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INTRODUCTION It is a privilege to have been invited as President of the European Commission to deliver the 1991 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture. As the first Director of the Institute, Alastair Buchan was responsible for establishing the solid base from which its deservedly high reputation has grown. The Institute, through promoting research and rigorous analysis, has made a significant contribution to the public debate on security and strategic issues. Since its early days when Raymond Aron played an eminent role it has had close European connections. Recent events make us stand back and more than ever ask fundamental political and strategic questions. Today, I will discuss the security aspects of European integration ! The Gulf war has provided an object lesson - if one were needed - on the limitations of the European Community. It is true that giant steps have been taken along the path of economic integration, and the last two years have seen advances on foreign policy cooperation. But the Community's influence and ability to act have not kept pace. 2 We should interpret this as yet another argument for moving towards a form of political union embracing a common foreign and security policy. This is in fact the mandate given by the European Council to the Intergovernmental Conference, which opened in Rome last December. The ideal which inspired Europe's founding fathers was to bring nations and peoples together in a Community which would be in a better position than each country on its own to give practical expression to shared values, to defend those values where they were threatened, and to promote them where they did not exist. The Intergovernmental Conference then will be a severe test of the Community's ambitions today and tomorrow, in a world which in many vital respects will not be very different from yesterday's. There will still be progress and setbacks, new patterns of cooperation, new sources of tension, new dangers from different quarters, which Europeans, like everyone else on the planet, will have to face with the same determination as before. Growing international interdependence is undoubtedly the key element to be taken into account in any discussion of foreign or security policy, as in any approach to major economic, monetary or trade-related issues. 3 Public opinion has to be persuaded of this. In our democracies this implies a high degree of awareness of what is at stake and an ongoing, wide-ranging debate. Two years ago I warned about the dangers of euphoria generated by two events of major importance to the Community. The watchword of post-1945 politics, "we must never go to war with each other again", buoyed the hopes of those who built the Community. That objective has been achieved. We must give credit where credit is due. The recent collapse of communism opened up prospects for an era of peace, freedom and trade throughout Europe: we must now work patiently and prudently towards that end. But we cannot limit our horizons to the new Europe. All around us, naked ambition, lust for power, national uprisings and underdevelopment are combining to create potentially dangerous situations, containing the seeds of destabilization and conflict, aggravated by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Community must face this challenge. If it is to be worthy of the European ideal, it must square up to the challenges of history and shoulder its share of the political and military responsibilities of our old nations, which have always left their mark on history. The road will be rocky . As yet there is no such thing as a European security policy. But we must lose no time in beginning the debate. Also we must remain firm in our resolve to speed up the process of political integration. This is the only possible response to the accelerating pace of history. 4 Before we consider the possible shape of a common defence policy we need to place it within the much wider notion of security, which encompasses a conception of a world order and the solidarity of social systems. The defence issue is being raised in a very different context today from forty years ago, when the founding fathers believed that a European Defence Community could lead to a political Europe. There is now a dynamic of European integration which is creating a number ofconditions favourable to a fresh advance. I. SECURITY, AN ALL-EMBRACING CONCEPT We are living through a period of radical change in which the basic factors are not in our direct control : the prospect of disengagement between the two major powers in Europe; the worldwide consequences of the changing nature of the Soviet-American duopoly; the lighter burden of that duopoly on the rest of the world; the rising tide of tension and conflict; and last but not least, in a list which is by no means exhaustive, the widening gap between North and South. As is often the case in times of uncertainty and threat, there is much talk nowadays of the need for a new world order which would improve the prospects for security and peace. Security or respect for the rule of law Respect for the rule of law in international affairs has always been the goal of those who have sought to devise a new world order, from the League of Nations before the last world war to the United Nations today. 