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Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would not presume to offer such an illustrious audience as this the last word on the new world order of which President Bush spoke in September 1990 when the Gulf Crisis was building up. Some have spoken of the end of history, as though the new world order was already in place; others think this is an illusion and prefer to speak of the new world disorder. Both camps fail to recognize that devising a new system of international relations will take a long time, especially after a forty- year ice age. The old world was organized around two forces working for integration - ideology was one of them and the nuclear deterrent was the other. The new world is looking for new approaches and new frameworks. The situation is no longer as clear as it was, now that our options are wide open again. But that should not make us unduly pessimistic, for in a world that is moving again, however chaotically, there is the prospect of a climate of hope that was virtually inconceivable in the Cold War era. Growing interdependence - problems and questions The interdependence of the world's nations seems somehow inevitable, though it must evolve in an orderly fashion; the reality is there, but we have not yet grasped it fully enough to devise the principles and rules of the new international game. Perhaps the simple fact is that we are at the beginning of an evolutionary trend. Well, events will not wait for us; we must be ready with our response. Talk of the interdependence of our national economies is now commonplace. You know what I mean - world trade is expanding rapidly, faster than production itself; financial markets are growing more closely integrated, thanks to information technology and deregulation; business strategies are devised in an international perspective, with direct foreign investment growing at an annual rate of 34% in the 1980s and international sales within firms in the same groups representing 40% of all world trade. Today many economists speak of the transition to a new stage - a quantum leap to a worldwide single market. There is plenty of evidence of this; the international credit card in the consumer's wallet is particularly symbolic. The globalization of difficulties is a no less obvious underlying trend: the frontiers are coming down and we must work together. We all realize that the developed world needs the Third World's help with a number of parameters that rank high on the political agenda - demographic pressure, degradation of the environment, nuclear proliferation and overarmament, the drug trade, organized crime and AIDS are the names of the game. The global dissemination of information means that ideas can circulate and public opinion can adopt a common way of thinking to such an extent as to justify talk of a universal conscience. The oppressors will go on oppressing, of course, the victims of persecution will continue to flee, and as barriers come down in one place they will spring up in another. But it is more and more difficult to remain ignorant or indifferent; hypocrisy and impunity are under attack. International apathy about human rights violations will not be able to hide behind the pretext of immutable, inviolable national sovereignty much longer. In all the debates going on now, the moral duty to come to the assistance of peoples whose very life is threatened is regularly brought to the fore; despite difficulties of implementation, it might well become a legal duty. There is a downside to this relatively optimistic vision, one which focuses on the limitations, the ambiguities, the fragility of the familiar trends which I have just described. Limitations not least because economic integration remains primarily the preserve of the Community, the United States and Japan. These Big Three of the international economy represent only 13.5% of the world's population, even if they do account at the moment for two thirds of its output. For some the alternative scenario to integration is fragmentation; they would refer to that part of the developing world where the demographic change is slow to emerge, where the process of economically catching up has ground to a halt, where revolutionary ideologies are far from dead and buried. At a time when there is so much talk of the "global village" it is surely paradoxical that part of the southern world seems almost to be removing itself from history, closing the door, hostile to penetration from outside. Limitations also to the birth of what I have called the "universal conscience". The information explosion, the development of the open economy, the spread of democracy, do not prevent us taking very different roads. Far from it. The upsurge in fundamentalisms provides the most striking example. For the rapid globalization of the economy is also a source of anxiety to peoples keen to strengthen their sense of belonging to communities with which they identify, on which they have a hold. In extreme cases - so much in evidence - claims and counterclaims can cause conflict between peoples who have long lived side by side. And the problem here is serious, because the right to self-determination is just as important a principle today with the throwing-off of the communist yoke as it was yesterday in the days of decolonization. I would add - and I will not go into detail - that economic integration, unless it is backed by a strong political will, will not in itself produce stronger international institutions or help create world government. This is why, although the need for a new world order is self-evident, our era is one of trial and error or, as the harsher critics among us would have it, of impotence, inability to take on world challenges. If we are to resist the forces of fragmentation, protectionism and exclusion, we must be more than just aware of our interdependence. We must move on and manage it, setting common objectives and applying common rules. Can the European Community, the product of a very different context, born of hostility and incomprehension, provide a blueprint for the creation of this new world order? The European Community contribution The Community experiment in interdependence in a common framework without being under the domination of any one nation must be the longest-running. It has its limitations, but it is a living process and an enriching one. In the context of a new world order it is certainly worth observing, even if the principles governing it cannot necessarily be reproduced. Let us deal right away with an objection that many have considered significant, but which will hardly stand up to close examination any longer: that is the image of Fortress Europe, the European Community as an economic bloc. Unlike the attempts at regional autarky in the 1930s, the European Community has shown for a long time that it is a factor for growth in international trade and its increasing liberalization. Our trading partners are gradually being won over to the idea that regional integration has a dynamic impact on all, and the European model is an inspiration for others - witness the recent agreements concluded by the United States, Canada and Mexico. So, having disposed of that canard, let me come to what seems to me the most interesting aspect for the matter at issue: the principles governing the Community, and their relevance to the establishment of a new world order. Thirty-five years after the European Community was set up, I believe it is not too presumptuous to