government recognises the important role of CSOs in development, is open to CSOs and includes CSOs in national policy and decision-making processes, as well as the legislative processes.”*

One already mentioned issue that stands out in several roadmaps is that the environment for CSOs engaging in service provision is open, and legal frameworks are in place, yet those organisations that work in human rights increasingly encounter difficulties. In Peru, for example, the environment is difficult and at times hostile for organisations that are active in the fields of indigenous peoples and environmental issues. Colombian civil society is protected by a legal framework, including in remote areas where the government has little influence. However, human rights organisations also suffer from criminalisation and persecution. In South Africa, the roadmap notes a declining respect for civic space, particularly the right to assemble peacefully and freely express opinions (i.e. police violent interventions in some demonstrations). The priorities could focus more on EUD support to organisations working in this field, as the Roadmap for Peru does.

Civil society participation in public policies and dialogue: All roadmaps of this cluster present priorities linked to the involvement of CSOs in public policies. Evidently, the EUD can play an important role as a catalyst for promoting engagement between civil society, national and local government.

- In Fiji, EU engagement with the government to promote an enabling environment for CSOs will be part of EU political dialogue once cooperation resumes in 2015. Ad-hoc measures helping to support civil society have been taken (e.g. press releases when the permit for the 2013 Women’s Day march was withheld by Government) and

support to NGO activities is a recurrent subject of discussions with the Fijian Authorities.

- In the case of Mexico, for example, the EUD has on several occasions actively intervened to promote issues of concern to civil society organisations in its official relations and dialogue with the government. This has had a positive impact.
- The Algerian Roadmap envisages as a long-term result of EUD action the establishment of a formal consultation platform for civil society that is truly representative and has an impact on national policy making.
- The Jamaica Roadmap prioritises EU engagement in supporting CSOs to engage with the public and the authorities in justice reform processes, and develop and implement communication strategies that will help build consensus and awareness for reform.
- The Roadmap for Peru envisages a clear role for the EUD in promoting the creation of civil society participation mechanisms to influence the development of public policies.

Capacity development: All roadmaps also include actions to improve the capacity of CSOs (weak internal governance and financial administration). Comparatively, civil society is most HICs and UMICs is pro-active, diverse and vibrant, yet professionalisation continues to be a priority and lack of funding a concern. In Israel, for example, CSOs interviewed for the mapping study recognised the need to improve their internal governance and their upward and downward accountability systems.

The Roadmap for Peru, and other roadmaps, propose to support civil society platforms to improve their representativeness. This is an important priority that can concretely contribute to enhancing collaboration and cooperation between civil society actors, and hence their collective voice in national policy-making. Indeed, the Colombia roadmap as well proposes to continue its support to increase CSO capacities to network and strengthen alliances to act more efficiently as development actors.

One overall weakness of most roadmaps is that the priorities and indicators are too ambitious and removed from possible concrete EU/MS action, rather than presenting clear objectively verifiable priorities that can be managed by the EUD and fall within its scope, albeit contextualised to a certain degree. Rather than presenting steps for strengthening engagement of the EU/MS with civil society in any given country, they reflect the vision of the EUD for a country. Roadmaps should stay close to their mission: they should be practical, operational and measurable. For example, Priority 1 of the Roadmap for Jamaica reads: *“(a) Improved access to justice for all, in particular the poor, women, children, people with disabilities and members of minority groups, (b) Monitoring and reporting on governance concerns within the security sector such as those contributing to impunity and inequality (e.g. extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses).”* Albeit wonderful priorities, the EUD can and should not pretend to have the capacity to achieve such goals. It could, however, envisage concrete support to civil society to contribute to this vision the EUD has for the future of Jamaica.

The number of indicators varies between 4 (Israel) and 32 (South Africa and Namibia). Whereas the quantity of priorities and indicators is not always directly correlated to the quality of the roadmap, it is safe to say that the more priorities and indicators, the more complex monitoring and implementation of the roadmap will be. Hence the importance of fine-tuning, reducing and defining measurable indicators that are connected to concrete actions and contextualised priorities.

The quality of the indicators of this cluster are both specific and measurable in 9 countries. The indicators presented in the roadmaps for Algeria, Namibia, Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Lebanon and South Africa, however, will not be easy to measure. The EUDs from South Africa and the Dominican Republic indicated that they would benefit from support in defining more realistic, timely, qualitative and quantitative indicators.