5 Growing international interdependence has started people talking, if not about the unattainable prospect of a world government, at least about the establishment of rules to promote security and more harmonious relationships and the introduction of procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Gulf crisis has raised an even more sensitive issue: in whose name and by what means can we ensure respect for international law, ultimately by the use of force? The tragic dimension of history casts doubt on the possibility of a theoretical answer to these questions and, more importantly, on the practicality of creating realistic and effective systems. And yet we have no choice. Abandoning the task, however arduous, would be tantamount to mass resignation. We would be lying to the people of Europe, long lulled by material prosperity and too often blind to the challenges ahead. They need to be told that democracy and freedom have a price, that they have to be fought for, and that they require cohesion at home and generosity and firmness abroad. 6 These comments are particularly pertinent to the Gulf war. It was vital to ensure that the rule of law triumphed, particularly as it applies to the integrity of every sovereign state - Kuwait in this instance. But how can we guarantee complete success without some vision of the postwar period? We need to combine the answers to a series of complex problems: a solution to the tensions caused by the Palestinian and Lebanese problems; a credible guarantee of security for every state; the need to reduce the weaponry which has made the region a giant powder keg; respect for the rights of minorities like the Kurds and the creation of an area of economic development whose fruits can be shared in time by all the people of the region. Today it is the Gulf. Tomorrow, crisis will hit some other part of the world. The way we contribute to a solution to the current crisis will have enormous consequences, positive or negative, for the strengthening of security worldwide. What is at stake is the fate of the United Nations, or at any rate its capacity to influence events. Once the guns have fallen silent, the United Nations must win the battle for peace, thereby demonstrating its ability to forestall any new crisis. 7 Security: a problem of society De Tocqueville knew all about the strengths and limitations of democracy. If he were alive today, he could illustrate his basic analyses, making allowance for the phenomenon of public opinion and the influence of the media, the modern tendency to be inward-looking and the difficulty of winning the support of the civic-minded for a grand design. On top of these internal challenges, we have to incorporate new dimensions such as the protection of the environment or, at a deeper level, the relationship between man and nature. Public opinion has sensed the major importance of this issue but has not yet grasped all the implications of a long-term policy to conserve the natural world and to hand down intact to future generations precious resources. Then again, on a different level, we are finding it more and more difficult to cope with migratory flows and devise ways of integrating immigrants into a pattern of harmonious relations between men and communities. Security however depends on our ability to create an attractive, harmonious society. If society is eroded from within by a decline in responsible citizenship, indifference to others and social tensions, how can individuals be expected to defend its security, let alone accept that their country should take risks to share international responsibilities with others? 8 It is for this reason - to return for a moment to European integration - that we are so intent on demonstrating the need for an ambitious European project: not just a large market to bring increased prosperity, but a real entity which attaches importance to social issues and regional solidarity. Without this breadth of vision, Europeans will never feel that they belong to a Community, which wants to provide a reference- point not only in terms of the values it espouses but also in terms of the way it puts these values into practice. Besides freedom and responsibility, solidarity is central to the Community both at home - between nations, regions and individuals; and abroad. Many need our help, from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on our eastern flank to the countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East on what we might call our southern flank. But the Community has wider responsibilities too: it must make a contribution to North-South issues. It is already active on all these fronts, but it is being asked to do even more. This should be our grand design, but there will be political difficulties before it is accepted and put into practice. 9 Security: a problem of defence In the last resort, security means the ability to defend oneself by force of arms. If the Community is to contribute to the new world order, it must accept that this presupposes participation, where necessary, in forces which are given the task of ensuring respect for international law, when all other attempts to create a basis of understanding and cooperation between nations have failed. It has to be admitted that wars happen, despite our best endeavours. To illustrate these arguments, let me turn once more to the Gulf crisis. It is true that from the very first day - 2 August 1990 - the Community took the firm line expected of it: it confirmed the commitment of its Member States to enforce sanctions, the first line of dissuasion against aggressors. However, once it became obvious that the situation would have to be resolved by armed combat, the Community had neither the institutional machinery nor the military force which would have allowed it to act as a Community. Are the Twelve prepared to learn from this experience? The tragic events of recent weeks will force them to take a stand on the basic principle at least, although it is generally agreed that progress must be gradual, because there are so many different sensitivities and so many uncertainties. There is no guarantee, for instance, that the nuclear threat will disappear, or that East-West tension is a thing of the past. 10 Discussions and negotiations on a common foreign and security policy are therefore taking place on shifting sands. But we should ensure that everyone is aware of the links