

Monitoring System of the Implementation of Projects and Programmes
of External Co-operation financed by the EU – ENPI

***Horizontal report on the Results-Oriented
Monitoring (ROM) findings of the DDH and
EIDHR projects in the European Neighbourhood
and Partnership (ENPI) region since 2008***

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Annex 1 List of Monitoring Reports

Annex 2 Good practices of monitored EIDHR projects

Executive Summary

This report is based on the review and analysis of 53 Monitoring Reports (MRs) and related background Conclusion Sheets (BCS) of projects funded under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Therefore, it is structured along the Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) criteria.

In general terms, EIDHR projects appear to be particularly **relevant** and respond to obvious needs of the beneficiaries and countries concerned. In spite of the high relevance of the project objectives, many MRs feature a common weakness, namely their poor design. Poor design has a number of reasons among which ROM missions have identified the following: lack of sufficient or genuine needs-assessment, overambitious and unrealistic objectives and results, insufficient strategic thinking on the part of the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and weak understanding of the PCM/logframe approach.

The poor quality of **design** affects not only the conception of the project but is also a weakness that accompanies the project throughout its implementation as EC procedures allow for very little flexibility of adapting the project design to local realities and needs. The lack of flexibility of project implementation has created a passive attitude among NGOs in which they abide by the de facto rule of implementing the project as it was originally conceived, leaving little room for observation, learning and improvement of project design.

A high level of **efficiency** is common to many projects, especially those which are either in support of the core work and mission of the implementing organisation, or are based on a previous partnership and are being implemented by organisations with strong organizational capacity. In most cases activities are implemented according to the project plan and resources are dealt with in a transparent way. However, efficiency appears to suffer where there is poor institutional capacity within beneficiary organisation resulting in weak project management skills, poor vision and strategic thinking, a lack of internal and external coordination, poor communication, weak accounting systems and contractual procedures and under-resourced institutional structures.

The quality of partnerships varies from project to project with projects based on previous sound partnerships being at the top and projects with very complex and new partnerships being at the bottom of the scale. The added value of European NGOs is not always apparent.

The level of **effectiveness**, i.e. the likelihood of project results leading to the achievement of project-specific objectives (project purpose), is not always easy to measure due to the lack of useful indicators for those levels and most MRs thus limit themselves to the assessment of delivered products and services (outputs) while facing difficulties in assessing whether those services have actually been translated or are likely to be translated into the stated results (outcomes). Most EIDHR projects refer to public information and advocacy campaigns on the one side and capacity building on the other, for the achievement of their goals. This report shows the shortcomings of the design and implementation of those sets of activities, which explains why effectiveness is often difficult to reach.

The majority of projects are generally oriented towards bringing about fundamental change and long-term benefit for people livelihoods. However, there are numerous problems concerning the achievement of long-term **impact** of most projects. This is due to a number of reasons such as: unrealistic projects with overambitious objectives; lack of sufficient capacity, resources, lack of time to achieve the stated objectives; lack of indicators and internal monitoring.

Overall, all parties should be more conscious that human rights projects will not achieve the Overall Objective and they are not supposed to do so. They will only partly contribute. Keeping this in mind, Monitors' findings indicate that projects are generally well on track towards making a modest contribution towards their overall objective.

In general **sustainability** of EIDHR projects seems to be an issue of concern. Several MRs state that financial project sustainability can only be achieved through a continuation of international donor's support since the issues projects deal with are unlikely to receive governmental funding due to their sensitive nature. A crucial aspect is that Human Rights NGOs, by nature, operate in adverse political environments. Even when the official line matches project goals, NGOs often have to deal with government institutions which pay lip service to policy but fail to cooperate in practice.

The report concludes with three substantial **recommendations** to the European Commission.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Scope and rationale of the report

This report was prepared at the request of EuropeAid and has been carried out in accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToRs) that can be found in Annex 1. In line with the provisions of the ToRs, the report aims at drawing on lessons learned and key conclusions from the monitoring of EC projects funded under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

The methodology followed in this report consists of a thorough review and analysis of 53 Monitoring Reports (MRs) and related Background Conclusion Sheets (BCS) produced between January 2009 and March 2010. The 53 MRs refer to a total of 33 projects¹ implemented in 13 countries of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Region (ENP)². The MRs cover all the projects which were monitored under EIDHR and DDH in 2008 and 2009, in both ENPI East and South regions. The conclusions are drawn and presented in line with the main ROM criteria, and are illustrated by the relevant MRs.

2. Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM)

The ROM system is based on regular onsite assessments performed at least once a year by independent ROM experts to ongoing projects and programmes funded by the EC. Projects and programmes are given simple scores against internationally agreed DAC criteria (relevance and design, efficiency, effectiveness, impact prospects, potential sustainability) using a strongly structured and consistent methodology. ROM missions include a short on site visit, preparation and drafting time and reports are supposed to be submitted directly after the visit of the project.

The aim of ROM is to monitor and assess ongoing projects with an EC contribution of at least €1 million as well as a sample of projects of less than €1M to be selected by the European Commission services on a case by case basis. The monitoring report is underpinned by the Background Conclusion Sheet (BCS), ensuring consistency and uniformity of the system. The BCS are primarily working documents for the monitors to analyse the specific underlying issues for each criterion, with a total of 21 sub-criteria and pertinent questions to consider.

Unlike the main monitoring report, the ROM methodology does not foresee the distribution of the BCS to project stakeholders.

¹ Several MRs cover the same regional project that was implemented in various countries. A couple of MRs refer to the same project that was monitored in 2009 and 2010. 2 MRs are horizontal reports drawing conclusions on various MRs.

² Moldova, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Russia, Lebanon, Occupied Territories of Palestine, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Jordan

3. The European Instrument for Human Rights (EIDHR)

The general objectives of the EIDHR are to contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms within the framework of the Community's policy on development cooperation, and economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries.

To achieve these objectives, the EC funds interventions belonging to a number of themes.

Thematic coverage

This report is based on 52 Monitoring Reports and BCS that cover a total of 33 projects working with the following EIDHR themes:

| EIDHR themes | Number of projects |
|---|--------------------|
| Promotion of democracy | 4 |
| Women's rights | 4 |
| Rehabilitation of torture victims and prevention of torture | 4 |
| Torture prevention | 2 |
| Rehabilitation of torture victims | 2 |
| Freedom of expression | 4 |
| Freedom of association | 3 |
| Minority rights | 3 |
| Enhancing respect for Human rights | 2 |
| Reinforcement of civil society organisations | 2 |
| Human Rights education | 1 |
| Fight against labour trafficking | 1 |
| Children's' rights | 1 |
| TOTAL | 33 |

Because of the small sample of available ROM reports falling into each theme, an analytical assessment of the individual human rights themes covered by the projects is not possible as there are not enough MRs covering each of the themes. However, a disaggregated view of the progress of individual projects belonging to each theme is available in the annex 2.

Breakdown of EIDHR MRs per project type

| Project type | Number of reports |
|--------------|---|
| Regional | 24 (12 HMRS ³ + 12 CMRS ⁴) |
| National | 28 |
| TOTAL | 52 |

Breakdown of EIDHR MRs per type of implementing partner

| Type of implementing partner | Number of reports |
|--|-------------------|
| European Countries Public Administration | 2 |
| International governmental organisations | 16 |
| International NGO/CSOs/Universities | 9 |
| Mix of different partners | 1 |
| Profit oriented organizations | 2 |
| Local NGOs/CSOs/Universities | 22 |
| TOTAL | 52 |

³ Horizontal Monitoring Report

⁴ Country Monitoring Report


II. MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE ROM REPORTS

This section provides an overview and analysis of the main conclusions included in the 53 MRs reviewed for this report. They are presented according to the six ROM criteria: project Relevance and Design, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability, and Horizontal Issues.

1. RELEVANCE AND DESIGN

The ROM definition of R&D is: *the appropriateness of project's objectives to the real problems, needs and priorities of its target groups/beneficiaries and the quality of the design through which these objectives are to be reached.*

Relevance/quality of design⁵



Note: A = very good (4); B = good (3); C = problems (2); D = serious deficiencies (1)

1.1. Relevance

High project relevance is common to almost all projects covered in this review.

Relevance is a multi-level criteria – it requires monitors to assess whether an intervention is appropriate with respect to Partner government policies, EC development and cooperation strategies, and the needs of the target groups. This composite aspect of Relevance is particularly complex in the case of EIDHR interventions – where it is often contradictory between the different levels (for example, what may be relevant to a particular target group, may not be a relevant to a partner government policy). In general, the ROM assessment of EIDHR interventions focuses on the level of relevance to the target groups.

Monitors make it very clear that there are strong local needs for which the projects are highly relevant. It is striking to observe that relevance of EIDHR interventions are often very high in terms of responding to the general needs of the target groups and their country – indeed higher than that of the average ENPI project. The many interesting and relevant projects range from topics as diverse as support to Bedouin-Arab communities which are not recognised by the Israeli government, to combating the practice of torture in the Russian

⁵ Source Monitoring Information System (MONIS) ROM scoring 2009.

Federation, and the promotion of women's rights in Egypt⁶.

1.2 Quality of Design

In the same way that high relevance is a common denominator to nearly all projects, the poor quality of project design is also common to almost all of them (please refer to above graph). We shall dedicate considerable attention to the analysis of this point since, as we will see, it not only affects the project during its design phase, but throughout its entire implementation, including the monitoring and evaluation of the project as a whole.

In this respect it should be mentioned here that the MRs do not indicate any significant difference between large international and small grassroots organisations with regard to quality of project design. It is noted that organisations such as Oxfam⁷ or the Council of Europe⁸ reveal design problems similar to those of small local organisations.

There is a slight tendency for projects based on previous actions to be among the few that are well-designed⁹, though this is not always the case as there are also projects that have obtained up to four EC grants in which the written proposal still fails to reflect the reality of the project¹⁰. Projects that reflect the core work of the organisation tend to be generally better designed¹¹.

The following are derived from the MRs as the main reasons for poor project design:

- *Lack of Sufficient or Genuine Needs-Assessment*
- *Overambitious and Unrealistic Projects*
- *Insufficient Strategic Thinking*
- *Weak Understanding of the PCM/Logframe Approach*

Each reason will be treated separately below.