An overall assessment of proposed actions shows that in 75% of the roadmaps these are defined too broadly and too general. In Algeria, for example, actions are not linked to specific initiatives, operational support or research making it somewhat difficult to assess their linkage to the proposed priorities. The EUD has indicated that support would be welcome in mapping activities that already exist and need to be continued and identifying new actions tailored to the specific polarised and restrictive operating context. Actions are properly defined in only four countries (Mexico, Namibia, Jamaica and Seychelles).

The Lebanon FBF makes the following observation: *“The selection of actions is specific and contextualised, however, even if they are achieved, the priorities may not.”* Indeed, an integrated approach to priorities, actions and indicators is crucial to an analytical and operational roadmap. Were the instructions for defining actions not clear, or is it Roadmap fatigue at the end of the process? A majority of roadmaps will need to further specify their actions referring to specific studies, research, dialogues and operational support. Roadmaps can further trim their indicators and priorities where possible to enhance implementation and monitoring. The indicators envisage clear outcome and roadmaps should include means of verification defined to allow continued tracking. None of the roadmaps thus far include means for verification.

## 5. EU Engagement

EU engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Several RMs fail to identify the specific programmes and financial instruments that are likely to fund the proposed actions proposed by the RM</li> <li>• Mainstreaming is envisaged in a majority of roadmaps</li> <li>• Approximately half the roadmaps do not clearly indicate MS involvement in future implementation of the RM</li> <li>• Examples of innovative practice.</li> </ul>
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Thematic and other EU programmes: About half the roadmaps do not provide much detail on specific programmes and instruments that could fund the proposed actions. All do provide references to general instruments such as calls for proposal under CSO&LA and EIDHR. Two roadmaps provide a good overview of EU cooperation budget-lines, including regional programmes that could be accessed for funding. A few also mention MS sources. Most roadmaps, however, could improve guidance on MS contributions to the achievement of the three global priorities set by the 2012 Communication.

Mainstreaming is a priority in approximately 2/3 of the HIC/UMIC countries:

- South Africa has been one of the leading EU Delegations in terms of mainstreaming civil society. A recent evaluation of budget support highlights the fact that engagement of CSOs (particularly in justice and health) has led to policy innovation and an enhanced equity approach in service delivery and accountability.
- Civil society mainstreaming in Israel is a priority in education and other social sectors (gender), however, this is limited to a few organisations. At national level, the EUD encourages direct interaction between CSOs and the Israeli government in the framework of TAIEX projects. The EUD also promotes engagement of local authorities with CSOs through the thematic line CSO-LA and as a result, five LA projects are implemented in partnership with CSOs.
- CSOs in Mauritius are involved in the identification and formulation of budget support and also consulted during implementation. However, they are not directly engaged in the implementing and monitoring of BS operations.
- For the EUD in the Dominican Republic, mainstreaming of civil society in all sectors is a priority: participation of civil society in reform processes through co-administration with the government. Bilateral cooperation and programmes support the reform of the public administration at central (PARAP) and local (PASCAL) level.



### Examples of innovative practice

- In Peru, an EU/MS Working Group has been created for the development and implementation of the roadmap
- In Israel, in the context of the development of the Roadmap, (as has been suggested by the guidance but not often implemented by the EUDs) non-EU counterparts that are important players in support to civil society were also involved
- In Elias Pina, Dominican Republic, one of the poorest regions of the country, a mapping was done of civil society actors and projects to include these in the development plans of the local authorities, enhance their involvement and avoid duplication
- In South Africa, the EU funded “Access to Justice and promotion of constitutional rights”(AJPCRP) support programme was based on a strategic collaboration between the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DoJ&CD) and the Foundation for Human Rights (FHR), a civil society actor
- The Roadmap for Argentina proposes to systematise good practice in advocacy of already implemented and ongoing projects financed by the EU, to serve as a catalyst for internal dialogue
- In Argentina as well, the Red Argentina de Cooperacion Internacional (RACI) develops capacity building trainings at national level for CSOs with limited capacity
- The Mexico roadmap proposes a number of actions that showcase a practical approach and could be a blueprint for other EUDs to follow, i.e.:
  - The EUD developed a matrix overview of EU and MS projects funded with civil society
  - Promote systematic participation of CSOs when the EUD is visiting the provinces; develop joint EU/MS support for pilot projects
  - On the basis of mappings of civil society projects in the country, promote their visibility by sharing the results with national and local governments
  - Enhance civil society participation in EUD efforts to analyse and address gaps in the legal framework. The results of the survey conclude that CS is appreciative of dialogue with the EU in the field of human rights (as an example of good practice: the EU Permanent Working Group with Civil Society on Human Rights was created in May 2013)
  - Support networking between local CS and European CSOs.
- The Dominican Republic NSA Panel has used a fortnightly TV talk show to share key messages and concerns with its CSO members and society at large. In Barbados, Dominican Republic and St. Lucia these panels have created specific websites and email groups providing information to their members about new opportunities for tender and participation in EU sponsored projects
- In Fiji, in the framework of the support to the sugar cane sector, a more structured dialogue with CSOs delivering assistance is taking place on issues like sustainable development, environment, gender and role of women in development. Four NGOs (FRIEND, Habitat for Humanity, Empower Pacific, Ramakrishna mission) and two farmers’ associations, Fiji Crop & Livestock Council and Fairtrade associations, representing more than 15,000 farmers, participate in six monthly Programme Steering Committee meetings. Stakeholders in the sector collaborate well and the enabling environment for CSO policy engagement is adequate. Strategic discussions with line ministries and relevant authorities on rural development, agriculture, sugar sector or social housing take place on a regular basis.