between our commitment to a new world order and the need to build a society of which we are proud and which will increase individual commitment to shared values and individual readiness to promote and defend these values, whether this involves economic and financial burdens, or even greater sacrifices. II. THE COMMUNITY DYNAMIC Before I answer these questions, I would like to make a quick assessment of the "state of the union". Where do we stand? What assets do we have? What is the intrinsic potential of earlier decisions now being implemented? The internal dynamic Let us begin with an undeniable fact: the Community's economic revival. Although much remains to be done to put the Community on a par with the world's largest economic powers, the impetus provided by "1992" over the last six years is changing our economic structures for the better, as witnessed by more rapid growth, increased investment and substantial job-creation. Our citizens can see this for themselves and are taking a keener interest in European integration. Our partners can see it too and sometimes are worried, indulging in attacks on the emergence of a "fortress Europe". The Community, the world's leading trading power, is perceived as an economic giant. Our reputation has preceded us and raised expectations. 11 Our own citizens are making greater demands on the Community too, in the name of a shared destiny or concern for an equitable balance between the costs and benefits of a vast common economic area. Hence the objective of economic and social cohesion, enshrined in the Single European Act and pursued through our structural policies. Strenuous efforts and substantial resources are being invested. ECU 60 billion have been allocated over five years to back regional development schemes, conversion programmes for industrial regions in the throes of change, and rural development,contributing to a more harmonious society. It is no longer correct to speak of a "common market". We are building a Community whose Member States jointly exercise a measure of pooled sovereignty through fully-fledged common policies - such as agriculture and economic and social cohesion; and other less developed ones - such as concerted projects in research and technology, or the environment, or measures associated with the social dimension. These are the foundations of a Community which, because of them, is now moving towards political union, which is the ultimate objective of the Single European Act. 12 One thing leads to another. This has been a feature of the Community, which is constantly being taken into new areas. One of these new areas is closely linked to the overall concept of security. I am referring, of course, to the consequences of free movement for individuals and the need for joint action, or at the very least close coordination, to combat the various threats to personal security: organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism ... . Political initiatives in this security-related area are another expression of solidarity, a leitmotif of the European pact. Economic and monetary union is another example of this virtuous circle. It is true that it will mean transfers of sovereignty, particularly with the creation of a European Central Bank. But this is not so much a great leap forward as a logical consequence of the success of the European Monetary System. It is not difficult to envisage the consequences of the Community, with its single currency, playing a major international role to deal with factors liable to disturb financial and foreign exchange markets. By throwing all its weight behind greater monetary stability - which implies world responsibilities for the European currency - and by calling for a more equitable apportionment of financial resources between rich countries and poor countries, the Community could make a meaningful contribution to strengthening security worldwide. But here again it would have to accept the constraints and the cost of an international responsibility which it had knowingly taken on. 13 The external dynamic Perceptions of the Community explain the numerous demands made upon it. It cannot evade them, nor can it indulge in well-meaning or disorganized activism, as political cooperation is sometimes tempted to do. But let us take a look at some positive elements. The Community is playing a key role in shaping the architecture of the new Europe. It is receiving applications for membership from European countries and requests for aid from elsewhere. It is responding to both as part of a multifaceted strategy that takes account of individual situations. On the Commission's initiative, talks have opened with EFTA to find a way of allowing its members to benefit from the single market. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, the Community began by making trade concessions under bilateral agreements and then assumed responsibility for coordinating aid and assistance to those countries by the industrialized world. Most of the burden, however, rests on the Community's shoulders. The Community intends to go further still, towards more binding agreements on these points and in every possible area of cooperation: foreign policy, culture, the economy. 