MEMO/09/32
Brussels, 28th January 2009
The most recent version of this MEMO is available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/cartels/overview/faqs_en.html
What is a cartel?
It is an illegal secret agreement concluded between competitors to fix prices, restrict supply and/or divide up markets. The agreement may take a wide variety of forms but often relates to sales prices or increases in such prices, restrictions on sales or production capacities, sharing out of product or geographic markets or customers, and collusion on the other commercial conditions for the sale of products or services.
Why are cartels harmful to consumers, businesses and to the economy in general?
Cartels shield participants from competition allowing them to charge higher prices and removing the pressure on them to improve the products they sell or find more efficient ways in which to produce them. It is the customers (companies and consumers) who foot the bill in terms of paying higher prices for lower quality and narrower choice. This not only makes consumers and businesses suffer but also adversely affects the competitiveness of the economy as a whole.
What legal basis underpins the Commission’s action to combat cartels?
Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community prohibits agreements and concerted practices between firms that distort competition within the Single Market. Fines of up to 10% of their worldwide turnover may be imposed on the guilty parties.
What happens to the proceeds from fines?
The amount of the fines is paid into the Community budget. The fines therefore help to finance the European Union and reduce the tax burden on individuals.
Does the Commission have the last word?
All cartel decisions by the Commission may be appealed against before the Court of First Instance (CFI) and then before the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg. They can, therefore, be closely scrutinised by these two courts, which are empowered to annul decisions in whole or in part and to reduce or increase fines, where this is deemed appropriate.
What is the European Commission’s leniency programme?
It encourages firms to provide the Commission with insider information on cartels. The first firm to do so is granted total immunity from fines. Other firms that follow suit may be granted a reduction in the amount of the fine. This policy is very effective in uncovering cartels but does not prevent the Commission from conducting investigations on its own initiative. For further information, see IP/06/1705, MEMO/06/469 and MEMO/06/470. Companies wishing to approach the Commission in order to benefit from the Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases should consult:
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.cfm
What practical steps has the Commission taken to step up action against cartels?
Since June 2005 an entire Directorate composed of six units (Directorate G, with a staff of around 70) in the Competition Directorate General has been involved exclusively in helping the Commission to detect and punish cartels.
What action is open to consumers and companies who feel that they have been victims of such illegal agreements?
Any person or firm affected by anti-competitive behaviour as described in this case may bring the matter before the courts of the Member States and seek damages. The case law of the Court and Council Regulation 1/2003 both confirm that in cases before national courts, a Commission decision is binding proof that the behaviour took place and was illegal. Even though the Commission has fined the companies concerned, damages may be awarded without these being reduced on account of the Commission fine. A White Paper on antitrust damages actions has been published (see IP/08/515 and MEMO/08/216). More information, including a citizens' summary of the White Paper, is available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html