- *Lack of Sufficient or Genuine Needs-Assessment*

It can be concluded that in the majority of cases, local partners¹² and beneficiaries¹³ were not sufficiently (and in most cases, not at all) involved in project design. This has led to situations in which objectives are not clear to all project partners, as with a project involving the government as a partner in which the government did not seem to have been consulted as they were not informed about the objectives of the project¹⁴.

Time-pressure during the proposal drafting phase is often mentioned as one of the reasons why consultation does not take place¹⁵. This goes hand in hand with the lack of a needs-

⁶ MR- 114620.01, MR- 120080.01, MR- 102315.01

⁷ MR- 107261.01

⁸ MR- 131260.01, MR- 41767.01, MR- 122620.05, MR- 125060.05

⁹ MR- 114620.01

¹⁰ MR- 115242.01

¹¹ MR- 106892.01, MR- 115242.01, MR- 115648.01

¹² MR- 120080.01, MR- 122620.04

¹³ MR- 114600.01, MR- 125060.05

¹⁴ MR- 124960.01

¹⁵ MR- 120080.01, MR- 122620.04

assessment of the situation in the country and the specific needs of the target group¹⁶, and is reflected in poor project choices such as the use of the internet to disseminate project information despite only a small percentage of the target population having access to internet¹⁷.

The lack of sufficient previous needs-assessment becomes apparent when the needs-assessment is conducted only once the project has already started, as was the case with one Council of Europe project for which a crucial amount of project time had to be devoted to the needs assessment, thus reducing the execution timeframe considerably¹⁸.

The problem is also recognised in that MRs often recommend the need for an inception phase (once the project has already started) to allow for the adjustment of projects to local realities¹⁹ (see previous comments). Finally, the lack of a needs-assessment also has a negative impact on project monitoring and evaluation. Without a previous needs-assessment, there is seldom enough baseline data against which to compare and evaluate results (e.g., how many people did not have access to the media before and after the project?).

This apparent contradiction between high project relevance, yet weak needs assessment can be explained by the fact that often projects are relevant to the country and target groups at the overall objective level, i.e. the overall vision and long term objectives. However they often fail to design a coherent project at the results and activities level, i.e. the more specific level.

- *Overambitious and Unrealistic Projects*

This is a feature common to a significant percentage of the projects. In fact, not one of the MRs refers to a project as being fully realistic or feasible. Certainly some projects are more realistic than others, but all of them may be qualified as being overambitious²⁰.

Some project objectives, such as fostering a new generation of civil society leaders in only 2 years and through a series of ad-hoc trainings²¹ or “strengthening civil society” in Ukraine and Moldova in 2 years²², seem to take ambitions to the extreme.

Furthermore, most projects are seen as having both overall and specific objectives which are too ambitious vis-à-vis the number of activities, specific results foreseen, dedicated time and financial resources²³. For example, MRs refer to some cases in which key project activities are allocated insufficient funding, thereby undermining the achievement of planned results²⁴.

MRs often refer to the need for a long-term process and continuous support to the NGO

¹⁶ MR- 106892.01, MR- 106884.01

¹⁷ MR- 124300.01

¹⁸ MR- 125060.05

¹⁹ MR- 41767.05

²⁰ MR- 107254.01, MR- 102942.01, MR- 125060.03

²¹ MR- 122620.01

²² MR- 122620.03

²³ MR- 122620.01, MR-104722.01

²⁴ MR- 122620.03, MR- 106880.02

beyond the duration of the project in order to achieve the stated goals²⁵. In other cases, NGOs appeared to purposely disregard rather obvious local realities. This includes projects such as the one implemented in Syria which concluded, after being selected, that no activities were possible due to the current political climate; or a project in the Russian Federation which proved unable to target the whole country as originally planned due to geographical reasons and the extensive travel involved, implying that the NGO had not been aware of such facts beforehand²⁶. MRs also point out that given the very difficult political circumstances in the one country, the project is then by definition unrealistic since the achievement of its goals would require the good political will of the government, which is unrealistic to expect²⁷.

Another point seen as underlying the reason for frequently over-ambitious projects is the EC granting system. Granting is based on the proposals' adherence to EC guidelines but also on a competitive process which includes a number of factors. One of the frequently cited factors in this competitive process is the level of impact which a grant proposal foresees in relation to the budget proposed.

Civil society organisations tend to know this and tend to inflate the number of beneficiaries that will be reached so as to obtain funding. In fact, the way the funding is provided is provoking a race towards complete unreality in terms of number of beneficiaries. EC services are aware of this aspect and of its possible negative consequences, however, seem unable to counter the development.

- *Insufficient Strategic Thinking*

Few projects were seen as being well thought out in the strategic sense. Positive project examples featuring strategic, long-term, sustainable ideas and thinking were rare. A couple of well thought and strategic projects include a torture rehabilitation project aiming to disseminate knowledge to other actors in order to increase the number of people sharing duties to assist torture survivors²⁸, and a project with training courses followed up by distribution of sub-grants to trainees to enable them to develop their own small projects utilising the knowledge acquired during training²⁹.

The vast majority of projects are found to be ill-conceived and too activity-driven, whereby activities absorb project planning and become an end in themselves. In other words, too much emphasis is placed on the implementation of activities at the expense of the meaning and strategic outcomes of those activities; execution of activities is the primary goal, while actual change is secondary³⁰. Monitors find numerous examples among the MR findings demonstrating insufficient strategic thinking, such as projects relying almost exclusively on one-off activities (workshops, training seminars) without a broader underlying strategy, to the point that in some cases participants did not even know that there was a project behind the

²⁵ MR- 102942.01

²⁶ MR- 118000.01

²⁷ MR- 40541.02

²⁸ MR- 115242.01

²⁹ MR- 115646.01

³⁰ MR- 41767.05

isolated activities³¹.

One of the projects concerned has dedicated an entire year to the production of a very long review, which would take more than 11 hours to read, without thinking that producing shorter, more digestible and to-the-point formats would have assured practical and effective use of the report. The same project included an extremely long list of recommendations in its publication but included no advocacy strategy to ensure follow up of any of those recommendations³². Several MRs refer to the production of research and studies by NGOs done in a format that does not encourage others to use them³³.

Other MRs refer to activities which were rather ill-conceived, such as a project on democracy promotion in which former prime ministers from Democratic countries visited several countries in the Middle East, but did so under such a poorly conceived format for the visits, (i.e. only two days, with too many meetings and topics to be covered) that no significant change resulted³⁴.

- *Weak Understanding of the Logframe Approach*

The MRs make it clear that an extremely low, almost insignificant, number of NGOs use the Logframe as outlined in the EC's PCM Guidelines³⁵. In order to illustrate this recurring and very important problem it may be useful to distinguish between the logical framework matrix (LFM), which is the standard document that summarises the main elements of the work programme and links them together, and the logical framework approach (LFA), which is the overall thought process by which individuals reflect on the elements of the project, i.e. activities, results, specific objectives, overall objectives and the connections between them.

The following situations are found when describing the quality of the LF Matrix and LF Approach of projects:

A. Projects demonstrating a good LF Matrix and LF Approach³⁶: these are definitely the exception to the rule. However, even those projects that have a relatively good LF Matrix encounter difficulties at the level of the indicators³⁷. It appears relatively easy to come up with lists of indicators, but much harder to refine that list into a realistic and useful set. In practice, few projects move beyond simple quantitative indicators. This goes hand in hand with the comments made in several MRs about the weak capacity of beneficiaries to monitor and evaluate the work they do³⁸, and the need for funding or training to enhance internal monitoring capacity³⁹.

³¹ MR- 125060.05, MR- 125060.01

³² MR- 106883.01

³³ MR- 106880.02

³⁴ MR- 108382.01

³⁵ Project cycle management guidelines, March 2004, European Commission

³⁶ MR- 106892.01, MR- 118000.01

³⁷ MR- 106880.01, MR- 106892.01, MR- 114600.01, MR- 119965.01

³⁸ MR- 131260.01, MR- 125060.01

³⁹ MR- 106883.01

B. Projects with a LF Matrix that cannot be used for monitoring and evaluation purposes due to its poor quality: the overwhelming majority of MRs refer to projects that fall under this category⁴⁰. MRs identify different causes for a poor LF Matrix:

- Projects with a poor LF Matrix and a poor LF Approach show that the project has no coherent thinking behind it⁴¹. Here we see MRs making comments like: “several results were irrelevant since no related activity was attached to them.”⁴²
- Projects with a good proposal written according to the LF Approach but with a poor LF Matrix indicates that a matrix is produced at some stage during the proposal drafting phase as a mere form-filling exercise fully disconnected from the proposal drafting exercise.
- Projects in which neither the LF Matrix nor the written proposal reflect the LF Approach but where the organisation implements the project according to the LF thinking: here the MRs observe that stakeholders agree on the project structure – including different levels of objectives, indicators and assumptions – and follow the LF Approach, but this thinking is never translated into a formal LF Matrix or a project proposal, often due to the fact that it is held in the minds of the NGO leaders who conceived the project, however, not clearly spelled out in written form. Many of those proposals display unwieldy and impractical frameworks of objectives and indicators that do not reflect the reality on the ground. This led some MRs to insert comments such as: “There is no LF Matrix yet the logical structure is clear to the project partners,” or “the project looks worse on paper (application, reports) than it is actually implemented on the ground,” or “despite design flaws and inconsistencies the project methodology is good,”⁴³.

The conclusions and recommendations included in numerous MRs show that the main constraint in the use of the LF Matrix is the lack of sufficient understanding by project beneficiaries of the LF terminology and the conceptual thought processes underpinning it⁴⁴. For example, several MRs point out confusion between overall objectives which are presented as results, results as activities, activities as objectives, projects that have numerous results but no activities linked to them, projects with more objectives than activities, or projects with activities not linked to any result - just to mention a few of common misunderstandings. We also find statements in MRs such as “intervention logic is unclear concerning the goal of the project, but also to what results will activities contribute,”⁴⁵. This demonstrates that there is no common understanding of the LFM concepts. Unsurprisingly, numerous MRs recommend Logframe training be provided to NGOs⁴⁶.