14 Let us turn now to what I have called the Community's southern flank. Here, in addition to the aid linked with the Gulf crisis and the consequences of economic sanctions, the Community is strengthening its ties with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries and with the countries of the Middle East. It has trade agreements, protocols for financial assistance, technical assistance, measures to improve the environment ... . And it will have to raise its sights even higher, redoubling its efforts, if it is to create the economic conditions conducive to peace and the stability and development of the region. A similar effort will be required if the Community is to make an effective contribution to solving North-South issues. This is exemplified, though not exclusively, by the Lomé Convention signed by the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Africa, in particular, will require more attention in the years ahead, for the serious economic and social problems besetting the continent are bound to affect security in that part of the world. A European Europe Some plain speaking is called for if the debate on the prospects for European Union is to take place under optimum conditions and attract public interest. Europe needs a political identity to bring its ambitions - if indeed it has these ambitions - to fruition. Europe must want to be European. 15 The formula has provoked controversy in the past. Now it is on the agenda again. Can the Community consent to spending of so much time and effort, can this be justified to the general public, unless it is part of a grand design? This cannot be achieved unless the Community acquires a distinct political identity and the influence derived from economic strength. The two are intimately linked. An ambitious project of this kind cannot be achieved if the Community is perceived as nothing more than a single market backed by a few common policies. It requires political will, based on an awareness of vital national interests. It requires the conviction that the defence and promotion of these interests will be more effective if Member States act together, exercising pooled sovereignty. It is fortunate therefore that past and future progress in the economic and monetary fields should have an appropriate political framework. You will appreciate the links between the work of the two intergovernmental conferences - one on economic and monetary union, the other on political union - leading to the creation of responsible, efficient institutions with democratic legitimacy. I am well aware of reservations and concerns on the part of certain Member States, which challenge this analysis and stick to the traditional view of national sovereignty. There are also friendly powers, which seem to fear the development of a European identity. 16 Let me assure them that they are mistaken and that their concerns are not justified. The United States -for this is the friendly power that I have in mind- has nothing to gain from a politically impotent and economically subordinate Community. I assume that this is agreed since the United States signed the Transatlantic Declaration on 20 November 1990. This declaration lays the foundations for a revived partnership based on increased transatlantic solidarity and acknowledges the existence of a European identity in the field of security policy, pointing the way to an equitable sharing of responsabilities and burdens. If this is indeed the case, the ball is now in our court. It is for us to shoulder our responsibilities and pull our weight. At this point, questions relating to foreign policy and security arise. After twenty years of foreign policy cooperation, the Twelve have grown in mutual knowledge and understanding, their diplomatic procedures have converged, and they have from time to time adopted unanimous positions. But this is not enough, which is why the European Council agreed that one of the main objectives of the revision of the Treaties is the gradual implementation of a common foreign and security policy. Although the two areas are closely linked, it does not follow that the Twelve can advance at the same pace and along the same lines in both. Even if we agree on the core of a common foreign policy, difficult choices will have to be made in the specific area of defence. This is the nub of the problem, which is why we need to put all our cards on the table. 17 III. DEFENCE POLICY OPTIONS The only option compatible with the complete vision of European Union is to insert a common security policy into this framework. This would not be the case if, as some propose, a series of Communities - one for economic integration, a second for political cooperation and a third for security - were to be envisaged for the final stage of European integration. Not that transitional arrangements should be ruled out. Indeed, they will be essential, notably in the area of defence where the Western European Union can play a very useful role. However, we must make it clear that what we are proposing is a single Community as a logical extension of the ambitions of European Union heralded by the Single European Act. And this, as we never tire of pointing out, is a Community based on the union of peoples and the association of nation States pursuing common objectives and developing a European identity. Other alternatives may be advocated. The course to be pursued must be carefully examined. But the ultimate goal must be defined. I would point out that if the authors of the Treaty of Rome had merely adopted a pragmatic approach without indicating the ultimate goal, we would never have agreed to the advances which have led to the Community we know today and to the potential that it has for tomorrow. The same applies to economic and monetary union. Our vision of tomorrow's Community calls for a single currency as a sign of its ability to act, as the object and instrument of our ambition. Political union is in a similar situation. 18 At this stage of the argument, I will spare you a long digression on the future of national sovereignty. My view is that it can retain some substance only through the exercise of pooled sovereignty given the international balance of power and the almost mathematical need to combine national ambitions to cope with the scale of the challenges. Patriotism, one of our shared values, is bound to blossom as our nations enrich each other. Our nations are not being asked to sacrifice their history or their traditions. What they are being asked to do is to build on their synergies for purposes accepted by all. This is the political pact that must unite us. Then, and only then, can we usefully discuss the process which will lead us to a common defence policy. Foreign policy and defence policy A common defence policy will be meaningless unless it reflects two types of solidarity: unity of analysis and action in foreign policy and a reciprocal commitment to come to the aid of any Member State whose integrity is threatened. 