## 6. SWOT and Conclusions

The purpose of the RM process is to improve engagement of EUDs with CS (particularly LCS) and also for the EUD to keep abreast of recent developments at grassroots level, support non-government local initiatives that are closer to the people, enhance legitimisation of civil



society and improve coordination mechanisms. A review of the HIC and UMIC roadmaps shows that EU support and engagement with CS is not only key in service delivery but also in promoting the rule of law and mediating between citizens and the government.

The quality of the RMs and FBFs varies. In some cases, the FBF does not properly reflect the data presented in the RM. The Peru RM, for example, refers to a wide variety of CS actors, whereas according to the FBF, the RM only mentions CSOs. Several RMs were developed without prior consultation processes with CS. In one case, the RM based its information on consultation processes in the framework of a recent civil society mapping (as this happened recently, this seems an effective approach).

Several RMs, rather than presenting a practical and integrated navigation tool for the EUD, are ambitious visions for the future of civil society in a country. Apart from a few good exceptions, many RMs do not provide much detail about the enabling environment or EU engagement (between 5 to 10 pages) and do not always properly distinguish between priorities, results, actions and indicators in section 3 and the dashboard. And finally, regular RM updates are needed as situations change rapidly. What was a proposal for a bill today can become adopted legislation tomorrow. The RM for South Africa, for example, refers to the Secrecy Bill, but campaigners in South Africa have in the meantime been celebrating the rejection of this controversial bill by President Jacob Zuma.

In line with the below analysis of trends regarding context, process and content of the roadmaps and EU engagement with civil society in the HIC and UMIC countries, most recommendations extracted from the FBF highlight the importance of further fine-tuning and narrowing down of priorities, indicators and actors. To enhance their implementation, roadmaps need further operationalisation. Second generation roadmaps could also significantly improve linking actions and programmatic tools, developing M&E systems and mechanisms for data collection and indicator development.

	Strengths	Challenges/Opportunities
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political stability, democratic contexts, economic growth</li> <li>Supportive enabling environment</li> <li>Functioning legal frameworks</li> <li>Active civil society in a wide variety of areas and sectors.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Significant differences in income and development</li> <li>Enabling environment for human rights organisations often challenging</li> <li>Good opportunities for strengthening EU engagement with civil society, particularly in governance issues.</li> </ul>
Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Good MS involvement</li> <li>Good CS involvement</li> <li>Two countries received support</li> <li>10 roadmaps are restricted.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Division of labour with MS</li> <li>Diversification of consultations with more diverse groups of CS</li> <li>Support RM implementation</li> <li>Develop in-country communication strategies about the RM</li> </ul>

		process.
Content	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Priorities in line with the EC Communication and properly contextualised</li> <li>• At analytical level, most RMs include a wide variety of civil society actors</li> <li>• Six country roadmaps present too generally defined and not properly measurable indicators</li> <li>• Weak definition of viable actions in a majority of RMs</li> <li>• Weak identification of financial instruments.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Narrow down and fine-tune priorities, indicators and actions</li> <li>▪ Involvement of CSOs in elaborating the RM</li> <li>▪ Involvement of CSOs in implementing the RM</li> <li>▪ Concrete plans for joint implementation of RM priorities.</li> </ul>
Engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mainstreaming envisaged in a majority of RMs</li> <li>• The often innovative and implementing role of CSOs recognised.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Information on consultation mechanisms not captured in the capitalisation exercise</li> <li>▪ Regular consultation and dialogue mechanism with CS following the RM process should be strengthened</li> <li>▪ Follow up with CS: joint implementation of RM priorities</li> <li>▪ Further concretise mainstreaming.</li> </ul>