The poor quality of design we see here has negative consequences on the ROM approach and the work done by monitors who often find themselves confronted with realities on the

⁴⁰ MR- 106883.01, MR- 108382.01, MR- 106880.02, MR- 114600.01, MR- 114620.01, MR- 125060.05

⁴¹ MR- 115685.01, MR- 122620.03

⁴² MR- 115685.01

⁴³ MR- 106880.01, MR- 115651.01, MR- 106884.01

⁴⁴ MR- 106884.01, MR- 40541.02, MR- 114600.01, MR- 122620.02, MR- 119965.01

⁴⁵ MR- 107261.01

⁴⁶ MR- 106884.01, MR- 106883.01, MR- 108382.01, MR- 114600.01, MR- 114620.01, MR- 122620.02

ground that are not reflected in the documents related to the project⁴⁷. They are nevertheless asked to assess the project against what is written in the proposal. The absence of adequate indicators and the lack of internal monitoring conducted by the organisation is also one of the main limitations that monitors face during their work as they often do not have sufficient information to judge issues such as the impact of the project i.e. MRs state “The likelihood of achieving the project purpose is not easy to assess, as Objective Verifiable Indicators are not clearly set out in the work plan”⁴⁸.

1.3 Flexibility of Design

The EC PCM guidelines refer to the need to adjust the LF Matrix during the evolution of the project in order to use it as a management and monitoring tool. However the reality is that EC grant management procedures and the administrative complexity linked to the approval of addendum requests render any such flexibility during implementation difficult. Moreover, in the Russian Federation for example, many NGOs met during monitoring missions did not know that there is at all a possibility to eventually adjust the design if some circumstances change significantly. Therefore, on several occasions where actually an addendum would be required because, for instance partners or entire regions dropped out of the project, NGOs might not do anything believing that the project plan is written in stone once the Application was approved.

MRs often mention that the LF Matrix (and therefore the project proposal) should have been reviewed during implementation⁴⁹, or the need to use the LF Matrix as a dynamic project management tool to be updated on a regular basis⁵⁰. While the position of the EC to limit the number of addendum requests is understandable as they need to ensure that NGOs abide by the grant contract, the evidence that a lack of flexibility has a very negative effect on projects and their overall impact is compelling. Indeed, the reluctance to deviate from the proposal and the LF matrix often prevents NGOs from reflecting on project activities and mindfully making necessary project design modifications or adjustments that could improve effectiveness and impact for the final beneficiaries. Thus MRs often refer to a lack of a monitoring and follow up system allowing to adapt to difficulties or allow for a learning process⁵¹.

The lack of flexibility in project implementation has created a culture among NGOs in which they abide by the *de facto* rule of implementing the project as it was conceived, changing as little as possible, no matter what. Thus MRs constantly refer to weaknesses in project design that should have been addressed during project implementation but were not, e.g. the need to adjust the project to local realities⁵²; projects needing to dedicate funding and time for coordination activities between various NGO initiatives⁵³; and the need to manage the project from a country office and not from a remote office⁵⁴.

⁴⁷ MR- 115242.01, MR- 115685.01

⁴⁸ MR- 120080.01

⁴⁹ MR- 102942.01

⁵⁰ MR- 106884.01

⁵¹ MR-104722.01

⁵² MR- 106884.01, MR- 106883.01, MR- 108382.01

⁵³ MR- 106884.01, MR- 106883.01, MR- 108382.01

⁵⁴ MR- 106883.01, MR- 125060.05

The following are cases identified by the MRs where the project could have been significantly improved if NGOs would have been able to improve project design and learn from mistakes: a website that was developed but did not contribute to effective networking since the site was not sufficiently interactive⁵⁵; a project conducting numerous field-visits which did not achieve the expected results because the duration of the visits was too short; a high number of research and studies produced but no dissemination strategy for the use of those documents by potential beneficiaries⁵⁶.

This reluctance to change exists on the part of the NGOs and on the part of the EC. From an EC perspective it seems that this reluctance to amend project designs is also linked to the granting method of the projects referred to earlier.


⁵⁵ MR- 122620.04

⁵⁶ MR- 108382.01, MR- 106880.01, MR- 106883.01

2. EFFICIENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION

The ROM definition of efficiency of implementation is: ***How well means/inputs and activities were converted into results (as in 'outputs')***.

Efficiency of implementation⁵⁷



Note: A = very good (4); B = good (3); C = problems (2); D = serious deficiencies (1)

A high level efficiency is common to many projects, especially with those that reflect the core work of the implementing organisation⁵⁸, provide a strong and continuous partnership⁵⁹, and have strong organizational capacity and institutional support⁶⁰. In some cases, MRs mention that the EC grant has had a positive impact on the efficiency and professional capacity of the organisation in that it has allowed them to improve the quality of their staff and their internal management systems⁶¹. In general, the utilisation of inputs and resources is considered to be transparent with no major concerns raised in the MRs apart from minor exceptions⁶².

In general, MRs report that activities have been implemented according to the project plan although difficulties are often mentioned with projects that were overly ambitious in the number and complexity of activities provided⁶³. The MRs identify several examples of good practices, such as an organisation that solved a liquidity problem (which arose due to a combination of delayed reporting by the NGO and slow approval by the EC) through the creation of a "buffer fund" by the co-donor to provide liquidity until the disbursement of EC

⁵⁷ Source MONIS database: ROM scoring 2009

⁵⁸ MR- 106892.01, MR- 115648.01, MR- 115242.01

⁵⁹ MR- 114620.01, MR- 107440.01

⁶⁰ MR- 41767.04, MR- 118000.01

⁶¹ MR- 41767.04

⁶² MR- 106880.02

⁶³ MR- 122620.03

funds⁶⁴. In this specific case, the main partner faced some difficulties to meet the requirements of multiple donors. This particularly regarded the complex reporting procedures, which needed more time than initially expected. Reports had to be sent to grant holders in one office, with further submission to the same organisation in the HQ and then only to the EC. This mechanism, together with slow EC approval procedures, caused some delays in disbursement.

2.1 Capacity of Implementing Organisations

Efficiency suffers where there is poor institutional capacity of implementing organisations which translates into weak project management skills, poor vision and strategic thinking, a lack of internal and external coordination, poor communication, weak accounting systems and contractual procedures and, in general, under-resourced institutional structures⁶⁵.

MRs often refer to organisations that focus on daily survival rather than on longer-term planning and development, or organisations suffering from serious internal organisational weaknesses that nevertheless tried to set up very complex projects, such as a regional project in 16 countries⁶⁶, which are far too ambitious and unrealistic for them. Weak organisational capacity also affects the implementers of projects that aim at strengthening the capacity of organisations, thus creating a situation in which organisations with inadequate capacity aspire to strengthen other organisations, which they unsurprisingly fail to do⁶⁷.

In several cases, MRs indicate that organisations are not aware of EC procedures or do not understand them properly. The MRs therefore suggest that training on project management and financial issues should have been made compulsory, especially for local NGOs⁶⁸.

Furthermore, poor internal and external coordination is also seen as a source of inefficiency. This is found in projects where there is a lack of synergy and coordination with other NGO initiatives⁶⁹ and where there is poor communication and coordination with the EU Delegations⁷⁰. Weak or inadequate implementing structures are also identified as a main source of inefficiency, as with a Council of Europe project cited for managing a project centrally without involving its country offices and for its practice of changing the entire project team every six months; and a regional network in the Middle East that was managed from Denmark with no presence in the region⁷¹. The lack of local partners in the country where the project is being implemented is often considered a serious weakness⁷².

⁶⁴ MR- 40541.02

⁶⁵ MR- 114600.01, MR- 114701.01, MR- 115651.01, MR- 115682.01, MR- 122620.03, MR-104722.01, MR- 122620.01, MR- 125060.05, MR- 124960.01

⁶⁶ MR- 122620.01, MR-104722.01

⁶⁷ MR- 114780.01

⁶⁸ MR- 107261.01, MR- 122620.02

⁶⁹ MR- 114600.01, MR- 102315.01

⁷⁰ MR- 107261.01, MR- 108382.01, MR- 106880.01, MR- 120080.01

⁷¹ MR- 125060.05, MR- 106880.01

⁷² MR- 125060.01

2.2 Partnerships and Coordination

The quality of partnerships varies greatly from project to project, with projects based on previous sound partnerships⁷³ at the top, and projects with new and very complex partnerships at the bottom of the scale. MRs refer to good practices featuring the sound involvement of partners and stakeholders, such as the establishment of a project advisory board or steering committee involving not only partners but also other stakeholders⁷⁴.

However, the added value of European NGOs is not always apparent⁷⁵, nor is it evident that projects managed by European NGOs are of better quality than those involving only local NGOs. Sometimes the involvement of a European NGO leads to certain inefficiencies as was the case with an Oxfam project that was delayed because they needed to set up an office in the country and select local partners⁷⁶. When the role of European partners is referred to as something positive, it is often related to technical expertise shared through trainings and similar activities, or to the role of the European partner as source of funding or at least a “facilitator” of that fundraising role⁷⁷. Projects implemented by European partners that have been working in the country/region for a long period of time tend to be of good quality⁷⁸.

2.3 Re-granting

Only one of the reviewed projects included a re-granting scheme. The assessment of the efficiency of that scheme is two-fold. On the one hand, the MR referred to a very successful project that allowed for the provision of training courses to beneficiaries which was followed by the distribution of small grants to participants to develop their own projects applying the new skills. On the other hand, the efficiency of re-granting was questioned since it consumed more time than envisaged and was shown that procedures were burdensome for both the grant maker and the grantee. In fact, one grantee even rejected a grant due to the complexity of administrative procedures⁷⁹.

2.4 Specific challenges faced by CSO when implementing EIDHR projects

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) implementing EIDHR projects are confronted with a wide variety of issues and obstacles hindering implementation of projects and their efficiency. Several MRs make reference to state political pressure and repression exerted on CSOs and project partners as the main obstacle to implementation⁸⁰.

In Russia for example, heavy political pressure forced the university rector and one partner to withdraw from a project⁸¹. In another instance, Belarusian authorities confiscated NGO computers in a raid⁸². State control of the media is another obstacle mentioned in the MRs.