What are the ten largest fines imposed by the Commission in cartel cases?
By company:
|
Firm
|
Fine (euros)
|
Year
|
|
Saint Gobain (IP/08/1685)
|
896 000 000
|
2008
|
|
ThyssenKrupp1 (IP/07/209)
|
479 669 850
|
2007
|
|
Hoffmann-La Roche AG (IP/01/1625)
|
462 000 000
|
2001
|
|
Siemens AG1 (IP/07/80)
|
396 562 500
|
2007
|
|
Pilkington (IP/08/1685)
|
370 000 000
|
2008
|
|
Sasol Limited1 (IP/08/1434)
|
318 200 000
|
2008
|
|
ENI SpA1 (IP/06/1647)
|
272 250 000
|
2006
|
|
Lafarge SA3 (IP/02/1744)
|
249 600 000
|
2002
|
|
BASF AG2 (IP/01/1625)
|
236 845 000
|
2001
|
|
Otis1 (IP/07/209)
|
224 932 950
|
2007
|
By sector:
|
Sector
|
Year
|
Total (euros)
|
|
Car Glass
|
2008
|
1 383 896 000
|
|
Elevators and escalators1
|
2007
|
992 312 200
|
|
Vitamins2
|
2001
|
790 515 000
|
|
Gas insulated switchgear1
|
2007
|
750 712 500
|
|
Paraffin waxes1
|
2008
|
676 011 400
|
|
Synthetic rubber (BR/ESBR)1
|
2006
|
519 050 000
|
|
Flat Glass1
|
2007
|
486 900 000
|
|
Plasterboard3
|
2002
|
458 520 000
|
|
Hydrogen peroxide1
|
2006
|
388 128 000
|
|
Acrylic glass1
|
2006
|
344 562 500
|
Fines imposed on cartels by the Commission since 2003:
|
Year
|
Sector covered by cartel
|
Number of undertakings subject to decision
|
Total fine (euros)
|
|
2009
|
Marine Hoses (IP/09/137)
|
6
|
131 510 000
|
|
2008
|
Car Glass (IP/08/1685)
|
4
|
1 383 896 000
|
|
2008
|
Bananas1 (IP/08/1509)
|
3
|
60 300 000
|
|
2008
|
Paraffin Waxes1 (IP/08/1434)
|
10
|
676 011 400
|
|
2008
|
Aluminium fluoride1 (IP/08/1007)
|
4
|
4 970 000
|
|
2008
|
Sodium chlorate1 (IP/08/917)
|
4
|
79 070 000
|
|
2008
|
International Removal Services1 (IP/08/415)
|
10
|
32 755 500
|
|
2008
|
Nitrile Butadiene Rubber (IP/08/78)
|
2
|
34 230 000
|
|
2007
|
Chloroprene Rubber1 (IP/07/1855)
|
6
|
247 635 000
|
|
2007
|
Flat glass1 (IP/07/1781)
|
4
|
486 900 000
|
|
2007
|
Professional videotape (IP/07/1725)
|
3
|
74 790 000
|
|
2007
|
Bitumen Spain1 (IP/07/1438)
|
5
|
183 651 000
|
|
2007
|
Hard Haberdashery: Fasteners1 (IP/07/1362)
|
7
|
328 644 000
|
|
2007
|
Dutch beer market1 (IP/07/509)
|
4
|
273 783 000
|
|
2007
|
Elevators and escalators1 (IP/07/209)
|
5
|
992 312 200
|
|
2007
|
Gas insulated switchgear1 (IP/07/80)
|
11
|
750 712 500
|
|
2006
|
Alloy surcharge (re-adoption)1 (IP/06/1851)
|
1
|
3 168 000
|
|
2006
|
Synthetic rubber (BR/ESBR)1 (IP/06/1647)
|
6
|
519 050 000
|
|
2006
|
Steel beams (re-adoption)1 (IP/06/1527)
|
1
|
10 000 000
|
|
2006
|
Copper fittings1 (IP/06/1222)
|
11
|
314 760 000
|
|
2006
|
Bitumen Netherlands1 (IP/06/1179)
|
14
|
266 717 000
|
|
2006
|
Acrylic Glass1 (IP/06/698)
|
5
|
344 562 500
|
|
2006
|
Hydrogen Peroxide1 (IP/06/560)
|
9
|
388 128 000
|
|
2005
|
Rubber chemicals2 (IP/05/1656)
|
4
|
75 860 000
|
|
2005
|
Industrial bags1 (IP/05/1508)
|
16
|
290 710 000
|
|
2005
|
Italian tobacco1 (IP/05/1315)
|
6
|
56 052 000
|
|
2005
|
Industrial thread1 (IP/05/1140)
|
11
|
43 497 000
|
|
2005
|
Monochloroacetic acid1 (IP/05/61)
|
4
|
216 910 000
|
|
2004
|
Choline chloride3 (IP/04/1454)
|
6
|
57 884 000
|
|
2004
|
Haberdashery products: needles3 (IP/04/1313)
|
3
|
47 000 000
|
|
2004
|
Spanish tobacco1 (IP/04/1256)
|
9
|
20 038 000
|
|
2004
|
French beer (IP/04/1153)
|
2
|
2 500 000
|
|
2004
|
Sodium gluconate (IP/01/1355)
|
1
|
19 040 000
|
|
2004
|
Copper plumbing tubes1 (IP/04/1065)
|
9
|
222 291 100
|
|
2003
|
Industrial pipes1 (IP/03/1746)
|
3
|
78 730 000
|
|
2003
|
Organic peroxides2 (IP/03/1700)
|
6
|
69 531 000
|
|
2003
|
Carbon and graphite products3 (IP/03/1651)
|
6
|
101 440 000
|
|
2003
|
Sorbates2 (IP/03/1330)
|
5
|
113 650 000
|
|
2003
|
Viandes bovines4 (IP/03/479)
|
6
|
12 690 000
|
1 Appeal lodged before the CFI
2
Following judgment by the CFI
3 Appeal lodged
before the CoJ
4 Following judgment by CoJ