MEMO/07/424
Brussels, 24 October 2007
EU steps up the fight against undeclared
work
What is undeclared work?
Undeclared work is defined as "paid activities that are lawful as regards
their nature but not declared to public authorities, taking into account
differences in the regulatory system of Member States". This definition has been
used systematically by the Commission since its 1998 Communication on undeclared
work.
The definition notably excludes criminal activities which are defined in
national law. Crime and tax fraud as such are outside the scope of employment
policy. This does not mean that there are direct links between fraud and
employment but there is no complete match (e.g. money laundering can take the
form of declared work).
Which policies can help curb undeclared work?
There are various examples of successful policy approaches to curbing
undeclared work in the different EU Member States.
- The tax burden tends to provide financial incentives for undeclared work,
especially in the case of workers with lower pay/skills. This is often combined
with receiving social benefits while working undeclared. EU Member States have
been reducing the tax wedge on low-paid labour over the recent years by
introducing a tax free income base or minimum wages, but the pace of the
reduction has been on average rather slow (1.2% on average compared to a
starting level of around 40%).
- Undeclared work may occur in conjunction with the evasion of indirect taxes.
Hence, some Member States have taken up the possibility offered by Directive
1999/85/EC to reduce VAT on specified labour intensive services. In France, this
measure has been applied to building renovation and maintenance and to personal
services, leading to significant job creation (more than 40.000 jobs).
- Administrative simplification has been undertaken by a number of member
states to remove another strong incentive for undeclared work. Service vouchers
have been introduced in Belgium, Austria and Spain, as a simplified system to
hire workers for regular domestic services. This measure has often led to
significant job creation (e.g. 40,000 extra jobs in Belgium), but also to severe
budgetary efforts due to the amount of public subsidies involved.
- Simplified systems for the registration of workers were introduced in
several Member States. In France such a system has been set up in the 1990s in
order to encourage regularisation of agricultural and seasonal workers. 900,000
workers are currently covered.
- Efforts to improve monitoring and control capacity were undertaken in many
Member States. This has often taken place through more effective cooperation at
national level between tax/social security organisms and labour inspectorates.
To this end, inter-ministerial coordination structures have been set up in
France, Belgium, Ireland and Italy, while interfaces between the relevant
inspections' databases have been established in Portugal, in order to improve
probabilities of detection of undeclared work. These have led to more effective
inspections and controls with positive but largely unmeasured employment
effects.
What is the extent of undeclared work in the different
Member States?
The best available estimates (which were collected through a study carried
out for the Commission in 2004 ) show that the overall extent and
characteristics of undeclared work differ widely in the Member States, with
highs of 20% of GDP or more in some southern and eastern European countries.
Undeclared work is still on the rise in several Member States (disregarding the
effects of recent regularisation campaigns of illegally staying third-country
nationals in Italy, Spain and Portugal), whilst in a number of new Member States
strong job creation in recent years and the emergence of labour market
shortages, has led to a decline of the phenomenon.
|
Country
|
Estimated size
|
Year
|
Latest developments
|
|
Austria
|
1.5% of GDP
|
1995
|
Slightly decreasing trend since 2005
|
|
Belgium
|
3-4% of GDP
|
1995, confirmed in investigations in 1997 and 1999
|
Likely reduction due to success of service vouchers (ca. 40000 new
jobs)
|
|
Bulgaria
|
35% of GDP
|
2004
|
Signs of expansion
|
|
Cyprus
|
4.2% of GDP
|
2003
|
Likely on the increase (clandestine immigrants)
|
|
Czech Republic
|
0.6% of total employment
|
2004
|
No increase anymore due to regular job creation.
|
|
Denmark
|
4.3% of GDP (3% black activities +1.3% ordinary tax evasion)
|
2005
|
Declining
|
|
Estonia
|
6.1% of GDP
|
2001
|
Clear decrease of volume of envelope wages
|
|
Finland
|
4.2% of GDP
|
1992
|
-
|
|
France
|
4-6,5 % of GDP
|
1998
|
Increase 2002-'05 on the basis of infractions (DILTI)
|
|
Germany
|
4.5% of GDP (3.1% black activities +1.4% ordinary tax evasion)
|
2004
|
Decline, but risk of increase in 2007 due to VAT increase and labour tax
reform
|
|
Greece
|
Over 20% of GDP
|
1998
|
Likely increase (push from immigration)
|
|
Hungary
|
18% of GDP
|
1998
|
Signs of decline (less self employed and increasing social security
incomes)
|
|
Ireland
|
Not available
|
|
|
|
Italy
|
16-17% of GDP
|
1998/2001
|
Stagnation if abstraction made of immigrant amnesty of 2002
|
|
Latvia
|
18% of GDP
|
2000
|
Slight decrease due to regular job creation
|
|
Lithuania
|
18.9% of GDP
|
2002
|
Decrease due to regular job creation and labour shortage
|
|
Luxembourg
|
Not available
|
|
/
|
|
The Netherlands
|
2% of GDP
|
1995
|
No clear trend, but noticeable shift towards fraud by employment
agencies
|
|
Malta
|
5.78% of GDP
|
2004
|
/
|
|
Poland
|
14% of GDP
|
2003
|
Declining trend due to regular job creation
|
|
Portugal
|
5% of GDP
|
1996
|
Trend unclear but likely push from immigration.
|
|
Romania
|
16-21% of GDP
|
2006
|
|
|
Slovakia
|
13-15% of GDP
|
2000
|
Moderate decrease due to regular job creation
|
|
Slovenia
|
17% of GDP
|
2003
|
Slight decline notably with small enterprises
|
|
Spain
|
15-20% of GDP
|
1985
|
Increase 2002-2006 if abstraction made of regularisation of 500000
immigrants in 2005
|
|
Sweden
|
5% of GDP
|
2004
|
Slight trend of increase
|
|
United Kingdom
|
2% of GDP
|
2000
|
No change observed
|
What are the main results of the new Eurobarometer survey?