⁷³ MR- 107440.01, MR- 114620.01, MR- 131260.01

⁷⁴ MR- 107065.01, MR- 115646.01

⁷⁵ MR- 106880.02, MR- 124300.01

⁷⁶ MR- 107261.01

⁷⁷ MR- 040541.03

⁷⁸ MR- 106884.01

⁷⁹ MR- 115646.01

⁸⁰ MR- 41736.04, MR- 40541.02, MR- 130820.01, MR- 040541.03

⁸¹ MR- 130820.01

⁸² MR- 40541.02

Policy makers in Azerbaijan and Belarus, for example, deployed a variety of resources and mechanisms to control the media, making it very difficult to reach target groups⁸³. Governments exercise control over the implementation of specific projects through various obstacles such as making the acquisition of visas for participants in activities particularly difficult or by making the NGO wait for long periods to get official permission for the implementation of activities⁸⁴.

Besides security issues, such as the disappearance of over EUR 100.000 from one NGO's bank account⁸⁵, MRs also make reference to cultural factors as a special difficulty faced by EIDHR implementers. This was, for example, the case with a project that encountered strong opposition from its own beneficiaries towards the adoption of certain democratic principles by trade unions in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Palestine.

⁸³ MR- 125060.03, MR- 125060.01


⁸⁴ MR- 107440.01, MR- 114620.01

⁸⁵ MR- 130820.01

3. EFFECTIVENESS

The ROM definition of effectiveness is: ***the contribution made by the project's results (as in 'outcomes') to the achievement of the project purpose.***

Effectiveness⁸⁶



Note: A = very good (4); B = good (3); C = problems (2); D = serious deficiencies (1)

Effectiveness should assess the likelihood of project results in achieving project specific objectives and having a lasting impact. However, most MRs limit themselves to the assessment of delivered products and services (brochures, training, draft legislation, etc) while not succeeding to assess whether those products and services have translated or will translate into the stated results⁸⁷.

The difficulties faced by the ROM findings here are a reflection of the difficulties faced by NGOs in designing a framework within which to implement their projects. A monitor's analysis can only go as far as the projects' original analysis went. In other words, if the objectives of the project and the cause and effect chain are not clear, the measurement of these can only be tentative.

Most EIDHR projects refer to objectives related to a change of mindset or behaviour, and projects often aim to bring about that change through public information and advocacy campaigns, or through building the capacity of local actors. This report therefore examines the MRs related to these two fields of intervention and their effectiveness in more detail. It also looks at the effectiveness of projects dealing with the creation of networks given their strong representation among the sample of MRs included in this review.

⁸⁶ Source MONIS database: ROM scoring 2009

⁸⁷ MR- 114600.01, MR- 115685.01

3.1. Public information and advocacy campaigns are very often used by local and European organisations alike to support their goals. A “public information” campaign generally seeks to change the knowledge, attitudes or behaviours of a defined target audience, such as with a campaign to raise awareness of the Egyptian people regarding their right to participate in political life⁸⁸.

An “advocacy” campaign seeks to mobilise concerned audiences and organisations to push for changes in activities, policies or practices of governments, for example, by activating and mobilising civil society for participation in the political process, or by exerting pressure on a government to promote freedom of expression and information⁸⁹. MRs indicate that monitoring the effect of those activities is difficult for a number of reasons:

- Measuring outcomes properly would often require direct canvassing of audiences through research methods such as surveys, interviews, and focus groups. The duration and means allocated to the projects are not foreseen for the application of these kinds of time-consuming research methods. The problem for monitors is the lack of a baseline practice within EuropeAid (unlike other donors which have a baseline survey taken before every project) and the lack of useable indicators in most cases to assess achievement of results and Project Purpose.
- Campaigns often aim to change practices and policies of government agencies related to issues that are considered sensitive by governments and which, as a consequence, are very difficult for NGOs to track, for example, torture practices by police forces or treatment of minorities by immigration officials⁹⁰.
- The vagueness of campaign design makes evaluation at a higher level of the intervention logic often impossible⁹¹.
- Overambitious specific objectives that are the equivalent of long term impacts, such as allowing journalists in Egypt to communicate freely⁹², which cannot possibly be achieved during the time frame of an EIDHR project.
- Lack of baseline data before the intervention, therefore it is not possible to measure the change before, between, and after project intervention⁹³.
- Lack of monitoring resources and poor know-how on results monitoring by NGOs often translates into the absence of an evaluation culture amongst campaign organisers and the provision of insufficient information to the monitors⁹⁴.

3.2. Capacity Building

EIDHR projects support a wide variety of capacity-building goals, which target populations ranging from women and community groups to high-ranking government officials⁹⁵. Training is the primary and in many cases the sole means by which NGOs try to build the capacity of

⁸⁸ MR- 114600.01

⁸⁹ MR- 107254.01, MR- 125060.01

⁹⁰ MR- 107261.01, MR- 122620.03, MR- 125060.01, MR- 120080.01, MR- 124960.01

⁹¹ MR- 114600.01, MR- 115685.01

⁹² MR- 114780.01

⁹³ MR- 131260.01

⁹⁴ MR- 131260.01

⁹⁵ MR- 114780.01, MR- 122620.03, MR- 122620.01, MR- 118000.01, MR- 125060.05, MR- 124960.01

project beneficiaries. MRs do cite examples of good practices and results related to training courses, such as: performing activities in the local language which increases impact and ownership; innovative training which led to the involvement of trainees in the project who then went on to develop their own projects; events led by two speakers having two distinct points of view; and other examples of training projects which led to substantial acquisition of knowledge⁹⁶. However most MRs indicate that capacity building activities were not entirely effective. This can be attributed to various shortcomings:

- Most training procedures and practices do not sufficiently anchor training within comprehensive capacity-building strategies. They are typically ad hoc/one-off activities with no follow-up strategy wherein trainees attend the training and are then expected to start implementing without any further support⁹⁷.
- Lack of a good training design: course length too short for the topics covered; lack of significant time for practical exercises and projects⁹⁸.
- Lack of sufficient knowledge of the real needs of trainees; there was no prior training needs assessments of participants and their priorities⁹⁹.
- Lack of sufficient monitoring and evaluation to assess the effectiveness of training courses. MRs seldom report anything more than the number of persons trained, training days and participant satisfaction at the end of the training, and include little or no information on training results in terms of workplace behaviour of participants and impact on development capacity, even where training is fundamental to the achievement of project goals. Hence, monitors and project managers alike generally do not have sufficient information to detect training weaknesses and improve training performance¹⁰⁰.
- Lack of an appropriate organisational and institutional context in which to apply the learning from training. Trainees need to have adequate resources and incentives to implement learning in the workplace. In order to measure the effectiveness of capacity building activities it needs to be clarified whether capacity is a means to an end or an end in its own right. One may ask: is the end goal of a training course for journalists only that they learn something about children's rights (capacity as an end), or is the goal that those journalists will be able to report on children's rights violations so as to increase public awareness (capacity as a means)¹⁰¹? Numerous MRs suggest that capacity building activities should not exist for their own sake, but because they aim at achieving better results, better performance. Yet the connection between capacity and performance is often absent from EIDHR projects and we find an overwhelming amount of capacity building activities designed as ends in themselves¹⁰². As a consequence, while MRs often refer to the learning of participants, there is precious little consciousness among project stakeholders of whether that learning lead to substantial changes to workplace performance or

⁹⁶ MR- 107440.01, MR- 114780.01, MR- 130820.01, MR- 122620.03, MR- 122620.04

⁹⁷ MR- 106880.01, MR- 114600.01, MR- 115685.01, MR- 131260.01, MR- 125060.05

⁹⁸ MR- 108382.01, MR- 115646.01, MR-104722.01

⁹⁹ MR- 115682.01, MR- 131260.01, MR- 122620.01, MR- 118000.01

¹⁰⁰ MR- 106880.01, MR- 131260.01, MR- 125060.05

¹⁰¹ MR- 115646.01

¹⁰² MR- 106880.01, MR- 114600.01, MR- 115682.01, MR- 131260.01, MR-104722.01, MR- 125060.05

enhanced development capacity of target institutions¹⁰³.

These issues are a reflection of the previously mentioned design problem where project designs tend to focus on activities and outputs rather than changed outcomes. Projects too frequently see themselves as output producers rather than change management agents. Finally, the translation of outputs into outcomes is primarily the responsibility of the targeted beneficiary themselves; this, however, requires an active willingness (and permission by senior management) to do things differently.

3.3. Creation of Networks

Numerous EIDHR projects refer to network creation, but they are rarely able to show and explain the overall usefulness, for direct beneficiaries, of having put people or institutions in contact with each other.

MRs point to numerous weaknesses related to the creation of and work done by networks such as: lack of network activity because very diverse, complex situations are addressed in simplistic ways; or because it does not have clearly stipulated objectives, goals and tasks; because it is not clear what benefits it will bring to its participants¹⁰⁴.

The sustainability of networks is often raised as an issue of concern since often networks do not have an official structure but are just informal and have been created by the project. Whether the network will manage to take off, meet regularly, share information, or provide concrete benefits to its members often remains an open question¹⁰⁵.

NGOs/CSOs tend to compete for scarce resources rather than cooperate with each other; they may enter tactical/strategic partnerships to access donor funding as networking is being pushed by the donors, but remain insular and isolated in their mission and activities. Many of them are in a perpetual state of fighting for organisational survival this is not a good environment to promote networking.

¹⁰³ MR- 107254.01, MR- 106880.01, MR- 115682.01, MR- 131260.01, MR- 122620.01, MR- 125060.05


¹⁰⁴ MR- 106880.02, MR- 122620.01, MR- 107261.01, MR- 106883.01

¹⁰⁵ MR- 106880.01, MR- 122620.03

4. IMPACT PROSPECTS

The ROM definition of impact prospects is: *as presently implemented, the project's likely contribution to the overall objectives.*

*Impact prospects*¹⁰⁶



Note: A = very good (4); B = good (3); C = problems (2); D = serious deficiencies (1)

The majority of projects are generally oriented towards bringing about fundamental change and long-term benefit for peoples' livelihoods. While ROM findings indicate that projects are generally well on track towards making a contribution towards their overall objectives (see table above), MRs also clearly show that most projects¹⁰⁷ exhibit numerous problems threatening their planned (quantifiable) achievement to longer-term impact.

