IP/04/862

Bruxelles, le 7 juillet 2004

Échange de droits d'émissions: la Commission autorise l'entrée de plus de 5000 installations industrielles sur le marché des émissions en janvier prochain

La Commission européenne a accepté huit plans nationaux d'allocation de quotas d'émission de CO₂. Cinq plans (ceux du Danemark, de l'Irlande, des Pays-Bas, de la Slovénie et de la Suède) ont été acceptés sans réserve. Les trois autres, ceux de l'Autriche, de l'Allemagne et du Royaume-Uni ont été approuvés sous réserve de modifications techniques. Ces modifications assureront leur acceptation automatique, sans autre évaluation par la Commission. Les plans nationaux d'allocation de quotas indiquent le nombre de quotas d'émissions de CO₂ que les États membres entendent allouer aux installations industrielles grosses consommatrices d'énergie, afin qu'elles puissent participer à l'échange de droits d'émission à partir de janvier 2005. La décision d'aujourd'hui autorise la participation de plus de 5000 installations, sur un total estimé à 12 000 dans l'UE 25. Elles recevront plus de 40% du total de quotas dont la mise en circulation est prévue. Le régime d'échange de droits d'émission dans l'UE permettra d'obtenir que les émissions de gaz à effet de serre dans les secteurs de l'énergie et de l'industrie soient réduites au moindre coût pour l'économie et aidera l'UE et ses États membres à atteindre leurs objectifs d'émissions aux termes du protocole de Kyoto de 1997.

La Commissaire à l'environnement, Margot Wallström, a déclaré: "La décision d'aujourd'hui constitue une étape cruciale car elle ouvre la voie pour près de la moitié des installations qui participeront au système paneuropéen d'échange des droits d'émission. Cette décision démontre notre engagement dans notre politique liée au changement climatique, et atteste que nous sommes prêts à lancer le système d'échange des droits d'émission en janvier prochain, comme prévu."

Évaluation de la première série de plans

Les plans nationaux d'allocation de quotas indiquent la quantité de quotas d'émission de CO₂ que les États membres prévoient d'allouer pour la période d'échange 2005-2007, et leur répartition entre les différentes installations. La Commission doit évaluer ces plans selon onze critères d'allocation énumérés dans une annexe de la directive sur l'échange des droits d'émission^[1]. Les critères les plus importants concernent l'intégration du plan dans la stratégie nationale générale de réalisation de l'objectif de l'État membre au titre du protocole de Kyoto.

Les autres critères ont trait à la non-discrimination, la concurrence dans l'UE, les règles relatives aux aides d'État et les aspects techniques. La Commission peut accepter un plan en totalité ou en partie. En cas d'acceptation sans réserve du plan, l'État membre peut arrêter la décision finale d'allocation.

Les huit plans évalués satisfont à la plupart des critères. La Commission a demandé des modifications dans deux cas de figure:

• lorsque le volume des quotas pour la période d'échange 2005-2007 ne permet pas à l'État membre d'atteindre son objectif Kyoto au cours de la première période d'engagement (2008-2012);
• lorsqu'un État membre envisage d'effectuer des "ajustements ex post" sur les allocations, c'est-à-dire s'il prévoit de redistribuer des quotas entre les sociétés participantes au cours de la période 2005-2007. Cela créerait en effet des incertitudes pour les entreprises et pèserait sur le fonctionnement du marché d'échange de quotas.

Dans chaque cas où des modifications sont nécessaires, la Commission a indiqué les mesures à prendre par l'État membre afin de rendre le plan acceptable.

La Commission a décidé d'entamer des procédures d'infraction contre plusieurs États membres qui n'ont pas encore soumis leurs plans ni/ou transposé la directive sur l'échange des droits d'émission. Ce point fait l'objet d'un communiqué séparé. (IP/04/861 et MEMO/04/44)

Quantité de quotas et nombre d'installations

Voir également:

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission_plans.htm

Annex

Information about individual decisions:

Austria: Plan accepted with technical changes required. If Austria implements the technical changes by 30 September 2004, all companies qualify automatically for trading. Austria has reduced the total number of allowances by over 0,3 million over the period to correct for a technical aspect.

The problem that the Commission identified in Austria's plan, as it stands today, is that Austria intends to re-allocate allowances from plants that close down during the 2005-2007 trading period. This constitutes a so-called "ex-post adjustment" to the allocation and contravenes criterion (10).