## Annex 3 – List of tentative questions to guide a mapping study

<p><b>General mappings</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>The Structure of civil society.</b> (i) What is the structure of CSO, in terms of the number of CSOs registered and operating in the country, and changes over time? (ii) How well structured is civil society, from the grassroots level to the level of networks and platforms? And its geographical distribution? (iii) What are the key roles performed by CSOs and their key areas of expertise?  Other relevant issues may also be: (iv) the number of performing and structured coalitions, networks and umbrella organisations (that is to say 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> level organisations) particularly when looking into political and policy dialogue; (v) the number of CSOs working in governance and human rights, particularly in fragile and difficult contexts; (vi) the existence and nature of emerging actors and movements, as more fluid forms of citizen action; etc.</li> <li>▪ <b>The Environment.</b> The political, legal and institutional environment in which CSOs operate; paying particular attention to: (i) the degree to which the legal and regulatory framework (in law and practice) is enabling and conducive for CSOs (i.e. existence of formalised, transparent and non-discriminatory registration procedures; free and independent operation and cooperation between citizens and the absence of disproportionate or unwarranted state interference; etc.) (ii) how open are the authorities to effectively involve CSOs in the elaboration of national and sectoral policies? ; (iii) do authorities guarantee in law and in practice free, clear and accessible flows of information on matters of public interest?  According to the specific country context, other important factors related to the enabling environment include any specific concerns in fragile states and/ or conflict prone countries.</li> <li>▪ <b>CS Capacity &amp; governance.</b> (i)What is the capacity of CSOs (human and financial resources and/or networking)? (ii) What are the gaps, constraints and key needs of CSOs in terms of their capacity on their different areas of work (i.e. to engage in policy dialogue, influence the government decision-making process, monitor implementation of government's commitments, perform an effective advocacy role act as service providers, etc.)? (iii) What mechanisms exist to promote internal governance (commitment to democratic decision-making, fair labour practices, transparency, democratic governance, etc.)? (iv) Do self-governing and governance standards exist and are enforced?; etc.</li> <li>▪ <b>CS Engagement.</b> (i)What space exists for CSOs to mobilize citizens, and to interact with government and other state bodies, or even the private sector (i.e. the entry points for CSOs and how effective they are; the level and quality of interactions between the State and CSOs in the different phases of the governance cycle, from problem identification to definition of policies/strategies, implementation of programmes and monitoring &amp; evaluation; the level of influence/impact that CSOs have in the different phases)? (ii) What are the key policy areas, in which CSOs are or could be successfully engaged in policy dialogue, given their current capacities, the state of the sector and the political context?</li> <li>▪ <b>CS Sustainability.</b> (i) What are the fundraising and income generating opportunities for CSOs? (ii) What donors are present in the country and what are their support models? (iii) What is the extent and quality of State support schemes?; etc.</li> <li>▪ <b>Support models for CSOs.</b> (i) How can the EC combine its programmes &amp; instruments (geographic and thematic ones), financing modalities (projects, common pool funds, budget support), and dialogue opportunities to answer the needs and opportunities identified in the mapping? (ii) Are there recommendations on new areas of cooperation for the EU and EU Member States? etc.</li> </ul>
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<b>Sectoral mappings</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Context Analysis: starting from where the sector stands, not from where it should be<sup>19</sup>.</b> Ideally, the assessment should go beyond legal frameworks, formal institutions and processes in trying to understand the political economy underpinning the functioning of a given sector in terms of rules, interests, resources and power. Another important element of the context analysis is the assessment of the legal, institutional, and political economy framework in which CSOs operate.</li> <li>▪ <b>The political economy of CSOs, in order to gain a deep insight into the actors, their roles and relationships.</b> The assessment can cover such issues as: (i) Who are the CSOs that are present in the sector (in terms of families, levels of structuring, etc.) and what are the roles they play? (ii) How do actors relate to each other (in terms of their interests, power struggles, tensions and cleavages, etc.)? (iii) What is their added value and what can be said about their legitimacy and representativeness? (iv) What can be said about their capacity for action (critical mass, degree of organization, etc.)?; etc.</li> <li>▪ <b>Interactions between the State (as well as other stakeholders) and CSOs.</b> The assessment could cover such issues as: (i) What are the entry points for CSOs and how effective are they? (ii) What characterises interactions between the State and CSOs in the different phases of the governance cycle (from problem identification to definition of policies/strategies, implementation of programmes and monitoring &amp; evaluation)? (iii) What influence/impact do CSOs have in the different phases? (iv) Are there innovative mechanisms promoting? etc.</li> <li>▪ <b>Support models for CSOs.</b> (i) How can the EC combine its programmes &amp; instruments (geographic and thematic ones), financing modalities (projects, common pool funds, budget support), and dialogue opportunities to answer the needs and opportunities identified in the mapping? (ii) Are there recommendations on new areas of cooperation for the EU and EU Member States?; etc.</li> </ul>
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<sup>19</sup> For further information, see Reference document (n°4) – “Analysing and Addressing Governance in Sector Operations” – 2009