The problems mentioned earlier in project design, intervention logic, indicators and baseline data percolate through the implementation of these interventions and result in difficulties for the ROM instrument to make a significant contribution to the discussion of their impact – or even the prospects for impact. For example, MRs frequently state that it is still too early to assess the potential impact of the project, or that given the nature of the project, it is simply unrealistic to assess impact no matter when the assessment is conducted.

This challenge faced by the ROM instrument also reflects the fact that projects themselves are not tracking the impact of their interventions.

Reservations about project impact prospects are due to the following factors:

¹⁰⁶ Source MONIS database: ROM scoring 2009

¹⁰⁷ MR- 114620.01, MR- 125060.03, MR- 125060.02, MR- 106880.02, MR- 107440.01

4.1 Unrealistic Plans or Overambitious Objectives

Numerous MRs refer to the unrealistic and overambitious goals of projects as one of the main reasons for their failure in contributing to the planned impact. Examples here include a project that targeted the entire population of Russia, where the MR determines that the project alone cannot possibly make much of an impact on such a large population¹⁰⁸. Other MRs consider that, given the very difficult context in which projects operate, thinking about a potential impact is unrealistic. This was the case with a project on freedom of expression and media in Azerbaijan where the MR states that training journalists in such a context of repression and government censorship will not contribute to the desired impact. A similar statement was made for a project in Moldova where the MR notes that most of the progress claimed has a “semi-fictitious” character because the country still suffers from significant weaknesses in the fields of justice, freedom and the rule of law¹⁰⁹.

Other projects are deemed unrealistic because in order to achieve the stated objectives the project would need government support, which is often absent¹¹⁰. Thus one MR concludes that “more time, resources, and continuous political commitment from national authorities are needed to achieve any meaningful impact. Indeed, the impact of the project may only be possible through a political reorganisation of the country, which can in itself be quite unpredictable”¹¹¹.

4.2 Lack of sufficient Capacity, Resources, and Time

The following statements are often found in MRs: “Given the limited scale of the project, it alone will not be sufficient to achieve sustainable change; more resources and more time will be required”¹¹². “The project would require a long-term vision, which will take time to achieve, well beyond the end of this project”¹¹³. “In order to achieve results the project would need more resources, more time, and continuous political commitment from national authorities”¹¹⁴.

4.3 Lack of Indicators and Internal Monitoring

An absence of adequate indicators and the lack of internal monitoring conducted by the organisation is also one of the main limitations that monitors face during their work as they often do not have sufficient information to judge the impact of the project. Statements such as: “The likelihood of achieving the project objective is not easy to assess, as Objective Verifiable Indicators are not clearly set out in the work plan”¹¹⁵ are often repeated.

As a result, NGOs and Monitors alike devote more time and effort to measuring activity outputs instead of estimating the broad benefits to democracy, freedom and human rights, in the ill-advised belief that the delivery of the activity will automatically lead to desired impact.

¹⁰⁸ MR- 124960.01

¹⁰⁹ MR- 41736.04

¹¹⁰ MR- 125060.04, MR- 120080.01

¹¹¹ MR- 125060.04

¹¹² MR- 107254.01

¹¹³ MR- 106884.01

¹¹⁴ MR- 122620.04

¹¹⁵ MR- 120080.01

Specific difficulties in monitoring the impact of EIDHR projects.


Human rights organisations work in areas where outcomes are hard to achieve and measure. Some of the challenges in measuring EIDHR projects include:

- Human Rights goals imply behavioural changes, e.g respect for the rights of women, respect of democratic principles, which are extremely difficult to measure.
- The time-span between project interventions and desired end results can be very long. This contrasts with the expectations of the EC project approach that is short-term and strives for immediate results.
- Desired changes are so large that they need the intervention of various actors. Achievements will therefore be stretched across many different organisations, which makes measurement much more difficult.

5. POTENTIAL SUSTAINABILITY

The ROM definition of potential sustainability is: ***the likelihood of a continuation in the stream of benefits produced by the project after the period of external support has ended.***

Sustainability¹¹⁶



Note: A = very good (4); B = good (3); C = problems (2); D = serious deficiencies (1)

No MR makes reference to projects that took into account the conditions for sustainability at the design stage or throughout the entire duration of project implementation. Instead, sustainability is considered only at the very end of the project and often is unsuccessful.

As visible in the above chart, sustainability, under the ROM instrument, is a composite assessment of financial sustainability (with the most important weighting), ownership, policy support and institutional capacity.

Financial sustainability is an issue of concern for the majority of projects, because NGOs, by nature are dependent on external funding.

Problems related to sustainability tend to specifically appear when there is a low sense of local ownership¹¹⁷ (e.g. a Council of Europe project), or where the organisation did not take even the most basic measures to ensure sustainability, as is the case with an organisation that did not develop a website¹¹⁸.

MRs often refer to the unrealistic donors' expectation that NGOs would obtain further funding from local authorities. This is often impossible due to the high sensitivity of EIDHR

¹¹⁶ Source MONIS database: ROM scoring 2009

¹¹⁷ MR- 125060.05

¹¹⁸ MR- 115648.01

projects¹¹⁹, e.g. those working on torture prevention or freedom of expression. Human Rights NGOs, by nature, operate in adverse policy environments. Even when the official line matches project goals, NGOs often have to deal with government institutions that pay lip service to policy but fail to cooperate in practice.

The MRs refer to several instances of good practices that increased the likelihood of sustainability. For example, one project was incorporated into pre-existing organisational structures and uses only local and regional experts¹²⁰; or a project for a Trust Fund was created to ensure sustainability of the core activity of the organisation – a Master programme on human rights¹²¹. Other good practices found to promote sustainability include charging training participants a small fee, or drawing on students that conduct internships with the organisation¹²².

Important questions are raised in the MRs about how well a project contributes to institutional and management capacity of the implementing organisations – crucial elements for sustainability. Numerous MRs show that capacity building provided to the implementing organisation(s) did not match their needs¹²³. This is reflected in the numerous recommendations made in the MRs concerning the need of training and capacity building for the implementing organisation¹²⁴.

¹¹⁹ MR- 118000.01

¹²⁰ MR- 107440.01

¹²¹ MR- 40541.02

¹²² MR- 114780.01, MR- 124960.01

¹²³ MR- 106880.02, MR- 107065.02

¹²⁴ MR- 107261.01, MR- 107254.01, MR- 114600.01, MR- 114620.01, MR- 114701.01, MR- 114780.01

6. HORIZONTAL ISSUES

6.1 Gender

Several MRs refer to the fact that gender perspectives are not duly addressed, apart from minimal components such as participation of women in events¹²⁵.

6.2 Regional Projects

EIDHR regional programmes show the same standard weaknesses than other (e.g. TA) regional projects. The reasons behind these weaknesses range from complex project designs, complex coordination, uncertain roles and responsibilities and sustainability issues.

Unfortunately, EIDHR regional projects are no exception to this rule and the quality of most regional projects is an issue of concern.

Numerous regional projects were found to be fragmented and poorly coordinated at the national level¹²⁶, or too unrealistic and ambitious given limited resources, as with a project dealing with a selection of 16 countries that were given homogeneous treatment despite each country having completely different needs and complex civil societies, thereby forcing a very superficial treatment of problems¹²⁷. In another case, the project could not qualify as a regional action despite being implemented in four countries because it actually had no regional activities but only country-related activities – i.e. pseudo-regional¹²⁸.

¹²⁵ MR- 106883.01, MR- 108382.01, MR- 106880.01

¹²⁶ MR- 41767.03, MR- 106883.01

¹²⁷ MR-104722.01

¹²⁸ MR- 125060.05

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

The implementation of the recommendations provided in this section represents a considerable overhaul of the current EC funding approach. The compelling evidence of fundamental issues provided in this report supports the need to address these weaknesses through adequate measures.

The recommendations are challenging, and reflect the need for substantial and meaningful changes. This report makes three core recommendations to the European Commission and NGOs to improve the impact of projects funded through the EIDHR.

1. Prioritise Concrete, Feasible, and Realistic Projects

A difficult situation seems to have arisen wherein both the EC's call for proposals guidelines and NGO proposals suffer equally from overambitious goals and unrealisable outcomes. Moreover, NGOs should pay more attention to developing the logic of the change that they want to achieve and to answer fundamental questions such as "can we really change X with action Y?", "what do we want to achieve?" and "how can we measure our success?"

NGOs also need to identify interim targets and milestones, which serve as indicators of progress towards set aims. However, NGOs cannot be expected to change if donors do not also strive for such change. This shift in NGO operations would need to occur within a broader shift (towards a more realistic direction) of the goals of the EC's call for proposals guidelines. The culture shift in EIDHR implementation would be best initiated by the EC setting the example to NGOs that it prioritises project quality and practicality over quantity, inflated numbers of beneficiaries or unrealistic assumptions.

2. Allow for Genuine Projects Guided by Reality and Need

a) Open Call for Proposals

The current call for proposals process and the strict guidelines set out by the EC tend to constrain NGOs to create projects that respond mainly to the needs and priorities of the EC. Most of the projects assessed in this review resembled donor-driven experiments rather than the core work of the NGOs.

The European Commission should consider a call for proposals system through which a series of priority Human Rights fields is set up within a less restrictive framework. This would prevent the EC from imposing its own priorities and put the onus on NGOs to demonstrate the relevance of the work that they are doing. For example, the EC would state that the protection of women's rights is a priority, and NGOs must then justify the relevance of their project for women. Application forms could be more focused on questions related to the organisation's previous work in that field, and would require more substantiation on the needs of the target groups. In this way, the EC would encourage more creative and innovative

thinking by NGOs and the submission of projects natural to the NGOs that are also relevant to local realities and needs.

b) Flexible Project Implementation

Current EC procedures require that projects be rigidly designed from the start with limited scope for ongoing adaptation to local realities. This results in NGOs routinely implementing projects designed over one year prior to project implementation with little room for change even when these would represent considerable improvement.

All projects, particularly human rights projects, are implemented in environments where many factors beyond the scope of the planned intervention may influence the way in which the project is implemented (no matter how well planned it may be). However, the structure of the EIDHR instrument is such that it does not allow much scope for project adaptation to new realities identified through implementation.