claim that it still has something revolutionary about it, that it is something of a "laboratory" for the management of interdependence. What are these principles? I would pinpoint four. The first principle may seem very remote, given the failure of the collective memory; that is, exchanges and cooperation between peoples. At a time when hatred, or simply ignorance and fear of others, is troubling that part of Europe which has just emerged from the totalitarian nightmare, let us not minimize our gratitude to the men and women who gathered at the Hague Congress in 1948 - first among them Sir Winston Churchill - and set their faces against any notion of revenge, of congenital distrust between peoples. They rejected the view that "To the victor belong the spoils" - a philosophy which had dominated many postwar treaties, in which the germs of the next war are planted in the peace settlement, which seek first to satisfy instincts for power and short-term interests. The founding fathers of Europe had the wisdom to set our countries on a path of solidarity and cooperation which would seem to make any return to the old demons impossible. Our peoples have learned to know each other, to talk to each other and to appreciate each other; this is the key to everything. Naturally, it does not preclude differences of opinion and arguments, but in the final analysis there is a determination to work out positive compromises. Second principle: the control of economic interdependence. There are three aspects to this in the Community. First of all there is competition, which stimulates: the approach of the single market, to which firms have reacted well in advance, has revived national economies which were in relative decline; mentalities are changing, the stage is set for keener competition, a more open attitude to the outside world. Then there is cooperation, which strengthens: examples are research policy, which should be closer to our firms, training and redeployment in industries faced with far-reaching change, and the development of infrastructure networks. Finally there is solidarity, which brings us closer together: this is embodied in the policy of economic and social cohesion, which is designed to give each region a real chance and sets us on a growth path which will be beneficial to all. Competition, cooperation, solidarity: these are the three inseparable aspects of the organization of Europe, the management of interdependence in this continent of ours. In other words, a positive-sum game. Third principle: the importance of the law, which ensures that the rules are accepted by all the players, so avoiding diktats and the domination of one state over the others. Each member country, whatever its size or strength, can say its piece and make its contribution to the common venture. The European Community is a community governed by law, where the Court of Justice plays an essential role, and where one of the Commission's duties is to see that the rules are observed by all. Hence the emergence of a political entity which is not easy to classify, where sovereignty can be limited, shared or combined, depending on circumstances; and it is because the rule of law is observed that the Community can be managed jointly, in confidence and transparency. Finally, the fourth principle: the need for an effective decision-making process. This is because, without strong institutions, the will to cooperate is by itself not sufficient: the institutional set-up must be such that we are forced to achieve results, i.e. to take decisions and act. To my mind the authors of the Treaty of Rome made a fundamental innovation in giving the Community a memory enabling it to act and a decision-making system enabling it to go beyond the limits so often encountered by conventional international organizations. But can these four principles, which make for the solidity of the European Community, be transposed for the construction of a world order? Are they sufficient to make the Community a strong and stable constituent part of that order? These are the two questions I would like to address in conclusion. Is it possible to draw conclusions from the Community experiment, the laboratory I talked about earlier, that will help us to build a new world order? My answer is "Yes, but". Yes, because in economic and monetary matters the order created is infinitely more stable internally than what went before. Yes, because the discipline deriving from common rules is gradually penetrating our countries, and that is the sine qua non of fruitful cooperation. But the set-up cannot be transposed as it is. First of all because the differences between levels of development are enormous. And then because civilizations, our conceptions of man, nature, society and even democracy itself, are very different. In the Community we have a great deal in common on these points. But this is not true everywhere on our planet, if only because democracy is still far from being the ruling principle for everybody. And finally because giving birth to institutions to which sovereignty is to be transferred and which are to be given power to manage cooperation and settle disputes is a slow and arduous process. To convince ourselves of this we have only to think back to the woes of the League of Nations, whose failure so marked Jean Monnet, or to measure the progress made in recent years by the United Nations; but let us not forget the obstacles still lying in its path. Think also of the gulf between the hopes that were pinned on the CSCE and its achievements to date. There is still a long way to go to make the United Nations stronger; we should not close our eyes to the difficulties. Let us make use of our experience, but with modesty and humility. The contribution that the Community as such can make to the new world order can, to use an image from the plant world, be considered something of a hybrid, what is produced by crossing a world power with an international organization. I have been struck by the gradual emergence of the Community in this dual role on the international stage. First it is an entity which is gradually equipping itself with the means of influencing world affairs, commensurate with what unites us and the essential common interests of the Member States. I do not doubt that the Community will thus be contributing to a more stable and more equitable world order, as is testified by the declarations which the Community signed jointly with the United States in 1990 and with Japan in 1991. It is also a mediator and arbitrator, when you think of the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe and the Community's role in the Yugoslav conflict - our observers on the spot and our presence at the peace conference today alongside the United Nations in Geneva. There is also a support function, when you consider the interlinking of the Community's humanitarian aid operations with those of non-governmental organizations and UN agencies. This is a new departure which is worth thinking about for the future, and it raises a new question: where do the rights and duties of "interference" start and finish? The Community is perhaps in a better position than others to give an unbiased answer to this question. The conclusion, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, is that the Community's contribution to a new world order is, like the Community itself, something original: a method which will serve as a reference, a body whose presence will be felt.* * * |
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