### Extended list of good practice indicators included in RMs worldwide

#### Priority 1 Enabling Environment

- Number and type of CSOs which have participated in the creation and implementation of the civil society legal framework
- In December 2016, there will be a system of follow-up and monitoring of the international commitments signed by (a given country), which can be fed or consulted by any organisation or institution online
- The government's response to the needs of CSOs, including an improved registration process, is enhanced, with full respect to CSOs' autonomy
- Rate of HR violations reported to the authorities and rapidity and effectiveness in reaction, or level of adherence to International Conventions regarding freedom of association/assembly etc., and number of reported incidents/violations to these freedoms
- Number and/or increasing rate related to the number of CSOs formally implied in the proposals received and financed in the framework of Call for Proposals launched by the EU
- Rate of HR violations reported to the EU, rapidity and effectiveness in reaction
- Number of professionals associated to research centres which have the capacity to carry out applied research to fulfil the needs and requests for inclusive development and vulnerable groups (youth, women and indigenous people)
- Trend in CSOs having diversified their funding sources (disaggregated by volume, region, thematic area, etc).

#### Priority 2 : Civil Society Participation in domestic policies

- Number of CSOs involved in consistent monitoring of the integration and enforcement of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction into key sector policies
- Number of policies, local development plans and budgets elaborated through participatory methodologies with CSOs
- Existence of civil society organisations mediating between citizens and line ministries as well as local authorities on policies related to the targeted sectors
- Number of new integration frameworks that enhance collaboration between CSOs and local authorities and that have been adopted for the implementation of development projects
- The number, representation and regularity of coordination frameworks at sectorial and local levels in each of the priority intervention sectors of the EUD and MS
- Extent and quality of civil society engagement/participation in local governance and oversight (through public hearings, budget processes or other forms of consultative/monitoring processes)
- Number and type of CSOs having participated in the design of the civil society legal framework; number and diversity of CSOs actively engaged in dialogue with the national authorities
- Public institutions actively publish draft and adopted laws and policies, unless they are subject to legally prescribed exceptions, and openly invite all interested CSOs to comment on policy and legal initiatives at an early stage. CSOs are provided with adequate information on the content of the draft documents and details of the consultation with sufficient time to respond
- Number of CSO partnerships for evidence-based advocacy supported by EU and/or EU MS funds
- Percentage of EU grants directly awarded to local CSOs (inclusion of local CSOs as co-applicants)
- Number of meetings organised with a view to analyse and discuss the legal framework related to associations and CSO
- Percentage of cooperation initiatives including CSO's participatory mechanisms in public

- policy management
- Number of consultations carried out in the framework of the EU cooperation programming, both bilateral and thematic.

#### Priority 3: Capacity Development

- Number of coordinated and common activities between CSOs as well as number of sustainable partnerships, as a result of support provided by EU and MS
- Increased use of mentoring by experienced CSOs for new initiatives, movements and civil society groups or regional CSOs
- Existing formal and informal networks support shared strategies or interests at national level, with a specific focus on including grass root organisations, and regional level
- Number of CSOs that adopt a Code of Conduct/Code of Ethics to deliver assistance in a transparent and accountable manner
- Number of CSO partnerships for evidence-based advocacy supported by EU and/or EU MS funds
- Improved technical and financial capacity of CSOs in providing the poor access to sustainable energy through advocacy and promotion of innovative services such as solar lanterns, home systems and solar pumps, etc.
- Number of CSOs having a clear capacity building strategy, including a clear work plan with activities for their staff, in order to reinforce their analysis, advocacy and communication skills
- Number of CSO staff trained in fundraising, project cycle management, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, research and advocacy, financial management.