This lack of reflection and adaptation of projects to local realities causes numerous opportunities for learning and improvement to go unheeded by NGOs. As a consequence, as shown in this review, numerous projects simply fail to achieve their aims.

The EIDHR instrument would be more effective if more space for iterative measurement of project implementation existed. This would imply regular reassessments of the situation, and scope for changing direction or even retreating as required. The initial assumption should be that the goal of the process is not to close the gap between planned and executed activities, but to reduce the gap between the plan and the reality on the ground, which necessarily includes taking advantage of emerging opportunities and challenges.

A balance needs to be struck between the EC's needs to account for resources dedicated to projects, ensure recipients have established necessary systems for monitoring impact and the use of funds for a predetermined purpose on the one hand with a process-oriented approach allowing more flexibility and learning from experience than the traditional output-oriented approach on the other hand.

3. Invest in Organisational Capacity

Point 22 of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness states: *"The capacity to plan, manage, implement, and account for results of policies and programmes is critical for achieving development objectives – from analysis and dialogue through implementation, monitoring, and evaluation."*

The truth of this statement is confirmed by the evidence provided in this report. Indeed, NGOs suffer from numerous institutional capacity weaknesses which have an extremely negative impact on the work they do, be it a lack of understanding of the Logframe approach, weak project management and financial skills, poor monitoring and evaluation capacity, or weak pedagogic knowledge on how to design a training.

However, part of this situation is provoked by the pressure of the international community (the EC included) to reduce administrative costs, and the tendency to fund projects as opposed to funding institutions. While understandable that the EC prefers spending its resources on beneficiaries rather than on “intermediaries”, the reality begs a different approach. The reality reflects a need to spend on process (i.e. the intermediaries) as well as projects (i.e. the beneficiaries), otherwise intermediaries are ineffective in planning and delivering change which in turn implies an inefficient use of EC funds.

Endowing institutions is a means to reaching out effectively to final beneficiaries. The EC’s own Project Cycle Management (PCM) Guidelines dedicate considerable attention to the description of the institutional and organisational capacity of organisations, highlighting the need to assess these capacities when considering funding.

The EC ought to further integrate those guidelines into the use of the EIDHR instrument and increasingly reflect on tools for assessing, and supporting the institutional – i.e. the structure of formal, informal rules and regulations within which individual organisations must work – and organisational capacity – i.e., the technical and managerial competencies within an agency such as leadership, policy making, financial management, human resource management and the technical capacities¹²⁹ – of its partners. For this reason, all projects should include a given budget for organisations to conduct internal capacity building. This could either be provided by the EC or organised by the organisation itself.

¹²⁹ Project Cycle Management guidelines, March 2004, European Commission, page 103

IV. CONCLUSION: RESULTS-ORIENTED MONITORING OF EIDHR PROJECTS

Overall, the objectives of monitored EIDHR projects are relevant to the country and target groups. The most successful projects are those that reflect the core work of the implementing organisation, backed up by strong partnerships, strong institutional capacity.

However, there tends to be a gap between generally relevant objectives, and an understanding of how to get there. In other words, organizations frequently fail to manage change (design projects) which contributes to those objectives.

The efficiency of monitoring EIDHR initiatives in the region is intimately intertwined with these more general design and implementation problems faced by these projects. As seen in the text, EIDHR projects and their external monitoring (ROM) can be summarized as facing the following difficulties.

The nature of EIDHR projects tend to imply behavioural changes - for example respect for the rights of women, respect of democratic principles - which are changes that occur slowly – though the time span of EIDHR interventions are short and strive for immediate results. Indeed, the report finds that all EIDHR interventions monitored were considered over-ambitious and unrealistic in their design given their objectives and resources. Frequently, the scope of the intended changes are so large, that they would require more time, more actors, and government support – which are often absent.

In reality, the EIDHR interventions are contributions to much longer term and ambitious initiatives. Here **ROM stumbles into difficulties. Firstly, measuring the nature of the change promoted by EIDHR projects while they are ongoing makes the ROM methodology somewhat unrealistic at the level of impact – hence the shift in the ROM methodology from measuring ‘impact’ to measuring ‘impact prospects’.** Secondly, ROM is mandated to monitor the log frame of a project, not the broader context (for example the organization itself and its core work) within which it fits, and the potential for longer term action.

For an accurate assessment of longer term change (impact), the NGOs themselves would have to be tracking change based on the measurement of a few key indicators. However, EIDHR projects tend to operate in areas (networking, capacity building, awareness raising) where outcomes are particularly hard to identify, and measure. Generally speaking, neither the projects, nor the institutions implementing them have identified indicators of change, which implies that baseline data against which progress can be measured is not gathered. In other words, neither projects nor institutions have processes in place with which to self-monitor their achievement of impact.

An absence of adequate indicators and the lack of internal monitoring conducted by the organisations is one of the main limitations that monitors face during their work as they often do not have sufficient information to judge the impact of the project.

Indeed, the vast majority of projects are found to be ill-conceived and too activity-driven, whereby activities absorb project planning and become an end in themselves. This reflects a general weakness in institutional capacity, project management, and the log frame approach on the part of the implementing organizations.

Because the ROM methodology is based on the log frame methodology, its weak understanding by civil society partners implies difficulties for the ROM process. The poor quality of design and needs assessment of EIDHR interventions have negative consequences on the ROM approach and the work done by monitors who often find themselves confronted with realities on the ground that are not reflected in the documents related to the project. In addition to the lack of information mentioned above, it is difficult for monitors to know *what* to monitor – i.e. should the project be judged against a static and outdated piece of paper (i.e. the contract's log frame) or the 'virtual' log frame which exists in people's minds but not on paper.

The ROM exercise is about monitoring processes. The difficulties faced by the ROM instrument are a reflection of the difficulties faced by NGOs in designing a framework within which to implement their projects. A monitor's analysis can only go as far as the projects' original analysis went. In other words, if the objectives of the project and the cause and effect chain are not clear, the measurement of these can only be tentative.

In the case of EIDHR projects, the processes are frequently weak (no baseline, no log frame, no intervention logic, no indicators) which makes it particularly difficult for ROM to accurately assess results in this sector. If processes are not in place, the ROM systems' role is to highlight these weaknesses and make recommendations. It is then up to project stakeholders (beneficiaries, and the EC) to use the information and recommendations provided by the ROM system (or not).

Indeed, the EC PCM guidelines (on which the ROM methodology is based) refer to the use of the log frame as a living document – to be adjusted in line with the evolution and management of the project. However, in the case of the EIDHR instrument, ROM recommendations may reach their limits as the EIDHR instrument does not promote results or learning from doing.

In summary, these factors taken together, make it difficult for ROM monitors to:

- **Assess the degree of change** resulting from the EIDHR intervention because of:
 - o The time lapse between the intervention and the desired change
 - o The unclear causality chain between the intervention and the desired change
 - o A lack of existing process (baseline data, indicators)
- **Improve processes:**
 - o EC granting mechanism promotes ambitious projects but limits adaptations of project intervention logics during implementation
 - o EIDHR projects may depend upon actors who are involved in project implementation (e.g. other NGOs, government institutions)
 - o Though there is no documented evidence, it would seem that EIDHR partners are less likely to receive the ROM reports than are TA partners – making it particularly difficult for ROM recommendations to be followed...

