IP/07/1725
Brussels, 20 November 2007
Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes said: "This decision sends two warnings to companies engaging in cartel activities: first, the Commission can prosecute cartels effectively even without prompts from immunity applicants, and second, obstructing a Commission's antitrust investigation leads to severe penalties."
The Commission started an investigation on its own initiative with surprise inspections, carried out at the premises of Sony's, Fuji's and Maxell's European subsidiaries in May 2002. The inspections proved particularly successful as abundant evidence of cartel activities was found. However, a Sony employee refused to answer oral questions asked by the Commission's inspectors, in breach of Sony's obligation to answer, while another Sony employee was found to have shredded documents during the inspection.
Fuji and, at a later stage, Maxell co-operated with the Commission and submitted additional evidence. Sony only acknowledged its involvement after receiving the Statement of Objections (see MEMO/07/109).
The cartel
The cartel covered the two most popular professional videotape formats at the time of the infringement: Betacam SP and Digital Betacam, which in 2001 totalled annual sales of some €115 million in the European Economic Area (EEA). TV stations and independent producers of TV programmes and advertising films are the main customers of professional videotapes.
Sony, Fuji and Maxell, with a combined share of more than 85% of the professional video tape market, organised three successful rounds of price increases and endeavoured to stabilise prices whenever an increase was not possible. They also regularly monitored the implementation of the price agreements.
The evidence uncovered describes in detail eleven meetings during which Sony, Fuji and Maxell discussed and agreed prices and/or exchanged sensitive commercial information as well as continuous contacts intended to monitor the implementation of their cartel agreements.
Fines
This is the first Commission antitrust decision where the 2006 Guidelines on Fines have been applied (see IP/06/857 and MEMO/06/256). Under the new method, fines better reflect the overall economic significance of the infringement as well as the share of each company involved.
|
Name and location of undertaking
|
Reduction under the Leniency Notice
(%)
|
Reduction under the Leniency Notice
(€)
|
Fine*
(€)
|
|
Sony (Japan)
|
None
|
None
|
47 190 000
|
|
Fuji (Japan)
|
40%
|
8 800 000
|
13 200 000
|
|
Maxell (Japan)
|
20%
|
3 600 000
|
14 400 000
|
|
TOTAL
|
|
|
74 790 000
|
(*) Legal entities within the undertaking may be held jointly and severally liable for the whole or part of the fine imposed.
Action for damages
Any person or firm affected by anti-competitive behaviour as described in this case may bring the matter before the courts of the Member States and seek damages, submitting elements of the published decision as evidence that the behaviour took place and was illegal. Even though the Commission has fined the companies concerned, damages may be awarded without these being reduced on account of the Commission fine. A Green Paper on private enforcement has been published (see IP/05/1634 and MEMO/05/489).
For more information on the Commission’s action against cartels, see MEMO/07/473.