19 On foreign policy, the current situation cannot continue. This has been made abundantly clear by the Gulf crisis. We see it every day in the absense of common and global thinking on matters affecting the Community's external relations. Now more than ever, economic action by the Community calls for political analysis before major decisions. This is borne out by the need felt by our Foreign Ministers to discuss Community and political cooperation aspects in one and the same forum. This has occurred on a number of occasions recently, although there is no appropriate institutional framework. The institutional dimension cannot be neglected even if, in the last analysis, progress presupposes strong political will based on consensus. That is why the Commission, in its draft Treaty, proposes a single centre to provide impetus and a single centre for discussion and action; and why it proposes that all provisions relating to external aspects - foreign policy, security, economic relations and development cooperation - should be brought together in one title of the Treaty. Coherence is essential if the pre-eminence of the political aspect is to be highlighted and if disparate, ill-prepared and insufficiently reasoned and considered action is to be avoided. 20 Obviously, precautions will have to be taken to avoid a forced march, which would only lead to internal crisis or impotence. It will be for the European Council, consisting of Heads of State and Government who are democratically answerable to their people, to agree on the essential interests they share and which they will agree to defend and promote together. Foreign Ministers would work within this framework. They would endeavour to produce a common analysis and then decide on action. In this area and for matters now covered by the Community, qualified majority voting would be an essential stimulant, the leaven of a Community in the making. Everything suggests that Foreign Ministers would use qualified majority voting with prudence and moderation, taking account of everyone's interests and the time needed to bring positions together. This has been the experience since the Single Act came into effect. You cannot ride roughshod over people's hearts or skimp on the time needed for better mutual understanding. As the dynamic of vital common interests gathers momentum, people will come to see the need for this missing ingredient - the means of defence, for the sake of national integrity, the values which nourish us, the solidarity which unites us and our responsibilities towards the rest of the world. This solidarity must be expressed in the Treaty and how better than by taking over Article V of the WEU Treaty and adjusting the wording as follows: 21 "If any of the Member States should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other Member States will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." Transition to a common defence policy As we have seen, implementation of a common foreign policy must be guided by a cautious, gradual approach. The same holds good for a common defence policy, for which specific parameters have to be taken into account. The persistence of the nuclear threat and the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons are undeniable facts. There is no point in discussing the role and the future of the French and British nuclear forces, for as long as it takes for a new world configuration to emerge. Nor can we discuss the issue of European defence without reference to reform of the Atlantic Alliance. On 1 December 1989, the US Secretary of State, James a Baker, raised vital questions in his very aptly entitled speech "A New Europe - A New Atlanticism - Architecture for a New Era". The Secretary of State opened up a very broad perspective: "Working from shared ideals and common values, we form a set of mutual challenges, in economics, in foreign policies, the environment, science, and a host of other fields. So it makes sense for us to fashion our responses together as a matter of common course". 22 I have chosen this passage to emphasize the fact that, over and above the defence issues dealt with in his speech, the Secretary of State was referring to all the fields potentially available for cooperation with America's European allies. Europe is expected to respond. The Transatlantic Declaration adopted last November does not constitute a full and adequate reply. The Declaration recalls common ideals and procedures for consultation, but does not tackle all aspects of joint discussions, any more than it resolves the inherent and many-faceted difficulties which confront Europeans with the unity of outlook and action of the United States. For this reason also, the unification of Europe is now more necessary than ever. Subject to these reservations, a common defence policy must be built on what already exists, that is to say, the Western European Union. Preliminary discussions within the Intergovernmental Conference have revealed broad agreement on this point. Member States differ, however, on the role of the WEU: should it be a forum for increased cooperation between the countries of Europe, a bridge to the Atlantic Alliance, or should it be a melting-pot for a European defence embedded in the Community, the second pillar of the Atlantic Alliance? 