Annexe 1: List of Monitoring reports

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Monitoring Reports | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|--------------|-----------------|---------|--------|---------------|-----------|---|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|------------|------------|--------|----------|
| Monitoring report number | Grantholder/contractor | Contract No. | Type of Project | Country | Domain | Contract type | Budget | Project Title | PM location | Start date | End date | Report date | Design | Efficiency | Effective. | Impact | Sustain. |
| MR-40541.02 | Nordic Council of Ministers Office in Lithuania | 113304 | NAT | BLR | DDH | Grant | 2,226,006 | BELARUSIAN HIGHER EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS | AIDCO A 03 | 30/12/2005 | 1//10/2009 | 08/08/2008 | 2.70 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.89 |
| MR-41736.04 | Bucharest Medical Rehabilitation Centre | 98949 | THE | MDA | DDH | Grant | 697,509 | PROVIDING REHABILITATION AND SEEKING JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE | AIDCO F | 12/07/2005 | 12/06/2008 | 20/05/2008 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.22 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| MR-41736.05 | ICAR Foundation, Bucharest Medical Rehabilitation Centre | 98949 | THE | MDA | DDH | Grant | 697,509 | PROVIDING REHABILITATION AND SEEKING JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE | AIDCO F | 12/07/2005 | 12/06/2008 | 08/08/2008 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.22 | 2.50 | 2.50 |
| MR-41736.06 | ICAR Foundation, Bucharest Medical Rehabilitation Service | 98949 | EAST-R | East-R | DDH | Grant | 697,509 | PROVIDING REHABILITATION AND SEEKING JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE | AIDCO F | 12/07/2005 | 12/06/2008 | 08/08/2008 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.22 | 2.10 | 2.50 |
| MR-41767.01 | Council of Europe | 126720 | EAST-R | UKR | DDH | Services | 995,000 | FOSTERING A CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH CAUCASUS AND UKRAINE | AIDCO A 03 | 4//12/2006 | 5//12/2008 | 31/01/2008 | 3.00 | 2.80 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.25 |
| MR-41767.02 | Council of Europe | 126720 | EAST-R | ARM | DDH | Services | 995,000 | FOSTERING A CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH CAUCASUS AND UKRAINE | AIDCO A 03 | 4//12/2006 | 5//12/2008 | 18/03/2008 | 3.00 | 2.20 | 2.78 | 3.00 | 2.67 |
| MR-41767.03 | Council of Europe | 126720 | EAST-R | AZE | DDH | Services | 995,000 | FOSTERING A CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH CAUCASUS AND UKRAINE | AIDCO A 03 | 4//12/2006 | 5//12/2008 | 18/03/2008 | 3.00 | 2.80 | 2.45 | 3.00 | 2.89 |
| MR-41767.04 | Council of Europe | 126720 | EAST-R | GEO | DDH | Services | 995,000 | FOSTERING A CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH CAUCASUS AND UKRAINE | AIDCO A 03 | 4//12/2006 | 5//12/2008 | 18/03/2008 | 3.00 | 2.60 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.50 |
| MR-41767.05 | Council of Europe | 126720 | EAST-R | East-R | DDH | Services | 995,000 | FOSTERING A CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH CAUCASUS AND UKRAINE | AIDCO A 03 | 4//12/2006 | 5//12/2008 | 18/03/2008 | 2.00 | 2.60 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.88 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Monitoring Reports | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|----------------|-----------------|---------|--------|-----------------|-----------|--|---|------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|------------|-------------|--------|----------|
| Monitoring report number | Grantholder/contractor | Contract No. | Type of Project | Country | Domain | Contract type | Budget | Project Title | PM location | Start date | End date | Report date | Design | Efficiency | Effective.. | Impact | Sustain. |
| MR-102315.01 | Movimento per l'Autosviluppo l'Interscambio e la Solidarietà (MAIS) | 117949 | NAT | EG | DDH | Grant | 299,862 | ADVANCING WOMEN RIGHTS: PROMOTING ATTITUDES AGAINST GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE THROUGH STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITIES OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS | EC Delegation to Egypt | 25/5//2007 | 25/5//2009 | 19/06/2008 | 2.60 | 3.00 | 2.88 | 2.50 | 3.13 |
| MR-102942.01 | | 16733 | NAT | MA | DDH | Project Measure | 1,000,000 | MICROPROJETS 2004, INITIATIVE EUROPÉENNE DÉMOCRATIE ET DROITS DE L'HOMME | EC Delegation to Morocco | 31/12/2005 | 12/9//2008 | 02/06/2008 | 2.60 | 2.60 | 2.55 | 3.50 | 2.90 |
| MR-104722.01 | Arab institute for Human Rights | 88625 | South-R | RMD | DDH | Grant | 735,107 | RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITES DE LA SOCIETE CIVILE EN VUE D'UNE PARTICIPATION EFFECTIVE AUX TRANSFORMATIONS DEMOCRATIQUES ET A L'ELABORATION ET LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE STRATEGIES NATIONALES POUR LA PROMOTION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME DANS LE MONDE ARABE | AIDCO A 03 | 1/7//2006 | 31/12/2009 | 02/09/2008 | 2.30 | 2.40 | 2.00 | 1.50 | 2.50 |
| MR-106880.01 | Jordanian's Womens' Union | 118155 | South-R | RMD | DDH | Grant | 816,000 | REFORMING THE FAMILY LAWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES | EC Delegation to Jordan | 5/12/2007 | 5//9//2010 | 13/10/2008 | 3.30 | 2.80 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.75 |
| MR-106882.01 | Club de Madrid para la Tansicion y consolidacion Democraticas | 117736 | South-R | RMD | DDH | Grant | 845,342 | STRENGTHENING DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE THROUGH FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST REGION | AIDCO A 03 | 28/12/2006 | 28/12/2008 | 13/11/2008 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
| MR-106883.01 | Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) | 117813 | South-R | RMD | DDH | Grant | 431,945 | MONITORING THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE EUROMED REGION | AIDCO A 03 | 1//9//2007 | 1//9//2010 | 13/11/2008 | 3.00 | 2.60 | 2.67 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
| MR-106884.01 | Firedrich Naumann Foundation | 117607 | South-R | RMD | DDH | Grant | 721,890 | ENHANCING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ASSOCIATIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD THROUGH NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY | AIDCO A 03 | 1//1//2007 | 1//1//2010 | 13/11/2008 | 3.00 | 3.20 | 3.55 | 3.00 | 3.11 |
| MR-106892.01 | Adalah | 88313 | NAT | IL | DDH | Grant | 513,684 | PROMOTING ACCESS TO THE ISRAELI LEGAL SYSTEM FOR ARAB CITIZENS OF ISRAEL | EC Delegation to Israel | 1//1//2006 | 1//1//2009 | 06/10/2008 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 3.00 |
| MR-107065.01 | Khiam Rehabilitation Centre | 118201 | NAT | LB | DDH | Grant | 642,000 | MEDICAL, SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE | EC Delegation to Lebanon | 4//4//2007 | 4//4//2010 | 13/10/2008 | 3.30 | 3.60 | 3.60 | 3.00 | 2.89 |
| MR-107254.01 | MUSAWA | 140001 | NAT | PS | DDH | Grant | 81,163 | THE ENHANCEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES IN PALESTINE THROUGH THE ENHANCEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES | EC Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip | 13/12/2007 | 13/3//2009 | 17/11/2008 | 3.30 | 3.80 | 3.33 | 3.00 | 3.67 |
| MR-107261.01 | OXFAM NOVIB | 117711 | NAT | EG | DDH | Grant | 787,014 | PRACTISING DEMOCRACY FROM THE VILLAGE UP TO THE CAPITAL: PROMOTING PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY BY STRENGTHENING LOCAL COMMUNITIES | EC Delegation to Egypt | 1/7//2007 | 30/3//2010 | 29/11/2008 | 3.30 | 3.00 | 3.55 | 3.00 | 2.89 |
| MR-107440.01 | Social Development Agency, Brussels | 117687 | South-R | RMD | DDH | Grant | 324,085 | DÉMOCRATIE ET SYNDICALISME, EVOLUTION DÉMOCRATIQUE DU SYNDICALISME DANS LES PAYS DU MAGHREB ET DU MASHREQ | AIDCO A 03 | 23/12/2006 | 23/4//2009 | 02/09/2008 | 3.00 | 2.80 | 2.55 | 3.00 | 2.75 |
| MR-108382.01 | Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) | Not Applicable | South-R | RMD | DDH | Other | | FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION – HORIZONTAL REPORT ON THREE CONTRACTS: C-117736; C-117813; C-117607 | AIDCO A 03 | ln/Da/cted | ln/Da/cted | 13/11/2008 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 |

| Monitoring report number | Grantholder/contractor | Contract No. | Type of Project | Country | Domain | Contract type | Budget | Project Title | PM location | Start date | End date | Report date | Design | Efficiency | Effectiveness | Impact | Sustainability |
|--------------------------|---|--------------|-----------------|---------|--------|---------------|---------|---|---|------------|------------|-------------|--------|------------|---------------|--------|----------------|
| MR-040541.03 | Nordic Council of Ministers | C-113304 | NAT | BLR | DDH | Grant | 2226006 | BELARUSIAN HIGHER EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS | AIDCO A 03 | 30/12/2005 | 11/10/2009 | 07/07/09 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.60 | 3.00 |
| MR-118000.01 | Public Committee on Human Rights Protection | C-146291 | THE | RUS | DDH | Grant | 100000 | USE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS TO INCREASE PUBLIC CONTROL OVER LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND COMBATING VIOLENCE IN RUSSIAN POLICE | EC Delegation in Russia - Operation Section | 26/12/2007 | 26/6/2009 | 01/04/09 | 3.30 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.60 | 2.50 |
| MR-119965.01 | Institute of Democracy, Georgia | C-137565 | SPP | GEO | DDH | Services | 99802 | ACCOMPLISHMENT AND EXTENSION OF JUVENILES'S ADVOCACY AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM IN ADJARA REGION | EC Delegation in Georgia and Armenia | 10/10/07 | 05/01/09 | 30/04/09 | 2.70 | 3.25 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.70 |
| MR-120080.01 | Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG) | C-147048 | THE | RUS | DDH | Grant | 298262 | COMBATING TORTURE THROUGH LEGAL ADVICE, EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY | EC Delegation in Russia - Operation Section | 1/6/2008 | 30/11/2009 | 14/05/09 | 2.70 | 2.95 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
| MR-122620.01 | Council of Europe | C-140325 | EAST-R | MDA | DDH | Services | 0 | CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERSHIP NETWORK - UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND SOUTHERN CAUCASUS | AIDCO A 03 | 13/12/2007 | 31/12/2009 | 27/07/09 | 2.70 | 3.00 | 2.50 | 2.40 | 2.20 |
| MR-122620.02 | Council of Europe | C-140325 | EAST-R | UKR | DDH | Services | 0 | CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERSHIP NETWORK - UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND SOUTHERN CAUCASUS | AIDCO A 03 | 1/1/2008 | 13/12/2009 | 23/07/09 | 3.00 | 2.80 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.70 |
| MR-122620.03 | Council of Europe | C-140325 | EAST-R | GEO | DDH | Services | 0 | CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERSHIP NETWORK - UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND SOUTHERN CAUCASUS | AIDCO A 03 | 13/12/2007 | 31/12/2009 | 28/07/09 | 3.00 | 2.65 | 2.00 | 3.00 | 2.30 |
| MR-122620.04 | Council of Europe | C-140325 | EAST-R | AZE | DDH | Services | 0 | CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERSHIP NETWORK - UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND SOUTHERN CAUCASUS | AIDCO A 03 | 13/12/2007 | 31/12/2009 | 27/08/09 | 3.00 | 2.65 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.60 |
| MR-122620.05 | Council of Europe | C-140325 | EAST-R | East-R | DDH | Services | 750000 | CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERSHIP NETWORK - UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND SOUTHERN CAUCASUS | AIDCO A 03 | 13/12/2007 | 31/12/2009 | 03/09/09 | 3.00 | 2.80 | 2.00 | 3.00 | 2.50 |
| MR-124300.01 | IREX Europe | C-159306 | NAT | BLR | EIDHR | Grant | 946942 | SUPPORT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION | EC Delegation in Ukraine | 1/1/2009 | 31/12/2010 | 05/10/09 | 3.60 | 3.20 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.70 |
| MR-124960.01 | Angel Coalition, Russia | C-157935 | THE | RUS | EIDHR | Grant | 150000 | PROVIDING LABOR MIGRANTS WITH SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE, ENABLING THEIR FULL PARTICIPATION | EC Delegation in Russia - Operation Section | 1/1/2009 | 31/12/2010 | 09/11/09 | 3.10 | 2.25 | 3.00 | 2.40 | 2.60 |
| MR-125060.01 | Council of Europe | C-140324 | EAST-R | GEO | DDH | Services | 0 | FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & INFORMATION AND FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND MOLDOVA | AIDCO A 03 | 1/1/2008 | 31/12/2009 | 27/10/09 | 3.30 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.00 | 2.40 |
| MR-125060.02 | Council of Europe | C-140324 | EAST-R | ARM | DDH | Services | 0 | FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & INFORMATION AND FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND MOLDOVA | AIDCO A 03 | 1/1/2008 | 31/12/2009 | 27/10/09 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.00 | 2.80 |
| MR-125060.03 | Council of Europe | C-140324 | EAST-R | AZE | DDH | Services | 0 | FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & INFORMATION AND FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND MOLDOVA | AIDCO A 03 | 1/1/2008 | 31/12/2009 | 29/10/09 | 2.40 | 2.20 | 2.00 | 2.40 | 2.50 |
| MR-125060.04 | Council of Europe | C-140324 | EAST-R | MDA | DDH | Services | 0 | FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & INFORMATION AND FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND MOLDOVA | AIDCO A 03 | 1/1/2008 | 31/12/2009 | 03/11/09 | 3.00 | 2.55 | 2.00 | 2.40 | 3.00 |
| MR-125060.05 | Council of Europe | C-140324 | EAST-R | East-R | DDH | Services | 1010000 | FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & INFORMATION AND FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND MOLDOVA | AIDCO A 03 | 1/1/2008 | 31/12/2009 | 05/11/09 | 3.00 | 2.75 | 3.00 | 2.40 | 2.50 |