It is the first time that a harmonized survey on undeclared work is carried
out across the whole EU-27 on the topic of undeclared work. However, given the
sensitiveness of the subject investigated and the pilot nature of the survey,
its quantitative outcomes should be taken with caution and are likely to provide
only a lower bound of the actual values. This being said a number of interesting
findings, concerning especially the qualitative features of undeclared work, can
be highlighted:
- The main reason to perform undeclared work is the mutual benefit for both
consumer and supplier (i.e. avoiding taxes and administrative burden).
- Undeclared work is more prevalent among students, unemployed and
self-employed and it is particularly concentrated in household and personal
services, construction and (on the demand side) retail.
- There is a large variation in the incidence of undeclared work across Member
States and its intensity, in terms of hours of work, is larger in Southern and
Eastern Europe.
- Envelope wages (i.e. wages paid cash-in-hand without registration) are far
more widespread in Central and Eastern Europe and concern especially the
construction sector. They constitute a significant share of the total pay
(around two-fifths) for the workers involved.
- The detection risk matters: people who consider the risk to be small are
more likely to be involved in undeclared work.
- People involved in undeclared work tend to be more tolerant of
norm-resistant behaviours. Also, undeclared work done by a private person for a
household is more accepted than other forms of norm-resistant behaviours such as
receiving welfare payment without entitlement or using public transport without
ticket.
- Somewhat surprisingly, people with a higher level of education and in
professional groups with above-average income are more likely to purchase
undeclared goods/services.
- In more than half of cases undeclared work seems to substitute for regular
employment: a majority (53%) of purchasers of undeclared goods/services say they
would have acquired them in the regular market in the absence of the undeclared
work option, showing the scope for regular job creation.
What is
the relationship between free movement of workers and undeclared work?
The non-application of the right to free movement of workers increases the
scope for undeclared work. For example, transitional arrangements limiting the
free movement of workers constitute a driver for undeclared work because of the
impossibility for certain workers from new Member States to regularise
themselves in the old ones.
The legal framework on free movement of workers is a safeguard against
undeclared work. Free movement of workers is a basic right laid down in the
Treaty, which works effectively for several decades. The basic regulations date
from 1971 as far as social security is concerned (including for the self
employed), and from 1996 as far as the rights of posted workers are concerned.
Once cross-border workers (whether in dependent employment or self employment),
are correctly registered to social security and labour institutions, they can be
controlled in the same way as nationals. It is thus crucial that cross-border
workers and their employers have a user-friendly administrative framework to
comply with these regulations. This is why the changes in the regulatory
framework would notably aim to improve administrative transparency and
simplification in the interest of the user, on the basis of better cooperation
between institutions across borders.
What could be the role of the "platform" of labour inspectorates?
The Green Paper on Labour Law stressed the need for more cooperation between
Member States in particular in the field of posted workers. The Commission plans
to adopt a recommendation aimed at reinforcing such cooperation through the use
of the Internal Market Information System, as well as a decision setting up a
high level committee. The Committee should support and assist the Member States
in identifying and exchanging good practices as regards control and enforcement
of relevant legislation.
How can social partners participate?
In a number of Member States, social partners have signed special agreements
with the government in order to curb the incidence of undeclared work in
specific sectors, such as construction. An illustrative example is the
tripartite alliance against undeclared work in the construction sector in
Germany. This sets a number of targets such as raising public awareness of the
negative consequences of undeclared work, enforcing rules concerning tax and
social security contributions payment and minimum wages and ensuring fair
competition. These agreements have triggered a number of innovative measures in
the construction sector, such as formalised notification for reporting suspected
situations of undeclared work, a job identification chip-card to be carried by
all construction workers, the exclusion from public procurement in case of
infraction and the improvement of local information flows between sectoral
organizations and control authorities.
What is the link with the flexicurity agenda ?
The problem of a segmented labour market, where large groups of workers are
trapped in unprotected activities, is also increasingly recognised. UDW
represents an extreme case of labour market segmentation and runs against all
the key principles of flexicurity. The Communication on flexicurity proposes
eight principles and four typical pathways, which can be considered as a point
of departure for Member States in designing their own flexicurity strategies,
according to their own particular situations and traditions. Such strategies
could help transform informal work into formal employment by making work more
attractive from the point of view of both workers and employers. Concretely,
flexicurity would imply more rights for workers in the form of access to
training, active labour market policies and unemployment benefits in case of
unemployment, while at the same time improving the conditions for regular job
creation by employers by reducing the administrative burden and ensuring the
availability of a more skilled workforce.
What can PROGRESS offer?
The PROGRESS programme , with an annual envelope of ca. 20 million € in
the employment section, supports inter alia studies, the development of
statistical tools and the exchange of good practices through networking and
dissemination activities. This programme is suited for filling current gaps in
measurement and the pooling of expertise among national authorities, involving
stakeholders such as notably the social partners. These will feature among the
priorities of the programme in 2008.