Denmark: Plan accepted with no changes required following amendments by Denmark in June. All companies qualify for trading.

Germany: Plan accepted with technical changes required. All companies qualify automatically for trading.

These are the problems that the Commission identified in Germany's plan:

1. Germany intends to adjust the allocated amount per installation during the 2005-2007 trading period to make up for potential differences between the situation based on which allowances were calculated, and the actual situation during the trading period. Inter alia, Germany intends to adjust, or possibly adjust, the allocated amount per installation during the trading period in case existing installations have annual emissions lower than 40% of base period emissions. Another case in which Germany considers possible adjustments is if installations benefiting from the CHP bonus allocation (bonus for combined heating and power production) produce less power in CHP-mode than during the base period. Such adjustments constitute "ex-post adjustments" to the allocation and contravene criterion (10).
2. Germany intends to potentially adjust the allocation of allowances to new entrants. Member States may establish a new entrant reserve to allocate allowances to new installations that start operating during this period. However, the Member State must decide upfront how the amount of allowances to be allocated to new entrants will be calculated, and it cannot change the methodology later on. Germany's intention to potentially adjust the allocation of allowances to new entrants represents another type of ex-post adjustment. It would discriminate new entrants compared to other installations where the Directive does not permit any ex-post adjustments. It therefore contravenes criterion (5) which requires non-discrimination in accordance with the Treaty.

Ireland: Plan accepted without changes, following amendments by Ireland in late June and early July. All companies qualify for trading. Ireland has reduced the total number of allowances by over 0,5 million over the period, has committed to make operational steps toward the purchase of Kyoto credits by November 2004, and has changed the rules that would have allowed for ex-post adjustments to the allocation.

The Netherlands: Plan accepted without changes, following amendments by the Netherlands in late June. All companies qualify for trading. The Netherlands has reduced the total number of allowances by 9 million over the period, and has changed the rules that would have allowed for ex-post adjustments to the allocation by giving left-overs in the new entrants reserve to existing installations.

Slovenia: Plan accepted without changes. All companies qualify for trading.

Sweden: Plan accepted without changes, following amendments made by Sweden in late June. All companies qualify for trading. Sweden has changed the access rules to its new entrant reserve.

UK: Plan accepted with technical changes required. If UK implements the technical changes by 30 September 2004, all companies qualify automatically for trading. The Commission welcomes the UK plan and considers it to be a sound basis for further discussion

These are the problems that the Commission identified in the UK's plan:

1. The United Kingdom has not provided sufficient information on the manner in which new entrants will be able to begin participating in the trading scheme. This contravenes criterion (6) on provisions for new entrants.
2. The United Kingdom’s plan includes a list of installations to be covered, but the list does not include installations in Gibraltar. The list required by criterion (10) is therefore incomplete.

General approach:

The Commission has requested changes to plans, both prior to the conclusion of the assessments and in the assessment decisions, in two cases of general importance:

1. Excessive allocation - if the allocation chosen by a Member State for the 2005-2007 trading period jeopardises the achievement of its Kyoto target. This contravenes criterion (1), which requires consistency with each Member States' path to Kyoto; and
2. Ex-post adjustments - if a Member State intends to make so-called "ex-post adjustments" to allocations. This means it plans to intervene in the market after the allocation is done, and redistribute the issued allowances among the participating companies during the 2005-2007 trading period.

Ex-post adjustments would disrupt the market and create uncertainty for companies. For example, if a company faced the possibility that the government might take away allowances if it reduced its emissions, it would be hesitant to reduce them in the first place, and/or it would hesitate to sell its surplus allowances. If (other) companies at the same time thought they could receive additional allowances for free from their governments, they would pursue this route rather than turn to the market and buy allowances.

Ex-post adjustments contravene criterion (10), which envisages that a Member State has to decide up-front, before the trading period starts, about the quantity of allowances allocated to each installation’s operator. (Article 11 of the Directive would also be contravened, but this is not the legal basis for the rejection.) This initial allocation decision may not be re-visited. This means no allowances may be re-allocated by adding to, or subtracting from, the quantity determined for each operator on the basis of a government decision or a pre-determined rule after the allocation decision.

^[1] Directive 2003/87/CE.