| Monitoring report number | Grantholder/contractor | Contract No. | Type of Project | Country | Domain | Contract type | Budget | Project Title | PM location | Start date | End date | Report date | Design | Efficiency | Effectiveness | Impact | Sustainability |
|--------------------------|--|--------------|-----------------|---------|--------|---------------|---------|--|---|------------|------------|-------------|--------|------------|---------------|--------|----------------|
| MR-106880.02 | Jordanian's Women's Union | C-118155 | South-R | RMD | DDH | Grant | 816000 | REFORMING THE FAMILY LAWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES | EC Delegation to Jordan | 5/12/2007 | 5/9/2010 | 05/08/09 | 3.40 | 2.40 | 2.00 | 2.40 | 2.30 |
| MR-107065.02 | Khiyam Rehabilitation Center (KRC) | C-118201 | NAT | LB | DDH | Grant | 642000 | MEDICAL, SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE | EC Delegation to Lebanon | 4/4/2007 | 4/4/2010 | 10/08/09 | 2.10 | 1.25 | 1.00 | 1.60 | 1.50 |
| MR-114600.01 | The Egyptian Association for Community Participation Enhancement (EACPE) | C-123785 | NAT | EG | DDH | Grant | 100000 | THE EGYPTIAN DEMOCRATIC STATUS WATCH | EC Delegation to Egypt | 18/12/2006 | 18/12/2009 | 10/07/09 | 1.70 | 2.65 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1.50 |
| MR-114620.01 | Physicians for Human Rights - Israel (PHR) | C-136980 | NAT | IL | DDH | Grant | 96856 | APPLYING GENERAL COMMENT 14* TO THE UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES OF THE NEGEV (GENERAL COMMENT 14 TO ARTICLE 12 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS | EC Delegation to Israel | 1/11/2007 | 31/10/2009 | 26/11/09 | 3.40 | 3.60 | 3.00 | 2.40 | 2.30 |
| MR-114701.01 | El Nadim | C-118185 | NAT | EG | DDH | Grant | 180677 | MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION OF VICTIMS OF TORTURE IN EGYPT | EC Delegation to Egypt | 26/5/2007 | 26/5/2010 | 10/07/09 | 3.30 | 2.55 | 2.00 | 3.00 | 1.80 |
| MR-114780.01 | Media Arts for Development (MADEV) | C-142597 | NAT | EG | DDH | Grant | 99900 | TOMORROW STARTS NOW | EC Delegation to Egypt | 1/5/2008 | 31/12/2009 | 10/07/09 | 2.70 | 2.75 | 3.00 | 2.60 | 2.50 |
| MR-115242.01 | Treatment & Rehabilitation Center for Victims of Torture (TRC) | C-148063 | NAT | PS | EIDHR | Grant | 1199874 | SUSTAINING AND ENHANCING COMPREHENSIVE, COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICE DELIVERY TO VICTIMS OF TORTURE AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE LIVING IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE WEST BANK | EC Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip | 1/1/2009 | 1/1/2012 | 11/12/09 | 3.00 | 3.30 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.90 |
| MR-115646.01 | Early Childhood Resource Centre (ECRC) | C-156955 | NAT | PS | EIDHR | Grant | 187026 | UTILIZING AND ACTIVATING MEDIA FOR PROMOTING AND SPREADING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS | EC Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip | 4/11/2008 | 24/12/2009 | 11/12/09 | 3.60 | 3.25 | 3.00 | 3.40 | 3.00 |
| MR-115648.01 | RESTART Association | C-118165 | NAT | LB | DDH | Grant | 348693 | REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR TORTURE SURVIVORS | EC Delegation to Lebanon | 1/5/2007 | 30/4/2010 | 10/08/09 | 3.60 | 3.65 | 3.50 | 3.00 | 2.50 |
| MR-115651.01 | Jordanian Women's Union Irbid Branch | C-146669 | NAT | JO | DDH | Grant | 99486 | PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRBID GOVERNORATE / JORDAN | EC Delegation to Jordan | 1/1/2008 | 13/12/2010 | 23/07/09 | 3.00 | 3.10 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.30 |
| MR-115682.01 | Jordanian Women's Union (JWU) | C-146845 | NAT | JO | DDH | Grant | 100000 | THE PROMOTION OF LEGAL LITERACY AND RESOURCE TO LEGAL SERVICES FOR WOMEN IN THE HITTEEN AND HUSSAIN CAMP AREAS AND SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES | EC Delegation to Jordan | 1/4/2008 | 31/3/2010 | 23/07/09 | 2.70 | 1.80 | 2.50 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
| MR-115685.01 | AMIN Media Network | C-156986 | NAT | PS | EIDHR | Grant | 159968 | BRIDGING GAPS - SECURITY FORCES & JOURNALIST RIGHTS | EC Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip | 15/12/2008 | 15/6/2010 | 11/12/09 | 2.40 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.60 |

| Country | Domain | Contract type | Budget | Project Title | PM location | Start date | End date | Report date | Design | Efficiency | Effectiveness | Impact | Sustainability |
|---------|--------|---------------|---------|--|---|------------|------------|-------------|--------|------------|---------------|--------|----------------|
| RUS | DDH | Grant | 673,370 | EIDHR - INTER-REGIONAL ELECTORAL NETWORK OF ASSISTANCE IN RUSSIA (IRENA) | EC Delegation in Russia - Operation Section | 1//2//2007 | 31/8//2010 | 31/03/10 | 2.70 | 3.60 | 2.00 | 2.80 | 2.40 |
| RUS | DDH | Grant | 950,000 | EIDHR - ENHANCING THE CAPACITY OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS IN RUSSIA TO APPLY THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR) IN DOMESTIC LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AND PRACTICES (EIDHR CAMPAIGN 2 - FOSTERING A CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS) | EC Delegation in Russia - Operation Section | 22/12/2006 | 30/6//2010 | 13/04/10 | 3.00 | 2.75 | 3.00 | 2.60 | 2.70 |

Annexe 2: Good practices of monitored EIDHR projects

***“BELARUSIAN HIGHER EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS”*¹**

- ⇒ an organisation that solved a liquidity problem (which arose due to a combination of delayed reporting by the NGO and slow approval by the EC) through the creation of a "buffer fund" by the co-donor to provide liquidity until the disbursement of EC funds

***“SUSTAINING AND ENHANCING COMPREHENSIVE, COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICE DELIVERY TO VICTIMS OF TORTURE AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE LIVING IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE WEST BANK”*²**

- ⇒ a torture rehabilitation project aiming to disseminate knowledge to other actors in order to increase the number of people sharing duties to assist torture survivors

***“UTILIZING AND ACTIVATING MEDIA FOR PROMOTING AND SPREADING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS”*³**

- ⇒ a project with training courses followed up by distribution of sub-grants to trainees to enable them to develop their own small projects utilising the knowledge acquired during training.

***“MEDICAL, SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE IN LEBANON”*⁴**

- ⇒ Partnerships: good practices featuring the sound involvement of partners and stakeholders, such as the establishment of a project advisory board or steering committee involving not only partners but also other stakeholders.

***“DÉMOCRATIE ET SYNDICALISME, EVOLUTION DÉMOCRATIQUE DU SYNDICALISME DANS LES PAYS DU MAGHREB ET DU MASHREQ”*⁵**

***“TOMORROW STARTS NOW (Egypt)”*⁶**

***“EIDHR - INTER-REGIONAL ELECTORAL NETWORK OF ASSISTANCE IN RUSSIA (IRENA)”*⁷**

- Capacity building: examples of good practices and results related to training courses, such as: performing activities in the local language which increases impact and ownership; innovative training which led to the involvement of trainees in the project who then went on to develop their own projects; events led by two speakers

¹ MR – 40541.02

² MR- 115242.01

³ MR- 115646.01

⁴ MR- 107065.01

⁵ MR- 107440.01

⁶ MR- 114780.01

⁷ MR- 130820.01

having two distinct points of view; and other examples of training projects which led to substantial acquisition of knowledge

“DÉMOCRATIE ET SYNDICALISME, EVOLUTION DÉMOCRATIQUE DU SYNDICALISME DANS LES PAYS DU MAGHREB ET DU MASHREQ”

“BELARUSIAN HIGHER EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS”

“PROVIDING LABOR MIGRANTS WITH SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE, ENABLING THIER FULL PARTICIPATION”

⇒ The MRs refer to several instances of good practices that increased the likelihood of sustainability. For example, one project was incorporated into pre-existing organisational structures and uses only local and regional experts⁸; or a project for a Trust Fund was created to ensure sustainability of the core activity of the organisation – a Master programme on human rights⁹. Other good practices found to promote sustainability include charging training participants a small fee, or drawing on students that conduct internships with the organisation¹⁰.

⁸ MR- 107440.01

⁹ MR- 40541.02

¹⁰ MR- 114780.01, MR- 124960.01