23 You will appreciate that the second option is only one compatible with my argument. It is the ultimate goal which separates the two approaches. There is no point in obscuring the discussion by dwelling for example on the fact that no more than nine of the Twelve are members of the WEU or on the situation within the Atlantic Alliance of countries such as Turkey, Norway or Iceland which are not members of the Community. We must stick to essentials. If we are to create a European Union, a lengthy process must be set in train to allow integration of the WEU and its "acquis" into the Community. By this I mean not only what it has achieved to date but any progress it may make in the future, more particularly as regards the formation of multinational forces or intervention units as two possible expressions of European unity. The proposal therefore is that, while allowing the three Member States which are not members of the WEU time to consider their situation, the new treaty should allow for common defence issues to be dealt with by the European Council and by joint Councils of Foreign and Defence Ministers. Little by little a framework for decision-making and action would be set up between the Community and the WEU. At the same time - and I will be coming back to this - a new Atlantic Alliance with redefined aims and new resources would come into being. 24 In proposing this outline, the Commission remains faithful to the guidelines set by the European Council in Rome last December, which compiled an initial list of issues of vital common interest in the field of security and defence: - arms control and disarmament - security matters covered by the CSCE and the UN - cooperation on the production, exportation and non-proliferation of arms. How can we act in these areas without defining tomorrow's defence policy, adapted to the risks of destruction and war? And once this policy has been defined, will we not need the means to implement it, other than by the involvement of a third party? All that remains then is to press on more resolutely with an arms research and production policy to maximize the cumulative benefits of a common market and a common policy. This cooperation could, of course, be organized in such a way as to allocate defence resources as efficiently as possible within the Atlantic Alliance. To underscore the gradual nature of this approach, I should perhaps make the point that in contrast to the proposed arrangement for a common foreign policy, decisions on the principle and implementation of a common defence policy would require unanimity. Moreover, to encourage the desired evolution, a Member State would, at its request, be released from the obligations resulting from such decisions. 25 The Atlantic Alliance and European defence There is no point in concealing the fact that these plans, even in outline, have caused concern across the Atlantic. It seems to me that the United States has stressed three demands: no internal bloc, continued globality of the allied response, no weakening of command structures. Let us look at each of these points in turn: It is in the interests of the Alliance that Europeans should speak with one voice. The existence of an internal bloc should not be a cause for concern. If it is, there are two possible interpretations. One implies rejection of the political integration of Europe, which would be unacceptable and in any event contrary to President Bush's stated wish that Europe should achieve political unity. The other implies that there are doubts about Europe's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. I feel sure that the eleven Member States which belong to the Alliance will have no difficulty in allaying such fears. A European Europe intends to confirm its attachment to the Alliance and its objectives and to shoulder a larger part of the burden thanks to a common defence policy. This, surely, is what the Americans have always wanted. Adjustment of the Alliance to the new geopolitical situation will make it possible to define, and hence maintain, a collective allied response on all matters coming under Article 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, this should be no bar to the Community determining its own course of action on matters outside the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty - following appropriate consultations of course. 26 As to command structures, they can not but be enhanced so as to ensure the credibility of the Alliance in the tasks assigned to it. Everyone knows that military operations cannot succeed unless they are supported by a coherent, effective infrastructure covering communications, intelligence, planning and controls. And to be frank, like it or not, the Western European Union in its new role will have to rely on the infrastructure mentioned earlier for a long time to come. As a difficult debate begins, this restatement of Europe's commitment and the adoption of a realistic approach to defence issues should go a long way to dispelling many ambiguities. * * * In conclusion, let me say that if we, as loyal partners, are prepared to concentrate on essentials, the only question that really matters is how we see tomorrow's world and what role we intend to play. Not only our role, but also the means of performing it. Our responsibility towards the new Europe, which we all want to develop into an area of harmonious relationships, of peace and freedom. 27 This is why a more integrated Community is equally necessary for the new Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. I have deliberately discussed the most sensitive aspects of a common foreign policy, and the most explosive aspects of a common defence policy. There is no point in seeking refuge in discussions about how we should proceed in an attempt to escape the basic issue of what we intend to do together. Once again History is at our door. We will be judged by the answer we supply to the simplest of questions: "What destiny are we proposing to the people of Europe?What destiny and what ambition?"